AFP Winter 2017/2018

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

WINTER 17/18

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*no Rohingya

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

editorial board

from the editor

Aliya Somani ‘20 Head of Publishing

Kevin Agostonelli ‘19 Deputy Head of Publishing

Shea Minter ‘19 Lead Data Developer

Max Molot ‘19 Managing Editor Europe & Canada

Maria Jerez ‘19 Managing Editor Latin America

Nicole Don ‘19 Managing Editor Middle East

Marina Finley ‘19 Managing Editor Asia Pacific

Yasmin AlKhowaiter ‘20 Managing Editor Africa

Dear readers, After a year-long hiatus, AFP is back with a new look. As Princeton’s only undergraduate foreign affairs publication, it is easy to fall into complacency and disregard the need to continuously innovate the way we work.

However, AFP’s short sabbatical gave us the opportunity to ask a crucial question about our scholarly direction - what can we do that others cannot?

The first answer is coverage on overlooked global issues. In this Winter edition, firstyear Misha Tseitliani ‘21 explores the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia - a region unknown to many. AFP will position itself as a publication committed to inclusive reporting.

The second is an attempt to articulate comprehensible numbers through engaging visualization. Over the coming issues, our new data development team will begin to demonstrate how domestic and international concerns should be understood statistically.

Both of these platforms will ensure AFP remains relevant and timely.

This edition presents some fascinating perspectives from our new contributors. Do enjoy.

Jason Wee ‘20 Editor-in-Chief

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY is a student-written, student-run publication based in Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. The magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions.

No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the sponsors, Princeton University, or AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. This publication strives to use all Creative Common licensed images. Please contact AFP if you feel any rights have been infringed.

All correspondence may be directed to:

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1212 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu

WINTER 2017/18

table of contents

Feature: Prospect Theory and The Psychology of The Rohingya Crisis

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HARRIET WANG ‘18

The Changing Face of Post-Soviet Central Asia

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The State of Filipino Overseas Workers

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The Annexation That No One Talks About

9

LEORA EISENBERG ‘20

KATHRYN WEN ‘20

MISHA TSEITLIANI ‘21

The Rise Of The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

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ELSA WELSHOFER ‘18

Kurdistan: Still Waiting SULLIVAN HUGHES ‘21

Mr. Trump, Tear Down This Wall!

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STEPHEN BORK ‘19

LEO LI ‘20

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Follow The Stars

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Rohingya refugees fleeing to Bangladesh (2017). UNICEF.

FEATURE: PROSPECT THEORY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

Harriet Wang ‘18

On August 25, 2017, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) militants attacked a series of Burmese police and military outposts in Burma’s restive Rakhine province.

The Burmese military, which operates independently from the civilian government and controls the national police and border forces as well, responded by launching “clearance operations” that have forced an estimated 620,000 Rohingya from their homes in what the U.S. recently labeled “ethnic cleansing”. Other than this classification, the U.S. has yet to punish, or even withdraw support from, the Burmese civilian government for its noticeable unwillingness to even denounce the military’s rampage. This seemingly disgraceful inaction can be better understood by analyzing it through the psychological lens of prospect theory.

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One of prospect theory’s fundamental principles is that people who perceive they are operating in a domain of gains are strongly risk-averse. As Burma haltingly steps towards democracy after over fifty years of military rule, proponents of a democratic Burma perceive they are operating in a domain of previously unthinkable gains. Therefore, many American policymakers worry that harsh criticisms or actions directed against the Burmese government over the egregious persecution of the Rohingya – a campaign which is depressingly popular with the Burmese public – risks forfeiting all the fragile progress Burma has made towards democracy. They fear that failing to support the civilian government will destabilize the economy, which would give the military an excuse to either launch another coup in the name of restoring economic security or destroy the democratic-government’s chances at winning re-election against the military’s proxy political party, based upon the government’s inability to deliver the prized “democratic

dividend.” Even if the military is unable to regain formal control over the country, an American abandonment of the Burmese government is likely to push Burma’s civilian leaders away from democracy and into the authoritarian orbit of China. These are losses which those invested in a democratic Burma are unwilling to risk.

In contrast, the Burmese military is operating in a perceived domain of losses which, according to prospect theory, typically renders people risk-seeking. As an entity which is still vilified by the U.S., and which has lost control to a civilian government, the military, through its persecution of the Rohingya, has demonstrated a willingness to risk severe international sanctions, increased radicalism, or even, in an admittedly very unlikely scenario, foreign military intervention, in order expand its power. Much of the military’s current legitimacy is staked on its claim to be the protector of a Buddhist and prosperous Burma.

Such claim is burnished when the military persecutes the Muslim Rohingya, who are commonly derided as Bangladeshi economic interlopers intent upon stealing the country’s wealth and heritage. Sadly, this craven ploy has elevated the military to its most popular point in the post-junta era.

The plight of the Rohingya is particularly desperate since those generally inclined to take risks to help them, such as the U.S. and even the Pope, are adopting the risk-averse approach of attempting to retain gains in other sectors in Burma, while the military and others who have lost in those sectors hope that persecuting the Rohingya will help them regain their former glory. For this reason, persecution of the Rohingya will likely continue to be a scarlet stain on the moral fabric of the world.

WINTER 2017/18

Leora Eisenberg ‘20

Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev visiting Kyrgyzstan in 2017. Wikipedia Commons.

THE CHANGING FACE OF POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

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Located on the part of a map that nobody looks at, postthe Soviet Union, although this is likely because of the Soviet Central Asia is plagued by an egregious lack of massive cult of personality implemented at the fall of the democracy and disregard for human rights. Of only five USSR, replacing decades of Lenin-worship. states, the leaders of two (Tajikistan and Kazakhstan) have been at the helm of their nations since the fall of the Combined with nostalgia and a lingering Soviet framework USSR in 1991. The recently deceased former president of comes a natural tendency toward a Soviet system and Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, for all intents and purposes, closeness with Russia. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, ruled Uzbekistan since the Soviet Union fell until his death Russian is a national language, on par with Kazakh and in 2016. Turkmenistan, known to many as “the North Kyrgyz. It was an official language in Tajikistan until Korea you didn’t know about,” has only had two leaders 2009, still retains official status as the “language since 1991, one of whom named the days of the of interethnic communication,” and is used week after his relatives. In Kyrgyzstan, the last as a lingua franca among the of the five, only 34.93% of country’s elite. For upward the population believe that mobility all across Central Asia “leaders should not favor — not just Tajikistan — one their own family or group.” must learn Russian. Further, Kazakhstan With all of this in mind, it millions of Central Asians come as appears that democracy and migrant workers to Russia, a close freedom don’t have much of a ally, requiring knowledge of both the Kyrgyzstan future in Central Asia. language and culture. When the author Uzbekistan lived in Dushanbe, Tajikistan’s capital, in On its face, this statement makes summer 2016, she used to regularly walk Tajikistan Turkmenistan sense. Having been tightly wound past a large billboard of the Tajik president, into Soviet policy until the USSR’s Emomali Rahmon, shaking hands with dissolution, the “Stans,” as they are Vladimir Putin. colloquially called, have only ever realistically known a Soviet framework of government. Four of the Despite this nostalgia for and mimicking of the USSR, five first (and, in some cases, only) leaders of these postthere is still hope. The face of Central Asia is changing and Soviet countries were the Presidents, Prime Ministers there is room for democracy. For one, the nations are finally or First Secretaries of their republics, meaning that they cooperating with one another, which, up until recently, was had gone through Communist Party ranks and requisite unheard of. Because of Soviet border divisions, groups of Party education. Some states, particularly the non-oilone ethnic population (e.g. Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, etc.) producing ones, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have have historically ended up within the borders of a country empirically shown high levels of nostalgia for the USSR, not their own. Border conflicts have contributed to frosty which makes sense given that they were, in some ways, relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as on the “receiving end” of Soviet policy. This phenomenon, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In an effort to move beyond however, is not present in Kazakhstan, as it is an oilthis, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have finally opened direct producing giant—and is now able to reap the benefits of flights between their two capitals for the first time in 25 its natural resources thanks to previously unfathomable years, and the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border was reopened, more capitalist policies introduced by President Nursultan or less, for the first time since 2010. Cooperation of all Nazarbayev. Turkmenistanis also show little nostalgia for kinds between the countries is increasing, largely in part

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

due to the policies of the new Uzbek president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who is also to thank for the thawing of relations with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Oppressed under former President Islam Karimov’s policies and cult of personality, Uzbekistan is now making steps toward democracy. Mirziyoyev has allowed for more (albeit not nearly complete) freedom of speech, foreign investment, and positive interaction with neighbors.

