Américas Volume VI by Américas: The Johns Hopkins University Journal of Latin American Studies

AmĂŠricas

The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies Volume VI 2017

AmĂŠricas The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies Volume VI 2017

Published By The Johns Hopkins University Program in Latin American Studies Baltimore, Maryland

AmĂŠricas, the Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies, was established in 2005 by students and faculty at the Johns Hopkins University under the endorsement of the Program in Latin American Studies. Our mission is to provide a multi-disciplinary form for students and scholars to present and discuss articles pertaining to Latin America, its issues and its diaspora. Our website is available at http://americasjhu.org AmĂŠricas, the Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies Published by The Johns Hopkins University Program in Latin American Studies 3400 N. Charles St. Baltimore, MD 21218 United States of America

Table of Contents Acknowledgement and Journal Staff……………………………………………………………1 Letter from the Editor in Chief………………………………………………………………….2 Politics, Trade and Finance: The Case of China and Argentina in Sino-Latin American Relations………………………………………………………………....3 Maria Belén Wu Influences of Economic Policy on Healthcare in Chile: The Development of Universal Healthcare from the Populist Movement to the Neoliberal Era…………………….20 Sara Jordan Chadwick History Repeated? Plan Colombia and CARSI………………………………………………..33 Alexandra Carr Addressing Brazil’s National Plan to Combat the Use of Crack Cocaine…………………….46 Daniela Natalia Teixeira Schermerhorn El conflict armado interno”: Discourses of Violence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru…………………………………………………………….65 Jon Ettinger The Metamorphosis of Las Mariposas: The Politics of Memory of the Mirabal Sisters in the Dominican Republic…………………………………………………..78 Lisa Krause

Acknowledgement We would like to thank our talented group of editors for investing their time and attention into each piece. Without them, this publication would not have been possible. A million thanks to Morgan Marc, who was in charge of the journal’s layout and beautiful cover. We would also like to thank our contributing authors, who worked closely with the Américas staff over a period of several weeks to ensure their work was of the highest caliber. Finally, thank you to the Johns Hopkins Program in Latin American Studies for its financial and programmatic support during the publication process.

Journal Staff Editor in Chief

Gabriela Rico

Faculty Advisors

Eduardo González Magda von der Heydt-Coca

Managing Editor

Sofia Schonenberg

Head of Public Relations

Daisy Duan

Editing Team

Amy Daniels Allison Keller Margaret Kupitz Bryan Hong Daisy Duan Gugan Raghuraman Kiana Boroumand Karen Sheng Ritika Achrekar

Copy Editors

Gabriela Rico Kiana Boroumand Karen Sheng

Layout and Cover Design

Morgan Marc

Letter from the Editor in Chief Dear Readers, This edition of Américas contains submissions that cover a broad range of topics. The six pieces selected for this year’s journal tackle a variety of critical issues facing the region of Latin America today. From national remembrance and recognition of state and guerilla violence to novel economic relationships to drug-trafficking, the selected pieces examine both past and present dynamics at work in the region. This year, I was fortunate enough to work with a hardworking and talented group of editors who dedicated numerous hours to reading submissions, attending editorial meetings and submitting comments and suggestions on each piece. We worked alongside a brilliant and diverse group of authors, who worked diligently to improve their already fantastic pieces. I am so proud to publish authors from a number of academic institutions who offer their own unique perspectives on issues related to Latin America. Maria Belén Wu’s examination of the rise of China in the region, particularly its relationship with her home country of Argentina, illuminates the new economic linkages being forged in Latin America. Sara Jordan Chadwick takes on the substantial task of tracking the development of Chile’s healthcare system from its inception to the present day, shedding light on its issues with inequality. From there, Alexandra Carr examines the role of Plan Colombia in influencing new multilateral anti-drug efforts in Central America, ultimately arguing that lessons from the past must be applied to the future. Daniela Schermerhorn, a Brazilian police officer, discusses drug policy on a national scale, proposing solutions for Brazil’s fight against crack cocaine. Jon Ettinger then addresses lived and remembered histories of violence in El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru. Finally, Lisa Krause examines the case of the Mirabal Sisters in the Dominican Republic, discussing the role of the politics of memory in shaping Dominican society after the fall of the Trujillo dictatorship. I am excited to present six pieces that do not shy away from addressing topics of great significance to the region and its future. The mission of Américas has always been to provide a multi-disciplinary forum for scholars and students to present and discuss articles pertaining to Latin America, its issues and its diaspora, and I believe this year’s edition accomplishes that goal. I hope you enjoy reading these articles as much as we did.

Sincerely, Gabriela Rico ‘18 Editor in Chief May 2017

Politics, Trade and Finance: The Case of China and Argentina in Sino-Latin American Relations María Belén Wu

With the continuous impetus of globalization since the mid-twentieth century, emerging market economies have become increasingly relevant actors in international trade and financial systems. Since the gradual implementation of economic liberalization reforms from 1978 onwards, China has undoubtedly become the most important player among these newcomers due to its sheer size and sustained double-digit growth. At the same time, the China boom has opened up significant economic opportunities to other emerging markets in Africa and more recently in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In light of the recent global financial crisis and the looming shadow of the Great Recession on the world economy, the political and economic networks between China and other emerging markets are worthy of examination on account of their impact on economic recovery and stimulus. This paper explores the political, trade, and financial dimensions of Chinese relations with its Latin American partners through a case study analysis of China-Argentina relations. Although the exact nature of Chinese engagement differs country by country, the Argentine case is ideal for the purpose of this examination on two levels. First, it presents a blueprint of the most common financial problems faced by LAC countries from the late twentieth century on, which has partially provided the foundation of China-LAC relations. Second, it possesses all the characteristics of the stereotypical trade pattern between LAC countries and China. In addition to this, the ebb and flow of left-wing populism and right-wing conservatism throughout its history has created a unique atmosphere in Argentina’s domestic politics. This makes Argentina’s case perfect for analyzing the additional dimension of the influence of domestic political alignment on the establishment of international political and economic ties with China. María Belén Wu is a rising senior at Johns Hopkins University majoring in International Studies and Economics. Beginning in Fall 2017, she will be pursuing a Master in International Finance and China Studies, with a minor in Latin American Studies and a specialization in Emerging Markets at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. She is from Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is of Chinese heritage. This paper was originally written for “The China Boom,” a course taught by Dr. Ho-fung Hung in the JHU Department of Sociology.

Argentina’s Economy and Domestic Politics Argentina is the third largest Latin American economy and the second largest South

American economy, behind Brazil. It is abundant in natural resources, mainly metal ores, gas, and petroleum, and has an export-oriented agricultural sector. Argentina’s economy achieved very high levels of development in the past that were followed by a drastic reversal, giving rise to the so-called “Argentine paradox”. In the early twentieth century, Argentina was one of the highest GDP per capita countries and the third richest developing country in the world, in part thanks to the generous income boosts provided by wartime commodity exports to Europe and the US. However, in the latter half of the century, the country became fraught with hyperinflation, currency crises, and sovereign debt defaults, the repercussions of which still plague the Argentine economy to this day. The decline of economic development in the post-war period was accompanied by the rise of Peronism in Argentine domestic politics, a political movement launched by President Juan Domingo Perón and his wife Eva Perón of the Justicialist Party. This is a left-wing third-position ideology that rejects both capitalism and communism as extreme ideologies. Peronism endorses the model of corporate socialism, which aims to mediate tensions between social classes, and conceives the state as the responsible agent for negotiating compromise in conflicts between managers and workers. Peronism’s nationalist and populist discourse enjoyed widespread support from its inception in 1946, and provides the political counterpart of the Argentine paradox: “Although the behavior of the Argentines is generally typical of the behavior of peoples in underdeveloped countries, Argentina has long enjoyed national independence and has been well-developed. The middle class is large, and literacy is high. Argentine nationalism cannot be explained as a simple function of the struggle for political independence and economic development.”i Even after the right-wing military dictatorship banned the Peronist government from 1976 to 1983, the influence of Peronism remained strong and several Peronist presidents have been in office since. In 2003, the Justicialist Party allowed multiple candidates to run for general elections due to the large size of the party and the diversity of its factions. As a result, Néstor Kirchner from the Front for Victory faction became the new President of Argentina. In the following twelve years, the presidency of Kirchner and later his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner gave rise to a new political movement: Kirchnerism.

Like Peronism, Kirchnerism is also a left-wing populist ideology that opposes neoliberalism. Similar to the Peronist economics of import substitution, the replacement of imports with domestic production, Kirchnerism has pursued an economic policy of industrialist developmentalism. This consists of a combination of import quotas and export taxes on agricultural goods in order to protect local industry and employment. Additionally, Kirchnerism has strongly supported economic ties within Mercosurii and vice versa, and also aims to strengthen Argentine relations with other Latin American countries in order to establish a South American economic axis. However, Kirchnerism’s economic measures have pushed away Argentina’s traditional allies such as Brazil and Uruguay, while displaying an increasing affinity towards Venezuela under the banner of Chavism, a failed socialist movement led by then president Hugo Chávez. Some of these measures include the cepo cambiario or currency controls imposed since 2011, which forbade the exchange of pesos into dollars in an attempt to slow down the rapid increase in capital flight. Another example is the levying of sales tax withholdings of 35 percent for all foreign consumption of Argentine residents since 2013. These policies depict Kirchnerism’s aversion to trade and financial integration, resulting in damaging levels of protectionism for the Argentine economy. II.

The Rise of Anti-US Politics and China-Argentina Relations The political counterpart to the anti-neoliberal economic stance of the Kirchner

administration is the rise of a consistent pattern of anti-US politics over the course of 2003 to 2015. Kirchnerism has strongly opposed multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements pursued by the US. The climax of this policy occurred with the confrontation between Kirchner and George W. Bush at the Mar del Plata Summit of the Americas in 2005, which resulted in Argentina's refusal to sign the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas and put an end to negotiations on this agreement. More recently, Fernández has expressed vehement opposition towards the US hedge funds that sued for full payment of the Argentine debt from the 2001 default. After Argentina lost the US appeals court case in 2014, the insufficient federal reserves to pay back bondholders led Argentina into a “selective default”iii. Parallel to its anti-US rhetoric, the Kirchner regime has established strong diplomatic and economic ties with China. As the second largest economy in the world, China is now competing with the US for global influence as well as resources. It is therefore in China’s interest to defy

the historical notion of Latin America as America’s backyard. President Xi Jinping visited Argentina in mid 2014 and Cristina Kirchner visited China in early 2015. During Xi’s visit, the leaders upgraded their countries’ ties to a bilateral “comprehensive strategic partnership” and signed the Convenio Marco de Cooperación en Materia Económica y de Inversiones, or the Framework Agreement for Economic Matters and Investment Cooperation (FAEMIC). Apart from its geopolitical relevance, this agreement highlights three broad aims of cooperation, including (1) the tempering of the commercial imbalances between China and Argentina, (2) the provision of financing for construction investment in key infrastructure for the development of Argentina's economy in the long run, and (3) the alleviation of the Argentine foreign currency shortage in the short run.iv The general agreement is composed of smaller, specific contracts on individual projects, which have the potential to promote the transfer of technology and knowhow as well as local production of skill-intensive industries. Theoretically the FAEMIC accurately reflects the global context in which China and Argentina find themselves and addresses their most burning anxieties: For China, its increasing concerns regarding energy security and its need for raw material and primary products to sustain its population; and for Argentina, its lack of financial credibility and currency controls preventing its overdue debt restructuring, as well as its interest in establishing more egalitarian terms of trade with the Asian giant. Nevertheless, the ratification of the FAEMIC has raised significant concerns and opposition amongst the Argentine population. A closer examination of the agreement’s execution is necessary to evaluate the veracity of the concerns, as well as to determine whether these issues are shared by LAC countries at large or are specific to the Argentine case. III.

China-LAC Relations vs. China-Argentina Relations Since FAEMIC In their paper “China Matters: China’s Economic Impact in Latin America,” authors Kevin

Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski highlight two relevant aspects of China’s economic relationship with LAC: Firstly, the effect of China’s economic growth on trade and foreign direct investment flows for LAC; secondly, China’s effect on the competitiveness of LAC exports in world markets. An additional political dimension worth exploring is the effect of China’s desire to establish its power position in the global economic system on LAC economies. Magnified through the lens of China-Argentina relations, the subsequent analysis dissects the three main

goals of the FAEMIC that respectively target trade, foreign direct investment, and debt financing in order to gain a more detailed overview of China-LAC relations. Asymmetric Trade “China’s growth may accentuate the LAC region’s reliance on raw materials and primary products, contribute to the persistent issues of current account deficits in LAC, and put LAC further behind in the race to ‘catch up’ to other developing countries in establishing competitive high-value-added manufacturing capabilities.”v More precisely, there are three main asymmetries in China-LAC trade illustrated by the most recent available economic data [See Table 1 and 2 in Appendix].vi (a) Relative sizes: while trade with LAC accounts for 6.08 percent of total Chinese trade, China accounts for 12.75 percent, or twice as much, of total LAC trade, consistent with a LAC trade deficit with China of $93 billion; (b) patterns of trade: while LAC top export products to China are ores, food products, fuels, and minerals, China’s top export products to LAC are electrical equipment, machinery, and vehicles; and (c) concentration of trade: the top 20 LAC export products to China concentrate 96 percent of total exports and the top five products comprise 89.8 percent of total exports, while the top 20 Chinese export products account for 86.6 percent of total exports to LAC and the top five products are only 60.2 percent of total exports, indicating a significant diversification differential.vii This is a relevant advantage for China, as exporting a wide range of products spreads out the risk of loss es to different industries. The Argentine case is completely consistent with the three asymmetries outlined above for LAC-China trade relations [See Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix].viii Concerning relative sizes of trade, China is both Argentina’s second largest export destination and import origin, while Argentina represents a virtually insignificant percentage of China’s trade. This is reflected in the current account balance, where although Argentina maintains an overall positive trade balance of $5 billion, it has a trade deficit of $10.3 billion with China and an overall current account deficit of $4.8 billion, according to the World Bank. In terms of trade patterns, Argentina’s top export products to China are consistent with the general LAC commodity export pattern, including agricultural products such as soybeans, beef, and seafood; in contrast, China’s top export products to Argentina are electrical equipment, machinery, chemicals, and construction materials, again depicting the Chinese manufacture export pattern. Regarding concentration of trade, the numbers indicate a lower level of diversification on both ends compared to China-LAC

trade, but the diversification differential is equally high: Argentina’s top 20 export products to China represent an impressive 99.3 percent of total exports and the top five products comprise 80.1 percent of total exports, whereas the top 20 Chinese export products account for 90.5 percent of total exports to LAC and the top five products are 70.1 percent of total exports. More importantly, the 2013-2015 trade data has shown no improvement whatsoever on the existing trade asymmetries between LAC and China, nor between Argentina and China since the ratification of FAEMIC. This deems the first goal of the agreement a failure and the domestic concerns a reality. Furthermore, China’s deteriorating effect on the competitiveness of LAC exports in world markets is clearly evidenced in Gallagher and Porzecanski’s manufactured exports threat index, which expresses the degree to which each LAC country’s exports is threatened by Chinese exports. See Table 5 in Appendix, in which the overall LAC threat stands at 94 percent, and Argentina suffers a total threat of 96 percent, making it the country experiencing the second highest threat after Mexico (99 percent), an outlier due to its manufacture-oriented export sector that is unable to contend with the Chinese competitive advantage. As a whole, in the short run Chinese demand for raw materials is positive because it increases direct exports from LAC and pushes up commodity prices. However, in the long run China’s growth deepens LAC’s specialization on commodity exports, which hinders their opportunities for industrialization and moving up the value-added chain. Moreover, this dependency means that China’s current economic slowdown and weakening demand for commodities directly translate into a slowdown of LAC economic growth as well. As a result, from the LAC perspective, these various economic threats have morphed into a more general fear of Chinese neo-colonialism, which is further exacerbated through the foreign direct investment channel. Controversial Infrastructure Investment According to Gallagher and Porzecanski, there is “no evidence of China-driven foreign direct investment (FDI) diversion from LAC but rather a synergy between investment flows to China and to LAC.”ix This lack of competition for inward FDI is explained by the fact that China and LAC generally do not source their FDI flows from the same countries and the investments are not directed towards the same sectors, except in the case of Mexico. However, Chinese

outward FDI to LAC paints a different picture, with a visible concentration of Chinese financial flows into some LAC countries and sectors. Five countries concentrate most of Chinese FDI in the region, with Venezuela at the top (51 percent), followed by Brazil and Argentina (20 and 17 percent respectively) and to a much lesser extent Ecuador (10 percent) and the Bahamas (3 percent). Regarding the sectors where FDI is directed, these are heavily concentrated in extractive sectors, with the top three being infrastructure (42 percent), energy (28 percent), and mining (5 percent), altogether comprising a 75 percent of total FDI.x As in the case of trade, Argentina’s inward FDI flows from China follow the pattern of financial flows into extractive sectors. This is clearly stipulated in the second aim of the FAEMIC, where the agreement explicitly states that the priority areas of investment are energy, telecommunications, land transport, and port infrastructure.xi Additionally, the FDI projects have been complemented with loans, mainly in the energy and infrastructure sectors, at lower rates and better terms than in international credit markets [See Table 6 in Appendix]. Some particular sub-contracts include an extension of more than 3,000 kilometers of the Belgrano Cargas railway in the provinces of Santa Fe, San Juan, and Jujuy, as well as the construction of two hydroelectric dams in Santa Cruz province and two nuclear power plants in Buenos Aires. The most controversial Chinese FDI project in Argentina was the construction of a Chinese space station in the Patagonia region, approved in early 2015. The China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General will be China’s first space installation outside its own borders.xii Opponents have raised fears that the space station could be assigned military uses, thus involving Argentina in unwanted conflicts with third parties like the US. The deal was also highly criticized for its lack of transparency, since it was approved in a rushed rubber-stamp vote by “automatic majority” in Congress, where Fernández’s Front for Victory faction holds majority in both houses.xiii After its ratification, the agreement was revealed to include a secret clause granting the Chinese a 50-year tax exemption for the base and a 50-year lease of the 200 hectares surrounding the antenna. This became an especially sensitive issue to Argentineans, as the territory would be considered Chinese sovereign territory, and it has been interpreted as a symbol of territorial colonialism. The lack of transparency is a major issue with Chinese outward FDI in general. “As the Chinese authorities have recognized, suspicions regarding the intentions behind China’s outward investments can impede major investments in other countries. Some of the M&A deals that have

been blocked or discouraged in recent years (such as CNOOC-Unocal and Haier-Maytag in 2005, Huawei-3Com in 2008, Chinalco-Rio Tinto in 2009) have been so large that if they had gone ahead they would have increased China’s total annual OFDI outflow by a large percentage.”xiv Allaying these suspicions in a systematic and effective way can therefore play a key role in realizing China’s potential in maintaining outward FDI expansion, while failure to tackle the problem may hold it back. Other notable problems with Chinese outward FDI in the LAC region include the lack of job provisions to locals despite the increasing amount of factories and power plants that result from investment. Many Chinese companies opt to bring along Chinese management and technical expertise and in some cases, even immigrant workers. The LAC countries that have relied mostly on Chinese employees are by and large the small Caribbean countries, where goods and labor markets are smaller and have a weaker bargaining position, while larger countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Argentina have not experienced this problem. However, there is a growing tendency to hire more local workforces due to several factors, such as the fewer Chinese who want to work on these types of projects abroad and prefer to stay in China, where wages and conditions have increased considerably. Moreover, Chinese firms have been fairly responsive to concerns voiced by LAC trade unions. Overall, LAC countries’ bargaining position with respect to the terms of Chinese FDI is relatively strong compared to China’s partners in Africa.xv Last but not least, local corruption is another issue that often sparks concerns in Chinese investment and loan agreements and it is closely related to the aforementioned lack of transparency on both ends. On the Chinese side, the country’s policy of non-interference facilitates unmonitored corrupt practices when dealing with Chinese financial inflows. On the LAC side, the countries’ general economic weakness coupled with a strong tradition of political corruption raises reasonable concerns. This is illustrated perfectly by the case of Argentina and the Kirchnerist search for short-term solutions to domestic economic problems.

Political Motives for Currency Swaps Argentina’s economic prosperity in the early to mid-twentieth century was followed by a prolonged period of hyperinflation from 1975 to 1990 with an average annual inflation rate of

300 percent, leading to the redenomination of the Argentine peso to the austral, at a rate of 1 austral to 1,000 pesos. However, this switch still failed to curb hyperinflation. In 1991 a currency board-like convertibility system was introduced, consisting of a hard peg of the peso to the USD at a rate of 1 peso per dollar in addition to legal restrictions on money supply growth and debt monetization in order to establish inflationary credibility. Ultimately the system collapsed in 2001 with an ensuing currency crisis and a devaluation of the peso that was accompanied by two sovereign debt defaults in 2001 and 2014, respectively. Since the Kirchner administration, there has been a rise in protectionist economic policies. Amongst the most notable was the cepo cambiario, or currency controls, introduced in 2011, a response to the increasing capital flight from Argentina due to investors’ lack of confidence in Argentine GDP growth and ability to repay its 2001 default debt to the international bondholders. Consequently, not only was the cepo ineffective against capital flight — net capital outflows totaled $7.9 billion in 2015 alone (up by 158 percent from 2014 according to the World Bank) — but it in turn aggravated the Argentine foreign reserve shortage as well as encouraged the growth of the dollar black market. While the official exchange rate stood at 9.67 Argentine pesos to one US dollar (ARS/USD) in late 2015, the dólar blue or black-market dollar exchange rate was at 15.22 ARS/USD. This indicates that the peso was overvalued by approximately 36 percent. The only reason why the official peso did not depreciate was the employment of a Chinese currency swap with Argentina, since the third and last aim of the FAEMIC was to relieve the Argentine foreign reserve shortage in the short run. Since 2014, China has agreed to provide Argentina with $11 billion worth of currency swaps in five installments over three years, of which Argentina has received $9.5 billion so far. Under the agreed terms, the swapped yuan may be freely converted into dollars, euros, or any other reserve currency. Theoretically this implies a significant benefit for Argentina since it allows for the replenishment of its dollar reserves that plummeted from $53 billion in 2011 to $31 billion at the time of the swap. In reality the swapped yuan remained unconverted into dollars. As a result, this series of currency swaps plumped up Argentina’s foreign reserves in name only and did not provide any real liquidity to the Argentine economy. The real objective of the currency swap was thus purely political on both sides. On one hand the swap allowed Fernández to conceal capital flight from Argentina until the end of her

presidential term, as she had pledged to not devalue the peso as long as she was in power. She was able to achieve this through the accounting trick of dollar substitution for yuan; the central bank reported net losses of only $247 million in foreign reserves in August 2015, when in reality there was a total of $1.4 billion in dollar outflow that was offset by a yuan swap recorded as $1.3 billion in dollar inflow on the bank’s balance sheet.xvi This political tactic was meant to favor the Kirchnerist presidential candidate in the months leading up to the October 2015 elections by maintaining the façade of a strong economy under Kirchnerism. On the other hand the currency swap agreement also stipulated that Argentina could pay for Chinese imports in renminbi (RMB). This was part of China’s attempt to boost the circulation of the RMB in the hopes to be included in the special drawing rights (SDR) currency basket. As of November 2015 the IMF has approved the SDR status of the RMB, awarding it the status of a reserve currency. This symbolic status provides little economic benefit, but is politically relevant for China’s insertion as a key player in the global economy. Similarly, the provision of currency swaps as a form of crisis lending to troubled countries provides no economic benefits to China, but helps China establish its position as a lender of last resort, challenging the traditional role of Western institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Although Argentina is still one of the only countries that has accepted China’s offer of currency swaps until now, it is likely that other LAC countries with large fiscal deficits and debts such as Venezuela will proceed in the same way. On the whole, when analyzing agreements between China and LAC, political motives should be taken into account, as there is a longstanding tradition of corruption and manipulation of the economy for political benefits. IV.

