Américas Volume X

américas The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies

VOLUME X

Américas The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies Volume X 2021

Published By The Johns Hopkins University Program in Latin American Studies Baltimore, Maryland

Américas: The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies, was established in 2005 by students and faculty at the Johns Hopkins University under the endorsement of the Program in Latin American Studies. Our mission is to provide a multi-disciplinary form for students and scholars to present and discuss articles pertaining to Latin America, its issues and its diaspora.

Our website is available at http://americasjhu.org

Américas: The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies Published by The Johns Hopkins University Program in Latin American Studies 3400 N. Charles St. Baltimore, MD 21218 United States of America

table of contents Acknowledgement and Journal Staff………………………………………..........................................……….1 Letter from Editor in Chief……………………………………………...……….......................................................2 Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s Emily Sanchez………….......…………………………………..……….......................................................……………….3 Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle Jordi Amaral….………….....……………………………………........................................................…………………...28 Trash, Tools or Belongings?: Views of Material along the Mexico-U.S. Border Ian Rice……….………………........….………………………........................................................……………………….57 No Más Bebés: Puerto Rican Women as “Misfits” in the Experimentation and Exploitation of Population, Fertility, and Birth Control Paige Skaff.………………………………………………………........................................................…………....……...69 Democracy or Dictatorship? Juan Manuel de Rosas and English-speaking Perspectives of the River Plate, 1816 – 1852 Kevin Ramsey………………………………………........................................................……………..…....……….……91 Lenin Moreno’s Path to the Middle: An Institutional Development Model for Ecuador Felipe Deidan….…….…………………………........................................................………………………....…...….…119 Access to Healthcare and Health Services in Puerto Rico Following Landfall of Hurricane Maria Andrea Newman-Rivera…………………......................................................………………………….……........135 About the Authors…………………………………....................................................…………………………....….151

Acknowledgement We would like to thank our talented group of editors for investing their time and attention into each piece. Without them, this publication would not have been possible. Volume X is our first edition completed entirely remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and we applaud their commitment and effort in this challenging year. We would also like to thank our contributing authors, who worked closely with the Américas staff over a period of several weeks to ensure their work was of the highest caliber. Finally, thank you to the Johns Hopkins Program in Latin American Studies for its financial and programmatic support during the publication process.

Journal Staff Editor in Chief

Gabriela Hubner

Director of Marketing

Stephanie Ruiz Torres

Editing Team

Nichole Calvin Noelle Curtis Claire Goudreau Melanie Pillaca-Gutierrez Sabrina Rainsbury

Cover Image

Antonio Berni, Demonstration (Manifestación), 1934, Latin American Art Museum of Buenos Aires (MALBA)

Faculty Advisor

Eduardo González

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Letter from the Editor in Chief Dear Readers, This year, I am proud to present you the tenth volume of Américas: The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies, the first Américas edition completed entirely virtually. Despite the many challenges this year posed, our editorial team has remained committed to amplifying young voices and publishing the incredible work produced by students on issues pertaining to Latin America. In a year of record submissions, we have chosen a unique set of pieces addressing challenging topics such as civil unrest, immigration, natural disasters and colonial eugenics.

This edition begins with a piece by Emily Sanchez on the emancipation of Afro-Peruvians in the 1850s, exploring the experience of abolition and the emergence of resistance movements in Peru.

From racial identity in Peru, we move to civil unrest and migration in the Northern Triangle. Jordi Amaral explores policy recommendations in the face of rampant corruption and impunity in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, and argues for the strengthening of judicial systems. Ian Rice sheds light on the dangerous journey immigrants take into the U.S. through the lens of discarded objects left behind at the border and calls on the reader to view these as tools and belongings as opposed to trash. We then shift gears to a history of exploitation through forced sterilization and birth control of Puerto Rican women. Paige Skaff argues that the United States has practiced eugenics on the Puerto Rican population as a form of culture eradication. Moving south to Argentina, Kevin Ramsey explores the complicated legacy of Juan Manuel de Rosas through the examination of American and British perceptions, shedding light on Rosas’ diplomatic impact. Felipe Deidan offers a perspective on Ecuador’s development model across different political administrations and identifies a need for an Institutional Development Model centered on institutions. In our last piece, Andrea Newman-Rivera explores access to healthcare in Puerto Rico after hurricane Maria and presents her own interviews with local residents as evidence.

This edition of Américas is about danger, safety and conflict. By exploring complex matters such as racial identity, civil unrest, institutional failures and unequal healthcare access, our authors shed light on the Latin America lived experience. We are proud to present these issues here, in such interesting and timely pieces.

This journal would not have been possible without the generous dedication of our six editors. I am so grateful to have worked with each of them this year. Many thanks also to our contributors, who worked diligently with us throughout the editorial process. This year, we publish work by dedicated young scholars from the George Washington University, Princeton University, Otterbein University, the Johns Hopkins University and Pacific Lutheran University. We hope you enjoy reading their work as much as we did.

Best, Gabriela Hubner Editor in Chief May 2021

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Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s

By Emily Sanchez Introduction On a Sunday of January 1855, five formerly enslaved Afro-Peruvians, Muaricio, Torivio, Gervasio, Gabriel Asin, and Francisco Chavarria gathered as a family to spend their day of rest together and celebrate the emancipation decree announced by President Ramón Castilla just two months prior.1 During their reunion, the Asin and Chavarria families heard a knock on their door.

It was corporal Manuel Piol. They were confused by his visit because they offended no one during their family gathering and it was still early in the day. However, within a matter of minutes, they learned that Corporal Piol was there to arrest the five men for allegedly making weapons for use against the police. 2 Corporal Piol transported them to the Intendencia, escorted by a group of ten armed soldiers. Once at the Intendencia, Commander Barquero ordered the whipping of Muaricio, Torivio, Gervasio, Gabriel Asin, and Francisco Chavarria without any evidence of the crime they were charged with.

The Asin and Chavarria family later wrote a letter to President Ramón Castilla detailing this experience with state authorities and published it in the national liberal newspaper of the 1850s, El Comercio. While urging the President to punish both Corporal Piol and Commander Barquero, they challenged the vision of emancipation the state had for Afro-Peruvians.3 The letter signed by Muaricio, Torivio, Gervasio, Gabriel Asin, and Francisco Chavarria foreshadowed the

1

Peter Blanchard, Slavery & Abolition in Early Republican Peru (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1992), 195.; Castilla announced the emancipation decree on December 3, 1855.; Although the term "Afro-Peruvians" was not used in nineteenth century Peru, this paper will use the term to refer to Peruvians of African descent.

2 “Clamor al excelentísimo señor,” El Comercio, February 11, 1855.

3 In this paper, “emancipation” refers to the social and political lives of enslaved Afro-Peruvians after receiving freedom.

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Emily Sanchez ongoing struggle of Afro-Peruvians to establish their meaning of emancipation and place it at the forefront, in the face of the state, liberal press, and conservative rebels.

Just weeks before this incident, Peru had ended the first of its two civil wars in the 1850s.

The first civil war pitted President José Rufino Echenique against liberal rebels. During the Echenique presidency, many prominent liberals, such as Domingo Elias Carbajo, criticized his administration and charged him with corruption. Elias Carbajo and Ramón Castilla organized a rebellion against the Echenique administration in early 1854, and in April of the same year, the rebels named Ramón Castilla provisional president of Peru.4 Under this position, Castilla announced the abolition of slavery in the country on December 3, 1854.5 Castilla officially claimed victory over the Echenique administration on January 7, 1855, after having won the Battle of Palma.6 It was after this battle that the Asin and Chavarria family gathered together and celebrated emancipation. Just a year after their reunion, Echenique along with conservative General Manuel Ignacio de Vivanco started a rebellion against the Castilla administration, with one of its principal goals being the reinstitution of slavery. This second civil war ended in March of 1858 when military troops ordered by Castilla defeated conservative forces in Arequipa.

As of now, historians understand the 1850s in Peruvian national history as a decade consumed by civil wars between the liberal and conversative elite leaders of the nation. In Historia de la República del Perú, Jorge Basarde acknowledges the civil wars of the 1850s between Generals Ramón Castilla, Rufino Echenique, and Manuel Ignacio de Vivanco, but does not discuss the place of Afro-Peruvians within these wars or the national society.7 Scholar of Peruvian national

4

Jeffrey S. Dixon and Meredith Reid Sarkees, A Guide to Intra-State Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816–2014 (California: Thousand Oaks, 2016), Chapter 4, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452234205.

5 Blanchard, Slavery & Abolition in Early Republican Peru, 195.

6 Dixon and Reid Sarkees, A Guide to Intra-State Wars, Chapter 4, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452234205.

7 Jorge Basadre, Historia de la República del Perú, 1822-1933 (Editorial Universitaria, 1983), x.

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Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s identity-building, Brooke Larson, explains that these wars and the following civil codes undermined the political rights and citizenry of Indians in the nation. Ultimately, Larson argues that by the late nineteenth century, Peru was divided into two different republics: one republic of the “white, coastal, and modern” region, and another republic of the “Indian, mountainous, and backwards” region.8 In doing so, Larson excludes Afro-Peruvians. This historiography fails to include another important struggle happening in the middle of the wars of the 1850s — the mobilization of Afro-Peruvians to define the meaning of their emancipation for themselves, the press, and state.

Additionally, scholars of Afro-Latin American studies have yet to address the presence of Afro-Peruvians in nineteenth-century Peru. The definition of Afro-Latin America explains the silence within this scholarship. Anani Dzidzienyo and Pierre-Michel Fontaine used the term "AfroLatin America" first in the late 1970s and established that countries part of "Afro-Latin America" must have a "significant" population of people with known African ancestry.9 Although Fontaine did not specify "significant" quantitatively, George Reid Andrews does so in his book Afro-Latin America, published in 2004. According to Reid Andrews, "significant" means five percent or greater.10 The population of people with known African ancestry in Peru was more than five percent in the nineteenth century but dropped in the following decades partly because Black people had lower life expectancies and higher death rates than whites, but also because people who identified as "Black" declined over the years.11 Even though Peru does not fit the definition of Afro-Latin America today, Afro-Peruvians are present in the country and make up a large portion

8

Brooke Larson, Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 150.

