Africa Briefing - September-October 2022

LEADER

The Rwanda asylum conundrum Kenya’s elite must stop taking the people for a ride

The tasks facing the ‘hustler’ President

A month after presidential and legislative elections in Kenya on August 9, and subsequent legal wrangles, a new administration led by President William Ruto has finally taken over the reins of power from President Uhuru Kenyatta’s government. Moses Onyango looks at the issues that the new leader will have to tackle as he tries to maintain his populist stance

The transformation of Kenya’s electoral system

After yet another presidential election had to be settled after legal wranglings, the Kenyan judiciary has shown that it can act without undue political influence by making rulings that have helped to bring finality to election disputes and, thus, strengthen the democratic process, writes Kennedy Olilo

ANALYSIS

COMMENT COVER STORY TECHNOLOGY

Does Africa need ‘safari tourists’ disguised as international election observers?

It is not enough for foreign poll monitors to rush into a country and make pronouncements on election results after a short stay, argue Babafemi A. Badejo and Nana K. A. Busia, Jr., who say these observers would not fully understand the complexities at play, especially before the day of elections

Fintech in Africa: The end of the beginning

Africa’s fintech industry is coming of age. In the face of political and economic challenges and a global pandemic, fintech on the continent is booming. Global management consultants McKinsey predict what comes next

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

Golden spice provides ray of light in Shell battle

Export of turmeric to help fund Niger Delta activists in their fight against oil industry pollution, writes Angela Cobbinah in London

REVIEW

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Witness to history

Angela Cobbinah enjoys the memoirs of Alexander Quaison-Sackey, a leading figure in the United Nations who helped put newly independent Ghana on the world stage

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The Rwanda asylum conundrum

THE British government’s £120 million deal struck with Rwanda earlier this year for the country to take in people who had arrived in the UK as asylum seekers is still facing an almighty turbulence. Since the announcement, and payment of the £120 million, no asylum seeker has been flown to East Africa.

Legal challenges in the UK courts have delayed the implementation of the plan, which the then British Home Secretary, Priti Patel, claimed was a “world-first agreement”. But it has always been unclear why the UK chose Rwanda for this project and how it would work.

Unclear in the sense that the British government initially gave the impression that Rwanda would serve as a processing centre for the asylum seekers. And then the successful applicants would be returned to the UK for settlement.

Along the way, though, this was changed. The British government said that the asylum seekers sent to Rwanda would have to apply for asylum there and hope for settlement in the country. Nothing about them coming back to the UK.

In all this, it emerged that British civil servants had expressed doubts about Rwanda’s human rights record and pointed out that with the asylum seeker deal it would be difficult to hold the government in Kigali accountable for human rights violations. Which is understandable, because whatever the authorities in Rwanda are saying about the country’s “good” human rights record, there are many foreign governments and international organisations that think otherwise.

Patel overrode opposition to the plan by her officials by invoking a “ministerial direction” that gave her sole responsibility for the decision; only the second time the Home Office had used such power since 1990.

But the UNHCR, which opposes the plan, cannot be wrong. The refugee body’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Gillian Triggs, said the UNHCR remained firmly opposed to arrangements that sought to transfer refugees and asylum seekers to third

countries in the absence of sufficient safeguards and standards.

“Such arrangements simply shift asylum responsibilities, evade international obligations, and are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Refugee Convention. People fleeing war, conflict and persecution deserve compassion and empathy.

“They should not be traded like commodities and transferred abroad for processing,” she said. Given that the UNHCR specialises in global refugee matters, it would have made sense for the British government to have heeded the warning.

Why then did the government decide to “export its asylum obligations”, as the UNHCR put it? Well, according to Patel,

proper protection because of the operations of these people smugglers. Added to this is the movement of criminal gangs from Albania into the UK, which, naturally, the British government has to put a stop to.

So, the whole Rwanda asylum scheme is fraught with so many imponderables. What the British government should have done was to have despatched its officials to refugee camps recognised by the UNHCR to interview prospective asylum seekers.

This has happened in many refugee camps in Africa over the years. Thousands of refugees from the civil conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s were safely relocated to the Australia, the US and Canada. These were orderly affairs.

One thing about the asylum/illegal immigration debate is that Europe has to

the whole asylum and refugee business had been usurped by people traffickers who were making a mint out of illegal immigration.

In the process, some of the migrants crossing the English Channel from France have lost their lives in one of the world busiest shipping lanes. There is no gainsaying that the British government has every right to put a stop to the illegal trafficking of people into the UK.

But the problem really lies with European countries – France especially. These migrants would have gone through several of these countries that are conflictfree before finally reaching the UK.

Why didn’t they apply for asylum in these safe countries, as is normal under international refugee regulations? Were they being chivvied along by the French police who conveniently turned their backs when dangerous boats were being launched off Calais?

The problem with this situation is that real asylum seekers are being denied

be held responsible for the chaotic nature that has developed. Take, for example, Libya, where boats are launched regularly with migrants heading for Europe.

Most of those arriving in the North African country these days are from subSaharan Africa. While Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was in power Libya was a destination for workers from the continent who were paid generous salaries for their services, given that native Libyans appeared to be work-shy.

But since NATO went in with all guns blazing in 2011 to remove Gaddafi from power, Libya has not been a safe environment for sub-Saharan Africans who were expecting jobs. NATO did not plan at all for the disruption it caused in a perfectly stable African country.

So, European countries have to be careful when they apportion blame on others for the migrant crisis. They are equally culpable. By dismantling a stable government in Libya, these countries have provided an opening for unscrupulous human traffickers.

By dismantling a stable government in Libya, NATO provided an opening for unscrupulous human traffickers ‘

Kenya’s elite must stop taking the people for a ride

YET another presidential election in Kenya has had to go to court before the winner was announced. Since the introduction of the 2010 Constitution, the results of the polls held for the country’s leader in 2013, 2017 and this year were all petitioned in court.

Opposition politician Raila Odinga, who was at the centre of these three court cases, has been as dogmatic as ever in fighting what he perceives as chicanery on the part of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). In 2017, the courts actually ruled that the victory of Uhuru Kenyatta was suspect and ordered a re-run, which Odinga boycotted, paving the way for Kenyatta’s second and final term as president.

This year, Odinga was up against Kenyatta’s deputy, William Ruto, who had been abandoned by the outgoing president who gave his backing to Odinga. Why would Kenyatta support a long-time political opponent against his deputy who

telegraphed his intentions on how he will run the country: making statements about dismantling the dynasties in Kenya and threatening to rock the boat.

It was said that Kenyatta had promised to give Ruto his backing for the presidency in 2022. But it was clear that the two were not singing from the same hymn sheet. Arrangements between presidents and their deputies simply don’t work in Africa; they become dysfunctional as soon as the deputy begins to make his boss feel uncomfortable.

The IEBC, though, has not acquitted itself well in the 2022 elections. Why would the Commissioners fall out over the final count? Are they saying that they were befuddled by basic maths? Surely, not. After all, they are part of Kenya’s elite who purport to know what is best for the country.

But going by the IEBC’s woeful performance, the Commissioners cannot be trusted to organise rip-roaring revelry

Councillors and other recently elected politicians jettisoning the party that got them to power and joining Ruto’s alliance. The electorate did not vote for this.

A Southern African friend of mine who lectures at an American university told me: “This is what makes it frustrating for students and observers of politics and governance in Africa. How does one even begin to make sense of what has happened in Kenya in the three past elections?

“Is it politics driven by any sense of political ideology and principles or simply shifting ethnic and tribal loyalties? Electoral alliances seem to be more of ethnic transactions than real politics.”

Speaking specifically about those who had defected to Ruto's alliance, he said: “No doubt that's where their bread and butter will be assured. It's politics of the belly all across the continent.”

Well, the “hustler” Ruto now has to fill the belly of his many supporters who are underprivileged in a very wealth country. The recent Africa Wealth Report showed that Kenya is fifth on the list of African countries with private wealth: $91 billion. Nairobi is also fifth on the list of African cities with the most dollar millionaires: 5,400.

stuck with him for 10 years?

Well, these things do happen in African politics. If a leader is not sure which way his successor will turn if he comes to power, he will try to scupper his leadership ambitions.

This happened in one-party Sierra Leone in 1985, when the wily President, Siaka Stevens, handed over power to the Army commander, General Joseph Momoh. Just as in Kenya, Sierra Leoneans were expecting Stevens’ Vice President, Sorie Koroma, to get the backing of a president who was going into retirement.

Koroma, like Ruto, was a populist who was in tune with the people. Stevens did not want Koroma to rock the boat. It was the same this year when Ruto

in a brewery. They let down Kenyans who showed their true mettle by voting in an orderly manner and waiting patiently while the IEBC circus went on.

No amount of frustration on the part of voters could get them to unleash violence, as some doomsayers were predicting. Ordinary Kenyans have learnt their lesson: why fight each other on behalf of politicians who would have sent their families abroad in the event of postelection violence breaking out?

That is the way it should be in future elections, not just in Kenya, but all over the continent. But also, the voters must get the political system that they voted for.

It must be rather disheartening for them to see MPs, Senators, County

With such wealth, Ruto, rather than trying to dismantle dynasties should find ways of making this money work for frustrated young Kenyans. He would do well to “free individuals to create, innovate and take risks,” as the new British Chancellor, Kwasi Kwarteng, once put it.

FOR those who are interested in private wealth in Africa, the four countries above Kenya are South Africa ($651 billion), Egypt ($307 billion), Nigeria ($228 billion) and Morocco ($125 billion).

The four cities above Nairobi where most dollar millionaires live are Johannesburg (16,000), Cairo (8,200), Cape Town (6,900) and Lagos (5,500).

Desmond Davies

Going by the IEBC’s woeful performance, the Commissioners cannot be trusted to organise rip-roaring revelry in a brewery

The tasks facing the ‘hustler’ President

PRESIDENT William Ruto has taken over power in Kenya in a global, regional and local environment weakened by various challenges ranging from Covid-19; economic crises; the environment, such as global warming; poverty; Al-Shabaab terrorism; to other security threats.

Apart from these challenges, the socio-psychology of the incoming president matters a lot. Ruto, the selfconfessed “hustler”, prefers making public declarations on issues.

This is probably because he is a product of humble beginnings and a hustler, as he is wont to say in his public pronouncements. Ruto has endured the pain of being labelled a “corrupt man”. He also had to go through the pain of being dragged to The Hague by the International Criminal Court and years of seeming persecution by former President Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration, beginning in 2017.

Ruto is unbowed and was quick to overturn Kenyatta’s policies immediately he took over power. He appointed the six judges the outgoing president had refused to appoint; he rescinded the recognition of Sahrawi Arab Republic, a decision that has caused a diplomatic uproar.

Will Kenya’s national and foreign policy-making and implementation be defined by Ruto’s personality or will the state structures and the international system shape his government’s policy? Ideally, the order of band-wagoning states such as Kenya is often shaped by the global, regional, local political and socio-economic dynamics, including the personality of the president.

The strategy that Ruto may decide to adopt and adapt will be influenced by many other internal variables as he shapes his leadership. Kenya’s evolving democracy requires politics of compromise. The slim

winning margin between Kenya Kwanza and Azimio la Umoja means no single party can lead Kenya without striking compromises. Political compromise is also important in building a cohesive society, which is resilient against radicalisation.

Many Kenyans are unemployed. Many of these hustlers now have high expectations. Will Ruto fulfil their hopes, as promised within his term in office? The president has a difficult job ahead of him.

Even the Bolsheviks, who led a social revolution in Russia and took over power in 1917, failed to satisfy the needs of the masses who had enthusiastically supported their successful quest for power. Hopefully, the Kenyan hustlers will be patient and not lose hope or fall prey to radicalisation.