The Future of China-Argentina Relations On December 10 2015, the new President of Argentina, Mauricio Macri, came into office.

He is the first President from the Republican Proposal Party, a center-right political party. In his short time in office, Macri has already changed the face of Argentina’s foreign policies, presenting a clear shift towards market liberalization. He has warmed up relations with the Western world, striking investment deals with Coca Cola, Royal Dutch Shell, Dow Chemical, and other Western multinational corporations at the World Economic Forum at Davos. He has also been diplomatically active, as demonstrated by Barack and Michelle Obama’s visit to Argentina, which marked the first US presidential visit to Argentina since 2005. Macri has also

pledged to strengthen relations with all Latin American countries with the exception of Venezuela, an unmistakable sign of a shift away from the previous regime’s quasi-socialist populism. Financially, Macri has made remarkable progress on improving Argentina’s financial credibility by reaching a settlement with the holdouts for $4.65 billion in cash payment, thus ending the Argentine sovereign debt default. In late December 2015, the Central Bank of Argentina was able to convert $3.1 billion of the swapped yuan into dollars, thereby increasing liquidity.xvii In April 2016, Argentina issued $16.5 billion of sovereign bonds, marking its return to the international debt market after 15 years of absence with the largest emerging market bond sale on record.xviii Apart from this clear indication of recovery of financial credibility, Macri has removed export taxes on most agricultural goods, as well as lifted the cepo, which in effect has devalued the official exchange rate to around $14.3 ARS/USD. Both actions have increased competitiveness of Argentine exports and will provide a significant boost to GDP. So far Macri has maintained friendly relations with China, as he did when he was mayor of Buenos Aires, welcoming the influx of Chinese infrastructure investment. At the 2016 G20 summit, Macri met with Xi and talked about the possibility of establishing more symmetrical trade relations, as well as more diversified FDI channels. He has also announced that the trade deals signed under Fernández are currently being reviewed, subject to modifications and cancellations. In fact, in April 2016, the Argentine government announced that it reached an agreement with its Chinese counterpart to downsize operations of the hydroelectric and nuclear plants projects that were contracted in 2014, and that further environmental assessments were needed before proceeding with construction. Exactly one year later, in April 2017, construction of the hydroelectric power plants finally began.xix V.

Conclusion Will Argentina be able to remain politically friendly with China while moving

economically towards neoliberalism? This question stems from the customary bond between economic assistance and political affinity, whether from traditional Western institutions or alternative Chinese institutions. However, Macri’s economic policies and diplomacy so far may just prove to be the exception to the rule. He has removed the ideological element of anti-US

imperialism from the relationship with China and turned it into one of pure pragmatism by identifying himself as a pro-West, pro-market conservative. It is very likely that China will accommodate to this new type of relationship. As long as both parties remain economically interdependent, the benefits of economic cooperation will outweigh the costs of political alienation. On the one hand, the three asymmetries in trade in favor of China are likely to persist for several years to come. Despite the decline in Chinese demand for commodities in recent years, China continues to rely on primary product imports from resource-rich countries such as Argentina to maintain a sustained, albeit slowing growth. As such, drastic changes in the current trade framework of China-Argentina relations seem improbable. On the other hand, Argentina’s shift towards market liberalization will bring Western competitors to Chinese FDI and loans, potentially bringing investment diversification as well as auction-style offers going to the bidder who offers a lower interest rate, longer repayment period, or fewer strings attached, which further reinforces the detachment between economic and political ties. As a result, changes in Argentina’s financial structure and re-entrance to international markets will not have a significant impact on its established diplomatic relations with China. On a broader scale, through the case analysis of China-Argentina relations and the FAEMIC agreement, it is clear how Argentina’s economic and political ties to China reflect myriad common concerns shared by LAC countries at large on the dimensions of trade, investment, and finance. Argentine economic policy’s priority remains the same as the rest of LAC countries. Although domestic institutional improvements such as central bank independence, transparency of negotiating agents, and rule of law constitute the crucial basis for long-term stable economic growth, in diplomacy and foreign economic policy, LAC countries must also take on a more proactive role and improve the regional synchronization of negotiations with China to achieve more comprehensive benefits for all countries. This requires cooperation especially from larger LAC economies that hold significantly more sway in said negotiations. This not only applies to relations with China but to all foreign economic and political relations. Most importantly, by reinforcing the idea of economic interdependence, LAC countries can detach politics from economics and hence use their collective leverage more efficiently and pragmatically to increase their national benefits in all fronts of politics, trade, and finance.

Appendix Table 1: Top 20 Latin America and the Caribbean’s exports to China, 2013-2015 (in thousands USD) Latin America and the Caribbean’s exports to China Product label

Share in

Value in 2013

Value in 2014

Value in 2015

Total top 20 export products

93715579

97529041

82556684

96.0

Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruit, etc, nes

21153706

20295109

20061313

24.3

Ores, slag and ash

30420944

26090062

19371864

23.5

Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc

10431510

20547012

13480175

16.3

Copper and articles thereof

12069375

11249768

10223483

12.4

Pulp of wood, fibrous cellulosic material, waste etc

2714594

2928503

2961535

3.6

Meat and edible meat offal

938600

1117521

2059389

2.5

Vehicles other than railway, tramway

1662965

2219821

1514202

1.8

Sugars and sugar confectionery

1829702

1116732

1144399

1.4

Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder

1213349

1024990

1138776

1.4

10. Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons

583539

993442

959339

1.2

11. Iron and steel

1025813

778720

888695

1.1

12. Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather

953599

1111508

886530

1.1

13. Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc

576955

471375

849047

1.0

14. Animal,vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc

1331207

870782

735975

0.9

15. Electrical, electronic equipment

1098071

883268

720956

0.9

16. Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates nes

399239

490209

590535

0.7

17. Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal

434559

621832

517523

0.6

18. Ships, boats and other floating structures

1525

6748

412638

0.5

19. Plastics and articles thereof

449631

412600

391482

0.5

20. Beverages, spirits and vinegar

187760

187697

330999

0.4

2015 (%)

Source: author calculations based on Trade Map. Table 2: Top 20 Latin America and the Caribbean’s imports from China, 2013-2015 (in thousands USD) Latin America and the Caribbean's imports from China Product label

Share in

Value in 2013

Value in 2014

Value in 2015

Total top 20 import products

174468643

179596865

176362720

86.6

Electrical, electronic equipment

56072799

57064989

55090831

31.2

Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc

36247755

35739856

32419528

18.4

Vehicles other than railway, tramway

7436427

7758251

7996761

4.5

Articles of iron or steel

5900386

5204043

5393238

3.1

Plastics and articles thereof

4826439

5129732

5194911

2.9

Organic chemicals

5341469

5379232

5137684

2.9

Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc apparatus

5055401

4605251

4966949

2.8

Iron and steel

3554863

5138759

4957173

2.8

2015 (%)

4098036

4103646

3812788

2.2

10. Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet

Toys, games, sports requisites

3631515

3849222

3707939

2.1

11. Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings

3005695

3136424

3183427

1.8

12. Rubber and articles thereof

3061560

3204887

3099417

1.8

13. Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet

2997601

3213448

3080582

1.7

14. Ships, boats and other floating structures

578524

718837

2821601

1.6

15. Commodities not elsewhere specified

2331125

2286054

2757702

1.6

16. Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof

2697032

2727702

2588763

1.5

17. Fertilizers

1161209

1981353

1886343

1.1

18. Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel goods

1698644

1797043

1674242

0.9

19. Aluminium and articles thereof

1357250

1401967

1562502

0.9

20. Manmade filaments

1541721

1641050

1452656

0.8

Source: author calculations based on Trade Map. Table 3: Top 20 Argentina’s exports to China, 2015 (in thousands USD) Product Label

Argentina's exports to China Value in 2015

Share (%)

Top 20 export products

5174432

99.3

Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruit, etc, nes

3568025

69.0

Animal,vegetable fats and oils, cleavage products, etc

446619

8.6

Meat and edible meat offal

248071

4.8

Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic invertebrates nes

204673

4.0

Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc

175767

3.4

Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather

96392

1.9

Vehicles other than railway, tramway

58269

1.1

Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes

56584

1.1

Wool, animal hair, horsehair yarn and fabric thereof

50907

1.0

10. Dairy products, eggs, honey, edible animal product nes

38040

0.7

11. Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes

28138

0.5

12. Pharmaceutical products

24759

0.5

13. Cereals

24377

0.5

14. Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal

21501

0.4

15. Residues, wastes of food industry, animal fodder

21081

0.4

16. Beverages, spirits and vinegar

20675

0.4

17. Essential oils, perfumes, cosmetics, toileteries

17840

0.3

18. Plastics and articles thereof

15296

0.3

19. Organic chemicals

14083

0.3

20. Albuminoids, modified starches, glues, enzymes

7528

0.1

Source: author calculations based on Trade Map and INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de la República Argentina).

Table 4: Top 20 Argentina’s imports from China, 2015 (in thousands USD) Argentina's imports from China

Product Label

Value in 2015

Share (%)

Top 20 import products

11749039

90.5

Electrical, electronic equipment

4025472

34.3

Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc

2284315

19.4

Organic chemicals

855943

7.3

Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment

545379

4.6

Vehicles other than railway, tramway

532304

4.5

Plastics and articles thereof

314646

2.7

Articles of iron or steel

300295

2.6

Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc apparatus

279493

2.4

Toys, games, sports requisites

235757

2.0

10. Miscellaneous chemical products

162929

1.4

11. Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings

159759

1.4

12. Knitted or crocheted fabric

157075

1.3

13. Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof

142498

1.2

14. Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes

105656

0.9

15. Articles of leather, animal gut, harness, travel goods

101239

0.9

16. Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet

100987

0.9

17. Rubber and articles thereof

96170

0.8

18. Miscellaneous manufactured articles

78500

0.7

19. Fertilizers

77899

0.7

20. Manmade staple fibres

72041

0.6

Source: author calculations based on Trade Map and INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de la República Argentina). Table 5: Percentage of Manufactured Exports Threatened by Chinese Exports as of 2006 Country

Directly threatened (%)

Partially threatened (%)

Total threat (%)

All Latin American and Caribbean countries

Argentina

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Mexico

Source: Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, The Dragon in the Room: China and the Future of Latin American Industrialization (California: Stanford University Press, 2010), 50; Ho-fung Hung, The China Boom: Why China Will Not Rule the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 109.

Table 6: Chinese loans to Argentina, listed by individual project Date

Type

Purpose

Lender

Amount (in USD)

August 2007

Other

Export sector development

China Development Bank

30M

January 2010

Other

Renewal of 2007 loan

China Development Bank

30M

July 2010

Infrastructure

Train system

CDB and others

108

July 2010

Infrastructure

High-speed trains

CDB and CITIC

273M

March 2012

Energy

Renewable energy projects

China Development Bank

200M

July 2014

Energy

Hydroelectric dam construction

CDB, ICBC, Bank of China

2.5B

July 2014

Infrastructure

Belgrano Cargas train line

CDB and ICBC

2.1B

August 2014

Infrastructure

Purchase of 150 cars for metro line A

China Ex-Im Bank

162M

Total 15.3B

Source: China-Latin America Finance Database.

Arthur P. Whitaker, “The Argentine Paradox,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 334, Latin America's Nationalistic Revolutions (Mar., 1961), 103. ii Sub-regional bloc and customs union established in 1991 between Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela and Argentina. iii Peter Coy, “What Happens Now That Argentina Is in ‘Selective Default’,” Bloomberg, July 30, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-30/what-happens-now-that-argentina-is-in-selective-default. iv Matías Mancini, “Sobre el Convenio Marco de Cooperación Económica y de Inversiones entre Argentina y China y sus implicancias”, Universidad de La Plata, http://perio.unlp.edu.ar/node/5019. v Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, “China Matters: China's Economic Impact in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review 43 (2008), 186. vi Author calculations based on latest data on LAC-China trade from Trade Map, www.trademap.org. vii Carola Ramon-Berjano and María Belén Wu, “Chinese Trade and Investment in Latin America: Neo-Colonialism or Alliance?,” Hopkins Undergraduate Research Journal, 21 (2015), 8. viii Author calculations based on latest data on Argentina-China trade from Trade Map, www.trademap.org, and INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos de la República Argentina), www.indec.gov.ar. ix Gallagher and Porzecanski, “China Matters,” 195. x Author calculations on latest data available from China-Latin America Finance Database, http://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/. xi Mancini, “Sobre el Convenio Marco de Cooperación Económica y de Inversiones.” xii Uki Goñi, “Argentinian congress approves deal with China on satellite space station,” The Guardian, February 26, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/argentina-congress-china-satellite-space-station. xiii Ibid. xiv Ken Davies, “China Investment Policy: An Update,” OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2013/01, OECD Publishing, 58. xv Ramon-Berjano and Wu, “Chinese Trade and Investment in Latin America: Neo-Colonialism or Alliance?”, 10. xvi Javier Blanco, “Reservas: ya se usó 85% del swap chino,” La Nación, August 29, 2015, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1823288reservas-ya-se-uso-el-85-del-swap-chino. xvii Javier Blanco, “El banco central logró convertir a dólares 3086 millones del swap con China,” La Nación, December 22, 2015, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1856429-el-banco-central-logro-convertir-a-dolares-3086-millones-del-swap-con-china. xviii Julie Wernau and Carolyn Cui, “Argentina Returns to Global Debt Markets With $16.5 Billion Bond Sale,” The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/argentina-returns-to-global-debt-markets-with-16-5-billion-bond-sale1461078033. xix “Prevén un pronto relanzamiento las centrales hidroeléctricas,” Telam, April 2, 2017, http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201704/184448-santa-cruz-represas-cepernic-kirchner.html.

Blanco, Javier. “El banco central logró convertir a dólares 3086 millones del swap con China.” La Nación, December 22, 2015, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1856429-el-banco-central-logro-convertir-adolares-3086-millones-del-swap-con-china. Blanco, Javier. “Reservas: ya se usó 85% del swap chino.” La Nación, August 29, 2015. http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1823288-reservas-ya-se-uso-el-85-del-swap-chino. Coy, Peter. “What Happens Now That Argentina Is in ‘Selective Default’.” Bloomberg, July 30, 2014. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-30/what-happens-now-that-argentina-is-in-selectivedefault. Davies, Ken. “China Investment Policy: An Update.” OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2013/01, OECD Publishing. Gallagher, Kevin and Roberto Porzecanski. “China Matters: China's Economic Impact in Latin America.” Latin American Research Review 43 (2008), 186-201. Gallagher, Kevin and Roberto Porzecanski. The Dragon in the Room: China and the Future of Latin American Industrialization. California: Stanford University Press, 2010. Goñi, Uki. “Argentinian congress approves deal with China on satellite space station.” The Guardian, February 26, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/argentina-congress-china-satellitespace-station. Hung, Ho-fung. The China Boom: Why China Will Not Rule the World. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Mancini, Matías. “Sobre el Convenio Marco de Cooperación Económica y de Inversiones entre Argentina y China y sus implicancias.” Universidad de La Plata, http://perio.unlp.edu.ar/node/5019. Ramon-Berjano, Carola and María Belén Wu. “Chinese Trade and Investment in Latin America: NeoColonialism or Alliance?” Hopkins Undergraduate Research Journal 21 (2015). “Prevén un pronto relanzamiento las centrales hidroeléctricas,” Telam, April http://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201704/184448-santa-cruz-represas-cepernic-kirchner.html.

2017.

Wernau, Julie and Carolyn Cui, “Argentina Returns to Global Debt Markets With $16.5 Billion Bond Sale.” The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/argentina-returns-to-globaldebt-markets-with-16-5-billion-bond-sale-1461078033. Whitaker, Arthur P. “The Argentine Paradox.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 334, Latin America's Nationalistic Revolutions (Mar., 1961).

Influences of Economic Policy on Healthcare in Chile: The Development of Universal Healthcare from the Populist Movement to the Neoliberal Era Sara Jordan Chadwick

I. Introduction Many Latin American countries displayed similar patterns of economic development throughout the liberal era and into the 20th century. Their dependence on a single-export economy has contributed to a relatively low level of economic diversity and industrialization, which has fostered an increase in income inequality, a persistent concentration of wealth in top percentiles, and the emergence of the informal proletariat as a significant portion of the workforce.i However, Chile managed to develop differently: its economic success afforded the country a greater degree of economic development and caused a significantly smaller portion of the workforce to be comprised of informal labor. The high proportion of formal labor in Chile enables the country to collect sufficient taxes to fund a nearly universal healthcare program. Notwithstanding these successes, the program’s current structure is not free of flaws. Despite being universal in nature, the split between privatization and public healthcare has caused problems in the distribution of health services to the poorest in Chile. Overall, the foundation and evolution of healthcare in Chile has been greatly influenced by its economic development and changes within the country’s government. Since its origination in the 1950s, the healthcare program underwent several phases of change concurrent with the political evolution of the country. This paper will discuss three key periods: the 1950s to the 1970s, the three-year span of Salvador Allende’s presidency, and finally the massive transformation into the half-privatized, half-publicly funded program that exists today based on the reforms of General Augusto Pinochet. The economic and political agendas of these three eras directly translated into policy changes for the healthcare system. Whereas the socialist attitudes attached to populism facilitated an approach to healthcare focused on state involvement and funding, the individualistic nature of neoliberalism and its emphasis on private Sara Jordan Chadwick is a recent graduate of Johns Hopkins University with a double major in Chemistry and Spanish. A Maryland native, she is interested in the impact of healthcare on populations both globally, and locally through her volunteer work in a women’s health clinic in College Park, MD. She would like to thank her professor, Dr. Magda von der Heydt-Coca, for her encouragement and support during the writing of this paper.

enterprises decentralized healthcare and transformed it into a more privatized, free-market sector. In addition to the overt effects of the antithetical policies under populism and neoliberalism, the dynamic economic environments induced shifts in the workforce and varying income inequalities during these periods, prompting a more subtle influence on the healthcare system and how effectively it was able to serve all populations of Chile. II. Early Development of Universal Healthcare (1938-1970) The elements of Chile’s healthcare system originated in 1938 under the Preventative Medicine Law that was intended to aid in the early detection of tuberculosis, syphilis and heart disease, which lead to the further development of the Servicio Médico Nacional de Empleados (SERMENA).ii Following its establishment, SERMENA evolved into a primitive form of health insurance mainly intended to support white-collar workers in the public, financial and manufacturing sectors of the economy, allowing these employees using the plan to see private doctors. As part of the formation of a new constitution under Gabriel González Videla in 1952, Chile’s healthcare system took on a more formal role within the government. In an expansion of the existing system, the constitution instituted provisions that created several health departments intended to serve all populations in Chile (not only white-collar workers) such as the Nation Health Service (NHS), which from then on subsumed the healthcare plan SERMENA.iii The development of the initial system was accelerated by the installation of ambulatory health centers and the hiring of directors for hospitals, allowing these centers to recruit public health officials. While a small private health sector did exist during this time—serving approximately 10 percent of the population as the sole form of healthcare coverage—patients were able to use SERMENA-subsidized payments to access both private inpatient and outpatient care. Thus by retaining reasonable market prices accessible to individuals under both the public and private healthcare systems, the private sector actually provided for 33 percent of outpatient care.iv The healthcare reform of 1952 reflected a shift to a centralized public healthcare format with systems like NHS that brought about an increase in the state’s role in healthcare administration. This treatment of healthcare as a mandated responsibility of the government lead to a homogeneity of care: there was little difference in the quality of care received based on income, social status or economic system,v and Chile’s health indicators (morbidity and infant mortality rate) improved across the general population.vi

