Africa Briefing - May - June 2024

Combatting Somali piracy demands local empowerment and

global cooperation

PIRACY along the Somali coast has been a persistent and multifaceted issue, affecting local communities and international shipping lanes alike.

Originating as a defence mechanism against illegal fishing by foreign vessels, Somali piracy has evolved into a significant threat to global maritime trade, driven by complex socio-economic factors and the collapse of effective governance in Somalia. Tackling this issue requires a nuanced approach that combines local empowerment with robust international support.

Piracy in Somali waters began as a desperate response to illegal fishing by foreign trawlers. For decades, Somali artisanal fishermen have faced the depletion of fish stocks and destruction of marine habitats due to the unsustainable practices of foreign vessels. Bottom trawling, a particularly harmful method, has wreaked havoc on the seafloor, further jeopardizing the livelihoods of local fishermen. With the collapse of the Somali government in the 1990s, these foreign vessels exploited the lack of maritime governance, exacerbating the problem.

PUBLISHER’S NOTE

The surge in illegal fishing activity following the fall of General Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime in 1991 left local communities vulnerable and economically desperate. The Somali Navy’s inability to patrol and protect its waters allowed foreign fishing fleets to operate with impunity, pushing local fishermen to take up arms to defend their resources. This initial defence mechanism soon morphed into a more profitable venture, with pirates targeting commercial vessels for ransom. The Gulf of Aden, a crucial route for global trade, saw a dramatic increase in piracy, disrupting shipping and causing economic repercussions worldwide.

Africa bucks global economic trend

IJon Offei-Ansah Publisher

Desmond Davies Editor

Publisher Jon Offei-Ansah

Editor Desmond Davies

Contributing

Editors

Prof. Toyin Falola

Tikum Mbah Azonga

Prof. Ojo Emmanuel Ademola (Technology)

Valerie Msoka (Special Projects)

Contributors

Justice Lee Adoboe

Chief Chuks Iloegbunam

Joseph Kayira

Zachary Ochieng

Olu Ojewale

Oladipo Okubanjo

Corinne Soar

Kennedy Olilo

Gorata Chepete

Designer

Simon Blemadzie

Country Representatives

Deputy Editor

The economic impact of Somali piracy has been substantial. Increased insurance premiums and shipping costs forced some firms to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, significantly lengthening travel times and expenses. The sea transportation industry has borne the brunt of these costs, estimated to be around $7 billion annually, covering ransoms, security measures, and rerouting expenses. This has not only affected the global economy but also placed additional pressures on politically unstable countries.

n 2018, six of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world were in Africa, according to the World Bank, with Ghana leading the pack. With GDP growth for the continent projected to accelerate to four per cent in 2019 and 4.1 per cent in 2020, Africa’s economic growth story continues apace. Meanwhile, the World Bank’s 2019 Doing Business Index reveals that five of the 10 most-improved countries are in Africa, and one-third of all reforms recorded globally were in sub-Saharan Africa.

What makes the story more impressive and heartening is that the growth – projected to be broad-based – is being achieved in a challenging global environment, bucking the trend.

In the Cover Story of this edition, Dr. Hippolyte Fofack, Chief Economist at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), analyses the factors underpinning this performance. Two factors, in my opinion, stand out in Dr. Hippolyte’s analysis: trade between Africa and China and the intra-African cross-border investment and infrastructure development.

Angela Cobbinah

Stephen Williams Contributing Editor

Director, Special Projects

Michael Orji

South Africa

Edward Walter Byerley

Top Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights 47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, Milnerton 7441, South Africa

Tel: +27 (0) 21 555 0096

Joseph Kayira

In response to the piracy crisis, both local and international efforts have been mobilised. One of the most effective local responses has been the establishment of the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) in 2010. With substantial support from international partners, particularly the UAE, the PMPF has played a crucial role in reducing piracy incidents. Their deployment in piracy-prone areas and effective maritime patrols have significantly enhanced security along Somalia’s coastline. The PMPF’s operations have led to a dramatic decline in piracy incidents, from a peak of 160 attacks in 2011 to virtually no recorded incidents by late 2013.

Much has been said and written about China’s ever-deepening economic foray into Africa, especially by Western analysts and commentators who have been sounding alarm bells about re-colonisation of Africa, this time by the Chinese. But empirical evidence paints a different picture.

Despite the decelerating global growth environment, trade between Africa and China increased by 14.5 per cent in the first three quarters of 2018, surpassing the growth rate of world trade (11.6 per cent), reflecting the deepening economic dependency between the two major trading partners.

Empirical evidence shows that China’s domestic investment has become highly linked with economic expansion in Africa. A one percentage point increase in China’s domestic investment growth is associated with an average of 0.6 percentage point increase in overall African exports. And, the expected economic development and trade impact of expanding Chinese investment on resource-rich African countries, especially oil-exporting countries, is even more important.

Justice Lee Adoboe Chuks Iloegbunam

Zachary Ochieng

Olu Ojewale

Oladipo Okubanjo Corinne Soar Contributors

Gloria Ansah Designer

Despite the notable success of the PMPF and other initiatives, recent incidents suggest a potential resurgence of piracy. Isolated cases of hijackings off Puntland in late 2023 highlight the need for continued vigilance and investment in maritime security. These incidents underscore the importance of accurate reporting and careful differentiation between genuine piracy and other criminal activities. Mislabelling incidents can distort the reality of piracy and undermine efforts to combat it effectively.

Country Representatives

South Africa

Edward Walter Byerley Top Dog Media, 5 Ascot Knights 47 Grand National Boulevard Royal Ascot, Milnerton 7441, South Africa

To maintain the gains made in combating piracy, ongoing investment in local security infrastructure is essential. Empowering local police and security forces, reconstructing functional courts, and modernising maritime laws are critical steps. Training prosecutors with expertise in maritime crime and establishing a robust legal framework will enhance Somalia’s capacity to address piracy comprehensively.

Cell: +27 (0) 81 331 4887 Email: ed@topdog-media.net

Ghana

Nana Asiama Bekoe

Kingdom Concept Co.

Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com

Nigeria

Tel: +27 (0) 21 555 0096 Cell: +27 (0) 81 331 4887 Email: ed@topdog-media.net

Ghana

Nnenna Ogbu #4 Babatunde Oduse crescent Isheri Olowora - Isheri Berger, Lagos Tel: +234 803 670 4879 getnnenna.ogbu@gmail.com

The resilience of African economies can also be attributed to growing intra-African cross-border investment and infrastructure development. A combination of the two factors is accelerating the process of structural transformation in a continent where industrial output and services account for a growing share of GDP. African corporations and industrialists which are expanding their industrial footprint across Africa and globally are leading the diversification from agriculture into higher value goods in manufacturing and service sectors. These industrial champions are carrying out transcontinental operations, with investment holdings around the globe, with a strong presence in Europe and Pacific Asia, together account for more than 75 per cent of their combined activities outside Africa.

A survey of 30 leading emerging African corporations with global footprints and combined revenue of more than $118 billion shows that they are active in several industries, including manufacturing (e.g., Dangote Industries), basic materials, telecommunications (e.g., Econet, Safaricom), finance (e.g., Ecobank) and oil and gas. In addition to mitigating risks highly correlated with African economies, these emerging African global corporations are accelerating the diversification of sources of growth and reducing the exposure of countries to adverse commodity terms of trade.

This makes me very bullish about Africa!

Nana Asiama Bekoe

The success of the PMPF demonstrates the importance of a holistic approach that addresses both sea and land-based threats. International collaboration has been instrumental in transforming the PMPF into a professional maritime law enforcement agency. Continued international support, combined with local empowerment, is vital for sustaining maritime security and preventing the resurgence of piracy.

Kingdom Concept Co. Tel: +233 243 393 943 / +233 303 967 470 kingsconceptsltd@gmail.com

Nigeria

While significant progress has been made in reducing piracy along Somalia’s coastline, the persistent threat requires sustained efforts. Investing in local justice systems and maritime security infrastructure, along with robust international cooperation, will be crucial in ensuring long-term stability in the region and protecting global trade routes. As we move forward, it is imperative to maintain a balanced approach that addresses the root causes of piracy while enhancing the capacity of local authorities to combat this menace effectively.

Taiwo Adedoyin MV Noble, Press House, 3rd Floor 27 Acme Road, Ogba, Ikeja, Lagos Tel: +234 806 291 7100 taiadedoyin52@gmail.com

Kenya

Naima Farah Room 22, 2nd Floor West Wing Royal Square, Ngong Road, Nairobi Tel: +254 729 381 561 naimafarah_m@yahoo.com

Africa Briefing Ltd

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Kenya

Patrick Mwangi Aquarius Media Ltd, PO Box 10668-11000

Nairobi, Kenya

Tel: 0720 391 546/0773 35 41

Email: mwangi@aquariusmedia.co.ke

©Africa Briefing Ltd

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Africa’s human rights merry-go-round

LEADER COMMENT COVER STORY

Africa’s diaspora must now come to the fore for continental development Securing the Indian Ocean Threat still exists

Ahmed Ibrahim looks at the evolution of piracy along the Somali coast and, specifically, how the Puntland Maritime Police Force is combatting the resurgent sea marauders

Although the Puntland authorities are acting tough on pirates in their sphere of influence along the Somali coast, industry bodies are worried about continued acts of maritime piracy not just in the Eastern region of the continent but also in the Gulf of Guinea

World on precipice of pronounced change

Humankind is living in an unprecedented era of new, interconnected crises and elevated global uncertainty that will have profound implications for all people, the planet and the future of humanity, warns Ban Ki-moon

BUSINESS & ECONOMY

MINERALS ANALYSIS

AGOA reauthorisation: boosting US-Africa trade in critical minerals

Experts discuss how the ongoing AGOA reauthorisation could strengthen US-Africa trade relations in critical minerals, fostering economic growth and strategic partnerships amidst the clean energy transition, Jon Offei-Ansah reports

Ghana’s minerals sector needs to be people-driven 6

Small-scale and illegal mining activities have led to the destruction of a quarter of forest cover in the south-western area of the country within the decade ending 2017 due to the absence of predictable, accountable and participatory leadership that reconciles the interests of the state and society, finds Clement Sefa-Nyarko who is proposing the use of the social licence at the disposal of members of society to reverse this trend

CULTURE

Embracing unity: the vision behind Africa's monument of humanity

Nestled in the picturesque seaside town of Kribi, Cameroon, a monumental project is underway, poised to rewrite history and reshape the global narrative on Africa. Spearheaded by the visionary Nijel Binns, the Mother of Humanity® Monument is set to stand tall as a beacon of unity, reflection, and hope for a shared future, writes Jon Offei-Ansah

Shanghai Grand International Logistics Co., Ltd.

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Africa’s human rights merry-go-round

AS Rwandans commemorated the 30th anniversary of the genocide in their country, the Chairperson of the African Union, Moussa Faki Mahamat, rather offhandedly announced the appointment of the first AU Envoy for the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities. The announcement was made on X (formerly Twitter).

We say offhandedly because such an appointment warranted more than just a few lines on social media. This is a massive move and it deserved wider publicity to reassure Africans that the powers that be on the continent are concerned about changing their lax attitude to ratifying human rights treaty, dealing with conflict and, generally, reducing the tensions in African societies that are being fuelled by intense hate speech.

Faki later confirmed in a speech in Rwanda during the commemoration of the genocide that Adama Dieng, an experienced Senegalese human rights lawyer, would take up the role. We are still waiting to hear what Dieng’s terms of reference will be and how he is to go about dealing with the issues he has been charged with to tackle.

Faki is expected to step down as AU Chairperson at the beginning of 2025, and we are wondering whether the whole business was clearly thought out. Or was it just a spur of the moment idea?

This is symptomatic of the manner in which human rights, peace and security issues are dealt with in Africa. They are not given the gravity that they deserve. Is it any wonder that African civil society organisations that are focusing on these issues are frustrated with the slowness of strengthening these crucial areas on the continent?

In this edition, we have an article pointing out that the Malabo Protocol that is supposed to provide Africa with the most expansive and ambitious understanding and definition of international crime has still not entered into force 10 years after African leaders adopted the document. The reason? Although 15 countries have signed the

Protocol, only one has ratified it.

This is really not on. Indeed, the slow ratification of Africa’s ratification of human rights instrument was at the fore of the first Joint Forum of the Special Mechanisms of the African Commission and Peoples’ Rights in Dakar in April this year.

The activists reflected on the state of human rights on the continent, measured the gains, identified the key challenges, and how the African Commission “may better contribute to human rights protection and promotion on the continent, particularly within the context of the African Union’s human rights and governance agenda”. They also pointed to the “lack of sensitisation of the citizens on the human rights instruments which the state intends to ratify, and the issues which will be addressed therein”.

Crucially, the forum noted that government officials themselves did not have a clue about the instruments that had been adopted by their countries, and there were “misconceptions on the obligations of states arising from human rights instruments”.

The AU is the body that must ensure that all these treaties are in force through its Peace and Security Commission. But is the PSC up to the task?

The Egyptian ambassador to

discussing thematic issues at the expense of considering crises on our continent. The tabling of country situations should be prioritised, and appreciating that these crises ultimately involve thematic issues.”

Conflicts continue to erupt on the continent, throwing the state of peace and security in constant disarray. The latest armed conflict which blew up in Sudan last year has been most catastrophic. Some eight million Sudanese have been displaced as a result.

The Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique are also in the throes of violent conflict. “These realities are a reflection of the miserable state of the state during transitions and conflict in Africa,” Gad pointed out.

So, these persistent armed conflicts are causing setbacks for the implementation of human rights instruments in Africa. The upshot of these conflicts has been the negative effects they have had on populations, including the internally displaced.

The irony of all this is that the people who suffer the brunt of human rights violations and other mass atrocities are the ones who do not even know that there are legally binding mechanisms that can stop all of these happening – only if their governments would to the right thing and ensure universal

Is the Peace and Security Council up to the task? ‘

’

Ethiopia and his country’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Mohamed Gad, gave a clear insight into the failings of the PSC in an interview with the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa this May. It was talk as usual without much action to deal with peace and security issues in Africa that are linked to human rights abuses.

