Existence of Divine Essence: REPLYING OBJECTIONS ON DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE

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EXISTENCE OF DIVINE ESSENCE

BY AHLUSSUNNAH

WAL JAMA:”AH

A REPLY OF THE 13TH CHAPTER OF BOOK NON EXISTENCE OF GOD BY Nicholas EVIRITT OMNIPOTENCE OF DIVINE ESSENCE. Preliminary A

‘Ahlussunnah Diuband are the Defenders of “Asha:’iah and Maturidiah. But they are also the defenders of ‘Ahlussunnah Wal Jama:”ah. Not only ‘Ahlussunnah they are the defenders of ‘Isla:m. Not only ‘Isla:m they are the defenders of All ‘Abramamic religions and their set of Intersections. They Defend in General the Theism.It is their duty and resposiblity.

When Mr. Nicholas Everitt wrote the book “ Non Existence Of God” it is their Duty to write a Proper Reply to his work.

In this section it is tried to Reply the 13 th Chapter of the Book “The Non Existence of God”.

Preliminary B The word God is often misused and some time Atheists say that God should be spelled backwards [Na”iudhu:billah]. So it is better to use the word Deity instead of it. But the best way is to use the word Divine Essence or Divine Per Se Subsistent Essence. The Divinity of the Divine Essence is Identical to It. So Deity is Divine Essence and Divine Essence is the Deity.

Preliminary C A logical thing is Divided into two .

Either it is Per Se Absurd [Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t] or it is not .

If it is then its Existence is Per Se Absurd.

It it is Not then it is Per Se Possible [Mumkin Bidh Dh:a:t ‘Al ‘”A:m] If it is Mumkin Bidh: Dh:a:t ‘Al “A:m then either it is Per Se Necessary [Va:jib Bidh: Dh:a:t] or Per Se Contingent [Mumkin Bidh: Dh:A:t ] ‘Al Kh:A:s: .

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2 If a thing is Per Se Necessary then its Non Existence, Annihilation, Distruction,Negation ,Mutation etc. all are Per Se Absurd.

A Per Se Contingent is One whose Neither Existence Nor Existence are Per Se Absurd.

If a Per Se Possible is Neither Per Se Necessary nor Per Se Contingent then it is Per Se Implied by the Divine Essence and is the Essential Attribute of the Divine Essence. The Per se Necessary is Per Se Subsistent but this is not and Subsisteth with the Divine Essence. Its Negation, Non Existence, Annihilation, Destruction all are Per Se Absurd.

A Pararadox whose existence and Non Existence both are Per Se Absurd is a Per Se Absurd.

Preliminary D Divine Omnipotence is an Attribute of Divine Essence that is Over each and Every Per Se Contingent.

It is incorrect to say that Divine Attribute of Omnipotence is upon each and every Per Se Possible but it is one each and every Per Se Contingent.

Since ages these things are known to ‘Ash”ri and Maturidi Theologians and Scholars and they did continue to debate and discuss on the Divine Omnipotence.

Preliminary E Time Is Per Se Contingent and any definition of time what so ever it may be which implieth that it is not so is incorrect Preliminary F There are two types of Implications 1] Per Se or Intrinsic Implication and 2] Per Quod or Extrinjsic Implication.

If a Per Se Possible Implieth a Per Se Absud then either it implieth be an Implication Which Is Per Se Implication or it Implieth by an Implication which is Extrinsic. If by the former then it is Per Se Absurd since any thing which Per Se Implieth a Per Se Absurd is Per Se Absurd.So Such Implication Between Per Se Possible and Per Se Absurd is Per Se Absurd.. It is Per Se Absurd for Per Se Contingent to imply a Per Se absurd by Per Se type of implication.

If it impieth by the latter type of the implication then the Per Se Contingent remaineth as Per Se Contingent and Per Se Absurd remaineth as Per Se Absurd.

It is Per Se Absurd for Per Se Necessary to imply a Per Se absurd by any type of implication.

Preliminary A ‘Ahlussunnah Diuband are the Defenders of “Asha:’iah and Maturidiah. But they are also the defenders of ‘Ahlussunnah Wal Jama:”ah. Not only ‘Ahlussunnah they are the defenders of ‘Isla:m. Not only ‘Isla:m

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3 they are the defenders of All ‘Abramamic religions and their set of Intersections. They Defend in General the Theism.It is their duty and resposiblity.

When Mr. X wrote the book “ Non Existence Of God” it is their Duty to write a Proper Reply to his work.

In this section it is tried to Reply the 13 th Chapter of the Book “The Non Existence of God”.

Preliminary B The word God is often misused and some time Atheists say that God should be spelled backwards [Na”iudhu:billah]. So it is better to use the word Deity instead of it. But the best way is to use the word Divine Essence or Divine Per Se Subsistent Essence. The Divinity of the Divine Essence is Identical to It. So Deity is Divine Essence and Divine Essence is the Deity.

Preliminary C A logical thing is Divided into two .

Either it is Per Se Absurd [Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t] or it is not .

If it is then its Existence is Per Se Absurd.

It it is Not then it is Per Se Possible [Mumkin Bidh Dh:a:t ‘Al ‘”A:m] If it is Mumkin Bidh: Dh:a:t ‘Al “A:m then either it is Per Se Necessary [Va:jib Bidh: Dh:a:t] or Per Se Contingent [Mumkin Bidh: Dh:A:t ] ‘Al Kh:A:s: .

If a thing is Per Se Necessary then its Non Existence, Annihilation, Distruction,Negation ,Mutation etc. all are Per Se Absurd.

A Per Se Contingent is One whose Neither Existence Nor Existence are Per Se Absurd.

If a Per Se Possible is Neither Per Se Necessary nor Per Se Contingent then it is Per Se Implied by the Divine Essence and is the Essential Attribute of the Divine Essence. The Per se Necessary is Per Se Subsistent but this is not and Subsisteth with the Divine Essence. Its Negation, Non Existence, Annihilation, Destruction all are Per Se Absurd.

A Pararadox whose existence and Non Existence both are Per Se Absurd is a Per Se Absurd.

Preliminary D Divine Omnipotence is an Attribute of Divine Essence that is Over each and Every Per Se Contingent.

It is incorrect to say that Divine Attribute of Omnipotence is upon each and every Per Se Possible but it is one each and every Per Se Contingent.

Since ages these things are known to ‘Ash”ri and Maturidi Theologians and Scholars and they did continue to debate and discuss on the Divine Omnipotence.

Preliminary E

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4 Time Is Per Se Contingent and any definition of time what so ever it may be which implieth that it is not so is incorrect Preliminary F There are two types of Implications 1] Per Se or Intrinsic Implication and 2] Per Quod or Extrinjsic Implication.

If a Per Se Possible Implieth a Per Se Absud then either it implieth be an Implication Which Is Per Se Implication or it Implieth by an Implication which is Extrinsic. If by the former then it is Per Se Absurd since any thing which Per Se Implieth a Per Se Absurd is Per Se Absurd.So Such Implication Between Per Se Possible and Per Se Absurd is Per Se Absurd.. It is Per Se Absurd for Per Se Contingent to imply a Per Se absurd by Per Se type of implication.

If it impieth by the latter type of the implication then the Per Se Contingent remaineth as Per Se Contingent and Per Se Absurd remaineth as Per Se Absurd.

It is Per Se Absurd for Per Se Necessary to imply a Per Se absurd by any type of implication.

Preliminary E The term Logically Absurd/ Logically Impossible in Secular Logic is equivalent to the term Per Se Absurd in Theological Logic. But it also incluseth many Absurdities which are Logically Absurd if there is a Per Se Necessary Essence.

There are three traditional Principles in Secular Logic.

1] Law of Identity [‘Al ‘us:u:l “Al “Ainiah] A is A , and if A is Not B then A is Not B. 2] Law of Non Contradiction. [‘Al ‘Ijtima:” ‘An Naqi:d:ain] It is false that Ais B and A is Not B.

3] Law of Excluding the Middle [‘Al ‘Irtifa:” ‘An Naqi:d:ain] It is false that A is neither B nor Not B. The forth one in Theological Logic is as fallow.

‘An Naqs: “Alalla:hi Muh:a:l Bidh:Dh:a:t.

That is Defects, Flaws, Imperfections Upon the Divine Essence is Per Se Absurd [Logically Impossible].

There is a difference between Possible and Contingent. These two terms are often used alternatively but they are not.

As for Logical Necessary it includeth both Per Se Necessary and Necessary for the Per Se Necessary Essence.

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5 The second one may be termed as Per Se Possible but it is Not Per Se Contingent. Since a Logically Contingent is one Whose Neither Existence is Per Se Absurd nor Non Existence is Per Se Absurd.

As for them they are Not Per Se Necessary since they are Per Se Implied by Per Se Necessary [‘Al Lava:zim ‘Adh: Dh:a:tiah] and their Non Existence , Annihilation, etc. are Per Se Absurd.

Preliminary G An Essence is One that is Per Se Subsistent. These are alternative terms . An Attribute is one that is not Subsistent and Subsists with a Per Se Subsistent and is Per Se Implied By it. Divine Enistence is not an Attribute [S:-f-h, Pl S:ifa:t] but the Essence that is the Divine Essence [Dh:a:t] Itself.