9 George Reid Andrews, Afro-Latin America, 1800-2000 (Oxford University Press, 2004), 3-4.

10 Ibid, 4.

11 Ibid, xii, 5.

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Emily Sanchez of the population of coastal states, such as Ica.12 Afro-Peruvian organizations, like Ashanti Peru, have coordinated several national projects advocating for recognition of the human rights and citizenship of Afro-Peruvians today.13 In order to understand the activism of Afro-Peruvians in present-day Peru, scholars must investigate how Afro-Peruvians in the nineteenth century experienced abolition and created movements of resistance and defiance against restrictive definitions of emancipation.

This paper aims to address this gap in scholarship by exploring how Afro-Peruvians envisioned their own participation in the Peruvian national community as citizens from 1854-1857 through an analysis of El Comercio newspaper articles. Manuel Amunátegui and Alejandro Villota founded El Comercio, based in Lima, in 1839. They were members of the Chilean and Argentinian creole elite, respectively. Although born outside of the nation, both of them led most of their lives in Peru and were influenced by liberal politics.14 With Amunátegui and Villota as the main editors, El Comercio became known as the main platform to communicate "sound" ideas and opinions that interested the nation by the late 1840s. Guided by the scholarship of Saidiya Hartman, I critically engage the work of El Comercio editors in order to understand how Afro-Peruvians envisioned their own emancipation and participation.15

12

Ibid, 5. “¿Quiénes Somos? – ASHANTI PERÚ,” accessed December 1, 2020, https://ashantiperu.org/quienes-somos/.; “Quienes Somos,” LUNDU Centro de Estudios y Promoción Afroperuanos, accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.lundu.org/quienes-somos.html.; “Presencia Y Palabra: Mujeres Afroperuanas,” accessed December 1, 2020, https://www.facebook.com/presenciaypalabra/.; LUNDU and Presencia y Palabras: Mujeres Afroperuanas are two other activist, Afro-Peruvian organizations. The first organization, LUNDU, focuses on developing programs, laws, and policies that center African descendants in Peru. In addition, the second organization, Presencia y Palabras, aims to create spaces for “dialogue, actions, and reconnection” between Afro-Peruvian women.

14 Juan Gargurevich, Historia de la prensa peruana, 1594-1990 (Lima: La Voz, 1991), 67, https://catalog.princeton.edu/catalog/741428.; Héctor López Martínez, Los 150 años de el Comercio, 1839-1989 (Edición de “El Comercio,” 1989), 16-17, 60.; In this case, “liberal” does not mean that the newspaper stood for racial equality, but rather advocated for a gradual form of emancipation.

15 Saidiya Hartman, “Venus in Two Acts,” Small Axe 12, no. 2 (July 17, 2008), 11-12.; In “Venus in Two Acts,” scholar Saidiya Hartman discusses how historians can begin to address the silence in the archives of enslaved peoples and imagine their lives and “what cannot be verified.” She challenges researchers to “speculate arguments” 13

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Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s This paper will begin by looking at reports of Afro-Peruvians seeking freedom and positions in government before December of 1854. These reports demonstrate that Afro-Peruvians began defying proposed limitations of the state and liberal press over their freedom before the abolition of slavery. I will then revisit the 1855 letter of the Asin and Chavarria family and explore the continuation of Black activism in the months after abolition. The Asin and Chavarria family make it clear that state-centered abolition did not align with and endangered the vision of emancipation Afro-Peruvians had for themselves. A last set of articles, from 1856-57, discusses the ways in which Afro-Peruvians fought against the reinstitution of slavery and for the Castilla administration on the battlefields. The documented actions of Afro-Peruvians within these articles suggest that, by 1857, they had mobilized themselves to advocate for a multi-faceted emancipation, including legal protection from the state, and ultimately, respect of their humanity and status as citizens in the national society. Although Afro-Peruvians and the liberal press viewed the first as supporters of the presidency of Ramón Castilla from 1855-1857, both diverged in their positions regarding the meaning of emancipation.

Defining Emancipation on the Eve of Abolition In the months leading up to the abolition of slavery in Peru, Afro-Peruvians advocated for their place in Peruvian national society as active political members. While attempting to make their envisioned freedom a reality, Afro-Peruvians faced direct opposition and violence from state authorities. In 1853, Evaristo Urrutia asked for the price of his freedom from his owner, Nicolás Pruneda. One of Urrutia’s countrymen had given him money to purchase his freedom after Urrutia

based on secondary sources and the primary evidence. In this paper, I read both with and against the grain of the El Comercio archive to understand how Afro-Peruvians envisioned emancipation in the years following abolition.

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Emily Sanchez had injured himself at a bakery and could no longer work.16 Since Pruneda refused to give Urrutia the price for his manumission, Urrutia took his case to court, and advocated for his own right to freedom.17 He had not accepted Pruneda’s refusal to inform him of the cost for his manumission.

Despite Urrutia’s efforts to gain his freedom, state authorities saw him as someone who must remain without agency over his body and actions. Specifically, by March 1854, the case had been “mysteriously” appealed to the Superior Court of Lima, which consequently delayed a decision on the case, extending Urrutia’s status as an enslaved person.18 Moreover, in March, Pruneda had temporarily given Urrutia to Colonel Felipe Rivas.19 On the 24th, Rivas ordered his soldiers to tie Urrutia up and place him on a cross in a public square. Later, these same soldiers imprisoned Urrutia in the barracks of the Colegio Real and prohibited any of his family members from visiting him.20 This combination of violent torture and subsequent lack of action from the court suggests that state authorities of Peru, under the administration of Echenique, envisioned enslaved Afro-Peruvians as people who must remain enslaved, and therefore, should be punished for pursuing their freedom.

In contrast to state authorities, the author who published the experience of Evaristo Urrutia in El Comercio expressed disagreement with the actions of Colonel Rivas. First, the author titled his report on the case, “Horrible Attack Committed by [...] Coronel Felipe Rivas,” and thereby recognized Urrutia’s torture as unnecessary and unjust.21 Moreover, the author said that Rivas had "so much money with which he could buy the magistrates," suggesting that he was wealthy enough

16

“Atentado horroroso cometido por el mum-plus ultra Sr. Coronel Felipe Rivas,” El Comercio, May 26, 1854.; “Countrymen” is quoted from the newspaper article and refers to someone who was most likely also Afro-Peruvian.

Although the newspaper did not say whether or not Evaristo was African-born, in the case that he was, “countrymen” might have referred to someone who was from the same region of Africa as Evaristo.

17 “Atentado horroroso cometido por el mum-plus ultra Sr. Coronel Felipe Rivas,” El Comercio, May 26, 1854.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

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Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s to bribe the courts in his favor.22 Perhaps Rivas had bribed the court to "mysteriously" move the case to the superior court of Lima and, consequently, extended the enslavement of Urrutia on purpose. This statement also implies that Rivas had enough influence on judicial authorities to make them purposefully ignore his use of torture. The reference to Rivas's actions as a "horrible attack" and acknowledgement of his bribery communicate that El Comercio disapproved of the illicit lengthening of Urrutia's enslavement. However, this disapproval does not mean that the liberal press supported all paths to emancipation, particularly those outside of the legal system, that Afro-Peruvians pursued for themselves.

Enslaved Afro-Peruvians who resisted their enslavement and found their freedom outside of the legal system faced precarious situations as well. As Carlos Aguirre explains, not all enslaved Afro-Peruvians had a personal network like that of Urrutia, which would facilitate access to legal ways of finding freedom.23 Due to Urrutia's connection to a friend who could lend him money, Urrutia was able to ask for his manumission and dispute his case in court.24 Many enslaved AfroPeruvians who did not have channels to legal emancipation ran away from their slaveholders and lived their life on the margins of society.25 This decision to escape was a difficult one to make because they would have to relocate to somewhere far away from their slaveholder in order to avoid capture. Cimarrones, enslaved Afro-Peruvians who ran away, escaped into areas that were completely unfamiliar to them and left behind family and friends, who they would possibly never see again.26 Once having escaped, cimarrones would have to live in fear of being killed at any moment or being captured and sold into slavery.27 Enslaved Afro-Peruvians who gained 22

Ibid.

Carlos Aguirre, Agentes de su propia libertad: Los esclavos de Lima y la desintegración de la esclavitud : 18211854, 1. ed (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Fondo Editorial, 1993), 246.

24 “Atentado horroroso cometido por el mum-plus ultra Sr. Coronel Felipe Rivas,” El Comercio, May 26, 1854.

25 Aguirre, Agentes de su propia libertad, 246.

26 Ibid, 252.

27 Ibid, 247.

23

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Emily Sanchez manumission through the legal system would have legal protection from re-enslavement, but cimarrones did not. The state pushed cimarrones into the margins of society and made them live precariously because they did not seek their emancipation legally.

The liberal press also contributed to the unstable nature of the lives of cimarrones. As Aguirre highlights in his scholarship, El Comercio accepted fugitive slave ads from slaveholders before December of 1854.28 El Comercio published three fugitive slave ads in less than a month after their report on Evaristo Urrutia,29 conveying that the liberal press did not support all paths to emancipation. They disapproved of Afro-Peruvians who sought ways to freedom outside the purview of the state. Through these ads, El Comercio elevated the possibilities of capture, and therefore, further pushed cimarrones into the margins of society. The publication of fugitive slave ads defended the institution of slavery and reaffirmed the power of slaveholders, ultimately invalidating the paths cimarrones had been taking to freedom. Although El Comercio supported the legal manumission of Evaristo Urrutia, it starkly opposed Afro-Peruvian agency in determining the terms of emancipation.

In 1854, Afro-Peruvian individuals began to advocate for a kind of emancipation that encompassed political leadership. According to an El Comercio article from February, an unnamed Afro-Peruvian was running for a local office in the Huancavelica region.30 This person viewed himself as a leader within the nation. However, the liberal press opposed Black political participation.

