Necessary Existence and Necessary Existence by ALIMKANWALIMTINAA

Glass

Book

BlaiOQ Â«

f THE

NECESSARY EXISTENCE OF

DEITY?

SECOND EDITION.

OF CoÂ£

EDINBURGH

PHILALETHEAN-PUBLICATION-OFFICE. MDCCCXL.

Had

not revelation discovered the true principles of religion, they had

without doubt continued altogether unknown. they appeared so consonant to

them

for the production of

human

reason, that

Yet on

their discovery,

men were apt

to mistake

it.

Warburton's Div. Leg. B. III. Sect.

^1 T>RINTEI>

Bt NEILL AND

CO.,

OLD

SH M AR K ET , ED I N BT.< B OB

EXAMINATION OF

ANTITHEOS'S "REFUTATION a OF THE

ARGUMENT A PRIORI FOR THE BEING "

AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD."

WILLIAM GILLESPIE.

ISSUED

BY THE SOCIETY FOR PEACEABLY REPRESSING INFIDELITY.

rbv khsiror * A^rov' fiscal ds

Tiadai

Ka/ Ts

6' avdgtotfwv

avdgsg

s&oj&ev

Aihg nrami [mv ayuicu, ayopa),

Xifisvsg' ffavry} ds

Awg

fbs<sri

ds ยงd\a,(f<fu,

xs^yjfjbsda tfdvrsg'

y<kยง xai y'svog h/Asv.

Aratus.

CONTENTS.

to the

Preface,

Second Edition,

PART The Relevancy

Page 9

Existence,

.......

a priori argumentation

PART

for

Real 21

II.

The " Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes of

God," an irrefragable Demonstration,

PART The

The

and of Matter,

IV.

" Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes of God," an irrefragable Demonstration,

PART The

III.

non-infinite divisibility of Extension

PART

Argument a

God," an irrefragable Demonstration,

priori, for the

PART The Argument " a

Being and Attributes .

113

VI.

priori, for the

Being and Attributes

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration,

129

—— CONTENTS.

PART The

Argument a priori,

VII.

for the

Being and Attributes

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration,

145

the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space.

M. Des

Cartes,

Mrs Cockburn,

PART Of

Etc.

150

VIII.

the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space.-—

Newton, Clarke, Butler, Price, Locke, Addison, Tillotson, Milton, Etc.

PART Of

165

IX.

the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space

......

Antitheos, Reid, Gleig, Gassendus, Episcopius, Leibnitz, Etc.

PART Of

182

the Sentiments of Philosophers concerning Space.—

Law, Watts, Brougham, Kant, Berkeley,

PART The ".Argument, a

The

202

XI.

priori, for the

Being and Attributes

of God," an irrefragable Demonstration,

PART

226

XII.

" Argument, a priori, for the Being and Attributes of

God," an irrefragable Demonstration,

Notes to Part XII.,

244

257

CONTENTS.

APPENDIX,

Appendix

to Part IV.,

VI.,

VIII.

Appendix A, B,

Appendix

to Part

.... .... .

Appendix

265

270

273

Appendix ...

Page 261

281

282

283

284

Part XII.

Appendix ...

ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION.

The

of 1000 copies, being

first edition,

now

exhausted, a second

become necessary. In presenting which to the public, it is right briefly to state wherein it differs, in any essential respect, from the preceding ediis

tion.

In the present edition, the head

lines,

will be a great help to readers, in a

indicating Part and Section,]

work containing

many

re-

ferences backwards and forwards.

Besides a few alterations, some less some more important, a good deal of

new matter

has been introduced, which Ave presume to think

will not be found either useless or uninteresting.

say nothing more concerning the improvements which have

been made, in a few instances

the

new matter

includes a passage

of great moment, occurring in the fourth Part, J and an

Appendix

big with the fates of an Atheistical Society, and of an Atheistical

Newspaper.||

t It

may be proper

mention on what principle the sectioning proceeds.

section-'mark (ยง) occurs at the beginning of every paragraph

being used for the sake of reference merely.

See the note

See

(t)

Appendix

ยง

22.

to Part.

XII

Appendix

the section-marks

In short, they denote topical as op-

posed to logical divisions.

;

ADVERTISEMENT.*

From

the

many

whose authority municated

highly favourable opinions, expressed by persons

much weight, which have been comhe feels very confident as to the ultimate

entitled to

to the author,

result of his undertaking, to establish the necessary existence of

Deity. Whatever misgivings the author may have had as to the reception which his mode of treating his subject might meet with he never ;

allowed himself to have any misgivings as to the goodness of his cause, generally or particularly

a god

;

particularly,

Generally, or as to the Being of

and validity of

as to the applicableness

a priori reasonings in reference to that momentous topic.

indeed gone over, but then plored

Men

having at

little of

the ground

thoroughly ex-

many

rather knowing that there are

command

The age

Much ground

live in is certainly the age of superficialness.

sciences,

and

a few common-places with regard to each, than

caring to be complete proficients in any one branch of knowledge.

But notwithstanding

now no

un-

is superficial,

but

this circumstance, the author has

The age

easiness as to the fate of his production.

there are exceptions to the general rule

And

it is

very fortunate

that no age receives those impressions which are to be lasting, and to influence the sentiments of posterity,

found thinkers.

The skimmers over

from any but the more pro-

the surfaces of things

may make

a little noise as they pass along, but in a short while all trace of

them is vanished. The author, then,

anticipates that ere long a great change will

take place in the public mind, in relation to the question of the fitness

>Tis

and value of the species of reasonings employed in this work. all question, that a priori reasonings on subjects out

beyond

of the mathematical sciences have descended

the general estimation, though

mer period such reasonings used But there are spicuous position.

a low point in

equally certain, that at a for-

it is

occupy a very high and con-

signs that better treatment is

awaiting argumentation from the necessity of the case for a First Cause.

The immediate consequences, would be

so ardently desired,

present.

A sudden

or rather th e concomitants, of a change

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

the following

stop in the

to specify

no more

tune of your mere a posteriori

We should no longer have thrust into our hands whole volumes of anatomy, botany, astronomy, and what not, called, in virtue of an exceedingly small sprinkling of other matter, treatises on Natural Theology ; we should no longer, I say, have such thrust

men.

ADVERTISEMENT. upon us

sound arguments

as containing the only

proving the

first

grand article of

made

out.

to be

met with,

We should no

all religion.

therefore, be told, that the infinity^

ture cannot be

11 for

longer,

and the unity of the Divine Na-

The quick disappearance

of specula-

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

avowed, atheism a consummation, however devoutly to be wished for, which has never been brought about under the long, presumptuous reign of the oracular responses issuing from the extive, or

perimental School.

"Who does not were ever

Have

been prone

at once perceive of

what mighty consequence

have the mouth of avowed speculative atheism closed for

not the very bad kinds of practical atheism too often

seek shelter under the wings of speculative atheism

live in all respects as if there

were no God

Therefore, to wish

most anxiously that there were no God Therefore, to confirm oneAre not these not unfreself in saying that there is no God quently bound together as links in the same dreadful chain \\ And :

make

is it

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

application to the circumstances of the present day

Where

that Socialism, the prevalent form of Infidelity, takes refuge

when hard

pressed by pursuers

Where, but

in downright atheism

There are very few persons among us who are not aware of the alarming progress which Socialism, or Owenism, British dominions, Continent.

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

Socialism

making

in the

to say nothing of the state of matters

on the

just another

favourite disguise under

name for Infidelity.

effect of tearing off the

was j ust the

Infidelity proceeded to extend itself

Certain events, which are

in all directions.

had the

which

mask which

still

but recent, have

Socialism chose to wear*

on many occasions, and of rendering apparent,

to all but the

stupid and unthinking, that that widely-spread system

is at

most

bottom

nothing less than a thoroughly God-denying system.

In conclusion

a god

It cannot be too often repeated, that the being of

constitutes the fundamental point of all religion.

+ This

word

here taken in the popular, that

the loosest, acceptation.

{ Faults in the life hreed errors in the brain,

And

these reciprocally those again.

The mind and conduct mutually imprint

And stamp Each,

sire

their

imago

each other's mint

and dam, of an infernal race,

Begetting and conceiving

all that's base.

Cowper's * Progress

of Error."

the

â&#x20AC;&#x201D; ADVERTISEMENT.

human immortality and

future retribution, Theism is a The Christian faith does not lay, but it There is a god. Remember at all times, builds on, this foundation therefore, that to set out the proof for the existence of God, is the first step to the demolishing of Infidelity, of what description so-

doctrine of

necessary preliminary.

ever the Infidelity

Edinbobqh;

may

be,

August, 1840,

PREFACE.

It seems to give

be a duty which

due to the public in general, to

the

Antitheos's production was " called forth

present controversy. in

some account of the circumstances which led

consequence of a challenge, sent by the author of "

" gument, a priori, for the

Ar-

Being and Attributes of God,"

a society of professed atheists in Glasgow, " to answer and re" fute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work." letter containing the challenge

which had conducted to

to be subsequently alluded

word

gave a detail of those incidents

And for this

it.

to,

The

reason, and for another

that letter shall be inserted here,

for word.

the Society of Atheists which calls itself

P a g us Âť' or

The

The Areo-

Zetetic Society,' Glasgow.

" Before proceeding to the proper business of this letter, "

may

in 44

be but proper to give you a short account of the manner

which I was led

Some months

to think of addressing you.

ago, seeing, in the

window of a small book-

shop in a conspicuous street in this

of Paine's

person who sold the work, in order to know whether he be-

lieved the book to be infamous,

Age

city, a

newly printed copy

of Reason,' I determined on speaking to the

and sold

merely

for the

PREFACE.

" sake of gain, or whether he was, in every sense, a patron of 4 1

infamous a publication.^

" In the book-shop to which I allude, I saw a person " gave

was a

to understand, there

" Edinburgh,

who

society of Atheists in

who met on the Sunday

evenings, for the sake of

" confirming each other in infidelity. J

Subsequently, I met a

member

of the Society, (who

" hands,) who, indeed,

made no

said to be one of their best

secret of his sentiments.

" told me, that there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, " any being greater than himself ;| that his body and brain (for

" he positively assured me, he had no soul but his brain,) had " been produced by unintelligent necessary causes

;

and

that,

" after his death, the particles of his body and brain might " compose a cloud or a dung-hill, but could never, by any chance, " compose, again, the person

for so this

(by no means

"fortuitous) concourse of atoms was called. " i

undertook to answer, with ease, any thing that

" could be urged in favour of Theism.

I challenged him, and,

" through him, all his atheistical associates, to refute "

gument a priori?

Sec.

" forwarded to the body.

" did not hesitate for a

A copy

my Ar*

of which had been

I was soon informed, that

moment

engage to refute me.

With

sight of infidel works, in a public shop, was new to me three years Matters are so much altered since about the beginning of 1837, that sheets and volumes of infidelity, much more hideous than Paine's, may be seen, any day, vended publicly enough. X An atheistical society is no rarity to me now. And that there are socie|

The

ago.

ties

of ath

ists,

and that the

the

House

over the thanks to the Bishop of Exeter and

societies are studded, thickly studded,

country, every one by this time knows

;

of Lords.

All that was here meant to be conveyed was this That the person spoken of asserted, there neither was, nor could be, in the universe, a being of a species superior to the human. Surely I never could intend to convey, that the atheist in question had maintained, it was a downright impossibility that there should be a cleverer man than he in the world. And that, for ||

very obvious reasons.

â&#x20AC;&#x201D; 15

PREFACE. **

regard to the proposed refutation, I imposed on

ditions only.

2dly,

That

1st,

% that the said to

make up

for

After waiting long for the promised

refutation, I was, at length,

And

pointed out some (alleged) specific fallacy in

" alleged demonstration.

him two con-

That the answer should be on paper.

made aware, by a .

friend of

could not answer

my disappointment,

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

However,

it.

I was told, that there was

a society of Atheists in Glasgow, more numerous, more clever,

" and more learned, and that there neither was, nor could be, any " ground to doubt, that the **

Areopagus' would, on being chal-

lenged, step forward and (endeavour to) overturn

my reasonings.

" Shortly after receiving this piece of news, I came to the " determination of challenging you, each of you and all of you

As, accordingly, I now hereby do challenge you to answer and

" refute the reasonings contained in the aforesaid work.

Two

" copies of which are herewith sent to you.

" 44

You

challenge the world to prove, to you, that there exists

an Intelligent Great First Cause.

The work

in question

" professes to demonstrate that matter by the most rigid ratio-

" cination.

It asks

you

to grant

no proposition but tyose pro-

M positions which constitute the starting points of your Atheism, " to-wit, that there 44

Infinity of Duration,

Infinity of Extension,

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;be

and

that there

" or of space merely, or of matter and space together. 44

plain

must those truths be which are

" Theists, (I might have said, by 44

all

insisted on

men sound

and are the primary assumptions in Atheism "

shall soon see

that extension of matter merely,

whether you are able

How sound

in their minds,) itself.

to do all that

profess to have a capacity for, j" or whether, like the

formed an estimate of

all

you

Edinburgh

from what I ha must he confessed, the western antitheists can command talents and acquirements very superior to what the easterns have at their service. A certain piece of information allude*! to in this challenge was quite correct. t Certainly I

seen of the metropolitan atheists.

But,

atheistical talent it

PREFACE.

" Atheists, you " of persons

must be altogether dumb before one of that

who

are (in your opinion) so

" to believe in a necessary Being "

all

who

weak and

class

foolish as

contains within himself

possible perfections.

" I have to lay down to you the same conditions which I im" posed on the Atheists here. " spect) not hard.

The

conditions are (in one re-

I am, being very truly desirous of yOur

" attaining to a better mind,"

(Signed)

William Gillespie."

" Edinburgh, 21st August 1837."

and challenge, a

this letter

letter,

August 1837, was received in answer, "

What you

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

say of

dated Glasgow, 28th

which

" verse, an iota of superiority to himself in the scale of " gence,

not exactly the

" express themselves. * " that we

know

mode *

" your

clfeallenge, it is

reply to your

man

(and

are as follows

will be

at their

" Relative to

own

commenced forthwith;

much time

to spare,

But

cannot be

as the Society intend

charges, and are anxious that the

may

" thing should be proceeded with, you " being lost.

commonly said,

" expected to proceed very rapidly. it

atheists

hereby accepted upon your own terms.

Argument'

" but as the writer has not

" publishing

which

intelli-

warranted in so saying.)"

The concluding paragraph, &c. "

rely on no time

copy will be forwarded to you as soon as

" comes out of the press.

I have the honor to be," &c.

" To William Gillespie, Esq.'

(Signed)

About the middle

* It has frequently been

of no intelligence superior to that of

" I think any one

said

denying to any one in the uni-

of April 1838, I

was put in possession by

the writer of that letter, according to his promise, of a copy of his reply.

It is entitled, " Refutation of the

" for the Being and Attributes of

God

;

Argument a priori

shewing the lrrele-

â&#x20AC;&#x201D; PEEFACE.

" vancy of that Argument, as well as the Fallacious Reasoning " of

Samuel Clarke and

" in support of

it.

others, especially of

Gillespie,

By AxTiTHEOS."t

I have hinted, that there was another reason for giving a

copy of the

letter

which contained the challenge.

alleges in his Preface, that the letter

My adversary

was guilty of " containing

" passages which could by no means militate in favor of the " writer."

After asserting this, need

my respondent wished What

have been added that

no advantage of the " passages ?"

to take

ever operates more to one's prejudice than to say that the

conduct of one has been faulty in some instance, but the in-

formant

too charitable to

communicate the impropriety

of the matter before us, the public have

now been

But

constituted

the proper judges.

Gillespie,"

" had been disappointed,

says

Gillespie's opponent,

seems, in finding an antagonist

" elsewhere,J notwithstanding has anxious endeavours to pro" voke opposition.

" was

The

in his eye, as his

gauntlet was thrown down, but no one

fully prepared to take

words

up."

may

(Preface.)

If Antitheos

tend to lead his readers to

suppose he had, any thing besides the affair with the Edin-

burgh Atheists, (who gauntlet,

certainly,

had not been "

fully

though they had taken up the

prepared" for the combat

;)

might have been informed, had he made inquiry, that very soon after the appearance of the "

Argument," the author thereof

found an antagonist, an unchallenged antagonist, an antagonist of very considerable and acknowledged metaphysical abilities,

an antagonist who wrote laborious long as the work

strictures on the

work

itself.

t Published for the Glasgow Zetetic Society, 1838. +

but

Gillespie

had been disappointed

â&#x20AC;&#x201D; not in finding, as Antitheos

in not finding an atheistic antagonist.

lenge, (p.

14â&#x20AC;&#x201D;15

hereof.)

has

See the narration in the chal

PREFACE.

The " author

cidentally

"Refutation" gives very satisfactory evidence that

a person of no

and

mean

the work, are very numerous is

very

little

topics which, in-

have been introduced into

numerous, indeed, that there

one could say, in conjunction with that which

the grandest of

bearing upon

The

talents.

briefly, or otherwise,

its

all

subjects, but

For these two reasons,

there.

what would find something

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

in connection

with this discussion, we propose to meet and to remove every metaphysical difficulty which atheists can possibly start word,

shall, first or last, entirely

It is to be regretted that Antitheos has not

When

God.

numbered

his

I quote or animadvert on his words, I

shall give not only the chapter but the paragraph

who wishes

in a

exhaust the subject, to the

complete and everlasting confusion of the deniers of

paragraphs.

;

to look at the passage

the reader

under discussion must count

for himself.

In quoting, I may occasionally leave or perspicuity's sake, words which as to which the passage case, I

adduced.

most willingly leave

out, for brevity's sake,

make nothing

to the point

With regard to every such

to others to decide,

have, to the least extent, misrepresented

author.

whether I

EXAMINATION OF

ANTITHEOS'S

REFUTATION."

PART

THE RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENTATION FOR A REAL EXISTENCE. § 1. There are two tilings which the author of the " Refutation" has undertaken to do. One of them is, to

shew that the a priori mode of procedure is directed wide of the mark when applied to the question of the being of A God and the other is, to overturn the particular reasonings of those who have adopted that method ;

of argumentation.

The

§ 2.

first

chapter of that work

devoted to the for-

mer, and the remaining chapters are occupied with the latter undertaking. § 3.

Our atheist begins by being very merry on the sub-

ject of the irrelevancy of a priori istence of

" being

" "

Deity.

made

To hear

for the ex-

GoDf

the subject of demonstration by argument,

is," he remarks, " altogether astounding. Theannouncementonthe other hand," he adds, " sounds so oddlg,asto

" mitigate the effect of the •«

argument

of the existence of a

cite ridicule at the

first

impression,

not to ex-

wonderful discrepancy between the

theos,

have given capitals to certain of the words used by Antion which he had not bestowed one capital letter. That he is

so desirous of degrading, so far as he can, certain collocations of ters, is

a good evidence of someth in >j.

let-

—

RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT.

[Part

" end in view, and the means laid out for the attainment 44

(Chapter

it."

paragraph

1.)

But when the laugh is over, and it becomes time to serve us up something more substantial, we are disappointed at the meagreness of our fare. Such as it is. we § 4.

shall

probe every piece of

it.

§ 5. It being granted, argues our author, that " a God a * * must be held as a real being," " argument' 1 (he

means a priori argument)

—Now

for the proof,

Sir,

appears quite out of place." if

you please

would

" never do to talk of proving the existence of the 44

moon by argument

in the

;

neither would

man

be of any

avail to

the existence of a navigable channel between the At-

lan tic

employ a syllogism or a

and America

sorites to

demonstrate

Pacific oceans, through the arctic regions of

— All that

is here meant may be quite unobIf the reasoning Our author goes on

jectionable.

" under review be relevant, these must be so too. If " an a priori argument be capable of proving the existence of one thing, another may be proved by the same a * * process." (Par. 2.) The proof, the proof of this ?

where

is it

to be found

Passing over two pages and a

half, where* not a word on the subject occurs, we come, in the eighth paragraph, to something that looks as if it would turn out to be what we want. 44 The truth is, the argument in ques44 44 is nothing else than an tion" (the argument a priori)

attempt to establish the application of mathematical' (this

word should be metaphysical, vide infra, reasoning to what it has nothing

quentes) t4

heaven to do with,

proof?

C£

How

—namely,

47, et se-

in earth or

real existences."

— The —

vain and preposterous the attempt V

This metal will not pass. i(

tained, that as the

quantity,

— " As well might

whole

be main-

in the abstract a perfect

must contain within

itself all

the qualities

—

— RELEVANCY OF

4-8.]

ARGUMENT.

A PRIORI

of the different parts of which it is composed that, as " some of these parts are small and some large, some " round and some square, some black and some white " it must be white and black, and square and round, and ;

;

" large and small at the same time !"

Where

do.

tained, kc.

the proof of the AS

—Neither

well might

will this

it be

main-

the proof of the analogy between the cases

Well,

It is to seek.

we have had nothing

proof as

But we approach a syllogism, and Antitheos does " every sound argument is capable of " being reduced to the syllogistic form." We may hope then to get some satisfaction at length. " Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfections yet.

not deny, that

God;

" Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfec-

" tions

;

" Therefore, metaphysical abstractions are God." 11 says Antitheos, " a fair state§ 7. " If this be not, "

ment

Should

of the whole argument in the most logical form,

—

know what is." But I am not. be any way wrong, and should some ardent

at a loss to

u disciple of the metaphysical school of theology deign

" hereafter to take a part in this discussion, **

would be

well were he to consult the Stagyrite and correct

(Par. 9.)

mean

to correct

it,

though

it."

do not know

that the Stagirite here will be of vast service, for the principal fallacy to be pointed out

not of a strictly

logical character. 8. Passing over the major proposition, the minor " Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfec-

§ is,

tions."

What

are metaphysical abstractions

They

compose a certain class of thoughts. The minor proposition therefore amounts to this A certain class of our ;

thoughts, to-wit, metaphysical abstractions, possess absolute perfections.

— But by the bye,

this

minor proposition

RELEVANCY OF

A PRIORI

ARGUMENT.

known

middle term as

that the Stagirite does not allow the

occurs in the major, to contain a com-

term when

plete element not to be found in the middle it

Antitheos

omits a word, to us a very necessary word.

should have

[Part

This instance of high treason

appears in the minor.

against the Prince of Logicians cannot be suffered to pass.

Supplying the word which has been kept back, we have " Metaphysical abstractions" " necessarily" " possess ab" solute perfections" Do they indeed ? Metaphysics

have been in very bad repute for a good while. Berkeley and Hume, not to mention any other metaphysician, have, (it seems) brought them into everlasting disgrace with

But behold how

the majority of people.

runs in an opposite direction.

with metaphysics.

Metaphysical abstractions, he has

which

it,

The metaphy-

necessarily possess absolute perfections. sical abstractions

far Antitheos

downright in love

gentleman has been eonver-

this

sant with, must be very superior indeed to the generality of those with which other people have been brought into

acquaintance in these days.t § 9. After having said so

much about

hardly need to draw the conclusion, the conclusion, to the premises set

runs thus

the minor,

and proper

full

down by our

author.

Therefore, a certain class of our thoughts, to-

wit, metaphysical abstractions, is

The

God.

conclusion,

like the minor, speaks for itself.

Having thus paved the way, I proceed to do what was promised, and shall now correct Antitheos 's syllogism. § 10.

do not mean to say, t Antitheos

may

will

be unobjectionable even in a

say, that the absurdity of this

minor proposition

not to be fathered upon him, he doing no more than putting a certain collection of words into the mouths of your metaphysical theists. The

more shame

him

To write sheer nonsense

to write sheer nonsense,

ther more nor less than

what

his

and

bad enough.

But

call it other people's reasoning, is nei-

—what Antitheos has done.

own, and nobody's

else.

But

let

him keep

— RELEVANCY OF

§5 9-13.]

ARGOIEXT.

one make the best that can be he shall do very well. Here then it comes as

But

corrected form.

made

A PRIORI

it,

corrected.

Whatever necessarily God. But that about which

possesses absolute perfections

certain of our metaphysical ab-

stractions are employed necessarily possesses absolute perfections.

Therefore, that about which certain of our metaphysical abstractions are employed § 11. Antitheos

God.

next proceeds to say

Our reasoners

" a priori have either to acknowledge the absurdity here

" set forth in mood and figure, or deny that they appro" priate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological " science. 1 '

These reasoners will not deny, that they ap-

propriate abstract reasoning to questions of ontological science, but they will

mood and

forth in

acknowledge the absurdity there set and that even as has been

figure,

shewn.

go on to the words which succeed " If their an "agent, he cannot be a heap God " of abstractions," that is, a heap of our thoughts, for ab§ 12.

be a real being

—

— True, He cannot. He — " No reasoning ima" cannot be an agent." — Most ginable can make Him both." — Surely. — " Yet nostractions are thoughts of ours. " If

made up

of abstractions,'

or men's thoughts, "

true.

" thing short of

working out

" argument aim."

was that made out?

the

Oh, then, as I have corrected the syllogism 11 say no more.

syllogism

—"

How

this impossibility does the

§ 1$.

Well

no great things as 'yet

in the

way

of prov-

A God

be a real being, a priori argument is quite out of place. Perhaps we shall alight on the thing ing, that if

we as

are in search

it is)

of,

at last.

Of a

truth, the proof (such

which we are seeking we come up

to at the twelfth

— RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT.

[Part

paragraph, but the reasonings which constitute the proof are not Antitheos's own, nor yet those of the Reviewer

who

cited,

they having been employed by

Mr Hume,

and being very ancient indeed. § 14. " The character of irrelevancy here laid at the " door of the a priori argument, is not unwarranted by

" the authority of good judges among the religious them-

Abundance of quotations might be adduced,

" selves.

" but

shall content

myself with an extract from the

" Edinburgh

" " " "

" "

Review for October 1830, (vol. Hi. p. 113,) in an article upon Dr MoreheacT s Dialogues on Natural and Revealed Religion.' That the reviewer reasons upon theistical principles is evident from the alluthe will of the Creator,' to which, sion he makes to in passing, he allows the most orthodox T may remark latitude." (Why, does Antitheos suppose, he may meet '

an atheist at every corner he can turn " our argument a priori he observes :

V) £

" Relative to

The

truth

is, it

involves a radical fallacy which not only renders

useless but dangerous to the cause

support.

purely a question of fact

The But

it is

question as to the being of a God, :

either exists or

an evident absurdity inpretend-

not

ing to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove

'argument a priori; because nothing

there is

Jlliatever

ceive as nonexistent,

" « <<

and

this

we conceive as existent, we can also conand consequently there is no being"

demonstrable,

unless the contrary implies a contradiction,

can never be predicated of the negative of any proposition which merely affirms or asserts a matter of fact.

he does

exist.

intended to

whose non-existenoe implies a contradiction, *>r, in other words, whose existence is a priori demonstrable. This must be evident to every one who knows what demonstration really means. that

all

It is

a universal law,

heavy bodies descend to the earth in a line di-

RELEVANCY OF

§§ 14-17.]

4£

ARGUMENT.

But the contrary of this may easily be conceived, because it involves no contrafor bodies might have fallen upward, if we diction may so express it, as well as downward, had such been the will of the Creator. But we cannot conrected towards

A PRIORI

its

centre.

;

ceive the opposite of one of the demonstrated truths of

geometry

a triangle should be either greater or less than two

right angles

The

monstrable truths and matters of

<£

—

as,

for example, that the three angles of

— because

this implies a

distinction, therefore,

contradiction.

between necessary or defact, consists in this,

—

that the contrary of the former involves a contra-

But there no contradiction implied in conceiving the non<£ and therefore His existence existence of the Deity " is not a necessary truth, a priori demonstrable."* "1" § 15. Of this extract from the Edinburgh Review, the ££

<£

diction,

whereas that of the

latter does not.

;

words which are here put into italic characters are precisely the words of Mr Hume, as they are to be met with in the ninth

" Religion. in the

££

Part of his

£t

Dialogues concerning Natural

We shall present our reader with the passage

Dialogues" in which those words are to be found.

original, generally,

preferable to a copy.

££

There is an evident absurdity in pretending to § 16. " demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any ar" guments a priori. 44

Nothing

demonstrable, unless the

Nothing, that

contrary implies a contradiction.

" tinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction.

dis-

Whatever

" we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non" existent. *There is no being, therefore, whose non" existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there " is no being, whose existence is demonstrable."

Hume has emphatically added I propose § 17. " this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest ££

" the whole controversy upon t

The reader may

it."

££

Dialogues," Part IX.

consult, here, the note (t) to § 33 of Part VI.

RELEVANCY OF

These words of

§ 18.

gument in the

citation

burgh Review.

A PRIORI

Mr Hume

ARGUMENT. contain

[Part

that

all

ar-

made by Antitheos from the Edin-

All the rest of the citation

mere

illus-

tration or repetition.

Our author thus comments on the passage he

§ 19.

has quoted

To add any thing

to the foregoing reason-

" ing of the reviewer were perhaps superfluous. Tt " and satisfactory." § 20.

clear

(Par. 13.)

Clear and satisfactory the reasoning referred to

what the first users of such view. But whether it be so

believe to be, with regard to ratiocination had in their clear

and satisfactory in every case, we shall presently see. For reasons already hinted, I shall address myself

§ 21.

to the ratiocination as contained in

Mr Hume's

words

rather than in those of the Reviewer. § 22. It

may be remarked,

that since

Mr Hume

rests

the whole controversy upon that argument, our atheist

may be

thoroughly assured, that

if it

turn out to be the

very reverse of clear and satisfactory, his cause

bad one. faith and

trust in the

§ 23. "

a mighty

to this stage of the business, our atheist's

There

is,"

argument are boundless. says Mr Hume, " an evident

ab-

" surdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact,

" or to prove

Hume

surdity for

by any arguments a priori." Because

many granted, who

has said

so.

take the existence of the ab-

perhaps have never seriously

weighed the evidence of its reality. The Sceptic's argument against any a priori argument for any matter of And, for the reafact, is happily very easily answered. son already brought out,t t

if it

can but be shewn, that

Neither in the Dialogues on Natural Religion, nor in any other is there offered any other argument against

quarter of his writings,

the possibility of a valid a priori

The same argument

argument for the being of

iii.

A Deity.—

substantially, a little differently set out, occurs

again in the " Inquiry concerning part

Human Understanding."

Sect.

XII.

— RELEVANCY OF

§§ 18-28.]

weak and

good sense there

at least

one matter of

Nothing

ARGUMENT.

we have

most* unsatisfactory,

for the

§ 24.

A PRIORI

his authority

in pretending to demonstrate

fact.

opens his argument in the following manner.

demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a

u contradiction.

Nothing, that

distinctly conceivable,

" implies a contradiction."

Both these propositions are granted to the fullest extent. But that which follows, " Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive 61 as non-existent" is most completely to be denied. He

—

appeals to the constitution of the ::

ever

conceive as existent,

" non-existent."

Now, what

human mind

What-

can also conceive as

this constitution

is,

in re-

ference to the point at issue, let us call in a few witnesses to depose.

§ 25. " I demand of any one to remove any part of pure " space from another, with which it is continued, even 64 n so much as in thought" I would fain meet

with that thinking man, that can, in ;<

his thoughts, set

any bounds to space, more than he can to duration or, by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either."

Locke's Essay, B. II. ch. xiii. § 13. 21. § 26. " As the order of the parts of time " so also

immutable,

To remove

the order of the parts of space.

these from their places, is to remove them from them" selves." Newton *s Principia : Schol. ad Befin. 8. § 27. " He that can suppose eternity and immensity

" *

removed out of the universe

may,

;

" please, as easily remove the relation of equality be" tween twice two and four." Dr SI. Clarke' # " Demon<£

stration,"

u § 28. " il

under Prop.

III.

find within ourselves the idea of infinity,

immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagina-

tion, to be

removed out of

being.

seem B

to discern

RELEVANCY OF

" intuitively, that there " what, external to

" the archetype of

§ 29.

A PRIORI

must and cannot but

Butler's Analogy, Part

it.

we cannot

created, since creatable,

created being.

annihilated or annihilable"

• 4

all

which

Part I

some-

ch. vi.

cannot conceive space possible to be*

§ 30.

ourselves, answering this idea, or

Essays, Essay

ARGUMENT.

may

conceive

as non-existent and

be conceived concerning every

Nor can we conceive

properly as

it 1

Watts' Philosophical

Sect. iv.

find that

we can with

other beings should not be.

ease conceive

how

can remove them

out of our minds, and place some other in the room of

them; but space

remove and

conceive of its not being.

believe, to every

we can never

the very thing that

man, that space

It is self-evident,

necessary"

JRev.

Jonathan Edwards' Notes.

§ 31. " 44

annihilated

and

but the space that contains

suppose that annihilated, seems

Beid's Essays, Essay £t

II.

remains

;

be absurd.^

chap. xix.

where the notions of magnihave once figure been acquired, the mind is tude and § 32.

see no absurdity in supposing a body to be

;

It is certain that

immediately led to consider them as attributes of space

no less than of body and (abstracting them entirely from the other sensible qualities perceived in conjunc44 tion with them) becomes impressed with an irresistible 4; conviction that their existence is necessary and eternal, " and that it would remain unchanged if all the bodies Bugald Stewart's in the universe were annihilated." 44

;

Elements, Vol. § 33.

II.

chap.

ii.

Now, here we have,

just by

way

of specimen,

eight individuals of the utmost veracity and intelligence, asserting in express terms, or in terms from which the

inference

necessary, that they cannot conceive the non-

§§ 29-37.

RELEVANCY OF

}

existence of space.

only one more. § 34. " The "

first

A PRIORI

ARGUMENT.

those authorities,

proposition,

—

shall

add

Infinity of extension is

NECESSARILY existing, it would be absurd in the ex" treme to deny. No more can we imagine any limit •' prescribable to extension, than we can imagine the out" side of a house to be in the inside of it." Antitheos. u Refutation," Chap. VI. par. 3. 9

§ 35. "

What, now,

the utmost value we can set upon

the argument a priori for the being and attributes of

God

M 4i

Does

possess any value whatever

If it does,

has yet to be shown, for in the hands of the great

Rector of St James's,

it only proves that something must have existed from all eternity and in those of a " learned and eminent logician of our northern metropolis, " nothing more than the necessary existence of infinite *'

;

" space and duration

none of which propositions were'' Antitheos. 6< Refutation,"

" ever disputed.'"

[or was]

Chap. XIII. par. 1. § 36. " To add any thing to the foregoing" authorities " were perhaps superfluous."

Mr Hume,

factory."

They

therefore,

are " clear and satis-

entirely

wrong

Whatever we

conceive as existent,

" ceive as non-existent."

cannot conceive space as

— whatever, with the exception —

we conceive to exist, we can also conceive not The conclusion from his argument, " Conse-

of space, to exist.

M quently there

no being whose existence

" strable,"

—must therefore be limited

no farther

;)

consequently there

supposes, whose existence

Now,

denion-

to this extent, (if

no being, except space,

space be not a being, the being which

§ 37.

His proposition, therefore, must undergo

non-existent.

this modification at least.

or, if

when he says we can also con-

appealing to our mental constitution,

necessarily

demonstrable.

as that exhibition of the a priori argu-

— RELEVANCY OF

ment

for the being of

A PRIORI

Deity which we

to defend, t lays hold on space as

work

;

//"infinite

ARGUMENT.

its

space be a property, or

we cannot ascend from

substance invested with is

a thing demonstrable,

it,

are concerned

foundation, or ground-

mode of existence, Supreme Mind,

as theologians express themselves, of a

then, unless

[Part

the property to the

the being of a

Supreme Mind OUR ATHEIST

a necessary truth,

HIMSELF BEING JUDGE. § 38. What has become now of Mr Hume's argument against any a priori argument for any matter of fact ? It has turned out to be indeed the farthest thing possible

from being clear and satisfactory. And no wonder, when such a one as our atheist appeared as an evidence AGAINST IT. § 39. So much has this gentleman turned the tables upon himself by venturing to appropriate the reasoning which to him seemed so irrefragable, and upon which he shewed no disinclination to peril his cause. What will he do now ? It is easy to see what he should do. <c reasoning of the reviewer" ap§ 40. Although the peared to our author to be " clear and satisfactory," yet he follows it up by a remark of his own, which we shall " Men have often been made to suffer severely notice. ;< on some occasions to the loss of life for denying the " being of a God. * * * But was ever any one put to

—

" death, or sent to the pillory, for denying that twice two " make four ? The idea, indeed, is ridiculous but where;

" fore should

be so

there should be any

ter."

(Par. 13.)

twice two

make

Simply because

it is

not possible

difference of opinion about the

Surely

four

;

though

ceive the denial to be correct.

is it

not possible to con-

And 'tis

not to be taken for

And on this subject I would, humility, refer to " Division II." of the " Introduction" to the

t It is the only proper exhibition.

with "

all

mat-

possible to deny, that

Argument,"

especially, to the

3d section of that Division.

RELEVANCY OF

§§ 38-42.]

ARGUMENT.

A PRIORI

granted, without 2Jroofi that no one ever denied that twice two is four Things as absurd have been said.+ :

There may be assigned another reason why the civil magistrate in no country ever put any one to death for telling a certain lie, and denying that two and two are four which reason is this, a lie of that kind could injure no one's morals it could only shew the already wretched § 41.

—

;

morals of him

uttered

could go no

tical truth

foundations of

supposed

who

civil society,

tend

denial of that arithme-

undermine and loosen the as some other denials have been

do.%

not four, can never

it.

way

fine, to

inflict

say that twice two

wound

either on public or

private morality.

must be granted

§ 42. It

to Antitheos, that

possible to conceive the denial of the proposition,

twice two

we must

make

four, to

not that

be correct. But at the same time

take care to remember

this,

that there are truths,

as well as that arithmetical one, which, to use Antitheos'' s

language, " it is not possible there should be any difference " of opinion about." To instance in the case of the truth,

There "

" " "

" "

" 44

space

infinite

;

that there

necessarily such,

and most natural conclusions, that any man, who thinks at all, can frame in his mind And no man can any more doubt of this, than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to four. 'Tis possible indeed a man may in some sense be ignorant of this first and plain truth, by being utterly stupid, and not thinking at all (For though it is absolutely impossible

one of the

first

for t

him

to imagine the contrary, yet he

Vide Part.

§ 18. not.

" and society, the Atheists and

dcsj/isers

Legation of Moses, B.

first

bonds of association,

of God andrcliyion."

II. sect. iv.

the subject before us, consult the whole of

stupendous work.

possibly

%—quoq; Part. XII. Not. CC.

—Those whoso principles dissolve the

Uurton's Divine

may

Books

With I.

— War-

reference to

II. III.

of that

— RELEVANCY OF

" neglect to conceive this ;

think that twice two

ARGUMENT.

[Part I.

Tho no man can

possibly

A PRIORI 1

not four, yet he

" be stupid, and never have thought at 46

so or not.)'

all

may

possibly

whether

"f*

But what of was insinuating, not that the propositions concerning two and two making four, and concerning the existence of space, were not on a footing as to real undeniableness, but that the former of the propositions, and the one affirming the being of a God, are not on such a § 43. I grant all this, Antitheos will say.

that

footing.

§ 44.

The following

the reply which

to be

what Antitheos has been* supposed to advance it

may

—

made to Though

require some thought and painstaking to rise

from the is,

truth, that space is necessary, to the

Being who

so to speak, the substratijpi, or, as logicians would say,

the subject of inhesion, of space, and or attributes of that Being

still

;

the other properties

we can

so ascend,

legitimate ratiocination, then the proposition affirming

the being of a

God

on the same footing as to true

undeniableness with that maintaining, two and two are Antitheos being to judge,

equal to four,

seen, he has lent his for ever, the pillar

The

hand

to constitute,

which sustains the weight of the

steps in the reasoning

stration long

may be many

thematical affairs ?

The

or self-evident.

;

edifice.

the demon-

But the length of a demonstration

allowed to be a presumption against so here

we have and make firm

for, as

its

there any reason

why

truths of mathematics are not

To demonstrate

validity in it

not

ma-

should be

all intuitive

the greatest

mathema-

These words are from Clarke's " Demonstration," under Prop. are here used only as accommodations. What the Doctor has But I could not in view, is somewhat different from what I am upon. think of words better adapted to express my meaning in this place t

III.

They

than those of

his.

RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT.

§§ 43-47.]

much

tical certainties, requires

thought, labour, and time,

by means of

for the demonstrations can be effected only

perhaps some thousands of intermediate ideas.

Our

§ 45.

atheist,

after

making the observation we

"If, however, have thus noticed, proceeds in this way " the dogmas of theology, or even say the primary one," :

(which is the one that maintains the necessary existence of space,) " were capable of demonstration as mathema" tical doctrines are, there could be no difference in the

" respect due to doubts and denials in either case or " rather, it would be impossible to find doubters and ;

" deniers in the one more than in the other.''

senti-

ment this with which we must entirely agree. mary dogma of theology be not capable of being demon-

If the pri-

strated,

it is

and

truths,

because

we adduced depose

it is

rather of the class of self-evident

so stands in

need of no demonstration

eight witnesses,

and one over and

above, to

to.

§ 46. So

much for

the " irrelevancy of the argument

but the chapter treats of something more

;

considers

" the character" of the argument.

The argument

§ 47. "

in question,"

says Antitheos,

nothing else than an attempt to establish the appli" cation of mathematical reasoning to * * real existis

" ences."-f-

argument

How

This It

the character Antitheos gives of the

employs mathematical reasoning, says he.

sad a misapplication of a word

What can any branch the case

this

way

Arithmetic or Algebra

Nonsense

Mathematical

of the mathematics have to do in ?

You jest

Geometry

How can lines and angles and segments come " How vain and preposterous the attempt,"

indeed, to apply mathematics to the proof of real exist-

ences t

These words have been already adduced.

purpose

now

different.

Vide

siq/ra, § 6.

Our

— RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT.

36 § 48. It

may here be mentioned,

application of the

[Part

that this curious mis-

word " mathematical"

is to be found not only several times in this chapter, but very frequently throughout the " Refutation, t"

§ 49. If Antitheos will point out one line, only one line,

wherein mathematical reasoning real existence, in the whole of

employed

to prove a

Clarke's "

Demonstrafor the Being and

or of " the Argument, a priori, " Attributes of God ;" I shall hold myself as wholly and for

tion,

ever refuted, and reduced to so desperate a condition by

rout,

weapon

as to be incapable of ever again taking

up a

in the cause.

§ 50. I cannot do better than here quote a passage from the Quarterly Review for February, 1836. The article is on Lord Brougham's Preliminary Discourse.

" It

{

quite absurd to apply the phrase

" cally impossible' to a matter of fact."

mathemati-

" Clarke might

" believe, that the existence of Deity is as certain, by " metaphysical evidence, as any proposition in Euclid is by " mathematical evidence

" of the

Maker

;

but to speak of the existence

of the universe as mathematically possible

" or impossible, is of all incongr uities the

and t

ridiculous.'''

Vide infra,

most extravagant

P. 401. J

57—quoq; Part. VIII.

§ 9. et

Part. VI. § 2.—$c.

J All men err at times : And Clarke himself, in a moment of forgetfulness, lost his sense of the fitness, or rather unfitness, (not of things for he never forgot that but) of words, for he speaks of the " Ma-

—

u thematical certainty, which in the main Argument was there easy to " be obtained."

Evidences

near beginning.

great man should have spoken, not of " mathematical certainty," but of a certainty equal in naked demon-

The simple

truth

is, this

strative force to mathematical,

— of a

certainty which, as well as

ma-

thematical certainty, flows from, yet always rests on, what Stewart would designate " an ultimate and essential law of human thought." ( See Philosophical Essays.

But though Clarke gave,

Essay

II. ch.

once, a

ii.

sect. 2.)

wrong character

to his

Demon-

RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT.

g§ 48-55.]

f § 51. The truth

is,

to give the truth in one word, our

atheist has mistaken metaphysical reasoning for mathe-

matical.

One

§ 52.

of reasoning

may be

great distinction between these two species is

Metaphysical reasoning

the following.

some extent, on almost any subject

exerted, to

Mathematical, that

is,

geometrical, reasoning,

appli-

cable to one subject only.