While it’s too early to say that the region has definitively changed as a result of these new policies, they are certainly a step in the right direction, especially when combined with Kyrgyzstan’s recent free elections.

For the first time since 1991, a Kyrgyz leader, Sooroonbay Jenenbekov, had been elected with only 55% of the vote, which, when contrasted with Mirziyoyev’s 89% and Kazakhstani Nazarbayev’s 98%, appears at least somewhat democratic. Jenenbekov was, however, virtually appointed by the outgoing president, Almazbek Atambayev (who, notably, stepped down after one term); there are also accusations of vote-buying and media bias. Although the recent Kyrgyz elections may herald a new era for Central Asia, we cannot speak too soon. Three “Stans” are experiencing little to no liberalization whatsoever, and experts cannot necessarily hope for political change through osmosis. Given Mirziyoyev’s collaborative efforts, however, it is possible that new policies of liberalization and democratization will spread. With that, the United States has all the more reason to be invested in Central Asia, particularly in light of the terrorist threat facing the region.

After the recent terrorist attack in New York by Uzbek national Sayfullo Saipov, the United States has become more aware of the trend of Central Asian terrorism.

Saipov is not the first terrorist to have recently come out of Uzbekistan: the perpetrator of the Stockholm attack was also Uzbek. Given that the country has clamped down on religious education, one would assume that radicalization was to be expected, but both men appear to have been radicalized abroad. The United States is fighting against terror and would find a logical ally in slowly-liberalizing Uzbekistan, in whose best interests it would be to protect its nationals from radicalization at home and abroad.

This is all in addition to the region’s location; given its proximity to Pakistan and Afghanistan, all Central Asian nations have to fight terrorism on a regular basis, and would benefit from American support. If Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are truly interested in democracy in addition to their “war on terror,” they would find a natural ally in the United States.

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The US has never prioritized Central Asian democracy,

but has expressed more interest post-9/11, primarily out of national security interests. In 2010, the United States gave Kyrgyzstan alone $82 million in the name of “government and civil society,” an admittedly trivial amount in comparison to the money spent on neighboring Afghanistan. However, given the region’s reliance on wealthy, neighboring China and historic ally Russia for guidance and cooperation, such an alliance might not extend far beyond cooperation regarding the “war on terror.” Many of these nations participate primarily in high-level, bilateral agreements because they don’t have the resources or connections to potential partners, like the United States, for larger-scale, multilateral ones.

Further, organizations like Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA), which have previously given notable aid to Central Asia, will now be seriously affected

by President Trump’s proposed budget cuts, which would cut off aid to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, uppermiddle income countries, and decrease certain budgets for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This would limit the United States’ ability to cooperate with these nations on anti-terrorism efforts and the promotion of democracy, opening the door to ready aid from Russia and China whose notions of civil society differ from those of the US. With aging presidents in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, the two nations may soon open themselves up to liberalization, just as Uzbekistan did following the death (and consequent replacement) of President Islam Karimov. New presidents will likely not have gone through Soviet ranks and will, thus, have a different outlook on political power — and perhaps even cooperation with the United States.

Whether the United States increases cooperation with Central Asia, however, is a different story. While the benefits of doing so have been made more obvious following the Manhattan attack, President Trump’s reduction of foreign aid and general lack of involvement in Central Asian politics will likely ensure that relations between United States and the “Stans” doesn’t extend far beyond anti-terrorism efforts. Geographically closer allies will probably seize the opportunity to support Central Asian development, but not in the ways the United States would hope.

That said, one can hold out hope for Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Neither is a true democracy, but recent developments inspire hope in analysts and onlookers. If democracy is truly a goal that these states wish to pursue, they may forge relations with the United States of their own accord in an effort to benefit from American aid. In the meantime, however, one can only hope for a regime change.

WINTER 2017/18

Protester at Victoria Park, Hong Kong (2007) Wikipedia Commons.

THE STATE OF FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS This is likely a consequence of the unique way in which globalization has manifested itself on the island nation.

While globalization in the context of developed countries such as the United States usually refers to the expansion of business overseas and use of cheaper foreign resources, Filipino globalization has largely taken shape with the practice of labor exportation. Motivated by a stagnant economy, high unemployment, and increasing demand for labor in developed countries at the time, the Philippine government began to encourage the outflow of labor in the 1970s.

Since then, the number of Filipino citizens engaging in contract work abroad has rapidly increased; over two million Filipinos are currently deployed to work overseas.

Indeed, the practice of labor exportation has become a crucial part of the Philippines’ economy. For instance, up to ninety percent of a typical family’s income depends on remittances—portions of a migrant worker’s salary sent back to their home country. These remittances compose a significant portion (10%) of the Philippines’ GDP, according to World Bank data; in comparison, remittances make up only 0.7% of global GDP. Thus, globalization in the Philippines has led to a significant shift of labor away from the domestic market.

However, its implications are not just limited to a migration of the labor force. In practice, globalization and labor exportation have enabled the exploitation of Filipino migrant workers in several ways. In order to encourage its new labor exportation policy, in 1982, the Philippine government established the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to act as a “broker” and match prospective Filipino migrant workers to their foreign employers. The agency was meant to facilitate both the process of finding a job and obtaining entry to the foreign countries, which typically limit the number of immigrants they allow; it was soon followed by a number of private brokering agencies that similarly recruited workers for overseas contract work (after which the POEA adopted a more regulatory rather than recruiting role). These agencies contributed greatly to the increasing migration of Filipino workers abroad, but ultimately provided the framework for the exploitation of Filipino laborers.

A case study by the Justice Centre Hong Kong clearly illustrates the extent to which brokering organizations can exploit migrant workers. The worker, a young Filipino woman, decides to become a migrant worker in order to support her family and uses a broker to help arrange a job overseas in Hong Kong. Because she doesn’t have sufficient money to cover the costs of securing her job, she enters a loan agreement with her broker in order to finance her move. Prior to leaving for Hong Kong, she spends time in a recruitment training facility, where her ID and passport are confiscated and she is physically and

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A recent study by the Justice Centre Hong Kong revealed that ninety-five percent of migrant workers in the city, many of whom are laborers from the Philippines, show signs of labor exploitation (see graph).

Kathryn Wen ‘20

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

its policy of exportation of labor as a resource, the implication that laborers are commodities that can be sold or traded to increase firm profits is further cemented.

By depersonalizing labor in this way, capitalist firms are more likely to engage in the “profit-orientated trading of people” without consideration of migrant workers’ rights.

Migrant workers in Hong Kong regularly work upwards of seventy hours a week and yet are paid less than half the minimum wage of domestic workers.

So, how should we approach the issue of exploitation of Filipino migrant workers? Clearly, globalization’s manifestations both as labor exportation and capitalist firms’ pursuit of cheaper foreign resources have contributed greatly to labor exploitation of migrant workers. To suggest that nations reverse globalization is ludicrous, yet what can be done to limit its negative effects on the Filipino labor market? sexually abused. After these experiences, she is no longer interested in working abroad, yet still feels compelled to go because of her debts. Upon arriving in Hong Kong to start her new job, she discovers that her job and living conditions are much worse than had been promised in her contract, but because she is indebted to her broker, she is unable to terminate her contract and return to the Philippines.

Though this case seems extreme, the conditions faced by this worker are remarkably consistent across Filipino migrant workers—unsurprising given the conditions of the migrant labor market. Overseas contract work and the potential for remittance income is extremely alluring for many Filipinos, given the lack of stable job prospects within the local economy, so brokering organizations face heavy demand from Filipino workers for a very limited number of migrant jobs. This puts these organizations in a unique position of power from which they can take advantage of the desperation of prospective migrant workers.

Exploitation becomes even more of an issue when we consider the commodification of labor. Globalization from the perspective of developed nations, such as the United States, largely consists of capitalist firms taking advantage of cheaper foreign resources. Among these resources is labor.