Divine power Leaving on one side for the moment the question of God’s omnipotence, how should we understand God’s power in general? The reason for asking this question is that it seems clear that our power to act and God’s power to act are importantly different. In general, when we do things, we do one thing by doing another (or by doing a range of things). For example, Charles is a revolutionary who wishes to foment a revolution. He decides to do this by assassinating the President. He assassinates the President by shooting him with a gun. He shoots the gun by pulling the trigger. He pulls the trigger by squeezing his index finger. And so on. And he has to achieve his aims in this indirect way because he cannot control directly (by the mere power of thought, as it were) the course of events. If he simply wills a revolution to occur, or the President to be assassinated, or the President to be shot, etc., nothing happens. He can perform one of these actions only by performing another.

Theists are generally agreed that God’s power is not essentially like that.

ANSWER : The Divine Power is the Absolute Attribute of Deity. It is Essential and Positive, Eternal and Its Negation is Per Se Absurd.

Although he could choose to operate in the world in this indirect manner, he does not have to. He can by-pass all the indirect methods which humans perforce use to achieve desired states of affairs, and he can bring into being, or actualise

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6 directly , whatever states of affairs he wishes to. If he wishes to make the President die, he does not have to bring it about that the President is shot (or poisoned, or incinerated, or savaged by hungry lions, or struck by OMNIPOTENCE

256 lightning, etc.). He can simply make the President drop dead, without there being any intervening causal chain between his (God’s) will and the end at which it aims. If he wishes the gun to fire, he can simply make the bullet shoot out of the barrel – he does not have to make that happen by making the trigger move or the hammer strike the head of the cartridge, or the charge explode.

This may sound at first like a completely mysterious kind of power about which the sceptic should indeed be sceptical. But the theist can urge that on a more modest scale, a similar sort of power is familiar to us all from our own experience. Although in general, we do one thing by doing another, this cannot be the case universally , for that would generate an infinite regress. If everything has to be done by doing something, then nothing can be done unless infinitely many things are done. At some point, the theist will say, we all recognise that we have a divine sort of power to do things directly – direct in the sense that merely by our willing something to be, it comes about. Exactly what sorts of actions are of this kind has been a disputed question. Some authors have thought that squeezing your finger is one kind of action of this kind. Other have argued that you squeeze your finger by contracting your finger muscles. But even if that is true, how do you contract your finger muscles? Perhaps the only thing we do directly is to put our brain in such a state that it will bring about the contraction of our finger muscles. But at some point in this regress (the theist will insist), we all have to recognise that anybody who can do anything at all can do at least some things in this direct way. As it is sometimes put, every agent can perform some basic actions. The distinctive thing about God’s capacity for action, then, is not that it has absolutely no parallel with the capacity of humans. It is simply that his capacity for basic action is very much more extensive than ours. It is no doubt this fact that Descartes has in mind when he says in his third Meditation that although God’s will has greater scope than Descartes’s own, ‘it does not seem any greater than mine when considered as will in the essential and strict sense’ (Descartes 1984 vol. II: 40).

The theist is therefore able to point to something in human experience

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7 which renders intelligible to some degree the kind of power that God has.

Although this is a limited achievement (because the relevant kind of human power is also philosophically very puzzling) it is a real and worthwhile achievement. For although a puzzle remains about how basic action itself is possible, and a further puzzle about how God’s power can be so extensive, the theist can plausibly claim that it is not utterly mysterious to us what kind of power it is.

OMNIPOTENCE

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The concept of omnipotence Let us turn then to the concept of omnipotence. What does it mean to say of any being that it is omnipotent? Here is one natural definition that seems initially obvious: Definition 1 X is omnipotent = X can do everything Some writers have accepted this simple definition. Descartes, for example, thought that God could even do something which was inconsistent with the laws of logic. God could have made the universe in such a way that 2 + 2 = 5, or triangles had four sides. That Descartes should have believed this helps to explain how it is so important to his epistemology that he should be able to prove that God exists, and that God is no deceiver, and why he thinks that an atheist mathematician cannot achieve any certainty even in mathematics.

ANSWER: This is an incorrect version. Divine Omnipotence is an Attribute that is upon each and every Per Se Contingent and Per Se Possible, Upon every thing whose Negation is not Per Se Absurd.

However, most writers have thought (surely correctly) that God cannot break the laws of logic (or alternatively, that he could not have made the laws of logic to be other than they are).

ANSWER: THEY ARE NOT MADE BUT ESSENTIAL AND NECESSARY. (Notice how this thought fits nicely with the idea that God is a supremely rational being, who does nothing arbitrarily or whimsically.) But most writers have also thought (again surely correctly) that this is not a genuine incapacity or limitation in God’s power, since this does not imply that there is (as it were) a realm of the doable from which God is excluded. To say that something is logically impossible is precisely to exclude it from the realm of the do-able. So to say that God cannot do what is logically impossible is not to say that his power is limited in any way.

This leads us naturally to a second understanding of divine omnipotence: Definition 2 X is omnipotent = X can do everything which it is logically

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ANSWER: This is a correct definition but it is misinterpreted by the author of the book.

A better Definition is as Follow: X is Omnipotent = X Hath Power over each and every Logical Contigent [Per Se Contingent].

This definition Excludes not only Divine Essence but also Excludes Divine Essential Attributes. Since the are Logical Necessaries. Divine Essence is Unimplied by any thing what so ever and Divine Essential Attributes are Per Se Implied by the Divine Essence. Negation , Non Existence, Annihilation, Destruction, and Mutation of each one of them is Logically Absurd. A Contegent is not a Paradox so Paradoxes are included in Logical Absurdities and and Per Se Absurd.

Although it might seem that the move from Definition 1 to Definition 2 is a small one, and a move which is forced on us by the obvious faults in Definition 1, it provides the theist with a powerful resource. Whenever the atheist finds an example of something which God cannot do, the theist can try to argue that the task in question contains some hidden logical impossibility, and hence that God’s incapacity is not proof of his lack of omnipotence.

ANSWER: Thing is actually topsy-turvy. Athiests often try to present things which have a logical Absurdity in them ,Theists only exposes them in general.

A range of problem cases Let us see how the debate might proceed from Definition 2. What possible actions can the atheist provide which God will be unable to perform? Prima facie, there is a range of things which are possible, because humans actually do them, but which are ruled out for God by God’s other properties. One set of examples concerns actions which humans can do because they are not OMNIPOTENCE

258 morally perfect. Humans can behave in a mean, cowardly, cruel, selfish, hypocritical way, etc. But since God is by definition morally perfect, it seems to follow that he cannot act in any of these ways.

ANSWER: There are some types of Acts which are Per Se Possible Upon Human Essence but Per Se Absurd Upon Divine Essence and Essential Divine Attributes. They form a Principle or a Law equal to Law of Thoughts in the Theological System of All Theologians and is stated as follow: “ ‘AN NAQS: “ALAL LA:HI MUH:A:L BIDH: DH:A:T” That is Defect/Imperfection/Flaw Upon the Divine Essence and Essential Divine Attributes are Per Se Absurd. Sowhen an act is Per Se Possible for a Created Essence say a Human Being it is Per Se Possible Upon Divine Essence. So this is nothing new. For Example Urination and Homosexuality etc. are Per Se Possible for Human Essences but not for Divine Essence, due to the above Principle . So they are not in Power Of Divine Essence. But there are several types of acts that are not upon the Essence of Agent but upon the Essence of Created Essences. They are in Divine Power.

A second set of examples concerns actions which humans can do but God cannot, and comes from the fact that humans have bodies and God does not. For instance, it is logically possible for humans to walk, since they have legs. It is not logically possible for legless beings to walk. Since one of God’s defining properties is that he is immaterial, i.e. has no body, it follows that

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9 he has no legs, and this in turn implies that he is unable to walk. Clearly, there will be many things which humans can do which logically presuppose that they have a body, and hence which will be logically impossible for a being without a body to do, such as winking, standing up, sitting down, running around, coughing, spluttering, kissing, hugging, scratching one’s nose, and so on.

ANSWER:These are logically Possible upon a Created Essence and not Upon the Divine Uncreated Essence.

So they are included in the Acts which are logically Possible of Non Divine Essence and are Logically Impossible for the Divine Essence . The Problem is that the the term Logically Absurd contain all Acts and Attributes which are Logically Impossible and Per Se Absurd Upon Divine Essence and Essential Attributes of Divine Essence. Also an Logically Absurd Kissing or hugging is different from Logically Contingent Kissing or Hugging. The difference between the two types are often neglected. For further details see AL J-HD AL M-QL by Shaikh: ‘Al Hind Maulana Mah:mu:d ‘Al H:asan who has explained the difference of these two acts with clearity.

A third example of a limit on God’s omnipotence is raised by a very traditional though frivolous-sounding question, namely ‘Can God create a stone which is too heavy for him to lift up?’ (let us label this a superheavy stone).

The thought here is that the answer must be either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. But either way reveals a limitation on God’s power. If the answer is ‘yes’, then there can be a stone too heavy for God to lift, so he is not omnipotent; if the answer is ‘no’ then there is a superheavy stone which God cannot create, so he is not omnipotent. Since omnipotence is a defining characteristic of God, and we have just shown that the concept is self-contradictory, it follows that no being can be omnipotent, and hence that God does not exist.