At the national level, Ruto will have to use his negotiating skills to reconcile Kenyans. Presidential election loser Raila Odinga has a large following. How he is treated will determine whether Ruto’s presidency is successful or not. Likewise, the opposition must respect the government; praise the government when it

has done well; and constructively criticise the administration when it has done the wrong thing.

If politics is not enmity, but rivalry, then this is the time to come together as winners of Kenya’s united future – both in opposition and in government – until the next election when citizens shall again converge to make politicians account for their actions.

On the crucial security front, Kenya has had problems with secession threats, coup attempts, radicalisation and terror attacks. Although Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya have generally been contained, violent extremism is still latent. Ruto must not allow any security vacuum to be exploited by “bad elements”.

The bloody terrorist assault on the upmarket Nairobi Westgate Mall on September 21, 2013 was carried out by AlShabaab a few months after Kenyatta took over from Mwai Kibaki. The attack was one of the most serious raids carried out on Kenyan soil since independence in 1963.

A month after presidential and legislative elections in Kenya on August 9, and subsequent legal wrangles, a new administration led by President William Ruto has finally taken over the reins of power from President Uhuru Kenyatta’s government. Moses Onyango looks at the issues that the new leader will have to tackle as he tries to maintain his populist stance

Ruto’s strategy will be influenced by many other internal variables

It came several years after the US Embassy bombing during President Daniel arap Moi’s administration in 1998. Many Kenyans were either injured or lost their lives in this attack.

The Westgate Mall attack was a major test for the new administration of Uhuru Kenyatta and its capacity to deal with emerging security challenges. Kibaki’s administration had sent Kenyan troops into Somalia in October 2011 on Operation Linda Nchi (Swahili for protecting the country).

Kenya is a pivotal geostrategic regional and international partner in countering violent extremism in an unstable region threatened by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and parts of Kenya. Political instabilities in Ethiopia and South Sudan are also major concerns in the region.

The Westgate terror attack, though, was not the first threat to Kenya’s national security.

The country went to a war, referred to as “Shifta” (Somali word for Bandit), with secessionist Somalis in the Northern Frontier District from 1963 to 1967. This war defined the security architecture of the first president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, after he took over power from the British in 1963. Young Kenyans were mobilised to fight a common secessionist enemy and defend the sovereignty of their country, while the British government came to aid Kenya in its fight.

Moi took power after Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978. Thereafter, Kenya Air Force rebels staged a coup attempt in 1982 but it was thwarted by loyal forces. Moi consolidated his presidency and Kenya’s security system in his favour.

Although the security challenges in Kenya and the region differ in nature, there is a common thread in these challenges. They tested the presidencies of incumbents at their weakest moment: at the time of transition of power and shake up in the security systems. But each used the security challenges to consolidate power.

Jomo Kenyatta had just taken power in 1963 when the Shifta war erupted. The same applied to his son, Uhuru, who had just taken over from Kibaki in 2013 when a series of terror attacks engulfed the country.

Although the attacks during Kibaki’s administration came in his latter months in power, they were engineered at the weakest

moment of his administration: after a hand over of power from Moi resulting in major changes in government staff following the serious 2007/2008 post-election violence. Kibaki’s government of national unity was struggling with legitimacy and financial issues at the time.

Although there are still sporadic attacks on civilians, associated with AlShabaab in Mandera, Wajir and Garissa, attacks on security forces have generally been contained.

At the regional level, there is a new administration in Somalia that is friendly to Kenya and a former deputy leader and spokesman of Al-Shabaab has been appointed in the government, a move aimed at reconciliation. Will this result in peaceful co-existence in the region?

Other political and socio-economic grievances, though, are yet to be resolved in the region.

Al-Shabaab’s prominence and capability, although currently weakened in Somalia, is a product of the disorder that emerged in that country after the removal from power of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). It had brought some semblance of order after the chaotic situation that existed in the wake of the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1991.

Al-Shabaab emerged as the alternative power against the perceived influence of the Ethiopian military, which had moved into Somalia to overthrow the ICU.

However, the post-9/11 overthrow from power of the Taliban in Afghanistan by the US military, and ICU in Somalia by the US-backed Ethiopian forces no longer counts. The Taliban are back in power in Afghanistan, and a former Al-Shabaab deputy leader and spokesman is in the government in Somalia.

Meanwhile, the military regime of the late Prime Minister, Menes Zenawi, an ally of the US, which was instrumental in fighting the ICU, no longer has influence in Ethiopia.

At the international level, Joe Biden’s administration has made it clear that the US has no business fighting wars for other states. He has further made it clear that peacebuilding is not the responsibility of the US.

This policy pronouncement followed America’s abrupt withdrawal of its military forces from Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Russia’s war in Ukraine is redefining the global security architecture. NATO’s identification of Russia as a new security threat will redefine global security geostrategy.

Finally, on the security challenges, violent eruptions are often major challenges emanating from expensive and tension packed elections in Kenya, whereby the security machinery is overstretched, leaving some spaces unsecured.

Insecurity also arises when the government is shaken by the new administration through dismissals of staff perceived to have voted for the opposition, replacing them with new civil servants. The civil service must be apolitical for stability to prevail.

In the course of political transition or shortly thereafter, security gaps are often exploited by “bad elements” as the new government organises itself or while settling to fully engage in its functions. The presidency, security machinery – the intelligence, the police and the military – should take up this as a challenge, and address it appropriately, and come up with a contingency plan, where required.

AFRICA

Kenya is a pivotal geostrategic regional and international partner in countering violent extremism in an unstable region threatened by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and parts of Kenya

Dr Moses Onyango is a political scientist. He teaches International Relations at the United States International University-Africa (USIU-A). He is the Acting Chair of the International Relations Department at USIU-A and the Director of the Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IPPIA) in the school of Humanities and Social Sciences at USIU-A.

The transformation of Kenya’s electoral system

KENYA’S Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) announced on August 15 that President Uhuru Kenyatta’s Deputy, William Ruto, had won the 2022 presidential election following a closely contested race. The IEBC gave the tally as 50.49 per cent of the votes in favour of Ruto as against the 48.85 per cent of his closest challenger, Raila Odinga.

This was forthwith disputed by Odinga’s team and eight other petitioners, among them anti-corruption crusader John Githongo and four out of the seven electoral commissioners, who claimed that final tallying process and the statistical figures were of an “opaque nature”.

Odinga took the matter the Supreme Court, alleging several irregularities, multiple electoral fraud, voter suppression and inappropriate and forceful takeover of the IEBC by the commission’s chair, Wafula Chebukati. He claimed the chair had breached the Constitution and acted unilaterally.

Nonetheless, a unanimous ruling, read out by Chief Justice Martha Koome on September 5, rejected all these claims. Consequently, Ruto was declared the winner and was sworn in as the country’s fifth president on September 13.

This was Odinga’s fifth shot at the presidency, having also failed in 1997, 2007, 2013 and 2017.

Although the latest judgement said his team’s argument was “nothing more than hot air”, it is important to recognise the role Odinga’s legal petitions over the years have played in helping to shape the democratic process in Kenya.

In 2017, the Supreme Court established that there were problems with transmission

and verification of the results. This contributed to the reforms that were made in preparation for 2022 elections.

In 2013, the court ruled that results at the polling station were final. This made it mandatory to post polling station results at each station for the public to view and to compare with the online public portal run by the IEBC.

These two rulings made the elections in 2022 more efficient and transparent. As

the court itself admitted on September 5, Odinga’s latest petition would most likely result in “far-reaching” reforms in the electoral commission.

Odinga’s petitions have recognised the courts as the final arbiter of election

conflicts. This is remarkable in a country where a post-election dispute in 2007 led to widespread violence in which more than 1,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands internally displaced.

After yet another presidential election had to be settled after legal wranglings, the Kenyan judiciary has shown that it can act without undue political influence by making rulings that have helped to bring finality to election disputes and, thus, strengthen the democratic process, writes Kennedy Olilo

The electoral legal challenges have granted the judiciary a momentous opportunity to establish and enhance its independence ‘ ’

Kenya’s Supreme Court upheld Ruto’s victory

The court cases have granted the judiciary a momentous opportunity to establish and enhance its independence in a country where it is trying to strengthen its capacity and legitimacy. The reforms have helped Odinga’s supporters, the general public and other democracies in the world to appreciate the role that peaceful resolution of election conflicts can play in deepening democratic governance.

Also, unlike other democracies with experiences of internet shut downs, arrest of opposition party leaders and opportunistic incumbents trying to change the Constitution to stay in power, Kenya has overcome these malpractices. Even when Kenyatta was championing the 2020 Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill to stay in power indefinitely as Prime Minister, his efforts were halted by the judiciary, which ruled that the amendment was unconstitutional.

The push was thwarted primarily because the process was initiated by a sitting president. The opposition also accepted the court’s ruling and has promised to continue to institutionalise democracy.

“We have always stood for the rule of law and the Constitution,” Odinga said. “In this regard, we respect the opinion of the court although we vehemently disagree with their decision today.”

Furthermore, the internet was accessible to everyone.

However, during the run-up to the

vote on August 9, and its aftermath, misinformation and disinformation were rife. Besides limiting the rights of every citizen to access accurate information, it presented a new challenge to Kenya and weakened trust in its independent institutions.

Odinga has long been seen as an anti-

received from Kenyatta in 2022, Odinga could well have used the state apparatus to rig the election in his favour. This did not happen.

Largely, Kenyan politics and elections are not so much about ideological positions or even distinct policy differences. They are more to do with the ability to craft

Misinformation and disinformation presented a new challenge to Kenya and weakened trust in its independent institutions ‘ ’

establishment candidate. He has a common touch that resonates with Kenyans who have felt locked out of the power matrix controlled by two ethnic groups since independence in 1963: the Kikuyu and Kalenjin. His supporters have always believed he is the antidote to the rampant corruption and wanton nepotism, among other ills in society, that have defined, in varying degrees, the administrations of all the former presidents.

Odinga, to his supporters, is exiting the stage as a champion of constitutional reforms and electoral justice. As many cynics pointed out, given the support he

strategic coalitions built along ethnic lines. Consequently, in 2022, none of the presidential candidates, not even Odinga, ran on the same party or coalition platform they were on prior to this year’s elections.

The Kenyan Supreme Court became the first country in Africa to overturn a presidential election result when it did so in 2017 after finding the victory of the incumbent Kenyatta was tainted by irregularities.

Malawi became the second country in Africa to overturn a presidential election after its Supreme Court annulled the results in 2019 that declared the incumbent, President Peter Mutharika, as the winner. Opposition leader Lazarus Chakwera, who had claimed that the polls were characterised by anomalies and irregularities, subsequently won the new election. He became the first opposition candidate in Africa to win a repeat election after a nullification.

In all this, the number of questionable elections being held around the world is fuelling fears of a global democratic recession, whereby the will of the people is not reflected in the final results announced. In upcoming elections in countries such as in Nigeria in February 2023 and Sierra Leone in June 2023 the electorate will be wary of disputed outcomes.

But they could take heart from the Kenyan example whereby the judiciary over the years has proven itself capable of exercising independent judgement and bringing finality to elections.

Odinga has

anti-establishment candidate

Odinga, the eternal political activist

In October 2017, after yet another bruising presidential election contest in Kenya, Raila Odinga turned up in London, talking to anyone who might care to listen about the chicanery that was exposed by the courts, which then ordered the election to be contested again. Odinga withdrew from the race, clearing the way for President Uhuru Kenyatta to run the country for a second term. Desmond Davies caught up with Odinga five years ago, when the politician was in the UK, for a conversation. What he said then is still relevant today. Here are excerpts from that discussion

On political dynasties in Kenya.