III. Economic Conditions of Chile that Encouraged the Establishment of Universal Healthcare Plan (1950-1970) The formation of a state-run healthcare system was not insulated from other trends in Chile and occurred as the country, in general, moved towards stronger state involvement in the economy, effectively encouraging domestic growth and diversification. The economic conditions that fostered growth during the early development of the healthcare system can partially be attributed to the rise in import-substituted industrialization correlating with an increase in available funds for public healthcare spending during the 1960s. From 1960 to 1970, Chile’s GDP per capita increased from 24,594 pesos to 29,812 pesos, with growth rates exceeding 8 percent at the maximum growth per year in 1966.vii The rise in GDP and general economic expansion and development was particularly evident during the presidency of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970), whose economic platform prioritized “an industrial modernization program that reactivated the role of the state as the generator of investment initiatives.”viii The shift in focus towards galvanizing domestic industrialization and economic development succeeded in forming new sectors of business (including telecommunications and the petrochemical industry), agricultural land reforms, and the start of the process of nationalization of the country’s copper mines.ix In fact, the most significant growth rates in GDP (11.2 percent in 1966) occurred under the presidency of Frei Montalva, and the GDP during the entire span of his presidency surged from 223,186 million pesos to 308,449 pesosx—an overall increase of 38.2 percent. The economic growth during this period served as the foundation for the subsequent increase in public health spending. Furthermore, in addition to this relatively high degree of economic prosperity in Chile at the time, much of the country’s workforce remained in the formal sector rather than moving to the informal sector in comparison to labor patterns other Latin American countries. With the formalization of labor permitting the government to tax labor wages, during the 1960s the Chilean government was able to secure tax revenue from this growth and then channel the funds into social welfare spending programs such as the development of the healthcare system. Chile’s ratio of informal to formal proletariat in the workforce has consistently remained lower than other countries. Alejandro Portes, a Cuban-American sociologist at Princeton, argues that these

differences in the formal and informal sectors of the economically active population (EAP) separate Chile as one of three “Southern Cone countries,” where the formal proletariat forms over half of the EAP.xi In comparison to a general rate of 60.3 percent of labor in Latin America consisting of the informal proletariat in 1970, Chile exhibited rates of only 26 percent of the economic sector as informal proletariat—a rate that remained stable into the 1970s.xii Meanwhile, in 1972, the formal proletariat comprised 60.5 percent of the workforce, a majority of the country.xiii As the GDP of Chile was increasing, the formal labor force made it possible for the government to harness this growth and convert it into a means for social welfare spending through taxation. Its unique economic structure in comparison to other Latin American countries allowed Chile to fund healthcare development while mitigating the cost to the government through the collection of funds from formal labor. IV. Advancement of Public Healthcare Sector During the Populist Presidency of Allende (1970-1973) Rather than introduce further reforms to the existing healthcare system, medical doctor and former Minister of Health Dr. Salvador Allende sought to strengthen the public sector of healthcare so as to achieve a truly universal system, closely resembling a socialized healthcare program. Over the course of Allende’s presidency from 1970 until the coup d’état on September 11, 1973, Allende increased government spending on healthcare to supplement the funds collected from wages. In 1970 Chile spent 1.7 percent of its GDP on healthcare, whereas by 1973 the program’s budget had increased to 3.4 percent.xivxv Allende built his expansion on the growing contribution to the healthcare sector during the Frei Montalva presidency, which increased annual funding from slightly under 1000 pesos per capita to over 1400 pesos per capita. At its peak at the end of 1973 immediately following the presidency of Allende, public health spending had ascended another 700 pesos to 2100 pesos per capita.xvi Allende’s strengthened investment in public healthcare formed the basis of his Six-Year Health Plan—Allende’s vision for a unified, fully socialized health system that consolidated all of Chile under the public health sector. The program introduced expansion of local and neighborhood health councils, reallocation of funds from the hospital sector instead into the nationwide health centers, and most notably, a program to extend the distribution of milk to impoverished children under 15 and expectant mothers.xvii By distributing 39 million kilograms

of milk each year, Allende’s presidency succeeded in strengthening the school meal system and childhood nutrition for the benefit of 3 million children and mothers (approximately 70 percent of pregnant women and children).xviii While many criticize the inefficiency of the milk program, there were some noticeable changes in public health indicators of these at-risk populations: the general maternal mortality rate declined from 1.8 percent to 1.28 percent in the first year of Allende’s presidency and infant mortality rate per 1000 live births fell from 82.2 in 1970 to 65.8 by the last year of Allende’s presidency in 1973.xix These improvements in maternal and infant health additionally coincided with an increase in medical consultation for reproductive care in women: the number of medical visits rose from 593,000 in 1970 (a number that had stayed relatively constant over the previous five years) to 788,100 in 1972.xx Following the end of Allende’s presidency, the number of women’s health consultations rapidly declined and would not rise again until 1976.xxi The delivery of milk across the country and the refocus on providing funding to local health centers over centralized hospitals represented Allende’s commitment to extending healthcare to rural populations and ensuring that the healthcare system served all populations equally. Despite these improvements and the growth of the public sector, Allende’s plans could not be fully realized in his abbreviated three-year term in office that was interrupted by the coup d’état. In contrast to the regional rate of 22 percent for formal labor across Latin America, in Chile, the increase in the proportion of formal labor during the early 1970s as shown by the data collected by Portes correlates with a strengthening of the central government and the healthcare system—a trend that is consistent with populism and rising labor regulation. By 1972 (two years into Allende’s presidency), the proportion of formal labor remained fairly constant at 60.5 percent, still significantly higher than the approximately 22 percent formal labor component in most other Latin American countries during that era.xxii However, Chile’s GDP did not exhibit the same stable growth as the previous two presidencies (Alessandri and Frei Montalva collectively from 1960 to 1970). In fact, whereas the first year of the Allende administration experienced an abrupt upsurge in the GDP from 283,097 million pesos to 308,449 million pesos, the subsequent years were accompanied by a decline in the economy to 304,707 million pesos in 1972 and 287,750 pesos in 1973.xxiii Several economic factors pushed the economy into decline after the first year of Allende’s presidency, including “public revenue losses due to drops in real (public) utility rates, appreciating exchange rates, weakening public and private investment, and

a rapidly expanding money supply.”xxiv These factors—in tandem with a decline in actual production in 1972—engendered the economic instability that disrupted the previous equilibrium of stable upward growth in Chile. The harsh and volatile economic and political environment that emerged after 1971 undoubtedly obstructed Allende’s vision for uniform quality of healthcare under one public system as the ultimate approach to eliminating the effects of income gaps and economic inequalities in progress towards a more socialized Chile. The sum of these economic pressures culminated in the coup d’état of September 1973 that ultimately truncated Allende’s Six-Year Health Plan to a brief three year experiment in populism and increasingly socialized medicine, a period that would then be followed by a contrasting approach to healthcare—neoliberalism. V. The Neoliberal Reform of Healthcare During the Pinochet Regime (September 19731990) The healthcare system underwent its most radical changes in the Pinochet era, a dictatorship that embraced neoliberalism. According to David Harvey, a prominent anthropologist who specializes in the study of geographical factors in social injustice and Marxism, neoliberal theory entails “the assumption that individual freedoms are guaranteed by freedom of the market and of trade” that manifests itself as a political agenda to foster “a state apparatus whose fundamental mission was to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital.”xxv These individualist values prevailed during the Pinochet regime due to a group known as the Chicago boys, a collection of American neoliberal thinkers that was able to influence Chilean politics in favor of international interests. In direct opposition to the populist movement towards a centralized state government controlling nationalized economic activities and social programs, individualism of the neoliberal era favored the transfer of national exports, industry, and services to the private sector with a focus on individual profits. Similar to the general neoliberal trend in Latin America, in Chile neoliberalism specifically brought about “a counter-reform that led to the privatisation of public enterprises, the elimination of agencies and administrative organisms, the commoditisation of basic social services and the implementation of regressive taxation reforms” that promoted the advancement of the overall economy at the expense of widening gaps in social inequalities.xxvi The

privatization of various government-run programs included both the social security system and the healthcare system. During this time, the increased privatization of healthcare lead to the separation of the privatized ISAPRES from the public sector Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA) as part of NHS, in which public funds collected from taxes on wages went towards the private sector in addition to FONASA. Government spending on healthcare responded rapidly to the emerging private sector as more services were transferred to ISAPRES: in 1975, following the seizure of power, the Pinochet regime lowered the annual per capita public health spending, which had previously grown during the preceding presidencies, from 1360 pesos to 1242 pesos per person. The following year, the decline continued to a per capita public health spending value of 1196 pesos. After recovering over the course of a few years to its previous values, the public health spending value experienced another decline between 1982 and 1983, when it fell from 1440 pesos to 1254 pesos per capita.xxvii Meanwhile, as overall government funding for healthcare generally decreased throughout the Pinochet administration, the participation in the private sector health organizations, ISAPRES, accelerated. Coupled with the fall in participation in FONASA, the initiation of ISAPRES in 1981 lead to increased membership in the private healthcare sector, as exhibited by the surge in the number of beneficiaries served in the private sector, from 26,415 beneficiaries in 1981 to 798,687 Chileans in 1990.xxviii As a percentage of national population of Chile, almost 20 percent were covered under ISAPRES by 1991, while the beneficiaries under FONASA fell from around 85 percent of the country in 1981 to a little over 70 percent in 1991.xxix During this period of over 10 years, various changes occurred in the economy as General Pinochet disassembled the strong centralized government and promoted the growth of private sectors, including a general GDP increase with two significant periods of declineâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the first from 1974 to 1976 where the GDP fell from 290,554 million pesos to 253,043 pesos and a second from 1981 to 1983 where the GDP decreased from 386,611 million pesos to 324,717 pesos.xxx Between 1974 and 1976, as deregulation of the economy was underway through abolition of price controls and import liberalization, the sudden decline in copper prices was especially destabilizing.xxxi In contrast, the instability of 1981 was a result of external debts doubling in tandem with a failure of the export economy.xxxii

Consistent with the effects of neoliberalism elsewhere in Latin America, the opening of industry to the free market dismantled import-substituted industrialization. Combined with a decrease in government jobs during the neoliberal era, the profile of the labor sector responded accordingly with a gradual increase to 27.1 percent informal labor in 1980 in comparison to the 1970 value of 26.0 percent.xxxiii By the 1990s, these trends had intensified; formal labor steadily decreased from 60.5 percent in 1972 to 45.7 percent in 1990, 44.9 percent in 1994, and 43.4 percent in 1998, while the informal sector compensated with proportions of informal proletariat of 37.0 percent in 1990, 32.1 percent in 1994, and 30.8 percent in 1998.xxxiv Some of the decline in the informal proletariat after its peak in 1990 can be attributed to rise in the informal petty bourgeoisie (autonomous business owners and managers in the informal sector of the workforce) from 2.7 percent to 7.2 percent over the same time period.xxxv Additionally, during the two periods of economic decline, the unemployment rate rose suddenly (from 5.33 percent in 1974 to 6.92 percent in 1975 and from 7.63 percent in 1981 to 11.03 percent in 1982).xxxvi The combination of the loss of formal sector jobs and long periods of underemployment during this time presented grave problems to the Chilean healthcare system that relied on collected funds based on income. In particular, the decline in formal labor combined with the lessening of public health spending by the government had a disproportionately large effect on the resources available to the public healthcare sector, which unlike the private sector, did not have profits to bolster its funding throughout the neoliberal era. VI. Effects of the Neoliberal Reforms During the Pinochet Era on the Health of Chile (1973-1990) As a result of the increased burden on the public healthcare system, like other reforms during the neoliberal era, income inequality effectively increased and there was a disparity in the quality of healthcare received between the rich and the poor. According to Pilar Vergara, author and researcher at the Latin American Faculty of Social Science (FLACSO) located in Chile, â&#x20AC;&#x153;privatization has created a dual welfare system, in which a private system with high-quality services for high-income groups coexists with an increasingly underfinanced state system for those who cannot afford private service,â&#x20AC;?xxxvii constituting a deep divide between the care that the wealthy receive from ISAPRES versus the services disseminated to the poor populations through FONASA. Through the privatization of healthcare, companies operating under ISAPRES

became centered on profits and largely disregarded the medical needs of the poor. For example, under the less stringent government regulation of the Pinochet regime, the ISAPRES were allowed to discriminate against people based on preexisting conditions and other social characteristics influencing population health including the exclusion of “elderly people, the chronically infirm, those who suffer from preexisting maladies, and individuals with large families.”xxxviii The burden of these high-risk populations subsequently fell on the public sector health systems, which, through loss of resources to the private sector, was less equipped to deal with these costly illnesses in their overburdened, outdated facilities. VII. Implications and Outcomes of Privatized versus Public Healthcare in Chile While the length of Pinochet’s dictatorship allows for evaluation of his regime’s economic plan and its effect on healthcare, it is more difficult to properly evaluate socialized medicine to the degree it was implemented by Allende. And yet the push towards a more socialist system and the neoliberal reform both seem to have had destabilizing effects on the economy that threatened to harm healthcare spending, both policies diminishing the GDP and thus the national funds available for spending. Despite losses of GDP during the later Allende years, one significant difference between neoliberalism and populism is that Allende continued to increase healthcare spending throughout his tenure. Although healthcare spending was not as robust during the Pinochet regime as the previous populist presidencies, common health indicators that reflect the overall health of Chile’s population (such as the child mortality rate, the maternal mortality rate, the death rates, and the life expectancy) did not appear to suffer from the decreased funds.xxxix xl Therefore, it is likely that the shift between privatized medicine and centralization of healthcare and the effects of the subsequent economic changes have had more subtle influences on the public health of Chile than simply an overall advancement or decline of general health indicators. In fact, as the emerging problems of the healthcare system under the Pinochet regime suggest, the effects of privatization are manifested as differences in the access to healthcare within specific economic groups of the Chile, rather than of the population as a whole. Severe inequalities have been found in several health outcomes, despite their overall positive trend in the country. Studies by the Chilean government compiled in 2002 found that the infant mortality rate from respiratory infection was 15.4 times greater in the children of mothers with no

education compared to those who had completed high schoolxli and during the first year of life, infants from mothers with less than eight years of education had a six times greater risk of death than those of mothers with 13 or more years of schooling (a rate that has changed insignificantly since the 1980s).xlii The disparity has also extended to inequalities found in the public and private sectors of healthcare, due to public practices being disproportionately burdened with lowerincome patients, where only 20-30 percent of women in labor in public centers receive epidural anesthesia, while in private practice the use of epidurals is nearly indispensable.xliii Similar to other aspects of neoliberalism such as growing income inequality, the privatization may have increased the efficiency of healthcare and decreased the direct cost burden on the government; however, the cost differential between the private and public healthcare systems created a disparity in the quality of health services. The resulting disparity works to the disadvantage of the lower income economic sectors of the general population. The problem is likely in the main difference between the public and private sectors—that the private sector in addition to offering health services, also focuses on profit margins. As both sectors receive funding from the government, the private sector will outcompete the public sector through the addition of profits, precipitating the inequalities observed in Chile that surfaced during the Pinochet era. Under the current democratic government of Chile, the country has recognized these persistent problems and commenced drastic efforts to reverse the trend of socioeconomic inequality, specifically in healthcare.xliv Due to this initiative, Chile was one of only three countries to have a declining level of income inequality between 2010 and 2014. Nevertheless, the country still has the highest inequality of all countries studied by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.xlv Addressing this issue requires acknowledging the indirect burden of socioeconomic inequality on the country, which may not harm the general health statistics of the population, but disadvantages the overlooked, underprivileged groups of Chile.

Alejandro Portes, “Latin American Class Structure Their Composition and Change During the Last Decade,” Latin American Research Review 20 (1985): 7-9. ii Anamaria Viveros-Long, “Changes in Health Financing: The Chilean Experience,” Social Science and Medicine 22, no. 3 (1986): 379, doi: 10.1016/0277-9536(86)90137-1. iii “History of the Health Care System in Chile,” American Journal of Public Health 67, no. 1 (1977): 32-33, doi: 10.2105/AJPH.67.1.31.

Natalie Bruce, “The Chilean Health Care Reforms: Model or Myth?,” Journal of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs 11 (Spring 2000): 72, http://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/files/2000-5.pdf. v “History of the Health Care System,” 32-33. vi Banco Central de Chile, Indicadores Económicos y Sociales de Chile 1960-2000, May 2001, Distributed by Banco Central de Chile, ISSN: 0716-2413, 924-926 (Indicadores de Salud I, 1960-1999; Indicadores de Salud II, 1960-1999; Mortalidad Infantil, Materna y Atención Profesional del Parto, 1960-1999) vii Banco, Indicadores, 19 (Producto e Ingreso a Precios Constantes (1)). viii Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, “Economic Development in Chile Since the 1970s,” In Economic Reforms in Chile: From Dictatorship to Democracy, (New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2010), 6. ix Ffrench-Davis, “Economic Development in Chile,” 5. x Banco, Indicadores, 19 (Producto e Ingreso a Precios Constantes). xi Portes, “Latin American Class Structure,” 21. xii Ibid., 23. xiii Ibid. xiv Evelyne Huber et al., Latin America and the Caribbean Political Dataset, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008, Distributed by Evelyne Huber & John Stephens (UNC Political Science), http://huberandstephens.web.unc.edu/commonworks/data/, Rows 294-296, Column BD (labeled cshlth). xv Jennifer E. Pribble, “Protecting the Poor: Welfare Politics in Latin America’s Free Market Era,” PhD diss., University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 2008, 209-210. xvi Viveros-Long, “Changes in Health Financing,” 380. xvii “History of the Health Care System,” 33-34. xviii Ibid., 33. xix Banco, Indicadores, 926 (Mortalidad Infantil, Materna y Atención Profesional del Parto, 1960-1999). xx Ibid., 924 (Indicadores de Salud I, 1960-1999). xxi Ibid. xxii Portes, “Latin American Class Structures,” 23. xxiii Banco, Indicadores, 19 (Producto e Ingreso a Precios Constantes). xxiv Ffrench-Davis, “Economic Development in Chile,” 9. xxv David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (New York: Oxford University, 2005), 7. xxvi Richard A. Dello Buono and José Bell Lara, “Neoliberalism and Resistance in Latin America,” In Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America, 1-16, (Boston: Brill Leiden, 2007), 3. xxvii Tarsicio Castañeda, “Contexto Socioeconómico y Causas del Descenso de la Mortalidad Infantil en Chile,” Estudios Públicos 64 (primavera 1996): 15. xxviii Banco, Indicadores, 957-958. xxix Ibid., 955. xxx Ibid., 19. xxxi Ffrench-Davis, “Economic Development in Chile,” 11. xxxii Ibid., 13. xxxiii Portes, “Latin American Class Structures,” 23. xxxiv Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman, “Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change During the Neoliberal Era,” Latin American Research Review 38, no. 1 (2003): 57, doi: 10.1353/lar.2003.0011. xxxv Ibid., 56. xxxvi Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016), Unemployment Rate (indicator), doi: 10.1787/997c8750en, Accessed on 15 November 2016, https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm. xxxvii Pilar Vergara, “In Pursuit of ‘Growth with Equity:’ The Limits of Chile’s Free-Market Social Reforms,” International Journal of Health Services 27, no. 2 (1997): 213, doi: 10.2190/KCNX-FM8K-DKWG-Y83P. xxxviii Ibid. xxxix Banco, Indicadores, 926. xl Castañeda, “Contexto,” 5-7. xli Ministerio de Salud, Gobierno de Chile, Los Objetivos Sanitarios para la Década 2000-2010, Distrubuted by División de Rectoría y Regulación Sanitaria, Departamento de Epidemiologia, 1st Edition. October 2002, Registry of Intellectual Property No. 129.370, http://epi.minsal.cl, 238. xlii Ibid., 237. xliii Ibid., 14. xliv Verónica Vargas and Sergio Poblete, “Health Prioritization: The Case of Chile,” Health Affairs 27, no. 3 (2008): 783, doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.27.3.782. xlv Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016), OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD): Gini, Poverty, Income, Methods and Concepts, Accessed on 15 April 2017, http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distributiondatabase.htm.

Banco Central de Chile, Indicadores Económicos y Sociales de Chile 1960-2000. May 2001. Distributed by Banco Central de Chile. ISSN: 0716-2413. Bruce, Natalie. “The Chilean Health Care Reforms: Model or Myth?” Journal of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs 11 (Spring 2000): 69-86. http://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/ files/2000-5.pdf. Castañeda, Tarsicio. “Contexto Socioeconómico y Causas del Descenso de la Mortalidad Infantil en Chile.” Estudios Públicos 64 (primavera 1996): 1-50. Dello Buono, Richard A., and José Bell Lara. “Neoliberalism and Resistance in Latin America.” In Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America, 1-16. Boston: Brill Leiden, 2007. Ffrench-Davis, Ricardo. “Economic Development in Chile Since the 1970s.” In Economic Reforms in Chile: From Dictatorship to Democracy, 1-28. New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2010. Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University, 2005. pp. 5-63. “History of the Health Care System in Chile.” American Journal of Public Health 67, no. 1 (1977): 31-6. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.67.1.31. Huber, Evelyne, Mustillo, Thomas, Pribble, Jennifer E., and John D. Stephens. Latin America and the Caribbean Political Dataset. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 2008. Distributed by Evelyne Huber & John Stephens (UNC Political Science). http://huberandstephens .web.unc.edu/common-works/data/. Ministerio de Salud. Gobierno de Chile. Los Objetivos Sanitarios para la Década 2000-2010. Distrubuted by División de Rectoría y Regulación Sanitaria, Departamento de Epidemiologia. 1st Edition. October 2002. Registry of Intellectual Property No. 129.370. http://epi.minsal.cl. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016). OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD): Gini, Poverty, Income, Methods and Concepts. Accessed on 15 April 2017. http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016). Unemployment Rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/997c8750-en. Accessed on 15 November 2016. https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm. Portes, Alejandro. “Latin American Class Structure Their Composition and Change During the Last Decade.” Latin American Research Review 20 (1985): 7-39. Portes, Alejandro, and Kelly Hoffman. “Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change During the Neoliberal Era.” Latin American Research Review 38, no. 1 (2003): 41-82. doi: 10.1353/lar.2003.0011.

Pribble, Jennifer E. “Protecting the Poor: Welfare Politics in Latin America’s Free Market Era.” PhD diss., University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 2008. Vargas, Verónica, and Sergio Poblete. “Health Prioritization: The Case of Chile.” Health Affairs 27, no. 3 (2008): 782-92. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.27.3.782. Vergara, Pilar. “In Pursuit of ‘Growth with Equity:’ The Limits of Chile’s Free-Market Social Reforms.” International Journal of Health Services 27, no. 2 (1997): 207-15. doi: 10.2190/KCNX-FM8KDKWG-Y83P. Viveros-Long, Anamaria. “Changes in Health Financing: The Chilean Experience.” Social Science and Medicine 22, no. 3 (1986): 379-85. doi: 10.1016/0277-9536(86)90137-1.

History Repeated? Plan Colombia and CARSI Alexandra Carr

Introduction In 2000, the United States announced an initiative to aid one of its South American allies

in countering seemingly indefatigable guerilla insurgencies and in curbing hemispheric drug trafficking. Now, sixteen years later, Plan Colombia is touted as a success by officials in both Washington and Bogotá who have called for it to serve as a model for United States initiatives in other countries.i This paper will explore how the United States has followed this advice in its current aid endeavor, the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Based on this comparison, I will predict some successes and failures of CARSI based on the successes and failures of Plan Colombia. Most importantly, I will show that just as Plan Colombia’s failure to amend drug policy away from prohibition and toward legalized regulation resulted in limited and temporary security gains because of the violence associated with illicit drug trafficking, so too will a failure to amend drug policy in Central America stunt the potential success of the Central America security initiative. Considering the financial and human costs of Plan Colombia,ii it is crucial that the United States reconsiders the implications of once again pursuing a security strategy that ignores drug policy reform in Central America. II.