He said: “We have noticed an increasing trend in the Council towards

ratification and domestication of all human rights instruments and “ensure consistent reporting to the Commission, highlighting any challenges on ratification and implementation,” as the forum recommended.

This should not be a tough ask of African governments. But we wonder why they are always so reluctant to do the right thing, and continue to play games on the human rights merry-go-round. AB

Africa’s diaspora must now come to the fore for continental development

THE Nigerian government recently announced the creation of a $10 billion diaspora fund aimed at harnessing remittances to fund investment in infrastructure, healthcare and education in the country. This is a splendid idea. Such a fund should make a difference in a country that received some $20 billion from its nationals living abroad in 2023, according to World Bank figures.

It should make a difference if the money goes into economically viable projects, rather than to individuals who receive the bulk of remittances. Most of this money is spent on consumption to cover daily needs of recipients. And I am not just talking about Nigeria.

Again, according to world Bank figures, in 2022, the 160 million Africans in the diaspora sent home more than $95 billion in remittances. Of this figure, $53 billion went to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe topping the list. The World Bank noted that the total figure for 2022 far outstripped the $30 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) and just $29 billion in official development aid for SubSaharan Africa.

Unnecessary

For the most part, complacent African governments have viewed remittances as the answer to their failure to provide a social safety net for their citizens. So, remitted funds go to cover the daily needs of over 200 million family members, according to World Bank figures.

But what about the revenue that African governments collect from individuals and companies that are involved in exploiting natural resources? Shouldn’t this be spent on social security? Fat chance. Instead, there is a drain on state funds to pay the travel expenses of entitled African leaders who go on regular foreign jaunts. Some of which are not even necessary.

There is now clearly a case for improving the management of remittances and use for a much better development effect. As the World Bank notes, when remittances are brought into the formal financial system, their impact increases.

Indeed, it is high time that such remittances go directly to productive

imports

lead

to leakages in African economies

’

the devaluation of African currencies and the strengthening of external economies.”

Importing goods willy-nilly is a sure way of unnecessarily leaking money out of African economies. But the African diaspora can make a huge difference in business development in Africa. And there is a willingness to help.

Tsitsi Masiyiwa, Chair of Co-Impact and the END Fund and Founder and Chair of the Higherlife Foundation and Delta Philanthropies, notes: “Members of the African diaspora have often shared with me their desire to expand their giving beyond their immediate family or community.

“The problem, they explain, is that they do not know which local organisations they can trust. That is why credible actors should be connecting the diaspora with community-based organisations that need and deserve support.”

African diaspora funds that can directly aid local entrepreneurs must now be a priority. And there are loads of dynamic African businesses that are looking for such investment to make Africa less dependent on unnecessary imports.

It’s going to get worse on the FDI front. New data and analysis from the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) show that global FDI flows dropped by seven per cent in 2023, to $1.364 billion, continuing on a declining trend and remaining below pre-pandemic levels for the second consecutive year.

This is clearly a challenge for African countries that did not even feature in the scramble for FDI. But it is a challenge that can be countered by remittances, which must now go to investments in the productive economy to make a huge difference.

businesses that are privately owned. First of all, there must be enabling regulatory frameworks that will protect such investment. Africans in the diaspora are thinking more and more these days of investing in worthwhile businesses back home that will create employment and reduce imports of goods that can be easily produced locally.

Why do African countries have to import, say, chicken, fish and turkey when they can be easily made available at home? You then get prices rising all the time because of weak local currencies.

My friend, Adedeji Ebo, aptly points out in this edition of Africa Briefing: “Africa consuming what it does not produce and producing what it does not consume is an endless path to dependency,

How We Made It in Africa is one of the best places to source credible businesses. Established in 2010, it is an award-winning online publication in Cape Town, South Africa that conducts in-depth interviews with entrepreneurs and investors in Africa to reveal how they built their companies and uncover their key investment insights.

Over the years, it has showcased an impressive array of young African entrepreneurs, many of whom are women. Now is the time for these pioneering businesspeople to be given the needed support to make a huge difference to the continent.

Africans in the diaspora do not have the vote back home. But they can call the shots through economic empowerment, and let politicians go back to being servants of the people rather than the other way round. AB

Desmond Davies

Securing the Indian Ocean

Ahmed Ibrahim looks at the evolution of piracy along the Somali coast and, specifically, how the Puntland Maritime Police Force is combatting the resurgent sea marauders

PIRACY along the coast of Somalia takes place in various locations spanning the country’s territorial waters and neighbouring areas, including the Gulf of Aden, Guardafui Channel and Somali Sea. This longstanding issue has diverse interpretations within different communities. Initially targeting international fishing vessels in the early 2000s, piracy quickly escalated to pose a significant threat to international shipping, particularly during Somalia's internal conflict.

The fishing potential in Somali waters is significant, but it faces sustainability challenges due to illegal activities by foreign vessels. While the domestic fishing sector in Somalia is limited and underdeveloped, foreign trawlers have been operating in these waters for over seven decades. Somali artisanal fishermen perceive the illegal operations of these vessels and their crews as a threat to their traditional way of life. Competition posed by these foreign factory ships has led to a decline in fish populations and damaged marine habitats, particularly through bottom trawling, a method that destroys the natural seafloor habitat.

Foreign fishing in Somali waters has experienced a significant surge, increasing enormously since 1981. The most substantial rise occurred in the 1990s following the collapse of the Somali military government under General Mohamed Siad Barre and the subsequent civil war.

Somalia was labelled a failed state due to prolonged internal conflicts and significant instability that persisted until 2012 when the Somalia Federal Government was established in exile. Despite foreign intervention and support, the Federal Government of Somalia struggled to assert full authority, facing threats from the jihadist group, al-Shabaab. Consequently, Somalia continued to be classified as a fragile state. This situation

led to ineffective government policing of Somali waters by the Somali Navy, allowing large foreign fishing vessels to exploit this weakness, posing additional threats to the livelihoods of local Somali fishing communities.

In response, local coastal communities formed armed groups to deter perceived intruders, utilising small boats such as skiffs and motorised vessels. These groups occasionally seized ships and crews for ransom, evolving into a profitable trade where substantial payments were often demanded and met. Subsequently labelled as pirates, especially after targeting nonfishing commercial vessels, these groups

operated within a context of poverty and governmental corruption, which hindered the political will to address the crisis at the local level. Many unemployed Somali youth saw piracy as a means of supporting their families. Concerns from international organisations grew over piracy's detrimental impact on global trade and the potential for profiteering by insurance companies and others. There are suggestions that certain elements within Somalia collaborated with the pirates, aiming to bolster political influence and financial gain.

The Gulf of Aden is an important link to global trade and shipments. More

Somali artisanal fishermen perceive the illegal operations of foreign trawlers and their crews as a threat to their traditional way of life

than 12 per cent of world trade and 10 per cent of gas shipments pass though the Gulf. As a result, gas and oil prices have been affected, rising by approximately 30 per cent, according to reports from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) National Oil Agency. Additionally, global trade shipment prices have also risen due to increased uncertainty in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The attacks have raised concerns over potential disruptions to global supply chains. Shipping firms are reportedly weighing the difficult choice between paying significantly higher insurance premiums on the risky Red Sea route and taking the longer and costlier way around the Cape of Good Hope. This means the turbulence in the Red Sea has disrupted global trade value chains, coupled with the economic pressures imposed on the states to counter piracy. According to the Oceans Beyond Piracy project by The One Earth Future Foundation in Colorado, the sea transportation industry shouldered 80 per cent of the cost of Somali piracy’s impact on the global economy, and the remaining 20 per cent was expended on

Misinformation distorts the reality of piracy

anti-piracy efforts by countries in the region. According to the report, the total piracy cost is estimated to be around $7 billion, considering various factors, such as ransoms paid to the pirates, piracyrelated insurances, the costs of securing equipment’s and guards, as well as rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. Such costs have had a serious impact on daily subsistence prices across the world, adding pressure on politically unstable countries

As the scourge of piracy continues to plague maritime trade routes, particularly in regions like the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, concerted efforts have been made to combat this criminal activity. One notable strategy in this ongoing battle is the option of building on-the-ground forces in areas where piracy reached alarming levels in the early 2010s, before experiencing a significant decline in the following years.

At the forefront of this reversal is the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), whose establishment and operations have played an essential role in reducing piracy activities along the Somali coastline. Since its foundation in October 2010, the PMPF has been dedicated to eradicating piracy within Somalia's territorial waters.

Headquartered in Bosaso, the force

strategically deployed forward bases in other piracy-prone towns along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. This deployment has provided the PMPF with the necessary operational capacity to conduct maritime patrols effectively, ensuring the safety and security of vessels navigating these perilous waters.

This has been down to international collaboration and local vigilance in maritime security.

Indeed, one of the key factors contributing to the success of the PMPF has been its regional and global connectivity. Recognising the transnational nature of piracy, Puntland's leadership sought support from international partners, most notably the UAE.

Under the leadership of then Puntland President Abdirahman Mohamud Farole, the UAE collaborated with the East African state to establish a force capable of not only patrolling the coastline but also confronting piracy on land as well as other anti-government elements. This holistic approach aimed to deny pirates a base on land and counter the threat posed by terrorist groups like Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, and ISIS which sought to exploit Somalia's instability.

The partnership with the UAE

Local coastal communities formed armed groups to deter perceived intruders

facilitated the recruitment and training of personnel for the PMPF, transforming it into a professional maritime law enforcement agency. Furthermore, international security training companies were engaged to provide specialised maritime training, enhancing the force's operational effectiveness. This collaboration extended to other regional and multinational stakeholders, including the European Union Capacity Building Mission, which provided training and equipment to boost the PMPF's capabilities.

The success of the PMPF is evident in the significant decline in piracy incidents along the Somali coastline. Whereas 2011 witnessed a peak in piracy attacks, with 160 reported incidents and 358 vessels targeted, the subsequent years saw a remarkable reduction in such activities. By mid-2012, following the commencement of PMPF operations, piracy incidents began to decline steadily, culminating in the eradication of piracy by late 2013, marked by the absence of recorded incidents.

However, recent events have raised concerns about a resurgence of piracy in the region. Despite the effectiveness of the PMPF and other counter-piracy measures, isolated incidents have occurred, prompting speculation about the reorganisation of pirate groups.

For instance, reports from the Atlanta Piracy Situational Report highlighted

incidents such as the hijacking of vessels off the coast of Puntland in late 2023. While these incidents are troubling, it is essential to distinguish between real piracy activities and other criminal acts masquerading as piracy.

One such example is a case reported as a piracy hijacking in December 2023 by Atlanta Piracy Situational Pirate Report. Contrary to initial assessments, investigations by the PMPF revealed that the incident resulted from a business disagreement between boat owners and crew members.

This highlights the importance of accurate reporting and careful scrutiny of incidents before labelling them as piracy-related. Misinformation not only distorts the reality of piracy activities, but also undermines efforts to combat the phenomenon effectively.

In response to reported piracy cases, local authorities, led by the PMPF, have taken swift and decisive action. The establishment of forward bases in former pirate enclaves has enabled proactive policing, which prevented the re-organisation of pirate networks by swiftly responding to any emerging threats. For instance, a recent success was a joint operation which led to the arrest of a pirate group responsible for hijacking a Bulgarian bulk carrier in December 2023. This demonstrates the effectiveness of local authorities to combat piracy and making

it difficult for the pirates to have a safe heaven on land.

Moving forward, sustaining the gains made in combating piracy requires continued investment in maritime security infrastructure on the ground. The PMPF's success underscores the importance of holistic approaches that deal with the pirates at sea and blocking them from seeking refuge on land. Additionally, efforts to address the root causes of piracy, including empowering local police and the security forces on the ground, are essential for long-term solutions.

While the eradication of piracy along the Somali coastline represents a significant achievement, recent incidents serve as a reminder of the persistent threat posed by maritime crime. The PMPF, through its professionalism and dedication, has been instrumental in combating piracy and maintaining maritime security in the region. However, sustained efforts to invest in the local justice system are still missing.

These include reconstructing functional courts, creating an attorney general’s office, training prosecutors with expertise in the maritime sector and modernising regulation by assisting the ministry of justice to develop maritime crime laws. This approach should enhance, on the ground, justice systems that alleviate pressures brought on the other states by piracy.

Threat still exists

Although the Puntland authorities are acting tough on pirates in their sphere of influence along the Somali coast, industry bodies are worried about continued acts of maritime piracy not just in the Eastern region of the continent but also in the Gulf of Guinea

THE International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has raised concern about the continued attacks by pirates off the coast of Somalia in its first quarter report for 2024, released in April. It recorded 33 incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the first three months of 2024, an increase from 27 incidents for the same period in 2023.

Of the 33 incidents reported, 24 vessels were boarded, six had attempted attacks, two were hijacked and one was fired upon. Violence towards crew continues with 35 crew members taken hostage, nine kidnapped and one threatened.

The report highlights the continued threat of Somali piracy incidents with two reported hijackings. In addition, one vessel each was fired upon, boarded and reported an attempted approach. These incidents were attributed to Somali pirates who demonstrate mounting capabilities, targeting vessels at great distances, from the Somali coast.

A Bangladesh flagged bulk carrier, MV Abdullah, was hijacked on March 12 and its 23 crew were taken hostage by over 20 Somali pirates. The vessel was underway about 550 nautical miles (nm) from Mogadishu while enroute from

Mozambique to the United Arab Emirates.

When the pirates released the hijacked ship along with its crew of 23 in April, they claimed that they were paid a ransom of $5 million ransom.

Abdirashiid Yusuf, one of the pirates, told Reuters that the ransom was delivered two nights prior, adhering to the customary procedure. “The money was brought to us two nights ago as usual… we checked whether the money was fake or not. Then we divided the money into groups and left, avoiding the government forces,” he said.

At the time of writing, the authorities in both Somalia and Puntland had failed to throw more light on the ransom issue. However, an anonymous Puntland police officer was quoted by Garowe Online as saying: “The practice of paying ransoms could potentially encourage more pirates.”

IMB says it is aware of several reported hijacked dhows and fishing vessels, which are ideal mother ships to launch attacks at distances from the Somali coastline.