ANSWER : These acts are Impossible and Logically Impossible since all Divine Essential Attributes are Beyond the Divine Omnipotence and it is Per Se Absurd for the Divine EssentialAttributes to be Self Contradictory and Paradoxial. So they are beyond the Divine Omnipotence. But their Exclusion from the Divine Omnipotence doeth not Imply any Limitation on It. A fourth class of actions which promises to create difficulties for the theist concerns humans’ ability to end their own existence: they can commit suicide. But can God commit suicide? It would be natural (even if ultimately indefensible) to say that an omnipotent being must be able to do everything which we (as non -omnipotent beings) can do, and more ; so that if we can commit suicide then so too can an omnipotent being. Certainly, if we accept Definition 2, it will follow that an omnipotent being can commit suicide. But many theists would find this conclusion unacceptable. They have wanted to say that if God exists at any time, he exists at all times.

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10 On the face of it, then, there seems to be a range of things which it is logically possible to do (since we do them), and hence which an omnipotent being ought to be able to do; and yet which God cannot do. So, if to be God a being would have to be omnipotent, it would follow that God cannot exist. How is the theist to reply to this pro-atheist argument?

ANSWER : Once again the learned author have commited a Gross Error. For centuries the Theologians are dividing the Realities in Three types. 1] Per Se Necessary (Va:jib Bidh: Dh:a:t). 2] Per Se Absurd (Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t). 3] Per Se Contingent (Mumkin Bidh: Dh:a:t or Mumkin Bdh:Dh:at ‘Al Kh:a:s:.) It may be noted that One That is Not Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t is termed as Mumkin Bidh: Dh:a:t ‘Al “A:m (Per Se Possible).

Divine Omnipotence is Only Upon Mumkin Bidh: Dh:a:t ‘Al Kh:as: [In Short Mukin Bidh: Dh:a:t]. Divine Life is an Essential Attribute and any Flaw upon any Essential Attribute of Divine Essence is Per Se Absurd.

So commiting suicide for Deity is Per Se Absurd. Once again Flaws, Defects Upon Per Se Necessary Existent are Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t. This implieth either there is no Divine Essence or such acts say death ,suicide are Per Se Absurd Upon Divine Essence and Divine Essentialn Attributes. Things, Actsand Attibutes etc. which are Per Se Contingent Upon Per Se Contingent are Per Se Absurd Upon Per Se Absurd like An Identical Copy of Divine Essence [Naz:i:r] and Upon Divine Essence. So a Logical Absurdity Upon Divine Essence is not necessary a Logical Absurdity Upon a Non Per Se Possible Essence. The Problem with the learned Scholar is that he does include each and every Logical Absurdity in his definition but does not include the any Per Se Absurd in them which is Logically Absurd Upone the Per Se Necessary Existent by the Principle “ ’ANNAQS: “ALAL LA:HI MUH:A:L BIDH: DH:A:T “ that is the reason he argues as such.

Coming back to a conclusion this is not a new objection and scholars are aware of this objection since ages. The Essence of this Objection is that there are may Attributes and Acts which are not Logically Absurd on Non Divine Essences yet the are Logically Absurd on Divine Essence. So the proper answer is that they are Absurd in Regard to the Agent. The are Logically Absurd Upon Divine Essnce but not Upon None Divne Essence. For Example Temporality [H:du:th:]. It is not Logically Absurd . If it would have been Logically Absurd it must have been absurd on the World and there must have nothing non Eternal in the world even if the World was Eternal. But the thing is different in case of Divine Essence. It is Per Se Absurd [Logically Absurd] Upon Divine Essence. So Divine Essence can not be a Locus [M-H-L] of H:du:th:] Since it is logically absurd Upon Divine Essence. The Problem of Limilation emerges from incorrect classification of Acts and Attributes and Misconception about Divine Omnipotence [Qudrah]. There are Three types of Acts and Attributes.

1] One those which are Logically Absurd in all cases. Like To make a thing which Existeth and Existeth Not simultaneously.

2] Two Which are Logically Contingent .

3] Three Which are further Divinded into two Sub-types.

3.1] They ate Logically Absurd Upon Divine Essence.3.2] Which are Logically Contingent [Possible] on Non Divine Essence.

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11 So if a thing whether it be an Act or an Attribute is Logically Contingent upon Non Divine Essences it is Logically Absurd [Logically Impossible] Upon Divine Essence. For Example Contradictions and Paradoxes of Pe Se Necessary Existing Essence. For Example the Divine Essence cannot Annihilate It Self since if It is Per Se Necessary then Its Non Existence is Per Se Absurd [Logically Absurd] and Not Logically Possible Logically Contingent]. In such cases one must say that It is Infinitely Wrong to say that Such type of Acts are Logically Possible hence by the alleged definition they are included in Divine Omnipotence. They are Absurd inregard to the Agent. That is some of their sub types are Logically Contingent and Some Of their types are Logically Absurd. So when it is said that All Logically Contingents are in Divine Omnipotence they are excluded Per Se Necessarily . Now in Secular logic there are three or four laws of thought. In religious Logic there is an other Law of thought or an Axiom equlal to Law of thought and That is “ NAQS: “ALAL LA:HI MUH:A:L BIDH: DH:A:T] “ and it is generally explained as “ Naqs: On the Divine Essence and Divine Essential Attributes of Divine Essence are Muh:a:l Bidh:Dh:at]. As the Secular logic does not Include it as an Independent Axiom of it, it consider it as some thing incorrect but in religious and heological Logic it is one of the Most Fundamental Axiom. But it can be shewn that it is Logically Absurd even in Secular Logic.

For Example Divine Essence is Logically Possible to be Annihilate Per Se Impleith that Divine Essence is Not Divine Essnce and that is a Logical Contradiction. Divine Essence Intercourseth Implieth Divine Essence is Not Divine Essence. Since it Implieth Mutation in Divine Essence and If Divine Essence is A Per Se Necessary Existent then it is Per Se Absurd that and thing which Per Se Implieth Divine Essnece is Not Divine Essence is Logically Absurd. Also Divine Only Excludeth Logical Impossibilities it also excludeth Logical Necesaries like Divine Essence It Self and Divine Essential Attributes of Divine Essnece.

So

Some possible replies The theist, however, has a range of possible replies, different replies to different lines of attack. Let us consider first the superheavy stone, the one OMNIPOTENCE

259 which is so heavy that not even God can lift it. Rather surprisingly, it seems that the theist can find a consistent line of defence for either a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ answer. Consider first the case for a ‘yes’ answer, i.e. for saying that God can make a stone too heavy for him to lift up. The theist has at least two lines of argument here. According to the first, he could say that God can create the superheavy stone, and that as long as he does not do so he remains omnipotent. Of course if he were to create the stone, there would be something that he would not then be able to do, and he would then no longer be omnipotent. But if he never creates such a stone, he is, was and will be omnipotent for all time.

This is incorrect. For sake of an argument let it be supposed that Divine Essence Hath the Power to Create this Stone of Supreme Heaviness . If such a stone is In Power Of Divine Essence then such a Stone

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12 is Per Se Contingent. But any thing that Contradicteth Either Divine Essence or any One Of the Divine Essential Attributes Of the Divine Essence is Per Se Absurd [Logically Absurd]. If it is so then it is not in Divine Power. The learned Scholar has supposed that any thing which contradicteth a Divine Essential Attribute is Logically Contingent. But it is not the case . If infinite many stones are Logically Possible such that each one of them is Logically Possible to be elevated, then it is not implied that a stone is Logically Possible such that its Logical Contingency to be Elevated Contradicteth Divine Essential Attribute of Omnipotence. Since If there is a Divine Essence and If there are some Divine Essential Attributes of the Divine Essence then they are Logically Necessary and any thing which contradicteth a Logical Necessary is Logically Absurd.

The problem with this first line of reply is that if omnipotence is one of the defining characteristics of God, then a being who is not omnipotent at any time cannot at that time be God. But could a being exist as God at one time, and while continuing to exist, cease to be God because he had deprived himself of one of God’s defining propersties? We considered this issue in Chapter 1, when we looked at whether ‘God’ could be interpreted as a title. We accepted there that theists were entitled to impose a constraint on the interpretation of ‘God’, namely that if God exists at all, he could not continue to exist while ceasing to be God. It was this consideration which ruled out the idea that ‘God’ is a title. Similarly, in this context, the idea that God could destroy his own omnipotence and hence his divinity, while continuing to exist, will be unacceptable. So, the theist cannot solve the problem of the superheavy stone by saying that God has an unexercised power; for this would be saying that God ..

Theist have solved the Problem of this type of Supposed heavy Body. Since such a Heavy Body say stone is Per Se Absurd since it Contradicteth the Logical Necessary Existent i.e the Divine Attribute of Omnipotence. Similarly the Divine Essence cannot Annihilate Its Own Omnipotence since it is Logically Necessary and any Existent that is Logically Necessary is Not In Divine Omnipotence. It must be noted that the Negation of Divine Omnipotence is Per Se Absurd. Similarly there is no Per Se Possibility of Limitation of Divine Essence and Divine Essential Attributes. could cease to be omnipotent (if he were to exercise the power), whereas we are agreeing that God cannot lose any of his defining properties.