Plan Colombia and CARSI Compared Plan Colombia was an initiative originally developed in 1998 by Colombian President

Andrés Pastrana with goals to “reduce the production and trafficking of illegal drugs (mainly cocaine) by 50 percent within a period of six years, and to improve security conditions in Colombia by re-gaining control of the large areas of the country that were in the hands of illegal armed groups.”iii Pastrana also sought, through the Plan, to promote economic and social development in the country. The United States, seeking to curb the flow of illicit drugs into its Alexandra Carr received her master's in Latin American Studies from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in May 2017, where her research centered on the human rights, fiscal, and security implications of the hemispheric war on drugs. She has also focused on inter-American migration and holds a certificate in Refugees and Humanitarian Emergencies from Georgetown's Institute for the Study of International Migration. She has worked as a teacher in Taiwan and Spain and completed internships at the State Department, Drug Policy Alliance and Cornerstone Government Affairs. She holds a bachelor's degree in history from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.

territory and to promote security in the Andean region, pledged financial and military support to Colombia under President Bill Clinton. This support was administered through various federal programs such as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the Foreign Military Financing Program, and the Department of Defense.iv Originally conceived as a six-year plan, Plan Colombia extended beyond this time frame, winding down in 2015 after having evolved significantly during its tenure. Though the plan maintained its counter-narcotics focus, the military component that Clinton added to Pastrana’s original plan was deepened in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The U.S. administration under President George Bush began to define Colombia’s armed insurgents as international terrorists. The military focus was also intensified within Colombia by Pastrana’s successor, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe. Uribe promoted the image of the FARC-EP, Colombia’s largest armed insurgent group, as narco-terrorists, or a group that uses drug trafficking to finance terrorist activities.v In 2015, Plan Colombia concluded, with total spending since 2000 estimated at US$10 billion, though allied relations and military cooperation between the United States and Colombia continue through a new policy plan, Paz Colombia.vi Officials from both countries feel that the aims of Plan Colombia were achieved, and thus have turned to new strategies in 2016. I will demonstrate the tenuity of these claims later in this paper, but first let us turn to Central America. The Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) began in 2008 with the goal to: create safe streets for the citizens of the region; disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband to, within, and between the nations of Central America; support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central American governments; re-establish effective state presence, services and security in communities at risk; and foster enhanced levels of coordination and cooperation between the nations of the region, other international partners, and donors to combat regional security threats.vii The United States Congress appropriated US$1.2 billion to and spent $457 million on CARSI between 2008 and 2015.viii The FY2016 appropriations estimate was $348.5 million, while the FY2017 request was $305.3 million.ix This initiative covers the Central American countries of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Reviews on the

success of CARSI thus far remain mixed, and members of Congress have been especially demanding at appropriations hearings, requesting evidence that the strategy is working to justify continued funding.x As CARSI is still in its early years, its full success remains to be determined; however, the fact that this initiative is relatively new is precisely the reason why its merits should be discussed. Plan Colombia and CARSI differ in many ways. Most obviously, Plan Colombia concerned one country, and the Central America initiative involves seven. The countries comprising CARSI are not under threat of a political insurgency, as was the case in Colombia, whose Plan sought to finally defeat the FARC armed insurgents that had posed a security threat for five decades. Unlike Colombia, with its Andean tradition of coca cultivation, Central America is not a main production site of illicit substances, but rather serves as a path of transit – terrestrially, over maritime routes, and by short-distance aerial missions.xi Furthermore, Plan Colombia was a bi-lateral U.S. – Colombia initiative, whereas CARSI calls for cooperation among multiple nations, as well as international financial institutions and civil society.xii Nevertheless, many high-ranking officials have taken to making the comparison between the two plans. Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez and former Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina publically stated, based on the dire security conditions in the Northern Triangle due in large part to drug trafficking, the need for the U.S. to implement programs modeled on Plan Colombia in the region.xiii Some see CARSI as this response, as it draws heavily on the Colombia model, even establishing training programs carried out by Colombian security forces.xiv The U.S. sees its Central American efforts as benefitting from “Colombia’s established and expanding expertise and capacity for countering transnational organized crime […] and shared U.S. responsibility to address the demand for illicit narcotics.”xv Despite the differences between Colombia and Central America, the most salient point of comparison for the two countries’ security initiatives lies the international post-9/11 climate. According to this worldview, promoted by the United States and subscribed to by most countries in the hemisphere, there exist “hybrid networks” of international organized crime. These networks fund terrorist endeavors, using the sale of illicit substances to finance a web of corruption, chaos, and terror. Thus, even areas such as Central America that lack well-known terrorist actors or organizations are key to defeating terrorism. According to the Director for Anticrime Programs of the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,

the global war on terror cannot make progress until the terror-fighting regime “dismantles the illicit architecture that enables the financing of terror,” a dismantling whose efforts include “anticorruption, counterterrorist financing, anti-money laundering, border security, and other law enforcement tools.”xvi Such efforts now comprise CARSI. III.

Plan Colombia: Intertwined Failure Many prominent voices tout Plan Colombia as a success. In addition to Presidents Barack

Obama and Juan Manuel Santos publicly declaring their support, others have also come forward.xvii John Kerry, former U.S. Secretary of State during Plan Colombia, wrote in 2016 that the partnership “helped transform a nation on the verge of collapse into a strong institutional democracy with historically low levels of violence.”xviii British publication The Economist, in a January 2016 issue, claimed that because Plan Colombia was “first and foremost a counterinsurgency strategy,” the demobilization of the paramilitaries under former President Álvaro Uribe and the FARC guerillas under current President Juan Manuel Santos are evidence of the plan’s success.xix Indeed, there are stylized facts that support the Plan’s success. According to the Colombian Defense Ministry, many improvements were made in the first nine years of the plan: homicides dropped from 28,837 in 2002 to 15,817 in 2009; kidnappings fell from 2,882 in 2002 to 213 in 2009; terrorist attacks plunged from 1,645 in 2002 to 486 in 2009; FARC guerilla membership estimates decreased from 19,000 in 2002 to 9,000 in 2009.xx Later years also speak to security successes – peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC concluded in 2016, and the guerilla group has begun its demobilization.xxi The historic negotiations between government officials and FARC negotiators in Havana should certainly be viewed positively; however, these analyses that claim success ignore the original multifaceted goal of Plan Colombia, one that was aimed as much at curbing drug production and trafficking as it was at countering insurgency. Most analysts agree that Plan Colombia failed to significantly curb eliminate drug trafficking. But what is more important to reconsider is the “success” of the security initiative. It is clear that the security gains achieved through plan Colombia will prove to be temporary. It’s possible that a different strategy, one that radically reforms drug policy away from a prohibitionist model, could better secure the security gains of Plan Colombia and better address the issue of drug trafficking.

Plan Colombia’s most obvious failure was the effort to eliminate drug production and trafficking. Despite years of aerial fumigation of coca crops implemented by the Plan, the overall global production of coca was not reduced. During some years, fumigation decreased the total coca cultivation, but this was not permanent. Other years saw an increase – for instance, after years of fumigation, the same amount of coca was cultivated in 2007 as 2001, previously the highest year on record.xxii It is true that estimates of total land designated for coca crop cultivation within Colombia have decreased. The UNODC estimated 160,000 hectares in 2000 and just 42,000 hectares in 2013.xxiii However, this reduction in designated land has not always resulted in lower coca yield, for the average yield of coca per hectare has risen, so that “even apparent declines in cultivated land area may not translate into less coca available for processing into cocaine.”xxiv Furthermore, even when production within Colombia has decreased, the global coca supply has remained constant, simply moving into Peru and Bolivia.xxv This phenomenon is known as the “balloon effect,” whereby growers simply move across borders or to new areas and smaller plots that are harder to detect.xxvi One could argue that because Plan Colombia was only concerned with Colombia itself and production decreased within its borders, the Plan accomplished its goals. However, the balloon effect illustrates the unsustainability of the tactics Plan Colombia implemented. It is likely that production could move back into the country’s borders, and numbers within Colombia will rise with the end of aerial fumigation (which President Santos ordered in 2015).xxvii Even when aerial fumigation did disrupt the supply of raw materials, it did not lead to the expected result of higher street prices in the U.S. (a strategy the U.S. believed would decrease its domestic consumption). In many cases, supply disruption has punished only the campesinos who grow the crop, as the monopsony cartels have over these suppliers prevents them from charging a higher price (a phenomenon coined as the “Walmart effect”).xxviii In some years, street prices of cocaine and heroin have even dropped.xxix Plan Colombia’s effect on drug trafficking is plainly lacking. But what of its effect on security? Eliminating the FARC was not the ultimate goal but rather part of an overarching strategy to bring greater security to the Colombian citizens who have lived under security threats caused by the FARC and other groups. That is, if violence continues to threaten Colombia even after the FARC demobilizes, as is already proving to be the case, Plan Colombia could be seen as a security failure.

As long as drug trafficking operates illegally and unregulated, violence will continue to be associated with it. The inherent risk of incarceration in dealing with illicit commodities necessitates increased production costs as producers take measures to avoid detection. This leads to a smaller number of market suppliers than would be found in a licit, free-market industry, giving the suppliers the monopolistic freedom to substantially increase market prices. Because of this phenomenon, profit margins are estimated at 300 percent and the value-added of trafficking is estimated at more than 2000 percent, giving extreme power to those controlling the industry. xxx

Violence is inevitable in an illicit industry because, just as in any other market, disputes arise.

While disputes in a legal industry can be settled through legal mechanisms and institutions such as courts, in black market industry legal, institutional property rights enforcement mechanisms are clearly unavailable.xxxi Thus, violence must be used to settle conflicts and enforce blackmarket justice and regulation, and value must be added to the product in order to finance this coercion. Not only do drug traffickers under a prohibitionist regime engage in violence to ensure their business operations, but so too must the state engage in violent efforts to counter drug trafficking. Throughout Plan Colombia’s implementation, the Colombian military has been responsible for many deaths of civilians caught in the cross-fire (with some critics alleging gratuitous human rights violations).xxxii Indeed, rhetoric surrounding a ‘war on drugs’ often leads the public to “accept collateral casualties that would never be permissible in civilian law enforcement, much less public health,” and these collateral casualties will very likely continue to threaten citizen security.xxxiii This clearly establishes the link between continued prohibition and continued violence. Some may argue that the FARC, once demobilized, will no longer be involved in drug trafficking, thus eliminating a significant portion of the actors involved in this illicit trade. This, however, has been disproven. Beyond the numerous examples of new drug trafficking organizations that spring up every time a “kingpin” is taken down (coined both the “cucaracha” and “hydra” effect), there is a more pertinent phenomenon in Colombia that demonstrates the failure of Plan Colombia to permanently improve citizen security: criminal bands, or bacrim.xxxiv Plan Colombia wiped out many insurgents and the resulting peace process has demobilized most of those remaining; however, without eliminating the drug trafficking market though legalization, demand for mercenary security will remain. Former insurgents (in addition

to previously demobilized paramilitaries) possess the exact skills to supply this security, and without other options, many have done just that. Though the official numbers are hard to trust, it is thought that of the 31,000 AUC members and 11,000 insurgents from the FARC and ELN (another leftist guerilla group) that demobilized during the presidency of Alvaro Uribe,xxxv there are roughly 3,000 individuals who have become members of 22 new criminal organizations, groups that have been termed bandas criminales emergentes, or BaCrim for short.xxxvi The reality is that without more lucrative alternatives, the drug trade has continued to attract participants, and true security gains remain limited. IV.

What Went Wrong? Radically reforming drug policy in Colombia was a key strategy missing from the Plan.

The most obvious way moving past prohibition will bolster security is by reducing violence. If an industry is legal and regulated, it no longer needs to rely solely on the use of violence as an enforcement mechanism. Some analysts have correctly pointed out that legalizing the production and sale of drugs is an incomplete crime-fighting tactic – indeed, drug trafficking is only one form of criminal activity, and the crime associated with it won’t end with legalization. Yet eliminating this sector of illicit trade could have an extraordinary impact on levels of violence, simply due to the high numbers of those involved in drug trafficking. In Colombia in 2013, there were 87,226 persons charged with trafficking (by comparison, in the United States the number was 27,247xxxvii ; Colombia’s population in 2013 was 48.32 million while that of the U.S. was 316.5 millionxxxviii ). This is probably a conservative estimate of the scale of trafficking crimes committed – this number is of persons, not number of criminal charges, and represents only those brought into formal contact with authorities. Though these numbers are from 2013 when the FARC was still active and its members likely constituted a portion of these statistics, the numbers are, nevertheless, unlikely to change with this group’s demobilization because of the aforementioned bacrim phenomenon. In regards to violent crime other than drug trafficking that threatens security – arms trade, human trafficking, counterfeit currency, etc. – drug trade legalization can still have an impact. Profits from illicit drug trade are used to finance these other industries, as well as terrorist endeavors, with much crossover of actors in multiple illegal endeavors. xxxix Cutting off this supply of income would, though not eliminate, mitigate the scale of other criminal activity,

weakening the power of these players over Colombian government and civilian life, and reducing their ability to wage the violence inherent to unlawful activity. V.

Lessons for CARSI Radical drug policy reform did not occur under Plan Colombia despite the fact that doing

so could have ensured that Plan Colombia’s security gains remained in place. There is an opportunity for the governments of the Americas to not repeat this mistake. Let us now return to CARSI to examine how, just as in the case of Plan Colombia, any measures implemented unaccompanied by radically re-classifying the legal framework of the drug trafficking business will be limited. One of the goals of the Central American Regional Security Initiative is to combat increasingly menacing criminal threats. Central America, particularly the Northern Triangle, is unique in that it faces violence from both international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and local gangs, or maras. There is not enough evidence to conclude that legalizing drugs would disrupt the activities of these local gangs – according to most analysts, these gangs are neither the major profiteers of the drug trafficking business nor are they responsible for the majority of violence in the region.xl Rather, drug legalization would combat security threat posed by the larger, international DTOs that operate in Central America and across the hemisphere. In recent years, drug transport activities in Central America have increasingly been operated by Mexican organizations like the Sinaloa and Zeta DTOs. The increasingly high rates of homicide in Central America (39.8, 84.3, and 39.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, respectively) are due partly to the presence of these notoriously violent DTOs.xli According to the World Bank, drug trafficking is “both an important driver of homicide rates in Central America and the main single factor behind rising violence levels in the region,” evidenced by the fact that hotspot drug trafficking areas have 100 percent higher crime rates than non-hotspot areas.xlii Just as in Colombia, legalizing and regulating the trafficking of drugs across the hemisphere would prevent the violence used by DTOs to enforce their policies and settle disputes. The Mexican DTOs have also taken control of Central American migrant smuggling routes, often “enacting harsh penalties on those who fail to work for them or pay them quotas.”xliii This is a case of the aforementioned phenomenon whereby organizations use funds

from illicit drug trade to finance other criminal activities. By legitimizing the drug markets and regulating the flow of profits, these tangential criminal activities could be mitigated. Moving from prohibition to rule of law could also promote security in Central America by strengthening the state and battling corruption. The decline into current disastrous conditions has been accompanied by massive corruption. The UN has stated that “illicit traffic generates large financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate commercial and financial business, and society at all levels.”xliv Removing the influence of DTOs on officials in Central America could contribute to combatting corruption. VI.

Conclusion Moving from a model of prohibition to one of regulation in the Western hemisphere can

contribute to citizen security. Concerns over drug consumption due to such a policy shift would likely abound – yet such concerns neglect the fact that prohibition has not significantly decreased levels of drug use in the United States, and many doctors now urge a public health and harm reduction approach to addressing drug misuse. The current climate in Latin America shows this to be an opportune time for drug policy reform in Latin America – 2016’s United Nations General Assembly Special Session on drug policy (UNGASS) highlighted Latin American voices as the loudest in calling for international reform, and countries like Uruguay have already emerged as drug policy reform pioneers.xlv The goals of both Plan Colombia and the Central America Regional Security Initiative were to improve levels of citizen security and combat drug trafficking. The illicit status and criminalization of the drug trade has led to massive levels of violence in both Colombia and Central America. To be sure, reforming drug policy will not solve all security issues, and much institutional reform, particularly in Central America, needs to be done. Nevertheless, the potential from reforming this policy perspective is too great to ignore. i

Adam Isacson, “Don’t Call it a Model,” Washington Office on Latin America, July 14, 2010. http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Drug%20Policy/notmodel.pdf ii John Kerry, “Getting the endgame right in Colombia,” Miami Herald (Miami, FL), January 30, 2016. iii Daniel Mejía, “Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs.” Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2016.

Connie Veillette, “Plan Colombia A Progress Report,” CRS Report for Congress, June 22, 2005. P Smith, “Plan Colombia: Ten Years Later,” Drug War Chronicle, July 15, 2010. vi Ernesto Londoño, “Taking Stock of the $10 Billion Washington Spent on Colombia’s War,” The New York Times, November 16, 2015. vii “Central America Regional Security Initiative,” U.S. Department of State, 2016. viii Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2015. ix Peter J. Meyer, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and FY2017 Appropriations,” Congressional Research Service, February 8, 2017. x U.S. Engagement in Central America, a Hearing before the House Appropriations Commmittee Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs. 114th Congress (February 11, 2016). xi Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2015. xii Ibid. xiii Eyder Peralta, “Central American Presidents Say U.S. Shares Responsibility for Migration Crisis,” National Public Radio, July 24, 2014. xiv Alexander Main, “The U.S. Re-militarization of Central America and Mexico,” NACLA Report on the Americas, 2014. xv “Joint Press Release on the United States – Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation,” U.S. Department of State, April 15, 2012. xvi David M. Luna, “Narco-Trafficking: What is the Nexus with the War on Terror?” U.S. Department of State Archive, October 8, 2008. xvii Jack Norman, “No US president will mess with Plan Colombia’s ‘success’,” Colombia Reports, April 25, 2016. xviii John Kerry, “Getting the endgame right in Colombia,” Miami Herald, January 30, 2016. xix “A new plan for Colombia.” The Economist, January 23, 2016. xx Adam Isacson, “Don’t Call it a Model,” Washington Office on Latin America, July 14, 2010. xxi “Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera.” Mesa de Conversaciones, August 26, 2012. xxii Adam Isacson, “Even if Glyphosate Were Safe, Fumigation in Colombia would be a Bad Policy. Here’s Why,” Washington Office on Latin America, Apr. 29 2015. xxiii Daniel Mejía, “Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs.” Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2016. xxiv Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, “Executive Summary,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Washington Office on Latin America, 2004), 4. xxv Adam Isacson, “Even if Glyphosate Were Safe, Fumigation in Colombia would be a Bad Policy. Here’s Why,” Washington Office on Latin America, Apr. 29 2015. xxvi Ibid. xxvii William Neuman. “Defying U.S., Colombia Halts Aerial Spraying of Crops Used to Make Cocaine,” New York Times (New York: NY), May 15, 2015. xxviii Tom Wainwright, Narconomics: How to Run a Drug Cartel (New York: Public Affairs). xxix Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, “Executive Summary,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Washington Office on Latin America, 2004), 1. xxx Matthew S. Jenner, “International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic Solution,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 18, no. 2 (2011): 904. xxxi Ibid, 906. xxxii Marshall B. Lloyd, “Conflict, Intervention, and Drug Trafficking: Unintended Consequences of United States Policy in Colombia,” Oklahoma City University Law Review, 293 (2011): 9. v

xxxiii

Ethan Nadelmann, “Drugs,” Foreign Policy, no. 162 (2007): 24. Marc Chernick, Acuerdo Posible: Solución Negociada al Conflicto Armado Colombiano (Bogotá: Ediciones Aurora, 2012), ch. 5. xxxv Douglas Porch and María José Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008): 522. xxxvi Ibid, 530. xxxvii “Drug-Related Crime Report,” UNODC WDR (2015), 52. xxxviii “Population, Total,” The World Bank, (2015). xxxix Matthew S. Jenner, “International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic Solution,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 18, no. 2 (2011): 922. xl Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet and Humberto Lopez, “Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge,” World Bank LAC, 2011. xli Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2015, 3. xlii Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet and Humberto Lopez, “Crime and Violence in Central America.” xliii Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2015, 8. xliv Matthew S. Jenner, “International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic Solution,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 18, no. 2 (2011): 910. xlv “UNGASS 2016 About,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016. xxxiv

______________________________________________________________________________ “A new plan for Colombia.” The Economist (New York, NY), January 23, 2016. “Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera.” Mesa de Conversaciones, August 26, 2012. https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/sites/default/files/AcuerdoGeneralTerminacionConfli cto.pdf “Central America Regional Security Initiative,” U.S. Department of State, 2016. http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/carsi/ Chernick, Marc. Acuerdo Posible: Solución Negociada al Conflicto Armado Colombiano (Bogotá: Ediciones Aurora, 2012), ch. 5. “Drug-Related Crime Report,” UNODC WDR (2015), 52, http://www.unodc.org/wdr2015/field/12._Drug_Related_Crimes.pdf. Isacson, Adam. “Don’t Call it a Model.” Washington Office on Latin America, July 14, 2010. http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Drug%20Policy/notmodel.pdf Isacson, Adam. “Even if Glyphosate Were Safe, Fumigation in Colombia would be a Bad Policy. Here’s Why.” Washington Office on Latin America, Apr. 29 2015. http://www.wola.org/commentary/even_if_glyphosate_were_safe_fumigation_in_colombia_woul d_be_a_bad_policy_heres_why

Jenner, Matthew S. “International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic Solution.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 18, no. 2 (2011): 904. “Joint Press Release on the United States – Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation.” U.S. Department of State, April 15, 2012. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/187928.htm Kerry, John. “Getting the endgame right in Colombia.” Miami Herald (Miami, FL), January 30, 2016. Lloyd, Marshall B. “Conflict, Intervention, and Drug Trafficking: Unintended Consequences of United States Policy in Colombia.” Oklahoma City University Law Review, 293 (2011): 9. Londoño, Ernesto. “Taking Stock of the $10 Billion Washington Spent on Colombia’s War.” New York Times, (New York, NY). November 16, 2015. Luna, David M. “Narco-Trafficking: What is the Nexus with the War on Terror?” U.S. Department of State Archive, October 8, 2008. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/110828.htm Main, Alexander. “The U.S. Re-militarization of Central America and Mexico,” NACLA Report on the Americas, 2014. https://nacla.org/news/2014/7/3/us-re-militarization-central-america-andmexico-0 Mejía, Daniel. “Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs.” Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2016. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/04/global-drugpolicy/Mejia--Colombia-final-2.pdf?la=en Meyer, Peter J. “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and FY2017 Appropriations.” Congressional Research Service, February 8, 2017. Meyer, Peter J. and Clare Ribando Seelke. “Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2015. “Mission and Vision.” Drug Policy Alliance, 2016. http://www.drugpolicy.org/mission-and-vision Nadelmann, Ethan. “Drugs.” Foreign Policy, no. 162 (2007): 24. Neuman, William. “Defying U.S., Colombia Halts Aerial Spraying of Crops Used to Make Cocaine.” New York Times (New York: NY), May 15, 2015. Norman, Jack. “No US president will mess with Plan Colombia’s ‘success’,” Colombia Reports (Medellín, Colombia). April 25, 2016. Peralta, Eyder. “Central American Presidents Say U.S. Shares Responsibility for Migration Crisis.” National Public Radio, July 24, 2014. http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2014/07/24/334942174/central-american-presidents-say-u-s-shares-responsibility-formigration-crisis “Population, Total.” The World Bank, (2015). http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL Porch, Douglas and María José Rasmussen, “Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008): 522.

Serrano-Berthet, Rodrigo and Humberto Lopez. “Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge.” World Bank LAC, 2011. Smith, P. “Plan Colombia: Ten Years Later.” Drug War Chronicle, July 15, 2010. http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2010/jul/15/plan_colombia_ten_years_later “UNGASS 2016 About.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2016. https://www.unodc.org/ungass2016/en/about.html U.S. Engagement in Central America, a Hearing before the House Appropriations Commmittee Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs. 114th Congress (February 11, 2016). Veillette, Connie. “Plan Colombia A Progress Report.” CRS Report for Congress, June 22, 2005. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32774.pdf Wainwright, Tom. Narconomics: How to Run a Drug Cartel (New York: Public Affairs). February 23, 2016. Youngers, Coletta A. and Eileen Rosin, “Executive Summary,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy, eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (Washington Office on Latin America, 2004), 4.