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However, firms’ focus on decreasing costs of production through cheap labor reduces laborers to mere commodities. In the case of the Philippines, with

Ultimately, action should be taken both by the Philippine government and by the governments of the countries that employ Filipino migrant workers. In order to reduce levels of exploitation of Filipino migrant workers, the Philippine government will need to play a more active regulatory role with regards to overseas employment.

Manipulative brokers contribute greatly to the trafficking and exploitation problems that currently plague migrant workers. Part of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s responsibility as the regulator of the migrant labor market is to protect Filipino workers against abuse and discourage illegal recruitment, which it attempts by requiring licenses for brokering organizations.

However, in order to limit brokers’ exploitation of Filipino laborers, the POEA should also regularly investigate brokers’ recruitment practices and hold them responsible for violations of migrant workers’ rights.

On the part of countries like the United States, firms that recruit migrant workers should not only carefully consider the brokers through which they hire, but also examine the conditions in which their employees work and avoid the commoditization of labor. Such changes could be key to reducing labor exploitation of Filipino workers in our globalized world.

WINTER 2017/18

THE ANNEXATION THAT NO ONE TALKS ABOUT Misha Tseitliani ‘21

Putin and Khajimba at press conference post talks, Pitsunda (2017) Wikipedia Commons.

According to the Georgian Creation myth, on the day that God distributed land to the peoples of the world, the Georgians had been feasting, and thus were left out. The next day, they pleaded to God for land. Pitying their plight, he gave them the only land left, which he had saved for himself.

The Abkhazian and Ossetian conflicts have a deep and complex history, but its modern roots trace back to 1993, when these republics declared independence from Georgia. This war saw the creation of a de-facto independent Abkhazia and SO, who maintained their independence with Russia’s support. The 2008 RussoGeorgian War expanded the territory of these republics; the West remained silent, and the republics secured a small degree of international recognition, with important symbolic and diplomatic implications. Since then, their borders have expanded more thanks to support from Russia.

Because Russia is the sole benefactor of these republics, Raul Khajimba of Abkhazia and Leonid Tibiloy are zealous Putin supporters. They receive large stipends directly from

the Kremlin, protection by Russian troops who patrol their borders and ward off international influence. To engage internationally, Ossetian and Abkhazian citizens use Russian passports to travel abroad. Though Georgia extends the offer of citizenship to all these citizens living in its claimed territory, for Abkhazian and Ossetian citizens, acceptance of this offer is taboo. Administratively, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are a world apart from Georgia; both have their own political leadership and military forces.

Georgia maintains a purely symbolic government in exile for Abkhazia, while delegating representation for SO in its parliament for purely aesthetic reasons. Despite this, local governments take the lead in discussions for bilateral forums, some moderately successful like those resolving issues of water allocation, citizens relocation, and other diplomatic situations. One of these was the recent Ossetian seizure of additional territory, pushing deeper into Georgia and taking control of farmland and inching towards a transnational highway and international oil pipeline, dealing a major blow to Georgia’s international interests.

Another major problem that has resulted in war is the changing demographic of both Georgia, especially within the de-facto republics. Before Abkhazia’s independence, it was only 49% ethnic Abkhaz; Ossetia, too, was not majority Ossetian. However, after continued conflict, modern-

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Though much has changed since those times, the attitudes of the story are very much alive. Today, the land officially recognized as Georgia is home to two de-facto independent states: Abkhazia and South Ossetia (SO). For decades, there has been a tense conflict between Georgia and its breakaway regions, who currently exist solely thanks to Russia’s support. However, problems from the 1993 and 2008 wars remain: the conflicts exist in limbo, adhering to a stalemate which leaves all parties wanting more.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

day Ossetia and Abkhazia consist of only their respective ethnic groups along with Russians, while most indigenous Georgians have fled as internally displaced persons due to the intense animosity they face in these regions. The IDP problem has proved a major sticking point in negotiations, with many of these refugees’ former residences abandoned and uninhabited, there is a significant economic strain that prevents their full integration. Thus, the wounds of the war remain fresh; due to the information blackout, it is impossible to say whether this is deliberate ethnic targeting or simply a coincidence.

Georgia’s international prestige has had mixed effects. Its interest in Western institutions like the EU and NATO is never fully reciprocated, but an undying commitment confers some degree of protection. Specifically, its territorial conflicts have driven Georgia towards NATO to secure its borders and protect itself against a perceived existential threat. At the same time, due to tensions with Russia, the country continues to lose hold in what used to be its largest export market, seeking the EU to maintain economic vitality and attracting foreign businesses with little red tape. However, the conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia make this impossible. If accepted, Georgia would the first EU member nation with an ongoing conflict and border dispute. This also excludes any NATO membership due to the mutual defense clause, which requires all members defend an attacked member. Thus, the conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia, while they drive Georgian interest in Western institutions, make membership unsustainable.

Georgia’s population loss is another problem that has resulted from this conflict. Though home to five million in 1991, today the figure is slightly under four million, a legacy of the 1993 and 2008 wars. Many Georgians now go abroad due to economic stagnation and fears of security concerns: an unsustainable situation. Fields go uncultivated, classrooms unfilled, and its potential, untapped because of this population decline, much of which stems from the continuing conflict. Economically

and socially, then, the de-facto republics have threatened both their own and Georgia’s ability to integrate.

The most recent problem that has resulted comes from SO’s border expansion. Due to the lack of recognition of SO and Abkhazia, their existence relies solely on force and foreign support; this also means there are no officiallydefined borders. Russian and Ossetian forces recently took advantage of this fact by pushing the border fence further into Georgia, expelling dozens of farmers who lived on the Georgian plots of land, and further harming the nation’s vitality. This has consequences for Ossetia as well, making resource cooperation less likely, as evidenced through recent interactions in the Joint Control Commission, JCC, or 4-party working group. This border expansion has had much more severe consequences, however, coming under a mile away from the E-60 international highway and the Baku-Supsa international oil pipeline that provides to Turkey and Europe. All these developments signify only one thing: the conflict is worsening and looks to continue deteriorating.

Russian policies towards incorporating Abkhazia and Ossetia are relatively simple to understand. Russia aspires to create dependence, first through economic aid, then through international access by providing passports and resources for leaders and their citizens to interact globally, and finally though monopolizing the security sector to the point where Russian troops outnumber other parties.

Recently, Russia has taken the next step launching an agreement known as the Agreement on Alliance and Integration (AAI) with both Abkhazia and SO. The details of this deal represent a de-facto annexation and a critical lens into the Russian philosophy to incorporate these republics into their national space.

The AAI, when introduced in 2014, aimed to integrate the agencies of Abkhazia, SO, and Russia by 2017. This integration would leave no sector of the public untouched; this has led many international observers to accuse

% ETHNIC BREAKDOWN OF SOUTH OSSETIA, CENSUS 100 90 80 70 60

Ossetians

50

Georgians

40

Russians

30

Armenians

20

Jews

10

10

0

Others 1926

1939

1959

1970

1979

1989

2015

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However, while this deal is working in full force to integrate Russia with Georgia’s independent regions, it has its downside, mainly internal discord. Protesters in Abkhazia have come to demand Khajimba’s resignation, citing his failures to stand up to Russia, preserve autonomy, boost the region’s economy. Thus, while Russia has succeeded in de-jure integrating Abkhazia and mainland Russia, political tensions make a true union unsustainable, with many Abkhazians seeing that they get too little from their agreement.

This same discontent manifests itself in Ossetia, but it more subdued due Raul Khajimba, to the authoritarian ruling style of President of Abkhazia Tibilov.

On the other side, the West has sought to integrate these regions with Georgia opting for international norms and legal precedent. The Georgian perspective has closely aligned with this point of view, and former President Saakashvili sought to improve Georgia’s economic situation and encourage Abkhazia and SO to re-join.

Thus, Georgia has tried to woo the European Union and the west—besides the security guarantee from a future Russian invasion, engagements with the EU, like the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) signed in 2016, provide Georgia with the perfect locomotive for socioeconomic betterment. The idea to improve Georgia’s economic status is a pathway to align the regions’ interests and thus encourage willing re-integration; however, this has been met with limited success thanks to Russian presence and economic aid.