ANSWER : This type of Stone is Per Se Absurd, Since Divine Omnipotence is Upon each and every Per Se Contingent. Such a Stone or a body of any material is Per Se Absurd. 1] If it is Per Se Contigent then Divine Essence Hath No Power over a Per Se Contingent. This is Per Se Absurd. This is the reason that such a Body whether it be a Stone or Metal is Per Se Absurd and Per Se Impossible. Even on Secular level it is Logically Impossible since such a Massive Stone which cannot be in the Power of an Omnipotent is Per Se Absurd if there is any Omnipotent. So this is just like the question can the Divine Essence make an other Deity /Divine Essence like Himself/Itself? Since such a thing which excludes from the Divine

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13 Omnipotence is nothing but Per Se Absurd , and a Per Se Absurd is Logically Impossible. It must be noted that it to walk or to hug or to intercourse is neither Logically Possible not Impossible but one types of these acts are Logically Possiblew and an other types of these acts are Logically Impossible. As the Secular Logic do not include Defects Upon the Divine Essence Logically Impossible things the result is that the learned scholar has incorrectly assumed that Defect and Imperfection Upon Divine Essence are Logically Possible. So they are included in Logically Impossibles in Theological Logic. Any thing which contradicteth Omnipotence is Logically Absurd. Since It is absolute and Infinite. So if a thing Per Se Necessarily Implieth the Limitation of Divine Omnipotence it is Logically Absurd since Divine Omnipotence is Per Se Necessary and its Limitation, Non Absoluteness, Annhilation and Finiteness are all Logically Impossible. For Example let it be defined that A Logical Necessary is one Whose Negation is Not Logically Possible and is Logical Absurd. Now by this definition any thing which implieth its Negation is Logically Impossible.

However, there is a second line of defence for giving a ‘yes’ answer. Suppose that God when he creates the superheavy stone intends that it shall be too heavy to be lifted by anyone, even by himself. If this is a logically possible task, then he can indeed do it.

It is not a Logically Possible If it is not a logically possible task, then he cannot do it – but by Definition 2, the fact that he cannot do it does not show him not to be omnipotent.

The second definition has been Misinterpreted. Contradictions of Divine Essential Attributes are Logically Absurd. Also not only Logically Absurds are not in Omnipotence but Logically Necessaries are also not in Divine Omnipotence. The fallacy in the second definition is that the difference in the Possible and Contingent is neglected. A Possible is some thing that is not Logically Absurd, but a Contingent is one that is neither Logically Necessary Nor Logically Absurd. In the definition the word Possible is used for Contingent and not for Possible so in Theological Logic there is a difference between Possible and Contingent , which is neglected by the learned Scholar and such a Stone or any other body of any other matter is Logically Absurd.

Further, if it is logically possible for God to create the stone, and he does create it, the theist need not then concede that since God cannot lift it, God cannot be omnipotent. For by Definition 2, God’s omnipotence requires only that he be able to do whatever it is logically possible; and (so the theist can argue) it is not logically possible to pick up a stone which an omnipotent being has made unliftable.

IT IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE SINCE ANY THING WHICH IMPLIETH LIMITATION TO OMNIPOTENCE IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. SINCE ABSOLUTENESS OF DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE IS LOGICALLY NECESSARY AND A LOGICAL NECESSARY IS ONE WHOSE NEGEATION IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE. This objection is based upon two misconceptions. A] Neglection of the reality that any thing Which Negateth or Contradicteth Divine Essence and Divine Essential Attributes are Per Se Absurd i.e Logically Absurd. B] Neglection of the Reality that an Essential Attribute of Per Se Existing Essence Is One Whose Negation is a Logical Absurdity.

Similarly whose limitation is a Logical Absurdity.

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14 . For if it were possible to lift the stone, that would have shown that the omnipotent being had failed to achieve a logically possible task – and that would surely be self-contradictory.

That is certainly Not the case . Such a stone is Logically Absurd since such a Stone Contradicteth the Necessary Essential Attribute of Divine Essence as stated several times . See above.

(Alternatively, if the omnipotent being had failed in the task, that would prove that the task is not logically possible, contrary to hypothesis.)

Such a Stone is Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t , that is Self Absurd Per Se Impossible. The hypothesis of the Possibility of such a stone is False, and Wrong .

One can present some more such questions and each one can be Replied on these grounds.

1) Can Divine Essence make a close champber/box such the Divine Essence cannot See inside It? 2) Can Divine Essence make a thing which Divine Essence Itself is unable to Destroy? A generalized version of this questions is as follow: Can Divine Essence Create a thing such that Divine Essence is Unable to Annihilate It? 3) Can Divine Essence make a Rod so Strong such that Even Divine Essence is Unable to bend it?

4) Is it in Power of Divine Essence to make mutation in Divine Omniscience?

5) Can Divine Essence make a Lance such that it can break any shield , and Can Divine Essence make a Shield which cannot be broken by any Lance , and what shall happen if this Lance hits this Shield?

6) Can Divine Essence make another Divine Essence ?

Such Questions are answered as follow:= It is Per Se Absurd for Divine Essence to Make a Box or a Chamber such that Divine Essence cannot See inside it since such a Box or a Chamber implieth a Contradiction the Divine Attribute of Sight , which is an Essential Attribute and there fore such a Box or a Chamber is Per Se Absurd.

It seems then that the theist can consistently allow that God can create the superheavy stone. Could he also consistently take the other option and deny OMNIPOTENCE

260 that God could make the stone? If the idea we sketched above is correct, then it seems he could. For the argument would then be that although God could not make the stone, this does not show that he is not omnipotent, since making such a stone is not logically possible.

This is the correct answer. Let it be seen what is the objection on this answer.

It is not logically possible to make something which is too heavy to be lifted by an omnipotent being, i.e. a being who can lift up anything which it is logically possible to lift up.

In brief, the theist can argue either that it is logically impossible to

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15 make the stone (because it is logically impossible to make something too heavy to be lifted by a being who can lift anything which it is logically possible to lift); or that it is logically impossible to lift the stone (because it is logically impossible to lift something which has been made by an omnipotent being with the intention that no one should be able to lift it). Either way, the incapacity in God is no evidence that he is not omnipotent, since it involves something which it is logically impossible to do.

The learned Scholar has accepted that this is not Problem. But Suppose for a while that A Stone is Logically Contingent such that its Elevation is Not Logically Possible. In such a case such a Stone is Logically Contingent to be Created yet Logically Absurd to be Elevated does not limit the Divine Omnipotence since Divine Omnipotence is On Each and Every Logically Contingent ,and anything which is not Logically Contingent is either Logically Absurd or Logically Absurd. Such a Stone if is Logically Contingent its Elevation is Logically Absurd implying that Divine Omnipotence is not Contradicted. But this is just for sake of an argument. Since if a thing Contradicteth a Divine Essential Attribute say Omnipotence then it is Per Se Absurd since Contradiction of any Essential Divine Attribute is Per Se Absurd [Logically Absurd].

The theist would be in difficulty only if there was something which it is logically possible to do but which God cannot do, and no such possibilities are raised by the superheavy stone.

Although this problem of the superheavy stone is in a way trivial, we have pursued it at some length partly because it is one of those problems which naive atheists think is sufficient to convict theism of paradox, and partly because it reveals how difficult it can be to find an example which will allow an alert theist no room for manoeuvre. On reflection, we can see that the problem of the superheavy stone is an unlikely candidate to put Definition 2 under pressure. What will put Definition 2 under pressure are examples of actions which are uncontroversially logically possible (e.g. because we perform them) yet which God cannot perform.

This shall be discussed latter with some historical background of the problem. Ahlussunnah Of Diuband and Khairabadi Cult continued to debate over the issue : Can Divine Essence Speak a False Sentence?

Creating superheavy stones is not something which we do, and it is far from obvious whether it is logically possible either to create or to lift such a stone. The atheist does better to stick to a range of obviously possible actions, such as sinning, or ending one’s own existence, and ask whether those possible actions are possible for

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16 God. As the Learned Author has accepted that this is not a Strong argument, and in reality it is not an argument in the least meaning one may proceed to the next case of alleged Divine Sin.

Can God sin?

History: There are two types of Acts which a Created Suppositum/ Essence hath Power to do.1) Those which are Not Immoral like eating, drinking sleeping, urination, vomiting,sextual relations with wives, forgetting .2) Some of them are Immoral, but are are either special cases of the first or both belong to same type, like sextual relations with mothers, cannibalism, homosexuality, etc. Some are morally incorrect like to speak a false statement, to make a false promise , Injustice ,to punish an infallable for no sin/transgression, to act against wisdom while being wise , misery etc.

Khairabadi cult does not differentiate between them and consider them all alike.Ahlussunnah of Deoband How ever consider the last type in divine omnipotence and exclude the firt two types. Yet both agree that exclusion of the first two do not imply any problem to the absolute omnipotence. In this reply the ‘ahlussunnah diuband approach and ‘ash sha:h ‘isma:”i:l shahi:d approach is used.

What is Sin Sin is a Transgression of Laws of Supreme Authority. Divine Essence is the Supreme Authority. To accept the Logical Possibility of Sin for Supreme Essence is to Accept the Logical Possibility of a Superior Authority then the Supreme and that is a Contradiction. So it is perfectly correct that Divine Essence Hath no Power to Do a Sin other wise this is no thing but the Logical Contingency of An Essence higher than the Highest. How ever there are atleast two types of Acts, 1] Which are Immoral for Created Rational Supposita and are Not In Divine Power since they Logically Absurd Upon Divine Essnce. 2] Which are Immoral for Created Essences but in Power of Divine Essence.