Particularly, El Comercio disagreed with the idea of granting freed people political rights because it would lead to the possibility of Black people holding positions in government. For

28

Aguirre, Agentes de su propia libertad, 251.

“Ojo,” El Comercio, June 17, 1854.; "Viente y cinco pesos de gratificación," El Comercio, June 17, 1854.; “Dos onzas de oro de gratificación,” El Comercio, June 20, 1854.

30 “Huancavelica - Cura Palomino, Juez Valdiva,” El Comercio, February 14, 1854.

29

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Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s example, in reaction to the abolition of slavery in Ecuador, an El Comercio article stated that slavery was “abusive,” and “barbaric,” but ultimately warned Ecuador that the emancipation of enslaved peoples would endanger the political stability of the society.31 The author first said in reference to the emancipation of enslaved Black Ecuadorians, “no está el bien en soltar derepente á la plaza los tigres que se han enjualados.”32 This image of caged tigers entering public spaces suggested that formerly enslaved Black people would threaten the stability of the country and create chaos.33 The author then said that by emancipating enslaved peoples, and granting them citizenship, including all civil and political rights, a Black person could become President or Minister,34 and thus further specified the future instability and chaos as political. Ultimately, the author’s initial disagreement with the immorality of slavery and fear of viewing a Black person in a position of power communicates that the emancipation of enslaved Black people in Peru was acceptable to the liberal press as long as they did not have access to the right of holding political offices.

The lives of cimarrones and the aforementioned aspiring Afro-Peruvian politician demonstrate that Afro-Peruvians disagreed with the liberal press about the meanings of emancipation even before abolition in late 1854. Afro-Peruvians without the networks and means to seek manumission legally continued to escape from their slaveholders, while El Comercio published fugitive slave ads. On the eve of abolition, free Afro-Peruvians were already fighting

31

“Ecuador,” El Comercio, April 22, 1854.

Ibid.

33 Reid Andrews, Afro-Latin America, 102. Moreover, many cities across Latin America in the nineteenth century had “public order” statutes, which “tightened restrictions on black street dances and other public festivities.” Reid Andrews explains that the police force in Lima had asked artisan guilds to help “discipline … and control Lima’s unruly and frightening dark-skinned plebes.” This animalization and criminalization of black people was part of the larger nineteenth-century racist discourse and was a manner to communicate that black people were an inferior race, and thus, unfit for freedom. I would like to thank Professor Mota for suggesting that I make a connection to this larger racist discourse 34 “Ecuador,” El Comercio, April 22, 1854.

32

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Emily Sanchez for their incorporation into national society as citizens with civil and political rights. They were advocating for a definition of emancipation that would affirm their leadership in the nation, while El Comercio argued otherwise. This divergence on the meaning of emancipation would continue and amplify in the years following the abolition of slavery in Peru.

Directing the Mobilization of Afro-Peruvians: At Home or on the Battlefields At Home Afro-Peruvians continued advocating for an emancipation that encompassed civil and political rights well after the abolition of slavery on December 3, 1854. As the case of the Asin and Chavarria family demonstrates, formerly enslaved Afro-Peruvians viewed themselves as supporters of the Castilla administration, but also advocated against the continued violence they faced from the state in January of 1855. The Asin and Chavarria family began their letter, addressed to President Ramón Castilla, by introducing themselves and recounting the morning before their arrest: Muaricio, Torivio, Gervasio, y Gabriel Asin, y Francisco Chavarria, esclavos que fuimos de la hacienda de este señor Asin, á V. E. clamamos para que se digne oir nuestra suplica. Señor Excmo., El proximo Domingo que acabó de vuelta de toros hemos venido con nuestra familia para nuestra casa y estando en ella reunidos divirtiendonos con orden y regularidad, celebrando el exito de la campaña de la Palma, [illegible], a V.E. de rato en rato como nuestro libertador y por quien disfrutamos.35

By emphasizing their celebration of Castilla’s victory at the Battle of Palma, naming him a “liberator,” and publishing this letter in a national newspaper, Muaricio, Torivio, Gervasio, and Gabriel Asin and Francisco Chavarria inserted themselves within the national discourse and expressed support for the Castilla administration.36 However, this support for the Castilla

35

“Clamor al excelentísimo señor,” El Comercio, February 11, 1855.

Aguirre, Agentes de su propia libertad, 244.; For clarification, the use of “liberator” in this piece demonstrates support for Castilla, but does not necessarily communicate that Afro-Peruvians viewed Castilla as the cause of abolition and their freedom. Historians, such as Carlos Aguirre, have emphasized the role of Afro-Peruvians in

36

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Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s administration did not mean that the family did not face restrictive definitions of their emancipation. In particular, this introduction implies that the Asin and Chavarria family were facing surveillance from their local authorities. They specified that they were celebrating with "order and normalcy." Thus, it seems that their local police had already been monitoring their actions and perhaps were attempting to track moments of "disorderly conduct" to punish them.

Ultimately, the Asin and Chavarria family, formerly enslaved Afro-Peruvians, could celebrate together, but had to do so without creating the slightest public disturbance in order to avoid any state retribution. As conveyed in the following excerpt, this good behavior was not enough on that Sunday morning: Cantando el sereno las diez en punto se nos presentó en la sala un cabo o teniente de serenos ordenandonos cesase nuestra diversion [sic], y porque repusimos que todavía era temprano, y en nuestra casa sin ofender á nadie, nos hizo salir al patio, y haciendo entrar una partida de 10 hombres de tropa armada que comandaba nos metieron en el centro como á unos criminales andando por las calles hasta llegar a Santa Catalina [...] y de ahí nos condujo á la Intendencia donde para criminarnos, y salvar su atropellamiento dijo al comandante de serenos, que eramos unos escandalosos y que habíamos hecho armas contra la comitiva que manda.37

As Muaricio, Torivio, Gervasio, and Gabriel Asin and Francisco Chavarria explained above, at ten o'clock, a corporal asked the family to stop their celebration, even though it was still early in the day and they had not bothered anyone. This corporal then asked them to exit their house and forced them to travel to the Intendencia as "criminals," meaning mostly likely in chains, and waited until their arrival at the Intendencia to mention their crime — they had allegedly created weapons for use against the police. The abrupt stop of their celebration and subsequent criminalization of the Asin and Chavarria family suggests that the state feared gatherings of AfroPeruvians because they would possibly create commotion and endanger the state itself. Contrary

bringing about the abolition of 1854. In particular, Aguirre argues that cimarrones challenged the power of slaveholders and ultimately weakened the institution of slavery in the country.

37 “Clamor al excelentísimo señor,” El Comercio, February 11, 1855.

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Emily Sanchez to this perspective, the Asin and Chavarria family envisioned an emancipation that included not just the right to celebrate without state intervention, but also included recognition of their status as citizens with rights and legal protection: En esta virtud Señor Excelentisimo ya no tenemos amo que hable por nosotros, un mas amparo que Dios, y V. E., pues asi como nos ha dado la libertad sacandonos de la triste esclavitud en que viviamos, esperamos que sabe lor que V. E. sea de esta crueldad, que se ha hecho con nosotros no dejará impune el castigo que merece Manuel Piol comandante de la partida, y el señor Barquero comandante de serenos por la ligereza en el obrar — asi los esperamos de la rectitud de V. E.38

In the excerpt above, Muaricio, Torivio, Gervasio, and Gabriel Asin and Francisco Chavarria express that they have not received protection from the state or any authority since the abolition of slavery. More specifically, they found themselves having less protection from the state as freed people than compared to the protection they received as enslaved people and legal property of their slaveholder. They demanded that President Ramón Castilla punish Corporal Piol and Commander Barquero, and were also suggesting that the President clarify and protect the position of Afro-Peruvians as citizens with legal protection and the right to gather. This letter advocated for mobilization against state violence and urged the president to act. Most importantly, the Asin and Chavarria family were making public their vision of emancipation to the President and readers of the liberal El Comercio newspaper: their emancipation encompassed political rights and legal protection, rather than violence, from state authorities.

Although Muaricio, Torivio, Gervasio, and Gabriel Asin and Francisco Chavarria wrote the letter, the way El Comercio published it conveys doubt on the vision of emancipation of the family. In particular, the editors did not include a prefatory comment for this letter.39 Usually, letters within El Comercio were preceded by a small paragraph introducing the authors, addressee,

38

“Clamor al excelentísimo señor,” El Comercio, February 11, 1855.; In the letter, the five men specified that after Corporal Piol had arrested them, Commander Barquero ordered his officers to whip them without any evidence suggesting that the Asin and Chavarria family had participated in the creation of weapons.

39 Ibid.

14

Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s and concern raised within the piece.40 This silence accompanying the piece suggests that the editors felt discomfort with the demands of the Asin and Chavarria family, and thus communicates that the liberal press had challenged the activism of Afro-Peruvians urging for protection from the state, rather than violence. In other words, the liberal press did not approve of the open mobilization of Afro-Peruvians for meaningful freedom.41 As the possibilities of Afro-Peruvian activism expanded, El Comercio’s disapproval began to manifest itself as fear in the following year.

On the Battlefields Later in 1856, the liberal press promoted an image of Afro-Peruvians as specific types of supporters — as defenders — of the Castilla administration. This circulation of “defender” images occurred in the same year when General Vivanco initiated a conservative rebellion and planned to create a new constitution for Peru that would reinstitute slavery. On April 12, 1856, in response to the most recent publication of the El Heraldo newspaper, which had suggested that the Castilla administration “destroy itself,” and had recommended the installation of a government that would retract emancipation, an El Comercio editor claimed that Afro-Peruvians thought, “Este periódico ataca al Gobierno, lo hiere con teson, por lo tanto, si nosotros herimos al que hiere al Gobierno, este no puede castigarnos, luego tenemos impunidad para destrozar al papel que desea nuestra esclavitud.’”42 The editor implied that if El Heraldo continued to publish articles that promoted 40

“Carta a los negros manumisos,” El Comercio, December 12, 1856.; “Nuevo Atentado Cometido,” El Comercio, April 3, 1854.; “Cañete,” El Comercio, January 11, 1854.; Look at “Carta a los Negros Manumisos,” “Nuevo Atentado Cometido,” “Cañete.” For each of these letters, either the editor of El Comercio or the author of the letters themselves wrote a prefatory comment explaining to whom the letter was addressed and the issues presented in the letters.