ICC Secretary General John W.H. Denton noted: “The resurgence of Somali pirate activity is worrying, and now more than ever it is crucial to protect trade, safeguard routes, and the safety of seafarers who keep commerce moving. All measures to

ensure the uninterrupted free flow of goods throughout international supply chains must be taken.”

But the IMB has commended “the timely and positive actions from authorities ensuring the release and safety of the crew”. IMB Director Michael Howlett said: “We reiterate our ongoing concern on the Somali piracy incidents and urge vessel owners and Masters to follow all recommended guidelines in the latest version of the Best Management Practices.”

In the Gulf of Guinea, although the IMB reported that incidents continued to be at a reduced level, it urged caution. Six incidents were reported in the first quarter of 2024 compared to five in the same period of 2023. One such occurred in January this year when nine crew were kidnapped from a product tanker around 45nm south of Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea.

“While we welcome the reduction of incidents, piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea remains a threat. Continued and robust regional and international naval presence to respond to these incidents and to safeguard life at sea is crucial,” Howlett said.

Since it was established in 1991, IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre as been serving as a crucial, 24-hour point of contact to report crimes of piracy and lend support to ships under threat. “Quick reactions and a focus on coordinating with response agencies, sending out warning broadcasts and email alerts to ships have all helped bolster security on the high seas,” the IMB noted. “The data gathered by the Centre also provides key insights on the nature and state of modern piracy.

“IMB encourages all shipmasters and owners to report all actual, attempted and suspected global piracy and armed robbery incidents to the Piracy Reporting Centre as a vital first step to ensuring adequate resources are allocated by authorities to tackle maritime piracy.”

Bangladesh flagged bulk carrier, MV Abdullah, was hijacked on March 12 and its 23 crew were taken hostage by over 20 Somali pirates

Problems over Africa’s capacity to wield global influence

African agency, driven and dominated by states and the elite rather than communities and societies, is, first, not African, and, second, lacking in legitimacy, argues Adedeji Ebo

AGENCY is the capacity to act intentionally and with functional organisation to produce effects. It is the capacity to influence. In the case of Africa however, such “capacity to influence” is problematic and arguably ineffectual due to a legitimacy deficit resulting from the gap and tension between the agency of African states and elite on the one hand, and the agency of citizens and communities on the other.

The net impact of the two mutually exclusive sources of agency is that Africa’s agency is conflicted. Rather than flow into each other, state/elite agency and people-centred agency are fundamentally contradictory and antagonistic to each other.

Enhancing the agency for elites is in direct tension with agency for the marginalised and disenfranchised. This tension then has a debilitating impact on the collective agency of Africa continentally.

Africa’s collective agency cannot be divorced from its political economy in a global order that is structured to sustain the continent’s marginalisation. Despite membership of the World Trade Organisation, for example, Africa’s share of global trade declined from 4.4 per cent in 1970 to 2.7 per cent in 2020, underpinning the observation that “Africa has mostly been a taker than a maker of the rules of the international system…. While developed countries often talk about the need for reform, those same countries are unwilling to cede the rules that have secured their beneficial position.”

As UN Secretary-General Antόnio Guterres has repeatedly noted, imbalance in the global political system sustains the underdevelopment of many countries, while the benefits and burdens of multilateralism are inequitably distributed.

Marginalisation in the structures and process of global production and exchange has left Africa’s agency rather feeble and spasmodic. Despite a rich body of normative pronouncements, the various

levels of agency are disconnected, both within and between them.

At best, there is a loose connection between them. Rather than being cohesive and resilient, Africa’s agency is dissipated and vulnerable to being influenced rather than wielding influence. In an environment in which dominant actors (such as the European Union) are further consolidating their political and socio-economic amalgamation, collective African agency

is essential for transforming Africa’s subaltern role in the global system of production and exchange.

Hence the call for a “renewal of African agency…that goes beyond the purview of the state, of formal actors, to include abundant manifestations of Africa’s soft power such as its creative economies, arts, theatre, innovations, some of which exist in spite of state, not because of the state”. The agency of African youth is also authentically expressed “through acts of dissent, protest and self-determination, by voting with their feet through migration across the Mediterranean”. Juxtaposed against its political economy therefore, African ownership of agency is more apparent than real, more often assumed rather than clearly conceived; merely pronounced rather than firmly constructed.

Ownership is the litmus test against which to construct and measure agency. Yet, despite and beyond the universal appeal of national and regional ownership, there is very little clarity on the implementation and operationalisation of ownership.

There is therefore the need for a distinct construct against which African ownership of agency can be clearly recognised and operationalised. In

The African diaspora remains marginal to building capacity ‘ ’

contending that African ownership of agency is the basis for its legitimacy and without which it cannot be impactful, a framework for African ownership of agency comprises four key elements: common African vision; implementation capacity; financial resources; and a peoplecentred framework for monitoring and evaluation.

Collective action requires common purpose, otherwise Africa’s dissipated agency has the net effect of entrenching its marginalisation. Such a common vision would encapsulate and be driven by Africa’s agreed political aspirations and shared socio-economic agenda.

Africa’s agency cannot be effective (in the sense of having the capacity to influence) unless it is collective, i.e., has functional organisation driven by common purpose.

Therefore, a basic requirement for African agency is a clear African vision, which many would argue is currently rather blurry. The key question is: is there a uniquely continental “social contract” which can be said to reflect the aspirations of African stakeholders beyond the elite and governments?

Africa’s marginal role in the global political economy enforces upon it a particular and endearing urgency for the transformation (not merely tinkering) of the global system that works against and sustains its marginalisation. For Africa to define the basis of its coexistence with others, such a transformative ethos includes and must begin with the way Africans exercise agency among and within themselves.

This foundation would determine and define how Africa applies its agency to the rest of the world. A disunited Africa can neither own nor deliver impactful agency, both within Africa and between the continent and the rest of the world. Africa’s only chance of sustainable progress in a world so firmly structured against it, is one with a clear common purpose, common action, driven by collective purpose. Does the Constitutive Act of the

African Union qualify as such a capstone instrument for the synergised collective agency of Africa? Or is it merely a statutory contraption, despite its lofty PanAfricanist normative ideals?

While there admittedly is a palpable gap between aspiration and implementation, the AU Constitutive Act provides the basis for an African collective vision of agency: “Guided by our common vision of a united and strong Africa and by the need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among our peoples.”

To further concretise this unity of purpose, Agenda 2063 was signed in 2013 to serve as “Africa’s blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future”. It is intended as “the Pan African vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena”. The complex hybridity of African governance necessitates a multistakeholder conception of agency. This recognises the important role of the states and governments behind such normative instruments while also including “various citizens formations”, as well as customary and traditional systems which are richer sources of legitimacy as they are closer to the population. This importantly includes African youth and women, not merely in the urban but also the rural parts of the continent.

In the final analysis, as legality comes from the state above, legitimacy comes from the people below. Juxtaposed against its political economy, therefore, African ownership of agency is more apparent than real, more often assumed rather than clearly conceived, merely pronounced rather than firmly constructed. A viable African vision must include both people and state and must be able to bridge the gaps and address the tensions between them.

African capacity is another critical element of viable African ownership

and collective agency. African states, communities and peoples need to not only participate, but also lead in the implementation and actualisation of their collective aspirations.

Whether in the field of engineering, science, legal affairs and whatever else, such must also include the African diaspora which remains still a marginally incorporated component. Implementation capacity is a function of the human, institutional and collective energies of African actors, be they community, state, elite or citizen.

An important dimension of capacity is psychological, i.e., the African “state of mind” and its conditioning. The departure point, and the destination of collective agency, is the conviction that Africa and Africans are unstoppable by anyone or anything, inferior to no one, and welcoming to everyone. African ownership therefore requires that Africa is first and foremost the responsibility of Africans; external actors are secondary, though welcome.

This “can do”’ and “must do” spirit is essential to drive African implementation

capacity and enhance its impact. It can only come from African solidarity, indeed very much a normative darling of the African Union, generously effused by its Constitutive Act, as well as most key AU normative instruments.

There is a political economy of ownership through which power flows to

the “donor” and away from the “recipient”. African agency must therefore be consistently cognisant that “the hand that gives is always on top”. African ownership necessitates devoting Africa’s own resources to the implementation of agency, driven by African vision.

There can be no African ownership

Adedeji Ebo: ‘There can be no African ownership when and where external “donors”, for the most part, bear financial responsibility for entire processes and projects and initiatives on the continent’

UN Secretary-General Antόnio Guterres: he has repeatedly noted the imbalance in the global political system that sustains the underdevelopment of many countries

when and where external “donors”, for the most part, bear financial responsibility for entire processes and projects and initiatives on the continent. For example, the inspiration evoked by the AU Constitutive Act stands in sharp contradistinction with the financial dependency of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is reported to be two-thirds externally funded.

The list of the AU’s “partners” is a long one, and the “partnership” is typically disproportionately with external actors bearing financial responsibility for “support”. Following the money, African ownership is constrained, dependent, and African voices thus structurally muted.

For collective agency to be effective, African resources are best provided through inclusive and participatory processes that enable people and communities, beyond the state, to effectively exercise agency and, indeed, oversight. The process through which African resources are appropriated is important for agency and are best configured through transparent and participatory processes which allow agency to be directed by African voices and energies at each level.

There is need for resources that are legislatively appropriated, with open hearings in parliaments featuring active civil society and citizen groups.

In the struggle to identify African

Africa is first and foremost the responsibility of Africans ‘ ’

funding and resources, African energies should focus on renewed and louder calls for reforms of the international financial system, as well as calls for reparative justice in the form of financial reparations. The continent should negotiate more favourable terms on mineral and natural resources.

Growing intra-African trade should remain a priority. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) should not be implemented as acquiescence to the current economic order and giving up on the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

African resources could also be released by a concerted change in Africa’s demand patterns.

Africa consuming what it does not produce and producing what it does not consume is an endless path to dependency, the devaluation of African currencies and the strengthening of external economies.

The role of Africa and Africans in tracking political and socio-economic progress is crucial for determining how and whose “success” is being considered and measured. It is therefore a key element of African ownership.

Despite membership of the World Trade Organisation, for example, Africa’s share of global trade declined from 4.4 per cent in 1970 to 2.7 per cent in 2020

The process of review and assessment through which agency is monitored and evaluated needs not only to include but be led by African communities and states, in a participatory, inclusive and transparent manner. Success is measured as impact of agency by both states and citizens more broadly.

The challenge, therefore, is to develop a uniquely African operational framework which is horizontal, objective and effective in placing Africa squarely at the centre. In this regard, the African Peer Review Mechanism provides an encouraging basis which needs to extend statutory processes.

However, the effectiveness of Africa’s agency in contributing to the contours of a new global order would depend on a clear cohesive African component, an “African Pact” based on which Africa could speak with one voice on the most important issues. To be sure, such a common path is by no means a naïve insistence on “one of everything” (language, foreign policy, culture, etc.) for an entire continent.

On the other hand, “unity in diversity” should not be equated with the least common denominator of consensus. The key message is that Africa can least afford the “long way home”. There should be no surrender to the de-energising attitude of being “realistic”. We all are creators, through collective agency, of what is “possible”.

Collective agency is a particularly urgent imperative for both Africa’s role in the world and the role of the world in Africa. Therefore, whether for its own continental consolidation or for “projecting” the continent on the global stage through multilateral organisations, Pan-Africanism is the most viable, though challenging path to the continent’s transformation and full and optimal participation in the global political economy.

Bolstering Africa’s collective agency is imperative. Otherwise, Africa’s current, dissipated agency risks being a mere ingredient in the geo-strategic recipes of others.

Adedeji Ebo is a Visiting Professor at King’s College London (KCL). He is also the Director and Deputy to the High Representative, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. The views expressed in the above and the following two articles are those of the author only. They do not represent the views of the UN. They are from his presentation during Africa Week organised by the African Leadership Centre, KCL in March 2024 under the theme: Is Africa’s Agency for Hire, for Sale or for Renewal?

Africa’s chequered relationship with multilateralism

What the continent gets out of respective multilateral organisations depends on its inputs into them, and its stake is a function of the dynamic interaction between the primacy of politics and the fundamentals of economics within such a system, says Adedeji Ebo

WHILE Africa itself is losing confidence in global multilateral arrangements such as the UN, intra-African multilateralism (the AU, ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, etc.) is showing signs of distress. It is, or at least, it should be, the major focus of Africa’s agency to resist and transform the current hegemonic (dis)order which is predicated on and benefits from Africa’s marginalisation.

A collective African renewal from within, interconnected and mutually reinforcing between states and society and between communities and peoples, across regions to the continental and to the global, is a necessary condition for Africa’s agency to be impactful.

To determine whether multilateral organisations are “fit for purpose”, it is necessary first to decipher the “purpose” of Africa’s agency and whose purpose. Is it a common purpose (common “African voice”) that could form the basis for collective action, or is Africa’s agency to be found only in the quest for state survival and elite interests?

There are seismic changes taking place not only globally, but within Africa itself. Old arrangements are shaky and crumbling, while new ones are emerging. There could not have been a more opportune time for Africa to resolutely focus its agency on taking advantage of the chaotic, destabilised and declining global Western hegemony, as indeed some other regions of the world are gainfully doing, producing “new and emerging powers”. Unfortunately, however, Africa’s own dissipated and dissipating agency has rendered it more of a bystander than a beneficiary of the vulnerabilities offered to subaltern actors by the current state of anomie in global affairs. The 2024 UN Summit of the Future, at which states are to set a Pact of the Future, is an important opportunity for collective African agency, were it possible.

African multilateral organisations are essentially conduits for African agency and

connect national levels to a global level of agency. However, the record of African multilateral organisations in projecting Africa’s voice is not linear.

African multilateral organisations must be credited with major achievements, including bringing an end to colonisation, engaging boldly and creatively in peacekeeping, mediation, free movement of goods and citizens. Their record has however been spasmodic, and perhaps even retrogressive.

While African multilateral bodies tend to possess a rich body of normative frameworks and instruments, there are wide gaps between norms and practice. African multilateral organisations are typically state-centric, vaguely, and loosely connected to people and communities.