What about the thought that humans can act immorally and God cannot?

One mistaken way for the theist to reject this claim would be to challenge the view of divine perfection which the objection is implicitly resting on. Let us agree that God is by definition morally perfect, i.e. that no being could count as God unless it were morally perfect. Would this mean that God could not act immorally?

Once again the Learned Scholar has missed the Point. There is no Logical Possibility of an Act Upon Divine Essence. So if an Act is such that its Logical Possibility is either Upon the Essence of the Agent, or it is an Immanent Act or the Act is of such Nature that the Necessary and Sufficient Condition for its Logical Contingency is to be Associated with the Divine Essence or the Necessary and Sufficient Condition of the Per Se Contingency of the Act is to Subsist in the Essence of the Agent then it is Per Se Absurd and

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17 Logically Absurd. Similarly the acts of Bodies are Per Se Absurd for Divine Essence. But those acts which are not upon the Agent and are upon Essences other then the Essence of the Agent are them selves Susbistent are In Power of Divine Essence. How ever if any one of such Act is in Divine Omnipotence then it cannot be called a Sin or a Transgression.

Note: An Immanent Act is an Act which occureth within the agent.

In other words its Logical Contingency is in the Essence of the Agent or Associated with the Essence of the Agent or Subsisteth in the Essence of the Agent like eating, feeling of hunger, or commiting suicide or Sexual Activities, Biological reproduction etc. One may include in them such acts like Robbing, Stealing, etc. since the Logically Imply i.e Per Se Imply that Per Se Necessary Existent is Per Se Contingent Existent , which Per Se Impieth that Per Se Necessary Existent is not Per Se Necessary Existent. Let all of such types of Acts be termed as Immanent Acts in this article whether they be Immoral for Created Rational Supposita like Homosexuality or raping etc. or not Immoral for Created Rational Supposita like eating of vegetable , or eating of Non Vegetables etc.

Or would it be enough to say, more weakly, that although God could act immorally, he never does, and it is that fact which makes him morally perfect?

There is no weakness in this answer as for as those act are Concerned which are in Divine Omnipotence as discussed above.

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If this is a tenable interpretation of moral perfection, then moral perfection and omnipotence would be compatible.

OMNIPOTENCE

261 Although this may sound like a neat solution for the theist, in fact it quickly leads him into an untenable position.

It is a correct solution as for as the acts as for as Non Immanent Immoral Acts are concern but it is an Incorrect solution for Immanent Immoral Acts. The centuries old debates between the ‘Ahlussunnah of Diuband and Khairabadi cult are in regard to this types of Acts. Where ‘Ahlussunnah Of Diuband believes that Such Acts are in Divine Omnipotence like Injustice [In the Meaning to Punish a Person for nothing, to Speak a false Statement/Sentences in regard to Exoteric Declarative Positive and Declarative Negative Speech [‘Akh:ba:r of‘Al Cala:m ‘Al Lafz:i:]. It is necessary at this point to write some of the basic points of the old controversy so that the Learned Author may understand the debate. ‘Ash Sha:h ‘Ima:”i:l RH argued that if to speak a False Sentence is not in Divine Power but it is in the Power of Human Beings then the Power of a Human Being become than the Divine Power atleast in regard to Sentences. Respected Fad:l Haq and his followers replied that in this case what shall be said about acts like Eating , Sexual Activities, Drinking etc. Since it is agreed upon that they are in human power but they are not in Divine Power. What Shaikh:ul Hind replied to the followers is summerised as follow:= that there are two different types of acts in the power of Created Supposita. 1] One that are Naqs: Upon the Divine Essence 2] Those which are Naqs: Upon Gh:airullah . Like Falsehood upon ‘Al Cla:m ‘Al Lafz:i: . etc. To confuse both types of acts is a fallacy.

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18 So the argument of ‘Ash Sha:h ‘Isma:”i:l Shahi:d is valid for the second type. He did not use this argument for the acts of the first type.

A number of Muslim Scholars who had gained enmity of Theological Discussions declared this debate as useless . But it is now clear that such discussions are beneficial since we can anticipate Atheistic Arguments and work for their answers. Since no one has to learn any thing from Atheists since they did not say any thing which is not known priorly.

Suppose he grants that God does have the power to act immorally (since he is omnipotent). We then have to ask what the position would be if God exercised this power. It would surely follow that he was then no longer perfect; and since moral perfection is a defining feature of God (i.e. he must have it if he is to be God), this means that he would have deprived himself of his divine status.

As the Immanent Acts are not in Divine Power whether they be Moral or Immoral for Created Human Essences they are Per Se Absurd Upon Divine Essence. It is not the question of Divine Omnipotence over them but their Per Se Contingency is Per Se Absurd for the Divine Essence, that is their Logical Contingency is Logical Absurdity Upon Divine Essence. So if their Per Se Contingency is assumed then it is implied that Per Se Necessary is Per Se Contigency and that Per Se Implieth Per Se Necessary is Not Per Se Necessary. In an other sentence Necessary Existent is Not Necessary Existent. Any Act that Per Se Implieth Necessary Existence is Not Necessary Existent is Per Se Absurd.

However for Non Immanent Acts, they are in Power of Divine Acts. The question is what happeneth if Divine Essence Excercises His Omnipotence upon these types of acts is a fallacy. If Divine Essence Excerciseth them they do cease to be Immoral. Since it is not Immoral for Divine Essence to Exercise an Act that is in the Omnipotence of Divine Essence.

He would have brought about his own non-existence as God. This is precisely the position which the theist hoped to avoid when he denied that ‘God’ was a title which could be laid aside.

Clearly, then, the theist needs to say that God’s perfection consists not in the fact that he never does wrong, but in the fact that he cannot do wrong.

Almost all the discussion has been done and no further discussion is required . However they may be repeated in the end.

But how can this be reconciled with the claim that God can do anything which is logically possible?

It is correct in the meaning that if some acts are accepted Logically Contingent Upon Non Divine Essences but Logically Absurd for Divine Essence since they Intrinsically Imply that their Agent is Per Se Contingent and Not Per Se Necessary.

Some theists at this point simply add to Definition 2 a further clause saying that something counts as omnipotent only if it does not believe of anything which it does that it would be better if it did

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19 not do it (see, for example, Stewart 1993: 28). But by itself, this is a poor response for two reasons. First, it is simply arbitrary to add to a definition of omnipotence a clause (namely about what it would be better to do) which has no intuitive connection with omnipotence.

One need not to defend all the definitions , but even this definition may be defended. How ever one may leave this definition to those who like it for defending it.

Surely an omnipotent being ought to be able to do X even if it does believe that it would be better if it did not. Perhaps its belief has the consequence that it does not actually do X – but this does not show that it is unable to do it. Second, it still leaves God unable to do things which any human can do, namely perform an action while believing that it would be better not to perform it.

There is however a more promising line of reply for the theist, which we will shortly explore in connection with Definition 3.

Divine Omnipotence is Upon each and Every Per Se Contingent and by definition it Excludeth Per Se Absurds and Per Se Necessaries.

God’s lack of a body What then about the second category of cases produced by the atheist of things which God cannot do, namely those which depend upon the fact that humans have bodies and God does not?

Any act which per Se Implieth that its Agent Must be a Body is Per Se Absurd Upon Divine Essence since to be converted into a Body is Per Se Absurd for Divine Essnce to Become a Body.

One possible line of reply here for the theist is to argue that God can perform such actions, because God can have a body.

What this means is not that God standardly has a human body, for he is by definition an omnipresent spirit, and both of these characteristics are incompatible with being a human body. The thought is rather that on particular occasions, God could assume a human form. If this is so, then God could do that range of things whose performance by us depends essentially on the fact that we are embodied beings, and indeed beings with a very particular type of body (we have arms, legs, toes, fingers, etc.).

Incarnation of Per Se Subsistent Essence is Per Se Absurd.

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20 Divine Essence Cannot Assume any Non Eternal Form since it is Per Se Absurd.

It is unclear what force this line of reply has. Let us assume that it is OMNIPOTENCE

262 possible for God to create (maybe ex nihilo ) a human form, and to speak and act through this human form. Would that mean that if that human form did something (e.g. scratched its nose) that was literally God scratching his nose?

If Divine Essence Createth a human or an animal form it is just a creation and it is Separate from Divine Essence. Hence it is Not the Divine Essence. It is just a form if it lacketh a Subsistent Essence in it or it is itself Per Se Subsistent. If it Subsisteth in some other Subsistent Creation then it is the form of that Subsistent Creature/Creation.

If this line of argument is to be effective against the claim that we can do things which God cannot, the answer must be ‘Yes, that would literally be God scratching his nose’. But we might well be uneasy with this response, for the following reason. When I scratch my nose, it is indeed I who am scratching myself . It is not just that I am bringing about a scratching of something which I own or control: it is I who am being scratched. The person who does the scratching is identical with the person who is scratched. But when the God-created human form scratches his nose, it seems that what is happening is that God is bringing it about that a being who is not identical with God scratches his nose. For this reason, it is not clear that this line of reply to the objection (that we can do things which God cannot) is really compelling.