41 Aguirre, Agentes de su propia libertad, 253.; Carlos Aguirre explains that before December of 1854, AfroPeruvian cimarrones were living on the margins of society because they were resisting a system that defended slavery. The Echenique administration had been protecting the institution of slavery. This letter of the Asin and Chavarria family and its publication in El Comercio demonstrate that the state and liberal press transitioned from explicitly defending the slavery to defending a restricted vision of emancipation for formerly enslaved AfroPeruvians.

42 “El Heraldo de Lima,” El Comercio, April 12, 1856.

15

Emily Sanchez the reinstitution of slavery and elimination of the Castilla administration, Afro-Peruvians would hurt the newspaper’s writers in response. Moreover, the editor communicated that the state would not punish Afro-Peruvians for physically hurting El Heraldo editors because they “had impunity to destroy the paper” that desired their slavery,43 and further shows that the liberal press perceived Afro-Peruvians as receiving more leeway with the law and state authorities because their freedom was targeted by conservative rebels. This article demonstrates that the liberal press thought that the emancipation of Afro-Peruvians under Castilla provided them with sufficient protection.

However, this article also conveys that Afro-Peruvians had been mobilizing themselves against possible infringements on their rights, including conservative efforts to reinstitute slavery.

This mobilization becomes clear in the following excerpt of the article: “Luego los negros [...] tienen ojos para ver que la calle de Valladolid está empredrada con buenos guijarros; tienen manos para extraer esas piedras y lanzarlas sobre esa imprenta de donde sale diariamente ese grito que proclama el sistema destruido en la Palma.”44 This image of Afro-Peruvians destroying the El Heraldo office suggests that formerly enslaved Afro-Peruvians envisioned themselves as supporters of Ramón Castilla, but also conveys that Afro-Peruvians created a prominent and powerful public opinion against General Vivanco and his followers in Lima in 1856. They had been organizing themselves and publicly expressing their opposition to the conservative rebellion.

This image of Afro-Peruvians throwing rocks and destroying the Heraldo office echoes the unexplained arrest and torture of the Asin and Chavarria family. For Manuel Piol and Commander Barquero, the alleged idea that the Asin and Chavarria family had constructed weapons for use against the police was enough to arrest and punish them physically.45 They feared the possibility

43

Ibid.

Ibid.

45 Look to page 11 of this paper for an excerpt of the Asin and Chavarria family letter detailing this incident.

44

16

Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s of an Afro-Peruvian uprising. In this article, an El Comercio writer was advising El Heraldo editors to halt publications supporting General Vivanco in order to avoid the possibility of an attack from Afro-Peruvians. Both the experience of the Asin and Chavarria family and the "defender image" used by the El Comercio editor demonstrate white fear, of the state and liberal press, of a “race war” following abolition.

A couple months later, on December 11th, another contributor to El Comercio recognized the power of Afro-Peruvian mobilization in an article entitled, “Letter to Freed Blacks.” In particular, the author demanded that Afro-Peruvians join government efforts to combat the armies of Generals Vivanco and Echenique in order to guard their freedom and the nation.46 This call for Afro-Peruvians to join war efforts, like the last article, implied that there was a significant number of Afro-Peruvians publicly speaking out against the conservative rebellion, and thus highlighted the prominence of the Afro-Peruvian public opinion in Lima. This call, in addition to the aforementioned image of Afro-Peruvians destroying the Heraldo office, communicates that the liberal press envisioned Afro-Peruvians as defenders of the Castilla administration, and, therefore of the Peruvian government and state. However, simultaneously, this tall order took away from Black emancipation because it implied that Afro-Peruvians owed the Castilla administration their lives on the battlefields since Castilla “guarantiza vuestros derechos.”47 By early 1857, El Comercio recognized Afro-Peruvians fighting against the conservative rebels, supporting the image of Afro-Peruvians as defenders again. For example, on February 6, 1857, one article, while attempting to name and debunk the propaganda of General Vivanco, conveyed that Afro-Peruvians were heroes of the nation. In particular, the article addressed a rumor that General Castilla had given black people weapons to assassinate Peruvians randomly and

46 47

“Carta a los negros manumisos,” El Comercio, December 12, 1856.

Ibid.

17

Emily Sanchez refuted this rumor by asking "¿A quién han asesinado los manumisos?"48 The author then explained that Vivanco and other conservative rebels had, on the contrary, been killing formerly enslaved Afro-Peruvians, including those fighting for the Castilla administration,49 and thus recognized the sacrifice of Afro-Peruvian lives to the stability and preservation of the Peruvian government. In another El Comercio article, published in early 1857, the author said, “los negros han compendido la guerra, que es á ellos á quienes se quiere volver á la esclavitud y con heroismo se han lanzado al combate.”50 This author contends that Afro-Peruvians knew that the conservative rebellion opposed their liberty, and consequently, were devoting themselves to protecting it on the battlefield.

Although the 1857 articles presented Afro-Peruvians as defenders and martyrs in the civil war against conservative rebels, we must remember that previous articles reaffirmed white fear of "Black threats" and a "race war" after abolition. In 1854, El Comercio expressed fear at the prospect of Black people in Ecuador gaining government offices, thus communicating that the liberal press disapproved of the political mobilization of Afro-Peruvians. In 1855, editors published the letter of the Asin and Chavarria family without a prefatory comment, and in 1856, used the possibility of an attack from Afro-Peruvians to halt the publication of an opposing newspaper. The explicit disapproval of Black leadership in Peru, the silence around demands for a fuller emancipation, and the reference to violence from Afro-Peruvians all speak to how the liberal press was participating in the construction of race in Lima after abolition. The combination of white fear and the representation of Afro-Peruvians as defenders and martyrs communicate that the liberal press, although disapproving of Afro-Peruvian rebellion, sanctioned mobilization and

48

“Los siervos de la rebelión,” El Comercio, February 6, 1857.

Ibid.

50 “Los negros manumisos,” El Comercio, January 27, 1857.

49

18

Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s organizing that defended the state. These articles illustrate the divergence between the liberal press and Afro-Peruvians over the direction and possibilities of Afro-Peruvian activism, and therefore, the meaning of emancipation.

Redefining Emancipation from 1856-1857 In the late 1850s, Afro-Peruvians found ways to express and propel forward their visions of emancipation in the face of slaveholders hanging on to the remnants of slavery. As Peter Blanchard points out in his own scholarship, after abolition, many formerly enslaved AfroPeruvians had no choice but to remain working on the plantations of their former owners because the government did not provide them with resources needed for their economic independence, such as land, which would have allowed them to work separately from their former owners and potentially become independent farmers.51 Some Afro-Peruvians did have access to land, but as sharecroppers who had to contribute unpaid labor to slaveholders at the time of harvest.52 In the Chancay Valley, freed Afro-Peruvians who did not have any access to land and worked on plantations received very small wages, if any.53 As Blanchard demonstrates in his work, despite the abolition of slavery in 1854, former slaveholders and the Peruvian state still found means to control and exploit the labor of Afro-Peruvians. To them, the emancipation of Afro-Peruvians did not include control over their own labor.

The liberal press viewed Afro-Peruvians as permanent laborers of the nation as well. In February of 1856, an El Comercio article proposed that the government monitor and distribute their labor, reaffirming the notion that Afro-Peruvians must exclusively form part of the working

51

Blanchard, Slavery & Abolition in Early Republican Peru, 214.

Ibid.

53 Blanchard, Slavery & Abolition in Early Republican Peru, 214.

52

19

Emily Sanchez class. Specifically, in this article, published almost a year after the Asin and Chavarria family letter, El Comercio editors complained about the arrival of Chinese migrants in Peru, who mainly worked on plantations. The author argued that this migration was not necessary because “libertos,” freed Afro-Peruvians, could work the fields instead. The author said, “Por qué no se obliga á trabajar á los libertos cuya mayor parte se halla entregado á la ociosidad y al robo.”54 The reference to “forcing” Afro-Peruvians on the fields communicates that the labor of Afro-Peruvians, despite the abolition of slavery, should have been monitored and determined by the state as well. Thus, from the perspective of the liberal press, the emancipation of the Afro-Peruvians did not include agency over their labor, but rather included constant surveillance and guardianship. AfroPeruvians in Huaraz, within the province of Ancash, disagreed with this notion.

Similar to the Chancay Valley, in the years after abolition, several plantations in Ancash were relying on the labor of formerly enslaved Afro-Peruvians. In January of 1856, an El Comercio article entitled, “Sucesos de Huaras [sic],” explained that a group of freed Afro-Peruvians enlisted as soldiers fighting for the side of the Castilla administration destroyed the plantation of their former slaveholder in the city of Huaraz.55 Perhaps, they had worked in this plantation up until their enlistment.56 The article read, Los negros en número de doscientos se han retirado á Huarás, pero talando notos en absoluto la hacienda de San José en que han cabado todo su furor, á pesar del respeto y cariño que siempre han tenido á su antiguo amo al pacífico y honrado señor D. Gerónimo Gonzalez. No se comprende lo que esto significa; pero es un hecho que este hacendado ha sido arruinado completamente.57 54

“Chinos,” El Comercio, February 18, 1856.

“Los sucesos de Huaras,” El Comercio, January 20, 1857.

56 “Republica peruana: Prefectura del departamento de Ancash,” El Comercio, December 25, 1856.; This article suggests that several regions of Ancash, aside from Huaraz, had been relying on the labor of formerly enslaved peoples. Months after the incident in Huaraz, this article reported that Afro-Peruvians, who were formerly enslaved, had been working on a plantation in San Jose, Ancash. Given this evidence and the scholarship of Peter Blanchard, it is probable that the soldiers in Huaraz had previously worked on the plantation they destroyed after abolition.