Geometry

§ 53.

the science of abstract magnitude,

or, of partial considerations of

sense,

and

points,

it starts,

lines,

and

superficies,

and

figures,

;

for the

from which

can no where be found in the domain of nature

they exist only as conceptions

—But indeed we

no ideas corresponding to a

line

point without magnitude. § 54.

In one

bare extension.

respects not any thing really existing

really

have

without breadth, and a

Etc. etc.f

—L No reasoning can be mathematical which does

not refer to what

we may call

the subjects of the science,

the angles, the triangles, the squares, the circles, &c.

&c. &c.

And no

reasoning, even though occurring in

a professedly geometrical book, can be mathematical, unless

works by means of some of those subjects.

§ 55. Metaphysical reasoning, not unfrequently,

be met with in mathematical authors. stration, this, in sooth, has

no mathematics in

it.

Many

instances

Begging pardon of

the Archbishop of Dublin for saying so for this accomplished Logician, speaks of " the futility" (better, if he had spoken of the non:

"of the attempt of Clarke * * to demonstrate (in the mathema" tic Aii sense) the existence of a Deity." Logic. B. IV. ch. ii. § 1. existence)

(Sixth Edition.)

Whatehj, who writes so much about " ambiguous terms," may one word more among his number, in the next edition. t This assertion may seem odd, and may shock a mathematician's

set

But it is true. And not much reflection will be required to 6hew that it is so. Of course, there is no need to prove here the truth,

ears.

you will, the falsehood, of the assertion. and Antitheos has nothing to do with that.

or, if

The matter between

RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT.

of this might be given,f were these at

a metaphysician

may

all

[Part.

And

necessary.

occasionally turn mathematician.

But the boundaries of the two sciences remain always No two things can be more distinct than species of reasoning. the two § 56. Thus have we examined what our author has advanced on the " character and irrelevancy of the argument." There are various other topics touched upon in the first chapter, which shall all be considered in their well-defined.

proper places.

one only of these topics shall we say

something at present. § 57. " Here, indeed, the grand secret, in managing " the argument before us lies. It affixes a partial and " out-of-the-way meaning to words, especially those "

" " "

upon which the whole question turns, and so, misconstrues and misapplies general language. Necessity, for instance, which by the way is the key-stone of the structure, is different from what it is found to be any where else, except, perhaps, in some other region of mere

" speculation.

In the premises,

" utmost fineness

its

it is

attenuated to the

mathematical"" (metaphysical)

Take the first Note (the Note on the first Definition) in Playfair's Euclid's Elements. (Eighth Edition.) The reasoning is pitiable And the Grecian Geometer's definition, in spite of the Commentator's assault on it, has as much propriety as ever. t

Ex.

gr.

Wallace's

"Who could have suspected

it 1

But

the reasoning in the

Note in

question might be employed, with some success too, in behalf of the doctrine of unextended

human

spirits,^

— as well as in behalf of other

vagaries, as wild, (but hardly any wilder,)

worse

and accompanied by

still

results.

How

often one falls upon Mathematicians out of their road

And

your genuine mathematicians never go out of their road, but to be busied about what is sure to land in mischief. If the scales and compasses drop down from their hands, and an ill wind should blow any thing past problems and theorems up into the grand misfortune

is,

their heads

us look to the consequences.

;

then

X Vide Part. III. § 39. not. f

let

34. et

seq.—quoq; Part. VIII. Appendic. B.

24. et Part, IX.

RELEVANCY OF

§§ 56-61.]

ARGUMENT.

A PRIORI

" acceptation, although the weight of "

meaning

its

common and real

essential to the validity of the conclusion."

(Par. 11.)

remark here in passing. Our atheist and all the cognate words, are, by his opponent, used always in the same sense in the premises they mean what they mean, and nothing more than they mean, in the conclusion. Let him detect me in an inconsistency in this matter, let him seize me falling fairly asleep between my premiss and my conclusion, and forgetting when I awaken and proceed to the latter, the sense in which I had used my words in the former and I shall grant that the day is his. § 59. It will be a good thing to take the present op§ 58.

single

will find that necessity , r

;

portunity to inform

what

only,

opponent, once for

to be understood

In settling these points,

sary existence.

what, and and by neceswe shall be

all,

necessity,

What

affording the materials for answering the question, is,

in propriety, to

for the

decide will

Deity

question which here to

of the utmost importance, for a reason that

be immediately gathered.

§ 60. 4i

being of is

be understood by an a priori argument

When

Antitlieos says *

of the ne^soliool

" proved, not only that a

God

starts the logician

It is

irrefragably to be

does exist, but that he

exist,

and that too as necessarily

make

four

even be conceived."

" necessity

;

— that

as that

must two and two

his non-existence, in short, cannot

sought for

;

that

"A being

existing

(according to the

" logic) one whose non-existence it is not in the " of man to imagine." (Par. 5 k> 6.) When,

new

pow er r

I say,

Antitheos writes in this manner, he gives the true state of the case, he words

he knew well enough what

ought to be understood by an a priori argument. § 61.

But when, no more than three pages down, he

— RELEVANCY OF A PRIORI ARGUMENT.

[Part

quotes, with the utmost approbation, a writer who, as

(C observed, f states the question in this way The ques" tion as to the being of a God, is purely a question of " fact: HE either exists or he does not exist. J" When, :

Antitheos does this, he seems to have forgotten he what himself had laid down. By forgetting the neI say,

cessity,

priori

he has suddenly

argument

is.

knowledge of what an a

lost his fine, his

own

representations are

quite inconsistent with each other.

§ 62. Since, therefore, our atheist's views of an a priori argument seem so confused and inconsistent, seem " Neither sea, " Nor good dry land,"||

becomes highly necessary to attempt setting him in the to bring congruity and order out of the chaos. The disorder which exists among his ideas affects the very it

way

vitals of the subject in controversy.^

§ 63.

that

What, then,

necessity

In what direction

are to look for necessity

is it

t Supra, § 14. X In the very second paragraph (as we have quoted therefrom supra § 5.) the same sort of representation occurs. Indeed, throughout

the " Refutation," sometimes the one sort of representation, some-

times the other,

way

singular

is to

be met.

singular confusion of ideas

making a present point good

the confusion does no insignificant service to our atheist. services he

must henceforth dispense with

or,

Whatifcrer be the cause,

The

But

its

consequences of the

confusion are not to be allowed. il

Milton.

U It

not a singular thing not to have clear conceptions as to what

a priori argumentation for a real existence a sad delusion upon this subject,

persons

know

not what

is.

not an

Nay,

all),

they

fall to arguing,

production of their

own

fancy.

But

thing that distracts them, and they sightly shape.

What

that

case.

the proper meaning of the thing.

finding absurdities in their conceptions regarding

perhaps, after

to labour

uncommon

let

may

and

under

Many And

(no mighty matter,

to railing, against the

them only banish the ugly be presented with a more

which those persons have poured

wise contempt upon, they perhaps do not yet best know.

their

RELEVANCY OF

§§ 62-68.;

A PRIORI

ARGUMENT,

§ 64. Necessity does not concern things in themselves.

Necessity

no predicate of a thing, any farther than

expresses a certain quality of our conceptions regarding

the existence of the thing.

fine,

necessity lies not in

the objective reality, but in the subjective mind.

§65. To illustrate this doctrine by an example taken from the science of magnitude. That the three interior angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles, is a truth which, if the demonstration has been followed, cannot but be believed, when the subject is thought on. It is therefore pronounced a necessary truth. But the necessity that is in the case is not to be found anywhere but in the mind of the demonstrator. One very good proof of which is, that not the visible representatives of the mathematical lines, and angles, and triangles, but the real mathematical lines, and angles, and triangles themselves, can exist nowhere but in our conceptions. (Ut

—

supra, § 53.) § 66. In the next place,

What are we to understand by a necessarily existing being ? A necessary being, is one whose existence is necessarily believed by us ;

—

being, in a word, whose non-existence

But is

this all that is

indeed

all

of the its

It is

now be

is,

human mind

essential parts,

which

inconceivable.

very obvious what an a priori an argument from the necessity of the an argument drawn from those conceptions

§ 67. It will

is.

conceive.

meant by a necessary being

any thing more

argument, 4hat case,

we cannot

arise in the

of which

cannot be divested.

founds on nothing but those ideas

mind

in the very act of thinking, those

ideas which are the sine qua non of all other ideas.

what I have to say on this by an extract from an article in the Quarterly Review, to which we have been already indebted. (Supra " The arguments which have been adduced by § 50.) § 68. I shall conclude

topic,

RELEVANCY OF

A PRIORI

ARGUMENT.

[Part

" theologians in favour of Deity, have been generally " considered to be of two kinds, viz. arguments a priori, " and arguments a posteriori. In the strictly logical" [or rather, etymological] " sense of these terms, neither " of these " tion.

modes

of reasoning

For to reason a priori

from the cause assume the cause, the existence of which is the very point which is here to be proved. To reason a posteriori, is to argue from the nature of the effect to that of the cause. But this argument, if applied to the question, would assume the world to. be an effect, a point equally necessary to be proved before the argument can be legitimately applied. Though this is the strict and logical" [etymo-

" to the effect

" " 4C

" " "

applicable to the ques-

to argue

this evidently is to

logical] "

meaning of the terms, they are often employed, " the former to denote speculative or abstract reasoning, " the latter, that which is founded on facts or experience."

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;P. 399-400.

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

f " To confine " says Dr SI. Clarke, " the use of the term [a priori], u to argumentations about such things only, as have other things prior " to them in time is only quibbling about the signification of words." ;

Ans. to 7th Letter.

PART THE

II.

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIOF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

BUTES

Having considered the relevancy of a priori arguwhen directed to the most important of all matters of fact, (the most important fact, if it be a fact at all,) we proceed to examine whether Antitheos has been § 1.

mentation,

at all successful, or signally unsuccessful, in his attempt to exhibit any specific fallacy in the "

Argument, a priori and Attributes of God." Unless we mistake the matter very much, it will be discerned, both easily and obviously, that the gentleman in question has failed, failed in the most egregious manner, with regard to what he undertook to accomplish. ,

" for the Being

§ 2.

Gillespie's

argument, * * * *" our atheist

assures us, " is perhaps as well as can be expected of a " work of the sort, and may probably supersede every " thing of the kind that has gone before it." (Ch. V.

par. 1.)

of any kind

no force

the sort, says

bad enough.

willing to hint, the best

If Antitheos

in a priori reasonings for

disposed to see

A God, he

is, if

any thing,

less inclined to set value on the a posteriori method. " The " argument a posteriori" he remarks, " relies on experi-

" ence, and deduces causes 44

cess,

however,

from their

effects.

This pro-

quite illogical. * * It takes for granted

" the existence of an agent capable of producing the " contemplated as the source of the

argument

effects

—which of

" course

ARGUMENT, A is

PRIORI;'

begging the

IRREFRAGABLE. (Ch.

principle.'"

[Part II.

par. 4.)f

There

can be nothing worse in argument, than to take for granted the principal thing to be proved. In fine, " the " approval of the

argument a priori by * * * the most

" erudite and enlightened par. 1.) is

makes

—of the Christian world,"

held (by the best judges) to

lie in

their

it is

the direction, not

of the a posteriori method, but of the other. this is so,

(ch.

evident, that the strength of the cause

to the latter quarter that atheists

most formidable

artillery.

And

since

must point

—Upon the whole, we may

not unnaturally expect that our antagonist will bring

all

powers to bear against Mr Gillespie's exhibition of the argument a priori for the existence of Deity. his

§ 3. It is in his fifth chapter that the author of the " Refutation" begins to consider his present opponent^

Antitheos

work.

is,

in that place, in a sort of

rambling

and he stumbles over a good many matters, in a way that shall draw none of our attention at this time. There is, however, a certain thing propounded in the chapter referred to, which it will be well to take the opportunity

vein,

now

presented to set forth.

§ 4.

Our metaphysical opponents,"

theist, are

always for stealing h>march upon

says our anti"* * * * us.

" If Mr Gillespie had even told us what he meant by " the word being, which he so frequently makes use of, "

we should have been able to say whether it could be " proved necessarily to exist or not." % The truth in this

—

affair is,

that

t See, to the

% li

The same

same

Gillespie\\

effect,

;

II. last par.

sort of thing is iterated in

pie talks of a substance,

" &c.

Chap.

has told what he meant by

it is

another place.

— " Mr

Gilles-

true, a being of infinity of expansion,

but why has he neglected to V y Ch. XII. par. 2.

tell

us of what sort this substance"

[or being] « is

shall occasionally speak of Mr Gillespie in the third person* too frequent recurrence of a certain personal pronoun, and the to avoid J|

—

— "

§§3-4.]

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE.

word Being, and that as soon as ever he made use of it. Vide Part. XI. § 15. not.\ " If a mere abstraction," viz. a mere thought of your mind, or of mine, (vide part. i. " is represented by it, we can have no quarrel with § 8.) " any kind of demonstration about it he pleases. * * *" the

—And no wonder. '•'

Should

an agent of any kind

—

it,

on the contrary, refer

—something possessing power

" something that acts a thing, in short, having a real " existence^ in the same sense as that in which we apply

common

" reality of existence to

objects, there can

The

no objection to his free use of the term.

subsequent reasoning involves the latter construction

- l

(which construction,

' ;

uniformly

adopt.)"

I may

—Par.

mention once for 4.

I shall

seeks to prove, that

II.

necessarily an Intelli-

gent, an All-powerful, and a Free Being. 64

alt,

Who now is the stealer

marches ? Mr Gillespie, in Book the Being treated of in Book I. Antitheos''s words.

author's

This grand argument

give is

laid out

" in two books. In the first, the metaphysico-theologian M endeavours to prove that some being exists which is the :4

sine sists

qua non of every other thing

in existence.

con-

of three parts, or series of propositions, maintain-

ing, first, that

Space

this

being

second, that Dura-

;

tion

these are npt different, but identical.

also a

being of the same kind

;

and

third, that

The second

" book'ascribes to the subject of the fore-mentioned proofs, 44

the Divine attributes of omniscience,% unlimited power,

and freedom of agency."

Mr Gillespie assume,

And

(Ch. VI. par. 1.)

that the Being he treats of

could

a Mind,

possessing power, and freeness, before he had said one perhaps to steer clear of inconvenient circumlocutions in addition to the appearances of an offensive monosyllable. conjoined, presence of

The \

reader

The word

this, I

take

it,

some

The

third reason at times,

separate, or the

may

be detected.

to determine. in the text of the " Refutation" is

an error of the press.

is,

Ommjyri'sence," but

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part II.

How

word by way of proof ?

would this have been conand exactness of arrangement' which Antitheos found to be present in the

sistent with that " precision of purpose 44

work we have him now commenting on

No Mr

par. 1.)

Gillespie

(See Ch. V.

proceeded not to his business

But, quoth our atheist, I shall argue, ay,

so illogically.

and uniformly too, against my opponent, as if he had done a thing so illogical, as if he did 44 refer to * * * some44 thing possessing power something that acts" before he had offered aught towards proving the possession of Is not this stealing a march with power, and of agency. a vengeance \ If Antitheos be entitled to steal such a

—

march, then one entertaining the whimsical wish to find flaws in Euclid's demonstrations,

may

accuse the Elements

for not assuming the third book in the second, or the last

in the first

;

one desirous of catching Aristotle at a disad-

may

vantage,

censure the Analytics because they do not

take for granted the doctrine concerning valid syllogisms

An-

ere that of single propositions has been gone over. titheos

a 44

had

truly good reasons for calling his production

refutation, if his

opponent " makes intelligence, and

power, and freedom of agency, part of his argument,"

(ch. v. par. 4.) before

producing any reasons for what he

does.

§ 5.

The

overturn

secret

this

Gillespie's

Our

atheist

quite unable to

Argument," and

therefore, as

he must needs overturn it, he turns it over, and places the But as often as we tail of it where the head should be. find Antitheos busying himself at this play, we shall run to the rescue,

and

lose

no time

in setting things in their

natural positions. § 6.

The paragraph in Chapter V. from which we have

been quoting concludes as follows, the words being connected with the passage we have cited at large. 44

For

the tenability of his position, however, respecting the

§§ 5-8.]

ARGUMENT,

A PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

" necessary existence of such a being, according to his " own view of necessity, I would refer him to what has " been stated in the

Here he

refers to

chapter of this Refutation."

first

something supposed to be established

in a previous portion of his work.

would point to what the reader lation to that portion in Part I.

And

in our turn,

advanced in re-

will find

§ 7- " It is more easy to censure an argument in ge" neral terms, than to meet all its particular parts on fair

" and open grounds."

So says Antitheos (ch. i. last par.), and we shall not quarrel with what he says. It may be more easy to do one thing than another, while to do, with propriety, either the one thing or the other,

from being

easy.

In Part

very far

we have considered the

neral censure, and our present business

to inquire

ge-

whe-

ther or not our atheist has met, on fair and open grounds, the particular parts of the " alleged demonstration." That the grounds on which he has met these are any thing

but fair, bye.

will,

But we

are confident, be very apparent by

shall have, or

are mistaken, but

and

little

complain of on the score of the grounds not being open enough.

shall take," says our author, " the most § 8. " " laborious, and, at the same time, least advantageous

—

book way-f* of combating Mr Gillespie *8 principles, " by book, and proposition by proposition. This course

the

more necessary, as the argument a priori, un-

" like that derived from

experience, depends

upon a

—

" chain of reasoning, not upon the pointed putting of a " single case, or the tautological repetition of a thousand."

Ch. VI. par.

another place, "

" This labour, I cheerfully

he informs us in

undertake, that there

may

t Why the " least advantageous way" 1 (Would any way have been advantageous X) Has Antitheos his own defeat in view, and is there a willingness on his part to

make us

anticipate

it 1

— .

ARGUMENT, A

" be nothing

left

" ness," &c.

— Ch.

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part II.

to suppose on the score of disingenuous-

I. par. 14. Because the argument a priori depends on, or rather consists of, a chain of reasoning this appears of itself a sufficient reason why it ;

should be examined link by

But Antitheos had

link.

as-

signed another reason for his doing that which leaves

nothing to be supposed on the score of disingenuousness. " Authors," he had remarked, " are peculiarly jealous of " their privileges, and tetchy and froward with regard to 44

any freedom used

in the treatment of their expressions."

—

(it is worth while to notice where the freedom used extends so far as to turn the end round upon the beginning. Vide supra, § 5.

Ch. VI. par.

—

)

Our atheist is now come to the first of Mr Gillespie'' " The first Proposition, Infinity of ex-

§ 9.

Propositions. 44

Especially

tension

declares,

necessarily existing,'

is 44

—

would," Antitheos

be absurd in the extreme to deny," &c. &c.

Vide Part.

I. § 34.

But let us analyze that Proposition, and view It lays attentively what it affirms, or, at least, involves. § 10.

down, there laying sion.

down

And

necessarily infinity of extension.

that,

To which we

virtually lays

down, there

exten-

direct attention for reasons that

may

be forthcoming afterwards. § 11. Thus Antitheos admits, to the fullest extent, the To me, this is a most important truth of Proposition I.

admission.

For

that Proposition

can rationally deny rest,

it ?) I

this

granted (and who

undertake to make out

by necessary consequence.

necessarily true,

one

The

sarily

adduce what

of such vital

said in connection

Argument." Proposition I. Infinity of Extension is necesFor even when the mind endeavours to existing.

with it in the § i3.

shall

the

is so.

§ 12. As, therefore, the first Proposition

importance,

all

other Propositions are

;

§§ 9-17.1

ARGUMENT, A

remove from

" not, after

PRIORI''

IRREFRAGABLE.

the idea of Infinity of Extension,

all its

efforts,

avoid leaving

still

49 it

can-

there, the

" idea of such infinity. Let there be ever so much en" deavour to displace this idea, that is, conceive Infinity " of Extension non-existent every one, by a review, or ;

" reflex examination of his own thoughts, will find, " utterly beyond his power to do so.

it is

§ 14. "*Now, since even when we would remove Infinity " of Extension out of our mind, we prove, it must exist " by necessarily leaving the thought of it behind, or, by " substituting, (so to speak,) Infinity of Extension for In" finity of Extension taken

away

of Extension

;

from

mani-

this, it is

For, " every thing the existence of which we cannot but believe, " which we always suppose, even though we would not, is

fest, Infinity

necessarily existing

necessarily existing.

§ 15. " To deny that Infinity of Extension exists, is, " therefore, an utter contradiction. J ust as much a con-

" tradiction as

" equal to "

this,

but to 2

equal to

is ;

therefore 1 is not

2 not being identical with l.f

Extension

is ever present to the " mind, though we desire to banish it therefore, it can " be removed from the mind. This is just an application " of the greatest of all contradictions, A thing can be,

thus

Infinity of

;

and not

be, at the

same time." full

truth of Proposi-

assent,

however, cannot,"

§ 1G. Antitheos, then, allows the tion

" The same unqualified

he alleges, " be accorded to proposition the second M namely, that Infinity of Extension is necessarily indiu visible. 1 " Ch. VI. par. 3. '

shall immediately proceed to examine whe§ 17. ther he has offered any thing of worth to support this

assertion. t

For a moment, we turn rather

M equal to

therefore

1 is

aside, to say

can no more believe than that 1 is not equal to 1," &c. Note in " Argument."

contradiction which

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part II.

something as to the importance of the second Proposition, as a step in the reasoning. § 18. " It would be of no great consequence" our atheist maintains, " although the second proposition were as ir" refragable as the first. 1 " For it bears so \

Why

" upon nothing at

applicable to any being, whether

all

" real or imaginary."

Ch. VI. par.

the reader note the reason well.

What

Bravely

Let demand,

said.

'Tis natural to

the proof which Antitheos has given of his bold

allegation

When we

attempted to

mention, that he has not even

a single word of proof, we imagine the

offer

The

surprise into which our readers shall be thrown.

second Proposition of no great consequence

we have but

Why

to turn over a few pages of the " Refutation"

to perceive that

it,

subsequently, rose to be of no little " The fourth proeyes.

consequence, even in our atheisfs

" position of this "

finity of

city,

—

Argument'

Extension

—that

the Being of In-

necessarily of unity

founded upon

and

extension"

simpli-

should " being " be " infinity of extension," vide infra, § 23.) 44 indivisible," &c. i. e. is founded upon Proposition II. &c. is

(Ch. VII. par. 1.) consequence ?

If so,

(it

Is Proposition IV., too, of no great

May

not every Proposition in the

alleged demonstration be of no great consequence, in like

manner

And

a convenient mode of setting aside the

whole argument, in an easy way, be at once happily fallen

upon

The truth is, a great part of the reasoning in the Argument" is built upon the second Proposition, in spite of its being now pronounced to be of no great conThe Proposition in question is founded on, to sequence. § 19.

prove, not only that 44

the Being of Infinity of Extension

necessarily of unity

go over

all

that

it is

and simplicity" but that

—But to

founded on to prove, would be to

in-

troduce no small portion of the work referred to ; as the

— "

§§ 18-24.]

reader

ARGUMENT, A

may

PRIORI:'

IRREFRAGABLE.

easily satisfy himself

by turning

over,

and

glancing at the references occurring at the bottoms of the pages.

§ 20.

Thus much

as to the relative importance of Pro-

position II.

Antiiheos saw proper to be but brief with his

objections to

it.

And his having why he has

might be the reason sequence

right to detain *

§ 21.

not great.

And

him

seen that to be proper,

chosen to say,

insignificant

its

con-

matter had no

long.

next for the objections themselves.

them to be poor indeed as weak as they are But the brevity, great though it be, is out of brief. proportion, when compared with the want of strength. shall find

However, by reason of a certain interposed discussion, (with which Part III. shall be entirely occupied,) and because our antitheist has, in a small space, done a great deal to involve matters in confusion, (an easy undertaking,

gone about,) a considerable time must elapse before we get to the end of those objections. It since 'twas rightly

may

be thought incumbent on us to unravel the whole

perplexed clew,

—and

cannot be so simple a business to

get Antitheos^s reader clear of the labyrinth, as Antiiheos to weave

was

for

for him.

That the reader may be able, the more readily judgment upon those objections, we shall present him with what the " Argument''' offers under the The great consequence, too, of the second Proposition. § 22.

to pass just

Proposition, (under Antitheos's leave be

spoken,) affords

a warrant which would not otherwise exist for making the citation. § 23. " Proposition

" cessarily

indivisible.

Infinity of Extension is ne-

II.

That

is, its

parts are necessarily

" indivisible from each other. § 24. " Indivisible in this proposition 11

either really or mentally

means indivisible For there can be no objection

;

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI;'

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part II.

" to a real, which does not apply to a mental divisibility;

" and a mental

we are under the

divisibility,

" supposing, implies an actual

necessity of

divisibility, of Infinity of

" Extension. ยง 25. " The parts, then, of Infinity of Extension are M necessarily indivisible from each other really or men" tally. ยง 26. "

For that which is divisible really, may be and a thing which is actually divided " from another must have superficies of its own, every " way, and be removed or separated from that other thing, " divided really

" be it by'ever so little a distance. If any one should say " that things really divided from each other have not " real superficies of their own. every

" believe him,

we must

first

way

;

to be able to

be able to believe

this, that

" a thing can be, and not be, at the same time And if " any one should say that things which are really divided " from each other, which have real superficies of their " own every way, can possibly be conceived without a :

" certain distance, however " as this,

little,

being between them

could as soon be believed that in a good

" syllogism of the

first figure, the conclusion does not ne" cessarily follow from the premises. Being really divided, " and being really separated, mean, thus, the same thing, t

27. "

Now,

divisibility

meaning

possibility of separa-

tion : As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of " Extension can be separated ; that is, a part of Infinity " of Extension separated, by a certain distance from In61

A division by mathematical lines,

(which are lines of length with-

" out breadth,) of the real existence of Infinity of Extension, does not

" infer a greater absurdity than a division of a mathematical line by " something really existing if the division by mathematical lines :

" mean any thing more than a partial apprehension or consideration of " Infinity of Extension which is allowed to be possible, just as it is " possible to consider length without breadth, or depth witJwut breadth :

" or length."

Note

in "

Argument."

"ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE.

g| 25-30.]

" finity of Extension i:

" a

;

there

remaining Infinity of Extension

away ; the part of Infinity of Extension so removed, being removed from the remainthe part, thus, being ing parts to these very same parts at rest while it is taken away ; the part so moved away, being moved away from itself ; it still remaining, inasafter part of

it is

taken

;

" " "

much

£:

that

Which

an utter contradiction to say Infinity of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contra-

is :

as there is

necessarily Infinity of Extension ;f

though moved away, being not moved away

could not be, unless it is,

it is

is,

not indivisible."

§ 28. It will not be amiss to

a name than which there ;

that whatever

thus,

diction to say

sicians

false,

adduce the authority of

none greater among metaphy-

as to the propriety of the doctrines insisted on

(we speak not of the truth demonstrated) in the passage

which has just been quoted from the " Argument." k£ The parts of pure space are inseparable one § 29. " from the other so that the continuity cannot be sepa;

rated, neither really nor mentally.

and separate

" parts one

actually,

is,

as I think,

divide

by removing the

make two superficies, where and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity and consider them as removed one from from another,

" before there icas a continuity "

;

" the other "

;

which can only be done

" separation of acquiring Ci

in things considered

by the mind as capable of being separated

new

;

they then have not, but are capable of

but neither of

" these ways of separation, whether real or mental, u think, compatible to pure space.

§ 30. " It

" a space as t u

true, a

Prop. I."

and by which

distinct superficies,

man may

consider so

much

is,

of such

answerable or commensurable to a Note

in u

Argument."

Vide siq>ra § 14.

as I

foot.

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

PRIORI,"

[Part II.

" without considering the 44

rest, which is, indeed, a partial much as mental separation or division : since a man can no more mentally divide without considering two superficies, separate one from the

consideration, but not so

" other, 44

than he can actually divide without making two but a partial superficies disjoined one from the other :

" consideration is not separating. 11 44 Human Understanding." Book

Again

" Essay concerning II.

chap.

§ 13.

xiii.

" Expansion

and duration have this " farther agreement, that though they are both con" sidered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not 44 separable one from another, no not even in thought." § 31.

Ibid. chap. xv. § 10.

§ 32. battery,

Here,'

thus that Antitheos unmasks his

the author has given up his abstract necessity,

" and looks for something like experiment as alone capa44

ble of satisfying 44

notable,) 44

him

for" (the proof we shall see is very

notwithstanding some unmeaning talk, in-

tended to explain away this desertion of

his

own

prin-

—

upon a real division an 44 actual separation of parts, with some distance, however 44 little between them, as that which he means by divisi11 44 Ch. VI. par. 4. Unmeaning talk : That's combility. Unmeaning talk, to explain away the deserplimentary. The comtion of my own principles : Better and better pliment, like a rolling snow-ball, grows as it advances. 4<

ciples,

he evidently

insists

Why is Mr

Gillespie to

unmeaning

talk

intent of explaining

But what

be brought in guilty of uttering

Because he cherished the felonious

away a

desertion of his

own

the evidence of the felonious intent

principles. ?

Because

he gives up abstract necessity, and looks for experiment.

How

is it

proved that he does so

marvellous.

Mark it

closely.

—an

a real division

as that which he

The answer

He evidently insists upon

actual separation of parts,"

means by

truly

divisibility.

&c.

Where,

§§ 31-33.]

the

name

ARGUMENT,

A PRIORI."

IRREFRAGABLE.

of wonder, does he perpetrate such an offence

evidently

upon

meaning real In what words does the division actual separation ! author of the " Argument attempt to set forth so remarkable a paradox ? Present them to us, and we shall leave him to enjoy his paradox, undisturbed by any suggestions of common sense. Mr Hume was thought to have uttered a bold enough paradox, when he laid down, as a maxim, (that was the best of it,) " that an object may 44 (" Treatise of Human Naexist and yet be no where" Part IV. sect, v.) ture." But this paradox of the metaphysical theist, that bare divisibility means an actual separation of parts, with some distance between the parts, is, every inch of it, as original and striking as that of the Insists,

—

insists,

divisibility

writer of the " Treatise of

Human

Nature.

If Antitheos

had said, Mr Gillespie insists on a real divisibility as that which he means by a real divisibility, or on a real division as that which he means by a real division, (and it may be mentioned, that Mr Gillespie knows of no divisibility but a real, that is, a true, divisibility, and of no division but a real, or true, division :) Antitheos had not spoken so far amiss. § 33.

Gillespie

never did

insist,

sary might have

know •the

it.

former

known that

the reader

insists on,

well,

had

either evi-

And

dently or secretly, on any such paradox. it

his adver-

pleased him to

this time fully

aware

and that evidently enough,

;

what

is this

" That which is divisible really, may be divided really f And this: " A thing which is actually divided from another " must * * * * be removed or separated from that 44

other thing, be

supra § 26.

little

Gillespie, in

a distance."

a word,

Vide

divisibility is

and not division and to be actually divided, something more than a mere capacity of being divided.

divisibility is

by ever so

With Mr

Antitheos" s cranium,

;

we need have no doubt,

divisible

— "ARGUMENT,

*56

into two.

rated

A PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part II.

Is it therefore really divided, actually separ

If so,

—

we may continue the " Examination," but

there will be no Antitheos to read what shall be written.

But notwithstanding the

divisibility of his encephalon,

have hopes of obtaining him for a critic. § 34. Our author's next words are the following

" If

Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge ;" the charge,

to-wit, of evidently insisting

which he means by

upon a

real division as that

divisibility, and, as

a consequence, of

giving up abstract necessity, and looking for something

experiment to

satisfy him.

major, or the suppressed proposition,

this reasoning, the

—To

insist evidently

upon a real division being meant by divisibility, is to give The minor, Mr Gillespie up abstract necessity, &c. evidently insists upon a real division being meant by divisibility The conclusion, Ergo, he gives up abstract necessity, &c. Are all Antitheos' s own. Nobody but :

—

our atheist can claim them.

Gillespie gives

and

shall

is it

not up his favourite necessity.

Did our

what he read

? ?

atheist not understand

For that

'Tis difficult to say. necessity,

who

Yea,

be granted.

that he only pretends not to have comprehended

§ 35.

Grant, argues Antitheos, that

must be

as manifest as

the " Argument."

opponent gives not up

any thing can

be, to

him

words which have been quoted from

at all weighs the

These words contain the following

—Divisibility

reasoning.'

bility of division.

his

another expression for capa-

That which

actually divided from

another, must be removed, or separated, from that other

thing

To be

really divided being the

be really separated.

Now,

same thing as to

therefore, since

it is

proved,

that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily inseparable,

it is

indivisible

proved, that those parts are necessarily

That

is,

that the Infinity of Extension has

parts in the sense of capability of being divided.

§ 36.

ARGUMENT, A

§§ 34-40.]

PRIORI,"

The proof that the parts

IRREFRAGABLE.

of Infinity of Extension

are necessarily inseparable, the reader has had above, in

the twenty-seventh section.

way here,

§ 37- And, by the

Antitheos has not ventured

to breathe a syllable tending to call that proof in question.

the contrary, (and

worthy of remark

in this

he avows his belief in the entire validity of the " In the discussion of his second proposition, the proof. place,)

" author, 1

says our antitheist, " makes manifest the ab" surdity of supposing space really divisible." Ch. VII. '

par. 4.

§ 38. I must own, in passing, that I cannot, by any

means, reconcile the passage which has just been quoted,

wherein

admitted, that it is absurd to suppose space with what the author of the " Refutation*" has

it is

divisible,

advanced elsewhere, namely, that

it is

not to be accorded,

infinity of extension, or space, is necessarily indivisible.

Let him who can, reconcile the two must confess, that, to me, they look exan arrant contradiction.

Vide supra § 16. statements.

ceedingly like

Our author,

§ 39.

what goes to prove,

I repeat,

has not called in question

infinity of extension

rated.

sibility,

or the possibility of division,

infinity of extension

would not be "

sibility

" of

cannot be sepa-

the very nature of infinity of extension, divi-

were

infinity of extension.

excluded.

divisible, really

or mentally,

If it

" Indeed, that dki-

implies finiteness in extension, in the very notion

be evident to every one who considers the " relations of his clear ideas." " Argument, a priori'' &c.

it,

will

Prop.

§ 40.

ration

II. § 7.

return.

% Divisibility implies capacity of sepa-

Therefore, infinity of extension

indivisible.

This

the

reasoning

is,

of necessity,

which,

Antitheos

alleges,

renounces abstract necessity, and appeals to ex-

perience

—to prove

fancy) the necessary indivisibility

ARGUMENT,

A PBIOBI,"

of infinity of extension.

IRREFRAGABLE.

Verily

[Part II.

this be so, "'twould be

hard to say what keeping by abstract necessity, and looking in another direction than to experiment, could be,

when one would

prove, that " Infinity of Extension

" cessarily indivisible," or that 44

its

ne-

parts are necessarily

from each other." Locke argued as follows " To divide and § 41. * " separate actually, is, * by removing the parts " one from another, to make two superficies, where before 44 there was a continuity and to divide mentally, is to indivisible

When

make

mind two superficies, where before there " was a continuity and consider them as removed one « from the other." * * * Therefore " The parts in the

;

of pure space are inseparable one from the other

;

" that the continuity cannot be separated, neither really nor " mentally." Vide supra, When, I say, the 29.) §

(

author of the

Essay concerning

Human Understanding,"

argued in that manner, did the idea ever enter his mind, (and we all know, how preciously fond he was of every sort of idea,) that he 44

was looking

for

something

experiment as alone capable of satisfying him" as to

the necessary inseparableness of the parts of pure space

When

§ 42.

our atheist said "

makes manifest

44 :

The author"

(of the

Argument")

space

the parts separated without having any space between

them."

shall be

That

is,

really divisible,

the absurdity of supposing

since that would be to suppose

(The force of the reason Ch. VII. par. 4. Vide Part. IV. § 15.) examined afterwards. when our atheist employed this enthymeme to :

suppose spac<|jpally parated, &c.

divisible, is to

suppose

its

parts se-

therefore, to suppose space really divisible

;

The suppressed premiss of which expression of reasoning, being, To suppose the parts of space separated, Did it really enter his brain, to fancy he &c. is absurd is

absurd

was looking

—

for

something

experiment as alone

§§ 41-45.]

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

" capable of satisfying him," that space

really divisible

§ 43.

If,

made

the appeal

proving, that infinity of extension

directed,

absurd to suppose

in Proposition II., there is

to experience,

Nonsense

'tis

this it is

would

any appeal made

for the purpose of

necessarily indivisible

any appeal be the sake of getting an explanation If to experience

be.

only for

And

of divisibility\ divided, division.

what other quaran explana-

ter than experience, or use, one could go for

what

tion of

would be

understood by certain English words,

difficult to say.

would be impossible to

say,

with any sense.

§ 44.

have considered the antecedent of the hypo-

thetical proposition

u to this charge. 11 11

(If

" If

Gillespie pleads not guilty

We now pass

on to the consequent

Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge,) I

" would ask him how mathematicians have always re" garded the smallest particle of matter divisible to in.

" finity ?" Ch. VI. par. to

him

itself

Here he asks me to account be a fact. But the fact

for a thing alleged to

deserves to be looked into.

rarely condescend to treat of matter.

Mathematicians very It is not the

pure

Mathematician, but the Natural Philosopher, who considers the question, Is matter divisible infinitely

The

question which the mathematician undertakes to decide

Are the parts of bare extension infinitely divisible ? The two questions are commonly confounded. Very unfortunately. For thence no small portion of the confusion is this,

into

which the subject has been thrown.

differ in

§ 45.

most material

The

questions

respects.

great majority of natural philosophers have

determined that matter

divisible infinitely.

And

all

mathematicians are of opinion, that bare extension must be divisible infinitely.

take upon us, to make mani-

fest, in opposition to both, that matter

is not,

and that

â&#x20AC;&#x201D; 60

ARGUMENT,

A PRIORI,"

mere extension cannot

be,

IRREFRAGABLE.

infinitely

divisible

[Part II.

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;A

bold

undertaking, considering the overwhelming majority in the one case, and the entire unanimity in the other.

run counter to a thing which has, again and again, been demonstrated, and is received almost as an axiom, by mathematicians, needs some courage.

boast that

they shall be utterly overthrown by our opposition, seems to be the height of towering temerity.

But patience

the task will be easy and successful in proportion to the

apparent

difficulty of

the enterprise.

PART

III.

THE NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF EXTENSION AND OF MATTER.

The

§ 1.

propositions, then,

to establish are these

which we have undertaken

— That matter

not divisible to in-

And, That extension cannot be divisible to infinity. In the one case we have to do with the men of experiments. In relation to the other, we have to engage with finity

who

those

extension. in

confine themselves to the properties of bare

take the second proposition

shall

first

hand.

—

No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to " tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever § 2.

" shocked

common

sense

more than the doctrine of the

finite divisibility of extension,

with

in-

consequences

its

;

" as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians * " * *, with a kind of triumph and exultation.

quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, con-

" taining quantities infinitely less than

" in infinitum

;

this

and so on and prodigious^

itself,

edifice so bold

" that

it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration " to support, because it shocks the clearest and most natural

principles of human man Understanding. Hume, and who can lt

reason."

Inquiry concerning

Hu-

So says Mr refuse his assent to every word " But," continues he, and at this point the sceptic and we diverge into different routes, " what renders the matter E Sect.

XII. part

ii.

NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY.

62 " more

extraordinary

is,

[Part III,

that these seemingly absurd

" opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning the " clearest and most natural ; nor is it possible for us to " allow the premises without admitting the consequences."

What absurd opinions supported by the clearest and most natural reasoning the clearest and most natural premises leading to the most absurd conclusion Well when contemplating sceptic matter extramight the a so Ibid.

ordinary (the epithet how appropriate !) as that which here filled his view, proceed to infer " Reason here seems " to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspense, :

" which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her

" a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she " treads. " places

;

She sees a

full light,

which illuminates certain

but that light borders upon the most profound

And between

" darkness.

these she

and

so dazzled

" confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with cer-

" tainty and assurance concerning any one object. 1 ' Ibid. ยง 3. It admirably suited the sceptic to speak thus involve,

and

darkness.

;

to lose, the whole subject in the most profound

" His aim," as says a

much admired

writer,

" was," at all times was, " not to interrogate Nature, with " a view to the discovery of truth, but " tion of

by a cross-examina-

Nature, to involve her in such contradictions, as

" might set aside the whole of her evidence as t4

nothing."

Essay

II.

good

for

Philosophical Essays by Dugald Stewart.

chap.

And

therefore,

was quite

in accord-

ance with Hume's object, to make one part of our nature by way of illustrating the con-

jar with the other, and,

tradictiousness of the decisions to which our faculties

come, to make a proposition shocking and prodigious, by necessary consequence, from propositions most

follow,

clear

and natural.

This,

say,

was

in perfect

harmony

with Hume's grand purpose, and excites no surprise to find those

who

profess no scepticism, staid

but

and sober

NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY.

|ยฃ 3-7.]

mathematicians, rule-and-compasses-men, to find them

backing the strongest

effort of

the sceptic, assisting him

to lay the foundation for universal doubt

And

the matter for marvel.

it is

;

this, this is

matter for great mar-

vel.

ยง 4.

But what can we do

nion be, that extension

contends,

it is

However absurd the

is infinitely divisible, still

supported by a clear and natural chain of

make

reasoning, and the Mathematicians

ance to assure

opi-

Mr Hume

that

us,

it is

their appear-

even as he maintains.

fortunate for us, that they bring their demonstrations

For this circumstance puts it in our whether or not common sense and our powers

along with them.

power to

see

of reasoning are here to be set by the ears, as the Sceptic

would have

it,

and as

his supporters the

Mathematicians

seek not to hinder him from having. ยง

Now

sundry demonstrations have been offered by

geometricians in proof of the divisibility of extension to

infinity.

shall select the

demonstration propounded

This demonstration requires no

by the celebrated Enter.

previous mathematical knowledge.

And

it is

easy to see, that

tion of the problem,

how

if it

It is simple

and

plain.

be not a good demonstra-

to divide extension infinitely,

there cannot be a good demonstration any where else.

fine, 'tis

the best that could be had for our purpose. 1

ยง

" into

" In geometry," said that eminent mathematician,

always possible to divide a

two equal

parts.

line,

however small,

We arc likewise, by that science,

" instructed in the

method of dividing a small line, as a e,t any number of equal parts at pleasure, and the con" struction of this division is there demonstrated beyond

into

of doubting its accuracy. have only to draw a line

the possibility

ยง 7. "

You

I parallel

to a

" of any length, and at any distance you please, and " to divide it into as many equal parts AB, BC, CD, t See diagram, next page.

;

NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY.

DE,

&c. as the small line given

Draw

say eight.

and

straight lines I * 0,

to have divisions,

afterwards, through the extremities

the

[Part III.

a O,

they meet

till

and draw toward

in the point

from

the points of division

B, C, D, E, &c, the straight

OC, OD, which

OB?

lines

OE,

fee.,

shall likewise

cut the small line a

into eight equal parts. ยง 8. " This operation

may be

performed, however small

the given line a % and however great the number of parts into which you propose to divide it. True it is,

we are not permitted to go too far we draw always have some breadth*

that in execution

the lines which

whereby they are at length confounded, as may be seen

in the figure near the point

what may be possible possible in

itself.

;

but the question

for us to execute,

Now

geometry

not

but what

lines

have no

breadth, and consequently can never be confounded.

Hence

follows that such division

ยง 9. " If into a it

will

it is

is illimitable.

once admitted that a line

may be

divisible into

same reason

two thousand parts, and for the and into eight thousand,

into four thousand,

without ever arriving at parts indivisible. small a line halves,

divided

thousand parts, by dividing each part into two

may be

supposed,

and each half again

into two,

again in like manner, and so on to ยง 10. "

What

have said of a

still

However

divisible into

and each of these

infinity.

line is easily applicable

to a surface, and, with greater strength of reasoning, to

a solid endowed with three dimensions, length, breadth,

NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY.

§§ 8-12.]

and thickness.

Hence it and

divisible to infinity,

" divisibility in infinitum."

Dr H.

affirmed that

Letters to a

German

Vol. II. Letter

Hunter's translation.

extension

all

denominated

this property is

Princess.

viii.