Addressing Brazil’s National Plan to Combat the Use of Crack Cocaine Daniela Natalia Teixeira Schermerhorn 1

This is a social matter, a public health problem. If all those people were criminals or drug traffickers, we would engage in police operations, arrest everybody and send them to the penitentiary system. Those people are not drug traffickers, they are drug users that need health treatment. Brazil Public Security Secretary Alexandre de Moraes, Journal Folha de São Paulo. April, 2015.i

The Rise of Crack in Brazil Although the use of cocaine peaked in the 1980s and early 1990s in the United States,

South American cocaine usage began later and continues to rise. Brazil has long been a part of the route for drug exportation, but an increasing amount of this cocaine is now being consumed within the country. Brazil’s relationship with crack cocaine (referred to in this paper as crack) began around 1987, when the product first appeared in the poor communities of São Paulo and Salvador, but the crack market did not truly start to grow until 2000, when drug dealers in Rio de Janeiro discovered its potential profitability. Crack consumption quickly increased in Rio’s slums, popularly known as favelas, and soon spread throughout the country. This increased consumption was followed by a spike in health issues, including HIV, hepatitis C virus, tuberculosis and others, especially within poor communities.ii In Brazil, as it has elsewhere, crack use has been connected to increases in homelessness and prostitution, with several studies linking crack addiction to greater involvement in crimes in

Daniela N. T. Schermerhorn is a Rotary peace fellow and graduate student at the Duke Center for International Development (DCID), Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, pursuing a Master of International Development Policy with focus in Peace and Conflict Resolution. She is a Brazilian police officer with seventeen years of academic and practical experience in public security management, interested in all factors damaging the social fabric and disrupting peace and development. This work was originally written for “Policy Analysis of Development”, a course taught by Ph.D. Senior Researcher and Lecturer Rosemary Fernholz, with support of professor Dean Storelli. She would like to thank the professors for their time and guidance in the process of publishing this work.

comparison to other drugs.iii Because crack is an affordable and highly addictive drug, these types of social problems are particularly severe in low-income communities. In December 2011, the Brazilian Government launched a national program, “Crack, It’s Possible to Win,” as part of its national drug policy.iv Despite the implementation of this new program, crack use is still high, especially in urban centers. This paper examines the growing crises related to crack cocaine usage in Brazil, and argues that to be successful in decreasing the overall demand and supply of crack, Brazil needs to create a more integrated environment for policy intervention where private and public actors can work together in a coordinated way. Brazil is doing many of the “right things,” but they need to do them in a more coordinated – and therefore more effective – way. II.

Brief Profile Until recently, Brazil enjoyed great success in terms of economic development. It is the

fifth largest country in the world in area and population and the largest country in South America. Brazil’s GDP grew at an average rate of 2.5 percent between 2000 and 2016, reaching its peak in 2010, with annual growth of 7.5 percent.v However, the economy is currently facing a recession and deceleration, with a GDP growth of -3.8 in 2015, -3.3 in 2016 and uncertainty for 2017.vi The unemployment rate has been growing steeply, from 5.48 percent in 2012 (the lowest rate within the past ten years) to 11.54 percent in 2017.vii With a population above 207 million people, Brazil has shown substantial improvement in development indicators such as life expectancy, years of schooling and GNI (gross national income) per capita, which are reflected in an increase of 38.1 percent from 1980 to 2014 on the UN’s Human Development Index.viii In 2014, the country moved into the UN’s “high human development” category (with a value of 0.755 out of a possible 1.0).ix Even so, there are persistent inequalities, and as of 2013, 3.8 percent of Brazil’s population was living below the income poverty line and 7.2 percent were living near the poverty line.x Part of the problem is a steep rise in the ratio of Brazil’s urban population, which has grown from 46 percent in 1960 to 85.69 percent as of 2015.xi This growth increases competition for public goods and services, which has amplified unequal distribution and inequalities. Consequently, criminal organizations have shown active engagement in vulnerable communities, and currently, Brazil has one of the highest worldwide homicide rates, with a total of 50,674 in 2014.xii

The first national study on crack was published in 2014.xiii Using time location sampling (TLS) and the network scale-up method (NSUM), crack users were found to have an average age of 30 years old, with a larger incidence among 18–24 year olds (31.32 percent). The majority are male (78.68 percent) and non-white (black, mulatto, and native Indian) (79.15 percent). In terms of education, the study found that 57.60 percent of crack users in Brazil had not had any education beyond elementary school.xiv The research also provides evidence that a great number of crack users become homeless, even when they still have family bonds. They are also more likely to work as prostitutes or participate in criminal activities, especially in advanced stages of addiction. Users have access to drugs through a network of organized crime and small dealers. Brazil’s main organized crime groups, the Red Command (Rio de Janeiro) and the First Command of the Capital (São Paulo), work in close cooperation with traffickers in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay. These organizations control the drug market within these countries, as well as the transportation and distribution of drugs within Brazilian territory.xv At the street level, crack is distributed by these and other criminal organizations and small drug dealers within the slums of major cities. “Cracklands” (areas within urban centers with high populations of crack users), prison facilities, parties, social gatherings, and other points of consumption, are detected and exploited by this illegal market.xvi The drug revenue is used to strengthen criminal activities and establish territorial domination within criminal factions. III.

The Increase in Crack Consumption in Brazil Like all markets, the crack market operates in accord with basic economic principles. On

the supply side of this market, it is clear that the quantity of drugs is increasing within Brazil’s borders. This is due to inefficient border controls, the general growth of organized crime networks connected to poor rule of law, and international factors that have compelled cocaine-producing countries to use South America as a route of exportation.xvii The majority of cocaine worldwide is produced in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. The drug is transported to Brazil by land, boat, and small airplanes, or across the 1,600-foot “friendship bridge” that connects Brazil to Paraguay.xviii The flow of drugs into

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Brazil has become quite easy, especially since Brazil shares 8,062 km (5,010 miles) of land border with South America cocaine producers.xix The inefficiency of border control is connected to geographic location and natural composition of country boundaries,xx as well as the shortage of border patrol personnel, due to a lack of incentives and low wages for border agents.xxi The overall structure of border control is deficient, especially in heavily forested areas, which provide an advantage to illicit groups.xxii In urban centers, the inefficiency of law enforcement is also a factor. Police organizations have inadequate equipment and poorly built structures for public service provision. Police agents receive low compensation for their work, presently facing decline in social recognition and legitimacy, impacting overall performance.xxiii The public security sector lacks integration and unified information systems, and the growth of impunity is another demotivating factor. Unfortunately, the current ineffectiveness of the national criminal justice system follows a long history unproductive law enforcement, which benefits criminals, incentivizes the rise of organized crime, and harms social welfare.xxiv Another factor in the rise of cocaine use in South America is heavy international law enforcement and US economic pressure against countries producing cocaine. This has incentivized the exploration of new ways to export cocaine, using neighbor countries as both an easy transportation route and an easy market.xxv These countries, including Brazil, have large urban populations that have been shown to easily absorb the drug. On the demand side of the crack market, there are many causes that lead to drug use. The individual and societal effects of crack are still largely unknown in the general population, since the product is relatively new and still evolving. Many people have no information about the direct consequences of its use and the power of its addiction. Sadly, there is also no available treatment that has been shown to be able to fully recuperate those who are addicted.xxvi Public discussion of drugs and awareness campaigns have been relatively rare in Brazil, with low involvement of the national mass media in education and preventive measures.xxvii Social groups and environment have been shown to influence drug consumption.xxviii In Brazil, the traditional role and values of the family and religion have deteriorated, and the resulting lack of reference has been shown to be a factor on youth and their acceptance of drug consumption.xxix Psychological diseases and emotional trauma also contribute to drug use. Feelings of social exclusion, marginalization and not belonging to a social group may lead to

drug consumption.xxx In this context, gangs are able to manipulate and recruit youth, encouraging violence and involvement in the drug trade. In addition, gangs keep the price of crack low as a way to attract new users, and this low price makes crack affordable to youth and low-income populations.xxxi The governmental efforts to provide social assistance and voluntary rehabilitation programs have shown little effect on recidivism. Convinced of few consequences and no punishment for drug use, drug addicts in rehabilitation treatment are susceptible to remain dependent, since crack consumption has a long-term negative effect on usersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; motivation to pursue rehabilitation as well as their susceptibility to relapse.xxxii In addition, improvement in treatment structure and increase in rehabilitation facilities, as well as better understanding of crack addition is necessary.xxxiii When legitimate markets fail, it is the role of governments to intervene. Even more, when illegitimate markets create negative externalities, the government must act. In Brazil, supply and demand factors in the illegal crack market all favor the continued free flow of drugs throughout the country. Without intervention, supply and demand will continue to operate, negatively affecting the health and safety of Brazilian communities. IV.

Evolution of the Current Policy In 2002, the Brazilian government established a national policy against drugs (PolĂtica

Nacional Antidrogas, or PNAD).xxxiv This was the first measure taken to address reduction in demand for drugs in Brazil, fifteen years after crack arrived in its territory. The PNAD program was designed to change the way Brazil dealt with issues such as crack addiction. The program recognized the difference between drug users and drug traffickers and established different penalties for each group. This distinction intended to allow courts to mandate more appropriate measures for users, for example, mandatory support groups, and to reduce the incarceration rate, a reduction which would ideally decrease pressure and public expenditure on Brazilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s overburdened prison system. However, at the time the program was introduced, there were no clear guidelines within the law to help the criminal justice system differentiate between users and sellers and no mandated interventions for users. The real impact of the law has been that fewer users are going to jail and are more openly using crack. Also, the law was written at a time when we had limited information about the societal effects of crack addiction. Thus, while the policy

focused on the general demand for drugs, it offered no specific effective measures related to crack addiction. In 2011, President Dilma Roussef reframed this legislation, adding specific measure to combat the use of crack, and relaunched the revised program as a new national security strategy, “Crack, It’s Possible to Win”. The plan has three pillars: prevention, care and authority.xxxv The Ministry of Justice is responsible for overseeing this public policy, and the National Drug Policy Secretariat (SENAD), in partnership with the National Council for Drug Policy (CONAD) and other stakeholders, is responsible for its implementation. Changes, however, are necessary. In this model, different aspects of the drug problem are addressed separately in different programs under the three pillars. For example, prevention (through education) is housed in one set of programs and is implemented by the Ministry of Education. These programs are separate from the treatment programs and enforcement programs that are housed under the authorities implementing the other pillars. All of these programs are overly decentralized, with poor integration of data analysis and inadequate feedback systems. As a result, policy makers cannot compare results or conduct effective monitoring and evaluation of programs and therefore can not identify best practices or prioritizing expenditures. Additionally, the majority of actions are led by the national or regional governments, despite the fact that the programs are based on multi-level cooperative approaches that require integrating government, private sector actors and regional non-government leadership. This leads to lack of participation from civil society and the loss of their finances, expertise and local credibility. Unfortunately, in addition to losses in efficiency, this fragmentation may have also contributed to the continued spread of crack use throughout the territory.xxxvi Because the enforcement provisions are separate from the recovery provisions, addicts are not being arrested for using crack, but they are not required to get treatment, either. There is no link between the changes in penalties and the recognition that users need treatment. Because the enforcement provisions offer only optional treatment and weak incentives for addicts to commit to rehabilitation, recidivism has been high.xxxvii Another fault of the program is that it does not address the lack of opportunity and socioeconomic marginalization of vulnerable groups. It overlooks the structural problems of public institutions and the inequity in public goods and services. The program’s education pillar

has developed and distributed didactic material to increase awareness, but it still needs better integration with media and other sources of mass communication to achieve better outcomes. In the same year the strategy to combat the use of crack was launched, 2011, the federal government implemented another program called The Strategic Border Plan (Plano Estratégico de Fronteiras, or PEF) that limited cross border drug inflow under coordination of the vice president of the republic Michel Temer, (who is currently in office as a substitute for the impeached president, Dilma Roussef). The PEF focuses on strengthening prevention, control, and enforcement, and on repressing cross-border crimes through integration within diverse public security agencies, the army, and the Federal Revenue Bureau of Brazil.xxxviii The results achieved during the initial phase were largely celebrated, showing a steady increase in drug seizures by land border patrol.xxxix The early success was a result of strong public financial commitment and joint work executed through two major operations, Agata, coordinated by the Ministry of National Defense, and Sentinela, coordinated by the Ministry of Justice. In these operations, 26 federal public agencies and 12 Ministries came together to share data, plan more efficient interventions and employ more personal in shared priority areas. This coordination allowed the government to exercise better land border control and reinforce security measures along the 16,866 kilometers of border through which pass most of the drugs, arms and contraband entering the country.xl However, with massive expenditures due to national engagement in major events such as the World Cup in 2014 and the Rio Olympics in 2016, as well as corruption scandals and the country’s lingering economic crisis, public expenditures are being restricted and defense programs have had their budgets cut significantly. These cuts may account for the program’s overall failure to halt the rise of criminal organizations, as well as high levels of drug and gun trafficking on the frontiers.xli A final limitation of this program is its restricted focus on only one root cause of the overall problem (borders) without any connection with other initiatives. Additionally, there are limitations posed by the government itself. The enormous size of Brazil’s bureaucratic structure leaves ample room for a level of corruption that has become a national “rule” as a way of trading government influence for political support, creating severe deterrents for effective implementation of public policies. This corruption placed Brazil as 79th on the corruption perception index in 2016, alongside Belarus, China and India.xlii

Brazil has shown systemic corruption, economic crises, rising unemployment, inflation, and overall public dissatisfaction with weakened capability of public sectors in providing effective basic services. These structural deficiencies offer a flourishing environment for drug markets and have helped increase cocaine circulation and drug consumption. V.

It Is Possible to Win – through Reform, Not Revolution Despite the scale of the crisis and the flaws in the current programs, there are strengths

that the government can build on. In terms of drug users’ demand for crack, the current program, “Crack, It’s Possible to Win,” despite its weaknesses, is very well-outlined and has a clearly identified leadership structure. Likewise, the border program has had some success and has clear leadership in place. Wholesale changes, then, are not necessary, but overall improvement in both design and coordinated implementation is crucial. To be considered a success, the reformed policies need to reduce the inflow of crack into the country, reverse the increases in crack use, decrease the number of people (especially youth) who are being recruited into the drug trade and into becoming users, provide a path back to health for those who do use crack, and, in general, increase the rule of law in Brazil. In particular, these policies should be designed to gradually reduce consumption, increase recover rates for addicts, and increase the efficiency of relevant government programs and law enforcement within a specified timeframe. VI.

Implementation of a More Coordinated Strategy To decrease supply of drugs in Brazil’s market, several measures can be applied

including a modified Strategic Border Plan. The Government can strengthen cooperation with neighbor countries to combat drug traffic on the land border, as well as provide incentives to land border professionals. Those measures should be accompanied by regulations and design mechanisms that help to foster accountability in implementation of national programs and combat corruption. Integration within regional law enforcement agencies, as well as reform of legislation legitimizing protection of society by police agents is necessary to improve efficiency and accountability. Law enforcement agencies also need new equipment (weapons, ammunition,

armored vests, communication equipment, etc.) updated buildings, and appropriate vehicles in order to fight drug traffic. There are multiple options for decreasing demand. To foster the research and development of treatments for drug addiction, the government can invite participation from private sector actors (civil society organizations, education institutions and businesses) that could help in minimizing the negative externalities of drug addiction and move users away from ongoing dependency on the drug.2 Though a return to simply sending users to jail would be counterproductive, the government should consider establishing rules for mandatory drug treatment for individuals identified as crack-addicted, especially those involved in criminal activities. This approach is currently utilized in the US and has been successful in increasing enrollment in recovery programs.3 The government should also consider using in-kind vouchers as a positive incentive to boost addicts’ willingness to remain in drug rehab, as is being done as part of the US Program of Contingency Management.4 The Government could also provide grants and subsidies to increase public discussion around the subject, for example, through offering funding for research and workshops within higher education institutions or promoting student research and program design competitions. It could also directly provide information to the public through regulation of national awareness programs involving radio, television, and other means of national communication.5 Fortunately, the government has already achieved one of the first requirements of a good implementation program: legitimacy. The problem of crack consumption and its externalities is so disturbing to the public, especially in urban centers, that the government has gained legitimacy in all of its proposals that attempt to tackle the issue. Another important step, resource accumulation, is also already in place, since the creation of the National Anti-Drug Fund (FUNAD), managed by the National Drug Policy Secretariat. This fund concentrates allocations of public resources for measures aiming at a reduction of drug availability and mitigation of addiction externalities. However, it will be crucial to establish an ongoing public monetary base 2

In public policy circles, this approach is referred to as “public-private partnerships” or P3. Please see the Canada and Nova Scotia–Gambia Association program for an example of a P3 solution that addresses health improvement through education: http://www.accessgambia.com/biz1/nsga-nova-scotia-gambia-association.html. 3 More information is available at this National Institute of Drug Abuse site: https://www.drugabuse.gov/ sites/default/files/txcriminaljustice_0.pdf 4 Details on this program can be found here: http://www.drugrehab.us/news/contingency-management-keep-addicts-in-treatmentlonger/ 5 The US Health & Human Services “BeTobaccoFree” webpage is an excellent example: https:// betobaccofree.hhs.gov/laws/

for this fund, and to assure regular expenditures and correct budget allocation during implementation through cost-benefit analysis. It will also be necessary to identify external sources for short and long-term financing and to establish transparent allocation processes that allows for a bottom-up approach that fosters participatory development and sustainable outcomes. To improve service delivery, the government needs to strengthen regulations and design mechanisms that help to foster accountability in implementation of national programs and combat corruption. One way to improve service delivery is through creation of government corporations or privatization of services, which could enhance quality of social assistance, rehabilitation of drug addicted and health treatments. The government of India has taken this approach of partial privatization of education services, which has shown some enhancement on primary and secondary education. 6 Once the revised program is in place, the government will need to take steps to ensure its effectiveness over time. A serious monitoring and evaluation approach is one of the most important tasks in the policy cycle and is essential for systematically promoting social change and ensuring effective outcomes. The government, specifically the Ministry of Justice, should expand the role of the National Council for Drug Policy (Conselho Nacional de PolĂtica sobre Drogas, or CONAD) to oversee ongoing evaluation. Monitoring can also be increased by establishing partnerships between government managerial staff and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, the Osvaldo Cruz Foundation (the main source of research on crack usage in Brazil), educational institutions, and security sector statistic and data analysis units, as well as other public and private agencies, with the intention of establishing a unified national database and feedback system, able to perform periodic evaluations of implementation and performance of this public policy. Finally, local governments, regional leaderships, and NGOs must be encouraged to collaborate, and their needs must be integrated through capacity development strategies that may be part of implementation plans in their areas. Cross-border cooperation with neighbor countries is also essential to reduce the amount of drugs supplying illegal markets, especially in regard to information and monitoring. A lack of cooperation will be a serious deterrent to effectiveness of

More information on partial privatization of education in India can be found at: http://twocircles.net/2011dec21/privatization_education_india.html#.WBag_9wYZK0.

the strategy within Brazil and must be considered as one of the most important features of policy development. VII.

Conclusion Brazil is experiencing social, economic, and political problems that favor an increase in

drug consumption. The country has long been a part of the route for the exportation of drugs and has begun to absorb a great share of cocaine into its internal market. This impacts individuals lives, crime rates, violence, and the public capacity to cope with disease proliferation and assistance to drug addicted communities. The Brazilian Government has initiated several efforts; however, the problem requires closer attention, especially to the increase in crack consumption in vulnerable communities. With further development, I believe these efforts could do more to overcome challenges and take advantage of new opportunities.