57 “Los sucesos de Huaras,” El Comercio, January 20, 1857.; The original document italicized the word “significa.”; English translation: 200 black people have retreated to Huaraz, while totally tearing down the plantation of San Jose, which they have destroyed with all their fury, despite the respect and kindness they alway held towards their previous owner, the peaceful and honored Don Gerónimo Gonzalez. We do not understand what this means; but it is a fact that the plantation has been destroyed 55

20

Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s

In the excerpt above, the editor claimed that the soldiers had respected the "peaceful and honored" Gerónimo Gonzalez, their former owner, and thus could not find a reason why the soldiers would have destroyed the plantation "with all their fury." However, as mentioned before, like many formerly enslaved Afro-Peruvians, perhaps these soldiers had been forced to work on the Huaraz plantation after abolition because they had no land and no other option. Or, perhaps, Gerónimo Gonzalez had sharecropped the land to the soldiers and ordered them to work without pay on his fields during the time of harvest.58 Thus, in contrast to the conclusion of the El Comercio editor, the Afro-Peruvian soldiers did have a reason to destroy the plantation — it represented a limitation on their agency over their own labor. This elimination of the plantation symbolizes opposition to the permanent position of Afro-Peruvians as laborers and forming part of the working class. El Comercio disagreed with this type of mobilization: Esto significa, diremos nosotros, que de un partido que en Huarás tiene por defensores á 200 negros bandidos debe temer el pais mucho, y especialmente los hacendados de la costa que se hallan amenazados de ser victimas en sus personas, familias é intereses por este modo con que Castilla hace la guerra á la revolucion de los pueblos. Esto significa que el negro autorizado y armado por Castilla, podrá robar, talar y asesinar; pero que será inútil á su Libertador y nada temible al G. Vivanco, de cuyas fuerzas correrán siempre.59

According to this editor, the Afro-Peruvians soldiers, whom the El Comercio newspaper communicated were defenders and martyrs before, were now "bandits" and people whom "the country must fear very much." Moreover, the second excerpt conveys that Afro-Peruvians enlisted

completely.

Blanchard, Slavery & Abolition in Early Republican Peru, 214.; As mentioned before, Peter Blanchard explains in his work that many Afro-Peruvians were forced to work on the plantations of their former slaveholders after abolition. Afro-Peruvians who were able to find land were often sharecroppers. The owners of the sharecropped land often forced them to work on their fields without pay during the time of harvest.

59 “Los sucesos de Huaras,” El Comercio, January 20, 1857.; English translation: This means, we would say, that the country should fear very much the group of 200 bandits Huaraz has as defenders, and especially the plantation owners of the coast who have been threatened, along with their families. It is along these interests that Castilla makes war against the revolutions of the pueblos. This means that the authorized black person, armed by Castilla, can rob, destroy and assassinate, but will be useless to the Liberator and not scary at all to General Vivanco, whose forces they always run away from.

58

21

Emily Sanchez in the war were taking advantage of their position as soldiers to "steal, destroy and assassinate" and, consequently, were “useless” to Ramón Castilla in the fight against conservative rebels. This excerpt suggests that Afro-Peruvians were physically hurting the nation, and even contributing to a possible Vivanco victory since they "ran away" from his forces. Considering previous examples of editors that framed Afro-Peruvians as defenders of the nation who owed the government their lives on the battlefields, and thus took away from Black emancipation, this example went a step further by criminalizing the soldiers in Huaraz. El Comercio stripped the titles of "defender" and "hero" from them because they were fighting to establish their vision of emancipation.

The aforementioned desire to control the labor of Afro-Peruvians, along with the criminalization of Afro-Peruvian activism in Huaraz, reverberate the white fear present in “El Heraldo de Lima.”60 The first of the two articles argued that if the government neglected action and left the labor of Afro-Peruvians unmonitored, Afro-Peruvians would continue to devote themselves to “idleness and theft.”61 This image of "idleness" referred to Afro-Peruvians not working on the fields and perhaps mobilizing themselves in an effort to establish their visions of emancipation, like the soldiers of Huaraz. "Theft" might have referred to Afro-Peruvians who did not have enough means to survive and therefore had to steal in order to subsist.62 Theft as means of survival connects back to the period before abolition in Peru, as Carlos Aguirre highlights in his own work. Cimarrones had to revert to banditry in order to survive, resist the institution of slavery, and protect their freedom.63 Thus, this call to the government to force Afro-Peruvians on the field

60

“El Heraldo de Lima,” El Comercio, April 12, 1856.; “Chinos,” El Comercio, February 18, 1856.; “Los sucesos de Huaras,” El Comercio, January 20, 1857. In the first two clauses of this sentence, I am referring specifically to my analysis of the “Chinos” and “Sucesos de Huaras” articles, respectively.

61 “Chinos,” El Comercio, February 18, 1856.

62 “Documentos Parlamentarios,” El Comercio, October 30, 1857.; This excerpt from a congressional record reported that some Afro-Peruvians had to steal in order to support themselves.

63 Aguirre, Agentes de su propia libertad, 253.; English translation: He informed Hurtado of the incident, he [Hurtado] then took his hat, weapon (?), and gun, and directed himself to the place of the incident, and then spoke with his own words about the education and employment, with the goal of having them each one retreat without

22

Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s and prevent “idleness and theft” symbolizes opposition to the mobilization of formerly enslaved Afro-Peruvians advocating for an emancipation that included economic and social mobility.

Later in 1857, El Comercio released a police report that demonstrates the manners in which Afro-Peruvians who were not at war, but were in Lima, advocated against the continuous surveillance and brutality of the state. In this report written by Jose Maria de la Portilla, the officer recounts his investigation of a group of Afro-Peruvians in Lima, which had allegedly injured the Superintendent of police officers, Manuel Hurtado.64 When de la Portilla finds the group of AfroPeruvians on Maravillas Street, a fight breaks out between him, the accompanying police officers, and a group of Afro-Peruvians. An officer at the scene informed Hurtado of the fight: La aviso a Hurtado la ocurrencia, esto en el acto tomando su gorra, sable y una pistola, se dirijió al sitio de la ocurrencia, y hablandoles con palabras propias de su educacion y empleo a fin de que se retirarse cada uno de ellos a su casa y no interrumpiesen el orden publico, los negros atrevidos le contestaron a palos encorralandolo, y las palabras que decian los negros eran: matar á la policia, viva Castilla, matar blancos.65

Here we can see another instance of the state reaffirming the notion that Afro-Peruvians must form part of the laboring class. As mentioned above, when Hurtado arrived at the scene, he began lecturing the Afro-Peruvians on "their education and employment," so that they would return to their homes and no longer "interrupt public order." Perhaps, Hurtado assumed that they were unemployed and suggested that they find a job. Additionally, considering previous articles discussing the place of Afro-Peruvians in the working class,66 Hurtado may have even suggested that they work on plantation fields and under the supervision of former slaveholders. Similar to

disrupting the public order, the bold black men answered him back with sticks, corralling him, and the words that the black men said were: Kill the police, long live Castilla, kill the whites.

64 “Republica Peruana,” El Comercio, September 2, 1857.

65 Ibid.

66 “Chinos,” El Comercio, February 18, 1856.; “Proyecto Sobre los Esclavos,” El Comercio, February 2, 1855.; Refer back to the discussion of the “Chinos” articles on page 18. Another article, titled “Proyecto sobre los Esclavos” proposed the formerly enslaved people stay under the “surveillance” of their former slaveholders to work on the fields, conveying that formerly enslaved Afro-Peruvians must form part of the nation’s working class.

23

Emily Sanchez the El Comercio editor who opposed abolition in Ecuador in 1854, and Manuel Piol who arrested the Asin and Chavarria family while they were celebrating emancipation in 1855, Manuel Hurtado echoed the white fear of free Black people disrupting "public tranquility." Regardless of what Hurtado said about the education and employment of Afro-Peruvians, his position as a superintendent in the police force and his default to lecturing on their employment reveals that the state continued and increased the criminalization of Afro-Peruvians in the years following 1855 to 1857.

Despite this criminalization, Afro-Peruvians in this report rejected Hurtado's lecture and demanded recognition of their vision of emancipation. After Hurtado gave his speech, some members of the group responded with, "Kill the police, long live Castilla, kill the whites." The middle phrase, “long live Castilla,” implicated the abolition of slavery and reminded the police officers of the freedom of Afro-Peruvians, suggesting that state authorities had repeatedly been challenging the boundaries of their emancipation. Furthermore, the first phrase, "Kill the police," communicated that this instance of violence between the police and Afro-Peruvians was not the first during this second civil war. Even while the Castilla administration was fighting against a conservative rebellion, with the aid of Afro-Peruvians, the state was denying them peace and protection in their communities and doubting their freedom at home.67 Together, the phrases “Kill the police" and "long live Castilla'' conveyed that emancipation included protection from the state, not violence. Rather than accepting Hurtado’s definition of emancipation, Afro-Peruvians refused to leave and proposed another version of freedom instead, echoing the vision of the Asin and Chavarria family.

67

"Kill the police," also called for the mobilization of Afro-Peruvians against state brutality.

24

Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s The last of the three phrases, “kill the whites,” asserts that Afro-Peruvians advocated for a multifaceted emancipation that did not just include agency over one's own body and labor, and protection from the state, but also encompassed a social acknowledgement and respect of their humanity. The article, “Matanza canina,” described how Afro-Peruvians mobilized to accomplish it. In this article, El Comercio editors complained about the number of dogs killed by aguadores, who were people employed by the government to clean the streets and kill stray dogs.68 The authors later revealed this article was a joke and said: Ojala que los maten a todos juntos! solo que por no dar lugar a los perros no nos pongan en su rasgo en el "Comercio," diciéndonos las groserias que nos dicen los negros y los artesanos inciviles á quienes tenemos necesidad de tocar en jeneral, hemos tratado de congratularnos con los perros, para ahorrarles el trabajo de redactar un articulo ordinario y soez.69 This excerpt demonstrates that Afro-Peruvians had been complaining and standing up against jokes and disrespectful commentary regarding race in the newspaper.70 This advocacy suggests that Afro-Peruvians had been envisioning an emancipation that included social recognition of their humanity and place in the nation as citizens. The liberal press mocked their vision. Specifically, at the end of the same excerpt, the authors said that they created this article to save dogs time from writing a complaint about aguaderos, thus ridiculing and invalidating AfroPeruvians who did stand up against disrespectful commentary. When equating the efforts of Afro-

68

Stewart King and Beverly Tomek, ed., Encyclopedia of Free Blacks and People of Color in the Americas (New York: Facts on File, 2011), 609.; Many of the aguadores were Afro-Peruvians. In fact, King and Tomek explain that the position of aguador was a remnant of the colonial era, and was a governmental effort attempting to impose the responsibility of maintaining the streets clean onto Afro-Peruvians.