Indeed, for many communities and citizens, agency is derived necessarily from resistance to the state. This results in legality-legitimacy gaps and tensions, with contradictory and mutually antagonistic energies of Africa’s agency.

What is clearly and urgently needed is an agenda for rebooting Pan-Africanism. There is a palpable need for change in Africa’s marginalised role in the current global order. However, the transformation of Africa away from the periphery to the centre of the global political economy is an arduous and necessarily multidirectional task.

To be sure, it is possible, but only through a particular African agency that is collective, cogent, cohesive and impactful, and interconnected by a deep sense of common identity and purpose. A unity of efforts should be birthed by a unity of purpose, commonality of experience and confluence of interests.

To achieve this, Africa’s agency needs to change from being hired, sold, hijacked and dissipated to become more independent, energised, self-confident and African-owned. Systematic and systemic transformation is required rather than merely “cumulative progress”. Fundamental

changes, not mere tinkering, are needed. Such a transformation requires political and economic belt-tightening and a disciplined urgent sense of purpose at every level.

Set against the status quo, it requires a transformation in the respective elements of African ownership of agency: common African vision (African social contract); implementation capacity; African resources; and a people-centred operational framework. What needs to change is the seemingly lacklustre and dissipated African agency and what is needed to achieve this is its renewal and rebirth.

Given the wide gap between where Africa currently is and where it needs and aspires to be, all hands are required on deck, inspired by a common sense of identity, solidarity and purpose. What could move the needle is a characteristically, essentially, and necessarily Pan-Africanist agenda, as quite aptly captured in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, “a unique framework for our collective vision of Africa and in our relations with the rest of the world”.

In this regard, there is a palpable

gap between the lofty aspirations in the preamble to the Constitutive Act and the relatively cautious implementation which aims only at “the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union”.

A reawakening of Africa is urgently needed, to narrow the gap between the aspirations of African vision (as captured by the AU) and its realisation. What is required is a reboot of Pan-Africanism that interconnects various levels of African agency from the population to the state, to the regions and up to the global levels.

We are currently at an opportune juncture to revisit the basis of Africa’s multilateral arrangements and lay a firmer basis for the reinvention of Pan-Africanism. For one, the gap between multilateral normative frameworks and their practice has been rapidly widening, both subregionally, regionally and globally.

In the sub-regional case of ECOWAS, the tensions have been existential, with three Sahelian states opting out of membership. These challenges have been driven by, but extend beyond, “unconstitutional” changes of power.

The effects have been so seismic, that the ECOWAS leadership proposed a fundamental rethink of its arrangement, with “plans to engage in deep reflection with the participation of critical stakeholders on the fate of regional integration, democracy and good governance in an era of multipolarity and an asymmetric conflict environment”.

At the continental level of the AU, the timing is no less auspicious to take stock of its achievements and continuing

challenges, with a view to sharpening its vision for collective agency. The year 2025 marks the 25th anniversary of the Constitutive Act and the entire African Peace and Security Architecture, with a new leadership expected to take the helm of the AU Commission in the first quarter.

The Constitutive Act is the singular most significant attempt at an African Pact, aspiring for an African social contract. It is the basis of collective African agency, without which it would ultimately be dissipated and ineffective for the transformation that Africa sorely and urgently needs.

The time is right and nigh for a sharpening of the African vision, through a review of normative instruments such as the Constitutive Act, the entire APSA

and similar instruments for ECOWAS and other regional economic communities, with a view to better bridging the gap between norms and practice. African states and peoples should not hesitate to revisit some basic questions and topics which are essential for common action that emanates from common purpose that interconnect both state and society.

Africa’s ability to influence global processes and initiatives is a function of the level of cohesion that exists within Africa’s own multilateralism, i.e., its continental and regional arrangements. In other words, while there is a need for “forging a new compact with external partners to prevent a new Cold War in Africa”, such new arrangements can only be viable when they are based on a cohesive and united Africa which can engage external partners from a common African position. African regional multilateral organisations need to be part of a wider Pan-Africanist rebirth that effuses confidence, purpose and firm will to direct African energies.

Hopefully, the recent (attempted?) exit from ECOWAS holds the lesson that West African states are all mutual losers in a context of divided and mutilated agency. For Africa to be able to benefit from a “new compact” with external partners, first it must renew and rebuild the basis of its collective and cohesive agency.

Charity, it is said, begins at home. Africa’s collective agency is only as strong as its roots that lie in common African ownership and common purpose. African states are, ultimately, all mutual losers on a continent seemingly divided against itself. All should be guided, inspired, and challenged by the ultimate common purpose of African unity and solidarity.

Ecowas headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria: Intra-African multilateralism is showing signs of distress

Harnessing the demographic dividend for a better Africa

There is an urgent need to stem the waste of the human potential of the continent, which must include the positive and dynamic contributions of African youth and their “can do” originality, creativity and resilience

AS the continent with the youngest population globally, (as at 2023, about 40 per cent of Africa’s population is 15 years or younger, with a median age of 20), a new partnership compact must also include a strong generational dimension. By 2030, young Africans are expected to make up 42 per cent of the world’s youth and account for 75 per cent of those under the age of 35.

Therefore, such a compact should include a strategy to harness the demographic dividend of its youthful population. However, current signs are not encouraging: 52 per cent of African youth aged between 18 and 24 are likely to consider emigrating in the next three years due to economic strife, insecurity, political intolerance, unreliable internet and poor education systems. In Nigeria and Sudan, it is 75 per cent.

The African inter-generational partnerships must also include a bridging element, in which African youth are equipped with intergenerational knowledge and awareness through the presence of those living African heroes that are evolving to becoming “future ancestors”, manifested in all walks of life and professional disciplines. Those great Africans – Mansa Musah, Nkrumah,

Mandela, to Queen Amina of Zaria –provide inspiration and direction to African youth who are typically confronted with, and distracted by, a complex set of influences.

It is a perplexing “reality” that the African continent is, so far, incapable of communicating within itself in a common African language, or two. The gap between state-elite agency and the agency of people and communities in Africa can be partly traced to the absence of a common means of communication (language) that could narrow such a gap continent-wide. The state communicates with its population in languages that many, if not most Africans, neither speak nor understand. The lack of an agreed common continental language with which African multilateral organisations, states, elite can communicate with each other and with all African citizens is a major impediment to the construction of African ownership of agency.

Article 25 of the AU Constitutive Act is a sore reminder of this missing critical ingredient of agency, a common African language: “The working languages of the Union and all its institutions shall be, if possible, African languages, Arabic, English, French and Portuguese.” Over 60 years after the founding of the Organisation

of African Unity, and almost a quarter of a century after the founding of its successor AU, the matter of “if possible” is yet to be addressed. Africa and Africans continue to conduct affairs with each other in the languages of their colonisers. This sustains the gap between state agency and citizens’ agency, has a dissipating effect on Africa’s agency, and a structural systemic handicap to Africa’s efforts at global agency.

Music as a tool of agency is underutilised. It has served Africa well as a means of social mobilisation, advocacy and indeed agency. Apart from bridging divides and building African agency, music has been a lucrative African export which has imprinted Africa as a major entertainment capital of the world and a major influencer of global culture.

The continent should continue to create the infrastructure and support for young Africans to explore their musical talent, including across national boundaries and on the global stage.

In all this, Africa has to be careful when it comes to information technology. There is a note of caution that needs to be sounded in relation to Africa’s particular vulnerability to the negative side-effects and the weaponisation of information technology.

Through misinformation, disinformation and hate speech, Africa’s agency can be subject to manipulation, divisions and deliberate falsehoods. In addition to establishing the infrastructure to police and contain such risks, African states should ensure active advocacy and educating the public that not all information found on the internet is accurate, valid, or true.

Indeed, there are often deliberate attempts to present false and inaccurate information to an otherwise unsuspecting population, weaponized for the purpose of manipulating the audience and to (mis) guide them towards particular desired outcomes and interests.

Adedeji Ebo

African NGOs ponder yet another international criminal treaty

In Abidjan recently, activists discussed the issue of a proposed Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity accord and wondered whether there was a need for it, given the existence of the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute, writes Elise Keppler

WITH only six months until the UN’s Sixth Committee takes a decision whether to advance the Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity to treaty negotiations, the need for greater awareness on the Draft Articles is high, especially on the African continent. Africa has the largest number of states that have yet to expressly weigh in on whether the Draft Articles should advance to negotiations.

A crimes against humanity treaty would in fact be distinct from the ICC’s Rome Statute. First and foremost, the ICC deals with individual criminal responsibility, while the hoped-for crimes against humanity treaty would concern the responsibility of states to both prevent and punish the crimes. And, it is precisely such a treaty that could open the door for states to hold other states accountable through the International Court of Justice if those obligations are not met.

While genocide and war crimes have dedicated treaties – the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Geneva Conventions –crimes against humanity exist in customary international law. Having express, delineated agreed upon provisions in a treaty is far more desirable.

Indeed, this is such an obvious gap to be filled that I have yet to meet an activist who did not wish to lend their support to the effort once appreciating its purpose. Our discussion among Ivorian human rights advocates turned quickly to how to best mobilise Cote d’Ivoire and other

African states to support negotiations for the treaty.

The UN’s Sixth Committee met in April in New York to discuss the Draft Articles and states’ views on whether it is time to move them to formal treaty negotiations. More than 70 countries spoke out in support. But achieving consensus – the customary operating procedure of this committee – to move the process to negotiations will necessitate more support.

Among African governments, several have taken a clear position. Sierra Leone has shown particular leadership, alongside South Africa and The Gambia. Ghana and Portuguese speaking African states –Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea and Capo Verde – also voiced support at the April session. A couple of others earlier expressed support, including Senegal and Tunisia.

But far too many African governments have yet to take an official position on the need to move these Draft Articles to negotiations for a crimes against humanity treaty, including those that have a history of supportive positions on matters of accountability, such as Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Namibia, Botswana, Benin, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Uganda, among others.

Global Justice Center has disseminated a series of proposals to enhance the Draft Articles to be gender-competent and survivor-centric. The following crimes, in our view, should be expressly incorporated into the Draft Articles: forced marriage, reproductive violence, gender apartheid,

and the slave trade.

We also are advocating for language that is meaningless at best regarding national pregnancy laws to be removed, for excluding the Rome Statute’s definition of gender, and for adding a definition of victims that recognises the scope of victimhood and language that attends to victims’ needs, including reparations.

But the priority is to advance the process, which has been pending in the UN’s Sixth Committee for multiple years, to the next stage – to treaty negotiations where particular proposals can be further debated.

Advocates, activists, and experts agree. More than 400 civil society groups and individuals, many from across the African continent, have signed a joint statement calling for their governments to support entering into negotiations on a crimes against humanity treaty.

Governments – particularly the many across Africa that have yet to take a formal position in support of treaty negotiations –should heed the call.

This opinion piece first appeared in the Daily Maverick on May 12. Elise Keppler is executive director of the Global Justice Center (GJC), an organization that uses international law to fight for gender equality. She joined in January 2024, after two decades at Human Rights Watch’s International Justice Programme, where she focused on situations across Africa.

A crimes against humanity treaty would be distinct from the ICC’s Rome Statute

Challenging state of human rights in Africa

At

a time when basic rights and the rule of law are increasingly under attack by those tasked with protecting and promoting them on the continent, Adama Dieng says this is now the time to strengthen commitments, overcome obstacles and reinforce opportunities

THE situation of human rights and the rule of law in Africa is in decline. More than 20 years ago, no one would have imagined the deterioration of these rights and governance that we are currently witnessing. For example, over the past four or five years, unconstitutional changes of governments have taken place in a number of African countries, with far-reaching consequences for the protection and promotion of the human rights of our peoples. The rule of law has been deliberately suppressed, while governance no longer relies on the consent of the people, but rather on the will of the powerful. Unfortunately, we are all witnesses to what is happening, among other regions, in Sudan, South Sudan, or Libya, in Tigray where the conflict is static, in the Sahel which faces enormous challenges, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the scene of serious atrocities and in many other situations.

Overall, the human rights situation on the African continent therefore requires more in-depth reflection, but also a new approach to the way in which we collectively approach these developments that are profoundly reshaping our societies in a context which is not so positive.

Since its creation, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was designed to be the voice of conscience on human rights on our continent. Yet we all recognise that the strength and effectiveness of the Commission depend largely on the support it receives from all stakeholders, including political actors who have the power and responsibility to facilitate its work and implement its decisions.

Although the Commission is an important part of our African human rights system, it is not a judicial body. It is the

recognition of this fact that has galvanised our efforts to have an independent and effective judicial body, with the aim of complementing and strengthening the protection and promotion mandate of the Commission.

For example, in 1994, during the heads of state summit in Tunisia, the Secretary General of what was then the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was responsible for “reflecting, jointly with the Commission, on means to improve the effectiveness of the Commission by considering the creation of an African Court”. Once again, this mandate entrusted to the Secretary General of the OAU was neither accidental nor misplaced. It arose from the fact that the important work of the Commission must be complemented and strengthened by that of an independent and effective judiciary.

But this task also recognised the Commission's primary role in protecting and promoting human rights. Indeed, the Commission played a vital and indispensable role in the creation of an independent Court.

The Commission has therefore played a leading role in the development of African

standards, notably by creating important mechanisms such as the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on prisons, the promotion of better conditions of detention and the maintenance of order in Africa, as well as women's rights, support for human rights defenders, preservation of freedom of expression and access to information, to name just a few. Furthermore, recognising the important role of civil society in the development of human rights, the Commission has done impressive work in collaborating with civil society organisations across the continent.

The dynamic relationship between the Commission and regional civil society groups has led to an increase in the number of entities granted observer status with the Commission, from a few dozen in the 1990s to more than 450 today. Civil society groups draw the Commission's attention to violations of the Charter, submit communications on behalf of individuals, while working to monitor states' compliance with the Charter and help ensure that the activities of the Commission are better known by organising conferences and other activities for this purpose.

Adama Dieng is the African Union’s Special Envoy for the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities

Donald Deya, Executive Director of the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU), noted the importance of this interaction between the Commission and civil society: “The Commission has provided a pillar, a foundation where African citizens and friends of Africa meet around the NGO forum, which has made it possible to build a solid platform of African actors who talk to each other.”