Souza, Felipe; Bergamim Jr, Giba. (April, 2015). Prefeitura de São Paulo faz ofensiva contra “favelinhas” da cracolândias. (Maior of São Paulo makes offensive moves against "favelinha" of cracklands). Folha de São Paulo Official Website. Retrieved from: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2015/04/1622597-prefeitura-de-sao-paulo-faz-ofensiva-contra-usuarios-nacracolandia.shtml ii

Domanico, Andréia. (2010). Crack Cocaine: Accelerating Use in Brazil. National Institute on Drug Abuse Official Website. Retrieved from: https://www.drugabuse.gov/international/ abstracts/crack-cocaine-accelerating-use-in-brazil iii

Bastos, Francisco Inácio; Bertoni, Neilane. (2014). Pesquisa Nacional sobre o uso de crack: quem são os usuários de crack e/ou similares do Brasil? Quantos são nas capitais brasileiras? (National Research about use of crack: who are the crack users of Brazil? How many they are on Brazilian urban cities?). Rio de Janeiro: ICICT/FIOCRUZ. Retrieved from: http://www.icict.fiocruz.br/sites/www.icict.fiocruz.br/files/Pesquisa %20Nacional%20sobre%20o%20Uso%20de%20Crack.pdf iv

Observatory: Crack, it’s possible to win Official Website. (2016). Balance of the Program. Retrieved from: http://www.brasil.gov.br/observatoriocrack/balanco-programa.html v

World Bank. (2016). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports vi

World Bank. (2016). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports vii

International Monetary Fund (October, 2016). World economic outlook (World economic and financial surveys). Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs /ft/weo/2016/02/pdf/text.pdf viii

United Nations Development Program, UNDP (2015). Human Development Report 2015. Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2015_statistical_annex.pdf ix

United Nations Development Program, UNDP (2015). Human Development Report 2015. Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2015_statistical_annex.pdf x

United Nations Development Program, UNDP (2015). Human Development Report 2015. Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2015_statistical_annex.pdf

World Bank. (2016). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports xii

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes. (2016). World Drug Report 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf xiii

Bastos, Francisco Inácio; Bertoni, Neilane. (2014). Pesquisa Nacional sobre o uso de crack: quem são os usuários de crack e/ou similares do Brasil? Quantos são nas capitais brasileiras? (National Research about use of crack: who are the crack users of Brazil? How many they are on Brazilian urban cities?). Rio de Janeiro: ICICT/FIOCRUZ, pp. 47-66. Retrieved from: http://www.icict.fiocruz.br/sites/www.icict.fiocruz.br/files/Pesquisa%20Nacional%20sobre%20o%20Uso%20de%20Crack.pdf xiv

Bastos, Francisco Inácio; Bertoni, Neilane. (2014). Pesquisa Nacional sobre o uso de crack: quem são os usuários de crack e/ou similares do Brasil? Quantos são nas capitais brasileiras? (National Research about use of crack: who are the crack users of Brazil? How many they are on Brazilian urban cities?). Rio de Janeiro: ICICT/FIOCRUZ, pp. 47-66Retrieved from: http://www.icict.fiocruz.br/sites/www.icict.fiocruz.br/files/Pesquisa%20Nacional%20sobre%20o%20Uso%20de%20Crack.pdf xv

Forero, Juan. (January 27, 2013). Brazil battles cocaine trafficking on long, porous borders. The Washington Post Official Website. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/the_americas/brazil-battles-cocaine-trafficking-along-long-porous-borders/2013/01/24/7a1fc19e-60c1-11e2-bc4f1f06fffb7acf_story.html xvi

In Sight Crime: Organized Crime in the Americas. (August 28, 2014). The Red Command and other Criminal Groups in Brazil. Retrieved from: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default /files/eoir/legacy/2014/09/29/red_command.pdf xvii

Drug Enforcement Administration – DEA/USA (1985-1990). History of Drugs in USA. Drug Enforcement Administration Official Website. Retrieved from: https://www.dea.gov/ about/history/1985-1990.pdf xviii

Silveira, Wilson. (January 11, 2013). Precariedade da Vigilância nas Fronteiras Alimenta Violência nas Cidades (Precarious land border security feed violence on urban centers). Retrieved from: http://policiadefronteira.blogspot.com/2013/06/precariedade-da-vigilancia-nas.html xx

Souza, André de. (January 28, 2014). Brasil falha na fiscalização de 17 mil quilômetros de fronteira. (Brazil fail on supervising its 17,000 Km of land borders).Retrieved from: http://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/brasil-falha-na-fiscalizacao-de-17-milquilometros-de-fronteira-11421408#ixzz4PxJFE8sN xxii

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes. (2016). World Drug Report 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf xxiii

Globo Official Website: G1 Tocantins. (February 4, 2014). Legislação e falta de estrutura são obstáculos ao trabalho policial. (Legislation and lack of structure are obstacles to the police work). Retrieved from: http://g1.globo.com/to/tocantins/noticia/2014/02/falta-de-estrutura-e-numero-de-pessoal-atrapalham-segundo-policia.html xxiv

Hill, David (February 16, 2016). ‘Never seen it so bad’: violence and impunity in Brazil’s Amazon. The Guardian Official Website. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/andes-to-the-amazon/2016/feb/16/never-seen-it-so-badviolence-and-impunity-in-brazils-amazon xxv

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes. (2016). World Drug Report 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf xxvi

xxvii

BRAZIL. National Drug Policy Secretariat and PUC/SP. (2013). Crack, é Possível Vencer. Enfrentar o Crack. Compromisso de todos. (Crack, it’s possible to win. Face crack. Commitment of all). Available at: http://www.pucsp.br/ecopolitica/downloads /docs_oficiais/1_D_2013_Crack%20_possivel_vencer_estrategia_completa.pdf xxviii

CEBRID, Centro Brasileiro de Informação sobre Drogas Psicotrópicas (Brazilian Center for Information about psychotropic drugs). (2012). Drogas Psicotrópicas (Psychotropic Drugs). Brasília: CEBRID/ SENAD. Retrieved from: http://obid.senad.gov.br/obid/ drogas-a-a-z/calmantes-e-sedativos xxix

Landry, Mim J. (1994). Understanding Drugs of Abuse: The Processes of Addiction, Treatment and Recovery. Washington Dc: American Psychiatric Press, Inc. Retrieved from: https://books.google.com/books?id=0cksP9g0Cc4C&pg=PA32&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=true xxxi

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes. (2016). World Drug Report 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf xxxii

US National Institute on Drug Abuse. (April 2014). Principles of Drug Abuse Treatment for Criminal Justice Populations: A Research-Based Guide. Retrieved from: https://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/txcriminaljustice_0.pdf xxxiii

BRAZIL. Presidency of the Republic. (2003). Política Nacional Antidrogas. (Brazilian National Policy against Drugs). Retrieved from: http://www.desenvolvimentoqs.ufba.br/sites/desenvolvimentoqs.ufba.br/files/Politica%20Nacional%20Antidrogas.pdf xxxv

BRAZIL. Presidency of the Republic. (2010). Plano Integrado de Enfrentamento ao Crack e Outras Drogas. (Integrated Plan for coping with crack and other drugs). Retrieved from: http://www.cbdd.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/PIEC.pdf xxxvii

BRAZIL. Ministry of Defense Official Website. (December 15, 2011). DEFESA - Resultados do Plano Estratégico de Fronteiras são positivos, avalia Vice-Presidente. (Defense: Results of Strategic Border Plan are positive, according the VicePresident evaluation). Retrieved from: http://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/noticias/3859-15122011-defesa-resultados-do-planoestrategico-de-fronteiras-sao-positivos-avalia-vice-presidente xxxix

Tomkins, Richard. (May 26, 2015). Budget Cut hits Brazilian Military. Retrieved from: http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2015/05/26/Budget-cut-hits-Brazilian-military/7251432654030/ xlii

Transparency International: The Global Coalition Against Corruption. (2016). Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/ corruption_perceptions_index_2016

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BRAZIL. National Drug Policy Secretariat. (2010). T355 Módulo para capacitação dos profissionais do projeto consultório de rua. (Workbook for professional on Project Street Office) Organizers: Antonio Nery Filho, Andréa Leite Ribeiro Valério. – Brasília: SENAD; Salvador: CETAD, 2010.Available at: http://conselheiros6.nute.ufsc.br/wpcontent/uploads/avea/conteudo/m%c3%b3dulo%20para%20capacita%c3%a7%c3%a3o.pdf BRAZIL. National Drug Policy Secretariat and PUC/SP. (2013). Crack, é Possível Vencer. Enfrentar o Crack. Compromisso de todos. (Crack, it’s possible to win. Face crack. Commitment of all). Available at: http://www.pucsp.br/ecopolitica/downloads /docs_oficiais/1_D_2013_Crack%20_possivel_vencer_estrategia_completa.pdf BRAZIL. Presidency of the Republic. (2016). Decreto nº 8.668, de 11 de fevereiro de 2016. (Decree 8.668 February 11, 2016). Retrieved from: http://planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03 /_Ato2015-2018/2016/Decreto/D8668.htm BRAZIL. National Drug Policy Secretariat (2016). Competencies of the National Drug Policy Secretariat. Retrieved from: http://www.justica.gov.br/Acesso/institucional/sumario/ quemequem/secretaria-nacional-de-politicas-sobre-drogas BRAZIL. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016). About the MFA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official Website. Retrieved from: http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/o-ministerio BRAZIL. Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (2016). Guidance on the Specialized Reference Center for Homeless Population and oriented Specialized Services. Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger Official Website. Retrieved from: http://www.cogemas.pr.gov.br/arquivos/File/Documento/Centro_Pop_Rua_1_ Vers%C3%A3o.pdf BRAZIL. Ministry of Defense Official Website. (December 15, 2011). DEFESA - Resultados do Plano Estratégico de Fronteiras são positivos, avalia Vice-Presidente. (Defense: Results of Strategic Border Plan are positive, according the Vice- President evaluation). Retrieved from: http://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/noticias/3859-15122011-defesa-resultados-do-planoestrategico-de-fronteiras-sao-positivos-avalia-vice-presidente

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Murray, J., Cerqueira, D. R. de C., Kahn, T. (2013). Crime and violence in Brazil: Systematic review of time trends, prevalence rates and risk factors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2013.07.003 Muth, Laura (August 19, 2011). Crack Cocaine on the Rise in Brazil, Argentina. Retrieved from: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/crack-cocaine-on-the-rise-in-brazil-argentina National Institute on Drug Abuse. (2016). Advancing Addiction Science: Cocaine. National Institute on Drug Abuse Official Website. Retrieved from: https://www.drugabuse.gov/ publications/research-reports/cocaine/what-cocaine Observatory: Crack, it’s possible to win Official Website. (2016). Balance of the Program. Retrieved from: http://www.brasil.gov.br/observatoriocrack/balanco-programa.html Silveira, Wilson. (January 11, 2013). Precariedade da Vigilância nas Fronteiras Alimenta Violência nas Cidades (Precarious land border security feed violence on urban centers). Retrieved from: http://policiadefronteira.blogspot.com/2013/06/precariedade-da-vigilancia-nas.html Souza, André de. (January 28, 2014). Brasil falha na fiscalização de 17 mil quilômetros de fronteira. (Brazil fail on supervising its 17,000 Km of land borders).Retrieved from: http://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/brasil-falha-na-fiscalizacao-de-17-mil-quilometros-de-fronteira11421408#ixzz4PxJFE8sN Souza, Felipe; Bergamim Jr, Giba. (April, 2015). Prefeitura de São Paulo faz ofensiva contra “favelinhas” da cracolândias. (Maior of São Paulo makes offensive moves against "favelinha" of cracklands). Folha de São Paulo Official Website. Retrieved from: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2015/04/1622597-prefeitura-de-sao-paulo-faz-ofensivacontra-usuarios-na-cracolandia.shtml Tomkins, Richard. (May 26, 2015). Budget Cut hits Brazilian Military. Retrieved from: http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2015/05/26/Budget-cut-hits-Brazilianmilitary/7251432654030/ The Economist. Print edition: The Americas. (April 6th, 2013). Drugs in Brazil: Cracking Up. Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21575810-worlds-biggest-crack-market-seeksbetter-way-deal-addicts-cracking-up

The Economist. Print edition: The Americas. (September 10th, 2016). The Impeachment Country: Does the ousting of Dilma Rousseff weaken or strengthen Brazilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s democracy? Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21706552-does-ousting-dilma-rousseff-weaken-orstrengthen-brazils-democracy-impeachment Transparency International: The Global Coalition Against Corruption. (2016). Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/ corruption_perceptions_index_2016 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes. (2016). World Drug Report 2016. Retrieved from: http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pdf United Nations Development Program, UNDP (2015). Human Development Report 2015. Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2015_statistical_annex.pdf United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC). UNGASS â&#x20AC;&#x201C; ten years on. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/ungass_E_PRINT.pdf United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC). Dugs: Legal Start (Drogas: marco legal). Available at: http://www.unodc.org/lpo-brazil/pt/drogas/marco-legal.html World Health Organization (2000). Primary Prevention of Substance Abuse: A Workbook for Project Operators. Retrieved from: http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/activities/global _initiative/en/primary_prevention_17.pdf?ua=1 World Bank. (2016). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Retrieved from: http://info.worldbank. org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports Zafarullah, Habib; Huque, A. S. (2012). Managing Development in a Globalized World: Concepts, Processes, Institutions. CRC Press: New York. Acknowledgements Fernholz, Rosemary, Ph. D. Senior Research Scholar and Lecturer. Sanford School of Public Policy. Duke University. Policy Analysis Orientation. Storelli, Dean. Writing and Communication Services. Duke Center for International Development. Sanford School of Public Policy. Duke University.

“El conflicto armado interno”: Discourses of Violence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru Jon Ettinger

For societies with histories of violent civil conflict, there is no clean break with the past. The signing of a peace accord does not necessarily end the underlying conflicts that generated an armed struggle. People encounter the past as part of daily reality through “lived history,” what individuals experience in their lifetimes; and “remembered history,” moments of past community trauma or pride that serve as justification for present action.i These lived and remembered histories of violence appear in narratives advanced by the state, economic elites, the armed forces, civil society organizations, local communities, and individuals. This paper will analyze such narratives in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru. Despite differences in context, the three cases share a common pattern. The state deployed a hegemonic Cold War discourse during the height of the armed conflict that excused atrocities as a necessary tool to combat so-called subversive terrorists. Later, national and international human rights advocates pushed a new conception of the conflict focusing on the state’s systematic repression of rural and indigenous populations. This narrative was reinforced by a truth commission report issued in each country. Finally, in the past decade, each society has struggled with issues that reveal old fault lines and reverberations of the original conflict. Each case will illustrate that a universalized human rights narrative of state repression and helpless victims does not tell the whole truth. Only an approach that demonstrates a nuanced understanding of lived experiences of conflict can address the underlying inequalities and structural violence of each society. I.

El Salvador: Transnational Disillusionment A few powerful coffee-growing families dominated El Salvador’s society, economy, and

politics throughout the 20th century, supported by a military-controlled government. By the Jon Ettinger is a student in the Latin American Studies MA program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. He holds a BA in Latin American Studies from the College of William and Mary. His areas of focus include development project design, socioeconomic inequality, and racial justice. He is grateful to Dr. Ginny Bouvier of the United States Institute of Peace for her invaluable guidance in researching this paper and would also like to thank his family for their support.

1970s, escalating popular discontent led to peaceful social mobilization by students, workers, and leaders of the Catholic Church, as well as to the formation of several armed guerilla organizations. These guerrillas subsequently joined together to create the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). In 1981, members of the FMLN attacked the capital of San Salvador, prompting a crackdown from the government This included the killing of several Jesuit priests by members of the armed forces and led to widespread international condemnation of the conflict. In an effort to negotiate a resolution, the FMLN and the Salvadoran government invited UN officials to mediate several rounds of talks, culminating in the drafting of a formal peace agreement in Chapultepec, Mexico. The Chapultepec Accords were finally signed by representatives of the Salvadoran state and the FMLN in 1992. As one aspect of the agreement, both sides mandated the UN Secretary General to create the Comisión de la Verdad Para El Salvador (CVES) to “assist the transition to national reconciliation.” This body would collect information and testimony on the Salvadoran conflict from 1980-1991 and make “legal, political, and administrative” recommendations on how to address human rights abuses and systematic violence perpetrated by both sides. Its proceedings would be confidential and last only six months.ii Notably, the three Commission members included the former president of Colombia, the former foreign minister of Venezuela, and a former president of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). The hope was that naming “neutral” foreign nationals would allow for an objective assessment of responsibility for violence and human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the Salvadoran armed forces and FMLN commanders attempted to influence the narrative of the CVES report by throwing up roadblocks to the Commission’s requests for documentation. In the end, the members decided to focus on particular emblematic cases. They advanced a notion of individual rather than institutional responsibility for atrocities, naming names and recommending a purge of offenders from the armed forces.iii Of the “significant sample” of 22,000 cases investigated in the final CVES report, 85 percent of complaints referred to agents of the state, paramilitaries, or death squads, while only 5 percent of atrocities were attributed to the FMLN guerillas.iv This proportion challenged the state’s narrative that any human rights abuses committed were merely a response to the FMLN’s aggression. To avoid a recurrence of violence, the CVES recommended the removal and discharge from the armed forces of anyone named in the report and a ban on their holding public

office for ten years; a transition to a civilian-controlled military; the disbanding of the old internal security forces; compliance with the Chapultepec Accords and relevant international agreements; the creation of a state fund for victim compensation; and the construction of a national monument with the names of all known victims.v Despite President Alfredo Cristiani’s public promise to comply with the report’s recommendations, its publication was met by an immediate opposition campaign led by the armed forces, which called it “an attempt to discredit the military institution,” by the Church, and by the Supreme Court, which claimed that the CVES findings had no bearing on judicial proceedings and that its confidential investigations violated due process.vi The Salvadoran legislature capitulated to the military’s demands and quickly passed an amnesty law that provided impunity from prosecution, rendering the CVES report a dead letter and sending a clear message that the state strategy for El Salvador was to “forgive and forget.”vii Salvadorans themselves stepped in where elites feared to tread. For example, the government failed to follow the CVES recommendation to construct a national memorial to victims of the civil war; in response, a citizen’s committee gathered resources and designs for a Monument to the Memory and the Truth, which was finally inaugurated in San Salvador in 2003. The huge black granite wall is inscribed with the names of 25,000 dead and disappeared people from 1980-1991. Citizens of El Mozote, a small town in the department of Morazan, constructed an additional memorial commemorating the 1981 rape, torture, and massacre of 300 civilians there by a US-trained Salvadoran army battalion.viii Others participate in the arts to maintain a memory of the civil war. As a counterweight to the state-run—and unsurprisingly silent – Museo de Arte Nacional (MUNA), the Museo de la Palabra y el Imagen (MUPI) is a nonprofit that typifies the new narrative of universal human rights. Founded by a Venezuelan native who broadcasted on the FMLN’s “Radio Venceremos” station during the civil war, the MUPI is “explicit in its dedication to memory work” and contains a central repository of archival images and recordings of the conflict.ix Various testimonial projects reveal the continuing efforts of Salvadorans to recover and publicize their personal histories, with the support of the international community. Historias para tener presente, later translated to English as Stories Never to Be Forgotten, is a collection of five personal narratives by Salvadorans who were separated from their families as children during the 1980s and later reunited. The project was spearheaded by the Asociación Pro-

búsqueda de Niñas y Niños Desaparecidos, a search organization run by a Salvadoran priest, and funded by Save the Children Sweden. These former orphans hope to “proclaim the validity of their stories to Salvadoran society”x and pressure the Salvadoran state to create an official search commission for children who were kidnapped, displaced, or separated from their families during the conflict. The writers emphasize the ongoing victimization of young people in El Salvador today through criminalization and lack of opportunity.xi Conversely, some people in former conflict zones live a kind of counternarrative to such memory projects. Irina Carlota Silber’s work zooms in on northern Chalatenango province, the site of much of the worst abuses during the conflict. Her longitudinal studies of chalatecos’ daily lives paint a mixed picture. Silber describes an explosion of, and subsequent community exhaustion with, international-led NGO activism through the 1990s.xii Moreover, a general sense of disillusionment and despair took over amongst former militants and FMLN combatants. For those who fought, peace brought what one former guerrilla calls “spectral reintegration,” explaining that “reintegration does not exist” and “the problems continue” that pushed him to take up arms originally.xiii Dominant community narratives of unified resistance against an oppressive state create simmering tensions, as many families suffered the loss of loved ones killed by FMLN soldiers and sympathizers.xiv Interestingly, immigration to the United States has become a tool for those who feel “burned by their sacrifices”xv to “seguir adelante” or move forward, changing the nature of their daily struggle from violent resistance to the search for prosperity and transnational connection.xvi II.

Guatemala: Saying “Peace” When There Is No Peace Guatemala’s history of armed conflict extends back to 1954, when the CIA instigated a

coup against reformist president Jacobo Arbenz. Over the next few decades, splintered guerrilla groups fought an on-again, off-again war against an authoritarian military state. Violence escalated in the early 1980s. By this time, established guerrillas and newer recruits who opposed the Guatemalan armed forces had formed an umbrella organization called the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG). Seeking to crush an alleged base of support for the URNG in the countryside, General Efraín Ríos Montt embarked on a scorched earth campaign that killed thousands of civilians, but failed to destroy the organization completely.

With no military victory in sight for either side, the two armed opponents followed the precedent set in neighboring El Salvador and began peace negotiations in the early 1990s. The Peace Accords that would eventually be signed in 1996 by the Guatemalan government, the armed forces, and the URNG included a mandate for a truth commission that followed many of the same guidelines as the Salvadoran CVES: it had a six-month lifespan, confidential proceedings, and the power to make non-binding recommendations. Perhaps after a wary glance at the potentially explosive precedent set by the that earlier commission, however, the Guatemalan Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) was not allowed to attribute responsibility to any individual, and its findings could not serve as the basis for prosecution in the courts.xvii Limitations notwithstanding, the CEH issued a forceful final report that accused the Guatemalan state of genocide against Maya communities. The report maintains that “economic, cultural and social relations in Guatemala are marked by profound exclusion, antagonism and conflict…violence was fundamentally directed by the State against the excluded, the poor and above all, the Mayan people, as well as against those who fought for justice and greater social equality.”xviii It lay the blame for 93 percent of human rights violations at the feet of the state and state-sponsored paramilitary groups, while assigning just 3 percent to the URNG.xix The CEH analysis corresponded with international understanding of the Guatemalan state and military as a monolithic, oppressive force. The CEH report also came four years after the Nobel committee awarded the Peace Prize to Rigoberta Menchú, situating it in the context of an international consensus that recognized indigenous peoples as particularly victimized groups. Amongst its many recommendations for institutional reform, the report called for its own dissemination in Mayan languages and a state education campaign aimed at promoting crosscultural understanding.xx This call echoed Peace Accord provisions calling for increased state investment in education and the expansion of curricula on multicultural and ethnic diversity. Such exhortations, however, did not translate into coherent, effective state policy. Elizabeth Oglesby finds that, as of 2007, history curriculum reform had occurred superficially at the primary level. However, there is no unified national project in Guatemala to teach “historical memory,” as the CEH report recommended.xxi A Ministry of Education-produced textbook on the CEH report was recalled due to opposition in Congress. Although “all the leading textbooks address the conflict to some degree,” the study of detailed history has actually all but disappeared

from Guatemalan students’ education. Instead, they are presented with brief sections of “social studies” topics that deal with the peace accords and human rights in general terms.xxii The post-conflict experience of the Guatemalan education system is typical of a systemic lack of political will to enact structural reforms. Carmen De León and María Patricia González describe a society where the “social framework is extremely divided” by instability, psychological damage, and the impunity of criminals from prosecution and change is hampered by the “absence of a social pact to mobilize actions and demands and place the main concerns of the majority of the population on the agenda.”xxiii Twenty years on, the Guatemalan state has not committed to compliance with the CEH report’s recommendations and even denies its validity.xxiv The same group of economic and military elites still hold power and maintain the bogeyman of vague “internal enemies” that threaten the state.xxv Even more concerning, the CEH report has not been publicly distributed. Many Guatemalans do not even know what it contains.xxvi This suggests that truth commissions, so celebrated by the international community, might not have much of an impact on citizens’ daily lives. The peace negotiations and the deliberations of the CEH were elite-driven processes that took place between a few people (usually men) behind closed doors, yet claimed to represent all of society and provide a “comprehensive” explanation of recent history. Given this context, “it is an error to assume that this now “official” definition of the war reflects a consensual, popular understanding.”xxvii In addition to national elites, Tani Adams describes the influence of what she refers to as a “cosmopolitan network” in shaping the discourse of the Guatemalan civil war and Peace Accords. These academics, activists, international NGOs, multilateral organization staff, Catholic and liberal Protestant missionaries, and guerrilla combatants or collaborators that shaped the new official story also mediated access to crucial international aid money.xxviii Adams argues that while this group continued to use the Peace Accords as a road map for the postconflict reconstruction of society, it did not understand the lived reality on the ground. In a chaotic conflict where neighbor killed neighbor, alliances constantly shifted, and local chronologies didn’t necessarily correspond to the official dates for the beginning and end of the war. In short, “the stories are so much more nuanced and complex and gray than we would have liked to have thought.”xxix

This knowledge gap may help to explain the narrow rejection of a 1999 Constitutional referendum by Guatemalan voters. The referendum proposed extensive alterations to the constitution based on the content of the Peace Accords, including legal and institutional reforms and recognition of limited autonomy for indigenous groups. Local and international elites who supported the changes did not pay attention to the motivations of various communities across the country and how they processed their lived history; a given town’s residents, for instance, might have been URNG partisans, military sympathizers, or a mix of both. Despite growing recognition of the connections between social movements and armed guerrilla organizations in the late 20th century, “little is known about the complex, local-level dynamics between the guerrilla and the peasant communities and urban sectors that supported them.”xxx The same is true for unexplored relationships between the state, armed forces, and economic elites, on the one hand, and urban workers, indigenous groups, and campesinos (peasants) on the other. Guatemala’s generalized violence, like El Salvador’s, can be explained by a weak state, a psychosocially traumatized population, and a lack of concrete policies to address massive gaps in wealth inequality and standards of living. As Adams points out, “the central challenge of social and national reconciliation is immeasurably more complex than it was at the end of the war because of the social and state disintegration that has occurred as result of organized crime and spiraling social violence.”xxxi Even when the state did move to redress grievances and provide some measure of compensation with the creation of the National Reparations Program in 2003, fierce contestations over who deserved to be designated as a victim paralyzed the process.xxxii Unless Guatemalans can create a narrative of their shared history that gives voice to the silenced, it seems unlikely that the country can move forward as a coherent whole. III.