69 “Matanza canina,” El Comercio, May 6, 1856.; English translation: Let’s hope that they kill all of them at once!

Just because we didn’t give a place to the dogs, they mention us in their piece in the “Comercio,” calling us all the bad words that the black people and uncivil artisans call us, who we have the need to touch (?) in general, we have tried to congratulate ourselves with the dogs, to save them the effort of writing an article that is ordinary and rude.

70 “Chinos,” El Comercio, February 18, 1856.; This disrespectful commentary may have included positions promoted by the liberal press that restricted their emancipation, such as the position that Afro-Peruvians must exclusively make up the laboring force of the country to maintain social order. Refer back to the discussion of the “Chinos” article on page 18.

25

Emily Sanchez Peruvians to an action performed by dogs, the editors dehumanized Afro-Peruvians and ridiculed their struggle to put forth a version of emancipation that respected their humanity.

In another example, a gossip columnist explained that a “phenomenon” was gaining traction in Lima — white people were insulting black people on the street and black people were responding with “revenge-insults.”71 Such commentary speaks to an environment of racial tension between black and non-black Peruvians in the post-abolition period. Moreover, the author recommended that Afro-Peruvians, instead, remain passive to the insults of white people, further mocking and invalidating efforts of Afro-Peruvians advocating for social recognition. While attempting to define the boundaries of emancipation for Afro-Peruvians, the liberal press actively took part in the construction of race in the country.

Although these articles undermined the advocacy of Afro-Peruvians, they also offer evidence of their activism against dehumanization and rejection of their definition of emancipation. In the "Matanza Canina'' article, the author explained that Afro-Peruvians reacted with "groserias" whenever the newspaper published an article disrespectful of their position in national society.72 In the gossip-columnist article, "Los blancos y negros," the author explained that Afro-Peruvians responded with insults when white people insulted them.73 The explicit mention of Afro-Peruvians reacting to and opposing comments that proposed limited definitions of their freedom suggests that efforts of Afro-Peruvians to make their envisioned emancipation a reality were gaining prominence in Lima. Ultimately, while the liberal press dehumanized AfroPeruvians and envisioned an increasingly limited form of citizenship for them, a growing number

71

“Los blancos y los negros,” El Comercio, January 9, 1857.

“Matanza canina,” El Comercio, May 6, 1856.

73 “Los blancos y los negros,” El Comercio, January 9, 1857.

72

26

Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s of Afro-Peruvians were imagining a multi-faceted emancipation that included some degree of racial equality and respect of their status as citizens in the national society.

Conclusion In the months leading up to the abolition of slavery in Peru, the El Comercio newspaper published several articles expressing support for the emancipation of enslaved peoples and for Ramón Castilla, the president who would eventually announce the decree abolishing slavery in December of 1854.74 However, upon further examination, it becomes clear that El Comercio did not support all forms of emancipation, particularly those envisioned by Afro-Peruvians, both before and after abolition.

As explained in the first section of this paper, after hearing the news that Ecuador had abolished slavery, the El Comercio newspaper reacted strongly against that decision. In the article entitled, “Ecuador,” the author argued that formerly enslaved black people should not gain all civil and political rights because they could create chaos and social disorder. This article reflects a sentiment that appears year after year in El Comercio issues following abolition — the sentiment being that the state must monitor and restrict the emancipation of Afro-Peruvians in order to maintain public order. In 1855, Corporal Piol and Commander Barquero arrested and punished the Asin and Chavarria family due to the allegation that they had built weapons for use against the police.75 Later, in February of 1856, El Comercio editors suggested that the state force AfroPeruvians to work on the fields in order to reduce “idleness and theft.”76 The liberal press was

74

Héctor López Martínez, Los 150 años de el Comercio, 1839-1989 (Edición de “El Comercio,” 1989), 61, 63-64.; Peruvian historian, Hector López, explains in his book that El Comercio expressed support for Ramón Castilla and the abolition of slavery. However, considering the articles presented in this paper, I argue that El Comercio only supported certain forms of emancipation.

75 “Clamor al excelentísimo señor,” El Comercio, February 11, 1855.

76 “Chinos,” El Comercio, February 18, 1856.

27

Emily Sanchez proposing a restricted version of the emancipation of Afro-Peruvians. Yet, at times, it seemed that El Comercio supported Afro-Peruvians and their efforts to maintain their emancipation after abolition. Editors named Afro-Peruvians, who were fighting on the side of the Castilla administration against General Vivanco, “heroes.”77 However, the newspaper was quick to strip away this label once Afro-Peruvian soldiers in Huaraz destroyed the plantation of their former slaveholder,78 communicating that their place in Peruvian national society must not be restricted to the working class.

Throughout the constant rejection of the visions of emancipation of Afro-Peruvians, El Comercio contributed to the construction of race in the nation. As explained in the “Directing the Mobilization of Afro-Peruvians - Battlefields” section, editors of El Comercio used the image of Afro-Peruvians attacking the El Heraldo office to convince them to stop publishing articles in favor of the conservative rebellion.79 They threatened El Heraldo writers by reaffirming “white fear” of a “Black threat.” Moreover, the editors who commented on the actions of the Huaraz soldiers claimed that the nation should fear any Afro-Peruvian soldier armed by the Castilla administration.80 The El Comercio newspaper was reframing Afro-Peruvian activism as evidence of possible “race wars” in the nation.

While El Comercio participated in the construction of race, Afro-Peruvians continuously advocated for their visions of emancipation. Nearly two months after the abolition of slavery in Peru, the Asin and Chavarria family wrote to the President and demanded that he punish Manuel Piol and Commander Barquero for their unjust punishment.81 They decided to publish their letter

77

“Los negros manumisos,” El Comercio, January 27, 1857.

“Los sucesos de Huaras,” El Comercio, January 20, 1857.

79 “El Heraldo de Lima,” El Comercio, April 12, 1856.

80 “Los sucesos de Huaras,” El Comercio, January 20, 1857.

81 “Clamor al excelentísimo señor,” El Comercio, February 11, 1855.

78

28

Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s in the national newspaper and demanded recognition of an emancipation that included state protection, rather than violence. The soldiers of Huaraz destroyed the plantation of their former slaveholder and established that their place in national society was not exclusively in the fields.

They emphasized that their emancipation included agency over their own bodies. And in 1857, on the eve of the second civil war’s end, Afro-Peruvians still had to prove and remind the state of their emancipation while also mobilizing for a Peruvian national society that would recognize racial equality and citizenship. Ultimately, in the years following abolition, Afro-Peruvians advocated for a multifaceted emancipation in the face of the state, conservative rebels, and liberal press, setting up the stage for future movements of Afro-Peruvian activism.

29

Emily Sanchez Bibliography Primary Sources: El Comercio, 1839-1913, World Newspaper Archive. https://infoweb-newsbankcom.ezproxy.princeton.edu/apps/readex/?p=WHNPX Secondary Sources: Aguirre, Carlos. Agentes de su propia libertad: Los esclavos de Lima y la desintegración de la esclavitud : 1821-1854. 1. ed Edition. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Fondo Editorial, 1993.

Andrews, George Reid. Afro-Latin America, 1800-2000. Oxford University Press, 2004.

Barrantes, Maribel Arrelucea. Sobreviviendo a la esclavitud: Negociación y honor en las prácticas cotidianas de los africanos y afrodescendientes. Lima, 1750-1820. Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2018.

Basadre, Jorge. Historia de la República del Perú, 1822-1933. Editorial Universitaria, 1983.

Blanchard, Peter. Slavery & Abolition in Early Republican Peru. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1992. https://catalog.princeton.edu/catalog/771102.

Dixon, Jeffrey S., and Meredith Reid Sarkees. A Guide to Intra-State Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816–2014. Thousand Oaks, California, 2016. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452234205.

Encyclopedia of Free Blacks and People of Color in the Americas. New York, NY: Facts On File, 2011. {"http://find.galegroup.com/openurl/openurl?url_ver=Z39.882004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&req_dat=info:sid/gale:ugnid:prin77918&res_ id=info:sid/gale:GVRL&ctx_enc=info:ofi:enc:UTF8&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft_id=info:sid/gale:bmcode:recid/4LFG":["fin d.galegroup.com"]}.

Fuente, Alejandro de la, and George Reid Andrews, eds. Afro-Latin American Studies: An Introduction. Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Gargurevich, Juan. Historia de la prensa peruana, 1594-1990. Lima: La Voz, 1991.

Hartman, Saidiya. “Venus in Two Acts.” Small Axe 12, no. 2 (July 17, 2008): 1–14. Accessed September 18, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/fulcrum.ft848q95r.

Hunefeldt, Christine. Paying the Price of Freedom : Family and Labor among Lima’s Slaves, 1800-1854. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

Larson, Brooke. Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes.

Cambridge University Press, 2005. https://www.amazon.com/Trials-Nation-MakingLiberalism-Ethnicity/dp/0521567300.

Martínez, Héctor López. Los 150 años de el Comercio, 1839-1989. Edición de “El Comercio,” 1989.

Michilot, María Mendoza. 100 años de periodismo en el Perú: 1900-1948. Fondo editorial Universidad de Lima, 2017.

“Presencia Y Palabra: Mujeres Afroperuanas.” Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.facebook.com/presenciaypalabra/.

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Determining Freedom: Afro-Peruvians and the Meanings of Emancipation in Peru, 1850s LUNDU Centro de Estudios y Promoción Afroperuanos. “Quienes Somos.” Accessed December 1, 2020. https://www.lundu.org/quienes-somos.html. “¿Quiénes Somos? – ASHANTI PERÚ.” Accessed December 1, 2020. https://ashantiperu.org/quienes-somos/.