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Can God destroy himself?

We considered above whether God’s omnipotence implied that he could bring about his own non-existence as God , by envisaging his doing something as a consequence of which he loses one of his defining Godly

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21 properties.

This has been answered in previous answers but this may be dealt with some additional discussions: Divine Essence is a Per Se Necessary Existent. If such an Essence Existeth the Following things of the Divine Per Se Necessary Existence are Per Se Absurd and Logically Absurd.

1] Annhilation of Divine Essence. 2] Non Existence of Divine Essence 3] Distruction of Divine Essence.

4] Mutation of Divine Essence. Per Se Contingency of the Divine Essence. 5] Per Se Absurdity of Divine Essence.

So Divine Essence is One That is Per Se Necessary in Existence and its Non Existence is Per Se Absurd. In an other sentence it is said as follow: A Per Se Necessary Existent is One Whose Non Existence is Logically Absurd. So either such an Existent Existeth or It Existeth Not. If it Existeth then Its Non Existence , Annihilation, Destruction, Mutation etc. are all Logically Absurd. A Logically Absurd is not in Divine Omnipotence.

We were there presuming that although before the change he was God, and after the change he was not, he was the same individual before and after the change. And we accepted then that such a conclusion would be unacceptable to theism. This might make it seem otiose to consider the related question whether God’s omnipotence implies that he can bring about his total non-existence.

The Learned Scholar has once again neglected that Divne Essence is Per Se Necessary in Existence [Va:jib ‘Al Vuju:d Li Dh:a:tihi]. Divine Essence is not Per Se Contingent in Existence [ Mumkin ‘Al Vuju:d Li Dh:a:tihi ‘Al Kh:a:s:]. A Per Se Contingent Essence is One Whose Existence is Per Se Contingent and Whose Non Existence is also Per Se Contingent. But it is LogicallyAbsurd for a Per Se Necessary Existent to NotExist if such an Existent Existeth. So even if it is assumed that there is not Divine Essence and Each and Every Essence that Exist is a Contingent Essence, in the Universe of this assumption the following statement would have been Perfectly true: If there would have been a Logically Necessary Existent then its Annihilation, Distruction, Non Existence, Mutation etc, would have been Logically Absurd.

In the case there is a Necessary Existent it is still true.

The question is not just whether he can produce a change as a consequence of which he loses his divinity, but whether he can produce a change as a consequence of which he ceases to exist altogether. Clearly the theist who denies that God’s omnipotence extends to the first alternative will also deny that it extends to the second.

These are Logically Absurd and Logically Impossible and if these are excluded from Divine Omnipotence there is no problem at all .

But there may be certain logical costs to such a denial, which we now need to explore.

Let the alleged costs be seen .

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22 We can certainly say that God could not have the power to destroy himself if he exists necessarily, i.e. if some versions of the ontological and cosmological arguments are sound. For the conclusion of all versions of the ontological argument, and at least some versions of the cosmological argument is not merely that God exists, but that he necessarily exists – he could not not have existed. Now if the impossibility of God’s non-existence is logical impossibility, then the theist can rightly claim that God’s omnipotence under Definition 2 would not require (and indeed would not permit) that he could bring about his own non-existence. For his omnipotence (we are assuming) requires only that he can do everything which is logically possible; OMNIPOTENCE

263 and if his own non-existence is not logically impossible, the fact that he cannot bring it about does not show that he is not omnipotent.

In fact, if we take God’s existence to be logically necessary in this way, it means that he cannot lose any of his defining properties (not merely that he does not or will not lose them, but that he cannot). This means, for example, that God not merely never has done and never will do anything immoral, but that he cannot do anything immoral. But these incapacities will not undermine his omnipotence, since it is logically impossible to do anything which will bring about the non-existence of a logically necessary being. We see here how a line of argument (namely the ontological argument) which might at first glance seem unpromising, can nonetheless be one which theists would hope could be patched up; for it has helpful consequences of a remote kind for the theistic enterprise.

This is correct that if Divine Essence is a Logically Necessary Existent then the Annihilation, Destruction , Non Existence, Mutation of Divine Essence are Logically Absurd and it is also Logically Absurd that such an Essence be a Substratum/Locus [M-H:L] OF Non Eternals [H:udu:th:].

However, most theists would be willing to concede that whatever kind of existence God has, it is not logically necessary: atheism is not actually selfcontradictory. If that is so, then, the problem for theism returns: given that committing suicide is a logically possible action, why cannot an omnipotent being commit suicide?

Either there Existeth a Divine Per Se Subsistent Existent or there is no Per Se Subsistent Essence. If it Existeth then it is A Logically Necessary Existent. Now the question becometh “Is there A Logically Necessary Existent or there is not Logically Neceesary Existent. If there is then Non Existence, Annihilation etc. of that Essence is Logically Absurd.

It must be noted that Suicide of Divine Existent is Per Se Absurd. Since Divine Essential Attributes are Necessary For Essence [Neither Identical Nor Separate (La: “Ain Vala: Ghair)] or they are Identical [“Ain] to the Divine Essence. In any case they exclude the Divine Omnipotence. It must be noted that not only Logical Absurdities are not in Divine Omnipotence but also the Logical Necessaries are not in Divine Omnipotence. Negation and Non Existence of Divine Essential Attributes are Logically Absurd [‘Al

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23 Muh:a:l Al Mant:-qi:]. So Divine Suicide is Per Se Absurd, since negation of Divine Life is Per Se Absurd and any thing that Contradicteth the Essential Attribute of Divine Life is Per Se Absurd. Last but not the least Suicide [ A SPECIAL CASE OF MAUTH (DEATH)] is a Defect [Naqs:] and it has been said that ‘An Naqs: “Alal La:hi Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t, So Suicide Upon the Divne Essence is Per Se Absurd [‘Al Maut “Alal La:hi Muh:a:l Bidh: Dh:a:t].

Omnipotence relativised to God The problems which we have been exploring reveal how Definition 2 allows the theist to cope with a range of initially problematic cases, actions which we can perform but which God cannot. The general technique of the theist is to show that when ascribed to God, the action contains some hidden logical impossibility, and hence is excluded from the scope of his omnipotence. But nevertheless, there remain some problem cases. In particular, if God’s existence is not logically necessary, why can’t he bring about his own non-existence, and why can’t he sin?

Divine Essence is Per Se Necessary , and to deny that Divine Essence is not Per Se Necessary is a type of Atheism. Even if the believer is a claimant of being a theist. So in this case we leave the two groups to deal with one another.

To resolve these problems, the theist is likely to relativise omnipotence to the being in question as follows: Definition 3 X is omnipotent = X can do everything which it is logically possible for X to do (i.e. everything which is logically consistent with X’s other defining properties) Relativised to God, this gives us: Definition 3a God is omnipotent = God can do everything which it is logically possible for God to do (i.e. everything which is logically consistent with God’s other defining properties) The new definition immediately gives the theist the ability to deal with cases which were problematic under Definition 2. It explains at once why God cannot sin: it is logically impossible for God to sin, since he is by definition OMNIPOTENCE

264 perfect, so his inability does not compromise his omnipotence.

To impose this condition does not make any sort of Difference . If this condition is dropped from the definition no proper objection can be made. Since If Divine Essence Hath Power over each and every Per Se Contingent then there are things which are of two types. A] That is Per Se Absurd or Logically Absurd. B] That is Per Se Contingent or Logically Contingent. So if it is saind that Divine Essnce Hath Omnipotence opon each and every Per Se Contingent, it is not required to add it in the definition of Divine Omnipotence.

Another of the defining features of God is that he is immaterial, or pure spirit. This means that it is not logically possible for God to scratch his nose, cough, etc. and hence his inability to do so will not be a limitation on his omnipotence.

Definition 3 also enables the theist to cope with a range of cases which otherwise threaten to be a threat to divine omnipotence, namely human free actions.

We noted in Chapter 12 how theists often seek to solve the problem of evil by relying on the free will defence; how the sceptic challenges the free will defence by asking ‘Why didn’t God make humans with free will, but

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24 make them so that they always freely choose to do the best?’; and how theists tried to answer that sceptical question by appealing to an incompatibilist account of freedom. According to an incompatibilist, if agent A freely decides at time t to perform action X, there does not exist at any time before t a set of conditions which guarantee that A will decide to do X. The only person who can bring it about that A freely decides to do X is A herself.

A freedom of a Per Se Contingent Created Rational Suppositum that Contradicteth Divine Omnipotence is Per Se Absurd.

But it is not a problem of Divine Omnipotence but it is the problem of Free Wills of Created Rational Supposita.

Although God can bring it about that conditions propitious for or hostile to A’s decision prevail, he cannot bring it about that A’s free decision is made .

Putting the matter slightly differently, in creating free agents, God is exercising his omnipotence to bring it about that there are some further states of affairs which he cannot bring about: the free actions of the beings whom he has created. This move is essential to the free will defence because it explains why if God gives humans freedom, he cannot ensure that they use it properly.

This objection is multifold and may be seen that any freedom which contradicteth Divine Omnipotence is Impossible and Which doeth not is bestowed as Divine Essence Hath the Essential Right to Bestow or to Create that is in the Divine Power and Potentiality.