Beyond case law, non-binding legislation, principles, declarations and recommendations, the fact that there is a framework where citizens come twice a year to interact is an important and invaluable advantage that has not been sufficiently taken into account.

Despite this impressive contribution to jurisprudence and human rights on the continent through a mandate of promotion and protection, the Commission could do more to improve its effectiveness and promotion of human rights, the rule of law and governance. I would like to briefly highlight a few points that the Commission should take into account in its work programme:

• Strengthen the role and engagement of youth, women and other marginalised groups. This will help the Commission harness the contribution of these essential components to strengthen human rights mechanisms and processes;

• Particularly in the digital age where

information sharing is more common, the Commission should strengthen the use of technology and investments in new technologies. It could thus contribute to investigations and the collection of information and evidence to support its work. It is a fact that the private sector is one of the main violators of human rights (social, economic and political). Thus, some of the most devastating conflicts on the African continent are fuelled by the work of this sector (for example in the extractive industry). However, it is also true that the participation of the private sector would not only allow for better dialogue, but also to further leverage its power and resources to achieve better protection of human rights, particularly with regard to social, economic, political and civil rights;

• The continuation of dialogue with member states in order to strengthen their obligations in terms of the Charter’s implementation;

• Although I am aware of the efforts being made to improve collaboration between the Commission and the Court, I would like to emphasise that closer collaboration between these two institutions will not only contribute to increasing human rights jurisprudence, but also to improve the protection of human rights and the rule of law in Africa through the principle of complementarity.

This meeting is happening at the right time. You stand on the giant shoulders of the brothers and sisters who came before you. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is the result of tireless work and efforts that helped lay the foundations of the system we know today. You have a responsibility to ensure that your work advances the vision of these courageous sons and daughters of Africa. You have the responsibility to pass on to those who would succeed you, institutions that are stronger, more collaborative and more effective than those you inherited. This is a difficult mission requiring a lot of selfsacrifice. But if your sole motivation and consideration is the interest and welfare of the African peoples, I am confident that your contribution to this Commission will make a big difference in the advancement of human rights and the rule of law on our dear continent.

In serving, with pride and humility, the African Union as its Special Envoy for the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, allow me to reiterate how sincerely I measure the weight of the trust placed in me by the AU, and my determination to contribute, alongside you and with your support, to the strengthening of human rights and the rule of law, whatever the challenges that we will all have to overcome, to ensure the advent of a better Africa.

Adama Dieng is Founding President of the Pan-African Alliance for Transparency and the Rule of Law, and Special Envoy of the African Union for the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities. The above is an abridged version of his address at the First Joint Forum of the Special Mechanisms of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held in Dakar, Senegal from April 25-27, 2024.

Happy times: the human rights situation on the African continent, though, requires more in-depth reflection

Why is the Malabo Protocol still on the shelf?

Ten years after African leaders adopted a document in Equatorial Guinea that aimed to provide the continent with the most expansive and ambitious understanding and definition of international crimes, reflecting both the progressive development of international criminal law and awareness of the unique and debilitating impact that some of these crimes have had and continue to have on Africa and its peoples, it has still not entered into force. Phoebe Oyugi and Owiso Owiso look at why ratification has been slow

ON June 27, 2014, leaders at the African Union (AU)) summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, popularly referred to as the Malabo Protocol.

Before and around the time of the adoption, there was mounting tension between the AU and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The AU criticised the ICC for purportedly targeting the continent unduly by politicising and misusing its prosecutorial powers against African leaders; for operating in a manner that undermined the sovereignty and stability of African states; and which was antithetical to

sustainable peace.

This tension was first clearly expressed in the AU summit decision in July 2009 directing member states not to cooperate with the ICC in arresting or surrendering the then President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir, and its earlier decision in February 2009 to consider expanding the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) to include an international crimes chamber.

The summit decided in 2013 to fast-track the expansion of the ACHPR’s jurisdiction, resulting in the adoption of the Protocol in June 2014 as a continental response to international crimes. This shift was intended to be a departure from

reliance on global mechanisms, signalling Africa's desire for autonomy and primacy over justice and accountability processes on the continent.

Ten years after its adoption, the Protocol is, however, yet to enter into force. Under Article 11, the Protocol will come into effect 30 days after the deposit of instruments of ratification by 15 member states. As of the latest information available, 15 states (Benin, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Mozambique, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome & Principe, Togo and Uganda) have signed the Protocol but only one has ratified it.

However, signature of a treaty is merely an expression of agreement with the provisions. At best it only signifies an intent to undertake at a future date the process of being bound by the treaty.

Ratification confirms the consent of a state to be bound by a treaty and typically requires formal approval from organs of the government, followed by the deposit with the Chairperson of the AU Commission of the instrument of ratification authorised by the President or Prime Minister. On March 5, 2024, Angola informed the AU Commission that it had approved the ratification of the Protocol and would soon deposit its instrument of ratification.

The reasons for the slow ratification of the Protocol are complex and multifaceted, reflecting both practical challenges and political considerations. As the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Protocol approaches, it is important to recall the reasons why it should be ratified and to advocate for states to do so swiftly.

Leaders at the African Union (AU)) summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, in June 2014

The Protocol established the ACJHPR by merging the existing African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the yetto-be-established Court of Justice of the African Union. Annexed to the Protocol is the Statute of the ACJHPR, Article 28A of which provides for the international criminal jurisdiction of the Court.

The provision bestows upon the ACJHPR jurisdiction over a wide category of crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, as well as crimes of aggression, unconstitutional change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenaryism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes and illicit exploitation of natural resources.

Thus, the Protocol provides the most expansive and ambitious understanding and definition of international crimes since the dawn of international law, reflecting both the progressive development of international criminal law and awareness of the unique and debilitating impact that some of these crimes have had and continue to have on the African continent and its peoples. By ratifying the Protocol, African states would therefore be demonstrating their commitment to accountability for these serious crimes and to fostering stability, peace and the rule of law across the continent.

Due to their cross-border nature, crimes such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, trafficking in hazardous wastes, terrorism, and money laundering pose significant challenges to African states by undermining security, stability and development. Organised criminal networks exploit weak borders and governance structures, fuel violence, and strain resources. Effectively combating transnational crimes and mitigating their effects, therefore, require

regional and global cooperation. By expanding the jurisdiction of the ACJHPR to include these crimes and providing reasonably detailed and clear definitions of these crimes, the Protocol has made a significant contribution to Africa’s efforts to combat transnational crimes. Ratifying it would, therefore, demonstrate African states’ commitment to addressing these complex challenges through regional cooperation and collective action.

The African continent continues to grapple with intractable conflicts rooted in historical injustices; communal tensions; political instability; external interference; competition for, and illicit exploitation of, resources; weak governance systems; and corruption. These challenges threaten peace and security in Africa, which are essential prerequisites for sustainable development and prosperity.

Some of these challenges affect the African continent in unique ways that the existing global legal and institutional frameworks and mechanisms have so far either underappreciated or neglected altogether. The Protocol uniquely translates these challenges into actionable legal commitments and provides an institutional framework for ensuring individual criminal accountability for them.

The ACJHR, in particular, can play a vital role in holding perpetrators of violence accountable and supporting efforts to build sustainable peace in conflict-affected states. By ratifying the Protocol, therefore, African states will contribute to strengthening the mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution and to addressing root causes and post-conflict reconstruction.

Many African states continue to grapple with unconstitutional changes of government and corruption which undermine good governance, stability and

democratic processes. These challenges often also hinder progress towards accountable governance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Protocol defines unconstitutional change of government and serious corruption as international crimes and establishes a judicial mechanism to ensure individual criminal accountability for such threats to democracy, thereby helping to safeguard political stability, good governance and democratic institutions. Ratifying it would therefore send a clear signal that African states are committed to upholding democratic governance and protecting the rights of African peoples.

The concept of “African solutions to African problems” is deeply rooted in Africa's history of foreign domination, exploitation and imposition of external “solutions” that often disregarded local context, needs and cultures. As a result, there is a strong aversion among most Africans towards foreign intervention and neo-colonialism, which perpetuate dependency and undermine selfdetermination.

Embracing indigenous approaches to problem-solving is seen as a means to reclaim agency, sovereignty and cultural autonomy; to counter the legacies of colonialism and subjugation, and promote autochthonous development. The AU is deeply committed, at least in theory, to strengthening and affirming the validity of its responses to challenges facing the continent. The Protocol can, therefore, be considered as a response crafted by the AU in repudiation of acontextual one-size-fitsall global responses to international crimes. The Protocol reflects the principle of “African solutions to African problems”.

By creating a regional mechanism for criminal justice and accountability, the Protocol demonstrates Africa's capacity to address its own problems and challenges without external interference, thereby asserting the primacy of African agency in shaping the continent's future.

The Protocol represents a significant opportunity for African states to strengthen human rights, justice and the rule of law on the continent. By ratifying this Protocol, AU member states will demonstrate their commitment to combating impunity, protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, enhancing regional integration, and fostering peace and security.

On the 10th anniversary of its adoption, it is imperative that African states take concrete steps to ratify and implement the Malabo Protocol for the benefit of all African peoples.

AU summit in July 2009 decided not to cooperate with the ICC in arresting or surrendering the then President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir

World on precipice of pronounced change

Humankind is living in an unprecedented era of new, interconnected crises and elevated global uncertainty that will have profound implications for all people, the planet and the future of humanity, warns Ban Ki-moon

NOW more than ever, we require multilateral solutions underpinned with cooperation and solidarity to empower the leaders of both today and tomorrow to rise to the occasion and ensure a peaceful and sustainable future for all. Great power rivalry is intensifying, particularly between the US and China. And, the illegal Russian war against Ukraine, alongside renewed conflict in the Middle East, represents one of the most dangerous moments for global security in decades.

Global crises such as conflict, pandemics and climate change have underlined our interconnectedness. They have also made it clear that we need global solutions in response.

And, I am confident that we have invaluable opportunities to change the world for the better. But to do so, we must come together in greater solidarity and urgency. We must find our common humanity.

How can we synergise multilateralism in this era of crisis and uncertainty? We can achieve this through sound policies and action, the power of cooperation and partnerships, building peace and sustainability in our communities, and a driving sense of global citizenship and solidarity with others.

At the same time, all key stakeholders must redouble efforts to achieve the UN’s noble vision of faith in the “dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”.

Conflict is expanding while the global security architecture has broken down; as seen in Ukraine, Gaza and Sudan. Human rights, earned through the blood of our forefathers and institutionalised through a handful of key documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are under threat from repressive regimes, xenophobia and impunity.

And development and humanitarian funds are being slashed just when we need them the most, right as our climate is changing in unprecedented and dangerous ways.

Despite such challenges, the UN is actively undertaking key transformational projects to realise its vision, and build on its previous essential work in the field of development.

Previously, the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) drastically improved human welfare around the world. The MDGs, established in 2000, represented eight guiding goals for the world to achieve by 2015.

Extreme poverty rates have been cut in half by 2010. This represents over one billion people, and is an incredible achievement. During this period, the underfive mortality and maternal death rates have been halved. Since 1990, 2.1 billion people have benefited from access to improved sanitation, and over 2.6 billion people now have improved sources of water.

But there is still so much work to be done. Over 10 per cent of the world’s workers and their families still live on less

than $1.90 a day. More than six million children die each year before they reach their fifth birthday.

And in 2023, nearly two billion people around the world still lacked access to clean and safe drinking water. This figure will surely worsen as a result of climate changeaccelerated drought and expanding water scarcity.

During my time as UN SecretaryGeneral, I brought the entire world together to agree to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Adopted by 193 countries in New York in 2015, the SDGs offer us a way forward to solve the most critical issues of our time.

These include poverty, hunger, public health, education, inequality, climate change, gender equality, and others.

The SDGs provide humanity, and our planet, with a collaborative blueprint to ensure the future we want. The SDGs also represent a transformational moment for global governance more largely, in that goal-setting itself was a key policy strategy.

This was a sea change from previous sustainable development initiatives such as

the MDGs. And this also differs from other global governance benchmarks.

Leading up to the realisation of the SDGs, many consultations with diverse partners and stakeholders were organised. This made the SDG goal-setting process more inclusive, transparent, and participatory than ever before.

The SDGs were borne out of a more organic, and bottom-up process; as determined and agreed upon by UN member states. As UN Secretary-General, I worked tirelessly to guide this process forward. I strived to harness the inclusive spirit of the first words of the UN Charter, “We the Peoples of the United Nations”, as part of the review and follow-up process.

Significantly, I also ensured that climate change was integrated into the process.

Today, more than eight years since their adoption, the SDGs have made notable sustainable development progress. This is especially true in terms of bettering maternal mortality rates, combatting poverty and hunger, and improving the quality of water and sanitation globally. However, progress is uneven on other SDGs, with some sectors and geographic areas moving faster than others. Expanding conflict, the deepening climate crisis, and the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic and its recovery have also all seriously stalled and reversed hard-won SDG progress.

Indeed, halfway to their 2030 target date, no country is currently on track towards achieving all of the SDGs. As of last September, a mere 12 per cent of the SDGs are on track, or, as the 2023 Global Sustainable Development Report summarises progress on the 2030 Agenda,

this is a “stagnation in the face of multiple crises”.

But I firmly believe that we absolutely must keep moving forward, together.

At the same time, I am confident that achieving the SDGs can bring us together to chart a more peaceful, sustainable, inclusive and prosperous future for all people and our planet. So, we simply must forge ahead under the multilateral spirit of cooperation, partnership and solidarity.

In this regard, SDG 17 highlights the crucial role that strong global partnerships can play to connect humanity, and help achieve the UN SDGs. It calls for, “multistakeholder partnerships that mobilise and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries”.

With this in mind, we truly need an “allhands-on-deck” approach to get us back on track to achieve the SDGs.

And the SDGs are a unique blueprint to build back better, greener, and more resilient from the pandemic, conflict, and climate shock. They can bring us all together to chart a more peaceful and sustainable future. Crucially, we need increased political will and policy changes from governments to scale-up investment and action on SDG priority areas like hunger, health, climate, education and gender.