§11. So we have had a demonstration of the

But whatever Eider may

diagram, according to wont.

have imagined, there

infinite

a demonstration referring to a

divisibility of extension,

a possibility of doubting the ac-

curacy, not of the construction of the figure indeed, but of

the statement of connection between the construction

and

the thing to be shewn thereby.

" You have only," says the demonstrator, " to

§ 12.

" draw a line

parallel to

M and at any distance u vide

into as

1 ''

many

(from at)

equal parts

as the small line given ,

at" (A

you

line,

" of any length, please,

and

Di-

AB, B C, CD, DE,&c,

to have divisions, say eight.

divide a line into eight parts, is to

one

make

eight lines

each of the eight being removed or separated from

Vide Part. by ever so small a distance. II. § 2G. et 29. Without removal or separation of parts, there can be no division of one line into eight lines there can be nothing but the partial consideration of so much of

the rest, be

of the rest, eight times. Uuler, for mathematicians, has said " In geometry lines have

the line to the exclusion all

" no breadth."

How

then can geometrical lines divide

some breadth or interval there is no breadth or distance between things, there is no division of the things. They are one and the same thing That is, we were mistaken when we said, there were more things than any thing

since division implies

between the things divided.

Where

one. at

all.

In short, a

How

" the small line given" has no divisions

then can

have eight

The demonstration

of infinite divisibility, has never touched one instance of division, and, to

speak plainly,

of the proposition with which

it is

no demonstration at connected.

all

NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY.

But mathematicians are

ยง 13.

themselves not with

same

the

still

[Part III.

to be held as busying

but with mental divisions.

real,

sort of objection falls to be

monstration of the infinite

made

But

a de-

divisibility of extension,

when

a mental divisibility only is concerned, as falls to be made to a demonstration of such divisibility, when a real divisibility is

parts,

spoken

of.

divide a line mentally into eight

to conceive eight lines

made

out of one

line,

each

of the eight being considered as separated from the rest.

And

as geometrical lines have no breadth, they cannot

And

be conceived as dividing any thing.

since they can-

not he conceived as dividing any thing, they cannot be 11 conceived as dividing " the small line a i.

So much

ยง 14.

now

for Eider's demonstration.

shall

demonstrate, in our turn, that the extension with

which mathematicians have to do,

and that

finity,

ble at

not divisible to in-

for this plain reason, that

it.

not

Our demonstration must have one

all.

which Eider's has

divisi-

quality

not.

Were

the lines and figures of which the geomesome more some less elastic and compresno dependence. could be placed on his science. Take

ยง 15.

trician treats, sible,

an example

If in

for illustration.

any right-angled

tri-

angle, the side subtending the right angle were compressible,

then a square described on that side might or might

not be equal to squares described

contain the right angle if

For

upon the

sides

which

has not been proved that

the hypotenuse of the triangle be compressible, the base

and perpendicular

are,

length of each, equally

in proportion to the respective so,

that

is, it

has not been proved,

that equal spaces in the base and perpendicular are com-

same degree as equal spaces in the hylines and figures of geometry, then, But all matter is comare no.t elastic or compressible. pressible. The extension, therefore, on which mathemapressible in the

potenuse

are.

The

—— NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY.

§§ 13-17.;

ticians superstruct their science

What

matter has. § 16.

say in another place

and a good thing

The reader has had

;

be then

some degree, what

we'

have to

but there appears to be no help for

will it

bear to be told oftener than once.

shewn, that there

finity of extension, (vide part. it

In answering this question, we shall be under the

necessity of forestalling, in

it,

not such extension as

extension can

ii.

necessarily in-

13, etseq.)

and has had

proved, that the parts of infinity of extension are ne-

cessarily indivisible, (vide part.

ii.

Now the

23, etseq.)

parts of matter, or the material universe, are divisible

each other.

Then, the parts of

ing necessarily indivisible from*each other intuitively evident, that the

tension,

if it

;

substratum of

and

therefore following, that the material universe

sion

infinity of extension,

— (For were

but

—

)

sort, that

Here are two which matter has

necessarily existing,

bu£in the

would, it

and

ii.

27.)

The

And the other, the exAnd as infinity of extenas the material universe ;

a part of

sense of partial consideration, for

otherwise infinity of extension can have no parts part.

be-

not of infinity of

exists in the extension of infinity of extension this {part,

But

sorts of extension.

tension' of infinity of extension.

sion

it is

not the

in exten-

truly of infinity of extension,

ing not that substratum, therefore

extension

is finite

unquestionably, be the substratum thereof :t

one

divisible

and the parts of matter from each other; and it

itself ;

being, on the contrary, divisible

substratum of

being

infinity of ex-

have a substratum, can be no more

than infinity of extension

from

infinity of extension be-

must penetrate the material

every atom, even the minutest atom, of

universe,

vide

and

it.

§ 17. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish beu Upon the hypothesis of substance being infinitely extended, wo f may regard it as 'the substratum of infinity of extension.' " RefuteChap. VHI. par. 3. lion."

NON-INFINITE DIVISIBILITY.

[Part III-

And

tween those two kinds of extension.

accordingly,

confining to matter, namely, to the distance of the extremities of matter from each other, the

name

extension

us apply to the extension of infinity of extension, the

;

let

name

expansion, or space. § 18. In

answer then to the question,

tension on which geometry

What

the extension of space, the extension which

For we know

finity.

then,

we know

ed.

it is

altogether beside the purpose.

Space,

the extension on which Geometry

But the parts

superstruct-

of space are indivisible.

(

Vide

Part

Therefore mathe-

supra § 17- locis collatis.) matical extension is indivisible. II. 27-

is, it

of in-

of no other sort of extension but

that of matter, and that of space ; or at least of any other,

the ex-

superstructed ? the reply

§ 19. Thus have we accomplished what we took in hand, and proved, in opposition to the Mathematicians, that mere extension, or space, cannot he infinitely divisible. There is no " strength of reasoning,' greater or less, in And, in the next place, we have their demonstrations. ,

positively, rigidly, irrefragably,

made manifest

the con-

trary.

§ 20. Should

be argued, that when our mathemati-

cian speaks of divisions, in demonstrating the infinite divisibility of extension,

he does not mean divisions at

all,

but only partial apprehensions or considerations, which are not so

much

as mental divisions

demonstrable that extension

t " To avoid confusion * * name extension were applied

he had said,

liberty

;

were possibly to be wished, that the

;

an<*the term expansion to space in

expanded, and body extended. I propose

capablH of being par-

general, with or without solid matter possessing

" space (<

only.to matter, or the distance of the

" extremities of particular bodies et

But

it,

so as to say,

in this every one has

only for the more clear and distinct

speaking." Locke's Essay, B. II. ch.

xiii. § 27.

way

other question

mole infra, Â§ 7.)

" If

be of any

an-

speci-

we speak," a New-York pippin for instance, " we can, in reality, separate one part from another." "fic body

(Ch. VII. par. 4.)

What good

reason, can be assigned

why

reason, nay

what specious

philosophers should not ever

contemplate parts in any sense but the sense of partial consideration only, even parts in the sense of capability of actual separation, bility,

the

of matter its

infinite, ?

when they are regarding the

or the

finite, divisibility,

divisi-

of any piece

Is the piece of matter not capable of having

parts actually separated from each other

are

the philosophers obliged to choose to confine themselves to partial considerations which are not so t

Vide Appendicem.

much

as mental

— "ARGUMENT,

g§ 1-3.;

divisions

know

A PRIORI?

If this be so,

its

source, that

IRREFRAGABLE.

whence the obligation

we may be put

9,5

Let

into a condition

to see a little farther into so strange a thing. § 2. In

veral ';

giving our author's reply to his question, se-

words were omitted, as the asterisks denoted.

Parts

—

lespie

himself has

" tion only."

the passage runs in this way, " as it

—

GU-

in the sense of partial considera-

When Mr

Gillespie

speaks of parts in the

sense of partial consideration only, he has something in his

view very different from the parts of matter, which

all,

so far as not already divided, are divisible, or

may

conceived as divisible, from each other, which, therefore, are parts in another sense than by partial consideration only is

;

he has in his view the parts of the extension which

of infinity, which parts, both really

and mentally, are

necessarily indivisible, and, so, are parts only in the sense of partial considerations or apprehensions. Of this no one who has perused the " Argument" can be presumed

and therefore our antitheist must be supposed known of it well when he penned the words upon which we are animadverting. What judgment, then, are we to pass on Antitheoss mode of speaking Is it calculated ignorant, to have

to convey a correct representation of matters

In giving

a misrepresentation of the case, can our atheist be reckon-

ed perfectly honest §

After replying to his own question,

A ntitheos puts another interrogatory. the antecedent is, mathematicians, "When

way,

his

own

When they,''

they,''

ask he,

speak of the hemispheres of the earth, divided either by the plane of the equator, or that passing from the me" ridian of Greenwich to the 180th degree of longitude,

" are they necessarily guilty of speaking unintelligibly

By no means, answer

we.

But nevertheless,

mathe-

maticians, geographers rather, speak of hemispheres of

the earth, of hemispheres divided by an imaginary plane

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part IV.

which they denominate the equator, or by a plane passing through the first meridian and the 180th degree of longitude, a plane every square foot of which

any foot

in the plane of the

equator

;

as ideal as

in other words,

if,

geographers employ the term divided in one, and that

perhaps not the best, of as readily,

and quite as

its

second intentions

,*t

they can

rationally, speak of their being

able to conceive the earth as divided into two by a real process, of the earth as being divisible in the sense of ac-

Geographers speak, we grant, and divisions of the earth when they mean no

tual separability of parts. of halves

of so

much

sion of the rest, for the time.

And

more than considerations a

sufficient right to use,

when they

to the exclu-

geographers have

please,

any word

a technical sense, in a sense of their own, if they but This quause the same word always in the same sense. lification is

necessary for a good reason

To be

consist-

ent with regard to the language we employ, as great, so

it is

pletely intelligible. visions,

ing

;

it is

an indispensable step towards being comGeographers, we repeat, talk of

when they do not mean

di-

divisions strictly speak-

but then they can also talk, to good purpose.it

may

be, of divisions in the proper sense of the term.

To render

the distinction between geographical and true and real divisions yet plainer, by a faLet a plane, called, if you choose, a miliar illustration. geographical plane, about six feet long and some two feet § 4.

divisions

deep, and of no breadth, be passed through the middle of a living human body. And indeed if this consideration

—

We would recommend to Antitheos's attention, first and last, (and

our recommendation he may turn, if he likes, to some advantage, for the future,) a caution given by a very eminent Logician. " The utmost care is requisite," in these words the present Archbishop of Dublin

warns us, " to avoid confounding together, either the first and second " intentions, or the different second intentions with each other." See Whately's Elements of Logic.

Book

III. § 10. (Ed. 6th.)

;

§§4-5.]

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

enable one to transmit the plane more easily

will

—ana-

tomists and physiologists are accustomed to treat of the

halves of the

whole

it is

human

frame,

when they

a counterpart to the other.

What

nate the transmission a dividing

we were

W ould he breathe

Would any

less,

to desig-

Would he who was

subjected to the act eat his next meal at for

us that as a

tell

symmetrical, the one-half forming in the main

or walk

less,

all

the worse

or sleep less

;

function be destroyed, or impaired in the

That gives us as an idea of the geographical But were one to turn to division of the right sort, and threaten in good earnest to divide in smallest

mode

of dividing.

a real manner a living man into halves the well-founded and salutary laws of the land would be apt to interfere, and shew how wide they regard the difference to be be;

tween a merely geographical method of dividing any ob long solid, and a mode of dividing, at least somewhat -

was practised by numbers of our heavy-handed dragoons when they were last similar to that which, so far dozen,

in the Netherlands.

Proper

divisions,

in short, are toto coslo different

from geographical ones.

Geographical divisions are in-

§ 5.

But the grand distinction it) between geoconsiderations and our partial consider-

deed partial considerations. (let

us not by any

graphical partial

means

lose sight of

ations of infinite extension, lies in this, that whereas

can

make

the ordinary subjects of the former kind of con-

siderations undergo divisions in our thoughts after ano-

ther sort than that effected by bare partial apprehension it is

quite out of our power to subject the parts of that

is of infinity to any other divisions by the mind than such as we denote by partial apprehensions or

extension which

considerations.

with no propriety, as

quently observed, that we bestow the

upon a mere

partial apprehension.

name

have

fre-

of division

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part IV.

geographers are not guilty of speaking unin-

ยง 6. If telligibly

PRIORI;'

when they

that the equator divides the

say,

globe into the northern and southern hemispheres, &c, " How is it," demands our atheist, " that extension is ne-

" cessarily indivisible

pretended to be able to indivisible.

The

why

never said even so

do not know.

I really tell

extension

much

as that

Argument" says no more than that

never

necessarily it

was

so.

" Infinity of

And really one would think, that any extension, unless it compose part of the extension which is infinite, is divisible to all intents " Extension

and purposes,

necessarily indivisible.'

from being necessarily

so far

indivisible.

1 If the author of the " Refutation ' should incline to urge,

that by " extension

he asked how

that extension

ble,

it is

he meant

infinity is

of extension, when

necessarily indivisi-

then we would refer him, for an answer to his ques-

tion, to

Part

and

II. ยง 27.,

to his

proof there occurring, as the said in the

ยง 15.

own comment on the comment is to be met

37th section of the same Part. Nay, demonstration apart,

et seq.

Ad is it

hose,

infra

not a truth

immediately self-evident, that infinity of extension, or space, is

? Let Antitlieos answer this quesadmits he, " that we may conceive of

necessarily indivisible

" I grant,

tion.

1 '

" an absolute separation,' 1 and therefore separability, " of " substance generally, which we cannot do in the case of " extension." Here by " extension11 Ch. VII. par. 4.

he means

Else, where the infinity of extension, or space. sense of the antithesis between " substance" and " exten-

sion

Not

1 to say that the context binds " extension'

to that meaning.

reply to that question

;

might have allowed Mr Locke to who, whenever he has informed

us what division implies, lays ly perceivable, is

indivisible

with him,

down

as a truth intuitive-

not by deduction necessary, that pure space

even so

much

as in thought.

Pure

space,

the extension distinct from the extension of

§§ 6-8.]

matter,

II. § 29.

ARGUMENT, A PBIORi; IRREFRAGABLE.

the extension which et

of infinity.

Vide Part.

§ 41.

"It may be said, perhaps, § 7. Antitheos proceeds " that although matter is, mentally, easy enough to di:

Doubtless one would think

vide"

it is

But by the

easy enough to

we must not enough to divide much that falls under the description of matter otherwise than only by the

divide matter mentally.

bye,

forget, that 'tis easy

Our

mind. " If

be of any

we noticed before :) body we speak, we can, in reality,

atheist has observed (as specific

" separate" or divide " one part

from another."

this is

going even further than we

Is the

Dog-star a

body V

specific

allowed by Antitheos that ject

It will probably

as no present

ob-

so,

to be attained by a denial,

Now

disposed to .go.

feel

—at

least,

no object

worth the cost of a shamefully obvious falsehood.

at all

Can we separate or divide one part of the Dog-star from f Ah, no. Sirius is too distant, and too big, for us to split it into pieces. To sum up what we have advanced If it be of any specific body we speak, we another, in reality

can

in reality,

tion,

or,

not in reality, at least in imagina-

divide the parts from each other.

or probably, Antitheos,

body upon

specific

any

this earth

specific

If so,

a patent for his discovery, that or by

—

men

— But

possibly,

body," meant any let

him take out

" can, in reality"

manual instrumentality, " separate one part from

another." § 8.

Our author has

pressions.

And

for declaring, that it tally.

often reasons for his forms of ex-

he happens to have an excellent reason is

easy enough to divide matter men-

The reason makes

chapter.

may

its

appearance

gather what

a subsequent

from the following

" That matter is divisible, (on a certain and " special construction of terms,) no one will deny but that " it is absolutely so, is not true/ Ch. VII. Par. 4. What

assertion.

;

— 100

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

PRIORI,"

[Part IV.

that certain and special construction of the term divisible

when we say with

we may same paragraph. " We " can divide substance," Antitheos informs us, " by ab" straction that is, I humbly apprehend, by a partial consideration, which happens to be no true division at But we can do more than divide substance by aball. For again " We may conceive of an absolute straction. " separation," and, a fortiori, separability or divisibility, is,

truth, matter

learn from words occurring

is divisible,

in the

" of substance generally"

(supra § 6.)

richly deserve to be weighed

most

substance

antitlieist,

Words which With our

attentively.

and matter mutually exhaust each by him, into the rank of sub-

other, that not being admitted,

stance which cial

What that certain and spe

not material.

construction

is,

we may learn

also,

may we

not

from

the words which, in our regular progress, we are examining

— " Matter

mentally, easy enough to divide." Accord-

is,

ing to our atheist, then, the reason divide matter mentally

is,

deed altogether impossible power, or

(if

that

—not

why it

easy enough to

is difficult

enough, in-

for us only, but

—

for

any

Antitheos would prefer another word) for any

chance or accident, absolutely to divide matter, at least matter " generally."

And,

in truth, it

must be confessed,

that the position, Matter " generally" mentally,

divisible only

a good consequence from the position, Matter

u generally11

is divisible,

but

all

only one possible,

we would

not divisible absolutely

events, on the supposition, (the

good consequence, at

preserve Antitheos''s cha-

racter for never being without a meaning,) that " absolutely" as contradistinguished from " mentally," means not mentally.

matter generally

divisible at all,

and be

not divisible out of the mind, it is wonderfully probable, Our atheist's reason, in that it is divisible in the mind. fine,

may

good

reason^ if

be admitted, with considerable safety, to be a it

constitute a good

and a true position in

But

itself.

—

ARGUMENT.

§§ 8-9.]

is it

true, that

matter generally,

What

§ 9. division

—

or, as

a whole

stance" or matter " generally as a whole

101

what Antitheos means when he may conceive of an absolute separation of sub-

for this, I conceive,

says, "

IRREFRAGABLE.

A PRIORI;'

far

—

matter

Is it true, that

not divisible absolutely, or out of the if

mind

absolute divisibility (we say not absolute

from

—

)

follows from the admission, for-*

tunately so liberally furnished by our author, of mental

tal process,

If we can divide all that is matter by a menhow can any one make it appear, it is impos-

sible in the

nature of things that

divisibility

vided by a real process

matter should be

all

Can w e, T

di-

in this case, infer the

existence of an impossibility outwardly, from the exist-

ence of a possibility inwardly

from a

an impossibility

in things,

possibility in our conceptions regarding the things

and impossibility too, can we have but that which arises from our conceptions ?t What we conceive to be possible, is possible. Which, indeed, is virtually saying nothing more than this, What Nay, what criterion of

possibility,

we conceive to be possible, proposition, in its turn,

possible to us.

may be transmuted

And

this

into another,

even into this most undeniable, yet important proposition,

Whatever we conceive ceive to be possible.

reality

The thing is ferent ways

We judge

then,

is,

really

a thing to be possible in reality :

of setting forth the affair, in

What

are these but

same position

the conception of real possibility.

sible in reality. +

dif-

The

each of the three expres-

Whatever,

clearly conceive to be possible in reality,

And

do con-

conceive a thing to be possible

possible in reality

grand element in the sions,

to be possible,

therefore, as

pos-

we do (having Anti-

can judge," says Archbishop Kino, " of things no otherwise t " " than from our conceptions." Origin of Evil. Chap. I. Sect. ii. & 2. I Perhaps Hume never wrote a better passage than the following, whether we regard the acutencss or the cogency of the reasoning. TT

102

ARGUMENT,

theos's leave) clearly

IRREFRAGABLE.

A PRIORI,"

conceive matter as a whole to be sus-

ceptible of division absolutely, or in reality,

wrong

matter as a whole

in affirming, that

being divided absolutely, in reality, as in §,

[Part IV.

we cannot be capable of

itself.

So much as to that divisibility which matter is Tho" we never add another syllable, twill

10.

subject to.

not be of great consequence

have by

this

time put

the proper train. But we may have occasion, some time or other, to speak again regarding the real divisibility of all matter a topic upon which our author

affairs into

seventh chapter, as well as in his sixth,) has gone

(in his

wrong

confounding as he does, in grand

altogether,

divisibility

style,

with division (things usually the same with

Antitheos^X) separability with separation, the conception of

a vacuum with the existence of a vacuum externally, and

drawing inferences from these his

own

times, self,

inexpressible comfort

and as frequently,

and

us,

were we not

indifferently,

and

sometimes to

satisfaction,

and some-

at the expense of landing himsufficiently reluctant to let

him

" Whatever can be conceived by a clear and distinct idea, necessarily u implies the possibility of existence and he who pretends to prove ;

the impossibility of

its

existence by any arguments derived from the

" clear idea, in reality asserts that we have no clear idea of it, because " we have a clear idea. 'Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in

" any thing that is distinctly conceived by the mind. Did it imply u any contradiction, 'tis impossible it could ever be conceived." Treatise of

Human

partis in.

Nature. B.

Part

ii.

Sect. 4.

Videnotam

(J)

apud §

64.

It will be observed, that the author of the Treatise goes

further than

we have

possible, is possible

gone.

We aver,

avers,

Whatever we conceive to be Whatever we conceive, is possible.

But perhaps the latter maxim differs very slightly at bottom from the The learned Cudworth says " Whatsoever is possible, that other. :

* * the very essence of possiwhatsoever is conceivable " bility being no other than conceptibility." True Intellectual Sys"

is,

;

—

tem of the Universe. Book I. ch. v. Birch's Edit. Page 647. As Hume's is the greater, ours the less, if his maxim be true, ours must therefore

be so too.

t Vide Part II.

§ 32,

§§10-11.1

ARGUMENT,

IRREFRAGABLE.

A PRIORI,"

103

be our conductor whithersoever he would, amidst the turnings and windings of a worse than Cretan labyrinth. § 11.

length

shall permit

our atheist to termi-

nate the sentence in the middle of which we broke

been

in the interruption, the weightiness of that

which

be accepted as an apology.

" It

we had to deliver "

in,

may have

hoping as we do that for what of rudeness there

may be

will

although matter is, mentally.

said, perhaps, that

" easy enough to divide,

impossible to apply the same

it is

For my part, I see no by " extension" be meant the extension, or part of the extension, which is infinite. " process to

Par. 5.

extension.''''

impossibility in the case

And

indeed we

may

;

unless

much

opine with

probability, that

such extension was that which was in Antitheos's view to stand for the for the very next sentence uses " space

;

" But is not the space ocextension'' of its predecessor. " cupied by the earth, or say, its useful little repre" sentation, a twelve or a twenty-inch globe, as easily " conceived to be divisible" or perhaps divided " by a mal<

—

" thematical plane, as the globe

" but only mentally divided tion

—

Why *

things divisible,

not really

little

globe, or

great globe itself,

Not because

divided ?"

For that

really divisible.

which

In answer to which ques-

the globe, the

The " not really

itself,

it is

no.

really or in the nature of

proved by our being able to

sufficiently

Vide supra, §

conceive the thing possible.

—

may

whether the space occupied by The great globe

Yea

all

which

or by a representation of

twenty inches,

itself,

inherit,

twelve inches, or

in diameter, (it is right to

an admeasurement

;)

say, as to

be conceived divided, or even,

whether

be exact with that

space can

you please, but

divisible.

104

ARGUMENT, A

PBIOBI,"

by a mathematical plane matical plane

let

IRREFRAGABLE.

What

us ask,

Our author informs

[Part.

IV.

a mathe-

us correctly

;

though

he has encumbered his information with a good deal of " mathematical point," he advances to the inanity.

—Why discard — " A mathematical point has

information thus, " has no dimensions" magnitude, the usual word

" no dimensions, because whatever possesses dimensions " must possess figure, and that which has figure cannot " be a point."

That which has

figure cannot be a point. " Refutation'" supplies not the reason.

But why ? The So that, as to why a point has no figure or dimensions, we are left within a little of where we began. Our author had spoken better, if he had simply said, A mathematical point has no dimensions, because that which has no di-

mensions point.

the definition given by mathematicians of a manner," he goes on, " a plane cannot

" In like

" have thickness, since whatever

" ness

not a plane but a solid."

just have said,

plane

of the smallest thick-

Par.

Could he not

defined to be a surface having

length and breadth but no thickness

as that which has

—

the three dimensions is defined to be a solid ? " then, " cannot have thickness :" " whatever smallest" or of'any " thickness then, can

A plane," is

of the

not a plane."

How,

conceive the space Antitheos speaks

indeed any space whatever, divided, or

divisible,

of,

by a

A division by a mathematical plane That which divides matter, or space, or any thing our atheist likes, must have some thickness,

mathematical plane is

no division at

all.

tho the thickness should be "of the smallest." touching

this,

an ample

before the reader.

sufficiency has

But

been already set

Vide Part. II. § 26. notamq; et § 29. <Sfc ~—ln fine, the space filled by the

Partemque III. § 12.

earth, or its " little representation,"

not as easily con-

ceived to be divided, or divisible, as the great globe, or

§§ 12-13.]

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

105

any small one, can be conceived to be divided, or divisible. For that space cannot be conceived to be divided or divisible at all.

" In dividing space by abstraction, " or

§ 12. tial

consideration, " therefore, there

by a par-

necessity, as

" our author would have us believe, of falling into the ab" surdity of space divided

" parts, leaving

by actual separation of the

no space between them.

Par

As our

Now

author would have us believe, says Antitheos.

the

author alluded to would have no one believe any thing by

How could, and the sixtieth part of a degree so absurd. where did, the author of the " Argument," in treating of considerations of infinite extension,

partial

space, which he, after the example of ;

to the exclusion, as

" absurdity" (word

were, of the rest,

fall

into the

w ell chosen) of supposing space divided r

by actual separation of parts, when with all his might, he is this

allows to

how could he, and where did he, in we may for a time consider so much space

be quite possible granting that

expansion,

Mr Locke,

the very thing which,

DEMONSTRATES TO BE IMPOSSIBLE,

very thing, to-wit, that the parts of infinite extension,

or space, are susceptible of actual separation ?

§ 13.

Our

atheist concludes

what he has 41

position to Proposition II. in this way.

to urge in op-

Gillespie's

" indivisibility be understood in an abstract sense, his " proposition is not true if, in reference to actual experi;

" ment, he

may be applauded

for having recourse to in" ductive instead of a priori reasoning, [but*h] he need

" not so soon have neglected the principles upon which " he started, without intimating some ground for the t This

its

word

supplied from a copy of the u Refutation," presented

author to a Jew (according to the

foresight

and

discretion,

" in this book,

The copy

flesh)

— Who, with true Jewish

wrote on the title-page

The

fool hath said

no God.'' The but is Antitheos's autograph. question composes one of the volumes in the Philalethean There

Society's Library.

106

ARGUMENT,

" change."

II.

IRREFRAGABLE.

After what has been so

Par. 6.

vanced in Part

A PRIORI,"

Mr Gillespie recognises but one

of proper divisibility, (and

who ever heard

and has demonstrated, that

we have great authority

infinity of extension is not

in the proper sense of the word. " his proposition IS * true."

that

kind

of any other

divisible,

And

ad-

fully

the reader needs no guide to lead him

through this maze.

§ 14.

[Part IV.

Therefore,

vouch

for

even the AUTHORITY OF OUR ATHEIST HIMSELF, shall now be

the validity of

Gillespie '« demonstration,

evinced past the possibility of room for doubt. § 15. In the discussion of his second proposition," says

we heard, ( vide part. ii. § 37 et § 42 J makes manifest the absurdity of supposing

Antitheos, as before

" the author

" space really divisible, since that would be to suppose " the parts separated without having any space between

" them."

agree with Antitheos, that the author of the " Argument" makes manifest the absurdity of sup-

posing space, or rather " infinity of extension," which

one with infinity of space, ( vide part. Hi. § 17.) to be really divisible but we can never grant, that it is absurd all

;

to suppose space Antitheos assigns.

why

there

is this,

really divisible for the reason

The reason given by

this

which

gentleman

absurdity in supposing space really divisible

to suppose space really divisible would be to sup-

pose the parts separated without having any space between

Now,

them. is

to say that to suppose space really divisible

to suppose the parts thereof separated, or divided,

confound two things which are entirely bility

and

division.

Gillespie

(vide part.

another

We have seen that our atheist charges

with confounding these two distinct things,

ii.

why he was

different, divisi-

§ 32. et § 34.^)

and here Antitheos exposes

so ready to charge such a procedure on

Antitheos confounds the two things himself.

cloven foot has

made

its

appearance.

The

ARGUMENT,

§§ 14-18.]

A PRIORI"

Our author has

§ 16.

supposes,

any

IRREFRAGABLE.

He who

quite reversed matters.

can suppose,

orte

(as

it is

107

certain no one

can.) that the parts of space are separated, or divided,

presupposes the separability, or divisibility, of the parts.

But he who supposes (and the person who supposes must nobody at all,) the divisibility of space, by no means thereby supposes, either first or last, the division

just be

of space. § 17. In a word,

we agree with our

atheist as to the

from him as to the reason of the fact, that under the second Proposition of the " Argument' is made

fact,

differ

manifest the absurdity of supposing-f infinite extension,

Had

or space, to be divisible. position

II.

Antitheos said that Pro-

manifests the absurdity of supposing space

really divisible, since to suppose it really divisible

suppose

him

its

parts separable,

we should have agreed with

as to the reason of the fact too

so far at least as

the absurdity of the supposition, that the parts of space are separable, tion, that

a reason of the absurdity of the supposi-

space

positions look as

mount

for, in truth,

the sup-

they were no more than barely tanta-

to each other.

§ 18. sides,

really divisible

shall turn our antitheist's admission

that viewing the admission in what light one pleases, is all

all

and make every conceivable supposition, to shew that our hearts could wish.

Should the author of

t We use the words supposing oy suppose, here and elsewhere, in the same sense as that in which Mathematicians speak, when, in a proper redvxtio per impossibile ad abmrdum, they ask us to draw an absurd consequence from a supposition which is to be set aside. The suppo-

sition in sible.

thin»,

one sense, and that one the best of senses,

We and

cannot clearly conceive the truth of

this

metrical style.

even before the contrary to

But

the case

tion were conceived to be true.

supposition which

can

really impos-

be a possible

it is establish"? in

due geo-

argued "s if the impossible supposimay deduce an inference from a

make

only

relatively, as

we may

say.

108

ARGUMENT

A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part

the * Refutation" be inclined to allege, that by " divisible"

he meant divided, never intending to admit more than

Argument" had manifested the absurdity of is really divided then, as we shall leave him no cloor to creep out by, away from us, we have They will be found these two considerations to urge. impediments adamantine to an escape. 1. The first conthat the "

supposing that space

;

sideration will have respect to the good faith in which an allegation of that description could be offered.

Antitheos

speaking in relation to the " second proposition," and the second Proposition, as it occurs in the " Argument" is

runs thus

" Infinity of Extension," (which

as space,) " this

way

necessarily indivisible."

Infinity of

Extension

the same

does not run

really undivided.

But

which such an allegation would need to be made, as a circumstance of trifling moment, we have to say, that the thing alleged, were it alleged, to be meant by our antitheist, would be altogether as acceptto pass over the faith in

For

able as the sign of his meaning.

manifested no more than, or rather so dity of supposing that space

much

as,

really divided,

words, he demonstrated'that space

Gillespie

the absur-

if,

in other

really not divided,

how

could he have done so but by demonstrating that space cannot be really divided not, only lespie

by proving that

demonstrate that a thing

And

cannot be.

For

say, that if

Gil-

really indivi-

to say, that space cannot be divided,

it is indivisible,

Gillespie

are one and the same.

demonstrated that space

vided, he has demonstrated that space

And

demonstrated that space cannot be really divided,

he must have demonstrated that space sible.

therefore even

and to So that

really not di-

really indivisible.

" divisible" in the passage in

question, be to stand for divided,

and our atheist be to

be held as admitting nothing more than that Proposition II. manifests the absurdity of supposing that space is

ARGUMENT,

§§ 19-21.]

really divided

;

A PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

we have, contained

virtually in

sion to that effect, his authority for

that

109

an admis-

Gillespie

has demonstrated the real indivisibility of space. § 19. To conclude this part of the subject, let the admission of our antitheist be regarded in any sense one likes, to

rity to

a certainty

vouch

have, as

affirmed, his autho-

for the validity of the demonstration, that

infinity of extension, or space, is indivisible.

§ 20.

And

since the author of the " Refutation" has

passed his word in sincerity for the truth of Proposition us rest contented, without bearing him any grudge what besides may have fallen from his pen. What matters it, though he cried out, at the first glimpse of the II., let

for

" unqualified assent

affair,

" proposition the second,

1 '

if,

cannot be accorded to

on second thoughts, (second

thoughts are the best,) he saw a sufficient reason for declaring, that his opponent " makes manifest the absurdity " of supposing space really divisible,"

his

opponent's

aim being to demonstrate that space, infinite space, really indivisible ? Whatever difficulties Antitheos as-

highest is

serted to be in the

the road

making as sary,

way

thoroughly

second Proposition

—

ultimately he proclaims that

we may know he was only

clear,

he would cause us a

However

affrightment.

§ 21.

;

true,

little,

a very unneces-

comes about that the

suffices

that

it is so.

can now proceed to judge in a certain

affair,

with capital authority at our elbow for the decision

his work,

the beginning of Chapter VII. of * " The fourth proposition * ntitheos says

%hall pronounce.

founded upon the

extension" (he should have said, " infinity of extension") " being indivi¥

baseless fabric of

sible,** &c. and in the fifth paragraph of Chapter VI. he had more than merely hinted, that Proposition II. con;

stitutes a gratuitous fallacy. divisibility

of infinite

Whether

extension

the necessary in-

be a baseless fabric, 1

— "ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE.

110

[Part IV-

whether the declaration that "

infinity of extension is " necessarily indivisible," be a gratuitous fallacy, admits

not

now

We have had our Argument" has demonextension is really indivisible, and what

of the possibility of a doubt.

word

atheist's

for

strated, infinity of

it,

that the "

more could be necessary infinite extension is

shew that the

no " baseless fabric"

indivisibility of ?

that the posi-

tion which affirms infinity of extension to be necessarily indivisible,

never to be reckoned in the number of

" gratuitous fallacies

§ 22. So far, then, as

we have gone

yet, all is well.

" It

" would be absurd in the extreme to deny" Proposition I. And, in spite of himself, Antitheos has accorded " the "

same unqualified assent" to Proposition Il.t § 23. The words which next occur in the " Refutation" " A corollary is here introbring us to a new subject. " duced, asserting the immoveability of extension." Oh. VI. par. 7-

There happens to be no corollary of the kind

the " Argument." is

Corollary there is indeed. But it " Corollary from Proposiin the following terms.

" tion II. Infinity f

spite

of extension

of himself, in his book,

necessarily

—but only there.

immoveable" For in a

letter ad-

the 15th of January, last, "Antitheos," in the contemplation of a second edition of the " Refutation," admits that he " would have to alter" his reasoning " with respect to the

dressed to

Gillespie, so lately as

" indivisibility of extension."

"No one I presume,"

writes " Antitheos,"

" ever thought of denying the applicability of infinitude, either to space or " duration, or of imagining the separability of their parts." So that out of (though only out of) his book, the first edition of it at any* rate, Antitheos has, spontaneously, " accorded to proposition the second"

same unqualified assent" which was accorded to Proposition the Now, let us remember that " a great part of the reasoning in " the Argument' is built upon the second Proposition," and that " to go over all that it is founded on to prove, would be to introduce " no small portion of the work referred to" (vide part. ii. § 19.) let us, I say, but keep this in mind, and we shall be at no loss to perceive that the letter by " Antitheos" constitutes a very precious document to the lovers of the " Argument, a priori." " the first.

"ARGUMENT.

§§ 22-23.]

IRREFRAGABLE.

Ill

widely different from what Antitheos repre" It is true," proceeds he, " that either

matter

this,

sents

to be.

A PRIORI;'

" finity or infinity of extension can never be supposed " capable of motion ." Bare finity of extension is not

capable of motion

;

but then every thing of

finity, of finity " Space cannot," continues our

only, in extension, is so.

atheist, " be carried out of itself."

equivalent, so far as

goes, to

Very true. That is what the Corollary de-

" Nor," adds he, byway of illustration, " can those " parts of it occupied by Mont Blanc, for example, and " the Peak of Teneriffe, ever be imagined to change

clares.

" places."

Precisely so.

themselves,

may

But the Mountain and the Peak, "

distinction well deserves observation.

what

••

must gite unreserved

And

be imagined to change places.

the

the truth of

here maintained, therefore," concludes he, " we assent,

independent of

its

nominal

" connection with the false doctrine immediately going be" fore." Ibid. The "false doctrine" is that which sets forth

that " Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible*." That have witnessed the author of the " Refuta-

false doctrine we

tion" transforming into a perfectly true one. § 15,

et seq.

The

" connection,"

which

minal" connection, (for what reason

than to

find,) is established,

following manner. "

immoveable.

" able *

it is

easier to search

under the " Corollary,"

" Infinity of Extension

That

is, its

among themselves.

Vide supra.

called a " no-

in the

necessarily

parts are necessarily immove-

For, motion of parts supposes,

He who does not " see that motion of parta supposes, of necessity, separa" of necessity, separation of the parts.

" tion of the parts, neM never be expected to see that " because every A is equal to B, therefore some B is equal " to A. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily in" capable of separation, is, therefore, necessarily immove-

" able, that

is,

" themselves."

its

parts are necessarily immoveable amonjj

112

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE.

The connection we speak of " The parts Locke in these words. ยง 24.

" immoveable, which follows

from

set forth

[PartV.

of pure space are

their inseparability

;

mo-

" tion being nothing but change of distance between any "

two things

" inseparable

;

but this cannot be between parts that are which, therefore, must needs be at perpetual

" rest one amongst another." ยง 25.

Essay B.

II. ch. xiii. ยง 14.

were finding some fault in our author's con-

but since, according to it, " unreserved assent" " must" be given to the truth maintained in the Corol-

clusion,

lary,

need, after

all,

have no quarrel with any thing

that accompanies the unconditional admission.

— 113

PART THE

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIAN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

" BUTES OF GOD," "

But we now come," such are the words which follow those last quoted from the " Refutation, " But we " now come to a proposition which may be said to carry §

1 "'

" with it " ness, of

all the strength, if it

Gillespie's

has any, as well as

Argument.' "

'Tis well that Antitheos attaches

Proposition he has

was treated as

now

if it

some importance

in his eye

were

'*'

;

weak-

the

Ch. VI. par.

to the

for the preceding

one

of no great consequence."

The Proposition which, as our author will have it, has all 11 11 the strength, or the weakness, of the " Argument, " is, that gentleman correctly remarks, " the third in number. " and announces that There is necessarily Being of

" Infinity of Extension.' "

Ibid.

§ 2. " If

we had not already seen" continues Antitheos, " that the author's reasoning leads us to conclude that " his Being is to be regarded as something substantial"

Where

did we see what, in his own sense of it, Antitheos we have seen ? Nowhere else but in the fourth paragraph of Chapter V., where we saw it stated (the statement being according to truth) that Mr Gillespie's subSEQUENT reasoning' makes intelligence, &c. part of his argument and where we saw our atheist lay down a determination to hold Mr Gillespie as making intelligence. &c. part of his argument ab ovo usque ad mala-— UN Isays

—

114

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE.

formly;

Vide Part. II. § 4.

[PartV.

promised to run

to the rescue whenever Antitheos

matters upside down, and this

was detected turning the first opportunity we

have had of making good our promise. regret

ways

we never had a second.

out according to one's

fall

should not

But things do not alwishes. .And our wishes

run a great chance of being disappointed Antitheos threatened us with uniformity as touching the

in this respect,

affair of putting things topsy-turvy.

So much as to where Antitheos and

§ 3.

seen that

his reader

had

Gillespie s reasoning leads to the conclusion,

that his Being is substantial, in our antitheist's sense of " substantial, as it occurs in the passage we are criti5

cising.

author

occurs in that passage,

ing accustomed to use substantial, and in

stance, **

we say

;

For our

not always consistent in his procedure, he be-

more senses than

substance" with him,

traction,""

which "

one.

its

cognate, sub-

Ex. gr. At one time,

that only which " possesses at-

observed under a thousand varie-

" ties of figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour,

com-

" bustion, crystallization, &c." which is capable of being " weighed," and " analyzed," and of having " its elements u reduced to gas." ( Vide Part. XII. §§ 1, 4J While, in the case before us, " something substantial," with our atheist, stands for nothing

more than

an agent of any kind

—something possessing power—something that acts"

something that has " intelligence, and power, and free"

dom

of agency."

V. par.

4.)

(Compare Chap. VI. : For there

Nothing more

par. 9. with Chap. is

no mention of

attraction, figure, density, colour, motion, taste, odour,

combustion, crystallization, &c. weight, gaseousness, &c. as

among the

that which

essential acts, properties, or capacities, of

is substantial.

doubt, Antitheos would say, were the question put to him, that every thing which has " intelligence, and § 4.

ÂŤ

3-5.;

a power,

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI;'

IRREFRAGABLE.

115

and freedom of agency," can attract and be atwould have colour if exposed

tracted, has figure, density,

may be supposed to have may be set on fire,

to the rays of the sun, moves,

a certain taste, and a certain smell,

may be crystallized, and weighed, and analyzed, and reduced to elementary gases. Such, however, is not the matter for consideration here. That composes the question respecting local conjunction, the question as to what qualities are inseparably associated in the It

may

be, or

may

same

subject.

not be true, that intelligence, and

power, and freeness, are never to be found but in a sub-

and density, and colour, and motion, and odour, &c. &c. but whether that be true, or whether it be false, concerns us not at present. On the contrary, the following are the questions which arise

ject having figure,

and

taste,

;

out of our atheist's procedure, as we have noticed substance because

being attracted

it.

that which possesses attraction, &c. &c. a substance

;

has the capacity of attracting, and of

And

again

Is that

which has

gence, &c. to be pronounced a substance

;

intelli-

to be pro-

nounced a substance just because it has the property of intelligence \ Is that which is of intelligence, therefore to be denominated a substance without our waiting to de;

termine the point as to how

must keep company with

Â§ 5.

When

properties or qualities

intelligence as

of the subject of inhesion

the affirmative.

many

Which

mutual occupiers

Antitheos decides in

Vide Â§ prwced. our author would hold, that

I observed,

every thing having intelligence, &c. can attract, and has figure, density, &c. &c. &c. I bore in

place says

" It (extension)

mind what he

one

also conceivable as one of

" the properties, if not the only indispensable property of " matter By which if the unwary Ch. VIII. par. 3.

reader should understand that Antitheos means to

even

' k

a very clever approach"

(to

make

employ our author's

116

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

PRIORI,"

[Part V.

racy languaget) to the Cartesian doctrine, that extension is

the essence,

itself,

his

our atheist means, in

own words, amounts only

ticular piece of matter

may

;

spite

that whereas a par-

without some one quality

ex. gr.

the book called " Re-

well be supposed to be without that weight

which even one whereas, in

to this

may be

which some other piece has futation"

much

of matter, i the reader would be

What

mistaken indeed.

solid

fine,

Argument would impart

;

that

each of the other properties ever found

matter may be absent, one after another, from a thing, and matter yet remain behind we cannot take away all extension, without taking away all matter too. The sentence itself from which those words are taken, commences " Although extension may be conceived of as a thus " pure abstraction :" that is, I fancy, as existing separately, or by itself; as in the case of pure space. From which clause we see how very far Antitheos was from going into the doctrine of Des Cartes. After all, it must perhaps be in

—

granted, that

and end of

no easy task to reconcile the beginning

it is

this sentence

" conceived of as

pure

" Although extension

one of the properties, if not

perty of matter."

how can

extension

the only indispensable pro-

If extension it

abstraction, it is also conceivable as

our antitheist says

may

can exist by

itself,

and

can, without thereby being matter,

make any approach,

unless a stupid

one, to being the only indispensable property of matter

In short, there diction.

The end

" a very clever approach" to a contra-

and the beginning can perfect harmony the sooner,

of the sentence

never exist together in

;

therefore, they separate for ever, the better.