Peru: Hegemonic Memory and Cycles of Repression In 1980, while Salvadoran and Guatemalan leftist guerrilla groups battled military

autocrats, an ideologically extreme Maoist insurgency calling itself Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) declared war against the democratically elected Peruvian government. Beginning in the highland region of Ayacucho, Sendero embarked on a campaign of terror that would spread to other regions of the country throughout the rest of the decade and into the 1990s, devastating the civilian population and presenting a significant threat to the integrity of the Peruvian state.

Unlike the Central American cases, the Peruvian government did not reach a negotiated settlement with the guerrilla opposition. It also engaged in conflict under a democratic regime through the 1980s, rather than a military-economic oligarchy. Nevertheless, the state employed systematic repressive violence against campesinos, much like the authoritarian regimes of El Salvador and Guatemala. By the end of the decade, the rural population of Peru had been devastated by Sendero’s ideology-driven total war, the Peruvian armed forces’ brutal response, and politicians’ seeming powerlessness to end the killing. When President Alberto Fujimori closed the legislature and seized control of the government in 1992, he enjoyed wide popular support. The feeling of relief that someone was finally taking charge increased after armed forces captured Sendero leader Abimael Guzmán and succeeded in dismantling much of the guerrilla’s combat capacity by the mid 1990s.xxxiii Fujimori and his intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos propagated a “hegemonic memory” that human rights “excesses” against Andean campesinos and indigenous Amazonian peoples were the unavoidable price of defeating terrorism.xxxiv This idea continued to hold sway with many Peruvians, even after Fujimori was discredited and forced into exile by substantial allegations of massive corruption. On the other hand, the collapse of Fujimori’s regime and prosecution of many top officials and military commanders in 1999-2000 did lead to a renewed public demand for respect for democratic norms and punishment of corruption.xxxv President Alejandro Toledo responded in 2001 by issuing an executive decree creating the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR). It was established to investigate the full period from 1980 to 2000, including the war with Sendero Luminoso and Fujimori’s autocratic rule. Significantly, it was the first commission of its kind in Latin America to hold public hearings.xxxvi The CVR produced a report in 2003 that was clearly influenced by previous truth commissions while asserting the essential differences of the Peruvian case.xxxvii The commission assigned immediate blame to Guzmán and Sendero for beginning the conflict with a 1980 declaration of war against the state. However, the report also detailed the underlying socioeconomic, political, and racial exclusion experienced by indigenous communities that exacerbated the violence. According to the report, Sendero was responsible for 54 percent of the abuses catalogued in the Commission’s investigations; the state, armed forces, civilian patrols (rondas campesinas), and paramilitary death squads accounted for 37 percent; and the smaller

guerrilla force of the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) accounted for the remainder.xxxviii The report’s recommendations echo calls from the CVES and CEH: acceptance of responsibility by all actors involved, compensation for victims, and institutional and education reforms to include indigenous groups in the concept of nation.xxxix Upon publication, 60 percent of Peruvians surveyed responded that they agreed with the CVR’s findings.xl Students, teachers, Christian groups, journalists, and victims’ organizations led by women in the Andean highlands pushed for human rights trials based on the report, but did not coalesce into a unified movement. Meanwhile, a familiar opposition bloc composed of the armed forces, some politicians, and conservative members of the Catholic Church attacked the CVR, claiming it was “biased” and did not recognize the armed forces’ contribution to bringing peace to Peru.xli The opposition campaign appealed to those who credited Fujimori’s iron hand with defeating the guerrillas and called into question who deserved to be compensated as victims of the conflict. Further controversy erupted in 2006, when the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) ruled that the Peruvian government owed $20 million in restitution to the families of female senderista prisoners killed in a military assault on the Miguel Castro Castro prison in 1992. The greatest opposition arose to the second provision of the ruling, that the names of those killed in the attack should be inscribed on an existing Lima memorial to victims of violence called “El ojo que llora” (“The Eye that Cries”).xlii Katherine Hite describes the discursive shift this ruling represented: Until the Inter-American Court ruling, the term “victim”…conveyed a generic quality, a remote, passive, depoliticized character. The ruling laid bare that the victims of the violence represented by the memorial included combatants, sympathizers, and resisters, as well as men, women and children in a time of terror. The victims included those assassinated in extrajudicial killings while under arrest, those who had been formally charged as terrorists, as well as those awaiting sentencing.xliii Peruvians continue to strongly disagree over such claims to victimhood, egged on by the protagonists of past violence who remain in power. The surprise extradition and 2009 sentencing of Fujimori to 25 years in prison was celebrated by human rights advocates as a crucial victory. Yet, his daughter Keiko ran a close second in the 2011 and 2016 presidential elections, indicating a widespread degree of continued popular support for fujimorismo. Alan García,

himself implicated in a different prison massacre that occurred during his first presidency (19851990),xliv has pilloried the CVR report and encouraged media campaigns against its findings.xlv A crisis during García’s second presidency (2006-2011) further exemplifies this past that is not past. In 2009, a coalition of indigenous groups protested that they had not been consulted on laws fast-tracked through Congress to facilitate the extraction of Amazonian natural resources. They blockaded major highways and sent a delegation to negotiate the laws’ abrogation. In response, García declared them “savages” who opposed national progress and sent in armed police. In the resulting clash, eleven policemen and dozens of protesters were killed. Rather than accept responsibility for its role in escalating the situation, the government issued a warrant for the arrest of indigenous leader Alberto Pizango, asserting that he incited his people to murder.xlvi This incident demonstrates the durable discourse of “subversion” as a justification for overwhelming state force. It also reveals that Peru’s indigenous peoples are still seen in elite circles as backwards and second-class citizens. IV.

Neat Ideals, Messy Realities What can we learn from the aftermath of civil war in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru?

The hegemonic discourse in each country initially shifted from one of justified state repression in combating terrorism to a discourse of truth-telling and respect for universal human rights. However, the ideals espoused by international NGOs and human rights groups tended to ignore or misunderstand the reality of lived daily experience in Chalatenango, in the highlands of Guatemala, and in Andean communities. Nothing is black and white there. The wounds of war still cut deep across regions, towns, communities, and families. Elite failure to understand these complex local dynamics exacerbates the crisis of weak states that have failed to provide structural solutions to poverty, unemployment, and racial/ethnic/gender exclusion. In short, “human rights are empty concepts in states that don’t work.”xlvii The tensions in these Latin American countries resemble nationalist backlash against neoliberal globalization policies in the United States, United Kingdom, and Western Europe. In both contexts, political and economic elites pushed forward with a hegemonic discourse and state policy without stopping to consider the communities who might be left behind. Unless we can honestly listen to the stories of those who have been ignored or silenced and grapple with their lived experiences, it seems unlikely that we will be able to heal and reconcile divided societies.

John Paul Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace (Oxford University Press, 2005, Kindle edition), Ch. 12. ii “El Salvador: Mexico Peace Agreements—Provisions Creating the Commissions on Truth,” in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Vol. 3, Laws, Rulings, and Reports, ed. Neil J. Kritz (USIP Press Books: 1995), 174-179. iii Ricardo Córdova Macías and Nayelly Loya Marín, “El Salvador: The peace process and transitional justice,” in After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano (New York: United Nations University Press, 2012), 180-183. iv Comisión de la Verdad Para El Salvador (CVES), From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in El Salvador, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf, Sec. IV Part A. v CVES, From Madness to Hope, Sec. V. vi Córdova and Loya, “El Salvador,” 186-187. vii Córdova and Loya, “El Salvador,” 187. viii Robin Maria DeLugan, Reimagining National Belonging: Post-Civil War El Salvador in a Global Context (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012), 122. ix DeLugan, Reimagining, 117-120. x Ralph Sprenkels, Stories Never to be Forgotten: Eyewitness Accounts from the Salvadoran Civil War (Tempe, Arizona: Bilingual Press, 2015), xiii. xi Sprenkels, Stories, 187. xii Irina Carlota Silber, Everyday Revolutionaries: Gender, Violence, and Disillusionment in Postwar El Salvador (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 94. xiii Silber, Everyday Revolutionaries, 2. xiv Silber, Everyday Revolutionaries, 66. xv Silber, Everyday Revolutionaries, 185. xvi Silber, Everyday Revolutionaries, 175. xvii “Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer,” http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Guatemala-Charter.pdf. xviii Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH), Guatemala: Memory of Silence, https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf, 17. xix CEH, Memory of Silence, 20-21. xx CEH, Memory of Silence, 55-56. xxi Elizabeth Oglesby, “Historical Memory and the Limits of Peace Education: Examining Guatemala’s Memory of Silence and the Politics of Curriculum Design,” in Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation, ed. Elizabeth A. Cole (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 183. xxii Oglesby, “Historical Memory,” 185. xxiii Carmen Rosa De León Escribano and María Patricia González Chávez, “Transitional justice in Guatemala,” in After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano (New York: United Nations University Press, 2012), 199-200. xxiv De León and González, “Transitional justice in Guatemala,” 203. xxv De León and González, “Transitional justice in Guatemala,” 215-16. xxvi De León and González, “Transitional justice in Guatemala,” 211. xxvii Tani M. Adams, Consumed by Violence: Advances and Obstacles to Building Peace in Guatemala Fifteen Years After the Peace Accords (Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2011), 6. xxviii Adams, Consumed by Violence, 11. xxix Tani M. Adams, telephone interview, 16 Nov. 2016. xxx Adams, Consumed by Violence, 5. xxxi Adams, Consumed by Violence, 45. xxxii Adams, Consumed by Violence, 35-36. xxxiii Carlos Basombrío Iglesias, “Transitional Justice and Democratic Consolidation: The Peruvian Experience,” in After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe, ed. Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano (New York: United Nations University Press, 2012), 224. xxxiv Carlos Iván Degregori, “‘Eppur Si Muove:’ Truth and Justice in Peru after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in In the Wake of War: Democratization and Internal Armed Conflict in Latin America, ed. Cynthia Arnson (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), 378. xxxv Basombrío, “Transitional Justice and Democratic Consolidation,” 225-226. xxxvi “Truth Commission: Peru 01,” USIP Truth Commissions Digital Collection, http://www.usip.org/publications/truthcommission-peru-01. xxxvii Degregori, “‘Eppur si muove’,” 373-374.

xxxviii

Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-peru-01, 54-55. xxxix CVR, Final Report, Sec. IX Part 2. xl Degregori, “‘Eppur si muove’,” 380. xli Basombrío, “Transitional Justice and Democratic Consolidation,” 231. xlii Katherine Hite, “‘The eye that cries’: The Politics of Representing Victims in Contemporary Peru,” A contracorriente 5, no. 1 (Fall 2007), 108-110. xliii Hite, “‘The eye that cries’,” 111. xliv Hite, “‘The eye that cries’,” 129. xlv Basombrío, “Transitional Justice and Democratic Consolidation,” 238. xlvi When Two Worlds Collide, directed by Heidi Brandenburg and Matthew Orzel (Yachaywasi Films, 2016). xlvii Adams, telephone interview.

Adams, Tani M. Consumed by Violence: Advances and Obstacles to Building Peace in Guatemala Fifteen Years After the Peace Accords. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2011. Adams, Tani M. Telephone interview. 16 Nov. 2016. “Agreement on the establishment of the Commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer.” http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/GuatemalaCharter.pdf. Basombrío Iglesias, Carlos. “Transitional Justice and Democratic Consolidation: The Peruvian Experience.” In Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano, After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe, 222 – 241. New York: United Nations University Press, 2012. Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH). Guatemala: Memory of Silence. https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf. Comisión de la Verdad Para El Salvador (CVES). From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in El Salvador. http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR). Final Report of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-peru-01. Córdova Macías, Ricardo and Nayelly Loya Marín. “El Salvador: The peace process and transitional justice.” In Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano, After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe, 170 – 195. New York: United Nations University Press, 2012. Degregori, Carlos Iván. “‘Eppur Si Muove:’ Truth and Justice in Peru after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” In Cynthia Arnson, Ed., In the Wake of War: Democratization and Internal Armed Conflict in Latin America, 373 – 384. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012. De León Escribano, Carmen Rosa and María Patricia González Chávez. “Transitional justice in Guatemala.” In Vesselin Popovski and Mónica Serrano, After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin America and Eastern Europe, 196 – 221. New York: United Nations University Press, 2012.

DeLugan, Robin Maria. Reimagining National Belonging: Post-Civil War El Salvador in a Global Context. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012. “El Salvador: Mexico Peace Agreements—Provisions Creating the Commissions on Truth.” In Neil J. Kritz, Ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Vol. 3, Laws, Rulings, and Reports, 174-179. USIP Press Books: 1995. Hite, Katherine. “‘The eye that cries’: The Politics of Representing Victims in Contemporary Peru.” A contracorriente 5, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 108 – 134. Lederach, John Paul. The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace. Oxford University Press, 2005. Kindle edition. Oglesby, Elizabeth. “Historical Memory and the Limits of Peace Education: Examining Guatemala’s Memory of Silence and the Politics of Curriculum Design.” In Elizabeth A. Cole, Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation, 175-202. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007. Silber, Irina Carlota. Everyday Revolutionaries: Gender, Violence, and Disillusionment in Postwar El Salvador. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011. Sprenkels, Ralph. Stories Never to be Forgotten: Eyewitness Accounts from the Salvadoran Civil War. Tempe, Arizona: Bilingual Press, 2015. “Truth Commission: Peru 01.” USIP Truth Commissions Digital Collection. http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-peru-01. When Two Worlds Collide. Directed by Heidi Brandenburg and Matthew Orzel. 2016. Yachaywasi Films.

The Metamorphosis of Las Mariposas: The Politics of Memory of the Mirabal Sisters in the Dominican Republic Lisa Krause

Politics and memory are closely interlinked. While memory can have a lasting impact on political decisions, politics often actively shape the narrative of specific events or individuals with a particular purpose in mind. The encouragement or silencing of what is considered the historical account serves political interests in the present. Memory, therefore, is a powerful tool in politics to create a collective recollection of noteworthy national events or individuals. In the social sciences, memory has been widely studied through the analysis of a variety of case studies worldwide. However, the Caribbean seems to have received little attention in this field. This research paper attempts to contribute to the literature on memory in the Spanish-speaking Caribbean by examining the politics of memory in the Dominican Republic for the Mirabal sisters. The critics of dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo’s regime are crucial figures in the recent history of the country, yet their leverage was not reflected in official politics, for instance by public recognition, until the 1990s. The case study of the Mirabal sisters illustrates how politics interfere in the construction of memory. The political situation since the assassination of the Mirabal sisters in November 1960 determined the ways in which they have been remembered. Different administrations dealt with this memory of the past in divergent ways. As memory is flexible, not fixed, the official narrative of the Mirabal has transformed significantly depending on the political and social circumstances. Whereas the lives and fates of the women were more of an open secret in society for almost three decades after Trujillo’s death, the Dominican state has started to embrace their legacy firmly in recent years by celebrating and reinforcing their political struggle. Keeping in mind the underground name that the sisters chose for their activism — Las Mariposas — I use the image of the butterfly’s metamorphosis that the sisters went through in the collective memory to epitomize the Dominican politics of memory. To support this claim, the paper will offer a brief description of the notion of memory based on the writing of sociologist Eviatar Zerubavel

Lisa Krause is graduate student at the University of Florida pursing a Master of Arts in Latin American Studies with a specialization in Crime, Law & Governance. She would like to thank Dr. Lenny Ureña and Dr. Carlos Suarez for their support in writing this piece. She is originally from Leipzig, Germany.

before examining the official steps to commemorate the Mirabal sisters in a chronological order starting in 1960. I.

Politics and Memory In neuropsychology, memory is a complex biochemical process. In the social sciences,

it is a challenging concept due to its subjectivity. Every brain processes information in a different way so that one personâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s remembered version of an event may be similar to or different from anotherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, but rarely identical. Memory is, however, not only limited to our own experiences. We also recall events that we did not directly observe, but were told about by others. Zerubaveli refers to these shared memories within society as mnemonic communities. In such mnemonic communities, individuals learn about a specific interpretation of an incident or person, which has certainly been shaped by external factors to some extent. Memory in mnemonic communities, mainly referred to as collective memory, is, in consequence, a social construction. Besides our membership in a social group, institutions are another important influence in shaping collective memoryii. The formation of collective memory through institutions is closely linked to politics. Politics decide what and who is remembered, such as through an official acknowledgement or the absence of such. It also shapes how the event or person is remembered. The means of remembrance are diverse, ranging from history classes at school to museums. However, the purpose is the same: to educate the public about a certain aspect of history and preserve the cultural heritage. The same applies to public memorials or commemoration days. Such institutionalized forms of remembrance reinforce a socially created collective memory. However, politics do more than encouraging or rejecting memory through an official narrative. It actively shapes not only memory through memorial sites and objects, but also language. As French historian Pierre Noraiii points out, memory sites, be it an actual memorial, object or symbol, tie the past to the present. Paper money, for example, often commemorates influential national personalities. Another instance occurred in 2016, when the German government decided to refer to the mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during World War I as genocide. Turkish leaders were outraged and firmly opposed the term, because it reframed what is referred to as the Events of 1915 in Turkey. This exemplifies how politics of memory follow a political purposeiv wherein politics hold agency over memory.

Oblivion, the opposite of memory in the actual sense, is another form of remembrance due to its absence. Just as with collective memory, collective forgetting or tabooing is a decision made by the social environmental and institutions. Whereas some societies and governments actively encourage the remembrance of events and people, others silence any form of memory and create a kind of collective amnesia or denial towards history. Returning to the example of the Turkish position towards the mass killings of Armenians in 1915, the official Turkish narrative of the event is one of relocation and migration of Armenians, an interpretation far from genocide. Hence the lack of an official acknowledgement or even mentioning of a historical event or individual is another way to shape collective memory through erasure. The Turkish example further illustrates that, despite institutional efforts to create an official narrative and shape collective memory, there are likely to be different interpretations of history and the memory of it. Such contrasting narratives can emerge strongly and form a counter-memory to the official memory. Zerubavelv terms this mnemonic battles. In some cases, the unofficial version will always be an alternative one. In others, the counter-memory gains enough public and official support to transform the way an event or individuals are remembered. A former counter-memory then becomes recognized as the new, official narrative. Regime changes often go along with a shift in memory as Forest and Johnson demonstrate in their article on Soviet-era monuments in post-Soviet Russiavi. If a new mnemonic version gains acceptance, commemoration sites may undergo a transformation from either â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;co-optation and glorification, disavowal, or contestationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;vii. The politics of memory adopts any of the described forms of remembrance or forgetting. Usually, governments choose to promote or discard a narrative, which becomes the official account for collective memory, especially regarding controversial figures and events. However, there are also examples of changing politics of memory, in which a memory has been encouraged for some time but later becomes rejected and silenced (or vice versa). The shifts in Holocaust narratives and collective memory in Israel illustrate such a change in official narratives. In the immediate years after the creation of Israel, the government celebrated the resistance fighters in the ghettos as symbols of an active rebellion against the Nazi regime, whereas Jewish prisoners in concentration camps were considered passive actors, accepting their traditional role as victims. Consequently there was no interest in the stories of concentration campus survivorsviii. However, once the state was consolidated, the collective memory started changing with the 1961 trial against Adolf Eichmannix. Since then,

survivors have been celebrated for their endurance and their testimonies have been met with great interest. The interpretation of history and memory can be applied to the politics of memory in the Dominican Republic. The highly repressive Trujillo dictatorship was responsible for the death of innumerable Dominicans and Haitians. It created an enduring climate of fear within society of speaking out against the regime and reinforced fear of Haitians by discrediting and denouncing the neighboring country and its citizens. However, the Dominican Republic has not undertaken any steps to come to terms with this part of its past. Whereas other countries in Latin America with histories of dictatorship (such as Argentina, Chile and El Salvador) established Truth and Reconciliation Commissions to uncover human rights violations, other crimes and state terror, the Dominican Republic has not. In recent years, there have been demands for the creation of such a commission, but so far the government has not undertaken any steps in this respectx. Taking this into account, the developments in the politics of memory in the case of the Mirabal sisters highlight these tensions. II.

The Mirabal Sisters The Mirabal sisters — Minerva, Patria and María Teresa — are remembered for their

political activism against dictator Rafael Trujillo, which resulted in their tragic deaths. Minerva was the most active and radical one of the sisters. She was the first to engage in the opposition, which later organized as the Movimiento 14 de julio in 1960 and was where the code name ‘Mariposa’, or Butterfly, emerged. She exerted a great influence on her family, inspiring Patria and María Teresa to join her fight and the rest of the family to support their efforts. To understand the importance of the Mirabal sisters for Dominican history, it is necessary to contextualize their activism. In 1930, Rafael Trujillo became president of the Dominican Republic through a coup d’état. For 31 years he secured his position through repression and state violence. Opposition was quickly eliminated or discouraged. For that reason, only a few people dared to oppose himxi. It was precisely these actions that led to the radicalization of the Mirabal sisters, especially Minerva. III.

Cover-up and Collective Silence On November 25, 1960 the sisters went to prison to visit Minerva and Maria Teresa’s

husbands, who were incarcerated as a result of having been active in the clandestine struggle against Trujillo. On their way home they were assaulted and beaten to death by some of Trujillo’s men. Although family members, other political activists and supporters had warned

them of the dangerous situation they faced, the sisters did not believe that Trujillo would order violent actions against them. They thought that the increasing international political pressure on Trujillo and their gender would protect themxii, which proved to be a false assumption. On November 27, the Trujillo-controlled newspaper El Caribexiii reported the deaths of the women in a short note on page 8 along with reports of other violent events in the country such as assault and battery. The article titled “3 Hermanas Mueren Al Precipitarse Jeep a un Abismo” disseminates the official version of an accident communicating that the driver, Rufino de la Cruz, had lost control over the car and fell into a 50-meter-deep abyss. The names of the passengers were only mentioned in the second paragraph, likely in an attempt to conceal the death of the dissidents, or at least to avoid calling attention to them. The Mirabal family uncovered the real circumstances of their deaths when they identified the women at the hospital. They saw that the injuries of the sisters were not consistent with a traffic accident, but rather a brutal beatingxiv. It was an open secret, at least for those involved and aware of the activities of the Mirabal sisters, that the official version was false. The regime, however,

Figure 1 - News report on the death of the sisters, 27 November 1960

pressured the Mirabal family to support the accident narrative . The murder of the young women had a crucial impact on the developments of the next months. It seems that the assassination was one crime too much for society to cope with, which led a group of men to plot Trujillo’s assassinationxvi. On 30 May 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and killed with seven shots while travelling on the main road between Santo Domingo and San Cristóbal. Today in the Dominican Republic this event is known as the ajusticiamiento, or to bring justice by execution, which implies a legal basis for Trujillo’s assassination. After Trujillo’s death, the murder plot against the Mirabal sisters was recognized and five assassins — Ciriaco de la Rosa, Alfonso Cruz Valerio, Emilio Estrada

Malleta, Ramón Emilio Rojas Lora and Néstor Antonio Pérezxvii — were brought to court in June 1962. The news coverage revealed the true circumstances of the death of the Mirabal to the broad public. The court condemned the five principal offenders to a 30-year prison sentence, the maximum punishment. However, none of the convicts served entire sentences, and they were all released after four years in prison. With the help of Trujillo’s loyal militaries, they managed to leave the country. The Mirabal family learned about their release only from the newspaperxviii . IV.