Raila Odinga (RO): There's nothing like a political dynasty. You just have individuals and there is no comparison.

On his father’s name helping him to progress in politics.

RO: I am in politics, not by invitation from my father. I came into politics on my own. [The name] did not help me. It did not stop me from going to detention three times without trial for a total of nine years.

I have been part of the struggle with the people of Kenya to [make it a better place]. I've suffered for it. So, we cannot talk about dynasties [and] that my father’s name propelled me to where I am [today].

My political base, by the way, is

not from where I was born, where my name could help me. I have been running as a politician in a very cosmopolitan constituency in Nairobi, and I've been elected there seven times as a Member of Parliament.

So, I've no apologies to make. I am a Kenyan by right. Uhuru Kenyatta, [on the other hand], was invited into politics by President Daniel arap Moi who was his father's vice president. So, there is a big contrast between me and the kind of politicians you're talking about.

The determination of Kenyan opposition parties to challenge illegalities in the country.

RO: We have been very vibrant. I think Kenya is different from the other

[countries]. We have continued, in between elections, to point out the weaknesses and the ills in government. We have played a very effective role as an opposition, which is required in any kind of democracy: that the opposition [must] hold the government of the day to account.

We have been able to point out cases of corruption by this government of Uhuru Kenyatta; whether it was the issue of the National Youth Service scandal, the Eurobond scandal, the Ministry of Health scandal.

We've also talked about the cost of living, ethnic discrimination, unemployment. So, this is meant for very dynamic and competitive politics in Kenya.

Does Africa need ‘safari tourists’ disguised as international election observers?

SINCE the ushering in of multiparty politics in Africa, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the early 1990s, observation of elections by external organisations has been one of the mechanisms employed to ensure free and fair elections in these countries. Although such monitoring is also carried out by local groups, there seems to be a general view that the credibility or otherwise of elections are better established by external observers with no stake in the voting.

This could be a naïve view, though. Before any multi-party election in African states, a number of international organisations such as the, European Union, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and notable international NGOs such as the

Carter Centre and the National Democratic Institute line up to observer.

This is so important, African states have negotiated a treaty regime on democracy, which among other things, makes provision for election observation: the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, (ACDEG) adopted in 2007, and entered into force in 2012.

A kernel of this development has been the pressure towards periodic credible elections to choose Africa’s leaders. This process has been the closest alternative for the expression of the popular will. To the credit of international observers there have been instances when rigged elections have been exposed or at least reports by

observers have cast doubt on the outcome. An example was the Kenyan election of 2007 that led to violence.

External observers, though, are not limited to those from Europe and America. There have been Africans and institutions from the continent who equally adopt the restrictive approaches of the West for electoral observation and equally pretend that they are able to make authoritative pronouncements on elections.

Debate on the relevance of election observation has been going on for a while. The focus then was on the ill-preparedness of external observers who rush in, making pronouncements on the outcome of the polls and having just spent barely 24 hours in the country. Even a two-week stay may not be enough for one to understand all that is going on, especially before the day of the elections.

Kenya’s 2007 elections led to much rethink. Many lives were wantonly lost in spite of the presence of international observers. Clearly, they had been unable to learn from the incumbent government’s determination to keep President Mwai Kibaki in power at all costs.

This was when international election observers started justifying the need for a longer stay before and after an election. However, has a longer stay in a country helped in handling misgivings and reducing violent reactions to election results in Africa?

Definitely, but each case would need a detailed assessment. It seems the integrity of the leadership of the electoral bodies in Tunisia, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana and The Gambia has weighed more positively on the outcome than the presence of electoral tourists paid for with funds from the West.

It is not enough for foreign poll monitors to rush into a country and make pronouncements on election results after a short stay, argue Babafemi A. Badejo and Nana K. A. Busia, Jr., who say these observers would not fully understand the complexities at play, especially before the day of elections

The patronising manner in which electoral observers intentionally or inadvertently have been bungling in Africa needs to be faced squarely

In Kenya, although electoral observer missions were many, with credible leaders from Africa, Europe and America, they failed woefully to prevent deaths in the aftermath of the elections of August 8, 2017. They wittingly or unwittingly endorsed a well-orchestrated fraudulent electoral process that was structurally flawed.

In spite of many of the missions being in the country for long, they failed to pay enough attention to many telltale signs around them. These included many opposition-led court cases aimed at upholding the constitutional prescriptions for credible elections as well as the assassination of Chris Msando. His death should have led to an assessment of the readiness of Kenya to electronically transmit results collated at the constituency level, as indicated by the Kenyan Court of Appeal.

It is quite difficult to understand why most of what were likely to compromise the integrity of the elections were not picked up earlier by the observers. Those from the Carter Centre, for example, were quicker than others to have a rethink. But

their hasty and short-sighted statements, it would not have dared to make a declaration that President Uhuru Kenyatta had been duly elected for another term. Lives lost in reaction to the IEBC’s declaration would otherwise have been saved.

An opposition candidate had called a press conference at which he stated

Debate on the relevance of election observation has been going on for a while

many held on doggedly to their position that the elections had been free, fair and credible until the Supreme Court of Kenya ruled otherwise. This was a clear lesson for Africa and the US, if not the entire world, that a bold and credible judiciary is needed for free, fair and credible elections.

The court’s conclusion that there had been irregularities and illegalities clearly exposed the reluctance of many of these electoral tourists to listen to the warnings from opposition and civil society groups. For them, election observation by foreigners was a waste of money.

If the electoral tourists had not emboldened the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) with

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that the results streaming on TV were pre-programmed from hacked sources. He also held meetings with the different international observers, pleading with them to be circumspect in their conclusions.

He even said that if there was no evidence of hacking, he would be prepared to concede defeat.

Observers like John Kerry, the former US Secretary of State, would not have any of it. The electoral tourists should have shown integrity by telling the world that the complaints of the opposition, within hours of the polling, needed to be looked into first before they could make statements beyond the fact that voting was orderly.

The Chairman of the IEBC who had initially promised that there would be no pronunciation of results, until all paper forms had been received, would not have been rushed into making a false declaration that was a result of irregularities and illegalities.

The patronising manner in which electoral observers intentionally or inadvertently have been bungling in Africa needs to be faced squarely. Who or which organisations from Africa went to certify the election of President Donald Trump in the US?

If the presence of external electoral observation is not helping ordinary Africans in freely choosing their own leaders and also saving lives, what is the point of continuing to have them?

Kenya presents several lessons for international election observation. Most important, is for introspection and caution when pronouncing on election outcomes. These foreign observers must pay more attention to statements of concern from opposition politicians.

Unless the incumbent government allows transparent access to the full election process, there should be no categorical determination by external observers. The template now calls for radical change, given that the Kenyan judiciary has dented the reputation of international observation.

There were no African observers to certify Trump’s election in 2016

Babafemi A. Badejo is a former Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia and currently, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Chrisland University in Abeokuta, Nigeria Nana K. A. Busia Jr., is a former Senior Legal & Policy Advisor, UN, currently Research Fellow, Public International Law at the School of Advanced Study, University of London

Burkina Faso: jihadist attacks grow fiercer despite junta pledge

When mutinous soldiers ousted the democratically elected president in late January, they vowed to do a better job of securing the Sahelian country from terrorist attacks, but violence has only increased over the past five months, writes Sam Mednick

MILITANT attacks, which began in Burkina Faso in 2015, have pushed hunger levels to a six-year high in the country. And they have depopulated large parts of the countryside, forcing rural residents into urban centres where resources are increasingly stretched.

Burkinabé military sources say jihadists, linked to al-Qaeda and the socalled Islamic State, are using more sophisticated explosives and larger ammunition calibres as they seek to capture more territory. These attacks are draining public confidence in the junta, threatening coastal West African states, and worsening a humanitarian crisis that has now displaced almost two million people – around one in ten Burkinabé.

Aid groups say the fighters are adopting new tactics against civilians, like destroying water points. The militants are also spreading into parts of the country previously untouched by violence, while using their bases to launch cross-border raids on Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo.

Officials told The New Humanitarian that insecurity was shrinking their access to people in need, and that areas reachable by road just a few months ago now needed helicopters to enter.

Relief efforts are, meanwhile, being blunted by a lack of funds: Burkina Faso is

ranked the world’s second-most neglected displacement crisis by a leading aid group, despite the number of people fleeing their homes growing faster than most other emergencies.

“We don't know what Burkina is going to look like in six months if the situation continues like this,” said Mahamoudou Savadogo, founder of Granada Consulting, a local conflict analysis and research company.

When the junta, led by Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, seized power from President Roch Marc Kabore in January this year, it had plenty of well-wishers. The takeover came on the heels of a putsch in neighbouring Mali, where extremist attacks since 2012 have also turned people against their elected officials.

But the Burkinabé junta’s first month in charge saw 160,000 people uprooted, while more than 530 violent incidents occurred between February and May – a 115 per cent year-on-year rise – according to ACLED, a conflict monitoring organisation.

Since taking power, Damiba, who is now president, has laid out plans for a three-year transition ending with elections. The country remains suspended, however, from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

To tackle jihadist violence, Damiba has

reshuffled the army command, promoting younger soldiers with combat experience. He has also requested civilians vacate vast swathes of territory in “military interest zones” ahead of planned operations.

Softer measures have been announced too. Communities engaging in dialogue with jihadists to halt attacks are now receiving support from the government, while fighters willing to come out of the bush have been promised some livelihood assistance.

However, none of these policies have helped curtail the humanitarian crisis, which is overwhelming aid groups and local officials alike. In towns The New Humanitarian visited in recent months, displaced people said they were receiving little or no support.

“We have no food, there are no jobs, and the living space is too small,” said Binto Ouedraogo, at a displaced person’s site in the northern town of Ouahigouya. Despite being displaced nearly one year ago, she told The New Humanitarian she had received food aid only once. “Three bowls of corn isn’t enough to cook for the family,” she said of the relief package she was given.

Conditions are tough in the urban centres where most displaced people are staying. In the northern town of Djibo, for example, the population has grown from 60,000 to around 300,000 during the conflict, according to government and UN statistics.

“[The displaced] find themselves in cities where they face new risks, such as exploitation, violence, or forced recruitment, and with limited opportunities,” said Abdouraouf GnonKonde, country representative of the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR. “You must make sure they have somewhere to live, something to eat and drink. If they are sick, you must care for them.”

Displaced people face particular challenges accessing services in Ouagadougou. The previous government

Transport constraints: there are

two helicopters in the country to fly relief items and personnel to provide

Sam Mednick

ANALYSIS

Humanitarian.

International aid agencies had a fractious relationship with the pre-coup administration. Some had their activities temporarily suspended, while others complained that government control over relief efforts slowed down their ability to respond.

Damiba’s appointment of the former head of the Burkinabé Red Cross as a humanitarian affairs minister has raised hopes that things may proceed more smoothly going forward. But aid officials and diplomats who have spoken to Damiba told The New Humanitarian he offered no clear plans for how to improve the humanitarian situation, beyond telling them he needs assistance.

sought to deny their presence in the capital and even tried to block them from settling there, according to humanitarian groups.

Still, Ouagadougou residents have felt a responsibility to help the displaced. “You must make sure they have somewhere to live, something to eat and drink. If they are sick, you must care for them,” said a local imam, requesting anonymity due to security fears.

In some towns, however, friction between displaced people and their hosts has grown as time passes and more people request help. In Ouahigouya, for example, displaced people said they were often chased from the forest by locals when searching for firewood.

“The [host community] is not very welcoming,” said Lamoussa Sawadogo, head of a displacement site in Ouahigouya. “We have no food, no space to sleep, and no money to take care of people.”