Quiroz, Francisco. “Peru.” In Encyclopedia of Free Blacks and People of Color in the Americas, edited by Stewart R. King, 2:604–10. New York, NY: Facts on File, 2012. http://link.gale.com/apps/doc/CX1981300286/GVRL?u=prin77918&sid=zotero&xid=26f6 a798.

Velásquez Castro, Marcel, ed. “Introdución.” In La República de Papel. Política e Imaginación Social En La Prensa Peruana Del Siglo. Lima, Peru: Universidad de Ciencias y Humanidades, 2009.

Zanutelli Rosas, Manuel. Periodistas peruanos del siglo XIX : itinerario biográfico. 1. ed. Serie Periodismo y literatura. Surquillo, Lima [Peru]: Universidad de San Martín de Porres, 2005.

Acknowledgements First and foremost, I’d like to thank Professor Mota and students in my History 400 seminar for troubleshooting with me different ideas I had for my JP in its early stages and providing feedback during workshop classes. A special thank you to Professor Mota for the many office hours conversations and guidance you offered whenever I had any doubts about my research or writing process. I’d also like to acknowledge two Mellon Mays mentors, Professor Brian Herrera and Dr. Afia Ofori-Mensa for listening to the initial stages of my research question, challenging me to refine and connect the question to my broader research interests, and giving reminders to take care of my well-being throughout the semester. Thank you to Fernando Acosta for being patient with me and eventually leading me to a whole collection of El Comercio newspaper articles on the World Newspaper Database. Lastly, I’d like to thank everyone who provided feedback on my drafts, especially Professor Mota, Abigail Sergeant and the Writing Center. Thank you, everyone! At the beginning of this semester, I was not sure how I would write my first JP while away from campus, but I was able to because of all your amazing support!

31

Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle By: Jordi Amaral Smoke and flames billowed out of the windows of the Guatemalan Congressional building on November 21, 2020, as Guatemalans protested against the government. The protests were over a hastily and sneakily passed budget that cut funding for education, health care, anti-hunger initiatives, and the judiciary, but also spoke to larger, structural issues such as corruption, weak rule of law and institutions, and poor governance. Among the issues provoking demonstration: the country’s weak judicial system, whose budget had just been slashed.

The countries of Central America’s Northern Triangle–Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador–are plagued by many issues that have created a hostile environment and fostered underdevelopment, driving migrants north to the United States. Above all, the region’s weak judicial systems and rule of law pose the greatest challenge. Underfunded, undertrained, and understaffed, the Northern Triangle’s judicial systems are not properly equipped to respond to the insecurity, corruption, and economic obstacles preventing the region from achieving prosperity.

Their lack of transparency and independence similarly hinders efforts to develop the region. These failures contribute to a vicious cycle that desperately needs to be stopped. Earnest investment in the judicial system will be necessary to expand reach and access to courts, while further autonomy and transparency must be achieved in order to create space for the judicial system to function properly without impediment. The United States can primarily help through conditional aid and technical assistance, but maintaining an active voice and presence in the region in support of good policy will similarly be important. Strengthening the judicial systems of the region, if successful, should in turn strengthen the fabrics of society and reduce push factors for migrants. In the longterm, the United States must adapt its migration system to increase access to economic migration

32

Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle and bolster the asylum system to respond more equitably and inclusively for Central Americans.

Decisive action must be taken for the betterment of the region and all those pushed to migrate to the United States.

The Northern Triangle’s Weak Judicial Systems The single greatest challenge facing the Northern Triangle is the region’s weak judicial systems and rule of law. Impunity reigns supreme in the region, from small-scale extortion to government corruption to homicide; all three Northern Triangle countries ranked in the bottom third of the Latin American and Caribbean region in the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index for 2020. All three countries are additionally below the region’s average for the Index’s Due Process of Law indicator, and are among the region’s worst for the Criminal Justice indicator.

While El Salvador is close to the regional average for the Civil Justice indicator, Honduras and Guatemala are among the region’s worst.1 The Northern Triangle’s judicial systems are systemically weak, and unable to appropriately respond to the violent and impoverished contexts of the region that incite northbound migration.

Furthermore, the Northern Triangle struggles with a lack of transparency. Each of the three countries rank around or below the Latin American and Caribbean average for the Open Government indicator of the Rule of Law Index, with Honduras placing 27th out of 30.2 Researchers at the Washington Office on Latin America have reported difficulty in accessing official information and data from all three countries for the construction of the organization’s Central America Monitor.3 Faltering transparency thus represents an obstacle to holding systems accountable and producing research aimed at improving them.

1

“World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2020,” World Justice Project, 2020.

Ibid.

3 “Central America Monitor: Evaluating Progress,” Washington Office on Latin America.

2

33

Jordi Amaral The region’s judicial systems fail most blatantly in their underinvestment and lack of reach.

The countries of the Northern Triangle are among the world’s most violent and homicidal, but their judicial systems are not equipped to respond to this issue. Globally, nations average 17 judges per 100,000 inhabitants–in 2017, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador recorded 6, 8, and 9 judges per 100,000, respectively. The region additionally suffers from a dearth of prosecutors and public defenders, as well as burdensome and inefficient caseloads.4 Budgets play a large factor in this: judicial institutions do not receive proper funding. In Guatemala, for example, Congress halved the budget requested by the Institute of Criminal Public Defense in 2017.5 In Honduras, the constitutional requirement for 3% of the national budget to be dedicated to the Judiciary is not met, and funding increases are disproportionately allocated to defense and policing.6 Although the various facets of El Salvador’s judicial system receive slightly more robust funding than their counterparts in Honduras and Guatemala, personnel remain overburdened and distributed poorly.

Critically, a very limited and insufficient proportion of personnel are dedicated exclusively to criminal matters, with far too many roles geared towards administrative work.7 There is an inefficiency and lack of quality in the judicial system’s staffing across the board. Moreover, poor distribution of personnel is particularly impactful for those in rural areas–a common theme across the region. Rule of law and strong judicial systems are not prioritized in the Northern Triangle, and inequities are even more pronounced away from the region’s urban centers.

4

“Guatemala’s Justice System,” Washington Office on Latin America and Fundación Myrna Mack, June 2019; “Honduras’ Justice System,” Washington Office on Latin America, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, and Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad, September 2019; “El Salvador’s Justice System,” Washington Office on Latin America and University Institute for Public Opinion, August 2019.

5 “Guatemala’s Justice System.”

6 “Honduras’ Justice System.”

7 “El Salvador’s Justice System.”

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Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) once represented a beacon of hope for the region, with the UN-backed institution providing invaluable assistance to the Guatemalan Attorney General’s Office, and driving a path forward for robust anti-corruption and anti-impunity initiatives that even took down former president Otto Pérez Molina. The Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), a similar program with support from the OAS, also showed reason for positivity. Both efforts, however, were recently dismantled by political elites and the countries’ presidents. Following CICIG’s shutdown by his predecessor, President Alejandro Giammattei has introduced a new Presidential Commission Against Corruption, but it has received criticism for a lack of independence and been labeled by some as a “smokescreen.”8 MACCIH, meanwhile, has not been replaced, and the future looks dim in Honduras. Many of the same politicians that sought to shut down the initiative had been investigated by the Attorney General’s Office with MACCIH’s assistance.9 In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele introduced his own commission, the International Commission Against Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES), but it has been widely criticized as insufficient and weak. The Due Process of Law Foundation notes that CICIES serves “as an extension of the executive branch” with little independence; it also suffers from a lack of transparency and oversight, and has not been constructed with input from civil society, which had been a key strength of both CICIG and MACCIH.10 CICIES thus far seems to have been created more for show and for the personal, political gain of Bukele than for any structural, effective change.

The Impact of Weak Judicial Systems

8

Zachary Goodwin and Héctor Silva Ávalos, “Guatemala’s New Anti-Corruption Body: a Mere Smokescreen?”

InSight Crime, July 21, 2020.

9 Héctor Silva Ávalos and Seth Robbins, “A Death Foretold: MACCIH Shuts Down in Honduras,” InSight Crime, January 22, 2020.

10 “From hope to skepticism: The International Commission Against Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES),” Due Process of Law Foundation, April 1, 2020.

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Jordi Amaral The Northern Triangle’s weak judicial systems and rule of law have serious implications for security. Impunity is endemic: 95% of homicides are left unsolved in the region,11 and Honduras has the second-highest level of impunity in the world according to Universidad de las Américas Puebla’s Global Scale of Impunity for 2020.12 The lack of personnel and funding for the region’s judicial systems causes an inability to dispense justice, and produces little accountability.

When criminal deeds go unpunished, there is scant incentive to avoid criminality, thus contributing to a pervasive culture of violence and impunity in which brutal gang violence, extorsion, sexual violence, homicide, and more are normalized. In addition, it causes massive backlogs of cases, with several thousand people in prison awaiting trial in each of the countries. In El Salvador, pretrial detention makes up almost a quarter of the total prison population; in Honduras and Guatemala, it makes up roughly half.13 Gangs commonly use prisons as a hotspot for recruiting, increasing their numbers by offering protection to inmates. As a result, the slow-moving, underfunded legal system helps gangs prosper and grow in the region. The weak judicial systems of the Northern Triangle struggle to dish out justice, and further mire the region in violence and insecurity. When violence goes unpunished, people see migration as their only option for safety.

The region’s economies, too, suffer grave consequences due to weak judicial systems. The countries of the Northern Triangle already suffer from underdevelopment and high youth unemployment, pushing many to migrate north, and weak judicial systems exacerbate these issues.

Weak institutions, impunity, and corruption–which creates added business expenses–deter investors, preventing an amicable investment climate. This, in turn, reduces economic growth and

11

Suchit Chavez and Jessica Avalos, “The Northern Triangle: The Countries That Don’t Cry for Their Dead,” InSight Crime, April 23, 2014.

12 “Escalas de impunidad en el mundo. Índice Global de Impunidad 2020,” Fundación Universidad de las Américas, Puebla, August 2020.