In today’s new era of pandemics, COVID-19 and other viruses have brought the health and security implications of biodiversity loss into focus. As biodiversity and habitats are destroyed due to environmental damage, wild animals have increasingly come into closer contact with

humans and, as a result, more novel viruses and pandemics have spread.

Indeed, nearly all of the viruses that have emerged in the 21st century from SARS in 2003, Ebola in 2014, to COVID-19 today, share the characteristic of being common infectious diseases that have jumped between animals and humans.

As such, the climate crisis and pandemics are two sides of the same coin and inherently intertwined. In addition to fortifying public health and boosting sustainability, the climate crisis is here now, and we need elevated ambition, action and political will to slash emissions, implement the Paris Climate Change Agreement, and safeguard the future viability of both humanity and our planet.

The global response remains critical and therefore we must resist the temptation to backpedal towards fossil fuels and instead accelerate the green transition despite expanding conflict.

This is particularly important, following the most recent COP28 UN Climate Conference in the UAE.

We urgently need enhanced initiative and effort in the spheres of climate mitigation, adaptation, innovation and finance to implement the UN Global Goals, limit temperature rise, protect biodiversity and save our planet. And every fraction of a degree matters immensely.

Consider the fact that, according to the UN, at 1.5 degrees warming, six per cent of the world’s insects will lose over 50 per cent of their habitats. And if current trends continue, more than half of the globe’s marine species may be all but extinct by 2100.

The UN is actively undertaking key transformational projects to realise its vision

This exemplifies the gravity of the extinction-level events currently transpiring, and elucidates the deep need for a paradigm-shifting universality that prioritises sustainable co-living with nature, ecosystems and other species. In this connection, acting now to urgently fight climate change must be the overarching task of our lifetimes.

The Paris Climate Change Agreement provides us with our best hope to persevere over the dire climate threats to the earth.

As I frequently stressed: we don’t have a plan B, because we don’t have a planet B either.

However, cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are still far from where they need to be, in order to safeguard a liveable climate and a thriving future for all. Indeed, recent UN climate reports paint a worrying picture of fast-approaching environmental tipping points and surging global heating, if urgent climate action is not taken.

At the same time, threats to our oceans and seismic biodiversity loss, impacting countless species and ecosystems, could be cataclysmic if left unchecked. In 2023 alone, nearly 400 millimetres of extreme rainfall fell in Libya in a single day in September, catastrophically flooding communities and resulting in over 4,300

deaths.

Furthermore, the eight hottest years of globally recorded temperatures have now all occurred since 2015, and 2023 was the hottest year ever recorded. We are now pushing the upper heat limits of human survival.

In addition, there have been apocalyptic predictions that the time of the sixth mass extinction will come. If and when the sixth mass extinction does transpire within the next 100 years, it will result in the catastrophic loss of more than 70 per cent of the earth’s species.

As such, climate change is clearly threatening the survival of humanity in all of its aspects.

Frankly, if we do not act now, humanity’s future survival will be greatly imperilled.

At the heart of such action, there is no other way than to drastically slash the planet’s carbon emissions on the road to net zero and ensure a just transition. This will address energy shortages, improve human well-being, and catalyse cooperation. And the role of young people is vital.

The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says that we have just seven years to cut emissions by 50

per cent, in order to restrict the planet’s temperature rise to 1.5 degrees before climate change becomes catastrophic.

The bottom line is that climate change is precipitating insecurity, conflict, displacement and grave public health risks all around the world. And it could get much worse.

Against this backdrop, to faithfully implement the Paris Climate Agreement and push it further, all stakeholders must expand their ambitions and urgency to cut emissions. Rapidly hitting net zero emissions must be the priority.

With this in mind, I believe that robust multilateral action must steer our responses forward. It is critical that we hit net-zero targets by 2050. And to do so, we must turn existing international commitments into decisive action.

At the same time, support for the most vulnerable countries is falling too short. And expanded conflict and ongoing COVID-19 recoveries are hindering crucial progress. As such, I welcome the historic breakthrough that was reached in Egypt at COP27 in 2022 relating to financial help for countries coping with climate changecaused loss and damage.

Low-income countries have contributed the least to the climate crisis,

COVID-19 and other viruses have brought the health and security implications of biodiversity loss into focus

but are being disproportionally impacted. This is why finance stands as one of the key pillars of the Paris Climate Agreement.

It is also why upper-income countries must fulfil their promises to expand climate funding for developing countries, and scale-up financing for climate adaptation around the world.

Indeed, equitable reinvestment of just two per cent of global GDP by the Global North can go a long way in accelerating the development of key green technologies and infrastructure to help avert climate catastrophe.

Despite the ongoing work of the United Nations in working towards the achievement of the SDGs, and responding to the climate crisis and COP processes, the UN’s overall role, effectiveness and reputation are being harmed by the malfunctioning of the Security Council.

The Council’s gridlock and inaction are, sadly, blocking the realisation of the UN Charter’s raison d'être of saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.

And this is also impacting global governance more largely. In this vein, I am of the view that organisational reform

is an important and ongoing process to ensure that the UN remains responsive to the geopolitical and humanitarian crises of both today and tomorrow.

Particularly, this includes reforming the Security Council, which is too often paralysed in responding to major crises such as those in Ukraine or Gaza.

In this regard, I believe that multilateral action rooted in prevention and partnership must steer the UN’s coordinated response forward to holistically address conflicts in a changing global environment. I commend UN Secretary-General Guterres’ prioritisation of prevention as the UN’s transformative driving approach to respond to security crises.

This deep-rooted vision has gained elevated relevance through the continuing process of the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the historic 2016 adoption of the twin UN General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions on sustaining peace.

However, we are witnessing a lack of requisite political will needed to make such prevention efforts successful. To help fill this vacuum, and simultaneously expand crucial dialogue to help prevent

and resolve crises, the ongoing efforts of key multi-stakeholder partners, including universities and civil society, are greatly needed.

At the same time, the UN, particularly the Security Council, must never turn a blind eye in the face of grave crimes unfolding in front of it. Indeed, the UN Security Council and its member states, particularly those countries who wield vetoes as they prioritise national interests, must never forget the lessons of their inaction in Rwanda, Syria, and today in Ukraine and Gaza.

Noting the inherent interlinkages between the UN’s three pillars, the international community must reaffirm human rights for all. We are now witnessing new threats and emerging challenges to human rights and other universal values in every corner of the world.

Indeed, the unfortunate reality is that human rights violations have been heightened as of late by conflict, the global pandemic, newly emerging technologies, and entrenched authoritarian systems.

The impact of such challenges exemplifies the interrelation of the nexus

between peace, development and human rights. This requires re-invigorated global solidarity.

And this is vital as human rights constitute the building blocks that underpin inclusive, resilient communities. Human rights protect us all, including during conflict.

They offer a pathway to durable peace and post-conflict reconciliation, justice and sustainable development. They are positioned at the top of our toolbox for countering terrorism and violent extremism.

And they form the basis of peaceful, sustainable and prosperous societies in which all people, everywhere, enjoy both

dignity and opportunity. I urge all leaders, and other key stakeholders, to lead by example through reaffirming humanity’s faith in human rights, and in the dignity and worth of each person, as envisaged by the UN Charter and key Declarations.

Now more than ever before, we must chart a brighter new course to confront the great challenges we are facing.

This is true for building peace and resolving conflicts, ensuring sustainable development, taking decisive climate action and empowering rejuvenated global governance.

As such, it is essential that we all join together in partnership under the banner of reinvigorated multilateralism—with the

AS the 8th Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as a child of war, the UN is extremely important to me, and it exemplifies the values and principles that we should all espouse to replicate. When I was a child, I saw the best of the UN during the worst of times for myself, my family and my country.

Indeed, I grew up in Korea during a time when the embers still burned from the Korean War. In 1950, I saw the destruction it caused first-hand and felt the stunted development it wrought on the Korean Peninsula.

I was an internally displaced person when I should have been a happy child. Instead of playing with toys and friends, I was struggling for survival during one of the most savage wars that history has ever seen.

We largely subsisted on food and medicine provided by the UN. UNICEF provided key humanitarian assistance; UNESCO gave us textbooks to study with; and it was the iconic blue UN flag – omnipresent in Korea during those dark times – that shined bright as a beacon of hope.

UN in the lead—to wage peace, accelerate progress on the SDGs, build back better in the post-COVID era, and spur urgent climate action.

We need greater unity, solidarity, action and compassion. We must remember that the interconnected global challenges of today require global solutions.

And I believe that refocusing our efforts on achieving SDG 5, which calls for achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls, is critical as it is a true game-changing enabler of all of the other SDGs. If we continue to hold back half of the world’s population, it’s simply impossible to reach our full potential on the UN’s three pillars. So, we simply must do more for women and girls everywhere.

We must remember that the current challenges are simply too enormous to be left in the hands of a few leaders. All of us have to work together in solidarity. Collaborate across borders and seas, generations, cultures and religions. This will boost peace, sustainability and collective action in an increasingly fractured world.

The challenges we are facing are unprecedented, so our response must be equally unprecedented.

Indeed, it was the UN’s three pillars of peace and security, human rights, and development that helped save Korea and its people. And these defining experiences of seeing the vital work of the UN up close as a child of war helped me become a man of peace, and eventually UN Secretary-General in 2007.

In 1945, as the ashes of World War II lifted, the UN was conceived to provide an essential international forum for maintaining global peace and security. Its critics were numerous then, but the UN offered all nations and peoples an alternative vision to the bombs, guns and destruction of the war.

This vision was, and is, anchored by the guiding belief that multilateralism and cooperation offer the international community a better way forward than war and conflict.

And so, 78 years later, the UN remains the pre-eminent forum for every country in the world to address serious global issues together through cooperation. During this time, the UN has tirelessly pursued its three interconnected pillars. This has bettered humanity and our planet; and provided light. But serious challenges remain.

The above is an abridged version of Ban Ki-moon’s talk at King’s College London titled “The Role of Multilateralism Under Current Global Challenges”, which was delivered on May 1 2024.

I saw the best of the UN during the worst of times for myself, says Ban Ki-moon

'Upper-income countries must fulfil their promises to expand climate funding for developing countries'

AGOA reauthorisation: boosting US-Africa trade in critical minerals

Experts discuss how the ongoing AGOA reauthorisation could strengthen USAfrica trade relations in critical minerals, fostering economic growth and strategic partnerships amidst the clean energy transition, Jon Offei-Ansah reports

IN the midst of a global push towards cleaner, more sustainable energy solutions, the United States finds itself at a critical crossroads. With an increasing focus on renewable energy sources and the electrification of transportation, there is a growing demand for critical minerals – essential components in the production of clean energy technologies such as solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicle batteries. However, this surge in demand has also underscored the vulnerabilities inherent in global supply chains, particularly the United States' reliance on geopolitical rivals like China for these vital resources.

At the centre of efforts to address these challenges lies the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a landmark trade programme enacted in 2000 with the aim of promoting economic development and facilitating trade between the United States and eligible African countries. Over the past two decades, AGOA has served as a cornerstone of US-Africa trade relations, offering duty-free access to the US market for thousands of products from participating nations.

As discussions surrounding the reauthorisation of AGOA gain momentum, analysts recognise the programme's potential to deepen trade ties between the United States and Africa, particularly in the realm of critical minerals. “The reauthorisation process presents a unique opportunity to align US strategic interests with African development goals, paving the way for a mutually beneficial partnership that could bolster both economic growth and energy security,” according to Zainab Usman, Senior Fellow and Director, Africa Programme, and Alexander Csanadi, Research Analyst, Africa Programme, both at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an international affairs

think tank headquartered in Washington, DC.

Usman and Csanadi see one of the primary challenges in harnessing Africa's mineral wealth las lying in navigating regulatory barriers that could hinder the flow of these vital resources to the United States. One such barrier is the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which includes

provisions that could inadvertently exclude African mineral producers from certain incentives aimed at promoting domestic clean energy industries.

“For instance, Section 30D of the IRA offers tax credits for the purchase of electric vehicles (EVs), but eligibility criteria related to the sourcing of critical minerals pose a potential barrier for African

countries. During the AGOA reauthorisation process, there is an opportunity to address these challenges by exempting eligible African mineral producers from IRA restrictions. By doing so, the United States can diversify its supply chains, support African value addition initiatives, and reduce its dependence on imports from geopolitical rivals.”

Beyond addressing regulatory hurdles, there is also a pressing need to reframe the US-Africa trade relationship into a strategic economic partnership fit for the twenty-first century. While AGOA has been instrumental in promoting trade between the two regions, its underperformance in recent years has led some to question its efficacy. However, rather than discarding AGOA altogether, there is merit in reimagining it as a platform for strategic collaboration that goes beyond traditional trade agreements. By elevating the trade partnership to a strategic economic level, both the United States and Africa can unlock new

opportunities for growth and development. This reframing would signal a shift away from aid-based approaches towards a more equitable and mutually beneficial economic partnership grounded in shared interests and objectives.

As part of this strategic realignment, there is also potential to negotiate a new Critical Minerals Agreement (CMA) under AGOA. Drawing inspiration from existing trade agreements, such as the US-Japan CMA, this agreement, Usman and Csanadi believe, could provide a framework for deepening trade collaboration while addressing concerns around mineral governance and supply chain security.

They stress that, “By leveraging AGOA's governance provisions, an Africaspecific CMA could ensure sustainable trade practices and bolster US clean energy resilience. Moreover, by focusing on critical minerals essential to the clean energy transition, such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements, the agreement could drive innovation and investment in both the United States and Africa, creating opportunities for economic growth and job creation on both sides of the Atlantic.’

The reauthorisation of AGOA presents a unique opportunity to reshape US-Africa trade relations and unlock Africa's vast mineral wealth for the benefit of both regions. By addressing regulatory barriers, reframing the trade relationship, and negotiating innovative agreements such as the CMA, both the United States and Africa can chart a course towards shared prosperity and energy independence.