Hunger is also rising as people are pushed from their farms and prevented from cultivating crops. Agricultural production is expected to decline by 10 per cent this year, even as food costs for the average household increase by 30 per cent, according to the UN.

Nearly 3.5 million of the country’s 21 million population are currently facing food insecurity – a 20 per cent increase from 2021 – while more than 630,000 are facing starvation, according to UN statistics shared with The New Humanitarian but not publicly available.

Hunger is particularly acute in villages controlled by jihadists. Residents are often afraid to farm because of attacks near their fields, while aid groups struggle to reach these places because of insecurity and the challenge of negotiating access with militants.

Djibo residents also told The New Humanitarian that soldiers had been

preventing them from bringing food to friends and relatives in rural areas outside the town for fear it will end up in jihadist hands.

“There are families [in villages] that spend three or four days without cooking,” said Alpha Ousmane Dao, director of Seracom, a local aid group in Djibo. “First, the harvest was very bad [and] second, lots of people didn’t cultivate due to the insecurity."

Towns blockaded by jihadists also face food shortages. Since February, for example, fighters have restricted the movement of goods and people into Djibo, which is controlled by the government and hosts military forces.

The blockade, one of many jihadists are imposing in the country, has severely damaged Djibo’s economy, with demand collapsing at a local cattle market that is one of the largest in the region. Also, the World Food Programme, for example, has been unable to access Djibo by road since December. Supplies positioned pre-siege ran out in March, while cash vouchers have limited value given how little food is getting in.

Some private traders have risked delivering goods by trucks to Djibo, but roadside bombs and attacks are frequent. When The New Humanitarian visited the town in May, an incoming convoy was ambushed, according to internal aid worker security reports.

In recent weeks, negotiations between Djibo community leaders and jihadists –undertaken with the junta’s blessing and logistical support – have slightly eased the blockade, allowing people to get in and out of the town more easily. Yet more than 1.2 million people across the country are currently unable to move freely, Barbara Manzi, the UN’s resident and humanitarian coordinator in Burkina Faso, told The New

Lack of cash is, meanwhile, hindering relief efforts. Under 50 per cent of the money requested from donors by the UN in 2021 was provided, while only around 15 per cent of the $590 million called for this year has come through so far – a gap other aid missions are also facing.

The UN’s Manzi said operational costs for aid groups had spiked with rising food, fuel, and fertiliser prices – a partial consequence of the Ukraine war. More funds are now needed to reach the same number of people, forcing agencies to prioritise services.

“If people don’t get education, the impact is big. If they don't get water immediately, they're going to die. Both are important, and it’s a difficult choice, but saving lives is the imperative now,” Manzi said.

Access is also a challenge for aid groups. In the last year, two major roads have been rendered unusable – the KayaDori axis, which is one of the main ways to reach the conflict-hit Sahel region; and the road from Ouagadougou to Djibo.

The road closures have forced humanitarian groups to rely on helicopters to transport relief items and personnel across the country. But there are only two helicopters in the country, and space constraints on board mean fewer supplies are being distributed.

With little humanitarian assistance and no end in sight to the violence, many local residents told The New Humanitarian they were questioning whether Damiba’s junta would really live up to its promises.

“Damiba found himself in a situation that was already bad,” said Salamata Nacanabo, a displaced woman in Ouahigouya, the northern town. “It is hard for him to stop things from getting worse.”

Djibo leaders caught in the middle of the conflict: the community’s economy is being destroyed by the jihadist blockade

Credit: Sam Mednick

The New Humanitarian travelled to Djibo using the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), which is managed by the World Food Programme

Terrorism: to report or not to report?

As terrorists become wise in the ways of the workings of the media, governments around the world are taking umbrage at any attempt by journalists to give the “oxygen of publicity” to extremists. But how should the media strike a balance between undertaking their responsibilities and ensuring state security? Gorata Chepete explores the complications involved, focusing on the Sahel

TERRORISM is a constant menace to peace and security in the Sahel region. Every day, words such as banditry, violent extremism, insurgency and terrorism make the headlines in the media, coupled with horrifying pictures and videos. For those in authority, such coverage adds to a sense of helplessness among the civilian population.

In recent videos that have been circulated showing terror activities in countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso, the media has been accused of unwittingly glamourising terrorist organisations. Also, organised crimes such as kidnappings and human trafficking are painted as the most lucrative business ventures in the region.

This narrative is quite harmful especially to a large population of unemployed young people who mostly roam the streets. Not surprisingly, terrorist organisations have gone further to promise jobs to young people, and this is often explicitly covered by the media.

Though there is a consensus that the criminal justice systems in the Sahel have failed dismally to protect civilians, it is, on the other hand, harmful to sell the idea that

looks like a better alternative: a guaranteed source of income and status. To a young girl whose family has been displaced, what would be a better alternative than to get married to a terrorist so that she could be protected and receive basic necessities?

For those who had decided not to lift a gun anymore, they would draw the conclusion that the only way to survive and

suddenly help governments in gathering vital intelligence from these reports. What insensitive reporting does is, it further cripples the already failing criminal justice systems, and, moreover, it re-victimises survivors of violence, perpetuates the violent cycle and gives terrorists the boost they need.

Civilians in the Sahel have experienced violence for decades now and so what they do not want to hear or see are the continual brutal killings, kidnappings and violence. Media coverage of such activities do not have to be traumatising in order to trigger discourse on terrorism, especially in the Sahel.

if the government cannot provide security, then these groups can be a safe haven for citizens.

To an unemployed young person watching these videos, they provide what

protect themselves was to go back to their old ways: violence. Therefore, this creates a vicious cycle of violence.

It is illusionary to assume that constant reporting of terrorists’ activities would

It is high time the media plays its part in contributing towards the attainment of peace through giving peace practices the same coverage as it does to normal news reporting. This includes interviewing survivors of violence who are now participating in peace practices; telling success stories of civilians who live together in peace

Freed Chibok girls in Nigeria: Media reporting should include interviewing survivors of violence who are now participating in peace practices

It is illusionary to assume that constant reporting of terrorists’ activities would suddenly help governments in gathering vital intelligence

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regardless of their differences; as well as profiling civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations that are working tirelessly to ensure better lives for survivors.

The media can also serve as an advocacy tool that can shape narratives, which can help to restore war-torn communities. Civilians rely heavily on the main means of communication – radio and television, newspapers, magazines and the internet – to stay on top of issues. In most instances, social media comes into play since it is easily accessible and has the capacity to circulate news rapidly as opposed to traditional media.

In a bid to maintain an informed citizenry, it is, without doubt, the responsibility of every government to disseminate relevant information to the public. The state also has the prerogative to protect private information, what is often referred to as intelligence, from the general public in the interest of national security.

This prerogative can be abused or overused by governments, where they even withhold information that is not sensitive. In an ideal world, the media should not be regulated by the government or sanctioned; it should exist as a neutral body that does not side with the government or the people.

The ineffectiveness of governments, the African Union and international organisations in countering terrorism in

the Sahel region should be exposed, and rightfully so. However, the impression that constant reporting on terror attacks will pressurised governments to react is just what it is, a fallacy. It rather traumatises

target the audience and how they react to their activities. Without the existence of the media, the terrorists know that their activities would not reach the greater population, making it difficult for them to

The ineffectiveness of governments, the AU and international organisations in countering terrorism in the Sahel region should be rightly exposed ‘ ’

civilians and pushes them to join these groups out of fear and desperation and exacerbates vigilantism. While there is a general eagerness from the public to obtain information about terrorist activities, the media has to strike a balance between disseminating such information and sensationalising terrorism.

Terrorists exploit the media for the benefit of spreading propaganda, gathering information, recruiting and fund raising. In most instances, terrorists

recruit, secure funding or try to justify their actions.

This is why terrorists always feel the need to claim attacks, film videos and agree to be interviewed by international media agencies with huge following. They know exactly whose attention they want and what outcomes they are aiming for.

Terrorists benefit a lot from the media; they want to be seen and they want to push a narrative that they are in control. At a point where they have successfully inflicted fear both on the government and the civilians, they use that window to negotiate, buy more weapons, recruit and reaffirm their mission.

When there is huge media coverage of terrorist attacks like kidnappings of school children, this gives terrorists an incentive to hold them captive for a long period to put pressure on the government. They want as much publicity as possible to secure a good deal.

Undoubtedly, there is a mutually beneficial relationship between the media and terrorist organisations. While that relationship exists, the media should be accorded its right to freedom, which will ensure that citizens enjoy their right to know. Similarly, there has to be a communication balance and a distinction between frightening the public and causing chaos by sensationalising terrorism and enlightening the public in war-torn communities.

Gorata Chepete is a Fellow on the African Leadership Centre’s Peace, Security and Development Fellowship Programme for Early Career Women in partnership with King’s College London. She has a background in criminology and is currently focusing on terrorism and counterterrorism

Terrorists want to be seen and they want to push a narrative that they are in control

Young Africans caught in a bind need to be freed

Almost 60 per cent of the population of Africa is under the age of 25, making the continent the region with the highest number of young people in the world. This has presented both opportunities and challenges for governments. Fobizshi Grace Shiri looks at the factors holding back marginalised youths and suggests changes that will make a difference to them

THERE is no denying that African governments, over the years, have been making efforts to improve life for their citizens economically, socially and politically. But at the same time, there has been a rapid population growth in Africa that has led to unemployment, poverty, desperation and an increase in crime among young people throughout the continent.

For example, studies showed that the sub-Saharan African unemployment rate for 2021 was 7.66 per cent, a 0.38 per cent increase from 2020. South Africa in 2021, registered the highest unemployment rate in Africa with 34 per cent of the county’s labour force not in work.

The impact of this situation has been borne most heavily by the youthful population, who, even after some quality education, cannot find gainful employment, giving them a feeling of hopelessness for the future.

The slow growth rate of industrialisation in Africa, for instance, is inhibiting job creation. Most African countries are involved mostly in resource production such as in agriculture, fisheries,

of these African countries. Manufacturing and the services sector are mostly in the hands of foreign investors or corporations who cart away a high percentage of the profits.

In some cases, governments are involved in these enterprises, but they are not run properly to be successful financially, such as many state-owned

State-owned enterprises have collapsed because of incompetent managers appointed out of nepotism and tribal sentiments

timber production and mining. These activities are carried out mostly by small holders using mainly non-mechanised labour.

The more lucrative sectors of the economy are still underdeveloped in most

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airlines and banks that have collapsed. They have failed because of incompetent managers appointed out of nepotism and tribal sentiments. Most of these government corporations are noted for corruption and embezzlements of funds.

Development efforts in these countries

are also stifled by political instability, civil unrest, and wars. For instance, in 2018 youth unemployment in South Sudan was at 12 per cent as a result of the country’s continued political instability since its independence in 2011.

In war-torn African countries, projects costing huge sums of money are abandoned midway due to insecurity caused by wars, resulting in a huge waste of finances and loss to the economy, adding young people to the list of the jobless.

The list of obstacles in the way of development in Africa is a long one: insecurity; poor management of resources; poor urban infrastructure; the effects of climate change in areas such as the Sahel; religious intolerance; and discrimination against women and girls, to name a few.

But the high rate of unemployment among young Africans is the main problem for their discontentment with their governments. This situation has already determined the mindset of these young

Africa’s youth demographic presents both opportunities and challenges for governments

people when thinking about their future.

Not surprisingly, the high rate of unemployment and poverty plaguing these countries has rendered many of

far from the reality they are faced with. Their documents are confiscated by the traffickers and they find it hard to be part of the formal economy, to find housing and

loss of skilled labour necessary for their development. The continent is losing its highly needed medical staff, engineers, technicians, teachers, lawyers, administrators and managerial staff.