Ergo, Georgia’s legal control over these regions

Abkhazia SUKHUMI

South Ossetia

Georgia

TSKHINVALI TBILISI

inhibits the full success over Russian efforts, which in turn inhibit a successful Georgian policy.

The result of this has been two-fold. The West has taken a hard line via the recent European Convention on Human Rights ruling and the post-Crimea sanctions on Putin’s regime. This has in turn inhibited Russian foreign aid to Ossetia and Abkhazia, and thus made it more difficult for the country to maintain its grip over these regions. On the flip side, the current ruling Georgia Dream coalition has expanded political and economic ties with Russia, building common ground on issues like car and wine exports and enabling increased cooperation on infrastructure.

However, this cooperation has been fruitless, helping Abkhazia and Ossetia sustain the status quo where they remain apart from Georgia but also Russia, ensuring only limited success.

With an international problem as convoluted as the one in Georgia right now, the integration of Abkhazia and SO would prove an arduous task; however, through US, EU, and NATO the goal of eventual conflict resolution could be attained. An accurate and successful policy ought to incentivize Abkhazia’s and Ossetia’s incorporation back into Georgia, but necessitate concessions from the Georgian government in the form of autonomy. At the same time, however, it must acknowledge Russia’s stake in the matter, giving it a rhetorical victory with a line that allows the Kremlin to hold on to nationalist support; this opportunity is unique currently due to Russia’s overstretched military—with major engagements in Syria, Ukraine, and the North Caucasus—it lacks the assets to effectively fight off the West’s forays in the country.

Thus, the first actor in this policy is NATO, who should accept Georgia as a member contingent on Georgia’s recognition of the breakaway region’s current governments, giving them immunity from past prosecution, as the heads of Autonomous Regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia with seats in the Parliament. Legally, this should set up the precedent allowing authorities in Abkhazia and SO to continue their rule, but creating the framework for both a national and international ascension of Abkhazia and SO to the international order. The main opposition to Georgian membership in NATO is Germany. To sway them would involve concessions on an issue impacting Germany significantly: the refugee crisis. Thus, Georgia should accept a quota of Syrian refugees, alleviating the social cost easier by preferring Syrians with a Caucasian background. This would both placate Germany and help solve some of the harms of the population crisis which the wars have created. These concessions that Georgia would have to make are costly, but in the wake of the recent EU expansion of the Schengen

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Russian officials of a de-facto annexation. Despite Abkhaz opposition, the treaty was signed in under a month, likely due to Russian posturing and leveraging of various military and economic aid it provides to the republic after the political ouster of Alexander Ankvab, who lead Abkhazia from since its independence until being forced out by pro-Kremlin protesters. His successor, Khajimba, was much more unequivocally pro-Russian, approving the deal in under two months, arguing it as the only way to promote socioeconomic development in a hostile world.

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Zone to include Georgia, are doable especially given the promise of NATO membership.

The next actor in the process is the US, Georgia’s most significant Western ally. To combat the Russian hold, the US would need to supplant the benefits of the Abkhaz and Ossetian-Russo alliance. To address the economy, the US can utilize USAID to create a foreign aid package specifically to the governments of these de-facto regions, contingent, of course, on continued bilateral dialogue outside the 4-party JCC, resulting in better negotiation on energy and water infrastructure. To protect political interests, the US should establish a Consulate in Sukhumi and a special interests section in its Tbilisi Embassy for Abkhazian and Ossetian affairs, helping give the regions an alternative to vocalize their international aspirations and objectives to the world’s hegemon.

Given the establishment of these embassies, there will be two main concessions vital from the Abkhazian and Ossetian governments: the unconditional re-acceptance of IDPs, allowing them to return to their former properties if unclaimed since the war, and a nullification of the previously-mentioned Agreement on Alliance and Integration with Russia. Georgian border authorities should take over the border checkpoints serving in conjunction with Abkhazian, Ossetian, and Russian military and police forces. Georgia must accept a continued Russian presence in these regions in the spirit of goodwill and compromise, but the security benefits it will attain are significantly better than the status quo, ensuring that it will accede to these concessions. This continued presence and continued access to Russian military facilities will allow the country to have a sway over its southern border, but end the conflict over recognition that remains Georgia’s largest obstacles in the status quo.

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By leveraging the interests of actors in the conflict, a multipronged policy to address all factors of the stagnation perpetuated by this conflict is the perfect step to resolve it, solving political, economic, and security ramifications that have plagued the region. Circling back to the Georgian creation myth, the tensions over ownership and control of this land are as old as time itself, hopefully alleviated through a series of measures designed to boost cooperation and improve national ties between governments and. Past policies have always ignored one aspect or the other of the conflict, from parliamentary representation to the impact of foreign aid. While pride remains a key motivator to its continuation, a multi-pronged approach is experience to unilateral Russian or NATO efforts of years past, making this approach both hopeful and realistic at the same time.

THE RISE OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS: THE NEED FOR A COORDINATED RESPONSE Elsa Welshofer ‘18

On October 14th 2017, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif sent a tweet to the world on his handle @JZarif , writing: “Today, Iranians—boys, girls, men, women—are ALL IRGC; standing firm with those who defend us and the region against aggression & terror.”

Within twenty-four hours, over two thousand responses came in from Iranian citizens. The most popular reply read, “No we are not! I never forget getting beaten down and tear gassed by IRGC in the streets. They are why we are suffering now!” Zarif ’s tweet came as a reaction to President Trump’s remarks a day earlier in the White House Diplomatic Reception Room, where Trump explicitly condemned not only the 2015 Iranian Nuclear Deal, but Iran’s IRGC, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Council.

Trump’s unprecedented remarks came with little warning, as he threatened to label the IRGC a terrorist organization, likely because of IRGC’s Quds specialty force and its alleged links to Hezbollah and Hamas.

Trump authorized the Treasury Department to sanction the IRGC under Executive Order 13224.

Trump’s threats to scrap the Iranian nuclear deal came as less of a surprise to U.S. legislators, and perhaps even Iran was prepared for a barrage of criticism from the President surrounding the lifting of economic sanctions in Iran, which were geared towards helping repair the country’s damaged oil economy. However, Trump’s address to the IRGC not only came as a surprise to U.S. politicians, but was also met with an especially violent and reactionary response by Iranian officials. Ali Akbar Saleh, head of the Energy Organization of Iran, warned that classifying the guards as a terror group would be “tantamount to a declaration of war”. Bahram Qasemi, Foreign Ministry spokesman, responded to Trump, “We are hopeful that the United States does not make this strategic mistake…

If they do, Iran’s reaction would be firm, decisive, and crushing…” IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari stated that the U.S. military bases in the region would be susceptible to attack. Perhaps even more surprising were the remarks by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who

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Despite the historically tense relations between the U.S. and Iran and the controversy surrounding the militant group, for many U.S. citizens, these discussions surrounding the IRGC ring unfamiliar. This is because, despite the group existing since 1979 and steadily increasing its power holdings in Iranian politics and economics over the last forty years, the U.S. has left the IRGC largely untouched. But, why?

Originally to protect against enemies of the 1979 revolution, the IRGC has grown to over 100,000 members, includes an army, navy, and air force, and manages Iran’s ballistic arsenal. Its members have been promoted to political positions such as the head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Corporation, and representatives on the Supreme National Security Council. According to the American Council on Foreign Relations, the IRGC also has economic ties to over one hundred corporations, totaling roughly twelve billion in construction and engineering capital. As of 2017, the Guards reportedly even run Iran’s largest airline.

In addition to its bullish influence in Iranian domestic politics, the group has been criticized by over two hundred EU parliamentarians for its human rights abuses; in 2016 alone Amnesty International reported that Iran carried out through the IRGC 55% of all recorded executions in the world. In the past four years since Rouhani has taken office, EU parliamentarians also reported that Iran carried out nearly 3,000 hangings.

The Guard’s specialized corps, the Basij Militia, brought attention to the world in 2009 after brutally crushing the rebellions following what citizens deemed corrupt 2009 elections. And yet, with the exception of President George W. Bush alleging IRGC provided roadside bombs to the Iraqi opposition in 2005, few have challenged the seemingly unchecked power of the Guards.