He cannot ensure this (according to the incompatibilist) because an action cannot be both freely performed by person A and also brought about by God. Does this mean that after creating free agents, God is no longer omnipotent?

A freedom which contradicteth Divine Omnipotence is Logically Absurd. As stated earlier this is not a problem of Divine Omnipotence but it is the problem of Free Wills of Created Rational Supposita.

Definition 3 enables the theist to answer ‘no’. Although A’s freely doing X is certainly logically possible (and hence is something which an omnipotent being by Definition 2 could bring about), it is not logically possible for God to bring about, so God’s limited power in this respect does not count against his being omnipotent.

Limitation of Divine Omnipotence is Per Se Absurd since like all Essential and Eternal Divine Attributes Omnipotence is not in Divine Omnipotence and this doeth not Limit the definition.

Strictly speaking, this theist argument is not that performing A’s free actions is incompatible with one of God’s defining properties, but that it is incompatible with one of God’s necessary properties, namely God’s nonidentity with any of his creatures. It is because God is not A that he cannot perform A’s free actions.

A’s actions are Per Se Contingent upon A as but Per Se Absurd Upon Divine Essence.

But we can charitably allow the argument through, by interpreting ‘defining’ widely to include ‘necessary’.

However, a further source of complication comes from the fact that there may be some kinds of action that are, as we might put it, possible at one time but not at another.

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25 In 1754, God had the power to cause or to prevent the earthquake which hit Lisbon in 1755. In 1756, given that he had allowed the earthquake to occur, he no longer had the power to bring it about that the earthquake had never occurred. Is it then logically possible for God to prevent the 1755 earthquake? Given the meaning which Definition 5 attaches to that question, i.e. would be it be consistent with God’s OMNIPOTENCE

265 other defining properties, we would have to say ‘yes’. But we can now see that this answer is too simplistic.

In such arguments the learned scholar have supposed that time is an independent quantity. In Mechanics time is taken as an Undefined Term. Some may have tried to define it. In Theology there are several definitions of time.Whether in Physics or in Theology the definitions of time which are acceptable must satisfy the following conditions.

1] Whether time is Continuous or Discrete it must by Logically Contingent , neither Logiclly Absurd nor Logically Necessary.

In terms of Theological Logic neither it be Per Se Absurd nor Per Se Necessary but Per Se Contingent.

2] It Must have a Beginning.

3] It must be a Creation of Divine Essence.

4] Divine Essence and Divine Essential Attributes Must Necessarily Be Beyond Time and Transients it.

5] Parallel times [Naz:a:’ir] are Per Se Contingent. [Maulana: Qasim Nanati is of the view that Parallel Times are Per Se Contingent].

So one may discuss the questions raised by the Learned Scholar a little latter.

In the era when time travelling and its Logical Contingencies are under discussion the Learned Scholar uses it as an argument against Divine Omnipotence.

The Learned Scholar is requested to study these discussions before arguing against the Divine Omnipotence.

How ever it is necessary to make an answer according to the basic principles.

RELATION OF TIME TO THINGS IN TIME. Time is a Container [Z:arf] and Things in Time are Contained [Maz:ru:f]. Both Obey the Laws of Z:arf and Maz:ru:f .

Under these conditions let it be supposed that at time η1 an event ξ1 occurred. This means that Time η1 was Created by Divine Essence. And in time η1 the event ξ1 was Created. Now at Divine Essence Annihilateth them and Createth a New Time say η2 and an other event in η2 Say ξ2. As time is Per Se Contingent and the Event which Occurreth in it is also Per Se Contingent . Now as according to Principle It is Per Se Absurd for a Per Se Contingent to become a Per Se Necessary or to become a Per Se Absurd, this implieth that it is Per Se Contingent even if it ceaseth to Exist.

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26 So it is Per Se Possible for the Divine Essence to Create the time η1 once again after it ceaseth to Exist or is Annihilated.

Divine Essence may not Create event ξ1 in it but event ξ2. This shews that that as Divine Essence , Divine Essential Attributes and Divine Act of Creation are beyond time they are not considered in Time and Laws of time are only applicable to things that are in time and not on those thing which are not in time therefore it is Logically absurd to apply the laws of Time to those which if they do exist they are not in Time. This does shew that Divine Essence Hath the Power to recreate a Contingent Period of time which is annihilated by the Divine Essence. As there is no Super Time which includeth both the Created Time and the Divine Essence ,Its Attributes and Its Act of Creation , so it must be a fallacy to Apply the laws of time to the them .

Maulana Qa:sim Nanatavi believes that Past , Present and Future all Exist [See His Book Hadyatushshi:”ah] and events [Vaqa:’I”] in them. But he cannot be an Eternalist since he cannot believe Time and Events in Time as Eternal. Further e cannot believe in an infinite future. Although cannot be believe that the future shall cease to be , he means that finite types of futures are created and the process of there creation is continuous.Once a future is created it existeth and is never ANNIHILATED. Returning back to the question that Doeth Divine Essence Have the Omnipotence to Change the Past the argument is based upon the Belief on Presentism.

[Eternalists believe that the past, present, and future all exist; i.e., some nonpresent things and times exist. Time Cannot be Eternal as according to Maulana Qa:sim since he have explicitly accepted the Necessity of beginning for the Time. Yet if the word Eternalist does not imply an Eternal Past he may be termed as so.]

Any how the ancient question that Doeth Divine Essence Hath the Power to change the Past and an argument against the Omnipotence of Divine Essence is based upon the Presentism.

[ Presentists believe that only the present exists; i.e., only present things and times exist.]

It is like to use nowhere argument against the time travelling theories.

Someone who advances The Nowhere Argument against the possibility of time travel must presume presentism .

The argument is essentially that, if presentism is true, then it is impossible to time travel, as the traveller would be trying to get to somewhere that does not exist. This is a common concern about time travel. The same is true for the Learned Scholar who uses Presentism against the Divine Omnipotence.

The Learned Scholar is using the dogma of Presentism against the Divine Omnipotence. This means that according to the Learned Scholar to change the Past Divine Essence is just trying to do some in a time that doeth not exist.

So an answer should be given which may satisfy a Theist whether he belongs to Presentists or Eternalists.

If the time of Past Existheth then there is no Logical Absurdity in making changes in it . It is doeth not then it is Still Per Se Contingent and it is Per Se Contingent to be Created.Since if a thing is Per Se Contingent its Creation is also Per Se Contingent.

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27 If existence of past is incorrect as according to Presentists , eve then if a Presentist if he believes in Omnipotence of Divine Essence cannot deny the Divine Omnipotence and the Per Se Contingency of the time of Past and its Recreation. So Divine Essence can change the past just by recreating it.

An other question is whether Divine Essence Hath the Power to Save the Twin Towers after 9-11 just changing the past. The answer is that if Divine Essence Createth the Past 9-11 in which the towers were destroyed and Saveth them it s just Per Se Contingent. Now the question is about the consequences of the change of past. The answer is they are also contingent rather Per Se Contingent so they may be re created or chosen other wise.

For example if Divine Essence sendeth a person back in time by creating the Past Time and the person some how saves the twin towers from the destruction the question is whether the twin be still be standing in the time just after he is sent and entire history be changed. A proper answer is that it dependeth upon the Choice of the Freest Agent i.e Divine Essnce whether the Divine Essence Willeth to change the Entire History or just some short Period of time . In the latter case although the twins are saved from destruction for the moment but as the entire history is not changed the are found fallen on the very next day even if they are saved on the previous day with out a reason.

Many things can be said and Per Se Contingencies are Infinite.

The theist needs to relativise God’s power to a time: something can be logically possible for God at one time and not at another.

This argument assumes that Time is an Independent quantity and not in Divine Power. It presuppose Atheistic Presentism in its worse form. If a thing is T is logically Contingent at time A then it is still Contingent at time B where B is relativelyin Future to A. There is no need to modify the definition as presumed by the Learned Scholar/ So Definition 3 needs to give way to Definition 4 X is omnipotent = at every time, X can do everything which it is logically possible for X to do at that time (i.e. everything which is logically consistent with X’s other defining properties) This is a misconception since Per Se Contingent cannot be converted to Per Se Absurdity , Per Se Contency cannot be Converted to Per Se Necessity. This is Per Se Absurd There are, however, some doubts which one can raise about Definition 4 omnipotence, stemming from the very undemanding nature of the conception of omnipotence which it provides. First, it opens up the possibility of there being great numbers of omnipotent beings.

This statement of the Learned Scholar is based on the neglection of Uniqueness of the Per Se Necessary Existent.

Of course there would be a great many things which these omnipotent beings were powerless to do; but as long as their powerlessness was a logical consequence of some of their defining properties, it would not show that they were really not omnipotent.

Certainly there could be a sequence of different omnipotent beings.

Pro-vided omnipotent being A exercises his power to limit his omnipotence, he could be followed by omnipotent being B, who in turn limits his own omnipotence, making possible the emergence of omnipotent being C and so on.

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28 This is certainly incorrect since it is stated that Divine Omnipotence is a Divine Essential Attribute of Divine Essence and No Essential Attribute is in Divine Omnipotence . This is thus Per Se Implied that Divine Omnipotence is not in Divine Omnipotence .