Clearly, what is needed now is for African governments to come up with solutions to curb this migration of the young among their population. In all this, young people need to see measures put in place that could bring change for the better to stop them from thinking of fleeing abroad.

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receive medical treatment.

the continent’s young people jobless, poor, frustrated, and with no hope for the future. They have lost confidence in their countries and strongly believe that greener pastures, and any hope for the future, can only be found abroad, especially in developed countries.

Hence the increased rate of movements of African youths to Europe, the US, the Middle East, and, to a lesser extent, Asia and the Far East countries. Unsurprisingly, there are unscrupulous groups that are feeding off this frustration by offering to assist those who want to flee. But the routes are unsafe and full of great dangers.

Many have died on this hazardous journey, but this has not deterred others from taking the risk. This epitomises the height of desperation among the continent’s neglected young people.

For those who make it, they soon discover that what they were promised is

Finding themselves working in the informal economy, these migrants from Africa are exploited by dishonest employers who pay them starvation wages. They then find themselves caught in a vicious circle: they do not have enough money to survive or to send home to friends and relatives, which was the object of the journey in the first place, and they are constantly on the lookout for the immigration authorities.

This migration is costing African nations a serious brain-drain and

As a start, Africa needs stable governments and societies, where there is peace and tranquillity because there can never be development in an unstable society. Primary industries should be mechanised, so as to increase production. More emphasis should be placed on the development of secondary and tertiary industrial sectors to open up more room for development and employment.

Emphasis must be placed on education in science and technology to prepare young people for work in the future. More schools should be opened in rural areas with incentives such as grants and low-interest loans to provide opportunity for young people in these regions that do not get the

needed support from governments.

African governments should promote tolerance in their various societies, discouraging social, sex, racial, religious and other forms of discrimination, giving equal opportunity to everyone.

They should be more prudent in their negotiation with foreign investors so that African countries do not lose out on the profits from their natural assets. These governments should combat corruption, waste and nepotism at all levels in their societies.

Achieving these will go a long way in making society more attractive for the younger generation, giving them back their confidence so as not to make migration a necessary option.

African governments need to come up with solutions to curb the migration of young members of their population

Migrants strongly believe that greener pastures, and any hope for the future, can only be found abroad ‘ ’

Fobizshi Grace Shiri is an undergraduate student of law at the University of Buea in Cameroon

Migration is costing African nations a serious brain-drain and loss of skilled labour necessary for their development

Opening the doors to opportunities for Kenyan girls

Africa Briefing: When was the Centre formed and what was the rationale behind it? From what backgrounds do those who have benefited from the Centre come?

Nyawira Wahito: Resource Centre for Women and Girls (RCWG) was founded in 2007 to respond to the rising number of deaths among adolescent girls due to HIV and HIV-related illnesses in the Eastern part of Kenya. Most girls found themselves in situations where they could not negotiate for safe sex, either due to the power dynamics or lack of awareness.

This saw an increased number of unwanted pregnancies, which led girls to a forced transition to adulthood without the knowledge, skills and confidence to navigate through life. Despite this happening in many communities, there was no response to the issue of unwanted pregnancies either by the community or the government. HIV was also a taboo

subject and people did not want to confront the issue, let alone confront the idea that girls were either having sex voluntarily or being abused sexually. The priority at the time was finding treatment for HIV and recording statistics of the high number of HIV cases in Kenya.

HIV campaign messaging for adolescents and young adults was centred on abstinence. Therefore, conversations about sex, sexuality and early sexual encounters were non-existent.

After conducting research on the ground, RCWG saw a high need and knowledge gap and responded by founding a programme as a pilot to answer to this. The Girls’ Mentoring Retreats were, therefore, created specifically for girls in this part of Kenya to enable spaces where they access information, skills and a network of mentors and sisters for support and exchange of ideas.

After three years of running the pilot programme, there was a need to reach out to girls from other counties in Kenya, because the challenges were similar, with stark knowledge and information gaps. To date we have reached out to girls from every county in Kenya and have grown from a small organisation to a reputable institution impacting lives of rural adolescent girls and young women in the entire country.

AB: How successful has the Centre been in providing support for those on its programme?

NW: RCWG has been very successful in supporting the community of Adolescent Girls and Young Women (AGYW) we work with. When RCWG was founded, very few organisations working with girls existed, let alone for girls in rural areas.

We are happy to have been the pacesetters on that front and realise that

Peer mentoring: RCWG participants are helped with personal awareness to make informed decisions about their lives

this work has led to a shift in attitudes towards girls. We are seeing a larger number of girls being educated formally and informally to circumvent some of the issues that led to the founding of RCWG.

Since the onset, we have run programmes for girls every year with expansion of our reach to all counties in Kenya. Girls continue to engage even after they have graduated from the Retreats and support the programme by peer mentoring or through monetary support and volunteer engagements.

Nationally and internationally, we have grown and become visible in the women’s movement, The success of our work has led to acclamation and recognition which has resulted in RCWG being an international award-winning organisation.

Institutionally, RCWG is an established organisation with a functioning team of young women who are all alumnae of the Girls’ Retreats and seeking to expand

Nyawira Wahito, Assistant Director of the Resource Centre for Women and Girls in Kenya, tells Africa Briefing of the transformative work the organisation has been doing among the country’s vulnerable young women

Stepping up: Nyawira Wahito, a beneficiary of the RCWG, is being prepared to take over as Director

engagement to include young women in higher institutions of learning.

In the community, teachers are seeking us out to engage with them and their schools and staying consistent with their interaction with RCWG. The local government is supporting the work we do with girls by providing access and technical support; and generally, we have been successful because of the critical mass of young women we have produced who are spread out around the world, leading in different ways in the spaces they occupy.

AB: What have some of the women and girls who have used the Centre achieved?

NW: Girls who have been through RCWG have made numerous achievements in their lives. RCWG has enabled spaces and accorded girls and young women the luxury to dream and be ambitious, as well as supported in the pursuit of these ambitions.

We have young entrepreneurs running various businesses, academics and researchers, finance and medical practitioners, girl activists and others working in the corporate sector as well as the care economy.

Our training at RCWG is centred on, and strongly emphasises, the importance of education. Girls are encouraged to pursue

education from the basic to highest level. Despite the different obstacles that attempt to hinder this for many young women that we work with, many have seen this ambition through. We are proud to have alumnae pursuing their Bachelors, Master’s and PhD degrees in reputable universities in Kenya, Germany, the UK and the US.

One such alumna is currently based in the coastal town of Kilifi, working at the Aga Khan Hospital after having been awarded a Master’s at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Several alumnae are deployed in different hospitals all around Kenya, having pursued careers in nursing, pharmacy and as general medical practitioners. This has been one of the critical markers of success and achievements by our beneficiaries and alumnae.

A significant and unique achievement we have had has been having a team of alumnae sitting at the helm of RCWG’s leadership, steering the mission and vision of the organisation. They are young women who use their stories of transformation on the frontlines of this work to change the lives of their peers through our programme with girls.

A highlight of this leadership practice is that I am being coached and prepared to take over the top leadership of the organisation as the Director. This is an

ANALYSIS

attestation to the success of our revolving door policy and the practice of feminist leadership as our guiding principle.

AB: Is the Centre providing a real need in Kenyan society? And, generally, what is the position of women and girls in Kenya? Are they being empowered so that they can be an asset to the country and Africa?

NW: In a recent revelation by the government of Kenya, the country currently ranks third worldwide in teenage pregnancies. AGYW are among the key populations affected by HIV/AIDs and most vulnerable to sexual and genderbased violence.

They operate in extremely difficult contexts, usually at the margins of society. We target girls at their convenience, as we believe that change will need to come from the periphery, and that is where innovation is driven by necessity such as the burning desire to survive.

Our model of intervention is therefore at the point where innovation is pushed by this necessity, usually led by girls and young women. Therefore, AGYW must be invested in through enabling opportunities for autonomous decision making about their lives, bodies, education and health.

RCWG responds to these needs by being an enabler for girls to access spaces for personal development, leadership, Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights education, academic excellence, peace education and human rights.

AGYW are, therefore, equipped with strategies to combat and reverse retrogressive trends and cycles that continue to impede their access to basic rights as a precursor to investing in current and future generations of empowered women, who are thriving and driving transformative change in their communities, the country and the continent as a whole.

AB: How is the Centre funded? Is there any support from the government?

NW: We are funded by people and institutions who believe in our vision and have recognised the importance of investing in girls. The government does not financially support RCWG.

Nyawira Wahito holds a Master’s in Security, Leadership and Society from King’s College London’s School of Global Studies, and a Bachelor’s in Sociology and Philosophy from the University of Nairobi. She was one of the young women who benefited from the Resource Centre for Women and Girls’ (RCWG) Empowerment Retreats. Wahito is currently the assistant director at the RCWG where she is undergoing coaching and mentoring to serve as the next Director

Making their point: young women at the RCWG give frank responses to questions about their social roles

Sexual empowerment programme: most girls found themselves in situations where they could not negotiate for safe sex

Transatlantic slave trade: the other side of the coin

The issue of the return to Nigeria of Benin Bronzes looted by British troops in February 1897 from the ancient kingdom has been in the headlines recently. While many argue in favour of the artefacts to be sent back, an African American group fighting for “slavery justice” does not support the idea. The Restitution Study Group contends that the bronzes would benefit the descendants of African slave traders. This has raised a few hackles among those who say that Africans were not responsible for the odious trade in human beings. Max Siollun looks at this thorny debate

SLAVERY remains an emotionally charged and difficult topic to address. The descendants of its perpetrators respond to it today with guilt, indifference or defiant denial. On the other hand, the descendants of its victims tend to hold Europeans solely responsible and minimise African complicity in the trade.

A common defence of slavery is that it existed in Africa before Europeans started the transatlantic slave trade. Slavery did indeed exist before European arrival in West Africa. However, its status was fluid.

A slave’s position was not always permanent. Slaves could emerge out of slavery and attain high status and leadership in society.

For example, one of the most influential chiefs in southern Nigeria, Jaja of Opobo, was a slave who rose to become one of the most powerful figures in his region. Additionally, many emirs who ruled northern Nigeria were sons of slave women.

The transatlantic slave trade intensified the demand for African slaves. As the trade became more lucrative and the demand for slaves increased, African slave traders terrorised their neighbouring communities, engaged in slave-raiding expeditions, and triggered artificial wars to capture slaves for sale to Europeans.

Although transatlantic slavery was a one-way ticket, and slaves could not return from America to warn their kinsmen of its horrors, in their quest for quick profit African slave dealers blinded themselves to the devastation they brought to their

neighbouring communities and ethnic groups.

Although it was not intentional, the slave trade disrupted West Africa in a manner that made it vulnerable to conquest by Britain. The fear of being captured and sold into slavery made some Africans voluntary prisoners of their own villages and cities.

Venturing too far away from home carried a risk of being captured by slave hunters. This inhibited inter-community and inter-ethnic alliances and cooperation.

This lack of inter-ethnic patriotism later came back to haunt Africans and

contributed to their inability to form a united coalition to oppose British invasion and rule. Slavery also drained the population of its able-bodied adult population, leaving behind the elderly and young children.

The first British ships to reach the land that later became Nigeria were led by Captain Windham and arrived in the Bight of Benin in 1533. Portugal and Spain were the leading slave-trading nations, but Britain eventually surpassed both of them.

Britain entered the slave in 1663 when King Charles II granted the Company of the Royal Adventurers of England Trading into Africa a royal charter and monopoly

In the 54 years between 1676 and 1730, Benin shipped 730,000 slaves

on trade in Africa. The company was contracted to supply slaves to British colonies in the West Indies.