One answer to the question of why the world is tolerating the militia group is that, despite the terror that the IRGC carries out, this seeming policy of appeasement may be in the best interests of the United States, as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson hints. In reaction to Trump’s threats, not just Tillerson has commented on potential diplomatic solutions. German, British, and Russian officials have remarked that the region’s inner complexities should

motivate members of the UN to proceed with caution— instigating hostility could not only escalate to full blown war with Iran, but also could mean an unraveling of stability in the already shaky region.

Amidst the precarious situation surrounding Iran, it seems as though the world outside Iran is unsure what may be the best strategy to proceed with in dealing with the superpower. While the IRGC clearly poses an increasing threat as it assimilates power, the UN’s hands are tied, as engaging with the group could unravel current diplomatic progress. However, with President Trump’s bold transition into a more hawkish foreign policy, it seems as though Europe and the U.S. are increasingly at odds over strategic decision making.

Furthermore, for the majority of U.S. politicians, Trump has now ushered U.S.-Iranian relations into unchartered territory, as this is the first time the U.S. has directly addressed the IRGC, and has acknowledged the major role the group has in influencing American policy towards Iran.

So how do we move forward, and what is the next step? The future of Iran relations with the free world is tenuous, but 2017 has brought two needs in the world of foreign policy. The first, is that the IRGC can no longer be ignored or understated in its importance to global peace and governance. The second, is that if we are to be successful in both holding the IRGC accountable and improving relations with Iran, the states of the UN who have traditionally asserted themselves as leaders in policy initiatives must act as a united front, with no room for deviance from strategy.

For the United States, this means that President Trump needs to refrain from unchecked boisterous criticism of the IRGC, as this distracts from potential for diplomacy, and puts Iran on the defensive— making them less open to cooperation with the UN. For Britain, Germany, and other world leaders, it means being more open to a hawkish stance towards the IRGC. At this point, it is impossible to ignore the rapidly expanding influence of the Guards both in Iran and the region itself. Given the track record of heated contention between Trump and European politicians, the prospect of a united front against the Guards seems slim. However, with the global order potentially at stake, we may be surprised to see world leaders uniting under necessity. Only time will tell.

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less than a year earlier had criticized the IRGC. After Trump’s remarks, Rouhani gave his full support for the organization, saying that it “has a place in people’s hearts.”

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan (2015) Wikipedia Commons.

Sullivan Hughes ‘21

KURDISTAN: STILL WAITING

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On September 25th, 2017, Iraqi Kurds went to the polls to declare their independence. According to the Kurdish electoral commission, 92 percent cast their vote to separate from Iraq. Three weeks later, the Iraqi government struck back, decisively seizing the contested city of Kirkuk from Kurdish separatists. These two events, Kurdish action and the Iraqi reaction, the call for freedom followed by immediate repercussions in the form of territorial setbacks, represent a microcosm of the IraqiKurdish relationship. The independence referendum was doomed before a single vote was cast, due to its inability to overcome longstanding external and internal barriers to a sovereign Kurdistan.

Kurdistan has always been plagued by internal political conflict. Today, this takes the form of a deep divide between the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which have led the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in a power-sharing arrangement since 1998. Additionally, an insurgent anti-corruption party, the Gorran movement, has made surprising gains in the Iraqi Kurdish Parliament (IKP), and weakened the coalition. Further complicating the Kurdish position is that is a landlocked, one-good economy, without diversification or significant natural resources other than oil, and therefore heavily reliant on foreign investment.

Given this long-term, structural economic weakness, the Kurds overplayed their hand with the September 25 independence referendum. Throughout Kurdistan’s existence, it has often gained power only in times of chaos.

With Iraq returning to some semblance of normalcy with recent ISIS setbacks, the Kurds will once again be under Iraqi rule. Global politics are equally unfavorable to the Kurdish position. The United States shows, at best, disinterested support for the Kurds, while the major

Middle Eastern powers are almost unanimously against independence. The Kurds have thus found themselves in a precarious isolation. For a Kurdish state to exist, there must be a nexus of internal strength with regional and global support, an impossibility given both the global political landscape and Kurdistan’s own economic and political strife.

Throughout Iraq’s history, Kurdish autonomy has been gained while the Iraqi government was preoccupied with war. World War II, the First Gulf War (which provided a UN-supported no fly zone over Kurdistan), and the fight against ISIS all granted the Kurds of Iraq greater autonomy over their political affairs. The Transitional Constitution of 2004 first granted Kurdistan, suppressed for decades

by Saddam Hussein, official autonomy. Since then, the Kurdish region has maintained limited control over its government, trade, and oil, with control over its border crossings and the ability to negotiate with foreign entities.

This cycle of war and greater Kurdish autonomy most recently manifested itself in the war against ISIS. Kurdish military forces, the Peshmerga, were essential in driving ISIS out of Northern Iraq, supported by Coalition airstrikes and arms. This allowed for the expansion of Kurdish territory, including full control over the oil-rich city Kirkuk. Kirkuk was previously under joint control of the Iraqi and Kurdish governments, and the loss of the wealthy city infuriated both Iraqi government officials and citizens. As Iraq, in conjunction with coalition airstrikes, has regained territory lost to ISIS, Kirkuk has once again become the flashpoint of Iraqi-Kurdish relations.

ISIS losses emboldened the ruling KDP, led by President Masoud Barzani, to call for a long-discussed independence referendum. The nominally non-binding referendum, widely criticized for being unilateral and uncoordinated

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While internal economic and political instability cast doubt on the viability of a Kurdish state, its external outlook is no better. Middle Eastern powers, the United States, and the United Nations have all, to varying degrees, expressed opposition. On the day of the referendum, a spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, put out a statement opposing the referendum. In part, it read, “The Secretary-General is concerned about the potentially destabilizing effects of today’s referendum in the Kurdistan region of Iraq...The Secretary-General respects the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Iraq.”

This statement, which went on to emphasize the need for an internal discussion between Kurdistan and the Iraqi government, rather than whole-sale independence, encompasses the global opinion on Iraqi Kurdistan.

In an interview with AFP, Jeffrey Laurenti *74, former director of foreign policy programs at The Century Foundation, described any statement from Guterres as a “ventriloquist’s dummy,” indicating that the permanent members of the Security Council all oppose the referendum. Very few states, aside from regional powers such as Turkey and Iraq, have clear reasons to oppose Kurdish independence, but in practice, the unilateral method of the referendum and concerns about regional instability negate any support.

The United States response to the Kurdish question has been lukewarm. Since the U.S.-backed Iraqi Constitution took effect in 2005, the United States’ goal in Iraq has been to maintain stability and democracy. Furthermore, for a country so intent on nation-building in the past, the Trump administration’s “America-first” ethic signals a policy of nonintervention. The first official U.S. response came on September 29, when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson put out a statement opposing the Kurdish referendum. He emphasized that the U.S. did not recognize the referendum, and that the “vote and the results lack legitimacy.” It seems the Trump administration and larger establishment have judged the continued stability of Iraq and fight against ISIS as taking precedent over Kurdish independence.

However, the extent to which isolationist campaign rhetoric and policy decisions align is still an open question, as Tillerson breaks the mold of the U.S. foreign policy establishment in his previous business relationship with Kurdistan. In 2013, as Exxon CEO, he negotiated a

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with Baghdad, demonstrated overwhelming support for independence. This desire for independence, however, is perhaps all that unites Iraqi Kurdistan.

On the international stage, there is a tendency to define the Kurds as a cohesive political unit, with the sole motivation of gaining independence, but since the late 1970’s, Iraqi Kurdistan has been dominated by two competing political factions, the KDP and the PUK. Today, Nechirvan Barzani leads the KDP following his father Masoud’s postreferendum resignation, who until recently was President of the COMPOSITION OF Kurdistan Regional Government. The other ruling party, the PUK, was founded in 1975 by former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. Talabani remained the head of the PUK until his death on October 3rd. The PUK and the KDP signed a power-sharing agreement under US guidance in 1998, but even since the region’s official unification of territory in 2002, this coalition has remained contentious. The insurgent Gorran Movement, established in 2009 by former PUK official Nawshirwan Mustafa, further shook up the Kurdish political landscape, particularly among young voters. It currently holds 24 of the 111 seats of the IKP, and has provided Kurds with a viable opposition. The PUK-KDP coalition now appears weaker than ever before.