As the world transitions to a lowcarbon economy, strategic partnerships and sustainable resource management will be key drivers of success. By embracing this opportunity and working together towards common goals, the United States and Africa can pave the way for a more resilient, prosperous, and sustainable future for all.

Unleashing Africa's critical minerals: a path to sustainable development

As the world transitions to clean energy, demand for critical minerals skyrockets. Sub-Saharan Africa, with its vast mineral reserves, stands at a pivotal moment. A report by the IMF explores how strategic policies, regional cooperation, and domestic reforms can transform the region's mining sector into a catalyst for sustainable development

THE global shift towards clean energy is not merely a trend; it's a monumental transformation driving unprecedented demand for critical minerals. According to projections by the International Energy Agency, between 2022 and 2050, the demand for nickel will double, cobalt will triple, and lithium will surge tenfold. This surge in demand presents a significant opportunity for SubSaharan Africa, home to approximately 30 percent of the world's proven critical mineral reserves.

Already, sub-Saharan Africa plays a central role in global critical mineral production. The Democratic Republic of Congo alone accounts for over 70 percent of global cobalt output and nearly half of the world's proven reserves. South Africa, Gabon, and Ghana collectively contribute over 60 percent of global manganese production. Moreover, countries like Zimbabwe, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo possess substantial but largely untapped lithium deposits.

“The potential windfall from critical minerals is staggering,” says the IMF in its World Economic Outlook published in April. Global revenues from the extraction of key minerals such as copper, nickel, cobalt, and lithium are projected to reach $16 trillion over the next 25 years. SubSaharan Africa stands to capture over 10 percent of these revenues, potentially translating into a GDP increase of 12 percent or more by 2050. “However, realising this potential requires more than just extracting and exporting raw materials,” the IMF adds.

One of the most promising avenues for maximising value lies in local mineral processing. While raw materials

fetch modest prices, processing them significantly increases their value. For example, raw bauxite sells for $65 per ton, whereas processed aluminum commands $2,335 per ton. Unfortunately, the lack of local processing facilities means that much

of Africa's critical minerals are exported in their raw form, missing out on substantial value addition.

Developing local processing industries not only enhances value but also

South Africa, Gabon, and Ghana

creates higher-skilled jobs and increases tax revenues, thus supporting poverty reduction and sustainable development. By diversifying economies and moving up the value chain, countries can mitigate the risks associated with volatile commodity prices and currency fluctuations.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays a crucial role in developing mineral processing industries, but the absence of a substantial regional market often hampers investment incentives. Policymakers must address this challenge by fostering regional cooperation and integration. A coordinated regional strategy can create a more attractive investment environment and unlock the full potential of sub-Saharan Africa's critical minerals.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers a platform for reducing trade barriers and developing infrastructure, thereby facilitating the creation of regional value chains. “Collaboration on policies and regulations,

such as harmonising mining regulations and simplifying bureaucratic procedures, is essential for creating a stable and predictable investment climate,” says the IMF.

Moreover, sub-Saharan Africa's projected population boom, coupled with rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, is expected to drive increased demand for renewable energy and processed minerals. Regional collaboration can streamline operations, reduce costs, and foster innovation, positioning Africa as a global leader in clean energy technology.

In addition to regional efforts, domestic reforms are imperative for unlocking the full potential of Africa's mining sector. Countries must undertake structural reforms to support local companies in mining and related processing sectors. While local content requirements can promote domestic participation, they should be implemented judiciously to avoid unintended consequences.

Furthermore, inward-looking policies and export bans on raw materials can stifle growth and hinder value addition. Strengthening domestic financial markets and improving access to finance can empower local businesses and attract

investment. Embracing fintech innovations can provide alternative financing solutions, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises in the mining sector.

Responsible management of resource windfalls requires transparent and accountable institutions, coupled with sound public financial management and equitable tax regimes. The Africa Mining Vision, launched by the African Union in 2009, provides a robust framework for guiding these reforms and ensuring that the benefits of mining translate into sustainable development for all.

Sub-Saharan Africa stands at a pivotal moment in history, poised to harness its abundant mineral resources for sustainable development. By embracing strategic policies, fostering regional cooperation, implementing domestic reforms, and embracing technological innovations, African countries can unlock the full potential of their mining sector and pave the way for a prosperous and sustainable future.

“The time to act is now, and the opportunity is vast. With concerted efforts, Africa can emerge as a global powerhouse in clean energy and mineral processing, driving economic growth and prosperity for generations to come,” the IMF declares.

Ghana’s minerals sector needs to be people-driven

Small-scale and illegal mining activities have led to the destruction of a quarter of forest cover in the south-western area of the country within the decade ending 2017 due to the absence of predictable, accountable and participatory leadership that reconciles the interests of the state and society, finds Clement Sefa-Nyarko who is proposing the use of the social licence at the disposal of members of society to reverse this trend

THE pervasiveness of unmitigated, mostly illegal, small-scale mining has devastated Ghana's land mass, forest and water bodies, and destroyed livelihoods of several populations who live in the six main mining regions in the country. This threatens to derail Ghana's commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals around climate and sustainability. Between 2007 and 2017, the south-western part of Ghana lost up to 25 per cent of the forest cover to small-scale mining, mostly done illegally.

Although small-scale mining only accounts for a third of Ghana's gold production, it caused seven times more devastation on the forest than industrialscale mining. In the forests of the Western, Ashanti, Eastern, Ahafo and two upper regions, river bodies have been polluted and landmass excavated beyond affordable recovery, creating significant harm to the ecosystem, health and livelihoods of people.

Small-scale mining, locally termed galamsey to refer mainly to the unlicenced version of artisanal and small-scale mining, also threatens Gross Domestic Production: the quality of Ghana's cocoa cash crop has been questioned by the European Union and other cocoa beans buyers due to emerging evidence of contamination of the cocoa plants by gold-washing chemicals such as mercury that are used by miners. Emerging evidence also shows that (illegal) small-scale mining contributes to the supply chain of organised criminal gangs in West Africa.

This phenomenon, although debatable, typifies the “paradox of plenty” concept: the presence of natural resources creating

a curse rather than blessing for developing countries. Other examples from Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Colombia exemplify this association between the extractives and a “curse”. However, it is the nature of the leadership of minerals governance, rather than a curse, that is the fundamental challenge in this sector in Ghana.

The country’s small-scale mining

industry has a long history. Formally recognised through the Small-Scale Mining Act, 1989 (PNDC Law 218), it was later integrated into the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703). It formalises small-scale mining with the aim of streamlining the practice and eliminating the persistence of its illegality so that, first, the environment can be protected through responsible mining and, second, the government can generate revenue

Small-scale mining only accounts for a third of Ghana's gold production, but has caused seven times more devastation on the forest than industrial-scale mining

through taxation and royalty payments. To differentiate it from large-scale industrial mining, the law insists that small-scale mining is reserved for Ghanaian nationals who rely on artisanal equipment for open, environmentally friendly mining.

A thin line exists between legal and illegal mining in practice ‘ ’

By this logic, legal small-scale mining is expected to have minimum impact on the environment and land resource.

On the contrary, however, small-scale mining in Ghana has had a devastating impact on the environment, water bodies, livelihoods and economic migration in the last decade. This is primarily because of the thin line between legal (licensed) and illegal (unlicensed) mining in practice: licensed Ghanaians have been aided by Chinese and other foreign investors to acquire heavy earth-moving equipment and toxic gold washing technology to fast-track the excavation and extraction of the metal without putting mechanisms in place to restore the environment.

With the introduction of the unlicensed technology in licensed small-scale mining (the use of heavy equipment and unregulated water-polluting chemicals such as mercury for extracting gold metals), the entire small-scale mining sector appears out of control. None of the anti-galamsey efforts from the government, civil society and traditional leaders has made any

difference in curbing it.

The inability of the state to distinguish between legal and illegal mining was the reason why it banned all small-scale mining activities in April 2017 and subsequently established the military-style Operation Vanguard to enforce the ban. While largely unsuccessful in its goal, it is indicative of the challenge of distinction. For this reason, while small-scale mining refers mainly to the unlicensed mining (galamsey), a distinction is not always apparent.

Why has (illegal) small-scale mining persisted despite the widespread knowledge about its social and environmental devastation and the expression of interest by national and sub-national leaders to curb it? The answer lies in the nature of leadership that is adopted in the sector, which is not distributed horizontally enough. Leadership in the governance of minerals is modelled to militarise a social and environmental problem. It excludes the local constituents in decision-making

President Akufo-Addo (left) and NDC’s John Mahama: The two main political parties, the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress, have also used political antics around small-scale mining, each promising to act against the ruling regime's policies if voted into office

and accountability, which is akin to the widely acknowledged colonial aptitude of hierarchy in governance. Such a leadership model has limitations and has contributed to exacerbating the crisis by, first, alienating the most affected populations from the resolution process and, second, creating a person- and position-loaded leadership structure that is disconnected from the realities on the ground. The nurturing of a process-oriented leadership in minerals governance has the best promise of a people-driven sustainable institutional design.

But there is an absence of process leadership in Ghana's minerals mining, which creates a disconnection between leaders and their constituents in minerals governance. This is neither a depiction of resource curse nor a mining sector problem. Instead, it is a systemic leadership anomaly that maligns members of society in institutional design.

Where members of society have expressed agency by standing up to demand for participation and accountability, as

from the state to society's demands for accountability: reactionary at best and, at worst, dismissive and non-responsive. This leaves significant loopholes for exploitation by formal and informal investors and operators in the sector, including multinationals and end-users of minerals, making them the only ones who benefit from minerals mining.

The lack of process-oriented leadership – that is, the absence of trusted methods that are implemented to reconcile the interests, goals, sanctions, opportunities and incentives for both leaders and constituents or followers – accounts for the persistence and devastation caused by illegal mining in Ghana. Desired outcomes of leadership are attainable if there is a demonstration of situation-relevant skills and responsible culture – that is, “shared motives, values, beliefs, identities and interpretations” of events – that are attractive to the constituents or followers such that they are motivated to alter their behaviour towards the common goal. If this happens, the constituents or followers will assume

Minerals governance militarises a social and environmental problem

happened when young people in the mining community of Ntotoroso in Ahafo Region disrupted operations of industrial mining for a week in 2017, their responses have often been ad hoc and reactionary rather than coordinated process-based interventions. So has been the nature of the response

responsibility for their own actions and work towards the desired outcomes rather than look up to leaders to drive change.

Neither governments, small-scale miners, nor industrial mining companies have been able to connect adequately with

the mining communities, thereby leaving them impoverished through the extraction of minerals. This is one of the drivers that fuels illegal small-scale mining, including incidences where licensed small-scale miners sub-let their licenses for large-scale excavation beyond the remits permissible by their licences. As a result, small-scale miners have taken prominence lately, initially clashing with the big mining companies and then fast-tracking the onslaught against the environment in other areas to cash-in some revenue.

Illegal small-scale mining is widespread in Ghana despite efforts to curb it. In the Western Region alone, there were 7,470 illegal mining operations in over 300 communities.

People's living conditions have deteriorated due to the lack of oversight and the irresponsible use of heavy machinery and crude technology that are not environmentally friendly. In the Amansie West district in the Ashanti Region, for instance, several acres of cocoa farmlands have been sold off to small-scale miners for mining activities.

This impoverishes farmers over time and increases food insecurity among residents in mining communities. There is a call to action from residents in the agrarian mining areas of Anyinamso in the Ashanti region: “We appeal to government to do something because the [miners] are destroying our cocoa farms. Every mine area here used to be a cocoa farm that could have served our country well, but they are digging all the farms out. “

Why is this devastation happening despite the availability of laws, several regulatory agencies, and promises by government and chiefs that the quest for a solution is a top priority? First is the lack of restraint in the ownership of gold. The Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703) does not offer any conditions for ownership and disposal of small-scale minerals.

Nothing therefore inhibits the acquisition and disposal of gold and any precious mineral in Ghana. Coupled with this is the availability of an international market for mined gold. Also, natural resources that are easily lootable and marketable lend themselves to control by non-state actors thereby fostering an increase in illegal mining and smuggling.

In addition, China's increased appetite for Africa's minerals since the 2000s has led to the injection of capital into the sector and

Small-scale mining in Ghana has had a devastating impact on the environment, water bodies

given further impetus for illegal mining. China willingly buys from anyone who has the minerals: players unencumbered by governmental regulations demanding at least some concessions to good practice on labour, environment and human rights.

Ordinary people can provide leadership in minerals governance if their efforts can be coordinated around their social license: that is, the conducive social conditions that residents in an area provide for mining to occur. Indeed, no mining can happen in an area unless residents offer this social license. Yet, despite the failure of vertical leadership in tackling the crisis of minerals mining, residents of affected communities who suffer the most do not use their social license as carrot-and-stick to lead adequately.

However, the people exhibit agency occasionally. Some residents of mining communities do withhold the social license for miners to operate, although this phenomenon of withholding such licence has not been systematically utilised as a bargaining lever to compel the government, traditional leaders and miners to prioritise the needs of the mining enclave.

The social licence wielded by members of society has historical precedence and if adequately utilised, can change the course of minerals mining and introduce rigorous and participatory process leadership. Those who wield power are fully aware that their reign is only as good as the legitimacy they receive, which must be acquiesced willingly and based on people's circumstances – whether coercion is applied directly, indirectly, or through volition.

The two main political parties, the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress, have also used political antics around small-scale mining, each promising to act against the ruling regime's policies if voted into office. Such deflection of responsibility from successive political administrations to previous ones is a characteristic of Ghana's politics, which cements the unwillingness of leaders to take responsibility for the things that matter the most. Moreover, people who own mining concessions and fund the mining schemes are known and yet, as has been noted earlier, only “diggers of the ground” are targeted as culprits, keeping the canker funded from afar without a political desire to address the root causes. Despite this

challenge, Ghana's Energy Transition Framework, which emphasises the significance of critical minerals, does not adequately acknowledge the environmental impacts of mining on the energy transition to net-zero carbon emission.