Britain became the leading figure in a triangular three-continent trade in which Europeans would travel to Africa, buy slaves there, then export them to the Americas. Badagry, Lagos, Elem Kalabari (Old Calabar), Bonny and Calabar (New Calabar) became major trading ports.

The number of slaves exported was staggering. In the 20 years between 1680 and 1700, according to conservative British estimate, Englishmen alone shipped at least 300,000 African slaves. In the 54 years between 1676 and 1730, Benin shipped 730,000 slaves (42 per cent of all slaves taken from the African continent during that time period).

Slavery became so routinised and associated with this part of West Africa that the area became known as the Slave Coast. In the 17th century the cost of a male slave was 13 iron bars and a female slave nine iron bars. To give some idea of the “price” of a human being, one iron bar could buy half a gallon of brandy, a bunch of beads, or a piece of textile.

In 1713 the Treaty of Utrecht granted

Britain a 30-year monopoly on the slave trade. Although European businesses that traded in Africa were often owned by wealthy men, the traders and crew who worked for them were not from the upper

combined with a growing abolitionist movement by Christians, eventually led to Britain’s decision in 1807 to make it illegal for its citizens to engage in the slave trade with effect from 1 January 1808.

echelons of society.

A British slave ship captain named Hugh Crow said that “many of the individuals composing [slave ship crews] were the very dregs of the community: some of them had escaped from jails; others were undiscovered offenders, who sought to withdraw themselves from their country lest they should fall into the hands of the officers of justice.”

According to Crow, “these wretched beings used to flock to Liverpool and attach themselves to sailing crews as a convenient method of absconding abroad to escape justice. Placing vulnerable slaves under the supervision of such criminals led to an astonishing level of casual cruelty”.

Britain’ increasing industrialisation,

After abolishing the slave trade, Britain stationed a naval squadron off the West African coastline to intercept slave ships heading for the Americas. The slaves recovered from these ships were sent to Sierra Leone and resettled in a colony of freed slaves on land bought from locals. This land was later christened “Freetown” and remains the capital of Sierra Leone to this day.

Britain’s abolition of the slave trade produced a generation of emancipated slaves who received a British education in Sierra Leone, converted to Christianity, and became Britain’s representatives for the spread of Christianity in West Africa.

Max Siollun is a historian and author who specialises in Nigeria’s past, focusing on the country’s military. The above are excerpts from his latest book, What Britain Did To Nigeria, published in 2021 by Hurst, London

‘Transatlantic slavery was a one-way ticket, and slaves could not return from America to warn their kinsmen of its horrors

Fintech in Africa: the end of the beginning

BETWEEN 2020 and 2021, the number of tech start-ups in Africa tripled to around 5,200 companies. Just under half of these are fintechs, which are making it their business to disrupt and augment traditional financial services. A recent analysis by global management consulting firm, McKinsey, shows that African fintechs have already made significant inroads into the market, with estimated revenues of around $4 billion to $6 billion in 2020 and average penetration levels of between 3 and 5 percent (excluding South Africa). These figures are in line with global market leaders.

One industry leader told McKinsey that rather than a “fintech disruption,” the continent is experiencing a “fintech eruption,” and local and international investors are taking notice. African fintech is emerging as a hotbed for investment, with average deal sizes growing and the proportion of fintech funding in Africa increasing over the past year, bringing jobs and growth to African economies. And the story is only just beginning. As fintech matures, financial services on the continent are at an inflection point, and several African countries have a significant opportunity to capitalise on the momentum of recent years to unlock further potential in the sector.

Despite a slowdown in funding in line with global trends, McKinsey expects significant growth and value creation to lie ahead for the fintech industry in Africa. “Cash is still used in around 90 percent of transactions in Africa, which means that fintech revenues have huge potential to grow. If the sector overall can reach similar levels of penetration to those seen in Kenya, a country with one of the highest

levels of fintech penetration in the world, we estimate that African fintech revenues could reach eight times their current value by 2025,” says the report.

McKinsey analysis estimates that Africa’s financial-services market could grow at about 10 percent per annum, reaching about $230 billion in revenues by 2025 ($150 billion excluding South Africa, which is the largest and most mature market on the continent). Nimble fintech players have wasted no time carving out a share of this expanding market. As the fastest-growing start-up industry in Africa, the success of fintech companies is being fuelled by several trends, including increasing smartphone ownership, declining internet costs, and expanded network

coverage, as well as a young, fast-growing, and rapidly urbanising population. The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated existing trends toward digitalisation and created a fertile environment for new technology players, even as it caused significant hardship and disrupted lives and livelihoods across the continent.

“Our analysis shows that fintech players are delivering significant value to their customers. Their transactional solutions can be up to 80 percent cheaper and interest on savings up to three times higher than those provided by traditional players, while the cost of remittances may be up to six times cheaper,” McKinsey says.

The African fintech space is growing exponentially, but the development of

Africa’s fintech industry is coming of age. In the face of political and economic challenges and a global pandemic, fintech on the continent is booming. Global management consultants McKinsey predict what comes next

the fintech ecosystem is still in the early stages. While fintechs have made significant inroads in Africa—notably in wallets, payments, and distribution—there is still plenty of room for expansion. As the market matures, unique white spaces are identifiable in almost all areas of financial services.

However, fintech start-ups in Africa are facing four key challenges on the road to sustainability: reaching scale and profitability, navigating an uncertain regulatory environment, managing scarcity, and building robust corporate governance foundations.

While the opportunity across the African continent for fintech growth is significant, in certain regions, the total addressable market (the relevant category of viable customers) is limited by infrastructure constraints. These typically include weak mobile and internet penetration in some markets,

lack of identification coverage, and limited payment rails—the backbone of all digital transfers of money. Across Africa, just three countries have real-time payments and the necessary payment rail infrastructure in place.

Fintechs aiming to scale across the continent may need to take this geographic variability into account and tailor their approach to each country based on its inherent characteristics, infrastructure, regulatory frameworks, and varying customer needs and habits.

Achieving scale is also just one part of a successful growth journey. Lower disposable income and lower customer loyalty in Africa make it harder for fintechs to build viable and profitable business models through customer monetisation, even with a large customer base; thus, finding ways to lower customer acquisition cost is vital. Assuming similar investment levels per customer, it is almost four times

harder to achieve profitability in Africa than it is in Latin America, and 13 times harder than it is in the European Union.

In addition to uneven infrastructure across markets, fintechs in Africa also have to contend with a fragmented financial regulatory framework. Different countries are evolving at different paces. While regulatory bodies in some countries are starting to support the development of an enabling environment—for example, by creating fintech sandboxes, updating licensing requirements, and implementing digital KYC (Know Your Customer) regulations—in general, complex and variable regulations, including license approval processes, can make it difficult for fintechs to ensure business continuity and compliance across markets.

Fintechs may find that they can’t adapt fast enough in some markets to keep up with regulation, which, along with the degree of enforcement, can sometimes

change quickly. In other markets, fintechs may find they are moving faster than the regulators, which creates a whole new set of challenges. Furthermore, entrepreneurs and investors can be exposed to fluctuating exchange rates and strict foreign-exchange control in some countries, which make it harder to maintain consistency.

Businesses don’t run on infinite resources. Time, money, and people need to be managed effectively to launch and sustain growth. After record-breaking fintech investment in 2021, funding is slowing down, especially for later-stage start-ups. But with incumbents starting to catch up with disruptors, fintechs can’t afford to slow down their progress. This suggests that African fintechs will likely have to tighten their belts to adjust to a new venture funding reality. Y Combinator (YC), a US-based technology start-up accelerator, has advised its community of over 7,000 founders to expect and plan for the worst, cut costs, and extend their runway because “during economic downturns even top-tier venture capital funds slow down their deployment of capital. This causes less competition between funds for deals that result in lower valuations, lower round sizes, and many fewer deals completed.” As a result, it may be necessary to find ways to boost local participation in venture financing. Currently, about 70 percent of fintech start-up deals are financed by investors headquartered outside of Africa, most of them in North America. Additionally, most locally financed deals are for early-stage start-ups.

Successful fintechs will likely need an ambitious strategy to attract, develop, and retain the very best talent. According to some estimates, about 50 percent of Africa’s software developers are based in just five countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, Kenya, and Egypt). What’s more, this concentrated pool of talent is in demand not just in Africa but globally. The World Bank estimates that there is a significant “brain drain” of information and communications technology professionals from low- and middle-income countries every year as they seek better employment opportunities and higher wages in countries where the digital sector is more developed. Successful fintechs will need to navigate these twin challenges of scarcer capital and increasing competition for talent to thrive going forward.

Ensuring world-class corporate governance is likely to be a critical factor

in enabling fintechs to navigate this uncertain and fragmented terrain, manage scarcity, and successfully reach scale and profitability. An effective governance structure can help to build a strong, positive organizational culture that provides stability, clarity, and direction—even in difficult times.

There are three broad characteristics of a healthy corporate governance model: strong culture building, productive stakeholder engagement, and a clear talent strategy to build the organisation’s capabilities. While matching a fintech’s value proposition to the right market may be a critical first step in building a successful start-up, to maintain momentum, it is necessary to define routines, norms, and processes that are shared and understood by everyone in the organisation. In today’s world of hybrid working, this is even more critical than before. And because fintechs can evolve rapidly, it is vital that they have

a well-developed compliance foundation to actively manage regulatory change and avoid falling foul of regulators—a challenge many are starting to face.

Fintechs operating in Africa will know that there are no quick wins on the continent. In overcoming the common obstacles in their path, our analysis shows that the most successful African tech startups share six common characteristics with features that mirror those of successful global companies, and have also adapted their business models to the unique economic realities and customer needs of Africa.

First, given the variability between African markets, it is important that fintechs match their value proposition to the market they are entering. Globally, we have seen fintechs evolving to achieve scale through three major routes. Some start out as a distributor of unique nonfinancial consumer products and evolve into a fintech, while

others start with a specific financial business-to-consumer (B2C) or B2B product and evolve into a digital bank. A third option is to start with a payment infrastructure solution and evolve into a national digital platform. In Africa, infrastructure constraints have meant that the continent’s oldest fintechs—for example, Fawry in Egypt, M-Pesa in Kenya, and Interswitch in Nigeria— entered markets by building infrastructure specific to a single country and, as a result, are now the market leaders.

Second, to achieve sustainable growth, companies that have a long history of operating on the continent have built their success on rapid customer acquisition. Africa’s fast-growing population of more than 1.3 billion people offers a large potential market for fintechs, but actually acquiring customers can be challenging because of factors such as infrastructure constraints and low customer purchasing power. Leading players have had to take steps to overcome such constraints by, for example, leveraging pre-existing physical networks or by employing aggressive pricing strategies to offer cheaper fees and

Unlocking the potential of fintech in Africa

All the signs point to the culmination of African fintech’s first phase of development Fintechs have become major players in the African financial-services sector (in some instances, rivalling traditional banks in terms of size and value), funding has increased, and value is being generated. In fact, the number of high-valued fintechs is increasing exponentially. Additionally, consumer access is at an all-time high. Today’s leaders have built the payment rails, effectively laying the foundations upon which the industry can grow, but tightening market conditions suggest that in their next phase of development, fintechs may need to adapt their focus as they look to consolidate and formalize to achieve enduring success.

A growing fintech industry has the potential to create jobs, skills, opportunities, and wealth across the continent. An IFC study estimates that over 230 million jobs in sub-Saharan Africa will require digital skills by 2030, creating opportunities in adjacent industries as well, notably training. The

charges than competitors.