Due in part to political division, Iraqi Kurdistan’s economic problems are manifold. It is a one-good economy, earning nearly 90% of its revenue from oil sales. Despite fertile land in its interior, it has been unable to develop a functioning agricultural sector. Such a lack of diversification leaves Kurdistan heavily reliant on foreign trade. Additionally, its oil-based economy has left it vulnerable to foreign influence, with Russia and Turkey holding oil export deals with the KRG. The oil revenue provides Kurds revenue independent of Baghdad, but furthers its economic instability. The loss of Kirkuk has created a 55% drop-off in Kurdish oil exports, with all of this revenue now flowing to the Iraqi government. Yet, perhaps the most immediate economic problem for Kurdistan is the $17 billion in debt hanging over its head. The problem is so severe that Kurdistan has been unable to pay the Peshmerga and its civil servants in full since 2014. Even apart from its reliance on oil, Kurdistan’s outstanding debt alone calls into question the long-term viability of a Kurdish state not dependent on foreign actors.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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deal between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the corporation to drill in Iraq. In doing so, he talked exclusively with the KRG, circumventing the Iraqi government. An oil export deal with Exxon would provide Kurdistan a revenue stream not subject to Iraqi control, as would a deal with Rosneft, the Russian oil giant. Ironically, Tillerson was criticized for dividing Iraq and weakening its position against ISIS at the time, while now he is arguing for unity and stability. In contrast, Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer has called for an independent Kurdish state, citing the Iraqi Kurds’ cooperation with the United States in the fight against ISIS.

Nevertheless, the main barrier to U.S. involvement in Kurdistan is its military alliance with Turkey. Turkey is home to vital U.S. military bases in Incirlik and Izmir, which provide strategic access to much of the Middle East.

The U.S.-Turkey military relationship continues even after Turkey’s recent moves towards autocracy, consummated with an April 16th referendum that consolidated Erodgan’s executive powers. The U.S. has yet to withdraw troops, and Turkey remains a NATO member. More importantly, U.S. nuclear arms remain housed at Incirlik, necessitating a continued relationship with Turkey.

Turkey staunchly opposes the Kurdish independence referendum. A conflict with the PKK, a Kurdish group classified as a terrorist organization by the U.S., has been raging for years throughout the country. Kurdistan breaking away from Iraq would set a precedent for Turkey’s own, large Kurdish minority to one day call for independence. Due to U.S. military obligations in Turkey, and the presence of the invaluable Incirlik base, it is almost inconceivable that the US will take action on Kurdish independence.

In Iran, as well, fears of a Kurdish state shrinking Iranian territory have sparked opposition to the referendum. Iran supposedly backed Prime Minister al-Abadi’s capture of Kirkuk, and has been increasingly influential in Baghdad since the U.S. war in Iraq. Iraqi Kurds are mainly Sunni Muslims, and as Iran is majority Shi’a, this has naturally pushed Iran to the side of the Shi’a elements in Iraq rather than the Kurds.

Considering Iran’s opposition, it is perhaps fair to assume Saudi Arabia would be a proponent of the Kurds, who are largely Sunni. However, Kurds, though Sunni, are not of the Arab ethnicity. Laurenti characterized the Kurds as only “nominally Sunni” from the Saudis’ viewpoint. The Saudis have little to gain from supporting Kurdistan, and it would be overly optimistic to hope for a Sunni ally (or puppet) to survive between Shi’a Iraq and Iran.

The only regional power expressing any support for a Kurdish state is Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, prior to the referendum, released a statement saying, “While Israel rejects terror in any form, it supports the legitimate efforts of the Kurdish people to attain a state of its own.” Since then, Israel has backed off from its position, under pressure from Turkey and most likely officials in the U.S. Outright support, according to Laurenti, would be perhaps the only factor that could shift U.S. policy on the Kurdish question, especially given President Trump’s relationship with Netanyahu.

Erbil

Sinjar Mosul Kirkuk

Baghdad

IRAQ

There are additional reasons the U.S. would oppose an independent Kurdistan. For most of the modern era, the U.S. has generally supported both the territorial integrity and unity of states facing secession movements.

In Laurenti’s words, “a reasonable facsimile of democratic practice” is enough for the U.S. to oppose a secession movement. The U.S. favors the status quo, and fears instability that could result from secession. In a region locked into a state of constant turmoil, the breakdown of a newly stable Iraq could prove disastrous. Iraq is not the haven of extremism it is has been in the past, and its future looks bright under Prime Minister Abadi. In an Iraq characterized by effective leadership and an improving economy, Kurdistan is unlikely to garner any international sympathy for its position.

Even if Kurdish claims to independence gain international recognition, the potential domino effect in not only Iraq, but also Syria, Turkey, and Iran, will outweigh any proKurdish sentiment. The tragedy of the Kurdish question is that it will be answered pragmatically, not morally, and Kurdistan will once again recede into the shadows of world affairs.

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US-Mexico fence at Border Field State Park (2007). Wikipedia Commons.

MR. TRUMP, TEAR DOWN THIS WALL! Stephen Bork ‘19

This is ironic because the wall will likely do very little.

In return, it will make it far more difficult for the U.S. government to work with other nations in confronting the international root causes of the very same issues that made the wall seem desirable in the first place.

On August 31 of last year, Mr. Trump said that when he met with current Mexican President Peña Nieto, they had managed to “agree on the importance of ending the

illegal flow of drugs, cash, guns, and people across our border, and to put the cartels out of business.” All other reporting aside, these are quite noble goals. The drug trade fuels a national health crisis that claims tens of thousands of American lives every year. The guns help members of large gangs like MS-13 fortify their presence in the United States. The profits from all this, of course, only make it easier for the cartels to tighten their grip and further refine their operations. The human tragedy these groups have caused across the Western Hemisphere is tremendous; seeking action against them is hardly disagreeable. However, a good cause and a good policy are hardly equivalent.

There is no reason to assume that Latin American gangs will not be able to engineer or bribe their way around any new fortifications on the border; in fact, many methods of drug smuggling already bypass simple overland transport.

Those who have seen the recent film American Made will know of Barry Seal, a CIA agent who began flying drugs across the border, dropping them over the swamps of Louisiana as he flew back to base. Even more creatively, catapults hurl packages of drugs over even the 698 miles of border with fencing currently in use and tunnels dug deep under provide ready access for gang members to transport cargo into the U.S.

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President Donald Trump’s plan to erect a “big, beautiful wall” along the U.S.-Mexico border is one of the most illconceived policy goals in recent history, ancillary questions like ICE’s (Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s) recent harsh and arguably coercive implementations of existing law entirely aside. Many have already discussed how ludicrously difficult building this wall would be, but it seems to me that building it was never the point. Rather, it seems a brilliant magician’s flourish, a way to reify the idea that America is “building things again” and standing up for itself against the rest of the world. The choice of messaging seems to have been a good one, as approximately 75% of Republican voters – a percentage increasing daily - support the project. The political backlash of not trying to follow through on the plan should be assurance enough the current Congress will take some form of action.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Furthermore, several other current methods of drug transport bypass the wall entirely, including speedboating to coastal cities, loading suitcases on commercial flights, or even just using the U.S. Postal Service. It is hard to imagine a wall built so high and so deep that it would be able to stop any of those methods - at the very least, currently proposals would not do. Even if all other ways of drug smuggling were closed off, the wall would do little to impede drug flow because drugs going through the border are ingeniously hidden in cars and trucks already inspected at checkpoints. These checkpoints and inspection procedures would remain no matter how much concrete is put between checkpoints, so drugs that can come in now would still come in then. These questions of efficacy alone should be enough to reconsider the project.

Another reason to reconsider would be that the rate of flow of illegal migrants from Latin America has been declining regularly since 2007. There appear to be many factors at work, most of them economic. Essentially, Latin America’s economies – particularly Mexico’s – have grown and stabilized enough so that there are both more and higher-paying low-skilled jobs available. Migration within Latin America has hardly ceased; it simply extends far less often to the United States. In fact, the Pew Research Center estimated that there was a net outflow of almost 150,000 Mexican migrants from the U.S. to Mexico between 2009 and 2014. Quite simply, new illegal immigrants are now predominantly Asian and African – and thus unaffected by a wall on the Mexican border.