The lack of informed coordination among members of society who are impacted by small-scale mining means that the leverage afforded them by the social license to operate is not adequately utilised. When the youth of the mining communities in the Ahafo Region denied a social license to operate, the mining company was not able to function. Along with the state, they temporarily lost revenue and legitimacy, thus making it imperative for them to court sustained community validation. Similarly, when some farmers refused to sell their farms to miners in Anyimanso, their cocoa farms were not uprooted for mining. Community members can use this social license leverage to counterbalance the power of miners and leaders who are compromised. Yet, without adequate guidance for members of society, they are unable to effectively counter the power wielded by the miners, compromised leaders and irresponsible investors.

The type of leadership adopted in Ghana's minerals governance accounts for its failure to halt destruction of the environment and livelihoods and to take advantage of the “blessings” of minerals. Miners don't always comply with mining laws and environmental safety norms, sanctions are not adequately applied by the

state, and there appears to be a competition for who inflicts the most harm on the environment and livelihoods of people. This has persisted despite the availability of laws, regulations and vertical leadership that has constitutional legitimacy. The power-asymmetry between leaders and their constituents account for this crisis, and I have argued that members of society's inability to take advantage of the social license they disburse has created a chaotic regime of minerals governance in Ghana.

Process leadership can harness the positive power of social license and ensure collective, predictable and accountable minerals governance. To achieve this, small-scale minerals governance must be participatory and operated on the premise of equilibrium between and among agents of behaviour – leaders, their constituents and the most affected populations. One pathway for such leadership is the recognition, expression and regularisation of the power at the hands of both the powerful and the not-so-powerful. Agents of behaviour do perceive that it is in their interest to comply with, challenge and compete under existing rules within certain circumstances to build relationships, receive resources and utilise options. Agency must be expressed by everyone along the minerals governance value chain – society, private sector, the state – to nurture a reinforcing relationship for effective process leadership. Without reining in the hazards that small-scale mining causes to the environment, Ghana's climate and sustainability ambitions would be in default.

Dr Clement Sefa-Nyarko is a lecturer in security, development and leadership in Africa at the African Leadership Centre, School of Global Affairs, Kings College London. The above is an abridged version of a longer article published by The Extractive Industries and Society Journal, Volume 18, June 2024, 101470.

Beans at risk: cocoa plants have been contaminated by gold-washing chemicals such as mercury that are used by miners

Embracing unity: the vision behind Africa's monument of humanity

Nestled in the picturesque seaside town of Kribi, Cameroon, a monumental project is underway, poised to rewrite history and reshape the global narrative on Africa. Spearheaded by the visionary Nijel Binns, the Mother of Humanity® Monument is set to stand tall as a beacon of unity, reflection, and hope for a shared future,

writes Jon Offei-Ansah

IN the heart of Africa’s coastal beauty, nestled in the seaside town of Kribi, Cameroon, a monumental project is underway, poised to redefine history and reshape the global narrative. When completed, the Mother of Humanity® Monument will stand tall as a beacon of unity, reflection, and hope for a shared future.

Los Angeles-based Nijel Binns, who is of Sierra Leonean and Jamaican parentage and the visionary behind this ambitious project, elucidates the profound significance of the Mother of Humanity®

Monument. “All life, all human life developed on the African continent,” he asserts. “We are one family, one large extended family, interconnected by our shared origins,” adds Nijel, who was born in London and raised in the United States. Yet, amidst this unity lies a sobering reality—centuries of division, prejudice, and exploitation.

The genesis of the Mother of Humanity® Monument traces back to Africa’s pivotal role as the cradle of civilisation. “Africa is the focus of humanity,” Nijel emphasises. “It’s time

to acknowledge Africa’s contribution to civilisation, to honour its legacy as the mother of all humanities,” he tells Africa Briefing. The monument, which will stand at a towering height of 313 feet, symbolises Africa’s central place in history and the collective consciousness of humanity.

But beyond symbolism lies a deeper mission—a call to action for global unity and stewardship of our planet. Nijel underscores the urgency of addressing pressing global challenges, from climate change to socio-economic disparities.

CULTURE

“Africa must lead the conversation,” he asserts. “We must reimagine our relationship with the Earth and each other, forging a path towards a sustainable future.”

The scope of the project extends far beyond a mere monument. It encompasses the creation of MotherLand™, a cultural hub celebrating Africa’s rich diversity, and the establishment of MotherLand™ University, a centre for education and innovation. “We envision a place where all of Africa’s cultures converge, where knowledge is shared, and where solutions are forged,” Nijel explains.

Central to the project’s design is the fusion of functionality with artistry, a marriage of form and symbolism. The monument’s silhouette, reminiscent of Africa’s contours, will serve as a visual reminder of our shared heritage. Each element of the design—from the outstretched hand of welcome to the symbolic feather of truth—embodies the ethos of unity and enlightenment.

The journey towards realising the Mother of Humanity® Monument has been marked by milestones and challenges alike. From securing land in Kribi to garnering support from global stakeholders, every step has been a testament to the project’s resilience and vision. “We have achieved milestones, but the journey is far from over,” Nijel reflects. “We seek the support

of individuals and organisations committed to shaping a better future for humanity.”

As the project evolves, its impact reverberates far beyond the shores of Cameroon. Anticipated benefits span from economic growth and cultural exchange to enhanced tourism and global cooperation. “The Mother of Humanity® Monument is a testament to what we can achieve when we unite in purpose,” Nijel affirms. “It’s a symbol of hope, a reminder of our shared destiny.”

In a world marred by division and discord, the Mother of Humanity® Monument stands as a beacon of unity and reflection. It beckons us to transcend barriers, embrace diversity, and strive for a future where humanity’s collective potential is realised. As Nijel eloquently states, ‘We are one family with one future. It’s time to embrace that truth and build a world worthy of our shared humanity.’

The Mother of Humanity® Monument is not merely a testament to Africa’s past but a bold assertion of its enduring significance. Nijel draws upon historical milestones, such as the Berlin Conference and the Atlantic slave trade, to underscore Africa’s pivotal role in shaping human history. Through the monument, he seeks to reclaim Africa’s narrative as the cradle of civilisation and foster a sense of global unity.

At the heart of the Mother of Humanity® Monument lies a profound symbolism that transcends cultural boundaries. Nijel intricately weaves elements of African heritage into the

monument’s design, from the feather of truth to the outstretched hand of welcome. This fusion of functionality with artistry serves as a visual testament to Africa’s rich cultural tapestry and the universal values of unity and enlightenment.

The journey towards realising the Mother of Humanity® Monument has been fraught with challenges, from logistical hurdles to financial constraints. Yet, amidst these obstacles, Nijel and his team have achieved significant milestones, from securing land in Kribi to garnering support from global stakeholders. Each milestone represents a triumph of perseverance and a step closer to realising the project’s transformative vision.

The impact of the Mother of Humanity® Monument extends far beyond its physical presence in Cameroon. Anticipated benefits include economic growth, cultural exchange, and enhanced tourism, not only for Cameroon but for the entire African continent. Moreover, the monument serves as a catalyst for global cooperation, fostering dialogue and collaboration on pressing global challenges.

In the face of mounting global challenges, the Mother of Humanity® Monument stands as a testament to the power of unity and reflection. It beckons us to transcend divisions, embrace diversity, and forge a future rooted in shared humanity. As Nijel eloquently states, “We are one family with one future.” It’s time to heed that call and build a world worthy of our collective aspirations.

The Mother of Humanity® name, image and related indicia are registered trademarks of Nijart International. All rights reserved.

Nijel Binns, the originator of the Mother of Humanity project

Computer generation of Mother of Humanity Monument

How seeds of discontent were sown

Sierra Leone: The Struggle for Power 1984-2007, by Eddie Momoh; Amazon, £20 paperback, £9.99 Kindle

This potted history of politics in Sierra Leone will give readers a better insight into why there is still so much political chaos in the country, finds Desmond Davies

EDDIE Momoh has done a great job of charting the course of political anarchy in Sierra Leone. Not for him an academic treatise that will end up befuddling readers. This is the work of an experienced journalist who knows how to present the information garnered in a riveting style.

It is a short read – 161 pages – but it will help Sierra Leoneans to better understand what they are currently witnessing in their country. Indeed, Sierra Leoneans need this potted history of politics in their nation because they tend to have short memories when it comes to the antics of their politicians.

This is why they are now surprised by the way in which President Julius Maada Bio is carrying on. But, as Momoh points out, Bio always had a plan to become leader of Sierra Leone. And he followed this ruthlessly once he, Captain Valentine Strasser and other young army officers overthrew the rather laid-back President Joseph Momoh in 1992.

Momoh writes: “Bio, the 33rd child of Paramount Chief Charlie Vonie Bio, is a political schemer, and, according to those who know him well, devious, vindictive and highly ambitious.” Thus, as Bio manoeuvred, he got rid of Strasser, who was head of the Supreme Military Council and leader of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), to take charge of the country; and then he tried to foist himself on Sierra Leoneans as president.

It did not work because the people robustly opposed his plan. In 1996, Bio was forced to abandon his quest for power, and Tejan Kabbah became President under the aegis of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP).

But can one blame Bio? After all, born in 1964, three years after independence, he did not know any better. Bio grew up under

the chicanery of President Siaka Stevens and his All People’s Congress (APC) that laid the foundations for political enmity and violence that the country is still grappling with.

Stevens had been stopped from becoming Prime Minister after the APC won the 1967 elections. Brigadier David Lansana intervened at State House minutes after the Governor General, Sir Henry Lightfoot-Boston, had sworn in Stevens. (By the way, Momoh wrongly stated in the book that it was Sir Maurice Dorman who was Governor General then. The Briton left Freetown in 1962 to be replaced by Sir Henry, a Sierra Leonean).

After a year in exile in Guinea, Stevens was restored to power through another coup, and for the next 24 years the APC generally rode roughshod over Sierra Leoneans. The one saving grace for Stevens and the APC was that the economy was doing well, and the president was adept at handing out largesse to appease opponents. Power, and excessive power for that matter, has been the hallmark of politics

disband other political parties and transform the country into a one-party state.”

On April 19, 1971, Sierra Leone controversially became a republic “through contortions and verbal subterfuge” after the APC had contrived to circumvent the Constitution. The act of Stevens becoming president would have been viewed as comical had it not been for the long-lasting consequences this move has had on politics in the country.

Momoh notes that three days of Sierra Leone becoming a republic, Prime Minister Stevens, “who had appointed a stooge in the person of Chief Justice C.O.E. Cole as ceremonial President, pushed several amendments to the 1971 Constitution through parliament to have himself installed as executive President”.

In the two years leading up to the next election in 1973, Stevens and the APC prepared the way for the first large-scale electoral violence in the country. The SLPP was so intimidated that it withdrew from the election, leaving the APC as the sole party in parliament.

Bio always had a plan to become leader of Sierra Leone

in Sierra Leone. Momoh writes: “By all accounts, the APC government’s first five years in office were marked by great economic improvement: the large trade deficit was transformed into a surplus while the country’s huge foreign debts were paid off or renegotiated.

“Against this backdrop, many APC leaders (no doubt instigated by the Prime Minister himself) started a campaign for Stevens to be given virtually unlimited power. It was the first clear sign that Stevens’ main political ambition was to

But four years later, in 1977, the SLPP met fire with fire during the election campaign, and managed to secure 10 seats in its South Eastern stronghold. This rattled Stevens and the APC, and a year later the country became an official one-party state with the SLPP MPs becoming members of the APC.

Momoh quotes an “impassioned” address by the leader of the SLPP, Salia Jusu-Sheriff, in parliament in May 1978: “The One-Party is now a fact of life and the One-Party Constitution has since become

the first law of the land; this means that every Member of Parliament should now belong to the… APC…the only party recognised under the new One-Party Constitution.”

But this did not assuage the restiveness of Sierra Leoneans who felt that they had been once again short-changed by Stevens and the APC. Momoh writes: “Even after the introduction of the one-party system of government, there was still some restlessness and instability in many parts of Sierra Leone, especially in the SLPP stronghold [in] the South East.

“Many people were reluctant to

accept the changes, as not only had they been denied the right to vote for the candidates of their choice, they also had no more representation in the Sierra Leone parliament.”

Thus by 1991, when Foday Sankoh and his Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began their incursion into Sierra Leone from Liberia, the seeds of discontent that had been sown long before then, were germinating. And in a most damaging way that saw the country facing death and destruction on a huge scale until peace was achieved in 2002.

In 22 short and sharp chapters, covering

the whole gamut of contemporary politics in Sierra Leone, Momoh’s book lays the groundwork for deep introspection among Sierra Leoneans. Are they still willing to be party to the ever-present double-dealing of their self-serving political leaders?

The politicians have been able to get their own way for so long because they are backed by wealthy businessmen who bankroll political activities to their advantage. Is it any wonder that there are so many businesses in Sierra Leone that operate as monopolies, thus making a mockery of the concept of an open market?

One businessman who called the shots for a long time was Jamil Sahid Mohamed, a Sierra Leonean-Lebanese who had great influence over the politicians. But in 1987, his nephew, Kazim Alie, was accused of treason, among others. Mohamed, who was then based in London, was not happy with the situation.

Momoh explains: “In several telephone calls to President Momoh, Jamil repeatedly threatened dire consequences – including a ‘bombing campaign’ that would kill all of Momoh’s ministers – if Alie was convicted and executed.

“To drive home his point, Jamil had requested that I convey this ominoussounding message in person to the president, and I did this during a two-week visit to Sierra Leone. When I met President Momoh at State House with the message from a man he still called ‘my friend’, he looked worried and asked me if I thought Jamil was serious about the ‘bombing campaign’.

“I replied that he, Momoh, knew his ‘friend’ better than I did. ‘We’ll see what to do,’ Momoh told me after a while.”

Anecdotes, such as this one, are dotted in the book, giving it an air of authority. Indeed, Sierra Leoneans would do well to get a copy of the book for a better insight into why there is still so much political chaos in their country. Momoh himself suggests: “This book should be read in schools and colleges throughout Sierra Leone because of its unique sense of history.”

Now that Momoh has set the cat among the pigeons, it would be good for some of the dramatis personae in the book, such as Bio and former President Ernest Koroma – “whose policies were reminiscent of the root causes of the civil war” – to write their own versions of events. They would make interesting reading – that is if Bio and Koroma ever get round to putting pen to paper.

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