Essential Divine Attributes i.e Divine Essential Attributes are not in Divine Omnipotence since their Negations are Per Se Absurd.

So a sequence of omnipotent beings is possible.

Plurality of Omnipotent Existents is Per Se Absurd and any thing which Per Se Implieth it is also Per Se Absurd, So the supposed Series or sequence what so ever is meant be the Learned Author is Per Se Absurd.

But it looks as if the simultaneous . existence of many omnipotent beings is possible too.

Let it be studied what the Learned Scholar says.

Suppose we define perfectrons as beings who by Definition 4 are omnipotent (i.e. can do anything which is not logically excluded by their other defining properties); and whose dominant preference is never to thwart the preferences of any other omnipotent beings. Then it seems that the universe could contain many perfectrons. For if we make it one of their defining characteristics that they wish not to thwart the preferences of other omnipotent beings, it follows that if they are unable to thwart those preferences, this is not a limitation on their omnipotence. For by Definition 4, any powerlessness in a being B which is implied by the defining features of B does not count against B being an omnipotent being.

We can even, it seems, imagine an absurd case which is consistent with this definition of omnipotence. Let us define a nullipotent being as a being, one of whose defining features is that he cannot do anything . He will then count as omnipotent by the revised definition. For it will be true of him that he can do everything which it is logically possible for a nullipotent being to do, i.e. nothing at all. It would clearly be absurd to describe a nullipotent being as omnipotent, so any definition of omnipotence which allows us to do this, as Definition 4 does, must also be absurd.

A Per Se Possible doeth not convert into Per Se Necessary or Per Se Contingent or both. This is Per Se Absurd. So the Divine Power over time is accepted since Time is Per Se Contingent and each moment of time or each Period of time how so ever large or small is Per Se Contingent. So It is in Divine Omnipotence to Create a time which Divne Essence Hath Created and Do a different thing in It. A Lot depends upon the chosen definition of time. But only proper Definitions of Time are those in which Time is a Per Se Contingent and a Creation of Deity. Any other Definition in which Time is not in Per Se Contingent is not accepted.

Is there any way forward for the theist? Can he amend Definition 4 to avoid the absurdity which it would allow? Some theists have suggested: Definition 5 X is omnipotent = at every time, X can do everything which it is logically possible for X to do at that time (i.e. everything which is OMNIPOTENCE This is based on the assumption that Logical Contingencies become Logical Absurdities as time passes AND Vice Versa . This is incorrect [‘Al ‘Inqila:b ‘Adh:a:ti:] This is Per Se Absurd.

266 logically consistent with X’s other defining properties); and no being, Y, greater in overall power than X, can be conceived 3

Although nullipotent beings qualify as omnipotent by Definition 4, they do not qualify by Definition 5 because they fail the final clause: we can conceive of beings greater in power than nullipotent beings. Does this provide the

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29 theist with a satisfactory account of omnipotence?

The revised definition still leaves the theist with some problems. There is first a problem about precision. The definition uses the notion of one entity being ‘of greater power than another’. But how are different degrees of power to be measured? Do we really have a sharp enough grasp of this concept to be able to make use of it in a definition? If one being A can do only X, and a second being B can do both X and Y, then clearly B is more powerful than A. But often the capacities of agents do not bear this simple relation. We find that A can do X, Y and Z, and B can do R, S and T. For an Omnipotent Existent it is Necessary to Have Power over each and every Per Se Contingent , including very time itself since time if not Per Se Contingent then it is Per Se Absurd but not Per Se Necessary . So there is no problem of A or B or Z or ‫ت‬ .

How are we to judge whether the power to do the former is greater or less than the latter? No doubt in some cases we will have some strong intuitions about the matter, but in other cases it will be very unclear which power is the greater. Suppose A can work out in his head all the prime numbers up to 10,000,000, and B can compose elegant sonnets in his head. Which power is the greater?

As there is only one Omnipotence Existent and there is none other all these discussions are invalid. Plurality of Eternal and Per Se Necessary Essences is Per Se Absurd as an Accepted Axiom of Theological Logic. T-”addud ul Vujba:’ ‘Adh: Dh:tiah Muh:a:l Didh: Dh:a:t] More seriously, from a theistic perspective the definition is both too lax and too demanding. It is too lax in that it allows that an omnipotent being could commit suicide (at least on the assumption that the ontological argument fails), whereas most theists would prefer to avoid having to accept this consequence.

If an Omnipotent Existent can Commit suicide then it ceeasth to be Per Se Necessary Essence and it Per Se Necessary Implieth that Divine Essence is Not Divine Essence. So this is Logically Absurd.

On the other hand, it does not let in enough, for it will exclude God from being omnipotent. To see that this is so, compare what God can do, with what a semi-God-like being (call him Semigod) can do. Semigod is omniscient, eternal, omnipresent, etc.

Plurality of Divine Existents and Existence of Semi Divine Essences are Per Se Absurd. This is against the Divine Uniqueness.

In fact, he has all of God’s properties except for moral perfection.

Such an Existent is just a Divine Essence and this Implieth Plurality of Divine Essences. It is to confuse one issue with the other . It must be dealt separately. But it is a well proved theorem of Theology that Divine Essence cannot make an other Divne Essence and any Essence that is like It in Essential Attributes. Shari:k ‘Al Ba:ri: Muh:a:al Bidh: Dh:A:t.

In terms of power, he can do everything which is logically consistent with his other defining properties. Since his actions are subject to fewer constraints from his other defining properties (no moral constraints, for example) than God’s actions are constrained by his defining properties, Semigod can do everything that God can do, and more.

This is incorrect since any thing that is not Per Se Contingent cannot be done by both and any thing that is Per Se Contingent is in power of both. A detail answer may be given but as Only Divine Essence is Omnipotent ,it is therefore out of the scope of the present work to answer this argument , since such an Existent is Per Se Absurd. Further if it is a Problem it is for followers of Rad:a Ibn Naqi: “Ali: [1856-1930] of Bans Baraily of U. P British India [1858-1947], since they believe that the Holy Prophet is Omnipotent and Omni Valent [ ‘AL Mukh:ta:r ‘Al Kull] not for others.

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30 He can sin and God cannot. Semigod would therefore be greater in overall power than God; hence God would fail to meet the final clause of Definition 5; hence God would not count as omnipotent by Definition 5. Nor does the definition entail that there can be only one omnipotent being. For all that the definition tells us, there might be a set of omnipotent beings, all of very great but equal power, and no other being could be conceived of with greater power than each of them had.

Every thing has been answered and replied and nothing is needed to say further. If any thing is Per Se Contingent and not in Divine Omnipotence but in the Potentiality of any other Existence then there is a Problem. But if an act is Per Se Absurd upon Divine Essence and Per Se Possible upon some Non Divine Agent, such a comment cannot be made. It cannot be the case that the Non Divine Essence is more Powerful then the Divine Essence or hath more Power. How ever if it becongeth to the class of those CTS WHICH WERE DISPUTED BETWEEN Ima:m ‘Ahlussunnah ‘Ash Sha:h ‘Isma:”i:l Shahi:d [Martyr] and Imam of Khairabadi Cult, it may be a problem for the followers of the latter.

OMNIPOTENCE

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Conclusion We have now reprised, in Definitions 1 to 5 the main course which is followed in discussions of this topic.

4

The conclusion that emerges is that the very idea of an omnipotent being, in the most natural reading of that term, is logically impossible. The most natural reading of that phrase is given by Definition 2; and all the subsequent amendments which we have considered have been attempts to find a sense of omnipotence which (a) allows that an omnipotent being is logically possible, and (b) renders consistent the thesis that God is omnipotent with a variety of other theistic claims about God. What can we conclude from the discussion?

The atheist may well conclude that there cannot be an omnipotent being; that God (if he existed) would be omnipotent; and therefore that God cannot exist. The theist is likely to reply to this, ‘It is we who are defending the claim that an omnipotent God exists, so it is up to us, not up to you the atheist, to say what we mean by “omnipotent”. And by our definition of the term, it is logically possible for there to be an omnipotent being, and an omnipotent being moreover who can have the other divine attributes.’ This is in one way a reasonable response, and in another way unreasonable. It is reasonable that anyone arguing for any thesis should have the right to specify what the thesis is. In that sense, it is indeed up to the theist and not the atheist to say how the concept of omnipotence is to be interpreted. But it is unreasonable in the sense that if the defence of the thesis in question requires extensive semantic deviance, then a more straightforward and perspicuous expression of the theist’s position would be to say ‘God of course is not omnipotent – because no being could be. Nor is he the most powerful being consistently describable – because he is constrained in his power by, for example, his essential goodness. He may not even be describable as the most powerful being that there is – since some ranges of power are simply incommensurable. All we can honestly claim is that he is indeed very powerful.’

Further reading Many sources provide helpful accounts of debates over omnipotence. Plantinga (1967) is an old but still useful guide. More recent contributions which lead the search for a definition into the present century are Swinburne

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31 (1986), Martin (1990), Gale (1993), Stewart (1993), Rosencrantz and Hoffman in Quinn and Taliaferro (1997). For a sophisticated modern analysis which tries to accommodate the points made in this chapter, see Flint and Freddoso in Craig (2002).

This is just a Summery and there is no need to answer it once again. How ever some thing may be added latter.

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