— We

have

only farther to remark, that tho' in this passage Antitheos

speaks of extension as perhaps being the only indispensable property of matter, yet the whole scope of his book, t

Last Chapter, ninth paragraph.

Vide Part. III. § 38.

ARGUMENT, A

6.]

where

Pi?/0i?7,"

§ 6.

117

what matter is, runs The exception to the general

at all bears on the topic of

counter to that sentiment. strain

IRREFRAGABLE.

a solitary one.

But not only have we " already seen"

futation," that

in the

"Re-

Gillespie s reasoning leads to the con-

clusion that his Being

" something substantial" but,

the author of that production throws out, we

may

see the

same thing in a different quarter altogether. <£ If," says he, " we refer to the third Division of his Introduction, " we find him contending that the necessary Being must " be of the character now ascribe-d to that subject. At " the twenty-third section" &c. &c. Ch. VI. par. 9.

—

Now

what is this that we have here ? The " Argument, a " priori, for the Being and Attributes of God," " pro" fesses to demonstrate that matter by the most rigid ra-

" tiocination." in itself, stration.

( Vide Prwfationem.)

The work

alluded to, accordingly, never refers

to the " Introduction"

To be complete

one of the necessary prerequisites of a demon-

Argument" that

—

this

Which

so distinct

might have received

from the

—and may

yet receive, (for the special benefit of refutation-makers,

now

that Antitheos has put into

letting

receive,

—

)

my head

the propriety of

publication separately, and be, not-

withstanding, a finished treatise, wanting nothing necessary in order to the presence of the most perfect unity of execution. The " Introduction," in a word, is in no respect any part of that which the Society of Atheists which fixed

on our author as

answer and

refute.

that Society, had

its

champion, was challenged to

might have challenged to overturn the reasonings which

Doubtless,

I liked,

compose the three Divisions of the " Introduction." And it may be noticed, that no proof has been adduced to evidence that,

means

if it

had been so challenged,

could,

of this champion, or of any champion, have suc-

cessfully overturned

any of those reasonings.

But

as the

118 case

ARGUMENT,

A PlilOBI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part V.

the Society was challenged to do no more — and —than answer and refute the reasonings contained

is,

less

in the

" Argument, a priori," &c.

Vide Prcefat.

§ 7. To enable our readers, the more perfectly to understand with what grace Antitheos in his " Refutation"

of the "

Argument, a priori,'''' &c, brings in quotations from the " Introduction," to find of what character the "

Argument" makes the necessary Being it discourses of we shall enumerate the topics of which the " In-

to be

;

" Division I. An Inquiry into troduction" consists. " the defects of mere a posteriori arguments, for the being

" of A Deity. Chapter I. Of the Argument from Expe" rience. Chapter II. Of the Argument from Miracles."

" Division II. Review of Br Samuel darkens De" monstration of the Being and Attributes of God." " Division III. Necessary existence implies infinite " extension. 11

mences thus

The :

first

section of which Division com-

" Supposing, that there

a necessarily

" existing substance, the intelligent cause of

things."

all

Division III., so far from being taken up in an attempt to do aught towards proving a necessarily existing substance, the intelligent cause of

things, sets out with

all

the express supposition that there

such

;

and

wholly employed in endeavouring to deduce a certain

consequence from that supposition. of the Division

we speak

may be drawn from supposed, then that

of,

are truly

its title

the contents

If necessary existence be

supposed, which implies infinite ex-

Marvellously good indeed

tension.

fine,

summed up in what

the grace with

which our atheist, at the place where he stands, and for the purpose which he has to serve, quotes from " the third " Division" of the " Introduction. 1 § 8.

Well then

here we have our antitheist going

" out of the record, 1 to use a legal phrase which he has '

adopted.

(" Preface.

)

referred lately to his deter-

§§ 7-9.

ARGUMENT,

A PRIORI*'

IRREFRAGABLE.

119

mination to turn matters upside down, or rather, to turn the end round upon the beginning.

With regard

to the case before us,

Vide supra, §

we can

acquit

him

any charge of placing the tail where the head only should be. His conduct now is of a different character from

what

was

in the

former instance

present, he

seeking to introduce into the beginning, neither end nor middle, but only something entirely distinct, alike from beginning, and from middle, and from end.

But we

shall

not copy the bad example, nor follow our atheist through those sentences, vicious as at the present stage they must

which respect something avowed in the third " Division." Not that there is any thing contained in those

be,

sentences, nor any thing about them, except the confusion

which follows

might

in their train, that

easily be shewn,

anxiously do

desire,

were

this

we need to fit

fear

opportunity.

we acknowledge,

But

to keep clear of

the confusion which very naturally would result from a present consideration of the sentences under notice. short, Antitheos

And we

had

his reasons for

what he has done.

have ours for reprobating his exceedingly un-

warrantable procedure. § 9. " If we had not already seen that the author's " reasoning leads us to conclude that his Being is to be " regarded as something substantial"

from such a supposition

—W

ell,

what follows

should have been at a

what to make of the subject of the above predicate. " As a logician would say, it is not distributed." Par. 9. The non-distribution of a subject can never be any reason why one shouh^be at a loss what to make of it. A non" loss

distributed subject, ject

made

is,

" as a logician would say," a sub-

to stand for a part only of its significate.

And

did ever any logician worthy of the name, assert that

should be at a loss what to is

taken in a part only of

make

its

of a subject because

extent

Logicians are quite

' ;

120

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part V.

as fond of undistributed, as of distributed subjects.

And

as an evidence, there are in the field of logic as

many The

particular propositions as there are universal ones

non-distribution of the subject being that which fixes

But our aim is not where the badness of

the particularity of the proposition. to rectify Antitheos^s logic, except his logic is

made a prop

to the goodness of his cause

and to pass over a matter which

moment

Afititkeos^s logic in

in the present business

after

preceding portion of the passage, finds

What

all,

little

the

totally at fault.

make the subject to be, to-wit, in the ProThere is necessarily a Being of Infinity of " Extension V The word Being. But how " Being" can be regarded as the subject, our atheist has not condedoes he

position, "

scended to declare, neither

To me indeed tion

is he at all able to declare. appears, that " Being" in that Proposi-

syncategorematic,

i. e.

constitutes a part only of the

complex term* composing the subject 7

fii

which

Being of Infinity of Extension :^ " there

being the predicate, predicate together. subject, and,

or, if

take to be,

But to

by consequence

mere

trifle,

necessarily,'

will,

the copula and the

settle

what is the right what is the right

you

possibly,

predicate, of the Proposition, thing, but a

is,

as well as the other

not worth vexing ourselves about

as shall be perceived in the eleventh section.

Though

Antitheos has called things by their wrong names,

turn out that the

slip in logic will

may

not afford him even a

semblance of support. Â§ 10. " Relative," says the author of the " Refutation,"

presenting us with the sentences which respect something avowed in " Division III.'" of the " Introduc" Relative to a Being of this sort, thevF that is, tion relative to a Being of the character spoken of in that after

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

" Division," to-wit, " a necessarily existing substance, " the intelligent cause of

all

things."

(Vide supra, Â§

7-)

;

§§ 10-12.]

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE.

But here we can have nothing Being which " Division

III.

121

to do with the assumed

treats

Our

of.

atheist

himself seems to have had his misgivings as to the propriety of the " then" for he immediately goes on to " At all events, relative to a substantial being11 say

—

substantial being

substance

Why

them

distinguish

Why

not a being

(t. e.

an existing)

a substance identical with a being

Is not

What

an unsubstantial being

? ?

shadow that proceeds not from any substance is not more a non- entity than an unsubstantial being. A substantial being is a substantial

that has

— being.

What

— substance

;

or a being

nothingness has a non-being

substance which an unsubstantial being has not ? § 11. " Relative to a (substantial) being, the truth of " the predicate" Antitheos proceeds, " is what we have ;

now

the

to try.

subject, so

now

" Being" to be

As he made

Par. 11.

he takes " Infinity of Extension" to

be the predicate, in Proposition III.

Our

atheist

would

represent Being as something already got at, and the aim of that Proposition to be, to invest the Being with

Quite contrary to the truth

nite extension. is

infi-

A Being

not something which the " Argument," as yet, holds

us in possession fact, is

neither

of.

more nor

a Being, indeed of sition

The

object of the Proposition, in

less

than

arrive at a Being

infinity of extension

but the Propo-

by no means considers " Being" and "

" Extension,"

Infinity of

afterwards proceeding to work out a conjunction of them. In a word, " Infinity of first separately,

" The truth of the " Extension" is not the predicate. " predicate is what we have now to try, says Antitheos. The truth of Proposition III., at any rate, he is going to 11

try.

And

§ 12.

that

shall

comfort for

sufficient

make

item and iota of the ordeal

us.

our business to examine every :

Because, the Proposition,

successfully established, goes near to be decisive, in our

122

ARGUMENT,

A PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

favour, of the whole controversy

and

;

[Part V.

objected

to,

whole demonstration, the whole of

sufficient grounds, the

the merely pretended demonstration, must go for nothing.

Our

atheist rightly holds the Proposition in question to

be of very high importance in the it

carries with

affair

;

whether or not

all the strength of the " Argument.

§ 13. " The evidence in support of the third proposi" tion is stated," our author remarks, " in the form of a " dilemma" Par. 11. And then he quotes § 1, and

part of §

2,-f-

and

The words he has quoted

§ 4.

are as

follows.

§ 14. " Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which 45

the same thing,) we conceive

" support or substratum 4C

ceive

;

to subsist, without a

or, it subsists

not, or

we con-

not to subsist, without a support or substratum.

§ 15. " First, if Infinity of Extension subsist without

" a substratum," [or, " it is a substance."

if it

******

have not a substratum,] " then,

******

§ 16. " Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not 44

without a Substratum," [that is, if it have a Substratum,] " then, it being a contradiction to deny there is " Infinity of Extension, J it is a contradiction to deny is a Substratum to it."

" there

" The conclusion deduced from the latter alter§ 17. " native," says Antitheos, " besides appearing lame and " impotent, is somewhat laughable. But allowing its logic \\

" to pass,

may be worth

while, if only for amusement,

" to try the force of this, the negative

horn of the

di-

lemma, by ascertaining what it is made of." Par. 12. pronounced to be the negative horn ? 'T would require more than an Aristotle to tell how it could pro44

Why is this

t Antitheos

X ||

does not signify, he has omitted any thing. Note in " Argument." Vide Part. II.

" Prop. I."

Vide Part. XII. §

§ 15.

— «

§§ 13 -18.]

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI;'

IRREFRAGABLE.

But though

perly be pronounced so.

yet possibly Antitheos can inform us,

nounced the negative horn.

123

Aristotle cculd not,

why

" this"

pro-

'Tis perhaps probable, that

Antitheos calls the alternative spoken

" the negative

of,

" horn of the dilemma, 1 ' because that alternative contains At least, I cannot think of any better the word " not"

With

reason he could have.

regard, then, to the ques-

whether the word " nof causes the member in which occurs to be truly negative the word " without," in

tion, it

the alternative, appears to be a negative one, to

And

and purposes.

all

intents

the alternative will be affirmative, so long as two negative words, (" not," and " withif so,

same thing

out,*')

which

—Be "

affect the

this"

horn of what sort

— are equal to a

may,

it is

Antitheos would, if he but could, get quit off

ever negative the horn

may

be,

'tis

time,

how he

off.

But how-

a positive truth that

Antitheos has been fairly stuck upon

struggling take himself

positive.

a horn which

it ,

and can by no good

shall observe, in

winces.

But whether " this" be the negative horn, or not, let us witness in what manner the force of it is tried. " The primary signification of the word substratum is, a § 18.

" thing lying

under something

" stance, a bed of gravel to " the substratum of that soil

" that, the sandstone " coal be

" of

it,

lie ;

else.

soil,

the substratum of the gravel is

on as far as we can penetrate.

" "

;

say,

must have a substratum, is nothing less than saying that it must have something to rest upon something to hold it up. That is, Space must have limits and there must be something in existence beyond its limits to keep it from falling out of itself! If this be not the acme of absurdity, a ship falling over-

— —

;

the substratum

" therefore, that space

gravel

there be sandstone below

found beneath the rock, coal

and

Supposing, for in-

under the

;

Vide Part.

§ 21.

124

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part V.

" board, as our sailors' jest goes, is no longer a joke ; and " the clown who boasted that he could swallow himself, " boasted of nothing that he might not bef reasonably bef " expected to perform."

And had

These are capital

Ibid.

they bat come in at a proper place,

have " laughed consumedly."

jests.

we should

The misfortune

is,

they

are not in season. § 19. " The primary signification of the word substra" turn is," 6ur philologist informs us, " a thing lying under " something else." So it is. Substratum is a participle 7

from the verb under.

substernor, Anglice, to

But, alas

substance

be strowed or strewed

the primary signification of the word

very similar to that of the word substratum.

The primary

signification of substance,

It being nothirfg

is,

standing under

but a derivation from the participle

But Antitheos is remarkably enamoured of the and therefore he has a respect for its primary signification, never bringing this in sight. But substajis-X

word

substance,

then he bears (with ample reason too) substratum a rible

grudge, and thinks nothing of exposing

its

ter-

primary

signification to well-merited derision.

work EngAt what

fine affair truly here. Strange work, § 20. " passing strange," might our atheist make of our lish

tongue, were he to go on at this rate.

point in t

One

its

of the

history could any language be.s is

an error of the press.

be to interfere with the

But

bear to pass

to say

which, would

style.

—

t From the neuter plural, Home Tooke says. It is curious, or perhaps it is not curious, that the two words in our language corresponding to sub and stans, to-wit under and standing, should,

one word, constitute a term denoting what

when

joined in

very usually reckoned

materialist

would busy us

about substance as not reaching to aught beyond body.

So that there

the superior portion of the mind.

some necessity

preposition. standing.

as substance

for our refusing to quit the English, for the Latin

And

Surely

may

Our

accordingly,

it,

are resolved to stick by the under-

in good English, does not so naturally

stand for mind.

mean

body,

ARGUMENT, A

19-24.]

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

through the primary-signification-alembic

meaning of a word, considered as to

therefore it is just the same come to But Antitheos

clusion to § 21.

Because the

etymon,

Is not that a

grand con-

not alone in the world, in the

Before him, a very celebrated

and freethinker went very

philologist

far in the primary-

signification-track.

§ 22. "

J£

True," says John

" past participle of the verb

Home *

" True, as we now write

Tooke,

"is

To Trow."

it or Trew, as it was means simply and merely That which is Trowed. And, instead of its being a rare commodity upon earth except only in words, there is no-

§ 23.

so,

use of such reasoning.

— clean contrary per-

now

haps to the incontestable fact

its

125

formerly

written

;

—

;

" thing but Truth in the world. § 24. " That every man, in his communication with " others, should speak that which he troweth, is of so .,

great importance to mankind

" prize us,

;

that

ought not to sur-

and exaggerated " praises bestowed upon Truth. But Truth supposes " mankind: for whom and by whom alone the word is form" ed, and to whom alone it is applicable. If no man, no " truth. There is therefore" [Save the mark! Therefore

find the most extravagant

M no such thing

eternal,

immutable, ever-

" lasting truth ; unless mankind, such as they are at preM sent," [and, of course, unless " Truth," " the third " person singular of the Indicative <l

eternal, immutable,

Trow,"]

and everlasting.

Two

" be also

may

persons

" contradict each other, and yet both speak truth for " the truth of one person may be opposite to the truth :

" of another. To speak truth may be a vice as well as " a virtue for there are many occasions where it ought " Diversions of Purley" Part II. not to be spoken." :

Chap.

— 126

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

PRIORI,"

[Part V.

44 Right is no other than RECT-tam (Regitum), § 25. " the past participle of the Latin verb Regere." § 26. " In the same manner our English word Just is

" the past participle of the verb jubere."

§ 2744

u 44

(Law)

and Anglo-Saxon verb means (something or any thing, Chose Cosa, Aliquid) Laid down." § 28. %A Right and J ust action is, such a one as is ordered and commanded.'" and

God

appears to

has a Right

" Just.

directed or

him

For" [Mark

highly improper to say, that

it is

the

also to say, that

reason

" nothing

.']

commanded concerning God.'

Law

§ 30, " I follow the

merely the past tense and past

of the Gothic

participle

§ 29.

for the rule of

God

ordered,

(what

conduct) when

laid

I follow

down by

the

Laws

human nature which, without any human testimony, we know must proceed from God and upon these are ;

" founded the

Part

II.

Rights

Chap.

of man, or

what

ordered for man."

Those sham Deities Fate and Destiny

§ 31. "

—

ali-

—are merely the past

" quid Fatum, quelque chose Destinee " participles of

§ 32. "

Fari and Destiner." * * * and

Chance

his twin-brother

" cident, are merely the participles of Fscheoir, Cheoir, " and Cadere. * * To say * It befell me by Chance,

—

" or by Accident,' is absurdly saying " ing. 1 " Ibid. Chap. ii. § 33.

Home

—

'It fell

But what need to multiply quotations

fall-

though

Tocike" as one not incorrectly says, " has fur-

" nished a whole magazine of such weapons for any So44

phist" [wise man, etymologically,]

Whatelfs Logic, B. § 34.

Now

judge in an

who may need them."

III. § 8.

hear the opinion of one

affair like

that to which he

who was no bad addressing him-

;

25-37.;

ARGUMENT,

IRREFRAGABLE.

127

and primitive sense alone/ the words of Dugald Stewart, " that, ac-

in this literal

we are citing " cording to him, ;

A PRIORI:'

' :

self.

employ

it,

Tooke,) a philosopher

entitled to

(any word,) even in the present advanced

state of science;

ing at

all

(Mr

and whenever he annexes to

different,

mean-

he imposes equally on himself and

" on others.

To me, on the contrary, it appears, that to " appeal to etymology in a philosophical argument, (ex" cepting, perhaps, in those cases where the

" ifc

;

of philosophical origin)

word

altogether nugatory

itself ;

and

can serve, at the best, to throw an amusing light on the v laws which regulate the operations of

human

Essay V.

Philosophical Essays. S

35.

We might

ch.

fancy.

ii.

favour our readers with a good

many

passages from Stezcart which have no tendency to with-

draw from the literal-and-primitive-sense-method any portion of the respect which is due to it. But we decline to put this philosopher upon the task of further, and in detail,

It is only necessary to

were, slaying the slain.

some

state

than the

things, to render a fuller refutation

statements themselves contain in gremio, wholly a work of supererogation. ยง 36.

of "

The author

The Diversions

Purley"

the end of his First Part, assures his readers

" for what building โ ข ;

myself well satisfied of

result of one's edification (to

importance.''

any where,)

pay

know

and am must on all the dark as to the

laying the foundation its

hands be admitted, that to work here,

in coin that should pass

not the most pleasant thing in the

we are building be

world, even though what

castles in the

air.

ยง 37-

And

Thus much

theos's

much

as to

Home

Toohtfs extravagancies.

same time, as to Antiargument derived from the " primary signification

thus

indirectly, at the

128

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

" of the word substratum?'' The thing less than " the acme of absurdity."

[Part V.

verily nothing

§ 38. But our atheist knew well enough what he was He understood assuredly that the " Argument," which maintains that " Infinity of extension," or space, about. i6

any premiss from could be inferred, by any stupidity, that " Space

necessarily existing" did not afford

which

and that " there must be someits limits" Antitheos was dis-

" must have limits

" thing in existence beyond tinctly aware, that

he could advance nothing stronger

than a rush to beat down the reasoning under Proposition III.

and

therefore, (like

many

dishonest sophists,

in circumstances so far analogous,) precisely because he

could do nothing in the

primary signification

way

of refuting, he raises a

— a — man

—a—

of straw, that no one

could have imagined was ready for the occasion, and laughs heartily,

he pretends, at the

effect this

appearance has on

him, calling on his readers to laugh too. Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici %

Ars

Poetica.

— 129

PART

VI.

THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRI" BUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION. § 1.

joined in

suppose that the merriment, whoever

shall

it,

has subsided.

And

truly with Antitheos

The words which we next come

lasted not long.

to in

the " Refutation" are far from laughing themselves, what-

some of them may force us to. we enter upon them, expose the fact, that, so little satisfied was Antitheos with the argument from " the primary signification of the word " substratum" the ground he had taken is deserted as ever the very gravity of

The words

alluded to, whenever

utterly untenable.

§ 2. " Should

" be understood in

be contended that the term ought to its

secondary acceptation,"

—the only

we may mention once for^all, the author of the " Argument" ever thought of putting upon it, as Anacceptation,

titheos

must have been thoroughly assured,

— " and that

" the substratum of the infinity of extension subsists with" in

itself,

" turn of

as any material body

its

own extension:

—I

said to be the substrawould remark, that we

know of nothing possessing extension except matter, " nothing else that can stand as an object to which ext;

" tension may be ascribed as a property ; and that matter, " not existing by mathematical" [the word should be metaphysical vide part. i. § 47, et seq.] " but only by physiu cat necessity, cannot be the substratum referred to.

—

â&#x20AC;&#x201D; 130

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI? IRREFRAGABLE.

Ch. VI. Par. 13.

Matter, says our atheist, exists by

physical necessity, that

such necessity

[Part VI.

is, it

exists because

But

exists.

no necessity at all, as might be evident even to the understandings of asses, as the Epicureans said, is

on a certain occasion

and therefore, there is no real newe should dwell upon the point. It perfectly

cessity that

suffices us, that

;

matter does not exist by metaphysical ne-

cessity, to-wit, in the sense of it

being a contradiction to

suppose it not to exist. " We know of nothing possess" ing extension except matter," we were informed,

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

" nothing

else that

tension

may be

bodies," as the next sentence has

can stand as an object to which ex" Material

ascribed as a property." it,

(there being 44

of Antitheos's sentences that serve, as a chorus,)

" 44

rial bodies,

of Being."

many mate-

All easily said.

we do know, or can know None of it so easily proved

And whether

easily proveable or not, the

comprising

nevertheless.

that

all

assertions assume the very thing

sumption, that we

know

Not a

make the

as-

of nothing but matter which has

the property of extension, or that

but a material body

But has not

be proved.

Antitheos offered us evidence of his right to

we know

of no Being

jot of evidence does he even

Then, the thing remains a barefaced

pretend to afford.

assumption of the^est part of the whole matter in debate, remains, to use an expression of his own, nowhere more

"an unproved extravagance. " (Oh. II. par. 15.) Hence it is evident, continues our atheist, " that, material bodies, comprising all that we do know, or

applicable,

Â§ 3. " 44

can know of Being,

will serve

lespie will cheerfully 44

it is

Gillespie's

impossible to find

purpose."

any thing that

Mr Gil-

Par. 13.

admit, that because

matter

cannot be the substratum referred to" by him,

impossible to find

any thing that

material bodies.

And

of his

work

it is

will suit his

it is

quite

purpose in

the business of a certain part

to demonstrate the impossibility.

His

first

§§ 3-5.]

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI? IRREFRAGABLE.

131

Scholium being partly taken up with proving, that " the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity

" of Extension for the

case (a is

Supposing the material universe to exist,

Scholium does not assume the thing, except

admitted

;

—but

in the

— caset) where

the Scholium beginning thus, " If, then,

common

not a universal

" should be maintained, that the Material Universe " Substratum of Infinity of Extension"

—And

the

cannot

be maintained that the material universe is that substratum, or any substratum, or any thing, unless

first

assumed

that matter exists. § 4. " Even this impossibility overlooked, however," Antitheos goes on, " what is it that next meets our view ? "

—

One substance occupying infinite extension, and anoM ther occupying part of this extension, if not also the M whole of it in other words, two things at the same " time occupying the same space. Theology always ;

" entangles

its

advocates in inextricable absurdities."

To the same purpose our author writes, farther Par. 13. " The real existence of matter brings along with it on. "

what

he,'

Gillespie,

much

afraid of

[icken

—

namely, the absurdity of two there is a good reason] " M beings at the same time occupying the same space. On " this ground let "

it be remembered that it is not requisite we should demonstrate the infinite extension of the ma-

" terial universe. 4;

space

;

and, the

In so far as infinitely

does extend,

occupies

extended substance occupying,

" of course, the whole of space, must occupy that of the u material universe as well as any other,

—

any other

" there be.

§ 5. " Let us suppose for a

moment," our antitheist we are now quoting,

continues in the chapter from which

t Few, indeed, and those few atheist*, or, at best, but half-thcists, contend for the existence of matter, in the sense which Antitheos puts

upon matter

dependent for

who, by its

matter,

means something which

existence on mind.

is in

no sense

132 44

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

PRIORI,"

[Part VI.

the being of a substance of infinite expansion, the in-

agent in the production of

telligent

^ this

contended for in the

—what was

per time and place]

things

all

Argument it

to do

—and

all

" [at the pro-

when perform-

ing the

nothing

stance as would be necessary to

in order to give

either matter could not be brought into being, or

must

already shown to be necessary in admitting the very

palpable doctrine of the actual existence of matter."

* ?

feat of creating the universe out of

Was it

much of its own submake room for matter,

to annihilate so

verge and scope enough ?t

suffer ourselves to

If not,

be driven to the conclusion

Ch. IX. par. 10, 11.

From

the work of a very celebrated atheist, cited on one occasion, and borrowed from on many more, by Antitheos, we shall extract a sentence or two which exactly chime with the passages which we have §

just set before the reader.

I shall inquire, 44

author of the famous Systeme de la Nature,

says the

matter

exists

In this case, matter, or the universe, must exclude every other being*who is not matter, from that place which

does not at least occupy a portion of space

Vol. II. ch.

the material beings occupy in space."

ii.

or rather D^Holbach, or those of Antitheos,

it is coolly

at the

which

same time occupying the same

taken

the words of the

for granted, that it is absurd to have 11 44 Refutation ) first of the passages from the (in

Matter certainly occupies a part of space, and from that part, at least, the Divinity must be excluded." 11 Appendix to the 44 System of Nature." Ch. xx.| § 7- In all these passages, whether those of Mirabaud

Again 44

if it

;

space.

two things

But

this

so conveniently assumed, happens to be the very t

Give ample room and verge enough.

Grayh Bard. % Vide

Appendicem.

§§ 6-11.]

ARGUMENT, A

thing which lay

—

place

yea,

to be proved.

PRIORI,"

and

IRREFRAGABLE.

still lies,

evince

—

at our atheist's door

by arguments which would

beyond the reach of rational question,

lutely necessary if

133

abso-

atheism be to stand.

We shall at once admit " the absurdity"

(we quote again from Antitheos) " of two beings at the same time " occupying the same space," in the same respect. For § 8.

this

would be

being

all

one with two beings which were but one

the quality and unity being confounded.

A great

enough absurdity truly. § 9. But that two things may occupy the same space at the same time, in different respects, is, I hope, very far* from being absurd to suppose. But be it what it may, it is nothing less than what the " Argument" has undertaken to demonstrate, § 10.

But the " Argument" does not

strating that,

till it

And

Scholium under Proposition IV. as

we have seen

(vide part.

ii.

4.),

credit for " precision of purpose

" ment."

And

set

about demon-

has gotten the length of the second

therefore,

Antitheos himself,

gives the "

Argument

-0

and exactness of arrange-

we,

who

are standing over

against nothing farther on than Proposition III.,

now

let

how the work in question demonstrates two substances may fill the same space, at the same

our readers know that

is not because we are under any strong necessity of doing so, but only because there is nothing to hinder us from following out a thing which

time, but in different respects, it

our atheist has started, out of season as in

evil

hour

happens, and

for himself.

§ 11. The secret, indeed, has already been divulged and of a truth it will never be easy to make a secret of that which must stare one in the face if he but opens his eyes and turns them in the proper direction. But in place :

of repeating the words which our reader has been pre-

sented with in Part III.

16,

shall

here cite the L

— 134

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

PBIOEi;'

ipsissima verba of the Scholium to

just

which reference has

been made.

§ 12. "

Scholium

" sion, or of

its

The

II.

parts of Infinity of Exten-

Substratum,

have a Substratum,

" being necessarily indivisible from

part,

§ 27. et part. Hi. § 16.)

ii.

" of the " other

The one

And And

ana the parts

Universe

" Extension * * *

»"

each other" (vide

«****.

Material Universe being divisible from each * * * and it, therefore, following that the

" Material

[Part VI.

sort, that

not the Substratum of Infinity of

Here are two

sorts of extension.

which the Material Universe has

the other, the extension of Infinity of Extension.

AS Infinity of extension

necessarily existing,"

(vide part. ii. § 14. necnon § 9.) " and as the extension " of the Material Universe must exist, if it exist, in the " extension of Infinity of Extension ; a part of this, or

" of

Substratum,

its

if it

have a Substratum, (part, but

" in the sense of partial consideration ;"

§ 27. 44

part. Hi. § 16.) "

vide part.

ii.

must penetrate the Material

Universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom,

" of it."

how

and very palpably dethe same space at matter exist. The two things fill the the same time, if same space in different, in very different respects. They fill the same space, the one by penetrating, the other by being penetrated : this, (to discriminate nicely, and not too nicely,) by filling or occupying the space, that, by con§ 13. So,

see

it is

easily

monstrable, that two things must

stituting

fill

it.

When

Antitheos lays down, that it is absurd to have in our view " two things at the same time occupy*' ing the same space," he makes no mention of the doc§ 14.

trine of penetration.

it,

he may

took care to

justify his silence

lent reason which

was

make no mention

by pointing to an excel-

in existence

all

the absurdity,

§§ 12-19.]

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

there was any, disappears whenever penetration

135 intro-

There cannot be complete penetration without two things filling the same space at one and the same duced.

time. § 15. Antitheos,

repeat, takes no notice of the doc-

trine of penetration.

because he could not help

did this, either advisedly, or it.

§ 16. If he could not help what he has done, or rather

what he has not done

;

in this particular matter,

he was

not so clear-sighted as was an author whose ideas are not seldom turned to good account in the " Refutation." M

They

(the theologians) will

insist,"

remarks D^Hol-

bach, " that their

God, who is not matter, penetrates that " which is matter." System of Nature. Vol. II. ch. ii. § 17- [Our readers may naturally, and very laudably, be desirous of being informed what objections the French atheist has to urge against the doctrine of the Deity's It is all the more proper to supply penetrating matter. the information, that our British atheist, so far from ob-

jecting to the doctrine, does not so

to notice

stow a

it.

little

vanced

much

as think

fine,

in opposition to

" trate matter,

it is

our tenet.

"It must be

§ 18. Objection.

obvious, that to pene-

necessary to have some correspondence

" with matter, consequently to have extent

" extent,

;

§ 19. Reply.

buted to

But

is it

material

—

one of the properties

— extension,

a true sine qua non of every substance it,

to have

proved anywhere in the " System

of matter, therefore whatever has extension is

now

to have one of the properties of matter.

of Nature," that because extension

which

right

we may with some advantage beconsideration on what the foreigner had adIn

indeed.

—

attri-

Has a vacuum

(and D^Holbach speaks of a vacuum as quite a possible,

not also a really existing thing ;) has a vacuum extent Then, according to the leaning of the objection, a vacuum

a plenum.

— 136

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

[Part VI.

—

Any

§ 21. Reply.

reason given

The

none to be examined.

IRREFRAGABLE.

" If the Divinity penetrates matter, material/'

§ 20. Objection.

" then

Then there

None.

may

assertion itself

very

correctly be designated, in Antitheos's nervous language, " an unproved extravagance. 1 ' Why, if matter is per-

by a distinct substance, the presumpsomething to the contrary be established, seems

fectly penetrated tion,

till

to be in favour of the penetrating substance being im-

all

material.

" By a necessary deduction § 22. Objection. " inseparable from matter." § 23. Reply.

course, so long as

But no

continues in existence.

been proved to have necessary § 24. Objection. " be in every thing. "

Then

not allow

logian, and,

;

what

is,

so long as

Matter has not

existence.

Vol. II. ch.

The theologians

§ 25. Reply.

may

that

it,

longer.

omnipresent,

This the theologian

System of Nature."

not separated from matter, of

penetrates

will

not allow."

ii.

of B'Holbactis book

but, for all that, every consistent theois

more, every rational man,

will allow

the necessity of the consequent.

And

§ 26.

thus

ground, replied to

we have gone all

over, and,

his

own

that the French atheist has object-

ed to the Deity's penetration of matter. things verily those objections.

But

No mighty

since they are all

that so ingenious and so zealous an objector could bring

we may depend

forward,

on't they constitute the full

strength of his bad cause. §

27-

arise,

led to

make

a reflection, which seems to

not altogether so unnaturally, out of the considera-

tion with which

we have just been occupied. What indeed,

but a passion for atheism, should incite certain to inveigh so mightily against the doctrine of penetration in general

And

we are upon the

subject,

may

not be amiss to

— §§ 20-30.]

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI? IRREFRAGABLE.

137

observe, that

can but

ill

become modern natural

philo-

sophers to incline determinately to look with an unfa-

vourable eye on the doctrine of the penetration of one

substance by another, even though this latter should be, if

any thing, immaterial : Modern Natural Philosophers,

none of

whom

confident,

it is

has yet proved, while

Modern Natural

of is

them are material

Philosophers, whose experiments and

investigations have led tric fluid is

many

not proveable, that light itself

them

to a full belief, that the elec-

a substance most intimately pervading every

material substance.

Let Antitheos, in the character of a

natural philosopher, represent the whole body of the philosophers spoken

of.

Hear him

discourse of the electric

fluid.

— —

as it is always com§ 28. " Should it be demanded " mendable to do on such occasions what the substance

is which we deem to be present in what is usually de" nominated a vacuum, we may reply the electric fluid.

—

" M

its level,

substance

capable of excluding

it.

As water

seeks

the fluid in question presses every where, that

may be

every where present and with this tenpenetrates, in a manner the most irresistible, " every thing that can be opposed to its course." Ch. VII. it

;

" dency, IT

par. 6.

§ 29. electric

The substance

not this lead as

recognised by the

name

fluid penetrates every material substance.

were,

the

way

may be

help us somewhat to conceive

of the

Does how,

that a part of the infinite extension,

of its immaterial substratum, penetrates every sub-

and the electric fluid with the rest, which can any manner fall under the cognizance of sense ?]

stance, light in

§ 30. Whether or not Antitheos saw, 'tis nothing very wonderful that he speaks he does speak as if he saw

—

not, ty,

how

it is

—

that two things may, without any absurdi-

be held to occupy the same space at the same time.

138

ARGUMENT, A

The demonstration matter

Not

PBIOEI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part VI.

of the penetration of matter, where

the very Hercules of his Lernsean Hydra.

exists, is

to see that demonstration in the "

Argument," or

being there, though the demonstration figures in a scholium of its own either of these altogether to forget

its

;

bad enough.

And there

something

which

is as bad very The doctrine of the penetration of matter, is dedutible, by UNDENIABLE CONSEQUENCE, FROM OUR atheist's tenets, as they are given by himself. Unfor-

§ 31.

likely,

worse

else

;

tunate Antitheos! though one door was somehow shut, (at least Antitheos does not say,

he saw

the enemy enter by another, which

open,) to have

not to be closed so

easily.

shall produce our antitheist's tenets, and § 32. afterwards address ourselves to the necessary conse-

quence of them as associated. § 33. In the first place, then, as specimens of one class " Infinity of extension is of tenets, take the following. " necessarily existing, it would be absurd in the ex-

—

" treme to deny." Etc. fyc. Vide Part. I. § 34. Again " Take away matter, and you effect the taking off of " every thing of which we can form the slightest idea. :

" All

annihilated except space

and duration. "t

Ch. II.

t This passage leads me to quote a sentence from a Review of the Argument, a priori" &c. which made its appearance in a No. of

The United Secession Magazine." " Were our minds," says the Reviewer, " to make the most extravagant of all possible supposi" tions, and compass the idea of all the material universe, and even " (let it be said with deep reverence) God himself being annihilated ;| "

" "

still 1

we know

of duration'

it is

certain that

would continue

Both these

" very nature, independent of all being, even of

author of which

may write

can, without running

God Himself—to \

and

infinity of extension

to exist.",.

Atheist" on

God

infinity

are, in their

himself."

The

his forehead, as soon as he

any risk of writing a

lie.

speak with seme, for reverence

If is

can conceive

altogether out of

Behold another Reviewer harping on the same string in Part

§ 14.

— §§31-34.]

Again

par. 26. ;t

ARGUMENT,

•

and space

may

" Matter

infinite.

have

whose non-existence,

NOT BE CONCEIVED

—that

sary

substratum

Ch. IX. par.

true,

award both

a something

and

To *

the *

so forth,

CAN-

a something, in short, that an-

Ibid. par. 12.

not necessary

the

not absolutely neces-

even extension, or space, should have any support

Also

2'.-

much

' :

things to which

desired,

tion

The NECESSARY

and

u swers to our notions of space."

same purpose

Ch. III. par. *

139

be regarded as eternal

must,

" attributes to the latter." like effect

IRREFRAGABLE.

A PRIORI"

whatever."

existence

sure of the necessity so

Gillespie lays hold of the only

can at

its

To make

44 :

be made applicable

all

Ch. XIII. par.

two

— dura-

Finally, take this

existence of infinite space and duration

space."

none of which propositions were" [or was] 44 ever dis" puted." Vide Part, I § 35. t Thus, infinity of extension, infinite space, is plenarily admitted by our author to have necessary existence. § 34.

We shall, in

the question

the second place, bring forward a set

— to be annihilated

diction to say,

exists not

exists quite independently of

caring about

Theology

;

if,

and

God

itself

in other words, if

infer no contra-

there be any one thing which

what is there in Theology worth becomes a phantasm. ;

another suitable opportunity of noticing that criticism

fall in

way, and as assuredly

'tis

for one, I shall not quit this disagreeable subject

thing of

Two

my mind

may never

worth nobody's while till

to search

I deliver

some-

concerning the performance generally.

remarks could not miss occurring

that deplorable Article.

The

first is,

to every sensible reader of

that the

Reviewer

sticks at

dishonesty, however gross.

The most shameful misquotations are never boggled at even though the want of all good faith should shine clearly through. The other is, that the writer has no head (any more than a heart) equal to such discussions. Every one who has a capacity for topics of that nature, will make the discovery, ere any two ;

sentences be read, that, whoever has, the wretched critic has not. t

See. also, " Refutation," Chup.

par.

140

ARGUMENT, A

PMIOBI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part VI.

of passages that speak a very different language. Accept " being existing by necessity is sought for that

first

"is

;

one whose non-existence

it is

not in the

" power of man to imagine * * * * * To seek " in nature for such a being ; to ransack the whole universe " for it were vain. Among real and known existences

was NO WHERE TO BE found."

Ch.

par. 6.

take "If such a condition as necessary or " really exists, * * Why can it not be :

self-existence

made

appli-

" cable to the material universe" ? Oh. II. par. 21. To a similar effect " Matter does not exist by that necessity " which alone is admitted in the argument a priori" :

Ch. V. par. 5. And this " may as well go into the " hypothesis of a vacuum at once * * * What, " then, is a vacuum ? It is space, I presume, without any :

" matter being present at

" It

all."

Ch. VII. par.

Once

as easy to conceive of the non-existence of

" the thing supposed," (to-wit by

" as to

Clarke,)

£c

conceive of the non-existence of that of which we are " ourselves made up, together with the world we inhabit, " and the countless suns and systems occupying space in

" all directions." Ch. XIII. par. 3. Again " Gods " and devils, angels and spirits, heaven and hell, sup" posing them all to exist -could have no claim to ne:

—

" cessary existence, since

" imagine them not to exist" fine: "

Ch. II. par. 20.

And

can conceive matter not to EXiST."t

Thus, matter

Ibid.

implies no contradiction to

by our atheist completely deprived

of true necessary existence. § 35.

collect into a focus the very dissimilar, yet

congruous rays, emitted by that body of light, the " Re" fetation,'' which sends forth no clearer beams than are here

In the one set of positions, we have an extension

f Consider, likewise, Chap.

II. par. 24,

and Chap. IX. par.

10.

.3-5-39.;

§^

which

•

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

necessary; in the other set, an

141

extension not

necessary.

§ 36.

hasten to the consequence resulting from the

We have an NECESSARY, and we have an extension which is NOT NECESSARY. We HAVE, THEREFORE, TWO EXTENSIONS WHICH CANNOT BE THE SAME. TWO EXTENSIONS THE ONE WHEREOF CANNOT BE ANY PART OF conjunction of the two kinds of positions.

extension which

THE OTHER. its

But a non-necessary extension cannot by

presence annihilate any portion of a necessary exten-

matter—which has the non—existing along with, not contained of extension which —the necessary

And therefore

sion.

;

necessary extension in.

the

extension

TRATE

infinity

;

the infinite extension, or space, must PENE-

matter must BE PENETRATED,

;

§ 37. Such, then,

tota, et totaliter.

the conclusion to which

we are

And

compelled to come by Antitheos's express tenets.

wherein does that conclusion of " Scholium II.

Not

differ

from the conclusion

any point at

all.

Let the reader give his utmost attention to what we have here been urging. For, the doctrine of penetration demonstrated, atheism falls down, dead as a stone. § 38.

And

knows

Antitheos

moment

in the affair.

us forget

And

the best of

own

little

all, is

—the doctrine of penetration

lows from his § 39.

he knows but

this, else

of any

— never

let

necessarily fol-

principles.

So that, to speak

words, as they occur in the

in allusion to

our atheist's

of the passages on which

first

we have been animadverting, Theology has not entangled There is no its advocate in an inextricable absurdity. which

that our

absurdity in the case, but one

;

author should stand up for the

atheistical hypothesis,

hold principles from which the

first

conducts to Theism, and to nothing plete necessity.

this,

and

grand principle which else, follows

by com-

142

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI? IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part VI.

§ 40. After the words referred to in the preceding religious friend who on thus "

section, Antitheos goes

" has corresponded with

me upon

this point, alleges that

" the substance of the substratum of " not material"

— Ch. VI.

cording to our atheist's

mode

extension

religious ac-

of reckoning, nothing

requisite than to be a theist.

infinite

To be

par. 14.

this understanding,

can easily help him to another religious friend (a friend

in the very best sense) ly,

who

same

alleges the

thing,

name-

that the substance of the substratum of infinite exten-

sion

immaterial.

And

this friend

no other than the

" Argument"" himself, who, though, to

Author of the

speak truth, he has not alleged that the substance of the

substratum of

infinite extension is

not material, has,

be not sadly mistaken, done much more than merely

allege

that which implies the immateriality of the substance of

and who will some one shall

the substratum in question

;

persist in think-

by truly As for the " Refutation, ^ of arguments, except those which are " a very clever approach"' to shockingly bad ones, it contains none. The Author of this production, himself, shall ing he has done

so, till

valid arguments, that the thought

witness for us, that the "

evince,

erroneous.

Argument" has undertaken

demonstrate what involves the immateriality of the substratum of " ting his

" * "

infinity of extension, or expansion.

(Mr

Gillespie's)

keep

* it

substratum of space

reason can be assigned *

" Admit-

why

infinity of

expansion

should have an immaterial something to

in existence, that

would not prove"

— &c. &c.

Here it is tacitly assumed, that the Ch. VII. par. 13. " Argument'' seeks to reach an immaterial substratum of infinity of expansion.

So that the "

introduces Antitheos to the front of what

a certain

and a good

as the very

asses'

sense,

and

religious friend"

may be

held, in

to his opprobrium, alas

bridge of the demonstration.

Observe,

— "

§§ 40-41.]

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

143

then, Antitkeos's " footing" and bearing, as he prepares to

make

he must

the leap, and pass the bridge. or else

;

atheism into powder. is

mere

repeat,

Immediately

babble.''''

loudly accuse

Observe,

hear

—

all

•"

But

this

readers

But I Then surely come you will

of having omitted something.

assure you, not one word has been missed.

something

how the passage

Behold, he springs aloft

to be effected. is

Get clear of

over on him, and crush his

will roll

follows.

True

but what

;

not think mends the matter. 4k

something he has been taught to

tate of his sounder judgment."

stance and matter are the same.

nymous and

—

This

repeafc,

mere

babble

—not the

— And why so — ?

The words

•"

;

dic-

Sub-

are syno-

in the sense of the

words

mutually exhausting each other, Antitheos means.