Despite all this, there are still individual migrants entering from Mexico, and one could argue a wall would impede their entry. During the Obama administration, significantly more agents were deployed on the border and estimated rates of successful border crossings declined by 30% (to a success chance of about 15%) without building additional fencing and well before Mr. Trump took office. Furthermore, just as “coyote” guides are asking for a larger fee to evade these harsher border patrols, a whole sector of skilled document-forgers has sprung up. The Center for Migration Studies estimates that some 2/3 of the illegal migrant population arrived not by sneaking over the border but by entering legally and overstaying a valid visa; successful visa fraud can similarly take advantage of the difficulty in telling whether someone has merely overstayed an invite. As before, none of these methods of entry would be affected by the wall.

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The wall’s few (dubious) benefits have already come with significant costs. There is of course the projected López Obrador (2013). Wikiepdia Commons.

$21 billion-some price tag, but most significant is its effect on the U.S.-Mexico relationship. A Pew Research Center study from this September found that the percentage of Mexicans expressing positive views of the United States rapidly plunged from 66% in 2015 to a mere 30%, with only a meager 5% of the population professing faith in Mr. Trump himself. Riding – and stoking - this wave of disillusionment, former Mexico City mayor Manuel López Obrador has propelled himself to the front of the 2018 presidential race. His call to arms is a promise to “bring Trump to his senses.” While fate is never certain in politics, it currently seems that a nationalist who has many times decried NAFTA will be the next President of Mexico.

With renegotiation of NAFTA terms nearly certain to continue into next year, involving a López Obrador government could significantly imperil the trade deal, which is estimated to have tripled American trade with Mexico and Canada and added 0.5% growth to the U.S. economy per year. Mr. López Obrador’s frequent promises to revise or cancel contracts with foreign corporations deemed corrupt or making “one-sided contracts in which the Mexican republic or its citizens are fleeced” should further show that more rides on this election than just NAFTA. It has been a long time since Mexico City and Washington were so at odds with each other, making further ramifications hard to predict; nothing is off the table. This need not have been the case, considering the fairly high opinion of the United States held by the average Mexican just two years ago. Let it be clear, the whirlwind being reaped is Mr. Trump’s own.

It would be easier to avoid such populist backlash were the United States not seen as hostile or irrational, or at the very least not acting solely for self-interest. The U.S. has not always been seen this way; the era immediately after the Second World War is a superb example. Voluntarily rebuilding continents, establishing a peaceful international order, and flying food to those trapped behind blockades did wonders for America’s reputation, no matter how much self-interest undergird those efforts. This kind of international goodwill greatly helped the U.S. call in military backup and invest overseas during the second half of the 20th century, but that goodwill has lessened significantly since. Several wounds to its image – the Iraq War, Abu Ghraib, the financial crisis, etc. – predate Mr. Trump’s presidency, but

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administration should make it clear to these governments that the status quo is not working and a different suite of policies would be more likely to cause positive change.

Such policies would be systemic changes based around alleviating poverty, providing for safer access to quality education, and making local government more responsive to local concerns. These policy clusters have already been Were the Trump administration to take a more active enacted by joint American and Mexican teams in several role collaborating with Latin American governments to Mexican municipalities to significant success. To that confront the gangs and cartels plaguing the region, much end, the administration should also continue to fund and of the goodwill the wall imbroglio imperiled could be expand the CARSI program, which aims to remove those regained. This naturally means that collaboration with the same social factors that lead dejected youth to join gangs.

Mexican government to confront cartel activities that has It should also work hard with the leaders of these nations already met with fair success should continue. to reduce government corruption, especially in the police force; slight alterations of the % As discussed above, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 69 66 66 Mexico is less and less the to scrutinize those parts of Favorable 63 65 56 56 56 source of border crossings 64 the government with access to 52 47 into the United States.

American weapons could help Its replacement is the ensure that progress is being 41 41 44 30 34 35 25 30 31 29 “Northern Triangle” of made. Crucially, Mr. Trump Unfavorable 27 Guatemala, El Salvador, must also emphasize that the and Honduras. The region, 2002 U.S. will help the Northern 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 paralyzed by the farTriangle governments just as reaching gangs MS-13 and diligently as it did when it was PERCENTAGE OF MEXICANS Barrio 18, is the single most providing tools for mano dura.

APPROVING OF THE U.S. violent area of the world SOURCE: PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2017) not at war. This violence

The Trump naturally has a direct impact on the number of refugees administration should also take lessons from what caused from the area entering the United States; one study the greatest reduction of homicides in the region: truces estimates that for every two additional homicides in the between the gangs, sponsored by the Catholic Church, one Triangle, there will be another refugee seeking asylum in of the few authorities universally respected there. One of the United States. Differently from the illegal immigrants the best ways Mr. Trump could directly encourage further from Mexico during the last decades, however, Northern rapprochement would be to tone down his rhetoric against Triangle refugees do not stay off the radar for long; they the MS-13 gang. It serves nobody: it makes higher-ups in generally surrender themselves willingly and seek asylum. the gang feel that governments are less likely to work with Moreover, there seem to be few illegitimate crossings: them, decreasing chances of rapprochement, while also Homeland Security officials assessing Northern Triangle making the gang seem more powerful, making it more migrants intercepted crossing the border immediately attractive for disenfranchised youth. Law enforcement found reason to support asylum claims in over 80 percent can confront MS-13’s influence in the U.S. without them of cases. One should bear in mind asylum claims are a being called “vile” on the Presidential Twitter. form of legal immigration and that asylees work legally and out in the open, for the same wage as anyone else.

Such efforts would undoubtedly be a difficult sell. As some of the provocative videos by personalities such Should the Trump administration wish to entirely do as Milo Yiannopolous should demonstrate, much of away with border crossings, the best way to do so would the young conservative movement is energized by the be to help improve conditions in the Northern Triangle “America First” ideology the wall so garishly symbolizes. enough to remove the need to migrate northward. The However, Mr. Trump, ever the showman, has time after positive effects of this on America’s international prestige time excelled at successfully selling a policy once thought would be considerable. The United States already sends politically toxic. Should the Trump administration back significant financial and technological aid to Northern off its commitments to the wall, it is hardly impossible that Triangle governments, yet many remain incredibly it could turn its policies towards Latin America back in a corrupt and wedded to popular mano dura (“iron hand”), successful direction. inefficient policies of zero tolerance. Through public statements and potential aid renegotiations, the Trump

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its ever-more popular reputation as an isolationist bigot does the country no favors. Not only does this makes it possible for the López Obradors of the world to take power, but it also opens the door for powers like China and Russia to step in and take the economic contracts and international leadership.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

President Trump receiving a military briefing in a secured location at Mar-a-Lago in West Palm Beach, Florida (2017). Shealah Craighead/Wikipedia Commons.

FOLLOW THE STARS:

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE TRUMP ERA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING Leo Li ‘20

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On the evening of January 20th, 2017, just hours after President Trump was sworn into office, the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly - 98 to 1, with one abstention - to confirm James Norman Mattis to the position of Secretary of Defense. The near-unanimity and bipartisanship of the vote, however, hid underlying concerns that were reverberating throughout Washington, the military, and scholars of civil-military affairs: Mattis, a retired 4-star Marine general, was assuming a job traditionally held by a civilian, disrupting a legacy of civilian control of the Pentagon not challenged since the confirmation of General Marshall to the post in 1947. But Mattis’ selection for the post wasn’t the only potential red flag for civilmilitary relations. General John Kelly would take on the role of Secretary of Homeland Security and eventually White House Chief of Staff. The National Security Advisor role would be first filled by LTG Michael Flynn (ret.), and then LTG H.R. McMaster, while still serving on active duty.

Since the end of the American Revolution and President Washington’s resignation of his military commission, the United States has often been held up as a model for civil-military relations, especially for democracies where elected, civilian officials wield power and authority over the military. The relationship, however, has not always been smooth. George Marshall’s appointment to be Secretary of Defense risked civilian control of the newly

formed Defense Department. The firing of MacArthur, while perfectly in Truman’s authority as Commanderin-Chief, severely damaged his standing domestically.