Third, once having acquired customers, leading fintechs have found a sustainable way to translate this into clear monetisation strategies. Such strategies have one of two things in common: they either have a repeatable and healthy revenue source coming from core activities, such as card switching for Interswitch or serving merchants with point-of-sale for Yoco, or they have multiple monetisation strategies, such as having a B2C arm for a B2B company or vice versa. For example, M-Pesa and MTN both have a strong lending component in addition to their wallets, while Paga has leveraged its strong position in wallets to expand into merchant acquiring.

Fourth, a key marker of success in Africa has been the ability to adapt to the reality of low average revenue per user (ARPU), both in the consumer and micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) sectors. GDP per capita in Africa is the lowest of any continent, and fintechs have adjusted to this by, for example, using scale to reduce the cost of serving customers, as M-Pesa has done, or

fintech eruption in Africa is seeding an ecosystem that could also bring a number of social benefits by, for example, improving access to healthcare and insurance at scale and increasing access to lending in key sectors such as agriculture. The newcomers are also proving instrumental in driving financial inclusion, particularly among women.

However, to scale up these benefits, stakeholders, including governments, investors, the traditional financialservices sector, and fintechs, have a critical role to play in creating the conditions for sustainable growth and in supporting innovation.

Regulators, for instance, could consider taking steps to formalize data systems, promote predictable regulation, and keep pace with changes in the fintech landscape, while investors may look to expand local opportunities, educate African investors on potential opportunities on the continent, and focus on the tangible value added by start-ups rather than just on their sale valuation. As Jumanne Mtambalike, CEO of investment firm Sahara

changing the business model to pay-asyou-go for businesses that can’t afford advance payments, as Yoco has done.

Fifth, another African reality is that, with 90 percent of all transactions on the continent still cash based, successful fintechs have had to find ways to reach clients offline. Key strategies here have included building agent networks or using pre-existing infrastructure such as physical shops for delivery of financial services. For example, South Africa’s first digital bank, TymeBank, overcame infrastructure challenges through a strategic alliance with major retailers. This has enabled the bank to place account-opening kiosks in retail stores across the country, bypassing the need for a physical branch network.

Finally, with regulators increasingly active in Africa, fintechs are required to pay attention to, and comply with, regulation. Many successful fintechs including OPay, M-Pesa, and Fawry have, after reaching significant scale, chosen to proactively engage with regulatory stakeholders so that they are able to move forward together.

Ventures, commented: “Whether we call them ‘Zebracons’ or ‘Camels,’ we need to find a way to make African start-ups look more like African businesses and not vehicles created to be sold to the highest bidders in the private investor and stock markets.”

Fintechs and incumbents could focus on building talent and training for the future as well as looking to build partnerships—with each other and with regulators—to build out the ecosystems necessary to support fintech growth alongside national development priorities.

Poised at the start of a new era, fintech players in Africa have a good reason for confidence; significant white spaces and underserved opportunities still exist in all markets. However, the path ahead will not be smooth. In addition to existing roadblocks, a tightening funding environment will likely put more pressure on Africa’s nascent fintech sector. Nevertheless, if stakeholders can work together to build on the momentum gained in recent years, the prospects for African fintech are strong—and the next marvel of African unicorns is ready to emerge.

How technology revolution is changing perspectives in the region

Anew report that includes the surveyed opinions of 4,500 Africans from Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana has revealed that the recent wave of technology innovation coming out of Africa is changing how Africans view the continent.

When asked if recent developments in African technology had impacted their perception of the continent, 4 out of 5 (84.6 percent ) answered “yes”.

According to the report, 9 out of 10 (91.7 percent) respondents said they are likely to use technology solutions that are made in Africa and 9 out of 10 (91.8

percent) are likely to describe Africans as innovative and entrepreneurial.

When asked which African technology stories they were most excited to read about, 29.8 percent said: “funding stories”, closely followed by “expansion stories” (28 percent) and “partnership stories” (27 percent).

The Africa Innovation Impact Report, which was compiled by Talking Drum Communications, a public relations and communications consultancy that works with African technology companies, and Survey54, an artificial intelligence-powered market research company, also found that

education (21.1 percent) is considered to be the sector most impacted by technology innovation in Africa over the last two years.

More than financial services (18.3 percent) and entertainment (15.1 percent).

A new innovation narrative has emerged in Africa in recent years, embodied by the exponential growth of funding for technology startups. Not only has investment into African startups grown 18x between 2015 and 2021, but funding for African startups also grew 2x faster than global rates between 2020 and 2021.

“This new innovation narrative has been dominated by news of funding rounds

Technology innovation from across the continent is shaping a new narrative that is changing how Africa is viewed across the world says a new report

for startups over the last few years. And understandably so. We’ve gone from a barren landscape to one of the fastest growing and most exciting technology ecosystems in the world in such a short space of time and increased funding has been a catalyst for this growth. Not only did investments into African startups grow 18x between 2015 and 2021, funding for African startups grew 2x faster than global rates between 2020 and 2021. In 2022, over $1 billion worth of funding came into Africa in just seven weeks. But this is not the entire story,” says the report.

Africa’s technology ecosystem has also seen its fair share of new products and services, acquisitions stories, expansion stories and so much more. As the ecosystem matures, the report predicts more consolidation across the continent with entrepreneurs joining forces to maximise their collective resources to deliver the most effective solutions.

According to the report, these solutions and the development they are enabling will also be instrumental in restructuring the African economy from its reliance on extractive sectors like oil & gas and agriculture, to more productive service sectors. As more funding goes into developing technology companies across the continent, companies expand, people are employed and the economy grows.

However, beyond the stories of multimillion-dollar funding rounds and acquisitions, there are also the stories of the people these innovations have been developed to help. The Africa Innovation Impact Report highlighted job creation (51 percent) as the biggest advantage of Africa’s growing digital economy.

More than exposure of the younger population to technology (29.3 percent), growing financial inclusion (12.4 percent) and the potential to plug infrastructure gaps on the continent (7.1 percent).

“Our aim with the report is to capture the impact of Africa’s emerging innovation narrative beyond anecdotes and hearsay and contribute to the conversation about how we keep things moving forward,” said Olugbeminiyi Idowu, Founder and MD of Talking Drum Communications, commenting on the findings of the report.

“Based on the data we have gathered, the innovation coming out of Africa is not only changing the way people live and work, but it is also changing the way people think, and how they view themselves as Africans and driving demand for more innovation. There is a growing appetite for these innovations, both from African users and global investors, and there is much to be excited about what the future holds.”

The key to unlocking Africa’s economic potential

Fostering intra-African integration and removing trade barriers will be critical to Africa's coming economic transformation. Two agreements, in particular, promise to lower production costs, create new value chains, boost domestic demand, and attract global investment, writes Landry Signé

AFRICA is on the cusp of an economic transformation. By 2050, consumer and business spending on the continent is expected to reach roughly $16.1 trillion. The coming boom offers tremendous opportunities for global businesses – especially US companies looking for new markets. But unless African policymakers remove existing barriers to regional trade and investment, the continent’s economy will struggle to reach its true potential.

Two major trade agreements – the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – will make it easier for African countries to trade with one another, and with the United States. Together, the agreements promise to remove longstanding impediments to industrialization. AGOA, passed by the US Congress in 2000, gives countries in sub-Saharan Africa preferential trade access, allowing them to export tariff-free products to the US. Although it will expire in 2025, US President Joe Biden’s subSaharan Africa strategy, unveiled in August, highlights its positive impact and promises to work with Congress on ways to proceed after AGOA lapses. AfCFTA, on the other hand, is an intra-African trade agreement with no expiration date. Established in 2018, its goal is to deepen trade ties between African countries by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers. Although these agreements’ scope, focus, beneficiaries, and structure differ significantly from each other, they are essential to strengthening African regional integration. Rather than viewing them as separate or competing agreements, policymakers and investors should recognize how they can complement each other in creating, sustaining, and transforming value chains across the continent. Value creation is critical to Africa’s economic transformation. In 2014, manufactured goods accounted for about 41.9 percent of the trade between African countries, compared to 14.8 percent of their exports to the rest of the world. Greater

regional integration will provide Africa with a larger supply market, which will accelerate manufacturing specialisation and make African producers more competitive globally. More robust manufacturing industries will provide jobs for low-skilled workers – particularly those not currently integrated into the formal economy. This, in turn, will increase average household incomes, boost domestic demand, spur innovation and diversification, and help protect local economies against external shocks.

AGOA has already created some opportunities for cross-border value chains. Yet despite some success stories like Madagascar’s apparel industry, which relies on an extensive regional supply chain, such opportunities remain limited. While integration has improved since AGOA’s implementation, particularly since 2015, it remains somewhat superficial: percent of Africa’s commercial value is currently generated through intra-African trade. The real game changer is the AfCFTA. By removing tariffs for a wide range of products across the continent, it will lower production costs and shift foreign direct investment toward manufactured goods, while also reducing transit costs and shortening supply chains – major benefits in a globalised economy. The International Monetary Fund projects that, under the AfCFTA, Africa’s expanded goods and labour markets will become more efficient,

driving a significant increase in African countries’ competitiveness. By creating a true continental market that increases intra-African trade and impels African countries to participate in “production sharing” at a higher rate, the AfCFTA will likely provide a further incentive to USbased multinationals, which will be able to access a larger market and establish a major global hub. AGOA has already spurred many companies to invest in Africa, and the successful implementation of the AfCFTA will strengthen this trend. The challenge for policymakers is to accelerate this process and ensure that the two programs complement each other. One way to do this is to deepen and broaden communication channels between Africa and the US, making it easier for investors interested in doing business in Africa to be better prepared for the expected growth in demand for regionally-sourced products. Supporting individual countries in implementing the AfCFTA would also help streamline the process.

A key problem that remains to be addressed is AGOA’s eligibility criteria, which are set on a country-by-country basis. These criteria can be detrimental to regional integration, as one country’s removal could affect another country’s supply inputs, thereby creating a ripple effect. For example, when Madagascar was removed from the AGOA-eligible list in 2010 following a coup d'état, the five African countries from which it had been sourcing apparel inputs were also punished. Considering the broader effect of country-specific sanctions will help prevent unintended investor risk. Effective regional integration is essential for Africa. Without it, the continent will continue to be overlooked and outpaced globally in manufacturing, information technologies, and agriculture. When considering the future configuration of both AGOA and the AfCFTA, policymakers should regard them as complementary mechanisms for ensuring Africa’s long-term economic development.

The AfCFTA headquarters in Accra: Unless African policymakers remove existing barriers to regional trade and investment, the continent’s economy will struggle to reach its true potential

Landry Signé is a professor and managing director at Thunderbird School of Global Management and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution

Golden spice provides ray of light in Shell battle

Export of turmeric to help fund Niger Delta activists in their fight against oil industry pollution, writes Angela Cobbinah in London

Ihad never tasted turmeric latte, a creamy golden tinged beverage sold in London’s trendiest cafes, but this particular cup of froth had a distinction all of its own.

The turmeric came direct from Ogoniland, a community in the oilproducing Niger Delta region of Nigeria best known for its David and Goliath battles with Shell over environmental pollution. As campaigners continue to fight the Anglo-Dutch conglomerate in the courts over the long awaited clean-up and compensation claims, they have begun cultivating turmeric and other crops for export as a way of generating income and reclaiming the land.

Overseeing the initiative is the man sitting in front of me during his recent visit to the UK, Lazarus Tamana, the president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (Mosop), the organisation that spearheaded protests against Shell more than three decades ago.