Yes,

convertible"

the words are convertible in that sense, IF the barely

assuming the thing our atheist had to prove, the mere uttering of an

unproved extravagance," be

necessary to be done in the 44

When," our antitheist proceeds,

to-wit, as 44

;

not

they become unin-

and immaterial matter."

ZTw-substantial substance

inasmuch as we might, then talk of an unsub-

stantial substance

substance

merely convertible words)

telligible

that

all

Vide supra, § 2. used otherwise" (than,

affair.

;

namely, substance that

Tw-material matter

matter

Par. 14.

;

to-wit,

Unintelligible indeed.

not

matter which

And

as such

hand them over to our materialist's tender mercies. § 41. (One word in relation to the latter unintelligibility. There is no opinion, however extravagant, but has had its advocates in the world, no assertion so wild as Antitheos not to have been made by some philosopher. t holds, and who is he who will think, Antitheos does not rightly hold

that to talk of im-material matter

But attend.

to talk

celebraflfjd

main-

t Nihil est tarn absnrdum quod non aliquix £ Philo$o]>hi$ asserat.

— Tully.

unintelligibly.

very

144

ARGUMENT

A PRIORI;' IRREFRAGABLE.

tainer of the materiality of mind,

had

also

[Part VI-

been an advo-

Dr Priestley, in his cate for the immateriality of matter. " History of Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and " Colours," declares for the " scheme of the immate" riality op matter, as it may be called" And we shall not take upon us to say, that he so declares himself with

reason on his side than he has when he appears, and he appears throughout his " Disquisitions on Matter and " Spirit" as a sworn friend to the materiality of mind.

less

From p.

matter\ this Doctor says, in the latter work, (vol. i. 144, 2d edit.) he has " wiped off the reproach" [a long

* absolutely incapable of standing one] " of being * " intelligence." Which perhaps he had accomplished all

the more

easily, if

matter be immaterial,)

— 145

PART

VII.

THE " ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRI" BUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1.

The next paragraph

mences thus " has

in the '^Refutation" com" But, to refer to the first Proposition,

not been demonstrated that infinity of extension

" exists necessarily

—

? that it exists, per se, by the most and metaphysical necessity ?" Ch. VI. par. 15. By the way, here we have the right word, i. e. " metaphysical" Though no farther back than the thirteenth

" abstract

paragraph, we had " mathematical," the wrong one.

Vide

Part. VI. § 2. Antitheos in a certain place speaks of a " magic rod" possessed by " the reasoners for the being " of a God according to the argument a priori who

are said to " work miracles with" " necessity" which

name

of the rod.

magic rod

must be

the

(See last Chapter, sixth paragraph.) :

But

and no mistake.

whether they a rod or no, should be presumed, notwith-

opinion, that our author's magical powers,

are centred in

standing his confirmed distaste to the supernatural, to be

nowise inferior to those resident in the rod of the a priori reasoners noticed.

turn,

when one

what is meand the mathe-

likes,

taphysical necessity into " mathematical,"

matical back again into " metaphysical necessity" plies,

methink s,

;

im-

a stretch of power equal, and indeed su-

perior, to the virtue ascribed

by him to our magic rod.

146

We, he

ARGUMENT, A

;

PRIORI;'

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part VII.

says, "

work miracles" Whereas, he works an and that's more than a miracle. has been demonstrated, that infinity of exten-

impossibility,

§ 2. It

It has not been,

So the first question is answered. and what is more, it never will be, de-

monstrated that

infinity of extension exists

sion exists necessarily.

per

se.

Antitheos has his second question replied to, but not affir" The first Proposition" maintains the necesmatively.

sary existence of infinite extension

;

but determines no-

thing concerning the topic whether that extension exists

itself

In the language of the note upon Pro-

or not.

position I

The

proposition affirms that there

" nity of Extension, but affirms nothing more?' pendix" to the " Argument."

is Infi-

See " Ap-

two interrogatories which we a manner, our atheist " In what sort of predicament, then, must that asks " reasoning appear, which gives up a leading and univer" sally admitted truth by placing it in a questionable " position ?" The reasoning that does so must appear, and, which is more, must really be, in an ill predicament But the This much may be held as settled. indeed. " then ;" the significant particle which insinuates that § 3. After putting the

have answered

in so satisfactory

" that reasoning"

But we come

Gillespie's

—"

there's the rub."

to the proof of the justness of the insinua-

" Mr Gillespie s dilemma recognises, at least, the " possibility of infinite extension requiring a substra" turn to support it infinite extension, which is itself

tion.

—

" necessary

Yea

Gillespie s

dilemma, or

dis-

junctive proposition, does recognise such a possibility

and, what first

;

a longer journey in the same direction, the

Proposition of Part III.

is,

inter alia,

taken up in

demonstrating that " Infinity of Expansion" or Extension " cannot exist by itself," that, on the contrary, " Infinity t

Puta Part. X.

§ 88. not. f.

2-4.]

•

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE.

147

" of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum or " Being." Gillespie, then, in his dilemma, and out

of ;1

too, fully " recognises, at least, the possibility^ of in-

finite

extension," " which

ing a substratum" " to support

it,"

— We

that

Infinite extension

is,

necessary," " requir-

is itself

shall not say

a " substratum

a substratum to be a substratum.

is itself

But

necessary.

then,

necessary that infinite extension exist per

not

it is

least,

this

has not been shewn to follow from the other posi-

tion

;

or,

moreover, from any thing

The

else.

positions.

Infinity of extension exists necessarily, and, Infinity of

extension exists per to treat

them

though

;

they expressed

has pleased Antitheos

much about

the same

The

thing, are positions of a widely different character. latter one is is

so,

than

no more necessarily is

Wke

because the former

necessary, that because there are such

things as vain assertions cemented together so as to form

weak arguing,

therefore the vain assertions should exist

Only conceive vain assertions that never proceeded from any idle tongue, or unfortunate pen that never

per

se.

existed, consequently, but

pure per

state

— wherever you

Refutation to reside in

Words are not so badly

by themselves

off,

please

The

congeal'd in northern air/f

though they must submit to be heard

Words

frozen

have been uttered.

And

at the thaw, as those assertions must be. in

hanging in the without even a

the atmosphere must

first

though there cannot be vain assertions that never were made, it is perfectly true there is an abundance of

yet,

the commodity in the world

—to try our patience.

Some

very vain assertions are not so far to seek either

though we mention no u § 4.

Gillespie 's t

;

al-

least,

the

place.

dilemma recognises, at

Hudibras.

Part

Canto

148

ARGUMENT, A

" possibility of " to

support

" sary

for his comfort,

§ 5. "

IRREFRAGABLE.

infinite extension requiring

—

How is

PRIORI,"

infinite extension,

this

I think,

which

we have

[Part VII.

a substratum

is itself

neces-

told him.

And,

he shall be told yet farther.

Was

it found," demands our antitheist in con" tinuation, that although space possessed a few of the " Divine attributes, it did not possess all, nor any thing

" like all that were deemed needful to constitute a " respectable deity ? Notwithstanding appearances, I " should hope not. But. at any rate, we are again landed " in a

quagmire of absurdity

—the absurdity of supposing

" a thing to be dependent and independent at the

same must be conceived a priori necessary, to " talk of a substratum being necessary in the same sense " of the word is nonsense." Par. 15. What (ioesAntiWithout theos here understand by the word " space V an accompanying word, or phrase, to determine the exact sense it is to bear, space always is rather an ambiguous term. Different schools of philosophy have employed -

If space

time.

to stand for very different things. § 6.

And

it will

be of singular use in clearing matters,

we present an enumeration of the different things understood by philosophers when they are treating of space. if

—In explaining the various ideas which have been tained, one thing shall be carefully attended to

enter-

We shall

take pains not to represent those opinions from which we dissent through the ject.

The

by space

inquiry

And

medium

of our

to be,

What

own

belief

on the sub-

do philosophers mean

should we presuppose, at least should

our exposition assume, that space stands for some particular thing exclusively, the representation of the senti-

ments of certain could hardly be given with fairness. In fine, though we have a fixed bias in this matter, we shall endeavour, while we deliver what others think, to proceed as

we had no preconceived notions

all.

§3 5-7.]

ARGUMENT,

IRREFRAGABLE.

A PRIORI,"

149

A few remarks, also, shall be thrown out, intended shew that of the various opinions some approach nearer Where notions are most to the truth than do others. completely opposed, the object viewed by the minds in § 7.

possession of them cannot possibly be the same, or

there

be not more objects than one, the sentiments cannot possibly all

be correct.

brought

us, as to

damental points.

'Tis certain enough, that the reports

what space

is,

—With regard

disagree in the most funto the exposition,

shall

not take space to stand for any one thing more than for

any other. But when we pass to the animadversions, we shall, on the contrary, by all means assume that space is that space

space

;

thing

less.

entitled to

make

great deal with

nothing more than space, and no-

assumption which, doubtless, we are well :

And

one that

— A thing

consider as remarkable.

be found to carry a

will

you may

But true

naturally incline to.

that so simple

is,

an act as holding so many of the conceits concerning space up to the light of the axiom, space lay bare their extreme emptiness.

— The

space,

digression as a

whole, in short, will be useful, inasmuch as

it will

go to

determine whether there be in nature space without matter, and.

body

is.

And

there be, what space without respect to besides the general purpose

to serve, parts of the digression it)

will

it is

designed

(we seek not to conceal

be attended with no inconsiderable collateral ad-

vantage to our cause.

150

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING SPACE. M. DES CARTES, MRS. COCKBURN, ETC.

—

Some

philosophers have considered Space to These may be divided into two classes. be a substance. First ; those who hold Matter and Space to be the same. Second ; those who contend that Space is a substance, and is distinct from matter. § 8.

Des Cartes having defined extension to be the made extension and matter to be the same, could admit of no space void of body, § 9.

essence of matter, and thus

could not admit, in other words, of there being space

which is,

not material.

consequence of the definition

that the material universe

infinitely

idea of the infinity of extension no

extended

man who

The

reflects

the subject can get quit of ; and, therefore, if extension " Puto" says Carbe matter, matter is without bounds. tesius,

" implicare contradictionem, ut

["I take

" universe

And

prima?.

mundus

sit finitus."

to involve a contradiction to say, the material finite,"

in extent.]

Epist 69. Partis

to reduce the position, Matter

is finitely

extended, to a contradiction, this ingenious theist had

nothing but his own vain extension, and extension

definition, is

the sun, or above, could he have

namely, Matter

matter.

What

else

under

from a rather ingenious author. Some (I^nean Des Cartes and his fol" lowers) confounding the ideas of extension and body have § 10.

shall introduce a passage

" by this

been led to assert the absolute

" even of the material universe

;

infinity

tho' they could not but

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 8-12.]

151

" at the

same time be sensible that their hypothesis in some sense rendered matter or body a necessary being. " by depriving the Deity both of the power of creating " a finite whole at the first, and of afterwards annihilating " any part.'' An Impartial Enquiry into the Existence " and Nature of God," &c. By S. C. (S. Colliber.) I add, that if extension, or space, B. II. Part ii. ch. 2. and matter are to be confounded, matter must have been, as well as must be, eternal, and is also necessary in the "

;

—

sense of exist

inferring a contradiction to say,

unless

;

sometime to

does not

will

be,

and can be imagined not to be at

have

it,

that

all

extension began all.

There can be space without matter, or body else, body is eternal, nay necessarily existing, that is, cannot be sup:

posed non-existent.

—

The opinion has been entertained by some, Space apart from matter, and that Space without matter is, itself, a substance. Under this head, may notice, in place, their notion we the first who tell us, § 11.

that there

that Space void of body stance

;

the two.

who

a kind of intermediate sub-

neither body nor mind, but a something between

And

in the next place, the sentiment of those

are willing to be held as maintaining, that Space

God. § 12. being,

—

(1.)

The

notion that Space

a substance between body and

a peculiar sort of spirit,

has been

adopted by divers writers of no very remote period.

distinguished female metaphysician expresses herself in " I see no absurdity in supposing, the following manner.

" that there " or bodies.

may be

********

other substances, than either spirits

There should " be in nature some being to fill up the vast chasm be* * * " twixt body and spirit. * What a gap be:

twixt

and intelligent immaterial subsome being, which, by partaking

senseless material,

" stance, unless there

—

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

152

[Part VII.

" of the nature of both, may serve as a link to unite them, " and make the transition less violent ? And why may

u not Space be such a being ? Might we not venture to " define it, an immaterial unintelligent substance, the place " of bodies, and' of spirits, having some of the properties " of both V* Mrs Cockburris Works. Birch's Edit. vol. i. p.

390-l.t § 13. This lady writes as

body and spirit were two and as if intelligence

distinctly different kinds of substance,

was the peculiar attribute of spirit. Senseless material substance, and intelligent immaterial substance thus she ;

distinguishes

And

alluding as she does to the violence

of that transition which passes from the one substance to

the other, she represents the substances as being separated by a mighty and irremoveable

gulf. She, good was yet possibly, undivulged) how to wipe off from matter the

woman, had not learned the it still is

—

secret

reproach of being miserably

ill

(it

—

qualified for sustaining

the heavy burden of thought. ( Vide Part. VI. § 41.^ Her distinction and representation we are disposed to

commend.

And

as for her ignorance of the secret

;

probably she was wiser without the knowledge. § 14.

But now

what

to us the important part in

the quotation, the statement, to-wit, of her opinion, that space

substance,

unintelligent substance,

yea an im-

was the author of " A Defence of Mr and other acute and excellent performances. The Defence was much prized by the incomparable author defended. She was also in high favour, on account of her writings, with Dr Thomas Each Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury, and the giant-minded Warburton t

Mrs

Catherine Cochburn

Locke's Essay,"

—

of these Prelates supplied a preface to a production of her pen.

Thomas Sharp, Archdeacon of Northumberland, carried on a controversy with Mrs Cockburn, as to the true foundation of morality. She surely was an honour to her sex. The words quoted in the text, occur in her " Remarks upon some writers in the Controversy concern" ing the Foundation of Moral Virtue and Moral Obligation."

—

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 13-17.]

(Of a truth, that space void of matter

material substance.

—which

153

—

what she means by space is ^Tra-material, none can deny.) By what arguments does Mrs Cockburn is

pretend to evince, that her opinion has foundation in the nature of things sage,

I find

only one argument in that pas-

and no more than one other The argument occurring

in all

infers the truth of the hypothesis

vantage attending

it.

her writings.

passage quoted,

in the

§ 15.

embraced, from the ad-

Space, argues

Mrs Cockburn, u by

" partaking of the nature of both" " senseless (or unin" telligent) material, and intelligent immaterial sub" stance"

But we must break

§ 16.

about that Space " ties of

vested

both"

in,

remark how

comes

invested with " some of the proper-

spirit

Because

it is

and

Why

body.

Space thus

immaterial and unintelligent.

in-

Had

Space is not matter, and is desan attribute this of spirit, Space is not body and lacks a property of spirit there had been

been

said, that, seeing

titute of intelligence,

;

But as the

nothing very objectionable. stand, the only

lady's

property' bestowed on spirit

—a cold negation

words

^-mate1

and the only property thrown a mere privation too. over to body is ^-intelligence To return from this interruption, which, we may say, was forced upon us, and for which we humbly beg pardon of riality

Mrs Cockburn § 17.

;

—

She argues, we repeat, that Space, by partaking and intelli-

of the nature of both unintelligent material,

gent immaterial substance, ture,

inasmuch as

useful in the realm of na-

serves as a connecting link,

and takes

can be taken from the violence of the transibetween substances separated by such a " vast

off all that tion,

chasm."

— Space,

intelligence,

in short, connects intelligence

matter and not-matter.

But

and non-

there be a

connecting link between matter and no matter,

intelli-

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

154

[Part VII.

why might we not extend the and introduce a connecting link between existence in general, itself, and non-existence by way of rendering the transition from the one to the other less violent ? But shall we indeed be ever able to say, without gence and no intelligence

principle,

;

violence to truth, that the great gulf betwixt non-exist-

ence and existence Tamely endured a bridge § 18. is

The other argument

wondrous length 1

to which allusion

was made, is an un-

not, indeed, intended to evidence, that Space

intelligent substance

without matter

second argument that Space

much

this

ment

But

a substance.

for immateriality, space all

the world over.

This

intended to evidence no more than

apparent,

in question

" of space

and as

immaterial

it will

then,

if it

do a great

really render

deal.

contained in these words

The argu" The idea

not the idea of extension, but of something

" extended" % § 19.

all, it will it

Remarks. argument be to go for any thing at obviously go for something very weighty. Thus

Now

if this

deserves our serious consideration. § 20. Space the argument implies, is not extension, but is, a substance, extended. ,

something, that

§ 21. But if Space be an extended substance, Duration be, on the same ground, an enduring substance. The

may

two things are

Time are each a

in the sine

same predicament.

qua non of every thing

Space and else.

They

non-existence of either cannot be conceived.

both t

limitless.

They

are, in fine,

shall decide,

are

on a footing of equality

Paradise Lost. B. II.

Who

The

„

when

doctors disagree

when Doctors differ from ladies % " If Space " and Dm-ation * * * be not (as His plain they are not) themselves " substances'" Br SI. Clarke's Ans. to 5th Letter.

And who

shall decide,

—

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 18-25.

And

every essential respect.

stance,

155

bare space be a sub-

be necessary to assign a sufficient reason

will

why bare duration

not.

It will

be consequentially ne-

and absolutely impossible. This is an argument from 22. § next shall be an argument from the cessary,

§ 23. Space

the consequence.

of a substance having extension

Now

The

the fact.

state

This the

argument involves. is an attribute of space, takes, of necessity, cogthe substance extended, and the nizance of two things, But though the hypothesis does so, extension thereof. This is an appeal to consciousness, and as the do we ? court applied to is competent to take the case in hand, so, it need scarcely be said, no other tribunal is qualified. Do we (I say) in conceiving space, as we conceive a thing being, do we conceive, in addition, a thing having, extenHow, and wherein is space, the substratum exsion ? tended, distinguishable from extension, the property of space The plain and simple truth is, space, the substratum, and extension, the property, are not distinguish-

lady's

the hypothesis, that ex-

tension

—

able at

all.

W^sonceive

only one extension, only one

space.

§ 24. for

So much

for the

an argument from

argument from

the fact.

Now

the icord.

" The § 25. Space just means extension or expansion. M words Space, Extension, Amplitude, and Expansion " are," says the author of the Impartial Enquiry, " no**

thing different, neither in their genuine signification

M nor in their original use"

" wont to be assigned

—

" whatever distinction

merely arbitrary."

See his Dis-

course concerning the Nature of Space.

§ 25. Sjiace, then,

merely another term for extension.

And therefore, to say, Space is something which is ed, or

sion

which

extension,

something which

is all is

extend-

one with saying, Exten-

space.

Which

propositions

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

156

[Part VII.

are indeed nothing more than the truth, in one view of that in which the propositions are beheld as

matters,

viz.

truisms

But, according to our lady's

what are tions

— Space

position

of reckoning

something (in the former equivalent pro-

ran, which

or possesses, extension

merly, which

But

space.

mode

equivalents, are tantamount to these proposi-

;

—but now

becomes) which

and, Extension

—at present) which

has,

something (for-

has, or is invested with,

simple space (in short) be not only exten-

but likewise a something or a substance

sion, or space,

possessing space

;

then, assuredly, simple space

And we

thing more than simple space.

some-

have already ar-

ranged, that we are not to permit any person to depart

from us with the impression, that space

any thing more

Vide supra, § 7§ 26. It may be remarked, in approaching the termination of this department of the subject, that space or ex-

than space.

may by all means But if it be, the circumthat mere space is, of itself, a

tension without any matter he connected with

filling it,

a substance.

make The very

stance will not

out,

substance.

reverse, indeed.

substance,

Space, then, so far forth as

§ 27-

not be a substance. stance,

elevate

to change its identity.

taching to the nature of substance

we must metamorphose which space resides § 28.

point, something

—

(2.)

it is

space only, can-

to the

rank of sub-

Before the dignity atwill sit

that which

easy upon space, space into that

in.

have, in

line of arguing.

§ 29.

S^ace supposing a

another thing, truly, from space being one.

all this,

confined ourselves to one

But the reader may which occurs

consider, at this

in the third section, above.

As the notion which we have

just consi-

dered regards Space as unintelligent, so the opinion next to be noticed views it as an intelligent substance. 30. Dr SI. Clarke has an observation on " the weak§

— SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 26-30.]

" ness of such, as 11

have presumed to imagine Infinite Space

to be a just representation or adequate idea of the Es-

" sence of the

Supreme Cause." t

curs under his 4th Proposition

157

What the Substance OR Essence*

stance

— Vide

The observation Which runs thus of that Being,

Part. V. § 10.] " which

oc:

[or Sub-

Self-Existent,

t Is there no confounding here of the objective and subjective of space and our idea of

it 1

fail in

preserving the distinction be-

tween object and subject, was no uncommon thing in the Doctor's age. The full consequences of the failure were rendered very apparent in But though the Doctor sometimes unthe age which preceded ours. fortunately lost his ideas in things, and changed, in spite of nature, things into ideas, yet, set him upon it, he could condemn all confusion The following passage may in regard to the external and internal. be admired, consistently, by the most finical stickler for the metaphysics which proceed " on the principles of Common Sense." " The u principal occasion or reason of the confusion and inconsistencies, which • appear in what most writers have advanced concerning the nature

—

" of Space, seems to be this that (unless they attend carefully,) men u are very apt to neglect that necessary distinction, ^without which " there can be no clear reasoning,) which ought always to be made :

" between Abstracts and Concretes, such as are Immensitas and Immen" sum ; and also between Ideas and Things, such as are the notion u (whicii is within our own mind) of Immensity, and the real Immensity * actually existing without us."

Correspondence with Ldbnitz.

Note in

5th Reply. X The Doctor employs these two words as perfectly synonymous, and entirely convertible. This will be very plain to him who reads what is under this 4th Proposition. In which, the Doctor, when

speaking in relation ing

times, (as

God

—

— Supreme

— the Self-Existent, — —

Necessarily-Exist-

Being Substance Cause, uses, no less than five we have denoted,) substance and essence as expressing exac tly

To say nothing of his employing, more than once, when treating concerning other things or beings. So that we may cite, as completely applicable to the present case, a marginal note in his Preface to " The Evidences of Natural the

same thing

the two words indifferently,

u and Revealed Religion." u sence

— " In

this

whole question, the word Es-

not to be taken in the proper metaphysical sense of the word, " as signifying that by which <i thiny is what it is. * * * * But Essence, " is all along to be understood, as signifying here the same with Subu stance." is

;

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

158

" or Necessarily-Existing, "

all

possible for us to

we have no comprehend

idea, neither is

;

no idea

The observation

stance

space of

;

—that

God.

pro-

have

an eye on those who, con-

imagined that we have an idea of such subour idea of

as Clarke has

itself,

persons

sets

The

God we

it."

position lays down, that of the substance of

trariwise,

[Part VII.

infinite

—

space

—not

infinite

the idea of the substance

The great Rector of St James's, then, knew of who laboured in trying to represent space to be

the substance of the Divine Being. § 31. " Some," says Leibnitz, " have believed " absolute space) to be

God

Himself.'

(real

Third Paper to

Clarke, 3.

§ 32.

And

bad judge he

Bishop Berkeley, good Bishop Berkeley,,t no

and -no lover of

of the sentiments of others,

language deficient in precision, speaks of " that danger" ous dilemma, to which several, who have employed their "

thoughts on this subject, imagine themselves reduced

" to-wit, of thinking either that real space " that there

God

something beside

God, or

which

" uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable."

else

eternal,

— "It

cer-

" tain," continues the Bishop, " that not a few divines,

P as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the " difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or an" nihilation of space, concluded

a Divine Substance

for,

must be Divine"

observe, his view here

viz.

directed

" And to those who put forth, " that real space is God. " some of late have set themselves particularly to shew,

God

" that the incommunicable attributes of Principles of

Human

Knowledge, Sect.

agree to

OX VII.

it.'

Thus

far Bishop Berkeley.

§ 33.

vindicate the t

shall seize this favourable opportunity, to

memory To

of a writer not so

much known now

Berkeley, every virtue under heaven.

—Epilogue

Pope

to the Satires.

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 31-35.]

Against the respectable author

as once he was.

we have

And

whom

our eye, has a serious accusation been brought

Isaafr Watts.

Doctor

159

great lover of truth was the

he be detected making a wrong state-

ment, we can have no

the false re-

difficulty in ascribing

presentation to the true source, and

knew no

roughly contented that he

may

rest

most tho-

better himself.

The charge which the Doctor's pen was trusted manner " Mr Raphson, a great

§ 34.

to drop flows in this

—

" mathematician, has written a book on this theme, De M Spatio Reali,f wherein he labours to prove that this " space is God Himself, going all along upon this suppo;;

sition,

that space

and must be something

" then his reason cannot find an idea for

" head."

Philosophical Essays.

Essay

real

Sect.

;

and

below Godiv.

But this testimony is not borne out by the fact Mr Raphsons book neither labours to prove, nor so much § 35.

as simply affirms, a thing so very absurd as the assertion,

that space soii's

" ••

attributum is

The 13th

God.

proposition in

demonstration concerning space (viz.

an attribute (or

See Cap. V.

And

immensitas)

Raph-

Causa?"

est

[" Space

not in one place only of his book,

this great mathematician maintains,

space or immensity,

" Spatium

immensity) of the First Cause."]

it is the it is

Prima

that space, infinite

nothing more than an attribute of

the Supreme Being. J

So very

far

was he from giving

t Published at London, in mdcxcvii. X

The following words occur

u *

Suprerni Entis infinitum

mbseqvens

sit

these passages are to be found

Mam

—"

Dc ********

in the Dedication

tract atvs ayit

Spatio Reali (ptatenus

antemum Attributum." In Cap.vi.

" Sjiathim reale

infantum, seu invisi-

ipsam immensitatem " esse Prima Causa," &c. " Amplitudo extensionis infinita, immaisam in " Prima. Causa essendi diffusionem, seu infinitam illius, vereq; intcrmina" tarn, essentiam, cxprimit." **

bilem

incorporearn tS Infinite extensionem,

— SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

160

VII.

Part.

any countenance to the monstrous position with which Watts has connected his name.t

and of

§ 36. Before losing sight of our mathemafician,

our metaphysician, we shall note, by way of setting mat-

Reverend accuser

ters farther right, that the

during one stage of his

(at least

vide part. x. § 57-) went did, to making Space to be

life

nearer than Joseph Raphson

In the very same paragraph wherein the mathe-

God.

matician's sentiment

" existent without us,

See also

we call

ibid, § 3.

distance." —Locke.

Vide Part. VII. % 44.

Essay, B. II. ch.

xiii. §

27,

— 202

PART

OF THE SENTIMENTS OF PHILOSOPHERS CONCERNING SPACE. LAW, WATTS, BROUGHAM, KANT, BERKELEY. § 1.

— V.

We hasten to

Hither class of opinions

becoming brevity

;

outposts

the

And

fifth

shall

and

last opinion, or

make our

notices with

except some case requiring a longer

consideration present § 2.

itself.

have seen, we have conquered, the foe

in their

the remainder resolve to defend themselves in

citadel.

have been upon the ground wherefrom

Space, specially Space in the distance, appears an exter-

nal nothing

;

and

it is

our present misfortune that we ap-

proach a territory, from which,

Space does not

agreeably resemble an internal nothing, it is

covered by a

'twill

dis-

be because

way.

conceit, perfect in its

—Multo nebulae circum Deat fudit amictu, Cernere ne quis—

The

peculiarity of this case,

is,

that a concealment

when

fected as entire as that of the ostrich,

head from

its

Not

pursuers.

and do excuse,

The Goddess who must be understood

influence of

is ef-

hides

its

to keep the reader too long

in suspense (we can imagine,

Dulness, u the mighty mother"

whom

here, is,

his anxious without doubt,

the Dunciad sings.

Under the

—whether or not sometimes Metaphysic calls for aid on Sense, —

whose yawn,

Metaphysics never call on Common-sense, but despise you and every thing as natural as you !

Book IV.

646.

to say, !

How much we

— SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 1-8.]

uncertainty

The

;)

opinion which

to a hearing, modestly yet distinctly

that space § 3.

to be admitted

and firmly whispers,

a mere idea of the mind.

mind

idea of the

think Space

now

203

Then, upon

turn out to be a

will

not a substance, so

Mode

;

word,

an idea, as

for

I it

very usually taken to be a condi-

tion or quality of one.

§ 4.

But

to descend to particulars,

drudgery of eyeing Space as

man's idea

this or that

—

and submit to the

appears in the shape of

—

The following passages are taken from the- Notes to Archbishop King's " Origin of § 5.

" Evil."

(A.) Bishop Laic.

There are *

" have nothing

ideas,

and simple ones

extra correspondent to them, no proper

" ideatum, archetype, or objective reality, and t;

why

Chap. "

I. sect.

don't see

may

not be reckon'd one of them." " Pure extension, which Note (3.)

that of space

an abstract

which

too,

—

form'd by the mind

idea,

and, as

itself,

—

" such, has no foundation

anywhere else." " Absolute " Space, which exists only in the mind." Note (6.) ConAnd as to Law's opinions sult also Note (7-) etc. etc. we beg leave to refer the curifarther, regarding Space, ous reader to the " Inquiry into the Ideas of Space,

—

Time," &c. 1734. or 1735. A work this, not seldom named and quoted by writers of that period, and subsequently, but now scarcely to be met with. "

§ 6. According to our Annotator, then, space

an external existence, never an objective reality ists

only in the

§ 7-

And

mind

is,

in short,

what, according to

is :

an abstract

Edmund

Latv,

never It ex-

idea.

an ab-

? at least, what is that abstract idea which composes, or is composed by, Space ? § 8. An idea an idea, even in the most unfavourable event. And Law agrees with Locke, in making idea stand for every thing about which the mind is conversant, or

stract idea

;

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

204

[Part X.

" which can be the object of perception, thought or un" derstanding." Note (2.) But we shall not pretend par-

what Locke took an idea to be. known, are, upon the whole, the

ticularly to declare here,

His " ideas?

well

'tis

most perplexing words ing one thing

in his

book

Sometimes,

at other times, another

;

and

;

—

But thus much we may safely remark,' and it we do remark, that, whatever Locke took idea in rerum naturd he knew but of Substances, Modes,

a third.

—

suffices,

to be,

and Relations.

Idea, therefore,

must be one of these

Vide Part. VIII. § 19. 21. 25. (B.) Dr Watts.—We shall be a

three. § 9.

signify-

frequently,

—

little

particular

with the Doctor, as it has been said, that he 4£ has with " great ingenuity discussed all the several opinions about " space."

Mrs

Cockburn's Remarks.

This which has been said, § 10.

(Vol.

I. p.

390.)

generally thought.

Watts' Essay on Space

entitled, "

fair in-

" quiry and debate concerning space, whether it be some" thing or nothing, God or a creature." Philosophical

Essays

—Essay

§ 11.

The Essay

in question falls naturally to

di-

vided into two well- denned parts In the first of which the author shews that " space cannot be merely an exist" ence in the mind," &c. In the ; /her, he (Sect. II.) :

labours to

out " the nihility of space"

make

Space being

nothing

real,

(sect, xi.)

but a mere abstract idea."

(Sect. XII.)

§ 12. 'Tis altogether unnecessary that

nutely regard

former portion.

that,

all

that in vain does tion, to invalidate

in propriety,

e believe,

Watts

we should mi-

appertains to the

most people may attempt, in the

what, in the

first,

easily see,

second por-

he advances on the

topic of the external existence of space. § 13.

general,

But to detail. Section I. explains the subject in " Void space," says Watts, " is conceived by

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 9-15.]

205

" us as scattered through

all the world between bodies, u as interpersed through all the pores of bodies, and as " reaching also beyond all the worlds that God has made,

* " and extended on all sides without bounds. * * " Space " The grand inquiry is, What is this space V 14 is," concludes the Doctor, " either something or no-

M thing " or

mere idea

mind, it exist without us, something existing without. if a substance, it is created is a substance or a mode :

something,

either a

it is

in the

;

" or increated/'t § 14. In Section II. the author " is

makes

" idea," but

" something without us."

§ 15. In Section III. he endeavours to

that space t § ti

plain, " that

Space cannot be a mere nothing," but, on the contrary, that it " cannot be a mere a " sort of something

make

appear,

a substance.

With which agrees, so far, Dr Clarice's summary of concep" All the conceptions (I think) that ever have been or can be

ms.

" framed concerning Space, are these which follow. " absolutely nothing, or a

" another, or that

mere

idea, or

That

it is

either

only a relation of one thing to

body, or some other substance, or else & property Note in 5th "Reply. Between the two Doctors, the agreement at bottom would seem to be complete as to fundamenThe dissenting Doctor alludes not to the tals, but in one particular. conception, in virtue of which space is only a relation, &c. But he had Elsewhere, it in his power to assign a good reason for the omission. it is

" of a substance."

he maintains that the fancy of space being only a relation, is unin" Some philosophers, particularly Mr Leibnitz, have telligible. " fancied Space," these are our Doctor's words, " to be a sort of rela" tive

mode, and

u which order

call

the order of co-existent beings or bodies,

their general situation or distance

Thus, after

* a manner which is unintelligible to me, they go on to explain their " idea of Space." Sect. III. § 2.

reader all

the

Our own is

general division, and minor divisions, include (as the

by this time aware)

members

all

the

members

in Clarke's division to boot.

pose, to present, once for

all,

of the opinions anent 1 Space. iThis word

6et

table of

in Watts' divisions,

may

and

be to some pur-

our division, and subdivisions,

Vide Appendic.

among David Hume's

Scotticisms.

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

206

[Part X.

"If Space be something which has an

§ 16. 44

——— —

existence

must be either a substance itself, or a " mode or property of some substance for it is most evi44 dent) that it must either subsist by itself, or it must sub44 sist in or by some other thing which does subsist by itself. -There can be no medium between subsistence in 44 and by itself, and subsistence in and by another. In Doctor is the perfectly think right. Vide all this, we without

us, it

;

14.— Atq;

Part.

But

§ 17-

what

Part.

VIIL

follows,

§ 25.

we think he

perfectly

Space cannot, he maintains, be a mode of a sub44 That space cannot be a mode or property,'''

wrong. stance.

he seeks to prove, by such arguments as these : 44 If space be a mode, where is the substance § 18. (a.) 44 Answer. The substance is where in which it is," fyc. ?

—

mode

the

§ 19.

to be sure.

is,

(b.)

—Answer.

Wherein does In this

the substance differ from the

whereas the

mode

extension, the substance has extension

many

Vide Part. VII. §

other modes.

mode

merely space or

and duration and 39.—-Part. VIIL

§ YJ.—Etc.

§ 20. (c.) That Space is not an absolute mode, the Doc44 Space tor would fain prove, and would prove thus :

4< 44

neither wants any subject to inhere in" c, no other being that we can conceive to make

wants

exist."

Answer. Whether this be truly so, or no, depends on what 41 Vide PUrh VII. § 5. Et Part. Space* lies under 9

§§

1. 2. 3. 5. 7.

t " Is this vacuum,' or immoveable, indivisible, and penetrable ex" tension, a substance or a mode ] It must be one of the two." Bayle. Bmjl means a vacuum, said by others to exist. Crit. Diet. p. 3083.

means, that vacuum must be either substance or mode, if it be at If " Space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, " it folloAvs undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance, « whose affection its extension is." " True Intellectual System of

all.

the Universe,"

Part

VIIL

7G9-70.

In the note

to the twenty-fifth section of

hereof, Cudivorth gives one-half of the reason.

—

]

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 16-28.]

207

§ 21. Other arguments, as we may say, are. spoken of. But they seeem far too wretched for serious notice. What, for instance, need one reply to such an argument as that which the next section shall set forth ? Remember,

the thing to be proved

that infinite space

is,

a sub-

stance.

§ 22. (d.) " Space wants no created being to support " its existence." Answer. dare say, not.

§ 23.

The Section

words

closes with these

" All the

" arguments that ever I read to disprove space to be a

" substance, carry no force at all with them, and seem to " be mere assertions, not only without reason, but con-

trary

On which

it.

and the following 24.

subject, see Part VII.

sections, to § 28, inclusive.

Section IV.

having been proved

manner which we have

— that

" surely

cannot be a created substance."

doubt "

And

in this

the

Space

a substance, he shews that

God

Himself.

If so, no

V. evinces that " Space cannot be God. 11

§ 25. Section

PaH. VII.

witnessed, but to the Doctor's

satisfaction

appears to be

—

§ 21,

entirely concur with Isaac Watts.

% 38. 39. 40.

44.—etc.

Vide

But we're no^

sure,

that he and we would agree, as to the arguments by which

the mutually received proposition should be established. § 26.

ing

The Doctors arguments are such

as the follow-

:—

§ 27. (a.) " If " are situated in

Space be

God, as

One might answer to the doctrine

§ 28.

(/3.j

" though in

'tis

God

Himself, then

in their

proper place

all

bodies

—"

x.r.X.

This cannot properly be an objection the doctrine

itself.

" If Space were God, then the Divine Being, its

whole

be unmeasurable,

" yet hath millions of parts of

" each other, measurable

itself,

that Space hath no separable) parts

— [Mark that —

really distinct

x.r.X.

one bear

from mind,

what Watts proceeds

— SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

208

[Part X.

at,) and that finite can bear no proportion to he might well admit the strength of the position

to glance infinite,

in the objection.

For

this position, also, is the doctrine

itself.

§ 29. " to be

(y.)

third " consequence of supposing Space

God,

this

Then every part

" will contain Divine Perfections in

" some part of each of them."

which,

shall turn to a place in

to a sixth Letter.

The

of this divine space

complete, or only

x.r.X.

For a

reply to

Dr SI.

Clarke's

Answer

individual Consciousness of the

One Immense Being, is as truly one ; as the moment of time is individually one, in all places

And

present at once.

the one can no more properly be said to be an

" or a mile of Consciousness, (which

the

sum

of"

ell

[Dr

Watts'] " objection,) than the other can be said to be an

ell

or a mile of Time.

This suggestion seems to de-

" serve particular consideration."

are" confident,

that this constitutes a basis for a triumphant reply. § 30.

If infinite space

(3.)

extended. " a spirit

But God " is

were God,

God

is infinitely

the most perfect spirit."

not extended."

In reference to the

And

first

whieh,propositions, consider Part VII. §§ 38. 39. 40. 44. etc.

—And

in reference to the third, consider

§ 34. with the following sections

Appendix B. § 31.

—Ak.

24.— And Part IX. Note

The Section concludes thus

Part

III.

\ of Part VIII.

(t) to § 39.

The

strongest

arguments seem to evince this, that space must be God, " or it must be nothing." The strongest arguments seem to evince, as you, good Doctor, saw yourself in your second And if any arSection, that Space cannot be nothing.

guments evince, or even seem to evince, that Space must be God, they are (we may depend on't) removed from the strongest arguments by the whole diameter of being. § 32. One reason why we deemed it to be expedient to go over those four arguments intended to shew, that Space

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 29-34]

20,9

may gather, if he ponders the word3 instantly to be quoted. They occur in the same Section. The remark contained in them appears t(j be " Most of the inferences which I in all respects just. cannot be God, the reader

" drew from the supposition of Space being God, are just " and natural, if Space be God's immensity," &c. § 33. In Section VI. the Doctor gives " a review and

" recollection of the argument."

" enter § 34. Well was he entitled to proclaim " into the abyss of space, infinite and eternal space, and :

" our thoughts are

lost

and drowned was the

declared, reviewing as he

in it." first

What

he thus

half of the way,

he might as truly have cried out at any subsequent stage

At the very beginning of this Essay, the " Would any one imagine, that so an idea as that which we have of space, should

of his journey.

author had said " familiar

" be so abstruse and mysterious, so difficult and unac" countable a thing, as that it should be doubtful and

" undetermined to this day, among the philosophers even " of this

knowing age, what space

" substance or mode,

" nothing."" effect

And

" It

God

in the

;

whether

be a

or a creature, something or

Preface he had written to this

strange that philosophers, even in this en-

" lightened age, this age of juster reasoning, should run " into such wide extremes in their opinions concerning " space that while some depress it below all real being, ;

and suppose it to be mere nothing others exalt it to <; the nature and dignity of Godhead." Dr Watts, we say, had so written and, of a truth, even by the time he had gotten the length of Section VI., well was he entitled " After all our philosophy" [Something like to demand half the word would have done.] " and toil of reasoning" [Such as it is, even with toil thrown into the scale, to make heavy weight.] " shall it be said that we know not ;

;

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

210 44

whether space be a mere nothing, or whether

—

be the

and eternal God V " Are the eternal God and a mere empty nothing, so near akin to one another, that we cannot see the difference between them that

" true 44

[PartX.

—

ther space be

are not able to

tell

nothing

whether space be God, or whe-

Reverend Doctor,

Indeed,

appearances look threatening

And

be dreaded, unless some third road

the very worst before us

(if

may

will

by which we may escape from paths so fraught with deceit and danger. Meanwhile, we heartily join in your prayer, that the shadows of your thick darkbut look for

may be

it,)

and that you may be led out of the and mistake, and helped to make your way through the abyss of night and so on. § 35. There appears to be, in the 7th Section, nothing ness

scattered,

labyrinth of gross ignorance

—

worth our notice

;

one nothing be excepted.

Space,

'tis

now darkly surmised, may ultimately turn out to be " a " mere non-entity or nothing." The Proteus, after going through

all his

shapes,

may

without any shape at

exist

shadow of a shape.

And

fix at last,"

and submit to

ay without even the

all,

hereabouts

lies

the mystery.

The 8th Section compares Space

§ 86.

darkness.

to shadow or

Is not darkness extended beyond the

utmost

We can no "bounds of the material ci^tionf <c more assign the limits of darkness, than we can the 44

" limits of space. 44

Again, as darkness hath a seeming im-

mensity belonging to

it,

has

not an eternity also ?"

Suppose that darkness is extended, infinitely extended, and is eternal What can be inferred ? That extension or space is mere non- entity or nothing ? Nay, nay. § 37- But has darkness, in reality, extension and duraDarkness by itself is not long, nor broad, nor tion ? No deep and as extent is not an attribute of darkness, so :

;

neither

time.

The

thing which

dark

may »

have, or

—

— SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§35-41.]

211

rather must have, these attributes or conditions.

you

suppose darkness and absence of body to coexist, then

you have dark

from

{Vide Part. IX. § 24.)

space.

In Section IX. the Doctor tries

§ 38.

the hint, that space

—or bodiless

nothing but the absence of body

—that

—

without body

as shade

;

take courage

—may be

or bodiless extension.

may be

that extension without body

is,

extension

—or the absence of light—

the

absence of light and to raise some efforts of reasoning, " to " prove space to be nothing real/'t Space is inactive and :

impassive

God

Therefore, argues this Logician,

ture

And

therefore,

Such

nothing." are not at

all

God

Space cannot be

nor a creature.

cannot be

nor a crea-

Space must be " non-entity or We answer: We

Watts' reasoning.

disposed to dispute either the premiss or

the conclusion of the to the second, while

first

But with regard we must

enthymeme.

we go

in with the premiss,

cast out the conclusion, as well as (therefore) that pre-

miss which the conclusion subsumes, not

viz.

That what

God

Himself, nor a creature, is non-entity or nothing. § 39. Section X. is " a re-examination whether Space

" has any real properties.

The

§ 40.

consideration advanced here may be is " emptiness, or absence of body or

first

said to be, that space

matter'" § 14.

and

§ 41.

And

x.r.X.

as touching

this,

see

Part IX.

§ 24.

The

second consideration says, in reference to

Space's supposed "capacity to receive bodies into it," " that " space is no otherwise capable of receiving body into it " than as the emptiness of a vessel makes it capable of re-

" ceiving liquor"

Emptiness t "

Or no

Wh,ich

real being," adds the Doctor.

medium between no

wish

x.r.X.

cordially granted.

either space without matter, or space with

thoughts to

But

hope, that there

and nothing real ; as I would not be nothing real which yet, arc not real Beings. real Being,

—

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

212

and subtile

thin

matter. Verily,

body into

ble of receiving

empty

Space

[Part X.

no otherwise capa-

than as the space within an

vessel (vacuum, for all practical purposes,)

makes

the vessel capable of receiving any sort of substance which is

no larger than the space.