Dominican Politics of Memory and the Mirabal Sisters The memory of the Mirabal sisters is an outstanding case to study the politics of

collective remembrance in the Dominican Republic as the path to their official recognition and celebration was long and only evolved in recent years. From their assassination in November 1960 to the late 1980s and early 1990s, an official narrative celebrating the Mirabal sisters for their activism was absent in the public sphere. Although the general public learned about the struggles and deaths of the women through the media coverage of their murder trial in 1962, an official oblivion and silence characterized the next three decades. This changed in the 1990s when the official promotion of the memory of the Mirabal began, which has since resulted in an extensive increase in public attention. Despite the rise in remembrance activities of the Mirabal in recent years, the information and materials available do not offer a satisfactory explanation that goes beyond the obvious: Minerva, Patria and María Teresa Mirabal were three brave women confronting the Trujillo dictatorship who eventually paid with their lives for their political struggle, but achieved their goal of freeing their country from the dictator after their death. The interaction of three main factors contributed significantly to a re-assessment of the past and the intensification of national remembrance of the Mirabal sisters: (1) the transition to democracy in the Dominican Republic during the 1990s, (2) the engagement of some members of the Mirabal family in politics and (3) the adaptation of the Mirabal life story by popular culture. The last remnants of the Trujillo era vanished with the definite democratization of the Dominican Republic in the 1990s. The assassination of El Jefe in May 1961was the beginning of years of a political turmoil, which included a coup against the democratically elected President Juan Bosch in 1963 and a U.S. intervention on the island in 1965. The election of Joaquín Balaguer in 1966 did not change anything in the official recognition of the Mirabal, or the lack thereof, which is likely due to the proximity of Balaguer to Trujillo, as the former served in different public positions for the Trujillo regime

over several years. After the post-dictatorship turbulence, Balaguer had to consolidate political and economic stability, which meant that the creation of a public narrative to remember the Mirabal sisters was not a political priority. A vivid memory of the three young women, wives and mothers might have encouraged a strong resistance movement to emerge against the former Trujillo collaborator just as their death triggered the plot against Trujillo in 1961xix. The fact that the Mirabal house in Conuco was searched 28 times during the 12-year presidency of Balanguer (1966-1978) supports this theoryxx. Therefore, the absence of any politics to promote the memory of the Mirabal sisters was most likely intended by Trujillo and continued by Balaguer. It was not until 1996 that Balaguer retired from politics and a new generation of politicians, free from a past with Trujillo, took over. The visibility and presence of the Mirabal family in public life has been a constant reminder of their sisters’, mothers’ and aunts’ struggle for democracy. This is not to imply that the Mirabal family has directly been pushing for any of the numerous memorials and honors. Rather it was the private work, especially of the surviving sister Dedé Mirabal, to keep the sisters’ memory alive through the Casa Museo Hermanas Mirabal. Additionally, the political careers of two Mirabal children preserve the memory the past in the present and, with it, possibly a feeling of debt among politicians. Jaime David Fernández, son of Dedé, and Minou Tavárez Mirabal, daughter of Minerva, have both been active in Dominican politics for many years and held high-ranking positions in the government. In fact, both served in the first Leonel Fernandez administration from 1996 to 2000, with Minou as Vice Foreign Minister and Jaime David as Vice President. Popular art took up the fate of the women prior to politics and publicized it to people in the Dominican Republic and abroad. Some of the works are based on the life of the Mirabal sisters such as Julia Alvarez’s In the Times of the Butterflies, whereas others refer to them in the context of Dominican history as in Mario Vargas Llosa’s The Feast of the Goat. With increasing knowledge about the Mirabal at the national and international levels, the need for official acknowledgement on part of the Dominican state became necessary. Each of these elements by itself provided the grounds for greater visibility and awareness of the Mirabal sisters, which had a clear impact on the politics of memory from their assassination in 1960. The decision to commemorate the Mirabal so openly and extensively is, in the end, political and it exposes the power of politics in collective memory.

The Metamorphosis of the Politics of Memory Plans to commemorate the Mirabal were promoted slowly in 1981 when, upon the

request of the Dominican delegation at the First Latin American and Caribbean Feminist Encounter, many Latin American countries recognized the sisters regionally as a symbol of the violence committed against womenxxi . The first recognition at the national level appears to be the issuing of a 25 centavos coin with the portrait of the sisters by the Dominican Central Bank between 1983 and 1987 as part of a coin series dedicated to human rightsxxii . The coin circulated during the presidency of Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982-1986) and ended early in the third presidential term of Balaguer (1986-1996). Many years before any public recognition was implemented, one site was already dedicated to the women. The Mirabal family, especially the surviving sister Dedé, dedicated their lives to the preservation of the sisters’ memory when the state kept silent. Since 1965, Dedé maintained the family’s house in which all sisters and their families lived, just as it had been the morning when the women left to visit their imprisoned husbands. People who knew about their political struggles could visit the house, see their personal items and talk to Dedé about their lives and activism. Over the years, more and more people came to visit the house, leading the family to convert it into a museumxxiii . The museum opened to the public in 1994 and Dedé continued to inform visitors about her sisters until her death in 2014. Today, the museum is one of the most frequently visited museums in the country, with 70,160 visitors in 2009xxiv . For many students, a visit to the museum is now an obligatory school trip. In March 1997, the Dominican government acknowledged the Mirabal sisters’ cause with an important national memorial, the renovation of the Santo Domingo obelisk. The 137-foot monument was built in 1937 to commemorate the renaming of Santo Domingo to Ciudad Trujillo by the dictator. The obelisk was painted by artist Dustin Muñoz in honor of the victims of and the resistance against Trujillo in 2011xxv. The pillar has been renamed Alegoría a la libertad and is decorated with the Dominican national flag, four women representing the patria in different forms and three butterflies symbolizing Minerva, Patria and María Teresa as inspired by their Figure 2 – Obelisk Alegoría a la libertad, Santo Domingo

underground name Las Mariposas. The dedication of this monument to the sisters is significant as it strips one of Trujillo’s most emblematic memorials of its original meaning by giving it a new and completely opposite identity. The United Nations offered the mariposas’ tragic story a broader platform and prominence in 1999, when it proclaimed November 25, the anniversary of the death of the Mirabal sisters, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women. However, Resolution 54/134xxvi , which establishes the international observance, does not mention the Mirabal sisters. It sets out the problem of gender based violence and international conventions already adopted to protect women. Only an information note by the Division for the Advancement of Womenxxvii provides information on the origins of this particular date and the history of the Mirabal sisters. However, it is also helpful to keep in mind that the fate of the sisters does not correlate with the intention to raise awareness about the diverse forms of violence against women. While it was their political involvement against Trujillo that ultimately led to their deaths, a gender component was not completely absent. Trujillo was known for being promiscuous and having affairs with countless young and beautiful women. Opposition to his advances was almost impossible considering his despotic rule. When Trujillo met Minerva Mirabal for the first time, before she was actively protesting the dictatorship, he was attracted to her. She, however, defied and rejected his advances — something that Trujillo did not acceptxxviii . He responded with retaliatory measures against Minerva and her family, arresting her father and ruining the family financially. He continued to bear a personal grudge against Minerva over several years and did not allow her to pursue her profession as lawyer despite her graduation with distinction because he oversaw the authorization of any professional and matrimonial registrationxxix . While Minerva and her sisters did represent a contrast to the traditional female image of the Trujillo regime, the principal reason for their assassination was their political opposition and defiance to the regime. In 2000, the remains of the sisters were transferred to their former house and now museum in Conuco. In addition, their graves were declared an extension to the National Pantheon of the Dominican Republicxxx — the burial site of the nation’s most honored personalities — which was an enormous acknowledgement to the memory of the sisters. The next major commemoration act happened in 2007. The second Fernández administration enacted Ley No. 389-07xxxi in another major step to commemorate the Mirabal. The act renames the province Salcedo to Provincia Hermanas Mirabal establishing:

[…] that the town of Ojo de Agua, Salcedo province, was the place where the Mirabal sisters were born and raised, who had the courage to fight for the political freedom of their country, strongly opposing one of the most unrelenting tyrannies ever seen in Latin America, that of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, […] that because of this attitude they were prosecuted, imprisoned several times and finally brutally murdered on 25 November 1960;[…] that the Mirabal sisters today are known as heroines of the Dominican Republic and have been immortalized in poems, novels, art and other facts that bear witness to their persistence; […]2 The legal text emphasizes their braveness in opposing the Trujillo dictatorship despite the danger that their political engagement entailed. Its phrasing is also noteworthy, as it indicates that the Mirabal are today known as national heroes of the country, which demonstrates that their sacrifice had not always been officially recognized. The regime treated the women as criminals and in the decades following their death, and the Dominican state took a long time to officially acknowledge the Mirabal sisters for the courage. Furthermore, the motto of the municipality Salcedo, where the women and their families lived, is “Cuna de las Mariposas”,yet another reference to their code name. At the same time, it reflects the pride felt by the region for their famous and courageous residents. In addition, there are many other memorial sites commemorating the sisters throughout the country that range from murals, an ecopark and a Mirabal route (which visits the places related to the life and work of the sisters) to the ruins of Patria Mirabal’s house in the Jardín Memorialxxxii . Additionally, in the latest series of paper money issued in 2014, the images of the women adorn the front of the 200 peso bill. The reverse side shows the monument dedicated to the Mirabal in their hometown Ojo de Agua, Salcedo.

[…] Que la localidad de Ojo de Agua, provincia Salcedo, fue el lugar que vió nacer y crecer a las Hermanas Mirabal, quienes tuvieron la valentía de luchar por la libertad política de su país, oponiéndose firmemente contra una de las tiranías más férreas que ha tenido latinoamérica, la de Rafael Leonidas Trujillo;[…]: Que debido a esa actitud fueron perseguidas, encarceladas varias veces y finalmente brutalmente asesinadas el 25 de noviembre de 1960;[…] Que las Hermanas Mirabal hoy son conocidas como heroínas de la República Dominicana, han sido inmortalizadas en poemas, novelas, arte y otros hechos que dan fe de su persistencia; […]

Figure 3 – 200 peso bank bill issued in 2014 portraying Patria, Minerva und María Teresa Mirabal

Popular culture has taken up the story of the sisters since early years. Pedro Mir, a highly distinguished Dominican poet, wrote a poem dedicated to the sisters in 1969 called “Amén de Mariposas”, in which he denounced their assassination and the loss for the country. He commenced the poems with the verses: "Cuando supe que habían caído las tres hermanas Mirabal me dije: la sociedad establecida ha muerto.”xxxiii Dominican-American writer Julia Álvarez, influenced by her own family’s history (her father was active in the resistance movement against Trujilloxxxiv ) eternalized the Mirabal in her much-celebrated novel In the Times of the Butterflies, published in 1994. The historical narrative, which recounts the life story of the Mirabal and their struggle against the Trujillo dictatorship, is probably the most famous adaptation. It introduced countless readers in and outside of the Dominican Republic, to the life of the Mirabal. It was later adopted into a movie in 2001. In addition, numerous other movies, documentaries and literary works, such as The Feast of the Goat by Vargas Llosa, have been produced about the sister and many others refer to them. VI.

Conclusion The case of the Mirabal sisters in the Dominican Republic is a paradigmatic example

of politics determining the parts of history that are remembered and the ways in which they are memorialized. At the same time, the case also demonstrates how memory and politics of memory undergo change, or metamorphosis, over time. The legacy of the Mirabal sisters in the Dominican Republic was neglected for several decades on an official level before a revision of history occurred, which was sparked by a fundamental change in the political agenda. The country now encourages the remembrance of the women with numerous honors

and memorials. For many years, the Mirabal family took on the task of preserving the sisters’ memory and telling their story so that today Dominicans and visitors can learn about their activism at the Casa Museo. Keeping their memory alive by opening their former house to the public has also enabled society to get to know Minerva, Patria and María Teresa beyond the national glorification; they were human beings, women with different characters and dreams as well as daughters, sisters, wives and mothers at the time of their death. i

Zerubavel, Eviatar. "Social Memories: Steps To A Sociology Of The Past". Qualitative Sociology 19 (3) (1996): 289, DOI: 10.1007/bf02393273. ii Halbwachs, Maurice. The Collective Memory. (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 51-52. iii Nora, Pierre. "Between Memory And History: Les Lieux De Mémoire". Representations, no. 26 (1989): 9, 19, DOI: 10.2307/2928520. iv Mitchell, Katharyne. "Monuments, Memorials, And The Politics Of Memory". Urban Geography 24 (5) (2003): 443, DOI: 10.2747/0272-3638.24.5.442. v Zerubavel, “Social Memories”, 295. vi Forest, B., & Johnson, J. "Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet–Era Monuments and Post–Soviet National Identity in Moscow". Annals Of The Association Of American Geographers, 92(3) (2002): 524-547, DOI: 10.1111/1467-8306.00303. vii

Mitchel, "Monuments, Memorials, And The Politics Of Memory", 448. Zerubavel, Yael. "The Death Of Memory And The Memory Of Death: Masada And The Holocaust As Historical Metaphors". Representations, no. 45 (1994): 80, 81, DOI: 10.2307/2928603. Zertal, Idith. "From The People's Hall To The Wailing Wall: A Study In Memory, Fear, And War". Representations, no. 69 (2000): 101, 102, DOI: 10.1525/rep.2000.69.1.01p0063x. ix Zerubavel, The Death Of Memory And The Memory Of Death”, 87 Zertal, "From The People's Hall To The Wailing Wall”, 110 x "It's Time For The Truth On The Dictatorship’s Violence, Terror". Dominicantoday.Com. July 1, 2013, http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2013/7/1/48140/Its-time-for-the-Truth-on-the-dictatorships-violence-terror. xi Codename: Butterflies. Film. USA: Cecilia Domeyko, 2009. xii Mirabal, Dedé. Vivas En Su Jardín. (New York: Vintage Español, 2009), 334 xiii Saint-Hilaire hijo, Domingo. "3 Hermanas Mueren Al Precipitarse Jeep A Un Abismo’". El Caribe, November 27, 1960 xiv Codename: Butterflies xv Mirabal, Vivas En Su Jardín, 332 xvi Balcácer, Juan Daniel. Trujillo. (Santo Domingo, República Dominicana: Taurus, Grupo Santillana, 2007), 422-423, 324 Diederich, Bernard. Trujillo. (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Pub, 2000), 71-72 xvii Balcácer, Trujillo, 313 xviii Mirabal, Vivas En Su Jardín, 334 xix Balcácer, Trujillo, 422-423, 324 xx Mirabal, Vivas En Su Jardín, 334 xxi La Red en República Dominicana. "25 De Noviembre De 1960 · 2015: Asesinato De Las Hermanas Mirabal Y Lucha Contra La Violence De Género". Blog. Red Latinoamericana De Sitios De Memoria. 2015 https://redlatinoamericanadesitiosdememoria.wordpress.com/2015/11/25/republica-dominicana-el-caso-de-las-hermanasmirabal/. xxii "25 Centavos Serie Cuna De Los Derechos Humanos. Republica Dominicana". Accessed April 29, 2017 http://miguelnumismaticaymas.blogspot.com/2011/05/25-centavos-serie-cuna-de-los-derechos.html. xxiii Mirabal, Vivas En Su Jardín, 314, 317 xxiv Santana, Wendy. "Museo A Las Mirabal Es El Más Concurrido". Listin Diario. May 16, 2010 http://www.listindiario.com/la-republica/2010/05/16/142113/museo-a-las-mirabal-es-el-mas-concurrido. xxv Medrano, Néstor. "Honran A Las Mirabal Con Gran Mural En Obelisco Del Malecón". Listindiario.Com. July 27, 2011 http://www.listindiario.com/la-republica/2011/07/27/197432/honran-a-las-mirabal-con-gran-mural-en-obelisco-del-malecon. xxvi Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. 54/134. Día Internacional De La Eliminación De La Violencia Contra La Mujer. New York: Naciones Unidas. 1999. xxvii Division for the Advancement of Women of the United Nations. 2017. Information Note - International Day For The Elimination Of Violence Against Women. New York: United Nations. xxviii Codename: Butterflies Robinson, Nancy. "Women's Political Participation In The Dominican Republic: The Case Of The Mirabal Sisters". Caribbean Quarterly 52 (2-3) (2006): 176, 177, DOI:10.1080/00086495.2006.11829706. xxix Codename: Butterflies Robinson, "Women's Political Participation In The Dominican Republic”, 176, 177 xxx Mirabal, Vivas En Su Jardín, 336 xxxi Consultoría Jurídica del Poder Ejecutivo. Actos Del Poder Legislativo. Santo Domingo de Guzmán, D. N., República Dominicana: Gaceta Oficial, 2007, 7. viii

xxxii

Blackmore, Lisa. "Violence In The Jardín De (La) Patria: The Monumentalisation Of The Mirabal Sisters And The Trauma Site In The Dominican Postdictatorship". Mitologías Hoy 12 (2015): 101, 109-110, DOI:10.5565/rev/mitologias.277. xxxiii Mir, Pedro. Amén De Mariposas. Poem. 1969. Accessed: http://www.jmarcano.com/poesia/poetamp/pmir5.html. xxxiv Vizcaya, Marta. "Julia Álvarez’S In The Time Of The Butterflies And In The Name Of Salomé: Re-Membering Dominican Heroines In New Novelistic Contexts". Powerlines 1 (1) (2002). http://userwww.sfsu.edu/clsa/portals/power_lines_2002/vizcaya.html.

Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. 54/134. Día Internacional De La Eliminación De La Violencia Contra La Mujer. New York: Naciones Unidas, 1999. Balcácer, Juan Daniel. Trujillo. 1st ed. Santo Domingo, República Dominicana: Taurus, Grupo Santillana, 2007. Blackmore, Lisa. "Violence In The Jardín De (La) Patria: The Monumentalisation Of The Mirabal Sisters And The Trauma Site In The Dominican Postdictatorship". Mitologías Hoy 12 (2015) doi:10.5565/rev/mitologias.277. Cassá, Roberto. Heroínas Nacionales. República Dominicana: Archivo General de la Nación, 2007. Codename: Butterflies. Film. USA: Cecilia Domeyko, 2009. Consultoría Jurídica del Poder Ejecutivo. Actos Del Poder Legislativo. Santo Domingo de Guzmán, D. N., República Dominicana: Gaceta Oficial, 2007. Diederich, Bernard. Trujillo. Princeton, N.J.: Markus Wiener Pub, 2000. Division for the Advancement of Women of the United Nations. Information Note - International Day For The Elimination Of Violence Against Women. New York: United Nations. Forest, Benjamin, and Juliet Johnson. "Unraveling The Threads Of History: Soviet–Era Monuments And Post–Soviet National Identity In Moscow". Annals Of The Association Of American Geographers 92 (3) (2002).: 524-547. doi:10.1111/1467-8306.00303. Galván, William. Minerva Mirabal. Santo Domingo, República Dominicana: Editora de la UASD, 1985. Halbwachs, Maurice. The Collective Memory. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. "It's Time For The Truth On The Dictatorship’s Violence, Terror". Dominicantoday.Com. July 1, 2013, http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2013/7/1/48140/Its-time-for-the-Truth-on-thedictatorships-violence-terror. La Red en República Dominicana. "25 De Noviembre De 1960 · 2015: Asesinato De Las Hermanas Mirabal Y Lucha Contra La Violence De Género". Blog. Red Latinoamericana De Sitios De Memoria, 2015 https://redlatinoamericanadesitiosdememoria.wordpress.com/2015/11/25/republica-dominicanael-caso-de-las-hermanas-mirabal/. Medrano, Néstor. "Honran A Las Mirabal Con Gran Mural En Obelisco Del Malecón". Listindiario.Com. July 27, 2011 http://www.listindiario.com/larepublica/2011/07/27/197432/honran-a-las-mirabal-con-gran-mural-en-obelisco-del-malecon. Mir, Pedro. Amén De Mariposas. Poem, 1969. http://www.jmarcano.com/poesia/poetamp/pmir5.html. Mirabal, Dedé. Vivas En Su Jardín. New York: Vintage Español, 2009. Mitchell, Katharyne. "Monuments, Memorials, And The Politics Of Memory". Urban Geography 24 (5) (2003): 442-459. doi:10.2747/0272-3638.24.5.442.

Nora, Pierre. "Between Memory And History: Les Lieux De Mémoire". Representations, no. 26 (1989): 7-24. doi:10.2307/2928520. Robinson, Nancy. "Women's Political Participation In The Dominican Republic: The Case Of The Mirabal Sisters". Caribbean Quarterly 52 (2-3) (2006): 172-183. doi:10.1080/00086495.2006.11829706. Saint-Hilaire hijo, Domingo. "3 Hermanas Mueren Al Precipitarse Jeep A Un Abismo’". El Caribe, November 27, 1960 Santana, Wendy. "Museo A Las Mirabal Es El Más Concurrido". Listin Diario. May 16, 2010 http://www.listindiario.com/la-republica/2010/05/16/142113/museo-a-las-mirabal-es-el-masconcurrido. Vizcaya, Marta. "Julia Álvarez’S In The Time Of The Butterflies And In The Name Of Salomé: ReMembering Dominican Heroines In New Novelistic Contexts". Powerlines 1 (1) (2002). http://userwww.sfsu.edu/clsa/portals/power_lines_2002/vizcaya.html. Zertal, Idith. 2000. "From The People's Hall To The Wailing Wall: A Study In Memory, Fear, And War". Representations 69 (1): 96-126. doi:10.1525/rep.2000.69.1.01p0063x. Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1996. "Social Memories: Steps To A Sociology Of The Past". Qualitative Sociology 19 (3): 283-299. doi:10.1007/bf02393273. Zerubavel, Yael. 1994. "The Death Of Memory And The Memory Of Death: Masada And The Holocaust As Historical Metaphors". Representations, no. 45: 72-100. doi:10.2307/2928603. "25 Centavos Serie Cuna De Los Derechos Humanos. Republica Dominicana". Accessed April 29, 2017 http://miguel-numismaticaymas.blogspot.com/2011/05/25-centavos-serie-cuna-de-losderechos.html.

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