“There are very few ways for activists to earn a good living in Ogoniland, so one of the key things Mosop is promoting is economic muscle and we see agriculture as a way of achieving that,” he told me, stirring his drink. “Turmeric has always been grown locally on a small scale –traditionally women rub it on their bodies during child birth and nursing – but we want to expand its cultivation because of its popularity in the West as a medicinal plant. It is also relatively easy to grow.”

Twenty co-operatives, each comprising several farms, have been set up over the last two years, producing turmeric alongside a range of other crops. Lazarus, who was elected Mosop chief in 2020, got the ball rolling with his own seven hectare farm and is preparing to plant his second season.

In 1995, when mass peaceful protests against oil industry pollution culminated in Mosop founder Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists facing execution on trumped up murder charges, Lazarus was in the UK heading the campaign to get the convictions dropped. But later that year, all nine were hanged by the Abacha military dictatorship, leading to widespread

international condemnation and Nigeria’s expulsion from the Commonwealth.

“They killed Ken and the others to teach us a lesson but the killings did not deter us,” said Lazarus. “Our only option was to resist as we knew what would happen if we gave in. We said enough is enough and we stood our ground.”

Unable to resume its operations in Ogoniland for the past 30 years due to continued Mosop resistance, Shell has faced a series of ongoing court claims for reparations over contaminated farmland and fisheries, the main source of local income. But it is a tortuous process. A £55 million operation to clean up oil spills agreed in 2014 has yet to get off the ground, while any compensation won has been limited to seven communities, with 34 remaining, and is much less than hoped for.

Poverty is pollution’s ugly sister and ironically many Ogoni end up working on Shell pipelines that crisscross the area en route for the hydrocarbon hub on Bonny Island.

“The last thing we want is for people to take contract jobs with Shell and this is why the farm project is so crucial. It is a departure from the usual subsistence farming in that we are seeking to earn a trading income that includes foreign exchange,” said Lazarus, Mosop’s former Europe co-ordinator.

The farms are based in the Ogoniland hinterland, away from the mangrovefringed riverine areas that bore the brunt

of oil spills and gas flaring and the initial turmeric crop has already been certified free of contaminants by Nigeria’s food and drug regulator, a prerequisite for export.

“The soil there is rich and we do not use pesticides or fertilisers. It is an organically produced crop,” he explained. “We are now looking to introduce it to the UK, initially targeting the food and drinks market.”

In the last few years, turmeric’s profile in Europe and America has risen from humble spice to superfood thanks to its nutritional benefits and can be found in a wide range of health products. Compared to the UK’s predominantly imported Indian variety, Ogoniland turmeric is more delicately flavoured, perfect for the turmeric latte that was being trialled at a busy central London cafe as a healthy coffee alternative. “Apparently, it has gone down very well,” said Lazarus with a smile.

With ginger, cassava, onions and bell peppers also being planted for both the domestic and foreign market, the farms initiative is seen as a ray of light by the Ogoni after so many years of bitter struggle.

“We are seen as anti-government and have to stand on our own to support ourselves. That’s why achieving economic independence is such an important way of moving forward,” he added. “It gives us a real sense of direction. In the meantime, we will continue our campaign to get justice for Ogoniland and be a force for change in the whole of the Niger Delta region.”

The turmeric came direct from Ogoniland

Renewables to the fore

The EU’s Global Gateway as well as multiple other initiatives have motivated a number of developed countries to give their commitment to resume clean energy infrastructure development in developing nations. Qondakuhle Dwangu reports

WHILE Africa has an abundance of solar, wind, hydro, and geothermal power resources that afford immense opportunity to institute clean energy systems for its citizenry, access to power remains a pressing challenge across the continent, adversely impacting quality of life and development prospects.

PriceWaterhouseCooper’s Africa Energy Review 2021 report estimate the cost of attaining a continent-wide net-zero energy mix by 2050 to be $2.8 trillion.

So far, China has been the single biggest investor in Africa’s energy infrastructure. Furthermore, the inception of the EU’s Global Gateway as well as multiple other initiatives have motivated a number of developed countries to give their commitment to resume energy infrastructure development in developing nations.

Attracting further investment requires innovative methods to address the financing of renewable projects. Greater insight into blended finance and public–private partnerships (PPP’s) is a necessity, as well as more defined roles that African governments and regional economic communities could play in integrating their power sector markets. Moreover, policymakers need to implement stable strategic and integrated power pool planning, along with transparent procurement policies, legal systems, regulatory frameworks, and international power pools.

South Africa has always welcomed funding alternatives owing to its developed infrastructure. Considerable opportunities abound for private providers to bridge the growing energy gap as South Africa’s principal electricity supplier, Eskom, remains burdened by financial and operational complexities.

These challenges have served as a strong incentive for two of South Africa’s

neighbours, Botswana and Namibia, to also reduce their reliance on Eskom and the two nations are currently executing new tendering processes for large scale solar investments.

With the backing of USAid, Botswana and Namibia are seeking to construct power plants with between 2 and 5 GW of solar capacity. Accordingly, they are ending the monopolies formerly enjoyed by their national power companies and seeking what is perceived as more reliable support from private power companies.

Establishing and testing feasible and trustworthy policies to attract foreign investment will ultimately bring an influx of purely private funding. Until such a time, public-private partnerships remain the way forward that will necessitate that governments expedite their decision making whilst lenders intensify their project assessment and management capacities. As more projects yield successful outcomes, associated costs begin to decline as the risks become better understood and therefore manageable.

At present, approximately 138 million households across Africa are living on less than $2.50 a day, yet collectively, their annual spend on energy-related products, including charcoal, candles and kerosene, amounts to $10bn.

Creating reliable access to modern energy solutions has the potential to dramatically reduce household costs, making resources available for productive health and education investment, over and above promoting renewable energy businesses.

Great strides are required for Africa to transform its fiscal regimes and administration to make way for meaningful energy investment. With a more transparent, decisive, and equitable tax system in place, it will make development funding far more appetising for investors.

To this end, policymakers need to take

proactive steps to advance their domestic resource mobilisation procedures.

Scaling up renewable energy investment in Africa will not only unleash the potential for an immense number of skilled jobs, incite economic transformation and reduce inequality, but will ensure the continent is uniquely positioned to take the lead in the global energy revolution.

The Africa Energy Indaba 2023 is the continent’s leading energy forum consisting of a two-day international conference and exhibition to be held in the beautiful city of Cape Town, South Africa.

The mega-event, in partnership with South African Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) and many other leading industry associations, serves as the ideal platform for industry, businesses, regulators and policy makers to discuss and deliberate on critical issues impacting the growth and proliferation of the energy sector.

The upcoming symposium is guaranteed to be an indispensable investment of attendees’ time and resources and will undoubtedly live up to its revered success rate, fostering positive change to the continent’s energy sector and the economy in its entirety.

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News, analysis and forecast

Witness to history

AS the first black president of the UN General Assembly, he had a front view seat of some of the most momentous events in mid-20th century history, not as a spectator but as a mover and a shaker in the world of global politics.

From the very beginning, Alexander Quaison-Sackey seemed to be blessed by providence as well as a first class brain as he went from a school pupil in need of a pen to career diplomat in soon-to-be independent Ghana, and thence to the top of the tree as Kwame Nkrumah’s foreign minister.

He tells his extraordinary story in a memoir that was launched in Accra in August by Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, head of the UN Office for West Africa and Sahel, who described him as a “a pioneer who projected the African personality on the international scene.”

Quaison-Sackey unexpectedly died in 1992 before completing his life story. It ends abruptly in 1966 when he is detained by soldiers in Accra before being allowed to travel to the UK following Nkrumah’s overthrow by the military. He left the handwritten manuscript with his daughter, Awo Aferba Quaison-Sackey, with instructions to get it published.

Don’t be put off by the book’s somewhat mundane title, The Makings of a Diplomatist. Quaison-Sackey was a witness to history, conveying the hope and vision of a generation of people who fought for their country to be born and then enter the world stage.

The book opens with his childhood days in the coastal town of Winneba, where he was born in 1924, with a fascinating account of his family’s history going back

deep into the 19th century.

From the beginning, he seemed to have a sense of his own destiny, writing to his father from his secondary school in Cape Coast with a request for a pen, saying, “What if I am destined to become somebody great but I am not able to write my exams because I do not have a pen?”

He continued his education at the famous Achimota School near Accra where he became swept up by the events of 1948 when the nationalist movement “spread

like wildfire” under Nkrumah’s leadership. Nicknamed “the young statesman” because of his fondness for talking politics, he describes how thrilled he was to meet Nkrumah during his visit to the school.

“These events fortified me in my conviction that I would in the future have a role to play in the affairs of Ghana but that I needed to be fully equipped intellectually and ideologically.”

That came when the colonial government awarded him a coveted scholarship to study PPE at Exeter College,

Angela Cobbinah enjoys the memoirs of Alexander Quaison-Sackey, a leading figure in the United Nations who helped put newly independent Ghana on the world stage

Quaison-Sackey with his friend Malcom X

REVIEW

Oxford, where he served as president of the West Africa Students’ Union. By now married and a father, he returned home to work as a labour disputes officer, a job that gave him a crash course in the art of diplomacy.

He had already begun to make an impression in government circles. In 1955, with independence just around the corner following Nkrumah’s election as prime minister in the new all-African legislature, Quaison-Sackey was handpicked to train as a diplomat in the UK. After work experience in the British Embassy in Brazil, he returned to London to serve as second secretary at the new Ghana High Commission on the very day the country became independent, March 6 1957.

From there the only way was up. Two years later, he was appointed Ghana’s permanent representative to the United Nations. The weighty issues confronting him concerned the fate of millions of people – the Cuban missile crisis, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Sharpeville Massacre, Patrice Lumumba’s murder, to name but a few. He was under no illusion as to the enormity of the task ahead of him but believed that Ghana, having taken a “revolutionary path to independence,” should be a standard bearer in the struggle for world peace and the liberation of oppressed and colonised peoples.

Popular, well respected and aged only 40, he was voted in as president of the UN General Assembly in 1964, the first black African to so serve, receiving a standing ovation when he made his first speech in the role, wearing traditional kente cloth.

These days, the UN has come to have lost its sheen, seen by many as an adjunct of US hegemony. For the author it was an “international ship of state” which he sincerely believed could help change the course of history. At the time, the NonAligned Movement, which represented the interests of the developing world, was a force to be reckoned with, and one can imagine his fervour as he mobilised around it, helping to set the tone for struggles ahead, not least in apartheid South Africa.

He rubbed shoulders with some of the world’s great leaders, including Castro, Che Guevara, Nasser and Nehru, as well as deepening his relationship with Nkrumah. He was also full of admiration for US

civil rights figures, writing of “my friend Malcolm X”, having lunch with Martin Luther King and hosting Paul Robeson and his wife at his residence. “I felt home in America, we felt part of the struggles that were raging,” he says.

He comes across as a dedicated public servant, one who away from the travails of the office, would have made genial company. He doesn’t seem to have a bad word to say about anybody, but perhaps that is a mark of a true diplomat. Although restrained and sometimes pedantic in his writing, there’s no mistaking the dramas that he witnessed at first hand.

In the last few pages of the book, he describes Nkrumah’s reaction to the news that he has been overthrown in absentia.

It was February 1966, and as Ghana’s newly appointed foreign minister, he was accompanying the president on a peace mission to Vietnam. It is a painful read and for Quaison-Sackey it must have been painful to write because Nkrumah later accused him of betrayal, something he denies. His sense of disappointment that Ghana’s independence did not meet the expected high hopes is palpable but the book suggests that as long as there are people like himself around, there are good grounds for optimism.

The Makings of a Diplomatist: The Memoirs of Alexander Quaison-Sackey is published by DigiBooks, Ghana