Space, in

no other-

fine, is

wise capable of receiving body, than as space

capable

of receiving body.

§ 42. The third consideration consists of this " Space " can never penetrate matter * * wheresoever mat:

" ter

—

•" Space is no more, and is is, there Space is not.*' " entirely lost, when body is placed in the room of empti" Ms. 11 Relatively to the topic of penetration, consult

Part VI.

§ 12.

and down to the end of

The fourth

§ 43.

infinity of space is

§ 36.

may be

consideration

said to be

not an infinity of fulness.

weigh what occurs in Part IX. § 57. § 44. Fifth consideration

The

to which,

Etc,

Infinite space is really divi-

and indeed divided, by the bodies situated in it. This is the same sort of consideration as the preceding. Space is not full, because there are bodies in it Space is

sible,

divided, because there are bodies in

The

considera-

same bottom to. remove the bottom remove the bottom from the other.

tions resting on the

from the one,

it.

;

" The true reason why § 45. Sixth Consideration. " space appears to want no cause, is not that it has such " a real and substantial essence as 46

by any cause, but that

it is

is too

such a

big to

be produced

subtile, tenuious, unes-

" sentzal, or imaginary thing, that has not essence, nor exist4

ence,

nor reality enough to want a cause, or to be pro-

" duced, or caused." actly as

we found

We are

§ 46. Seventh Consideration.

existence

too

much on

leave

happy at leaving

this ex-

it.

Space has not necessary

can be annihilated.

The reader has had

this subject in the course of our work, to

anywise necessary to add aught in this place.

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 42-52.]

§ 47.

The

rest of the Section

taken up in

we can have no

involves space,

illustrating

And as

a parallel between space and emptiness.

213

emptiness

objections to offer to the

—

of the comparison. There may also be as much analogy between space and shade, that is, dark space, as ever the Doctor likes. § 48. In the 11th Section is answered an objection institution

against the nihility of space. § 49. The objection amounts to this " space between 1 any " two bodies" or,

—

"20

miles of

you please, 20 nonillions of miles of space between any two points ''

—

For

mere nothing."

" cannot be

be nothing, the bodies, — or points,

the miles of space

— are

close toge-

Rather a shrewd objecnot so easy to see how it is to be

ther, or touch one another."

tion indeed,

and

'tis

got decently over. § 50.

The

reply consists of

a round denial" of the

truth ofcthe consequence in the proposition, If there be nothing between the bodies, or points, then they are close

together

Were

the miles nothing, the bodies, or points,

would not therefore touch. Emptiness, that

Space.

thing would be between.

Nothing.

Emptiness would be between.

—

But Space is nothing. NoBut what would the between

Therefore, between the bodies, or points,

there would be a nothing which was a nothing. § 51. Alas denial, unless

we have nothing

to bring against the round

were something not very unlike the square

or the cube of the miles of space. But the calamity to which

we are subjected in

such a case

is,

that space, or emptiness,

of no use

Except to keep bodies from dashing against

each other, when a better preventive of collision

not to

be had. § 52.

The

nihility of

rily established,

Space having been so satisfacto-

the 12th and last Section evidences

the best possible way,) that space

(in

"nothing real." Well

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

214 This

tallies

with

[Part X,

But the rubric immediately

its nihility.

goes on to do more than merely insinuate, that Space is " a mere abstract idea." Indeed And is a mere abstract !

idea,

an abstract

§ 53.

idea,

an idea, nothing real

But not to be

in too great a hurry.

nihility

" After

all

" these debates, wherein we" such are the first words of the Section, " have been endeavouring to prove space to " be nothing real without us, yet perhaps we may allow "

to be

without us

an abstracted idea of the mind."t This, then, was what we had :

by non-entity, or nothing, or

Nothing real to

understand

Space

nihility.

a non-

entity, or nothing, or nihility, as far as 'without us is con-

But as

cerned.

far as within us

concerned, Space

" an abstracted idea of the mind." so

much

compass, we are

§ 54.

by winds from

tossing

now wafted

Well

for us, if after

the quarters of the

all

into secure anchorage.

Isaac Watts presently repeats and answers

the arguments which, in the beginning of the &say, he

had used to disprove Space to be a mere idea. Space is § 55. The first argument, as now noticed, is without bounds, and therefore is not a mere idea in our :

minds.

A capital argument, in sooth And the answer " We can form an idea of infinite space of the ?

'Tis this

Our ever-grow'^a kind, and it may be a mere idea still. " idea, indeed, is not actually infinite" Good very good.

' 6

—

For an answer,

were capital

true the matter of the answer

—

idea

surely

were

is, it is

it not,

(by

ill

that,

however

luck) nothing

That we can form an idea of Space, does

to the point.

not

;

—

Space.

prove, that Space

Who

idea, or that our

but such dreamers as the worthy

Doctor ever dreamt that our ideas of Space might run when they had lost and drowned themselves in the enlarging and contracting themselves as Space abyss, grew from less to more, and shrank from more to less ? riot

—

See Essay

II. Sect. iv. par. 9.

Essay V. Sect.

par

alibi.

;

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§ 53-58.]

§ 56.

The

now mentioned,

second argument

215 as proving

that Space cannot be a mere idea, is as follows Space " seems to have a necesssarij and obstinate existence. :

The answer being to this effect Space has hardly so much external existence as certain mathematical truths, which the Doctor, who has a worthy object in view, calls external truths ; and, asks he in fine consistency, Have :

these external truths, which are nothing besides ideas,

any real existence extraneous to the minds that conceive

them

After

safely leave

all

we have

that

written,

to the reader, to place himself

we may

between the

argument and the answer, and judge which of them has the better cause by the hand. § 57. "

conclude," says

paragraph of his Essay,

Dr Isaac

Watts, in the last

after the laborious searches of

" thought, reasoning and reading in several stages of " my life past, these are the best conceptions and senti" ments that

can frame of space.

— The conceptions and

sentiments bear very evident marks of having been framed, not only in several stages of his

life,

totally opposite, states of his mind. <;

grant there

may be some

but in several, and proceeds " I

— He

difficulties

yet remaining, and

some darknesses which yet may hang over the subject. Learned men have laboured hard to scatter them in for" mer ages, and in the present too, without full success

" yet, perhaps, in future time there may be a way found " out for adjusting all these difficulties to the more comM plete satisfaction of some following age." I must, of

—

course, leave

not adjusted all the at

all

those is

events,

who can find

readers to decide, whether

difficulties

touching space

of this, that there it,

whereby to

;

have

but certain,

must be a way, to

set right every thing that

wrong.

§ 58. If the Doctor, by " difficulties'' t

Vide Appendic.

and

darkness-

— SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

216

[Part X.

most distant manner, difficulties and an incomprehensible cast, we have unques"Tis the height of absurdity tionably a remark to offer. to fancy, that the human mind can conjure up difficulties

es," means, in the

darknesses of

human mind canknow the incomprehen-

of the incomprehensible kind, which the

How

not solve.

could the mind

sibilities to be incomprehensibilities, unless it

had comfort-

able glimpses of that higher region, wherefrom the in-

comprehensible things appear indeed to be things incomprehensible

To comprehend

that certain things are of

an incomprehensible character,

at least to

comprehend

the things which are afterwards found to be incompre-

And comprehending

hensible.

the things

—

not that

incompatible with the things being not of a comprehen-

Puta Part. IF. Appendic. § 7- quoq; ? IX. § 17. Not. t. 59. With Br Watts, thus, space is " an abstracted

sible character

Part.

§ " idea of the mind." § 60.

And

mind, and

that he counts

all

abstracted ideas of the

ideas whatever, to be modes of a substance,

all

the reader of his second Essay will perceive, by abundance of evidence.

Referring to each of the four sections of that

Essay, in particular, and to passages scattered through his

volume of Essays,

in general

selves with citing these four

" or modes."

(Essay

—we

words

II. Sect,

shall content our-

" Abstracted ideas

ii.)

an abstracted idea of the mind. An abstracted idea of the mind is the mode of a substance. Therefore Space is a Mode. Thus Br Isaac Watts. And therefore we are under the painful necessity of sending him over to those who will have Space to be a Mode, and nothing more, and nothing less. The Doctor will agree § 61.

Space

with bis company, so far as antimodists are concerned. But the moment an investigation takes place with regard to the nature of the modality,

Watts, and those of his

— SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 59-63.]

way

must company being

of speaking,

of the

over the whole

217

retire within themselves, the rest

the while at liberty to expiate

all

field of nature,

and even

wander beyond

the solar walk or milky way.f

—

Lord Brougham. In the " Preliminary Discourse," and in the Section already referred to, (vide § 62.

(r).

part. ix. § 60.) the following words are to be found. " To " argue from the existence of space and time to the exist" ence of any thing else, is assuming that those two " things have a real being independent of our conceptions " of them for the existence of certain ideas in our minds :

' ;

cannot be the foundation on which to build a conclusion

" that

any thing external to our minds

exists.

infer

" that space and time are qualities of an infinite and eteru rial being is surely assuming the very thing to be proved,

a proposition can be said to have a distinct meaning

" at all which predicates space " thing. " ideas , u

and time as qualities of any What, for example, is time but the succession of and the consciousness and the recollection which we

have of that succession" § 63.

his

In this passage

x.r.x.

not obscurely hinted, that

Lordship takes Space and Time to be conceptions or

And of course, Space and Time cannot be " qualities of any thing," i. e. " any thing external

ideas in our minds.

" to

our minds,"

conceptions or ideas

Space and Time. (forget not)

that

is,

Space and Time be no more than

—namely,

conceptions or ideas of

On Lord Brougham's

hypothesis, which

makes Space and Time conceptions or

internal affections,

—

verily vain to

ideas,

speak of

Space and Time as being qualities (or any thing else) of any object external to our minds. Our conceptions, in one word, cannot be external to t

us.

Pope— Essay on Man.

Ep.

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

218

[Part X.

have little to do with his Lordship's ima§ 64. ginings about Time, bat as " time" is introduced, we shall

throw out a

hint,

which may have some claim to a brief %

consideration.

But

to the

is the succession of not Time (Br Price led the way, long ago,

Time, says his Lordship,

§ 65. ideas.

remark) presupposed by, or

in,

Succession ?t

What

were a succession that occupied no time, that had no duration

succession which will never succeed

ing any wise man's good

a Succession, actly the

is,

The

opinion.

so far as this question

same as the

position,

Time

—

position, is

in gain-

Time

concerned, ex-

Time.

And that, '

by the bye, is as true as the position, Space is Space. § 66. But Time not only is the succession of ideas, it and recollection of the succession. is the consciousness

Time

Time, and not only so, for Time is the recollecPerhaps oar readers may be more able

tion of Time.

than we

are, to help out*his

may be

§ 67- It

Lordship at a dead

noticed, in connection with

lift.

what

stated in the words under our examination, that they are

amazingly

inconsistent

with what

conveyed at the con-

clusion of the Section wherein they occur.

Remember,

that space and time, and, by consequence, infinite space is, immensity and and conceptions " in our minds," and, therefore, are not any things " independent of our concep" tions and " cannot be the foundation on which to " build a conclusion that any thing external to our minds

and

infinite

time (or duration), that

eternity, are ideas

" exists t

And

then weigh the following particular

We may measure duration by the

succession of thoughts in the

" mind, as we measure length by inches or feet but the notion or u idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the ;

" notion of length

Essay

III. ch. v.

antecedent to

its

Writes he not well

being measured."

Reid.

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

§§ 64-69.]

" eminent use" of " the

219

—

argument a priori" " The fact of those ideas of immensity and eternity, forcing them" selves, as Mr Steicart expresses it, upon our belief, seems " to furnish an additi(#ial argument for the existence of 11 A mind in which " those ideas," or, as the other passage calls them, " conceptions," are ? That is not said. " an Immense and Eternal But (and pray mark it ) " Beings Etc. § 68. Space with Lord Brougham is a conception or an idea. And gives he out aught as to what the conception or idea is \ The conception Space is not " independent of u our conceptions." The idea Space is an idea " in our " minds." So would his Lordship reply. And perhaps there might be good reasons why we should not press the :

subject farther. § 69.— (a.) Kant.— The Father of Critical Philosophy makes Space, pure Space, to be a form of our sensibility

—the original

—one of the — only the original

use of understanding itself

of the transcendental aesthetic

of the homogeneal,

rules

synthesis

[For the benefit of those among

fyc.

our readers who may not be familiar with the Kantian terminology

— as well as with

stands for any thing

gone as

;)

what

stands for (when

and who, therefore, have never

far, or as high

As metaphysic wit

can

fly

;

have to say, that the words put into italics are not errors of the press A thing which these readers, but for this I

—

assurance, might have been, well and wisely, ready to

That space, says the Professor of Konigsberg, in which all motion must be, (which itself is therefore absolutely immoveable,) is named pure or absolute space. imagine

Again

]

—We conceive

absolute

immoveable, intrans- #

poseable space, to which we in thought refer, at

last, all

— SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

220 motion.

—The

space has

IDEA.*!*

an absolute immoveable

conception of

itself

no object

etc

[Part X.

Absolute space, in

fine, is

but

etc-

§ 70. Yet we must not neglect £o notice, that though Kant thus takes Space to be nought except an idea or a conception, he can turn a new leaf, and write in a quite different strain. § 71.

I ('tis

Emmanuel Kant who speaks) by all means Space and Time

have a conception of Space and Time.

themselves are however not conceptions, though

Again

conceptions of them.

wood: so have as

wood

itself is

—

too conceptions of space and time.

no conception, Space and Time are

wise no conceptions.

Etc.

But, in the second place, Space

an external existence

have

But like-

etc. etc.

Space

§ 72. In the first place, then,

§ 73. After

have a conception of

wood

a conception.

not a conception

—

It is

exists externally.

almost a pity to be under the

all this, it is

necessity of bringing a third philosopheme of Kant's before the reader's eyes.

pheme next

— For the philoso— not be on

say

pity, I

to be introduced,

if it

does not succeed in

swallowing up the other two things,

account of any lack of good intentions

any rate § 74. nothings.

will

'twill

— The attempt

be made.

Our Professor has several kinds of nonentities or One of them, is the Nonentity or Nothing

which has not the original use of understanding, reality, (nihil privativum.) Such is the confor a foundation ception of empty or pure space. J t Does absolute Space, in which be, contain the material universe is

all

motion

is said,

by Kant,

If matter be contained in an idea,

—

not matter too an idea 1 How will Kant's followers answer \ am not sure, but what Kant rather makes pure space ens imagi-

% I

harium,

mena."

i. e.

an empty intuition without an

object.

See his " Prolego-

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

3§ 70-80.]

How

§ 75.

these three very apparent contradictions are

we cannot

to be reconciled,

they cannot be reconciled at §

76.

—

who had

make Space an

Perhaps

stay to inquire.

all.

Bishop Berkeley.

(e.)

place, to a writer

them

221

— But we come,

in the last

much reason

fully as

as any of

idea.

" All extension," says the good Bishop, " exists % 77. " only in the mind. 11 Principles of Human Knowledge. Sect.

" That

LXVII.

" without the mind,

(absolute space)

clear

cannot exist

upon the same

principles,

CXVI.

But

multiply quotations to the same purpose, would be, in

all

".that demonstrate/' &c.

conscience, altogether a § 78.

Space exists

And

with Berkeley, § 79.

way

§ 80.

The

Space, extension, Principles.

Sect.

Therefore Space,

an idea. does the Bishop of Cloyne take the

mode.

But no

tainly something very like

ideas

mind.

of idea."

elsewhere the same.

And what

idea to be

work of supererogation.

in the

the mind " only by

XLTX.

Ibid. Sect.

;

not a mode, though cer-

it.

following passages might lead us to suppose

were modes or properties.

" are active indivisible, substances

The former

(spirits)

the latter (ideas) are M inert, fleeting, dependent beings, which subsist not by

themselves,

t " It

is this

but are supported by, or exist

in,

minds or

circumstance that will be found, on examination,

" be the principal stumbling-block in the Berkeleian theory, and which " distinguishes it from that of the Himfoos, and from all others coin*

" raonly classed along with

by metaphysicians; that

annihilation of space as an external existence

;

involves the

thereby unhinging com-

of the mind with respect to a truth, about OF ALL WITHIN THE REACH OF OUR FACULTIES, we Seem tc " be the most completely ascertained and which, accordingly " was selected by Newton and Clarke, as the ground- work of their ar" guraent for the necessary existence of God." Dugald St en-art's Philosophical Essays. Essay II. chap. ii. sect. 2. pletely the natural conceptions

" which,

;

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

222

" spiritual substances." "

spirit

Principles.

Sect.

[Part X.

LXXXIX.

has been shewn to be the only substance or

" support, wherein the unthinking beings or ideas can " exist." Ibid. Sect. " I know what I mean,

OXXXV.

when

affirm that there

spiritual substance or

" support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and per" ceives ideas." Third Dialogue. " That there is no " substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit, is to me

Many are the similar passages. Ibid. Now what is a support but a substratum or subAnd what is a thing supported but a property

" evident." ยง 81.

stance or

mode

ยง 82.

But yet though Space

idea

made an

and an

idea,

seen to be a thing supported, and Space, thus,

represented as very similar to a property

;

Space

ra-

ther in danger of being taken for a property or mode,

than of being in reality a mode or attribute. ยง 83. " Those qualities (extension and figure) are in " the mind only as they are perceived by it that is, not ;

" by

way of mode XLIX. " Look

or attribute" &c.

you, Hylas,

when

Principles.

Sect.

speak of objects as

* * * * " existing in the mind My meaning is " only, that the mind comprehends or perceives them " and that it is affected from without,-)* or by some being ;

" DiSTiNCTt from itself."

same

And

Third Dialogue.

the

sort of thing in other places-

ยง 84.

Thus have we treated of every

distinct opinion

which can be entertained regarding Space. son can righteously add a sion, or

member

any per-

to our General Divi-

can with the least propriety subdivide farther our

subdivisions, he will cause

to be clearly understood,

that we have not gone over

all

the various opinions.

have no objection to oppose, should any one desire to put t

assumption of Space here

—

$6 81-89.]

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

upon

what we have written, and subject

trial

223

„

it,

in every

possible respect, to the severest examination.

§ 85. Before losing sight of our very long Digression,

and turning once more towards the " Refutation," we shall improve the present opportunity, and remark one or two things which could not perhaps be more conveniently noticed elsewhere. § 86. Space being

many

made by philosophers

to stand for so

word being, therefore, of so the " Argument" never employs

different things, the

ambiguous a description, it, but in one place, which

—

passage

§ 87.

the " Appendix."

The

as follows. Infinity of

Extension

necessarily existing.'

" Proposition. § 88. " Let the extension be of space merely, or of u matter merely, or of space and matter together.'''' Etc.

—

tide Part.

VII. § 2-t I hear an inquirer demand

Then

§ 89.

—

be so very ambiguous, how comes used, in the first Part hereof? t § 1. It

—

i. e.

did not suit our purpose,

you please

space without matter.

infinite

brief, the sufficient,

take for granted (even so little,

is.

That there

from the thing extension; not expansion,

viz.

from the extenthe business of the second Scholium under Prop.

sion of matter

;

I. to

demonstrate.

fact,

had the

it is

sets out

extension, infinite

expansion, or pure space,

IV. Part § 2.

the term

The

The " Argument"

what nature the extension

pure space,

to be used, so freely

— so much, as) the separate existence of pure space

denoted by the unambiguous word caring of

—

first

distinct

Proposition in the demonstration (in place

of being, " Infinity of

Extension is necessarily existing,") been in these terms Infinity of Space is necessarily existing ; — it might have been objected That it was unwarrantably, for without proof assumed, that in nature there is space where there is no matter A po:

—

without doubt, of vast consequence, as against atheism (vide and by no means to be laid hold of, before a right to possession be established. sition,

part. ix. § 6. 7. 8.J:

— SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

224 reply

employed in no tech-

least, if it

ever occur in a truly

that space, in that Part,

is,

nical sense

whatever

— At

[Part X.

technical sense, any other sense would,

considered, answer to the full as well.

all

things being

Let a

man

affix

what idea to space he pleases, the grand purport and object of what is advanced in the Part we speak of, will not, in truth and reality, be at all affected thereby. We

make

challenge our inquirer to

the experiment.

§ 90. Nay, substitute for " space," on every occasion,

(and the same observation applies to " magnitude," and " immensity,") the

quire

word

particular ambiguity

;

—the sense may —a word attended by no

extension

to be, infinite extension

re-

and the meaning and

force of the

passage, properly understood, will remain untouched. § 91. In fine, all that Part

that something

requires at bottom to

necessarily existing, be magnitude, or immensity, or simor space, something the

be admitted,

is,

ply extension.

But

hear another inquirer address me.

In the 27th section of the same Part (so is the second inquiry prefaced) Br Isaac Watts is brought in, saying, that we § 92.

But subsecannot conceive Space non-existent, &c. quently, he denied the necessary existence of Space. ride supra, § 46. atq; § 56.

etc. etc.

In these circum-

and altogether right, to apply the Doctor to that use which we find him forced to be of in

stances,

was

fair

that 27th section

— My answer

quite at hand.

'Tis

two-fold.

upon Dr Watts the FIRST and with Dr Watts the SECOND, we had there nothing whatever to do. Fide supra, §§ 11. 12. 57. We have had indeed a good § 93. I ran

many

things to say to

;

Watts the Second, (vide supra,

ad § 57 ) but certainly the occasion had not arwhen we were no farther on than Part I. § 27. Per-

§ 35, usq;

rived

haps a deal of remarkable attention has atoned for any

§§ 90-94.]

SENTIMENTS CONCERNING SPACE.

delay which

may have

225

taken place in paying our respects

to the last- mentioned Doctor, to-wit, the

Doctor

in his

last-alluded-to character.

§ 94. But, again, tho' later stage of his

existence

life,

— meaning, by

tinct in every respect

far as I

be true,

Isaac Watts, at a

denied that space has necessary space,

an external something,

from matter

;

—

still

dis-

he does not, so

remember, exactly deny any where the necessary some kind. He no where af-

existence of extension of firms of

all

extension whatsoever, that we can conceive

to be entirely blotted out of existence.

section of Part

first,

extension

done as well as " space."

—

all

And

extension

Ut vide supra,

in the

27th

—would have

§ 90,

220

PART THE

XI.

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIAN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

" BUTES OF GOD,"

We must now request our reader to retrace his and consider a second time the words quoted from Taking Antitheos in the fifth section of our seventh Part. ยง 1.

steps,

for granted that the reader has reverted to those words,

we repeat our

interrogation,

stand by the word space, as ยง 2.

We have

more nor

less,

does Antitheos under-

occurs in that passage

Space

with our atheist.

Is the "

et seq.

seen, that

What it

Space, and neither

Vide Part,

IX.

ยง 10.

space" with which at present we are

concerned, to be held as denoting merely bare space or exIf so, " to talk of a substratum being necessary," even " a priori necessary," to space, is, I should hope,

tension?

very far from being nonsense.

stratum to

infinite

Nay, that there

space or expansion,

is,

a Sub-

observed,

demonstrated in " Part III." of the " Argument." Part. ยง 3.

{Vide

VIL If,

ยง 3.) contrariwise, by " space" Antitheos

substance which space supposes,

if it

means the

supposes such

;

it is

indeed nonsense to talk of a substratum to space being necessary a priori, or in any other sense of the word necessary

For, in the case contemplated,

to talk of a substratum at

all.

it is

nonsense

'Tis assuredly nonsense

to talk of the substance to the substance, or of the sub-

ARGUMENT,

§§ 1-6.1

IRREFRAGABLE.

A PRIORI,"

stratum to the substratum, of Space. substance,

Our

§ 4.

227

If space stands for

stands for substratum.

atheist does not inform us, in so

many

words,

But from the circumstance of his making " space" take the place which <c in" finite extension" occupied, we are entitled to conclude, which sense he uses the term.

he employed the term

The "

former of the two senses.

in the

may be

connection, in short,

held to determine, that

stands for bare space.

space"''

§ 5. Besides,

not as

words which follow

much as this indicated by the " On the the " Refutation

" other hand," says our author, " if it (space) stands in " need of a substratum, the foundation-stone of this great " argument must crumble into dust, and be unfit to serve " as a substratum to any thing."

to which

Space

need of a substratum, this must be because Space

stands in

And

a property.

substratum

(of

which

Space

it will

a property

—to

stand in need,)

give

will

indeed

cause the foundation-stone, of an argument to crumble into dust, but the

ment for

cum

for

^ e B e ng

the being

A A.

not.

argument

will be,

of a Refutation. § 8.)

word

not the "

Argument God." but the argu-

{Vide Part.

XII.

§ 7-

in Antitheos^s ear, as to

whomever Deity The

the foundation-stone of the great argument (by

handled) from Space, to the existence of pillars of the

diction

if it

may

shake, and

fall

involved in supposing that

pillars of the

world world

fall,

had never been,

—

too

— — (no contra;

) but, though the and the universe of matter be

— the

foundation-stone of that

great argument standeth sure. § 6. A remark of somewhat the same nature as the remarks which our antitheist has in the 15th paragraph of Chapter VI., (all of which paragraph we have now gone over,)

we meet towards the end

" retrospective

of his volume.

In his

and concluding remarks," he concentrates

—

—— 228

ARGUMENT,

— IRREFRAGABLE.

A PRIORI,"

[Part

" into one view the chief features, the shortcomings,

Mr Gillespie's

" anomalies of"

and

" extraordinary attempt to

" prop up, upon rational principles, what has nothing to do " with such principles, but which must for ever remain a "

mere matter of

Chap. XIII. par. l.t

faith."

this ere proceeding farther,

rance we have for

it,

that

—

'tis

Gillespie's

in rational principles to his aid,

§ 7- In

now about

—Ponder

our antitheist's assu-

has

attempt to

call

failed.

Gillespie's case, " there is," says Antitkeos,

the work of concentration,

there

an odd

— Wherein —" extension and consists the oddness? du" ration are either necessary of themselves —absolutely " or they are not." — Hitherto the ground 44

forgetfulness of first principles."

(Par. 4.)

Infinite

infinite

is firm.

so,

Nothing can be more " selves, then 44

solid.

necessary of them-

the introduction of

Gillespie's sub-

stance or substratum gratuitous and absurd."

not

is it

as if

infinite extension

per SE

—that

— All firm

themselves is pretty much the same, we should say per se (in the plural.) If -Of

footing as yet.

is,

and

infinite

duration necessarily exist

without substrata

—then we cannot, with-

out absurdity, introduce substrata, or even a substratum. All

is well,

then, up to this point.

words

tkeos''s

not necessary,

on with Anti— To—go But where the "

OF themselves now f Oh it was not convenient to Not for you, Anticarry about the PER SE any longer. tkeos ! who have to conjure up short comings and anomalies But for me, who have to do nothing of in Mr Gillespie. the kind, who have to execute no greater a task than to 44 Refuexhibit such short comings and anomalies as the !

tation" abounds with

—of

which the present anomaly

Antitheofs the Atheist licks up the spittle of the Sceptic couched under language which forbids our not remembering Hume's " Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason." Essay on Miracles. Part ii. t

sneer

—

— "

§§ 7-8.]

ARGUMENT, A

and short coming

(of

IRREFRAGABLE.

PBIOJRI/'

229

two small Latin words, or the cor-

responding ones in English,)

a very

specimen

fair

For me, I say, it is quite convenient to keep the OF THEMSELVES in mind. I must have consistency in the matter of the PER SE. Well then: " If not necessary, OF THEMSELVES " the primary propositions in the argu" ment are false and groundless." (Par. 4.) What argument? It cannot be the " Argument, a priori" &c, because, in

the primary propositions do not concern

it,

themselves at

all

with the affair of PER SE.

Part. VII. §

§ 13. et seq.

—

2. 3.

Fide Part. II.

Part. X. § 88. not.\

take the passage in the way Antitheos has simply, "

If not

But

(reading,

it,

necessary,") and nothing can be

in-

disputable than that " the primary propositions in the" " Argument, a priori" " are false and groundless." But infinite

extension or space, and infinite duration, are far

from being NOT necessary

what settles the point rity for

Vide Part.

it.

mind, that though necessary,

The

is,

I. §

infinite

They ARE necessary. And we have Antitheos's autho35. But let us ever bear in

that

space and infinite duration are

not necessary that they exist PER SE.

farthest from

imaginable.

— And

this finishes

our

business, at this time, with the Chapter entitled " Retrol

spective

and Concluding Re^trks."

The 16th paragraph of Chapter VI. commences § thus " But if we are dissatisfied with the author's sub" stratum," [And Antitheos, unless so dissatisfied, could no atheist be ] " we are not much better situated with 8. :

—

— —

" the alternative left us

" has imposed upon us, u infinity of extension^

dilemma

;

for according to the

we are obliged is itself

to Antitheos

it will

a substance. remain.

sion stand in need of no substratum, t

The word

in the " Refutation" is " existence'

dilemma he

to conclude that 11

Yea And :

If infinite exten-

why then

can

— evidently an error

of the press.

—

— 230

stand by

ARGUMENT, A

And

itself.

—however But

PRIORI," if it

IRREFRAGABLE.

can stand by

may be

horrified Antitheos

in reference, further, to this,

—

itself,

[Part XI.

why then

a substance. see below § 21. and the it is

subsequent sections, to the end of the Part.

§ 9.

be ready to grant, that

shall at all times

in-

—

makes but an awkward substance prodigy among monsters. very But at whose door would the folly of creating such a substance lie, if it lay at any Not at Mr Gillespie's, for the " Argument" body's ? only says, " IF Infinity of Extension subsist without a

finity of extension

" substratum, § 15.

THEN,

et infra,

§ 15.

a substance"

it is

—

)

—

(vide part. v.

never saying, that Infinity of

Extension subsists without a substratum, saying as (Vide supra, § 2.) But the of making a substance out of infinity of extension, does the very reverse.

(as

folly lies,

indeed, evident enough, and as will be farther

is,

evinced below

vide infra, § 21. et seq.

at his door with

whom

—

) lies,

any substratum, quite by

itself in

nature

only, nature

of folly will likely be found near Antitheos is

repeat,

without

And therefore, that piece

repudiates such a subsistence

since he

infinite extension subsists

threshold,

so " dissatisfied" with the substratum of infi-

nite extension.

In reflecting #n " the dilemma" which

§ 10.

posed," do not forget § 11. " I "

how sad a one

it is

had thought," continues our

" im-

for antitheists.

atheist, " infinity

a mere nominal adjunct allowed to space, from the

cir-

" cumstance of our being unable to conceive limits to its " extent

—"

Here he makes

nominal adjunct, to space. an attribute thereof. saying

Vide §

is.

an adjunct, a mere is

We noticed, how incorrect this latter notw \ apud § 9. Part. VIII.

probably the former one it is

infinity

Elsewhere, he says infinity

is still

objectionable.

And But

not worth our while to write another syllable on the

subject.

had thought

so,

quoth he,

— " but the

theist,

— §§ 9-11.]

—

ARGUMENT,

IRREFRAGABLE.

A PRIORI,"

231

Infinity, with him, must be it seems, thinks otherwise. " a substance.' Only, if infinity exist per se. " On the 4; " same ground,"' Antitheos goes on, we might contend " that finity is a substance too " To be sure. If infinity

—

can exist per

se,

why may not

per

finity, likewise, exist

be a substance,

If bare infinity

se ?

— on

precisely the

same ground, bare finity may be a substance too. In between the theist and the anti-theist there is, for and indeed the thing seems once, a happy unanimity this,

—

" Supposing, however,'' proceeds 1

quite incontrovertible. Antitheos, *'

means,"

" can say

" that space that

is,

infinity, I

it"

extended

infinitely

—by what? by

take

(" space

—"

infinitely

what he that we

all

extended 11 )

be a substance it is no longer space, or extension, orj " any thing else than, just a substance ; unless it may

—

P be both extension and substance at the same moment. " But these are profane thoughts. 11 -They are, at all

—

empty words. As for thought, commodity is in them, is hardly equal

events, very this

" If

rising to the profane.

tended," " be

And,

in like

substance

ja,

manner,

substance, he

"space

" longer

" stance."

infinitely

— So,

be a substance, a substance.

it is

i. e.

to the task of " space infinitely ex-

no longer space"

This every one at

—just

nonsense. Again " If it,-' extended," " be a substance it is no :

—

* if

— Good.

Antitheos, finitely extended, be

no longer Antitheos.

a glance sees to be i.

it,"

— whatever of

* any thing else than, just a subthe finite thing called a "Refutation" is no longer any thing else than just

—

This, however,

anything but nonsense,

—

it is sense, and good sense, and just a truism " unless11 (indeed; the " Refutation" " may 11 [not] be both" a " Refutation' " and substance at the same mo-

for

;

Certainly, Space cannot be " both extension ment. " and substance at the same moment," if extension means

^extension ana nothing

more,\md

substance

means some-

"ARGUMENT, A PRIORI; IRREFRAGABLE.

232

[Part XI.

thing more than /extension and nothing more.^ But, this

can with

difficulty

be accounted a discovery.

— our atheist prosecutes the matter — " according to the new school of theology, not only

§ 12. " Perhaps"

thus "

may a book be

a substance, but

" be a substance, " and so forth."

per

se,

exist

its

per

se.

And

—if

Surely,

IF the weight

its

extension

weight another,

its

may

the extension can exist

can exist per

se,

if the colour can

not only according to the

this,

also

colour a third,

new

school of theology, but according to the old school of logic.

" Let us hear, however," (these are Antitheos's next words) " how the divine theory of infinity of exten§ 13.

" I

on being a substance

to be sustained.

—Mark with

what boldness of reasoning it is brought out. The in" fidel must look well to his footing and points of defence, " lest he be laid prostrate by its overwhelming force."

£t

Then

Par. 16.

proceeds to quote from " Pro-

Antitlieos

The quotation we shall give, but we shall same time, what immediately precedes in the " Argument," that our reader may the better understand whereabout he is. Part of the passage he has had bebut no matter. fore t

position III." give, at the

—

§ 14. " Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, (which is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, without a " support or substratum or, it subsists not, or we con-

"•

not to subsist, without a support or substratum. ceive " First, IF Infinity of Extension subsist without § 15. it

a substratum, THEN, it is a substance. comes the portion cited by Antitkeos'] "

should deny, that

" (that

is,

it is

a substance,

And" [now IF any one

so subsisting

without a support or substratum, i)

Viz. in Part. V. § 14. 15. mq; ac supra, % 9.

Observe the parenthesis

is Antitheos's.

to prove,

—

— "ARGUMENT, A

12-17.;

" " " "

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

233

beyond contradiction, the utter absurdity of such de-

nial,

we have but

to defy

him

to shew,

WHY Infinity

of Extension is not a substance, SO FAR FORTH AS IT CAN SUBSIST BY ITSELF, OR WITHOUT A SUBSTRATUM. "f

what our atheist points to as boldmust chagrin him, that he cannot find the weak side of the reasoning; though certainly none can hinder him from being highly offended at its boldness. The boldness, and the reasoning to the bargain, he would sneer down. But the reasoning, whatever becomes of its boldness, will never hang its head. § 16. This, then,

ness of reasoning.

—

§ 17. It

thus Antitheos follows at the heels of the

passage cited by him

" upon

—" A new

era has thus

dawned

grand discovery is on the eve of ren" dering her power irresistible, and her reign everlasting " and glorious. It is to be henceforth no longer neceslogic.

" sary for us to prove an affirmative t

The following paragraph

§ 1.

assert

what we may.

the one which follows, in the

" Argument." § 2. " As, therefore,

it is a contradiction to deny that Infinity of Ex" tension exists, 1 so there is, on the supposition of its being able to sub" sist wit/ioitt a substratum, a substance or Being of Infinity of Exten-

" sion necessarily existing

Tho' Infinity of Extension and the being " of Infinity of Extension, are not different, as standing to each other :

mode and subject of the mode, but now my readers will turn to Part II. and § 4.

in the relation of

are identical/'

§ 3. If

they shall find

our antitheist insinuating, that his opponent never told what he meant

by the word

being.

(Look,

of the " Refutation.")

being the

Being

first

also, at the

2d paragraph of Chapter XII. cited, that opponent (this

In the passage just

occasion of the " Argument's" using being,)

same

makes

and a substance to be wliat subsist* Wo have without a substratum. Is not this telling what is meant 1 yet to learn that Antiilieos could tell any thing better on the subject.

to be the

this as

as substance,

may, he has done the very thing

Gillespie

has done,

•he has given existing by itself as a good enough explanation of substance.

(Vide

infra, § 43 J

cumstances of the case, '

N Prop.

ends, you see, must be answered. have been committed why, in the could not very well have been avoided.

But present

an inconsistency turns out it

—

I."— Note

in "

Argument."

Vide Part.

II. §

15.

If cir-

—

234

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

PRIORI,"

[Part XI.

" no one dare deny our assertions. For to prove beyond " contradiction the utter absurdity of such denial, we " have only to put a brave face on it, and throw a defiance " in the teeth of our opponent to prove the negative

And in the Chapter wherein are concentrated (Par. 18.) " into one view the chief features" of Gillespie s " ex-

" traordinary attempt,"! our atheist, writing in a similar strain,

hath this sentence

— " He

(

Gillespie )

can

" only insist dogmatically upon duration and extension " being recognized as substances, and in self-satisfied

" proof, challenges any one, in the most braggart and impe" rious tone, to show why they are not to be regarded as " substances § 18.

Par. 5.

Gillespie maintained, (and

he yet maintains)

that, to prove the utter absurdity of a certain denial,

have but to defy the denier to point to any

What

reason for his denial.

denied by some one it

sufficient

there that has not been

Should the correctness of this

algebraic expression be denied (a-f-a) :2a

(2a

—

what better could be done than challenging the denier, (not in a braggart imperious tone, but in a gentlemanly

manner,) to produce a valid reason for his assertion, and thereby go far to shew us, that, like Hudibras, For

Gillespie, of

every

why he had

a wherefore

a truth, had thought, that

Vide supra, §

We have atheistical authority for

if all

men had

6. it.

" Hobbes says, that

men

—

" found their interest in it, they would doubt" [no but they would This composes one say they doubt] " the truth of Euclid's Elements." of Diderot's notes to D'Holbach

Vide §

Appendic. Part. VI.

makes him speak, we have two

The note being commendatory.

And

Hobbes ever spoke as Diderot

atheists testifying at once.

And we

readily admit the atheistical authority to be high, in the present instance.

It's

extremely likely the pair kave spoken the truth. None know what lengths certain men will go to, when they

better fitted to

think their interests are at stake

—Men may mistake their true interests.

£i

«3 18-19.;

ARGUMENT,

A PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

235

agreed on giving a certain name to each of the objects or things in which were

certain conditions

fulfilled

no per-

;

son could reasonably refuse to suffer the appellation to be

bestowed on any one of the objects

and

that if

mau

was found so exceedingly singular as to recede entirely from common language, and universally received notions, the onus probandi (to take a phrase from the law) lay on him, to make good the new and unheard of position.

That

men were

all

at one as to the propriety of calling

that a substance which exists without a substratum,

had verily esteemed a circumstance sufficiently entitling him to call upon him who should decline to permit the term to be applied to that which does so exist, to call upon him (I say) to assign some ground for his Gillespie

refusal. is

exclaims our atheist, such a circumstance

not sufficient to entitle

Gillespie

to "

throw a de-

fiance," (" dogmatically," of course,) at the refuser, to

shew why a thing existing without a substratum be designated a substance. atheist, for that

No, indeed

would be (here

not to

exclaims our

mistake) to usher

—

day of a grand discovery the dawn of a new era logic. And there's no room for any grand disco verm-

in the

—

lies his

new era would come too late. No no exclaims our atheist. But why does he so ? After the chiding we have got, we dare never so much as think of defying him, but we politely ask him, Why ? He should in logic

be able, and willing too, on every occasion, to give a reason for the principle § 19.

on which he

acts.

Gillespie contended, that

defy any one (an atheist, for example,

be such an one as Antilheos,

this

we have only

—and

let

gentleman

the atheist likes

—

)

point to some good ground for denying the proposition,

" If Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum, " THEN, it is a substance" in order to make manifest the ;

absurdity of a denial.

And from

this particular QaS6j

236

ARGUMENT, A

PitfOiZJ,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

Antitheos has drawn, as a specimen of

(which

the unrighteous part of the

proposition,

To prove any

Gillespie s logic,

affair,)

affirmation,

[Part XI.

the universal

we have no more

to do than, with " a brave face", to " throw a defiance " in the teeth" of all opponents to prove a negative Hurl :

your defiance at a negative, and, lo the affirmative is proven. The author of the " Argument" speaks of a !

special instance,

and the author of the

" Refutation,"

a skilful manoeuvre, forces his opponent to speak as

by he

inclined- to hold the special instance as the representative

of any case whatsoever

as if he inclined to

employ that

procedure on every occasion, which he used on one only occasion, because no better could be done.

This

height of disingenuousness.

But is

it is

fortunate, that the sophistry

miserable.

There

But

after all

Â§ 20.

is :

no mistaking

To lay down

This

the

wretched sophistry.

is as-

obvious as

it.

a thing, and defy

all

and sundry to shew a good though it may not be a commendable method, must at least be granted to be an allowable method, of starting towards the determination of any controversy whatever. Every thing which begins to be must have a Every affirmation, and sufficient reason for its existence. sometime to be. And was, began ever that negation every cause for asserting the con-

trary,

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

a person deny a position, without being able to assign a proper cause, we may be assured that the denial is imIt must always be admitted, that proper, if not absurd. if

the mere hurling of a defiance at an opponent, is not by It is sufficient itself sufficient to establish a doctrine :

0niy when conjoined with the opponent's inability to fur-

nish any just evidence for the truth of a contrary proposition.

Â§ 21. But, all this while,

men

we have been assuming, that

universally have consented to denominate that a

substance which has been decreed to subsist

itself,

— §§ 20-26.]

ARGUMENT,

A PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

without a substratum, or subject of inhesion

237

Men

uni-

with the exception of certain of the " atheistick

versally,

" gang,"t

who

perceive themselve&Jio be under the ne-

cessity of either contending that infinite extension, or

space, exists barely by

itself,

without any substratum, or

granting that infinite extension exists only by reason of the existence of something else quite irreconcilable with their atheism.

And

'tis

high time that we present our

readers with the evidence of our

title

make

the as-

sumption.

Our authorities shall be selected from the list of who are, among us, the best known and received as writers on such topics. Our authors, in short, must be § 22.

those

common and good

§ 23.

The

and as he

first

the

repute.

authority

first,

shall

adduce

Locke,

so he will be the greatest^

§ 24. " The ideas of substances are such combinations " of simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct parti-

" cular things subsisting by themselves" "

—B.

II. ch. xii. § 6.

Mode, on the other hand, he defines thus

§ 25.

Modes

contain not in

them the

" supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are consi" dered as dependences on, or affections of, substances."

Ibid. § 4.

§ 2G. In the 23d Chapter (same Book,) which expressly treats of our " ideas of substances," he hath these words :

The idea then we have, to which we give the general " name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but " unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, t

These are Cudworth's words. " In intellectual philosophy, Locke's celebrated work

all competitors behind by the common consent of man" kind." So says Lord Brougham, an excellent judge of the amount of fame which authors have, in one of his valuable and vera splendid " Dissertations." Vol. II. p. 113-4. Mucli in this 2nd vol. how un" leave[s]

—

much

in the 1st!

238

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part XI.

" which, we imagine, cannot exist SINE RE SUBSTANTE, " without something to support them, we call that sup" port substantial" § 2.

—

And

§ 27.

owns that

in hisTCetter to the

Bishop of Worcester, he

on the same footing with that of Burgersdicius, Sanderson, " and the whole " tribe of logicians," who, he informs us, define & substance his account of substance is

to be, "ens, or res per se subsistens."