During the final days of the Nixon Administration, General Alexander Haig was appointed White House Chief of Staff and, according to some observers, effectively ran the executive branch in those critical days. Even more recently, the appointment of then-LTG Colin Powell to the traditionally civilian role of National Security Advisor during the Reagan Administration raised even more questions about civilian control during a time when the Iran-Contra scandal occupied every headline and nightly news report.

It is important, then, with this brief history in mind, to organize challenges to what we consider the traditional approach to civil-military relations into two groups: one where traditionally civilian roles in foreign policy and national security decision making are given to career or active-duty officers, and another where career military professionals cross into and participate in the more partisan, party-aligned realm of American politics. The appointment of generals in the Trump administration brings both groups of challenges to the fore.

The purpose of this article is not to necessarily discover and analyze a definite trend in our country’s politicomilitary affairs. The purpose instead is to explore the specific effects the appointment of Mattis, McMaster,

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The Civilian Authority Problem

The appointment of General Mattis to Secretary of Defense and LTG McMaster to National Security Adviser are examples of what I call here the Civilian Authority Problem. In both cases, a role that is traditionally held (and in the case of the Secretary of Defense, legally required to be) a civilian was given to someone who was a career military officer and an active duty officer, respectively.

The issues brought up by many concerned with the Mattis and McMaster appointments are first the militarization of American foreign policy decision making, and second, the perception that the military is in fact in charge of foreign policy decision-making. The appointment of these generals, the argument goes, exacerbates the first issue and creates the second.

Let us first tackle the militarization issue. It can be argued that foreign policy since 9/11 and perhaps since the fall of the Soviet Union has been increasingly militarized. Even before the Trump Administration, previous presidents have answered foreign policy decisions with military interventions and operations, many of which we are still conducting today. The argument, then, is not that the appointment of Mattis and McMaster will begin the

LTG Michael Flynn (ret.)

Former National Security Advisor

General James Norman Mattis Secretary of Defense

militarization, but rather exacerbate or catalyze it. If the main advisors of the president are most familiar and comfortable with military action, the president and the national security establishment would then prefer and choose military options over economic or diplomatic ones.

However, Mattis and McMaster, I would argue, may be familiar with military operations, but are not comfortable with it, or at least prefer it as an initial policy action.

During budget hearings, Secretary Mattis argued in front of Congress that “if you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition, ultimately”.

He went on to say that such thinking is based on “a cost-benefit ratio. The more that we put into the State Department’s diplomacy, hopefully the less we have to put into a military budget as we deal with the outcome of an apparent American withdrawal from the international scene.” This kind of thinking is hardly that of a triggerhappy Marine general, let alone one called “Mad Dog.” These figures have seen decades of war. If anything, they are more familiar with the limitations of military action than any academic expert or politician that could fill the ranks of the Trump administration. So in this specific case, Mattis and McMaster might be a possible restraint on militarization, not a catalyst.

Furthermore, the amount of appropriations that President Trump and Congress have given to DoD and the service branches are not suddenly significantly higher, as a militarization of foreign policy might require. On the contrary, despite promises of a military buildup, the Trump Administration has not been able to increase military spending. Speaking to Politico, Katherine Blakeley, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a nonpartisan Washington think tank, states that there is “a professed goal of having a buildup, but I haven’t seen any kind of real engagement by the administration on … putting in the legislative groundwork to make that happen.” Despite arguments by LTG McMaster that “we need an end to the defense sequester… each of our services aren’t big enough”, no significant or successful action has been taken by the administration in this direction, something that would happen if the appointment of generals to these top national security posts were actually able to swing policy preferences to their “pro-military” side.

LTG H.R. McMaster Incumbent National Security Advisor

General John Kelly White House Chief of Staff

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Flynn, and Kelly have had on the Trump Administration and the national security establishment’s overall approach to decision-making and civilian authority, and how such effects have influenced the Trump Administration’s actions and policies pertaining to American foreign policy.

This analysis, of course, is based on certain assumptions.

The first is that these officers are well-qualified for the positions they are being appointed to, in terms of ability.

This does not mean they know every in and out about how to be Secretary of Defense, or National Security Advisor.

However, in terms of ability to accomplish their tasks and manage their offices, they are for the most part no more or no less qualified than the civilian appointees that have come before. This assumption is based on the fact that these appointees are general officers with decades of experience and education under their belt. While political experience may not necessarily be the same, such experience and rank is commonly recognized as a sign of ability on part with those with similar degrees of experience from civilian jobs and careers.

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In terms of the issue of military dominance in foreignpolicy decision making, this too, I believe, is exaggerated.

McMaster’s failure to reign in some of President Trump’s decision-making is evidence of this. Trump’s failure to offer his support for NATO members and Article V is a prime example. Despite constant lobbying by Mattis, McMaster, and to an extent Tillerson, Trump declined to signal his support for the alliance during his trip to Brussels early in his administration. McMaster’s lobbying for Trump not to use the phrase “radical Islamic terrorism” has also proven futile. More recently, despite Mattis being on the record as against moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, Trump made his attentions known that he would do so, irritating allies and an already tenuous region. In terms of the Trump Administration, it is very clear that Trump is still the dominant figure in decision-making, and any deference to the Pentagon on certain military issues is not representative of foreign policy decision-making as a whole. The military’s influence on foreign policy issues has not necessarily increased with the appointment of these generals.

The Civilian Authority Problem, to emphasize, is not a problem of complete replacement of civilian control to the military. The appointment of McMaster and Mattis does not challenge the inherent and actual structure of who controls who, but rather how civilian leaders are influenced. Increased fear of a military coup is a complete exaggeration. The military officers appointed to these positions have always made their adherence to republican principles, civilian control of the military, and the defense of the constitution explicit.

The Political General Problem

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The second issue that has arisen with President Trump’s appointment of numerous generals is the breakdown of the traditional barrier between nonpartisan, military policy affairs, and partisan, political agenda-setting and dealing. The biggest example of this is retired LTG Michael Flynn, and to a lesser but still significant extent, General John Kelly as Chief of Staff and General John Allen during the 2016 campaign.

Military officers, with a few notable exceptions, have mostly avoided the political realm, especially in the 20th century. The position of non-partisanship allows the military to retain strong positive public opinion and to work with whatever party is in control of the White House or Congress. Military policy consequently transcends partisan politics, allowing consistency in policy and legitimacy in the eyes of the country.

Under the Trump Administration, and arguably during the 2016 election, generals more recognizably and explicitly not only took sides in an election, but made their positions known on extremely partisan issues.

Michael Flynn, for example, gave an extremely partisan speech lambasting Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton, on issues including the controversial Benghazi attack that left several dead. John Allen, a retired Marine general, while less controversial, also gave a speech for Hillary Clinton the week after.

This, perhaps, is the more dangerous and significant problem that has arisen in civil-military relations immediately before and since President Trump took office.

The problem with Flynn’s speech is that he was eventually placed in charge of the National Security Council. His partisan stances seemed to be rewarded, despite concerns raised by several prominent military figures. Admiral Michael Mullen, scolded the partisan appearance of generals, arguing “it is about the disappointing lack of judgment in doing so for crass partisan purposes. This is made worse by using hyperbolic language all the while leveraging the respected title of ‘general.’” If officers are offered incentives to shed their nonpartisan nature, and these officers accept these incentives, trust in our military, even in those who still wear the uniform and pronounce non-partisanship, risks becoming eroded to the levels of other partisan political institutions. If so, the military’s ability to convey their interests, or perhaps even to function, may slowly erode over time, challenging the ability of the US in future crises to project hard power.

Conclusion The appointment of these particular generals by President Trump have not resulted in significant changes to foreign policy decision making, radical or reactionary. Relative to the views of President Trump, or at least the views he espoused on the campaign trail, these appointments have acted as status-quo institutionalists. They have not moved national security policy significantly one way or the other. They should, however, raise questions about the nonpartisan nature of the profession, and whether further instances of explicitly partisan generals aligning themselves with partisan candidates hurts the military’s ability to help formulate foreign policy that affects nations and people abroad, if not hurting the military’s ability overall to function as seamlessly between administrations and changes in party control in Congress. Restraint by generals and by politicians in their agendas and actions concerning future general officer appointments will be key in preserving this particular aspect of American foreign policy decision making.

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