But indeed we could accumulate

§ 28.

much from

Locke on this subject, that we must be content with the

specimen given, and with referring the reader to a great part of the Chapter on

Substances," and to his Letter and second Reply to Dr Stillingfleet. Etc. § 29. We do not feel ourselves under any necessity of

adducing a host of

' ;

Aristotelians, in the

shape of Peripa-

and Schoolmen, % of whose song the constant burden non inhwrens in is, Substantia est ens per se subsistens, alio, Substance is that which subsists by itself, and has itself no subject Because we believe that Mr Locke was an honest man, and an able and because (luckily for our

tetics

;

readers patience) he has spoken for " the " of logicians." § 30.

Our next authority

whole

tribe

matter shall be the

in this

celebrated author of the True Intellectual System of the Universe: of which Lord Brougham declares, " The pro" found learning of this unfinished work, and its satisfac" tory exposition of the ancient philosophers, are above " all praise"

Note

in Section

IV. (Vol.

I.)

The words

which we are about to adduce, we have made use of al( Vide Part. VIII.

ready, but the occasion was different.

§ 25. not 4 § 31. " Unquestionably, whatsoever

" of entity, doth either subsist by

is,

itself,

their testimony J Antitheos cannot reject " the truly estimable wisdom of the sclwols"

or hath any kind

or else

at-

At any rate he speaks

— Chap. IV. par,

§§ 27-34.]

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI:'

IRREFRAGABLE.

239

" tribute, affection, or mode of something, that doth sub" sist by itseff*' Here he opposes a Mode to that which subsists

by itself, that

uses to subsist by

§ 32.

From the

whole

indisputably evident that he

it is

and IJo be a Substance,^ as comSee also, of the same great work,

itself,

pletely convertible.

Chapter

to a Substance.

is,

context of the passage,

II.

Isaac Watts

vii. viii.

an author who,

one shape

or other, has passed through most people's hands,

whose authority

and

matters of logical and ontological

science used to be none of' the most inconsiderable.

what it may, now, we may very safely take his opinion upon the We need not require, and did we question before us. require, we might fail in obtaining, a better judge, as to his authority, in metaphysical subjects, exactly

the propriety of bestowing a certain

name on a

certain

thing.

§ 33. In his " Brief Scheme of Ontology" there are these words " Every being is considered, either as sub:

and then it is called sub* * " stance * or it is considered as subsisting by " virtue of some other being in which it is, or to which 44

sisting

of itself

belongs,

and then

called a

it is

mode."

— Chap. XVI.

§ 34. In the second of his " Philosophical Essays," in the third Section, the following sentence

" If

we can

and

to be seen.

lay aside all our prejudices in this point, I

" persuaded solid extension would appear

substantial

enough to be called a substance, since even mere empty " space, or extension without solidity, hath been by some philosophers esteemed substantial enough to subsist by t;

" itself and to deserve the honour of this wit,

the

name

of substance.

From

this

name

passage

— To-

appears,

that the Doctor reckoned that tiling which subsists by self to

be deserving of the

name

of substance.

it-

this

extent at least, he agrees with the philosophers he

al-

— 240

ARGUMENT,

A PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part XI.

ludes to.

Whatever difference there might be between the Doctor and the philosophers, otherwise* he evidently doubts not, for one moment, that u to subsist by itseTf

is ^to

takes

And by

substantial enough."^

mere empty space"

the bye, as he

into account, the quotation

speaks to our point, to a hair.

Read, likewise, of the

first

Section of the same Essay, the second paragraph, and

be found to speak no ambiguous language about that which the subsisting by itself makes a thing to be.—Etc.

will

Etc.

§ 35. In his " Logic," he says

Every being is con" sidered either as subsisting in and by itself, and then it is " called a substance ; or it subsists in and by another, and " then it is called a mode" Part I. ch. ii. sect. 1. See :

—

the same

also, to

ing section

effect,

the

first

paragraph of the follow-

etc. etc.

Vide quoque SPECIALITER Partis X. § 16.

§ 36,

§ 37.

next produce a philosopher whose spe-

shall

common sense, and that in For which reason, possibly, he

culations savoured strongly of

more than one is

respect.

none the worse § 38. " Things

for our purpose.

which may

exist

by themselves, and do not

necessarily suppose the existence of any thing else, are

called substances

attributes that belong to them, they are called the sub-

jects of

;

and with

relation to the qualities or

such qualities or attributes."

Essay

Essays.

chap.

the author points out

ii.

some

take for granted, as

mon

first

to Philosophers

— The

Dr Thomas

Reid's

chapter, this, in which

of those things"

which he

principles," principles

and to the vulgar,"

principles,

which are the foundation of science," principles which

all

com-

common

reasoning,

and of

all

4£

men

common understanding know

as they give a ready assent to, as soon as they are pro-

posed and

understood,.'''

;

are such as

all

or such, at least,

— t §§ 35-41.]

''•

ARGUMENT,

But the truth

§ 39.

IRREFRAGABLE.

A PRIORI,"

241

there would be no end to the

is,

quoting of authorities, on this subject, were we not to cut

—which here we as as authors of one species are concerned. — For as we have had our the40. But no kind so we the reader have authoia|^;oo, — a taste of the the matter short

far

do,

farther.

of authorities,

istical

shall let

a-theistical

in relation to

very important point which is^retore us decision regarding which, so very

What

§ 41.

much

—A

point in the

involved.

says Spinoza on the subject

for

we natu-

turn in his direction, he having been the most cele-

rally

brated (most justly celebrated) atheist of

Dr Samuel

and there not having arisen " Per Substantiam intelligo"

his equal in

Clarke 's time,+

atheism since. " id, quod in se

est,

per

se concipitur ;

ait Spinoza,

hoc

est,

id cujus

" conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari t:

debeat."

Substance I understand that which

" conceive to exist in

and by

itself;

that the con

t Were it lawful to quote, in an affair of this kind, a writer who had the bad fortune to get, for all time to come, an ill name, one, there we might have is no doubt, much worse, by far, than he deserved :

—

added, to the authors in the text, Berkeley : who says " Thing or " being is the most general name of all it comprehends under it two u kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing ;

common

u * u

sist

but the name, to-wit,

substances

the latter are

spirits

and

ideas.

The former

not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in,

" spiritual substances."

And

" It

Principles. Sect.

are

dependent beings, which sub-

LXXXIX.

minds or

(Vide Part.

acknowledged on the received principles, that " extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need § 80.)

of a support, as not being able

perceived by sense, are allowed

to subsist

by themselves.

But the

objects

be nothing bat combinations of

and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far " it is agreed on all hands." »Sect. XCI. See likewise, Section LXXIIL, and other places of his works, for the same sort of thing.' * those qualities,

Spinoza, the most celebrated Patron of Atheism in our time."

Demonstration.

—a 242

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

PRIORI,"

[Part XI.

" ception of which does not stand in need of the concep" tion of aught

Par.

§ 42.

else, in

order to

The Author now

other one.

worth them

bring him

than ordinary

Part. I. § 34.

§ 43. " I

rest.

§ 31. et seq. usq;

in,

to be ushered into notice

to be decided on,

35.—Part. IV. ad

—these Is

our wont.

by itself

—a

is it

—"f

substance

(Ch. XI. par. 4.)

given as another w ord for being, and 7

titheos, then, a substance

that which exists by

be argued,

(for

With Anitself*

we must provide against

every thing which can possibly be objected,) that

—

not, on the con-

'existence by ItselfMs the exegesis of substance.

Vide

are Antitheos^s words

a being

" trary, a characteristic property is

§ 14. et seq.—Part. VI.

§ 37-

" what intelligence " thing that exists

§ 44. Should

Tis Antitheos himself, I speak when any matter of more moment

would ask"

Here, substance

shall

put tog^her, for he sets the matter in

all

debate quite at

is no denyadd a single

these authorities, which, there

all

ing, are so entirely satisfactory,

of.

being formed."] Ethic.

its

Def. 3.

many

all,

when they say, (if they What subsists by itself, is a substance, had had not, others, when speaking to the same effect, have and that it is imthings only in view had ) finite if

not

all

authorities,

;

possible in the nature of things, that there can be finite

substance

:— Then, my

is,

in-

that Spinoza, the

head of atheists, shall be allowed to settle this particular department of the controversy, for us. As a matter of course, theistical evidence is to be had in abundance, but I shall

be content to limit myself to the evidence of atheists

themselves. " Substantiam corpoream,^ his verbis utitur Spinoza, § 45. " [" Corporeal " qua? non NISI infinita concipi potest t Vide Part. XII.

§ 14.

§§ 42-46.]

ARGUMENT, A

" substance *

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

necessarily conceived to be infinite

—Again

Ut vide § 2. Appendic. Part. VI. " substantia est necessario infinita." " necessity infinite."] § 46. I

243

Thus Spinoza.

—And

promised to be

—"

—"]

Omnisi

J/' Substance is of

Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 8.

But

I shall

be more liberal than

to Spinoztis authority I shall again

Antitheos himself. " cannot say," he observes, " whether matter be infinitely extend-

subjoin that of "

ED OR NOT.

In so far as our experience goes, and our

" observation can carry us,

substance completely With indeed all that we have for find

" occupying every part of space" Antitheos. matter substance.

in the

way

And

substance,

this

gentleman has no

That

of matter s infinity.

culty to throw in the

(Ch. V. par. 7.)

way of infinite

difficulty to is,

throw

he has no

diffi-

substance.

—

t The word " omais" goes, here, for nothing A position, I cheersubmit to the judgment of the learned. And did I dare to defy

fully

gainsayers, I should accompany

what

hand over, with something,

244

PART

XII.

THE u

" ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, FOR THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD," AN IRREFRAGABLE DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1.

" But WAIVING,"

— such

are the words which

succeed the passage quoted, from Chapter VI. of the " Refutation," in § 17. of the preceding Part " But

—

WAIVING, in the meantime, our plea of want of evi" dence for the affirmative, a simple man would say in " relation to the case before us, that substance possesses " attraction, which extension does not

that it is observed " under a thousand varieties of figure, density, colour, ;

" motion, taste, odour, combustion, crystallizatibn, &c. " which neither extension nor infinity ever is, or can in " its nature be.

" ask

its

and

might, in his deplorable ignorance,

ever infinity was weighed, or extension analyzed

elements reduced to gas \\

This would,

dare

" say, only evince in the eyes of the theologian, that such " a person had no idea of the very convenient art of ap" plying metaphysical language to things physical; where" by a mere abstraction, or at most a property of some" thing else, can so easily be charmed into a reality. "

shewing why

' 4

fore,

infinity

would be

set

of extension

down

as grovelling

" and, by consequence, useless."

and common-place,

Par. 19.

t The preceding passage was had in view, when section of Part V.

His

not a substance, there-

we were

in the 3d

— "

5§ 1-4.

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE.

245

§ 2. Antitheos speaks of an art whereby an abstraction,

that

a thought, of the mind,

is,

be charmed into a that no art

—

still

(vide part.

§ 8.

Now one

less,

necessary, or even admissible, for the purpose

simply because

tklhight

— can — )

would have imagined an art backed by a charm was

reality.

had

pose one of the classes of

;

and

this,

along been held to com-

all

Perhaps the decision

realities.

was erroneous, and a discovery of Inductive Science, has, in the hands of some fortunate Modern, made it plain that our thoughts are to be dismissed, for the future, to the dismal region of un-reality

where,

;

un-reality has

any where, we might expect, with the brightest and certainly the best-founded hopes, to behold sights unutterable, and worse

Than

—

in short,

fables yet have feign'd,t

the very same place (at least according to some)

Where

entity

The ghosts

and quiddity,

of defunct bodies,

fly.

" whereby a mere ab-

^ 3. Antitheos speaks of an art, " straction, or at most a property of something

- can so easily be charmed INTO a reality."

" should

come

behold

a property starts

else,

— " That

a property of something in need of an art possessed of a charm which, being used, !

to this !"+

The

into a reality.

" That

then, was no reality before.

property,

should come to

"this!"J § 4.

Our

atheist waives the plea of

want of evidence

for the affirmative side in regard to the proposition, If Infinity of self,

THEN,

Extension subsist without a substratum by it IS

a substance

;

only so far as

with his bringing forward reasons for the negative. insinuates, that t is

This

here only by

essential\\

way

Hamlet.

to a substance to attract

of accommodation.

Our

gront epic poi?t

speaking not of curious, but of dreadful things. {

it-

compatible

Vide Part. V.

:?.

— 246

ARGUMENT,

A PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part XII.

and be attracted, to have a certain figure, and density, and colour, and motion, and taste, and odour, to be susceptible of combustion, crystallization, &c.

and of a prowhereby it should be reduced to some gas and is not this to adduce a reason on the negative side ? cess

;

an attempt at best which could be made. however, any way you take § 5. It

—

it,

all

It is to it.

Events

likely,

the

adduce something,

When our atheist, (pass-

ing over in his hurry, by the bye, the exact nature of the defiance altogether,) insinuates to that effect,

is fla-

grantly guilty of a petitio principii, of begging the question to be proved, he is to be held as having uttered, once more, " an unproved extravagance." Observe the

—

" His," the simple man's, " skewing concluding words " why infinity of extension is not a substance, therefore, :

" would be set

down

as grovelling

" by consequence, useless."

and common-place, and,

Antitheos had been insisting,

tho' secretly, that, to be a substance, a thing must possess

And man had

attraction, figure, density, &c. &c.

santly concludes as if his simple

that infinite extension

found

not a substance, because he had

could not be weighed, nor reduced to gas, &c.

Verily, verily, his simple man,

&c.

such thing follow from such a cause, after

here he pleaactually proved

all,

but

—

-unless

if is

he had made any no such simpleton

we mistake the matter much

—

more of a knave than a fool.

" After all, advance- to the next paragraph. § 6. " however, how does the notable proposition stand, that

" there u

" (t

The it

necessarily a Being of infinity of extension

principle of the

—the dilemma,

argument brought up

in short

in support of

—gives way on every

side.

stands without a vestige of backing, except from the

* vain and swelling words of a blustering defiance," ] " the value [elsewhere called " a ridiculous bravado"t 4

—

t Last par. of " Refutation."

§§ 5-7.]

ARGUMENT, A

IRREFRAGABLE.

PRIORI,"

24?

M of which no one but a fool could be at a loss to esti44

mate."

—" thank thee teaching — By the bye, although the dilemma

(Par. 20.) ,1

that \vord.

-|-

for

" on every side" never a word

way

said to have given

was said by Antitheos to shew

gave way

in the middle.

Antitheos has never breathed one syllable against the di-

lemma, as a dilemma, or disjunctive proposition. He has never questioned the connexion of the members composing the disjunction, the propriety of proposing the one al-

—

The dilemma, then, But the members look at them, says he. And so we shall. The one is It (Infinity of Extension) subsists not, or we conceive

ternative is

when the other

is-rejected.

our atheist's eyes unobjectionable.

— 44

• ;

not to subsist, without a support or substratum.'

Well, what have you to say to that, Antitheos?

myself to be "

Infinity of

• thing.)

we conceive

substratum "

— The

What

theos, I tell

left to

you

—

infinite

)

§ 7.

member is

the same

itself

shall

and

— As

infinite

Anti-

this, says

Antitheos, I tell you,

increase

your serious-

the antitheists in the world, that

made

be a substance.

Vide

sequentes.

est

Now come we

Chapter before us

—

all

extension

Part. XI. § 21.

other

(which

any substratum,

Then,

seriously. +

you, and

own

to subsist, without a support or

stand by

(and the information

or,

say you, Antitheos, to that

entirely " dissoJ.isjied" with

extension

ness

8.)

Extension subsists,

—

with your substratum, Antitheos

(Vide Part. XI. §

replies. 44

dissatisfieoV

to the concluding paragraph of the

which paragraph opens thus

k :

The

" author himself, indeed, seems not half sure of having 44

made good

having done

the doctrine he has announced all

substratum upon extension' finite extension

—

]

for after

he could do, by the foisting in of

— [he should have

said, in-

After having foisted in a substratum

t " Merchant of Venice"

Vide quoq; Part.

10. 11. IS. 13.

248

upon

ARGUMENT, A

infinite

Prop.

extension

which

III.,

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

Who

foists in

[Part.

or what did that

XII.

Not

nothing but a dilemma, a

dis-

junctive proposition, and a conclusion deduced from either

member

But

or alternative thereof.

—

to see a little far-

ther into Antitheos'' s views " The foisting in of a substra" turn upon" [infinite] " extension to the destruction of " its necessary existence" He that foists in a substra:

—

tum upon

infinite extension,

by no means destroys the

Infinite extension has not

necessity of this latter.

proved to be not a mode only, of it

existence,-)-

a Substratum or Substance in which

a property only,

ence.

— After

indestructible,

the author of the "

way

inheres, if

it is

surely not to destroy, but, were that

make more

possible, to

been

and to give

its

necessary exist-

Argument

1 '

had, by

—

foisted in the substratum "

we are next

he," assured, " comforts himself with the reflec-

" tion, that

it is

Antitheos's

it,

of very

little

consequence whether

men

" will or will not consent to call this substratum by the "

name

of being or substance, because"

theos cites

a passage from the

— And then AntiThe

Argument."

pas-

sage we shall produce, but the context shall be cited likewise.

The

portion whereof the reader has had.

first

Vide Part. V. § 16. before him, already. " If Infinity of Extension subsist not Secondly, 8. § " without a Substratum, THEN, v to

deny there

" diction to deny there conclusion here,

is the

The ground

ludicrous.

being a contradiction it

a Substratum to

a contra-

it."

—[The

which Antitheos declaredtt

impotent, and, as if that were not enough,

and

laughable.

But

conclusion

to be lame

see.

Infinity of Extension,1f

Antitheos

Can

do not

for merriment, I confess I

may have be, that

a keener perception of the

he laughs when he should be

Vide Fart. VII. § 3. Etc. " Prop, I." Note in " Argument."

See Note- A A.

tt Vide Part., V.

% 17-

—

— §§8

10.]

ARGUMENT.

••

A PRIORI,"

rather weeping ?+

all

IRREFRAGABLE.

249

events, he should not have been

so close, and kept the source of the- jest all to himself

Had

he but revealed where the cause for the merriment

others might have participated in the amusement.] " Whether or not men will consent to call this

lay,

§ 9. lk

Substratum Substance or Being, is of very little conseFor" [The passage cited by Antitheos follows.] " 'tis certain that the word Substance or Being, has '*

queuce. '

never been employed, can.never be employed, to stand

for

any thing more, at

least,

Infinity of Extension.'"

" Argument," Antitheos does

than the Substratum of

—The next

sentence, in the

Tis as follows. such Substratum that name, being

" But to refuse to give

not quote.

" a thing obviously most unreasonable, let us call the SubM stratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name of Sub-

" stance or Being/' § 10.

Prop. III.

in this

way

§§4

that our atheist writes after

giving the quotation from the "

—"

Argument

is,

whether men " consent to do what they always have done and must ;i Exactly so. continue to do, or whether they will not." ;

of no

course,

manner

of importance

—

Antitheos lays

and

down a

Mr Gillespie gave the particular instance.

— " But how far" t:

general'rule, applicable to any case,

{Supra, §

9.)

our atheist next proceeds to ask, "

the because" [or the "for"] " and

its

certainty consist-

stratum

one can things,

one see

see.

How Men

when they it

far

Very far

indeecT.

far as

any

often both say and do very perverse

think

it is

for their interest. J.

May

not

to be, somehow, necessary, that there should be

a Substratum to

infinite

extension,

who

yet,

for

some

whimsical, or for some atheistical reason, refuses to ac-

cord to the Substratum the name Substance or Being t

See Note

B B.

J See

Note C

—

— 250

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

[Part XII.

Much more

wonderful phenomena may be witnessed every Mankind not unfrequently develope the possibility there is, that human passions, and even fancies, may sufday.

fice to

all

bring the tongue over to their side, in opposition

the sound dictates of the understanding.

are those

who

will

There

not be hindered by so paltry a

difficul-

ty as the obvious unreasonableness of a thing, from doing

the thing.

refuse to bestow a name,

as easy, in one

respect, as to see the propriety of the bestowment.

by this time the most inattentive reader must have remarked, how very few the insuperable obstructions are that lie in an atheist's path. " Yet, on the very heels § 11. Antitheos goes on thus think, that

of this misgiving, he concludes,

—

There

is,

then,

cessarily, a Being of Infinity of Extension." "

Hard upon

the heels of the lurking suspicion

NE-

— Yes

and misgiving

some men may not act very unreasonably, by refusing a name to a thing which deserves it, or, to deliver it more after Antitheos 's manner, hard upon the heels of the " lurking suspicion" and " misgiving" as to whether certain men, having a certain object in view, 44 consent to do what they always have done, and will 44 must continue to do," in other, and similar, circumas to whether

—

when no present interest warps their perceptions all 44 Argument'' thinks that by awry ; the Author of the Proposition III. it is made out, for ever, There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Extension., And I shall venture to say, I am persuaded my reader must think so « stances

too.

§ 12.

Our

atheist concludes his Chapter,

has to say in relation to

and what he

Gillespie's third Proposition,

44 The worthy old father of the church, with these words " who declared his belief of a Christian dogma because it :

impossible, is not far

from having a logician of the

was

mathematical school to keep him in countenance.

11-15.]

ARGUMENT, A

Pi?/Oi?/ " ;

IRREFRAGABLE.

251

" Gillespie frames a most absolute conclusion with his ;

premises dubiously faltering on his

lips."

—Mr

Gillespie

does indeed frame a most absolute conclusion, but that he does so with his premises dubiously faltering on his

many

one of those

lips, is

untruths which the reader has

seen dropping from Antitheos^s pen.

on an occasion.

tering pen,

racters,

And

It executes

his

no fal-

no dubious cha-

when a handsome misrepresentation

necessary

for the writer's cause

§ 13.

may

logician of the mathematical school

be, for

aught known to the contrary, a very proper person to keep company with one who has arrived at a " second " childishness." t But whether worthy or unworthy, old or young, fathers or sons, of the Church, are

than certain proportion their this

more prone

of persons, to believe in

incredibility of the

the

maxim

other descriptions

creed, to act as if

were, Credimus, quia impossibilia

a matter

which may admit of doubt, and

sunt

;

open

for fair investigation.

—

a substance § 14. " Is it (intelligence) a being " a thing that exists by itself? Or is it not, on the conw trary,"

demands

Antitheos, " a characteristic property

of a certain order of beings, dependent upon the exercise " of their external senses, and, by consequence, their or" ganization ? We cannot even conceive how it should exist, M independent of these circumstances. *

ligence, is

it is

necessary to have ideas

necessary to have senses

;

To have

intel-

to have ideas,

and to have senses,

it is

Intelligence, therefore, necessary to be material.' + " speaking generally, is nothing more than an accidental

"property of matter. "ft Chapter XI. parag. § 15.

Now

this

which Antitheos

speaking either generally or particularly, t Shakspere.

See Note

says, that intelligence,

D D.

nothing more tt See

H — %

252

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

than an accidental property of matter

[Part XII.

that

is,

such a thought of our minds as is denoted by the word ac(for is it not plain, that accident or chance cident or

— — —can be no

external,

—

real, separate existence in

chance

name

independent

realities,

the world of

and that " the honoured

of Being or substance" suits no such thing as the

—or

a-c-c-i-d-e-n-t

—can

ever denote

letters

c-h-a-n-c-e

I say,

that such a thought of ours should, some time or

have added thinking

other,

selves^) to certain

{ourselves

thus adding our-

—(or was the — to a

collocations of matter'}

matter not brought together previously truly " simple

man,

this,

)

—surely—as wild and

monstrous

a creed as any " worthy old father of the church" ever set himself

down

to frame, in the height of his zeal to be,

above measure mysterious

this IS

INCREDIBLE. And because it is

and "

divinely dark.

1 ' ||

This,

we would have our readers now somehow on the borders of that before our view touches § 16.

so,

consider, and evermore bear

in mind, that the point

question to which the whole atheistic controversy

may

well

more credible that Mind To becaused Matter, than that Matter caused Mind ? be reduced :%

lieve

To-wit, Is

that Matter (necessarily,

or accidentally,) caused

Mind to come into existence, is impossible. ft Then, Atheism IS incredible. § 17. And as it is impossible to believe, that Matter was the sole cause of Mind, so, with Antitheos, it is a CREDIBLE THING, THAT MlND WAS THE SOLE CAUSE OF Matter. Which we shall prove. With Anti§ 18. Our medium of proof shall be this :

theos, the Creation of Matter

was a possible

Thought thus

A favourite phrase with

the Rev.

Pope—Dunciad.

460.

tt See

Note

thing.

acting before thought existed.

G G.

iv. 1.

Chalmers..

See Note FF.

%% See Note

H H.

§§ 16-23."

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI" IRREFRAGABLE.

253

§ 19. Antitheos certainly jeers sufficiently at the doc-

trine of the

Creation of Matter.

— " Like the

dogma

of*

things being created out of nothing," [or, being-

all

created at

all,]

* the thing

seems impossible"

—Ch. The creation or annihilation mat" — which an Ch. V. par." — The miraculous and incomprehensible of creating the universe out nothing." — Ch. IX. —The and profoundly dogma creapar. 6.

either of

ter,

impossibility"

last

feat

' J

gross

" tion.

This

par. 11.

irrational

" bare all the absurdities of that

" be done to

its

not precisely the place to detect and lay

inmost core)"

dogma (which

—Ch.

XII.

could easily " He

par. 5.

^the theologian) takes for

of the material universe having been created out of no-

" thing*

—

created at

[or,

granted the astounding fact

But notwithstanding

§ 20.

Last Chap. par.

all.]

all

Antitheos''s jeers,

on this

" can conceive matter fruitful subject, he says " not TO exist." See, also, other passages, the same in :

effect,

from our

§34.

Now

§ 21.

atheist, (no atheist in this,) in

—assuredly—he

Part VI.

that can conceive Matter

not to be, or not to have been, can conceive Matter to

have had a beginning. To-wit, Matter been

And you

Matter be.

§ 22.

;

is,

Lay together these two

positions

and, Matter can be conceived not

hate

have the conception of the Creation of

the possibility that Matter

may have begun

And as

with our atheist (no atheist here,) Matter

may

have begun to be, the Creation of Matter is, with h im, a possible thing.t So that now we have, in FIRM keep-

—

ing, our medium of proof.

§ 23.

And

I fancy, it will

a grave face, J that

not be denied (at least with

Matter, t Sec Note

all

II.

Matter, began to be,

— 254

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE*

[Part XII.

Mind, or nothing, must have produced it That is, If Matter began to be, Mind must have been the cause.t :

—

§ 24. So that putting one thing by the side of another it appears, that, with Antitheos, at the bot-

—

tom OF HIS HEART, J WE CAN BELIEVE, THAT MlND caused Matter. And this was the thing to be proved.

—

Vide supra, § 17. Antitheos should call himself " Anti-

§ 25. theos"

—no, not

And

§ 26.

mination. in

for another hour.

here must be terminated our present Exa-

To advance

a high degree.

farther now, would be improper

We have weighed what Antitheos has

said in reference to

" Proposition I."

have exa-

mined every atom of an argument urged against " Pro" position II." And we have gone over word by word, and in order, each syllable written in opposition to the :

evidence of " Proposition III."

these three liang all

If those Propositions be granted, or are fully

the rest.

established (whether they be granted or no,) Antitheos

may

as soon cause the heavens to depart by a frown, as

he can get quit of the proof for the Being of A god. those three positions are necessarily true, there to our

hands the demonstration of all the phenomena, and of

Cause of

universe.

And

that they are so,

one of our readers vinced. "

—In

all

Intelligent First

the matter, in the

we have no doubt, each

this time

most thoroughly con-

short, all the remaining positions in the "

gument, a priori, t See Note J

for the

lies close

ArBeing and Attributes of God," J

rather, at the top of his head.

Whatever certain readers

may

say.

— "

§§ 24-30.]

ARGUMENT, A

are mere deductions laid

down

§ 27.

— IRREFRAGABLE.

PRIORI,"

255

—

doctrines evolved from the doctrines

in those preliminary Propositions.t

And on

the other hand,

the truth of these Pro-

made luminously to appear, 'tis quite needless to proceed beyond them. The Zetetics\ were

positions have not been

challenged to point out some lacy" in

ter of their

—some one— "

Demonstration.

avowed champion,

specific fal-

Antitheos, in the characalleges,

he has detected A

specific fallacy in the third, that vital, Proposition.

—

at that point he should have stopped

—

was mere supererogation to go over an inch of more ground One of the two foundation-stones of this great argument

be right,

—

crumbles into dust And the whole " fabric of the Argu" ment a priori comes lumbering down along with it."!!

That Antitheos resolved on sinking deeper own objections, is evidence of any

§ 28.

into the slough of his

thing but his

own contentment with the

liminary operations.

demeans himself as

enters

result of his pre-

upon new ground, and

the region he had passed over were

not territory fully conquered.

— —

shall come to a halt, then to see whether § 29. or no " Theology must be sorely distressed for standing 44

ground, if this be its strongest position 44 its rock its high tower." Refutation"

—

To go

we should have

its fortress

last

par.

subsume the unquestionable truth of a proposition to which my antagonist has fairly I mean, openly To take for objected. granted, against atheists, the truth of the 3d Proposition 44 this will we do, if God permit."U But not now will we. In the mean time, Antitheos is afforded an opportunity of § 30.

on,

—

t Of the truth of which, a slight inspection of that work, may Puta Part. II. § 19.

sa-

tisfy one.

I ||

Vide Append ic. ^. u Refutation." Ch. X. last par.

These words are used as accom :

modations.

not arguing with an antitheist, at present.

— 256

ARGUMENT, A

PRIORI,"

IRREFRAGABLE.

acknowledging what, we are bold to say,

all

[Part XII.}

our readers

must have perceived. " § 31.

—

Dr Samuel

PAUSE FOR A REPLY."

I conclude,

Clarke.

—"

in the

—

words of the penetrating

Infinite Space, is infinite Extension

" and Eternity, is infinite Duration. They are the two " FIRST AND MOST OBVIOUS AND SIMPLE IDEAS, THAT "

EVERY MAN HAS

IN His mind/'

—-Ans,

4ko

Sixth Letter.

—

NOTES TO PART

XII.

Note A A.

•

Space and Duration being- evidently necessary, and yet them-

^selves not substances, but properties or modes ; show evidently

" te

sist, is itself

Clarke's

SI. <c

necessarily-existing ; at

the

" which H

which these Modes could not submuch more (if that were possible) riecessary." Dr " Which (Space ) we evidently see to be 3d. Ans.

that the Substance, without

itself

same time it

and yet which (not being

could not exist

(much more,

itself

a substance,)

necessarily pr&MWDOses a Substance, without

;

Whicbj ^M^mce consequently, must be

possible,) necessarily-existing," Fourth Ans.

Note BB. Antitheos

perhaps he

may hold in admiration the ancient sect of Stoics, or may be lineally descended of the Danes. " On receiv-

ing mortal

" and ce

they

—

wounds

in battle,

they were so far from uttering groans

lamentations, or exhibiting any marks of fear or sorrow, that

commonly began

Great Britain. B.

to laugh

and sing."t

Henry's History of

II. ch. 7.

Note CC.

have, as

noticed before, atheistical authority touching

upon something hereabouts.

we have cal,

too.

Vide Part.

atheistical authority, so <e

that were there

XI.

§ 18. not. %.

And

shall treat ourselves to theisti-

believe that to be true, which some have affirmed,

any

interest of

life,

any concernment of appetite

u and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, " as of a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, whereby " men's judgments might be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding " all the demonstrations of them, many would remain, at least

sceptical about them." t

Cudworth

in Preface.

"Bartholin. «},2.''

NOTES TO PART

258

XII.

Note DD. do not know exactly whence Antitheos took this sentence." The same sentiments abound, of course, in the Systeme de la Nature, and every atheistical work. I

—

ec This passage of a modern writer, t We worms, cannot conceive, " how God can understand without brains, is vox pecudis, the lan" guage and philosophy rather of worms or brute animals, than of

" men."

Cudworth. P. 841.

Note EE. Antitheos,

thus appears, was the result of accident.

The con-

course of atheistical atoms mentioned in our Preface was

Doctors

necessity.

differ,

and

hypotheses agree in one respect.

so,

see,

product

atheists.

Both

Antitheos, as well as that con-

course of atoms, sprung from a word, or, at most, a thought his

own?

(Fide

or a neighbour's?

explanation of the enigma

§ 15. them.)

— Or

see an

Antitheos' s ultimate-particle-ftoefa/

was

the product of necessity, "jjjKsical necessity/' but his intelligence, is, his organizewbody, was the result of accident what Antitheos would deliver ? If so, half (and not the worse half) of him came by accident, but the other gentleman was, every inch of him, the result of " necessary causes." So still the

or mind, that

Is this

But is there any harm in that ? However, after all (e Blind fate and blind chance are at bottom much the same thing, and one no more intelligible than the

pair differ.

other."

Berkeley's

Siris."

Section 273.

NoteFF. It is

not an

ill

observation which Clarke makes, that the main

question between us and the atheist

" The

Self-existent

lies in

the Proposition, (his 8th,)

and Original Cause of

all

things,

must be an

" Intelligent Being."

Note GG. Vide Part. VIII. Appendic. B. § 24.

et loc.

in ed citat.

exclaims John Locke, " to every one's

own thoughts, " whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, <c as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was f<

I appeal,"

" no such thing ch. x. § 10.

Appendix.

as thought, or an intelligent being existing ?" B. IV. See the whole of the unanswerable passage in our

Vide Appendic.

K-

^ Hobbes.

NOTES TO PART

259

XII.

Note HH. Thft creation of Matter, but not out of nothing is

For

that, strictly,

—

The proper notion of Creation is not the something out ovmothing, but the making something be-

absurd nonsense.

bringing-

—

gin to be which before was not.

Let him who can, reduce

this to a

contwdiction

—

i. e.

render

ma-

nifest that to conceive it is impossible. I confess, if any man could be found so absoand void of understanding as to affirm that the Creating the World had * produc't it out of nothing

Colliher says **

lutely stupid

" Deity " as out "

" "

* * * * of a preexistent subject such a notion of might have some right to the character of a Contradiction. But since by Creation there can no more be meant than the causing to be what was not before, or the producing something it

" where

once was nothing, this

is evidently no more a Contradic" Impartial Enquiry." Book I. ch. ix. And Clarke : " To say that something which once was not, may " since have begun to exist is neither directly, nor by any conse" quence whatsoever, to assert that That which is not, can be, while " it is not ; or that That which is, can not be, while it is" Dem.

tion than"

— &c.

;

under Prop. X.

Note

II.

at being able to add Mr Locke s authority to that of on the topic of the possibility of the Creation ofi»Matter. " Possibly, jive would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, " and raisd(^ thoughts as far as they would reach, to a closer " contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim " and seeming conception how matter might at first be made, and begin " to exist." Essay, B. IV. ch. x. § 18. It will be observed, Locke goes farther than Antitheos, by one step. With Antitheos, the CreaWhile Locke conceives, not merely that tion of Matter is possible I

am happy

Antitheos,

Matter began

to exist,

but how.

Note

JJ.

" Man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right " angles." " This being of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine " that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all beings. £*

—— NOTES TO PART

260 ei

XII.

should ever produce any real existence."

Locke. B. IV. ch. x.

§§ 3, 8.

hesitate not to adopt, as pertinent here,

maxims, as

was understood by the

Nullam rem If there

was no

e nihilo gigni

Divmitusf un*quam.

Divinity, as they supposed there

— nothing could not cause anything. We

shall

one of EjiicHrus's

Sect. Lucret. Lib. I.

was not, why then

even go so far as to adopt the theorem as stated by

another Poet.

nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.

Persii Satir. III.

Nothing cannot be the cause of anything, nor reduce anything to 'Nothing cannot be a cause at all. "It had long ago been received as an indisputable doctrine, " if not an axiom in philosophy, that out of nothing, no thing can " come ; and it has never yet been shown to be essentially incor-

nothing.-

rect."

Refutation.

doctrine, or the axiom,

Ch. is

II. par. 25.

— The —and substantially

Antitheos

correct, essentially ,

t Vide Pwrt. VI. Jppendic. % 2.

right

too.

not.\\

APPENDIX. APPENDIX TO PART We

§ 1.

IV.

are about to bid a final adieu to the infinite divisibility

But

of matter, and to infinite divisibility of every kind.

ere

take our flight from the Cimmerian darkness of that uncomfortable region,

shall

do what

our power to display the doctrine

lies in

of infinite divisibility in those colours in which

will

be seen to

And in truth, it requires to be placed in the most favourable light, if we would fit it to be brooked at all, it being but a monster at best. Many of the partisans of that doctrine have But then represented it as a very Gorgon. A Gorgon indeed it is most advantage.

these gentlemen, with true Grecian mendacity, have bestowed it

more snakes and tusks than

was obliged

The very head and front of [its] In short, our statement shall be

much

to carry

upon

offending.

to the credit of the

dogma

and if its patrons do not give us their thanks, it will be because there is no gratitude in their bosoms, not because we have not done any of them a service. of infinite divisibility

§ 2. Matter, that

tum

What

§ 3.

—

are

tains an infinite

who have

is,

every part of matter,

understand by that

shall, in the first place, lay

does not mean.

§ 4. It

;

must,

divisible in infijii-

down what that

doctrine

cannot mean that any portion of matter con-

number of parts. we confess, be admitted,

that not a

few of those

treated of the subject, not a few friends as well as foes,

have represented the position, Matter

divisible infinitely, as

con-

vertible with the position, Matter contains, or consists of, an infinite

number

of parts.

There

no necessity for our producing the

willing testimony of friends, and the invective of enemies, to bear

out what w^fcffirm.

but what sage

well

What we

known.

atiinn

— I'm not

we suppose to be nothing Mr Hume, in a pas-

sure, that

which we have quoted, (vide part.

Hi.

§2.)

may

not have

APPENDIX TO PART

262 intended

to set out the

Certain

tation.

of an infinite number.

ma, there

no need

dogma we

under such a represen-

treat of

that in a note

it is,

upon

IV.

the place he speaks twice

In order to finding absurdities in that dogto misrepresent

first

or even to state

it,

it all

unfavourably.

But from the

we would

be rather more correct any particle of matter, (were the divisibility possible,) we can by no means rationally infer the existence of an infinite number of parts therein. For an The thing is very obinfinite number is a contradiction in terms. ยง 5.

infinite, or, if

with our word, the eternal,

vious.

When

infinity

in this case

units to the

number

one speaks of the possible signifies

sum we

What

infinite,

of infinity in

And were any one

could

make an

could conceive a unit added to

speak, then, of an infinite

And

therefore, even

it,

ce cc

number

greater, if

most certain we could.

to utter a contradiction.

particle of matter eternally divisi-

could not be supposed to consti-

number of parts.

dent, than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number."

Let a

as he will

as it

absolutely determinate

ยง 6. " The infinity of numbers," says Mr Locke, " to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it ; but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of numbers be, there is nothing yet more evi-

" " " " "

infinite

number

were every

ble, all the matter in the universe

tute an infinite

when any one determinate word ceases to possess any any respect, cannot be made

to be infinite, the

greater in that respect.

number

infinity of numbers, merely the power of always adding

before had, and

pronounced

meaning.

divisibility of

man frame ;

it is

in his

mind an idea of any * * number, as mind rests and terminates in that

plain, the

great idea,

which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which consists in a supposed endless progression." B. II. ch. xvii. ยง 8. Again: " Though it be hard, 1 think, to find any one so absurd as to say, he has the positive idea of an actual infinite number ; the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number, and that as long, and as much, as one will,"

&c. &c. ยง 7.

Ibid. ยง 13.

With reference to those persons who have accustomed them-

selves to speaking of

infinite

number of

parts, as the cause, or

the consequence, or the concomitant, of the infinite jjpisibility of

matter, and

whose speculations have ever been found to be shrouded opaque to stand in the wa} of clear views ; be-

in mists sufficiently

APPENDIX TO PART sides if

what

Locke has here already conveyed, conveyed

them

we would recommend the study of the following pasprovided we be allowed to make one alteration upon it.

they

sage,

263

IV.

like,

ec The great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve " all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, duration, or " divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas " of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the " comprehension of our narrow capacities." Ibid. § 21. We propose, by way of an amendment, to say, that the difficulties which involve many, perphaps nearly all, discourses concerning infinity,

in particular concerning infinity

when

divisibility to infinity is

about, have been the certain marks of a defect in

many men's

spoken ideas as

word infinity means, and of the disproportion between meaning thereof and the confused comprehensions of the meaning by certain narrow capacities. Were this amendment sufPray, if fered, John Locke, himself, would deal in better sense. WE CAN RISE SO HIGH AS TO SEE THAT THERE ARE DEFECTS IN OUR IDEAS OF INFINITY, WHAT SHOULD HINDER US TO SOAR AWAY FROM THE DEFECTS ALTOGETHER ? If WE CAN SPRING SO FAR ALOFT AS TO DESCRY THOSE DEFECTS AS UNDER OUR SUPERINCUMBENCY, IS NOT THIS A SURE SIGN THAT THE DEFECTS ARE, IN THE BEST OF SENSES, BENEATH OUR NOTICE ? to

what

the

the true

Quandoque bonus dormitat Honierus.t § 8.

—

In the next place,

shall

be understood by the dogma of the

mention distinctly what

divisibility of

matter to

all eter-

As the capacity of every particle of matter to be divided an odd chimera, or be it not,) does not entitle us to infer that matter contains an infinite number of parts, so, on the* other hand, it forces us to draw this conclusion, that no portion of matter, viz. that no body, consists of any definite number of parts at all. He who alleges that matter is eternally divisible, must maintain, that there is no body which is made up of truly ultimate particles ; no body which, with any propriety, can be said to contain aliquot parts ; in fine, no body whicli consists of parts component in any other sense than proportional, as halves, What are those parts of a body which are not quarters, &c. &c. ultimate ? which are not aliquot ? but which are only proportional ? But to sum up every question in one what ar» those parts of a body which are of no fixed, definite number ? nity.

everlastingly, (be such capacity

;

§ 9,

These consequences, or these concomitants, arc admitted, or, what involves them all is allowed, by those who ought to

at least,

^ rs

I'oetica.

•

264

APPENDIX TO PART

IV.

know something

of the affair, and who would not, for the world, unnecessarily allow any thing to the prejudice of the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of every portion of every body. § 10. " He who maintains divisibility in infinitum," says a stout defender of the divisibility he speaks of, " boldly denies, therefore, " the existence of the ultimate particles of body ;" " it is a mani-

" iC

fest contradiction, to

suppose at once ultimate particles and di-

—

" With all your might, then, resist this " assertion every compound being is made up of simple beings ; and " though you may not be able directly to prove the fallacy," &c. Eulers Letters. Vol. II. Let. xii. & xvi. And the same in other visibility in infinitum." :

places.

" If

§ 11.

ending

admitted, that the divisibility of matter has no

divisibility,

minute']

limit," thus speaks another

" can be

warm advocate

will follow, that

of the

dogma of never-

no" [one] " body" [however

called one individual substance.

You may as well

two, or twenty, or two hundred" substances, or twenty

call it

times two hundred substances., or nonillions of substances.

two hundred times two hundred

See Reid's Essays. Essay

thus represent a nonillion in figures

—

II. ch. xix.

1,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000,000000. § 12.

Think of the nonillionth part of a mote in a sunbeam being a body as the huge luminary in whose rays the mote Yet such a part of such a thing is as much a body as. the

much

dances

sun, according to

Reid's principles.

one small circumstance be true

And

verily

'tis

even

so, if

If such a part of such a thing be

And when you have cogitated upon that, suffiThink of an extension but the nonillionth part of the extension of a mote in a sunbeam as really existing in rerum naturd, and afterwards of the first of these extensions being divisible to all not a non-entity. ciently

eternity

who

will

§ 13.

These are the high mysteries into which those plunge it, that the divisibility of matter has no limit.

have

To conclude

When

one says that matter

ceternum, he must be understood as saying neither

divisible in

more nor

less

than that any particle, however small, can be divided without the possibility of ever

coming

to an

end with the

divisions.

And

render his assertion a provcable one, he must be held as maintaining Cirther, that, in point of fact,

any portion of a body, we

find,

when we that at

righteous termination to the business.

divide and subdivide no time can we give a

—

265

APPENDIX TO PAET The words quoted

§ 1.

passage to -which

in the

taken from the

reference,, are

VI.

New-York " Free

this

Appendix has

Enquirers' Family

" Library Edition" of the System of Nature, (mdcccxxxvi.) There The translation of the notes is are notes, s id to be by Diderot.

by one H. D. Robinson. In the Advertisement, we are informed, that " the Systeme de la Nature was first attributed to said to be

" Helvetius, and then to Mirabeau," be attribute!, with truth,

(p. iv.) and that it may now Baron D'Holbach. (Pp. v. vi. vii.)

to the

Of the " System of Nature" Lord Brougham says, in " Note "It is the only work of any consideration wherein atheism openly avowed and preached avowed, indeed, and preached

§ 2.

IV" c:

—

(See, particularly,

terms.

part

assertions of Brougham's, this one

" As

quality.

ing about,

ii.,

chap,

ii)."

deficient in a certain

many good

one who knew what he was speakthese so confident exploders of them are both unskilled to Atheists," said

—

the monuments of antiquity, + and" &c. Will his Lordship take quietly this hint, for want of a reproof, from his favourite Cudin

u-orth

— One

of the atheistical

De Rerum Natura" Omnia, ut

est, igitur,

Consistit rebus

;

monuments who sings

of Lucretius, per

se,

of antiquity

the

Natura, duabus

nam Cobpoea

sunt, et

Inane

quod possis dicere ab ornni (Jokpoke sejunctum, secretumque esse ab Inani Pra:terea nihil

Quod +

est,

quasi tertia

sit

rerum natura

reperta.

Unskilled in the monuments of antiquity

VII. VIII. and then deny,

you

Read Brougham's Notes VI.

can, that

This, this was the uukitulest cut of t

The hint occurs

so well called " iv. v. vi.

all.

what Warburton, that colossal man, has one immortal volume." (" Preface" to the 1st Ed. of Bool; in tho Pre/ace to

of the " Divine Legation of Moses.")

—

APPENDIX TO PART

266

VI.

—

Praeter Inane, et Cobpoba, tenia per se Nulla potest rerum in nuraero natura relinqui-

Lib.

Natura videtur Libera continue* Dominis privata superbis, Ipsa sua per setsponte omnia Diis agebe expers.||

natubam berum haud dlvina mente

And

Lucretius sings not unfrequently to the same tunes.

haps,

terms ? ((

Or,

they did

— Your Lordship

gr.

ii.

iii.

—But per-

Lord, the atheists of ancient times were of no consider-

Or perhaps, they did not avow and preach

ation ?

openly f

Lib. llb.

cooetam.||

affirm,

their

atheism

openly, perhaps they did not do

may

ill

to please with atheism.

with Spinoza, " Substantiam corpoream, quce

Ex. non

Natura Divina indignant " esse did posse." e. " That corporeal substance (or matter,) " which is necessarily conceived to be infinite, must be allowed to " be not unworthy of the Divine Nature :" Which may, very proMatter is infinite," and there perly, be reduced to this proposition, cannot be any God besides matter.] To affirm that, may not altogether satisfy your Lordship that the writer is an open, and avowed atheist, in terms. Your Lordship I shall repeat it may nisi infinita concipi potest, nulla ratione

—

ill

to please

with atheism

So very

ill

—

to pl-ease, indeed, that if

such an one as your Lordship will be at the trouble to read, of the " System of Nature," and of the second Part, the 9th chapter, (the

come

title

of which asks,

to think

—not

there exist Atheists ?"

—

)

he may

that there has been peradventure one, but that

— there never was a truly

atheistical

work

all.

Epicurus, and therefore Lucretius, speak, it is true, of Gods or a Divinity, But what says Tully of the Epicureans ? Vebbis ponunt, be tollunt Deos. " As Epicurus, so other Atheists in like manner have commonly had their " vizards and disguises * * * * Yet they, that are

—

" sagacious,

may easily

worth, Ch. II.

look through these thin veils

and disguises"

Cud-

& ii.

Epicurus had these reasons for speaking of G-ods. 1. Because the Greeks of his day, Heathens though they were, were not prepared to permit such a monster as an atheist to exist in peace. 2. He took no small delight in

making

—

more unthinking common-people. One would be apt even the common-people might always have appreciated such

fools of the

to think that

notable irony as the following Tenuis enim natura

Deum,

longeque remota

Sensibus a nostris, animi vix

The majority of Atheists, in and afterwards to mock them.

mente videtur.

all ages,

have seen

it fit

Lvcretii Lib. v.

to delude the vulgar,

APPENDIX TO PART

267

VI.

" no book of an atheistical de§ 3. " There is," says Brougham, " scription which has ever made a greater impression than the fa" mous Systeme de la Nature." § 4. " It is impossible to deny the merits of the Systeme de la Na" ture. The work of a great writer it unquestionably is." And

*****

accordingly, his Lordship has devoted a long Note

(it is

Note IV.)

to the performance.

Of the merit of the ct System of Nature/' it is thus that Lord Brougham speaks " Its merit lies in the extraordinary elo" quence of the composition, and the skill with which words sub" stitu^gd for ideas, and assumptions for proofs, are made to pass " current, not only for arguments against existing beliefs, but for " a new system planted in their stead. As a piece of reasoning, " it never rises above a set of plausible sophisms plausible only as § 5.

—

long as the ear of the reader being

" tion

" "

writer

directed is

to refer

away from

filled

the sense.

with sounds, his atten-

The

chief resource of the

to take for granted the thing to be proved,

back

to his

assumption as a step

while he builds various conclusions upon

plete.

in the

and then

demonstration,

it, as if it were comThen he declaims against a doctrine seen from one point " of view only, and erects another for our assent, which, besides " being liable to the very same objections, has also no foundation " whatever to rest upon. The grand secret, indeed, of the author " goes even further in petitione principii than this ; for we often" times find, that in the very substitute which he has provided for " the notions of belief he would destroy, there lurks the very idea " which he is combating, and that his idol is our own faith in a new " form, but masked under different words and phrases.

§ 6. ft

are

The

truth of these statements," continues his Lordship,

now

to examine."

But

into the examination

we cannot

follow his Lordship.

volume having crossed the Atlantic, and falhands of the New-World atheists ; the compliment to

§ 7. His Lordship's

len into the

the author of the book called the System of Nature is repaid, with " Henry Lord Brougham * * ," say the Transatlaninterest. infidels, " in his recent Discourse of Natural Theology, has " mentioned this extraordinary treatise, but with what care does " he evade entering the lists with this distinguished writer! He " passes over the work with a haste and sophistry that indicates " how fully conscious he was of his own weakness and his oppo" nent's strength." The western free-thinkers part from his Lordtic

—

268

APPENDIX TO PART

VI.

" It is with a few pages" [The pages are ship in this manner: as near to being sixteen, of the closer printed ones, as need be.] " of * e'

empty declamation that his Lordship attacks and coneloquent and logical work." See " Advertisement

demns

this

mentioned

§ 8.

ALL

American

in § 1. above.

Christian writers on Natural Theology," so write the

atheologists,

have studiously avoided even the ment knowing" [Herfc is the

tion of this masterly production

cause']

their utter inability to

cope with

powerful reasoning,"

its

[Then follows the effect] " they have wisely J passed it by in silence." The whole assertion says (to employ the mild lanAdvertisement. guage of Honyhnhnm ) the thing which is not. But whether it be an

ethical

mistake, w.

lie,

—

or merely a logical one,

shall not take

up time

—a

lie of malice, or only of endeavouring to determine,

The

assertion is false, whatever be the reason of the circumstance.

And

did

names of Christians,

deem

who

of Nature, but false,

do so, I should set down the on Natural Theology, the writers being

at all necessary to

several writers

not only have not avoided mentioning the System

who have examined

it,

Christian writers on Natural Theology writers

were

in the

knowledge

A- Theology.

The

effect

that the cause has therefore

it is

in silence

all

not true, that these

it is

of their utter inability to cope with

the Anti- Christian writer on (what as)

;

And

rather fully.

that the production has been passed

hope

Un-Natural, as well

has no existence

none

any wonder,

§ 9. I, for one, in place of studiously avoiding even the mention of

the

" System of Na ture," have,

as the reader of

my sixth

Part

well

aware, done the very reverse, and mentioned the production, when I

could have " avoided even the mention" of

it,

without being very

studious as to how, and without subjecting myself to be righteously

found

fault with,

on account of the avoidance.

have mentioned the

Nay more, I have quoted from it, and have commented on the citations. It may be but right to notice, that the citations are made from the chapter which forms, as Brougham truly declares,

production

" by far the most argumentative part" of the Frenchman's book. (Note IV.) With what success I have encountered the Goliath | %

These gentlemen subsequently except Brougham. There were good reasons for the wisdom. Vide infra,

§ 9. not.

APPENDIX TO PART

269

VI.

Whether

of Infidels, || let the attentive reader determine.

or no I mighty among there has been so far as matters between us have gone atheists But though I have not at least no wise passing him by in silence. passed by that author, I must certainly have passed by his " poweru ful reasoning," for, to the best of my recollection, I met with

display an utter inability

cope with a

man

—

may yet fall in with the none of it. But let us not despair. powerful reasoning which is so rife (according to report) in " this " masterly production." In a word, we may have better fortune the next time. shall not lose

toj^pting (at

and even

And

the reader

may

take our

word

for

it,

that

any opportunity at all suitable, should such offer, of atany rate) to cope with this paragon of Philosophers,

— to

make use

of fine figure in the genuine bathos%

—of

Infidels. "

We have

commenced the library with a translation of Baron d'HolSystem of Nature, because it is estimated as one of the most able " expositions of theological absurdities which has ever been written.'' " Let those read this work who seek to come at a knowledge of Again " the truth'." But farther: " If the most profound logic, the acutest dis" crimination, the keenest and most caustic sarcasm, can reflect credit on " an author, then we may justly hail Baron d'llolbach as the geeatest AMONG philosophers, and an honour to infidels." In short " We have " no apologies to make for republishing the System of Nature at this time " the work will support itself, and needs no advocate it has never been answered, because, in truth, it is, indeed, unanswerable." Advertise||

" bach's

'•

;

ment, already mentioned. +

To-wit, the Anticlimax.

270

APPENDIX TO PART APPENDIX

VIII.

—

u Motion proves a vacuum. But not to go so far as beyond the " utmost bounds of body in the universe, * * * to find a^a" cuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbour" hood, seem to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to tc divide a solid body of any dimension he pleases, as to make it i( possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way " within the bounds of that superficies, if there be not left in it a void (i

space, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said

solid body.

And

if,

where the

least particle of the

body divided

as big as a mustard-seed, a void space equal to the bulk of a

" mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of " the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies ; " where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a muscc

" "

tard-seed, there must also be a space void of solid matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a mustard-seed

for if

hold good in one,

hold in the other, and so on in infinitum." [_Not in inBut for a good while, perhaps till our finitum, or any thing like it minds can minish the particles no longer. Vide Part. III. § 26. et it

will

seq.~\.

" And

let this

void space be as

the hypothesis of plentitude.

For

little

it will,

destroys

there can be a space void of

body, equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now ex" isting in nature, it is still space without body, and makes as great u a difference between space and body, as if it were idy<*. ^a^a, (e a distance as wide as any in nature. And, therefore, if we sup" pose not the void space necessary to motion, equal to the least c(

" parcel of the divided

solid matter, but to T\ or

" same consequence will always follow of space without Locke's Essay. Book II. Chap. xiii. § 23.

it,

the

matter."

Mr Locke recurs to this topic in a subsequent chapter. " Of " such a void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved, "

as I think,

from

the motion

of body,

its"

[consequentially, or

—

APPENDIX TO PART

particle of matter to

Ch.

move but

;

— 271

VIII.

hypothetically] " necessary existence."

(

It is impossible for

empty space."

into an

any

B. II.

xvii. § 4.

This demonstration by Locke of the existence of vacuum, will suggest, to the classical reader, Lucretius' s exhibition of

ment

for the impossibility of

locus est intactus, Inane, vacansque. non ess«gt, nulla ratione moveri Res possent namque, obficiuin, quod Corporis extat, Obficere, atque obstare, id in omni tempore adesset Omnibus haud igitur quidquam procedere posset, Principium quoniam cedendi nulla daret res.

Quod

ttf e

argu-

motion in a perfect plenum. *

;

At nuncjper

maria, ac teras, sublimaque

coeli,

Multa mbdis multis varia ratione moveri Cernimus ante oculos quae, si non esset Inane, Non tarn sollicito motu privata carerent Quani genita omnino nulla ratione fuissent Undique Materies quoniam stipata quiesset. Lib. Prim. ;

the English reader

— Take

in the very words of Creech.

Thus prov'd. For were there none, no Bod}' could be mov'd Because where e'er the pressing motion goes, It still must meet with stops,} # * * Void

space intangible :

;

'Tis natural to Bodies to oppose.

So that to move would be in vain to try, But all would stubborn,§ fixt,§ aud moveless lie Because no yielding Body could be found Which first should move, and give the other ground. But every one now sees that things do move "With various turns in Earth and Heaven above Which, were no Void, not only we'd not seen, But * Bodies too themselves hud never been ;

;

Ne'er generated, for Matter all sides prest With other matter would for ever rest.

in those of

Dr James Mason

And know

Good.

space untouched and pure.* Were space like this vouchsaf'd not, nought could move Corporeal forms would still resist, and strive With forms corporeal, nor consent to j ield this

void

;

t J

§ II

Pope— Imitations of Horace.

—

6th Ep. of B.

Four words here left out, for These words here transposed,

sense's sake.

— for sound's sake.

The

capitals are the translator's.

APPENDIX TO PART

272

VIII.

While the great progress of creatioi^eas'd. But what more clear in earth or heav'n suhliine, Or the vast ocean, than, in various modes, That various matter moves ? which, hut for SPACE.f 4t 'Twere vain t'expect and vainer yet to look For procreative power, educing still Kinds from their kinds through all revolving time.j

C^ir readers will perhaps

pardon us,

we now present them

with

demonstration of the position, that tlie^hotion of any body proves

there

an immoveable space.

old author,

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;a modern,

The demonstration

shall

however, should you mention

be from an liirft

in the

same breath with the Latin Poet. The following axioms are laid down, at the ovd^U " Primum est, Nullius corporis superficies, quieWknte corpore, mo" veri potest, nec, moto corpore, quiescere. " Secundum, Nullum corpus ad aliud corpus quiescens proprius ee

motu locali. " Tertium, Nullius corporis potest fieri motus localis, nisi transeundo per aliquod Externum. " Quartum & ultimum, Omne corpus, localiter motum, movetur

accedere, nec ab eo recedere, potest sine

adcequate per

ilia loca,

quae

motu suo

acquirit.\\

" Estojam pro Cylindro,

" duas vel trcs uncias alto, " super terr am immotam, " ut jam supponemus, po"

sito,

Cir cuius

HKM

" Polusq; illius Aoois {circa u quam mojoetur} superior c<

inferior

<fy

A A.

manifes-

turn est, quod superficies

" Cylindri extima separat i:

a superficie concava

" ambientis

aeris,

per par-

" tes, puta H I a concava " parte H I, pergitq; ad " I K, 8$ sic de reliquis. Unde plane apparet totam superficiem con" vexam Cylindri eadem ratio est de planis) moveri in orbem ; ac The capitals are the translator's. The last line in the quotation from Lucretius lated by Mason Good, as one could have wished. t X

not

so evidently trans-

This last axiom does not appear to he used in the demonstration. But its nature is such that it can do no harm, although it be left in.

surely

APPENDIX TO PART

273

VIII.

" proinde quod totus Cylindrus in orbem movetur, per Axioma pri-^ " mum Sed nullum corpus movetur, nisi transeundo per aliquod " Externum : Ergo Cylindrus transit per aliquod Extensum, per " Axioma tertium. Sed per nullum Extensum transit extra ambitc Ergo per Extensum intra illum ambitum tranturn H K M H. " sit. Sed per suam ipsius Extensionem non transit; circumfertur " enim cum ea simul. Quid igitur reliquum est prater internum " suum "Locum, sive Spatium, quod occupat, per cujus partes tran" sire possit, nempe ab HAIdlAK, S$c. Quod opportebat de:

" monstrare.

" Rursus supponamus in eodem Cylindro majori H K M H sex "foramina Cylindracea, B, C, D, E, F, G, cequalia, totidemq; mi" nores Cylindros eisdem foraminibus insertos, superficiebusq; con" cavis horum foraminum cequatos et contiguos, Penatusq; aliquod "

corpus quiescens extra majorem Cylindrum, sitq; corpus P.

veatur jam denuo major Cylindrus,

" cundum ordinem literarum^. ft

HKMH

circa

axem

Mo-

se-

Dico, tametsi minor es

6$c.

Cylindri superficies suas non separent immediate nec a superficiebus

" foraminum suorum, nec a

superficie aeris

majorem Cylindrum am-

" Mentis, quod nihilominus moventur localiter. Nam dum major " Cylindrus movetur ab H ad I, Cylindrus B recedit a corpore P qui-

" escente ; Cylindrus vero E proprius ad illud accedit. Nullum " autem corpus ad aliud co?yus quiescens proprius accedere potest, si vel ab eo recedere, sine motu locali, per Axioma secundum : nec om" nino moveri localiter, nisi transeundo aliquod Extensum, per Axi" oma tertium. Sed Cylindrus Bper nullum Extensum extra Cylin" drum majorem pertransit, nec penetrat ipsum corpus C, cum ad C " pervenit. Igitur Cylindrus B succedit tantum in cylindraceum " sputium C,

" Cylindri

tSj

Cylindrus

dentiurn Cylindroma/,

K. T. A.

in spatium cylindraceum D, et singnli

successive spatia cylindracea, sive locos internos prcece-

Taken from

occupant.

Quod

erat

demonstrandum."

the 6th Chap, of More's

Manual of Meta-

physic.

APPENDIX

" that "God is present every of his essence," " appears most in the Scri]>turcs ; though the term extension, through "the inadequacy of language, conveys too material an idea." ยง 1.

"The

" where by an " harmony with

opinion

infinite extension

APPENDIX TO PART

274

VIII.

Theological Institutes, by Richard Watson. Part Second. Chap. III. Edit 2d. 1824. Such is the deliberate sentiment of this Theologian :

and

many works,

be easy to name

will not

each of them contain-

ing more talented sober theological discussion. § 2. " We conceive of him/' the " intelligent, self-existent, First " Cause," " as existing in all duration, and in all space. This is " precisely the idea which we form of the existence of God ; ex" actly the view which the Bible gives us of him." Rev. B. Godwin s Lectures on the Atheistic Controversy. Lect. II. (P. 53.) " He who upholds all things by his power, may be § 3. <(

said to be every § 4.

" This

where present.

" metaphysicians denominate an <e

essential ubiquity

the language of Scripture seems to favour."

Chapter

§ 5.

XXIV.

There

called a virtual presence."^

is also what and which idea

So says

Paley in

of his Natural Theology.

Lord Brougham has a note preference

to this passage of

(Vide Part. Fill. f5. not. X § 2.) In which his Lordship informs us " The three doctrines are—-ubiquity by dif-

the Doctor's.

fusion, virtual ubiquity,

or that of

power

only,

and ubiquity of

essence."

§ 6.

The

sensible

and

rather

Paley s Annotator loses not a doctrines

(it is

shrewd Paley gives us two

moment

in presenting us with three

out of his power to present us with three species)

of omnipresence

the third doctrine being that of ubiquity of

essence as opposed to ubiquity

diffusion, or that of ubiquity

way

his

opposed to ubiquity of essence

diffusion as

sorts of

without hinting there was a third.

presence, or omnipresence

whichever

;

Lordship pleases.

—

" Virtue cannot be without substance. It may be laid down as one of f " those truths which admit of no contradiction, that, with regard to the un" created substance at least, virtue cannot be without substance. Speaking " of this substance, Sir Isaac Newton hath these words : ' 0mnipro3sens est " ' non per virtutem solam, sed etiam per substantiam nam virtus sine sub:

1 stantia subsistere non potest. Newton. Princip. Mathemat. Schol. general. " sub finem." " Introduction" to the " Argument, a priori" &c. Div. III.

§ 23. " 'Tis natural to ask, not so much how it is proved, that God can be " virtually present, though not substantially present, in every part of na" ture, as what can be meant by being every where present by mere II

" energy,?" T|

" Introduction" to "

Properly,

it is

Argument."

of omnipresence he

Div.

treating.

11.

APPENDIX TO PART

VIII.

2J5

upon his Note, forewarns us " confessedly abstruse." Those

§ 7. His Lordship, in entering

the subject he

touch

that

create the abstruseness (well, if not the obtuseness) of a subject,

ought by all means to confess what the thing grew to under proper management. But it is not so right to represent their own handiwork as something they found ready made. § 8. The Author of the 'f Natural Theology" presents us with two divisions, as not only exhausting the subject, but being in fair antithesis.

be,

the

In fair antithesis the

members

essential ubiquity"

were two-fold

essential ubiquity being ' f

the one species of

" ubiquity of essence," the

This matter

diffusion."

of the division could not

may perhaps be

other,

" ubiquity

rendered plainer by

the following Schema. Virtual presence, or

omnipresence,

Species,

" Ubiquity of essence" in Brougham's words) " essential i. e. surely " ubiquity" (as in Paley's language). (as

—

Here one of the nus

itself.

And

distinction to

Tell us,

species

its

neither is

Ubiquity by diffusion." Ubiquity of what?

diffusion of what? vkie infra, § 10. collat. § 11. ct seq.

flRtaess than the ge-

the other species, in contra-

fellow-member, and the genus of both

and then we

omnipresence

pray, what

Queer.

— can

to the other great

shall see

in its

whether the genus

— essential

two-fold nature be fairly opposed

member

of the division

— virtual

omni-

presence.

The Author of the " Natural Theology," in short, recogno distinction of the kind introduced by the Noble AnnotaThe Archdeacon of Carlisle had too much of a " natural pretor. dilection" for what by due care may be " level to all comprehen§ 9.

nises

sions," to be smitten with the love of unadulterated If

nonsense.

our Archdeacon had no talent and no taste for metaphysical

speculation even though of the genuine cast, as

noticed by his

— APPENDIX TO PART

276

VIII.

Lad lie any regard for vile bastard metaphywould be well to remember. Lord Brougham speaks of " the Diffusive Ubiquity." Vide

Illustrator ;t far less, sics.

—Which

§ 10.

What can wow-diffusive ubiquity be? 5. not. % § 2. c ubiquity by diffusion" namely, Verily, the distinction between Part. VIII. §

of essence, or substance, (or, else, diffusion of (c

quity of essence

what?

— — )and "ubi-

a distinction without a difference.

How

can there be ubiquity of essence but by every- where-diffusion of essence?

What

ubiquity,

thing inexpressibly absurd.

What

limitless diffusion. § 11.

What

not diffusion every where

Ubiquity, then,

else

can

Someby

just ubiquity

ubiquity of essence which

not ubiquity of es-

Did we pretend not to know, 'twould, after all, be a shame. The nonsense has been fully consecrated: For no inconsiderable period has it been the fashionable theology. Ubiquity of essence which is not ubiquity of essence let the reader be prepared by boundless diffusion, is, —the UBIQUITY OF THE ABSENCE OF EXTENSION, 0)' IN EXTENSION, as The ubiquity or universal extension, in 'twas usually expressed. question, is the universal extension which has no exension at all. The every-where-ness under notice, is, in plain and honest English, sence by diffusion without bounds

just no-where-ness. § 12.

shall

dwell a

little

upon the

topic of the fashionable

theological whimsey. § 13. The Author of the " Argument" has the following passage. The common sentiment of Theologians, that the necessary sub-

sc ce

stance, is, at the same time, in every point of space, and every atom of mattevrentire, is, so far as the opinion is intelligible

at all, just

infinitely

this third hypothesis, that the

extended

to that substance.

Though,

For

'tis

necessary substance

true, all extension

to say that the

same substance

denied

in differ-

" ent parts of extension, at once, without being extended, is no " more absurd than to say, extension, itself, is not extended."

Introduction." § 14.

Division III.

Note

to § 28.

" Qui autem," says the (undeservedly) almost-forgotten

Raphson, " prcesentia

ilia,

vere essentialis,

cunctis, quce sunt, in-

" His," Paley's, " limited and unexercised powers of abstract discussion, t " and the natural predilection for what he handled so well a practical aru gument level to all comprehensions appear not to have given him any taste " for metaphysical speculations." Note in " Section III." of the " Prelimi-

—

nary Discourse."

— APPENDIX TO PART

'277

VIII.

" tima, per inextensionis hypothesin sine manifesto, contradictione " (qucecunq; tandem fuerit verborum collusio ) explicari possit, non" dum constitit, neq; unquam constare poterit : Fere enim locis, " etiam dicersis, S; a se invicem distantibus, per essentiam ades^y. " exempli gratia, globo terrestri, S; lunari, spatiisq; omnibus inter" mediis, quid aliud est, quam ipsissi?na ratio formalis rS extendi ?" From " Cap. VI!' § 15.

shall

next hear the sentiments of S. Colliber

once of some celebrity, and

of.

writer

undoubtedly, considerable parts,

and great good sense, in not a few respects. " This opinion/' " the opinion of [the Deity's] Inexten§ 16. " sion," " being once entertained, 'tis scarce conceivable what a u train of riddles and paradoxes it drew after it. For thence the

—

" Platonists and the rest of Ana x inlander s Commentators first beu gan to infer what is usually called his Indistance. For distance (e

being only a relative conception of Space, consequently it could " not, as they rightly concluded, be conceived in a being who was,

and dimensions. " Thus far they proceeded in absurdity, their next step was " impiety. For since they found it impossible to conceive a being f* without amplitude and dimensions any otherwise than as a mere " mathematical * point ; they began to speak of the Deity in the " like diminutive terms, and, in effect, imprisoned the Great Crea" tor within the smallest dust of his creation." [Less, infinitely less, as they imagined, absolutely without amplitude § 17.

so to speak, than the smallest dust

The

smallest dust

*********** something

but a

always " But

mathematical point' has no magnitude.']

they quickly solved

the difficulty with a mystery, and gravely concluded that it was no impossibility for * an Infinite Being to exist entire, tho'

" in a certain atomical manner, not only in one but in every indi" vidual particle of the universe at once. For this worthy discovery " vre are particularly indebted to Plotinus, one of Plato's dis-

who

ciples,

strate that

obliged the world with two whole books to

one and the same being

may be

all

demon-

entirel}' in

each distinguishable part of the world.

§ 18. " This Philosopher it seems had found the secret of pro" ducing more Deities out of one than the fruitful fancies of all the <f

Poets in their Theogonies could ever make. § 19.

" But

fearing,

good man!

lest this

discovery of his should

" be thought inconsistent witli the unity of God, he made bold to " stretch the mystery a little farther by concluding not only that " it's the property and privilege of the absolutely Infinite Being to " exist whole in even' particle of the world, but that he has an

— APPENDIX TO PART

278

VIII.

" undoubted prerogative of existing- whole in the whole of it too; " so as to be one individual innumerable universal Deity. All which " Platonical mysteries were afterwards received as articles of faith " by the Schoolmen, and are comprised in that vulgar maxim of " theirs, viz., Deus est totus in toto et totus in qualibet parte mundi, "

God

teries that require a

and whole in every part of the world, Mysdegree of faith beyond that of miracles; a

whole in the whole

ff faith which can transform contradictions into arguments with a " Credo quia impossible est."

§ 20. Listen, for a moment by the way, to the " Treatise of Human Nature" speaking in reference to the Schoolmen's maxim ;

—a That scholastic principle which, when crudely proposed, appears " so shocking, of totum in toto, et totum in qualibet parte ; which is " much the same as if we should say, that a thing is in a certain "place, and yet is not there." Book I. Part. iv. Sect. 5. Vide

—

Part. III. § 64. not. +.

We now go

on with

S. C.

— " Though

'tis next to imposspeak of such extravagances as these, and, at the same u time, to preserve that gravity which is so neeessary in discourses " of this nature ; yet I conceive it may not be amiss to have obseree ved thus much, to the end it may be seen how strangely the

§ 21.

sible to

name of Learning has been misapplied to whimsies of this kind, " and how profanely the sacred name of God has been abused to " consecrate the most egregious nonsense." Impartial Enquiry, &c. B.

II. Part.

ii.

ch. 4.

§ 32. Permit,

ye upon

whom

the Schoolmen hath fallen

the mantle of the

madmen amongst

permit a word of reproof, for the past,

and of warning, as to the future. Has not the egregious nonsense alto by the author from whom we have this instant parted, been one, and a very fruitful cause of the birth, and growth, of Atheism in modern times ? has it not been one of the great nurs-

luded

ing-mothers of the atheist-monster

a nursing-mother actively at

work, though in some respects remote from public view § 23.

" l( '

call in

evidence on the point.

spirituality believe they

selves accumulated,

f '

Let us

der each point of

difficulties,

by its

answer the

it;

partizans of

they have them-

The

soul is entire, is whole unan absurd answer will solve for after all it witi be found, that this

saj'ing,

extent.'

they have done

(

" The

difficulties

however insensible, however minute, must yet remain something." Thus writes D' Holbach. System of Nature, Part. I. ch. vii. And the following is Diderot's note on It is with what is set forth in the note that our prethat passage. i(

point } which

called soul,

— APPENDIX TO PART

279

VIII.

c< According to this answer an infinity of lies. unextended substance, or the same unextended substance re" peated an infinity of times, would constitute a substance that has

sent business most (i

which

extent,

absurd

;

hu-

for, according- to this principle, the

assumed (e that God is a being without extent, who is an infinity of times whole <c in each part of the universe and the same is stated of the huce man soul from whence we must necessarily conclude that God " and the soul of man are equally infinite, unless we suppose unex<c tended substances of different extents, or a God without extent more <e extended than the human soul. Such are, however, the rhapsoee dies which SOME of our theological metaphysicians would have ^'•man soul would then be as infinite as God, since

—

;

thinking beings believe

Vide Part. VI. Appendic. §

<Sfc.

What has rendered the doctrine of the immateriality of the soul so much out of vogue now-a-days, and another name with many for a monster of ab(A

§ 24.

surdity

word on

single

The saying

a collateral topic.

which

that that soul

immaterial,

altoge-

ther destitute of extension, occupying not 'even a point of space.

That

are

Because, what has no extension is nothing ; Hobbes' words, " Substance without dimensions

just the reason

or to give

words which

flatly contradict

Vide Part. III. § 34. cause,

it is

each other."

seq.—quoq; Part. IX.

Homine.

§ 89. not. f.

And

—

be-

repugnant to the dictates of our unsophisticated faculties

to consider gross matter (ay, or subtile matter, as the only cause of all thought.

41.— et

quoq; Part. VI. §

And

§ 2o.

Part.

you.

to that,)

Vide Part. III. § 39. atq; §

40.—

XII. Appendic.

as the hypothesis of inextension is well calcu-

lated to foster atheism, so the hypothesis of infinite extension

ad-

mirably adapted to extinguish atheism. § 26. In the first place, this hypothesis distinguishes two different

sorts of extension.

And

this of itself destroys

of the atheistic hypotheses material plenum, § 27.

And

the most plausible

to-wit, the hypothesis of an absolute

and but one substance in nature. it be established that there

in the second, if

an in-

corporeal, or immaterial, or spiritual expansion which pervades the

material universe,

it is

worth no atheist's while to contend against the is a mode of an Intelligent Spirit.

position, that that expansion

§ 28.

shall

draw

this

Appendix

to a conclusion with

one

other piece from the " Impartial Enquiry." § 29.

The opinion of the

Nullibists.

known that Weigelius was the reviver of this extra" vagance among Christians. For one assertion of his (among di'Tis well

" vers others

relishing of the height of enthusiasm

and

(distraction

— APPENDIX TO PART

280

VIII.

<e was that spiritual beings (since conceived " without dimensions) are no where and yet c<

be unextendecl or

chief patron of this profound mystery of Nullibism

" <c

every where.

Cartes.

But the was Bes

philosopher that has rendered himself remarkable for

these three confident assertions, viz., That whatever thinks is immaterial; That whatever is extended, or has dimensions, is material;

and That whatever

unextended, or without dimensions, is

nowhere.

in effect than a frank confession of

Which

(perhaps the truest)

last assertion

is no other what the Schools laboured to ec conceal under an insignificant and arbitrary distinction between u the Locus of a Body and the Ubi of a Spirit ; which it seems the " less metaphysical Cartesians find themselves unable to compre" hend." Ibidem.

§ 30.

Unable

of metaphysics

comprehend

no marvel.

Would any amount

—short of metaphysics run mad— enable Cartesians

comprehend, in all its latitude, the between locus and ubi? Take, upon the " If it be said by any one, point, the witness of two famous men. ee that it (the soul) cannot change place, because it hath none, for " spirits are not in loco, but ubi ; I suppose" witnesseth John Locke cc that way of talking will not now be of much weight " to many in an age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer (to say nothing of others) to

scholastic

distinction

—

themselves to be deceived by, such unintelligible ways of speak-

ing."

tions,

Essay.

about Spirits existing in

u mere empty

the second witness

signification." § 31.

less

— " The Schoolmen's distincUbi, and not in Loco are" — saith

II. ch. xxiii. § 21.

;

sounds, without

Dr Samuel Clarke's Ans. man than Dr Watts, the

any manner of

to 6th Letter.

Divine, and so respec-

table a one as Isaac Watts, the Metaphysician, harped mightily, in

own way, upon

this string, the distinction, to-wit, between the and ubi of a Spirit. Well, if he had been*helped to go back and destroy the empty distinction, by means of an observation of his own, which partly serves to bring up the rear, composing as it does one of his concluding (they are deeply pious) reflections on " Spirits being in a place and removing from it," 8$c. (Essay cc is, to guard VI.) " The best, thing we can do," observes he,-

his

locus

—

against those ideas of spirits which have any gross absurdities in

" them." Watts

(

Conclusion" to Sect. V.)

assure

Excellently said,

Dr Isaac

—And completely disregarded by yourself.

you

PACE.

Scbs

V A The same' Matter. V

Nothing. Vide Part.IX.ยงZ0,

Part. VII

31.

10.

relation.

Vide Part. IX. ยง

33, et seq.

vsq; ad ยง 59 inclus.

APPENDIX TO PART APPENDIX

TABLE OF THE DIVISION AND SUBDIVISIONS OF THE OPINIONS CONCEKNING SPACE.

SPACE

A A SCBSTANC E.

Vide Part

VII. ยง 8.

Vide Tart. VIII. ยง

V The name

Matter, vide Part. 10.

VI !.ยง!),

from

Of Matter.

Mattel-.

Vide Part.

Vide Part.V II i

V Neither more

or, Different

VIII

or, of

Miml Part.ix.%10,

V Unintelligent. Vide

Pan. VII. ยง 12, ctseq.

ll i

ulrlli-i'lli.

Vide Pari. VII. ยง

29,

Of an nite

Infi-

Mind.

Of a Finite Min.l. Vide Par(.X.ยง3,

VIII. ยง

Void.or emp-

Possibility, or

tiness. Vide Part. /X.ยง14, ยง 2C, el tea.

Pari. 1X.ยง 30,1 31. |

ยง 33, cl ยซeo. utq; ad ยง 09

282

APPENDIX

( seems to have a necessary and obstinate exist§ 1. " Space (CC ence:'" These words are quoted, in the place whereto this

—

Appendix

relates, as constituting

cannot be a mere idea) which

an argument (to prove that Space Isaac Watts is to answer.

§ 2. The whole passage, in the Doctor's work, is as follows " It is said, space cannot be a mere idea, because it seems to have " a necessary and obstinate existence, whether there were any mind <e There is no questioning that Watts, or no to form an idea of it." by " any mind," meant the mind of any man, or, at most, of any " created being." § 3.

That Space has necessary existence, we are firmly persuadtherefore, that Space would continue to exist, although

And

ed.

every mind, that ever began to be, ceased to exist,

These are points we hold as settled. But there is a controversy which may be

we can

easily

believe. § 4.

raised.

Can any

person be quite sure, that Space would be, were there no mind whatsoever to conceive Space? How could one be sure of that? § 5.

To be

plain in stating our

own

sentiment

—We

are quite

there were no Mind to form an idea of Space, there would be no Space. That is to say, the suicidalf supposition^ of no Space, is not more self-destructive than the supposition of no Mind. But is not Space that § 6. Space is not an idea ; not a mind about which ideas are employed ? is not Space an object of conconvinced, that

ceptions

And

not the object of a conception inseparably related

to a conception ?

object of thought

fine, Is

think of any thing

Is object of

—

not that to have an

thought not relative to mind

not Space relative to a mind cognising

§ 7. If so, 'tis sufficiently evident, that there

were no Mind in existence. § 8. Does it any way follow from sary,

Mind

Puta

not. f

could be no Space,

that seeing Space

neces-

necessary.

t Puta Part. II. § 14. &c. collat. § Part. III. § 16. 17. 1

this,

it ?

apud

§ 17. Partis

IV.

1. notce

apud

§ 88. Part.

X.—Quoq;

283

APPENDIX TO PART APPENDIX ft

â&#x20AC;&#x201D;

ter

XII.

tftf-

ever bare incogitative mat-

It is as impossible to conceive that

should produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing

" should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of * matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to " produce nothing. For example, let us suppose the matter of " the next pebble we meet with, eternal,, closely united, and the **

parts firmly at rest together

" world, must " Is it possible c<

to conceive it

" " " (t

" "

" <{ f*

" " " "

there were

no other being

can add motion to

matter, or produce any thing

u cannot produce " " " " " " " "

;

in the

not eternally remain so, a dead, inactive lump

in itself so

Matter then, by

much

motion

its

being purely

itself,

own

strength,

the motion

has,

be from eternity, or else be produced, and added to matter by some other being more powerful than matter: matter,

must as

also

evident, having not

power

produce motion

let

us suppose motion eternal too

ter

and motion, whatever changes

;

in itself.

But

yet matter, incogitative matit

might produce of figure and Knowledge will still be

bulk, could never produce thought.

beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as is beyond the power of nothing, or non-entity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was no such thing as thought, or an intelligent being existing? Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which wc are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it), vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please ; a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c, whose diameters are 1,000,000th part of a gry, will operate no otherwise upon other as far

matter

bodies of proportionable bulk, than those of an inch or footYlia-

meter

;

and you may

as rationally expect to

produce sense,

thought, and knowledge, by putting together, in a certain figure

and motion, gross

particles of matter, as

by those

that arc the

— APPENDIX TO PART

284

XII.

" very minutest, that do anywhere exist. They knock, impel, and " resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can <e

do.

can never begin to be

So that

will suppose nothing if

motion can never begin

eternal,

" ter and motion first, " For it is impossible to ce

we suppose to

first,

or eternal, matter

bare matter, without motion

we suppose only mat-

or eternal, thought can never begin to be. conceive that matter, either with or without

in, and from, itself, sense, percepand knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then sense, ce perception, and knowledge, must be a property eternally insepa" rable from matter, and every particle of it." Locke's Essay.

motion, could have originally tion,

B. IV. ch. x. § lO.t I shall

" be

add a

parallel passage

his

£e

every clod of earth

own

soul or mind,

" be generated " {C

from Cudworth.—" As no man can

so sottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him,

and personality such

;

out of dead and

it is

to be

real entity, whilst

certain, that

'senseless-

mind can never

matter or body, nor re-

a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures,

suit, as

and motions, and

" from

it,

therefore

must needs be a thing

or substance incorporeal."

sites,

really distinct

— P. 749.

Those passages are brought forward not as as solemn appeals to the Court of Consciousness.

authorities,

but

APPENDIX I!Alas

the Zetetic Society

their particular existence, in

" Community

The Zetetics have lost is no more. becoming members of e( the Universal

In finding (to the delight of their hearts)

Society."

Owenism, completely serves their purpose, and in amalgamating themselves, accordingly, with the Glasgow Branch of the Socialist " Religionists" Heaven preserve us from their relithat Socialism, or

—

And

in the 3d Chapter of the

ing as his sentiments

same Book, he had delivered the follow-

—" I see no contradiction in

it,

that the

first

eternal

he pleased, give to certain systems of created " senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, per" ception, and thought though, as I think, I have proved, lib. 4. c. 10.—it " is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its " thinking

Being should,

own

nature void of sense and thought) should be that eternal first-think-

" ing Being."

§ 6.

—

)

APPENDIX TO PART gion

285

XII.

— do not those gentlemen afford new proof, (were new proof

necessary,) that Socialism and Atheism are quite identical cal in the sense that Socialism

Atheist

not a Socialist, but

strict logical

matter

would

all Socialists are

consequence

in true propriety,

Atheists, as far as the root

but due to Antitheos to

the vile dose.

From the may lift his

very

of the

state, that

imagining Socialism

away

Socialists, to

What though

dren, in addition to

all

and

—and, —Antitheos has munities

lifted his voice

ills

human

not,

life.

justice, are

man

hopes of a happy hereafter

last

it is

mercilessly

life

more compas-

of his goods, and chil:

(oftener,

lodging, free of all charges, in

as the

(and

consolation, giving nothing

do them

they despoil a

exchange, a wife for every year of his bed, board,

the

all

the best sources of

The

in return.

first,

pen) against the newly -found-out, hu-

manly-invented, panacea for

and

— Every

(heavy on his stomach, he refused pointblank to swallow

understood, he

sionate.

—

identi-

atheistical?

concerned.

It is

takes

bottom

if if

the

offer, in

agreeable,

—

one of their Com-

scene of all,"t " the burial of an ass"

now, even

Zetetic atheism

to treat people

with.

Society, then, of dogmatic atheists (as they were proud to call

themselves) has ceased to exist. sustain losses as great.

—We

shall

The world may be doomed to by no means lose an opportunity

so very inviting, to mention, for the sake of such of our readers as

may

not be aware of the circumstance, that the great organ of dog-

matic atheism, in Britain, I lc

speak of

dead

also.

It is

the " Star in the East"

regularly stamped newspaper, set agoing in

Cam-

bridgeshire about three years ago, for the double purpose of ad-

" vancing the cause of ultra-radicalism, and of advocating, openly " and unblushingly, out-and-out atheistical principles/'IT The " Star in the East" (now set for ever in the West) has given way,

—

and made room for a new periodical, having doubtless discovered, that the " New Moral World", the grand mouth-piece of Socialism, was capitallj^raapted to express and to further its dearest objects. Are Atheism and Socialism not identical? is not the one contained in the other ? Socialism is a lax and manageable enough thing, and verily supersedes the necessity for any form of Atheism besides its own Wherever Socialism appears and flourishes, it eats out the sub:

—

f Shahipere.

Jeremiah, Ch. xxii.

See the rhilalethean Society's original Circular.

v. 19.

Dated May, 1839.

— ;

APPENDIX TO PART

286

XII.

stance of every other description of Atheism

already overgrown

cannot quit

to swell its

;

own

— dimensions. without remarking, that, contrary

this subject

what first appearances might indicate, Socialist atheism is much more dangerous and deadly than dogmatic atheism. This affirms, I know, I prove, there is no God Perhaps it declares with emphasis, I prove, there cannot be any God. The former yawns out, I know not very well, and I care not at all, whether there be any to

—

God

or no.

about

And

it.

be a truth that there

I shall

a God,

take no pains to know.

know

nothing

hold the whole

question to be a " puerile"t one. " Local education" t may make some " insane" t enough to trouble their heads with regard to such " Let us eat and drink a topic but I have been taught better. " for to-morrow we die." In fine, a dogmatic atheist may be ap-

—

proached with reasoning, but a Socialist atheist cuts off your only resource

when he

treats

your attempt as wholly

dogmatic atheist can be laid hold of

insignificant.

Your

he presents a rough exterior.

which slides through away, before one knows. Few, indeed, if they can but be prevailed on to reason at all, will stand out against the demonstration of A God ; but (such is the mishap) too many may

But your

Socialist atheistls like a slippery eel,

one's fingers.

—

It's

be got to refuse to give the question a |

See Robert Owen's September, 1839.

" Address

fair

hearing.

and Challenge

to the Philalethean So-

ciety."

[PRIN'TED BY NEILL

Lb S 78

AND

CO.,

OLD FISH MARKET) EDINBURGH.