13 “El Salvador: World Prison Brief data,” World Prison Brief; “Honduras: World Prison Brief data,” World Prison Brief; “Guatemala: World Prison Brief data,” World Prison Brief.

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Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle job opportunities, which are key push factors for migration. In fact, all three countries rank in the bottom half globally of the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, and in the bottom third for the Enforcing Contracts indicator–Guatemala ranks an abysmal 176th out of 190 in the category.14 The region’s weak judicial systems and frameworks are obstacles to economic development opportunities and disincentivize investment. Impunity for corruption comes at a high cost fiscally: in Honduras, corruption is estimated to have cost almost 13% of the country’s GDP in 2018, with the price rising steadily as a percentage of GDP for at least five years straight.15 And lack of enforcement on taxes has resulted in criminally low tax revenues. The Northern Triangle countries raised an average of 13.6% of their GDPs in taxes in 2015, whereas Latin America’s seven largest economies raised an average 24.4%.16 Low tax revenue diminishes much-needed funds for social services and economic programs, showing that weak judicial systems have wideranging effects that inhibit economic development and make life more difficult for potential migrants.

Moreover, the lack of strong judicial systems allows corruption to thrive in the region: elites are free to do as they wish, and there is minimal confidence in institutions and the state. A recent poll by the Atlantic Council found that three out of four poll participants in the region believed judges could be paid off, with less than 30% reporting trusting judges and prosecutors.17 While data suggests Guatemala saw significant increases in public trust of the Justice System amid CICIG’s successes,18 the commission’s poorly-received end does not bode well for continued trust,

14

“Ease of Doing Business in El Salvador,” World Bank; “Ease of Doing Business in Honduras,” World Bank; “Ease of Doing Business in Guatemala,” World Bank.

15 Gabriela Castellanos, et al. “Estudio: la estimación del impacto macroeconómico de la corrupción en Honduras,” Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción, 2020.

16 Richard Lapper, “Central America Is As Violent As Ever. What Would it Take to Change?” America’s Quarterly, April 11, 2016.

17 John Negroponte, et al. “Building a Better Future: A Blueprint for Central America’s Northern Triangle,” Atlantic Council, May 2017.

18 “Guatemala’s Justice System.”

37

Jordi Amaral and the region’s current anti-corruption initiatives do not inspire confidence. Mistrust of the state is rampant across the Northern Triangle, which gives license to illicit actors and flashes warning signals to firms and entrepreneurs. This further feeds into the insecurity and economic issues pushing migration, and ensures a vicious cycle of underdevelopment, violence, and weak state presence that is difficult to break.

Without a strong judicial system and rule of law, efforts to combat economic underdevelopment will struggle, with investors shying away from possible ventures, and corruption limiting sustainable growth. Efforts to combat insecurity, too, will falter, as the institutional infrastructure will not exist to effectively reduce violence and bring about justice.

Without strengthening the judicial system first, efforts to broach other issues will be hindered.

Weak judicial systems create profound effects on widespread insecurity and underdevelopment, thus driving migrants north to the United States. This challenge must be addressed in order to improve societies in the Northern Triangle.

Policy Recommendations for Northern Triangle Countries For substantial, durable transformation to occur in the Northern Triangle, the Northern Triangle itself must lead the charge. To strengthen the region’s judicial systems, the governments must grant them adequate independence and authority, modeled after the successes of CICIG, yet adjusted in consideration of its failures. Expanded transparency and committed, effective investment in the judicial system are likewise needed.

Grant Independence and Authority to Judicial Systems Large emphasis should be placed on granting autonomy to judicial institutions and attorneys general, and seeking to replicate the successes of CICIG. CICIG’s existence coincided with a period of substantial, positive change for Guatemala, with impunity, corruption, and

38

Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle insecurity all decreasing. As regional peers saw homicide rates increase on average by 1% each year over the time frame (2007-2018), Guatemala’s homicide rate fell annually by an average of 5%.19 This change was in large part due to the efficacy of CICIG as an independent body that was able to conduct investigations and support the work of the Attorney General’s Office. Moreover, CICIG was a robust partnership with the United Nations, which gave it strong international, institutional backing.

Honduras should introduce a new anti-impunity and anti-corruption initiative to replace MACCIH, while CICIES in El Salvador and the Presidential Commission Against Corruption in Guatemala must be revamped. These new initiatives must not be tied to the Executive, and instead should be independent with international support, much like CICIG was. Finding backing from a renowned, multilateral institution such as the United Nations would be ideal. Furthermore, they should be given the ability to conduct their own investigations to support the work of their respective countries’ offices of the attorney general. CICIG’s ability to investigate was crucial for its success, while MACCIH’s inability to do so hindered its efforts in Honduras. CICIG helped take down former presidents, politicians of all stripes, and organized crime, and should serve as a model for new initiatives in the region.

It is vital, however, to also learn from CICIG’s failures. President Jimmy Morales was able to legally shut down CICIG due to the commission’s mandate requiring renewal. And pending renewals in the past had previously resulted in pressure on the commission, as well. In Honduras, MACCIH suffered similar challenges. These common renewals beholden to political elites were a structural vulnerability to the groundbreaking, successful initiatives. To avoid the same mistake, new initiatives should be given longer-term mandates, potentially eight or ten years long. They

19

“Saving Guatemala’s Fight Against Crime and Impunity,” International Crisis Group, October 24, 2018.

39

Jordi Amaral would then be eligible for a renewal by popular referendum. In this, the power over judicial systems would lie in the hands of the people instead of political elites whose interests are not concurrent with those they ostensibly represent.

A common issue cited by critics of CICIG and similar institutions is that they infringe upon sovereignty. Critics fear that the countries of the Northern Triangle would become dependent on foreign actors and feeble, incapable of taking care of themselves and controlling their own destinies. These are valid concerns, but it must be recognized that CICIG was by no means allpowerful: it had no prosecutorial powers and thus was incapable of taking decisive, unilateral actions. Furthermore, the unpleasant reality is that the region’s institutions and judicial systems are simply not strong enough. Until serious change is made, they need some level of independence from the entrenched status quo; guidance and assistance from multilateral institutions can set them on the track to success. In the long term, they will need to be able to function on their own and not become dependent on foreigners, but to reach that point, they will require assistance. As Mark L. Schneider, former Vice President of the International Crisis Group, has noted, not ceding a limited degree of sovereignty to an institution like CICIG means ultimately ceding a greater degree of sovereignty to organized crime and corrupt actors instead.20 Across the board, the Northern Triangle’s judicial systems must be granted the independence and authority to do their jobs. In Honduras, a recent reform “prevents the Attorney General’s Office from carrying out surprise searches of suspects. According to Joaquín Mejía, a Honduran analyst who studies these legal reforms, the change will make it easier for those under investigation to destroy evidence.”21 Attorneys General and judicial systems must be given the

20

Mark L. Schneider, “Anti-Corruption in the Americas: What Works?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2020.

21 Héctor Silva Ávalos, “Honduras’ New Criminal Code Will Help Impunity Prosper,” InSight Crime, June 29, 2020.

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Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle space to operate freely without unnecessary obstacles. With that being said, the level of autonomy to be granted to prosecutors, judges, and members of the judicial system needs to be calibrated so as to avoid creating a lack of accountability. Countries should develop independent bodies to publicly review–with the utmost outward-facing transparency–the activities of members of the judicial system and any CICIG-like initiatives that are created. Then, should problems of hubris or illicit activity occur, it will be well-documented so that charges may be filed appropriately and legally if need be, and the public may judge the system’s functionality as it sees fit.

Capacity-building and strengthening of the justice system through measures such as training for judges, prosecutors, forensic scientists, and others is often cited as a catch-all solution, but is not enough on its own. A more structural approach is essential. In fact, “training on its own has proven to be a poor strategy for improving capacity because even highly competent and highly trained officials continue to work within institutions where their skills cannot be put to effective use.”22 The capacity to build capacity must be achieved first by strengthening the institutions that constrain these actors, and this can only be accomplished when the judicial system is given the space and independence to succeed.

These changes will be politically difficult to implement; politicians are incentivized to keep institutions weak and, at times, are the very same people who are benefitting from high levels of impunity. Although these initiatives are less popular among the political elite, they enjoy high levels of popularity amongst the people: “according to a public opinion survey released just six months before it was shuttered, 72 percent of respondents expressed support for the work of CICIG. A November 2019 public consultation conducted by the Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Security at Honduras’s National Autonomous University found that 75 percent of respondents

22

Jeff Ernst, et al. “US Foreign Aid To The Northern Triangle 2014–2019: Promoting Success By Learning From The Past,” Wilson Center, December 2020.

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Jordi Amaral believed MACCIH should continue to operate.”23 There is a high level of public support and demand for these types of institutions which can be mobilized to motivate their implementation and maintenance. Grassroots pressure from civil society and the general public is key: politicians must be shown that they will not survive the next election cycle if they do not seek change.

To grant independence and authority to the region’s weak judicial systems, it is vital to place emphasis on economic incentives. An independent and stronger judicial system will stimulate higher levels of foreign direct investment and opportunities for economic growth, which are both financially and politically beneficial for decision makers. The economy is the pillar on which societies and individuals stand, and the opportunities for enhanced development due to reforms could be an effective inspiration for change. Although popular and economic incentives will be imperative to encourage change, the harsh reality is that political will and virtue will be necessary to enact these reforms. Genuine change will require genuine leaders.

Transparency and Openness The governments of the Northern Triangle must also work to increase transparency and open access to information for the region’s judicial systems. Access to information on cases and proceedings needs to be expanded, as it is sorely lacking. In Honduras, the Judiciary has “not publicized information on their institutional web pages as required by law.”24 Freedom of Information requests and public-facing websites can be tricky to navigate and frustrating to engage with. This is a stumbling block for public accountability and continued growth of the judicial system. Increasing digitization and consolidation of resources and public information will help individuals, businesses, and researchers alike.

23

Ibid.

“Transparency in Honduras,” Washington Office on Latin America, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, and Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad, September 2019.

24

42

Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle The lack of transparency in the selection of judges in the region is troubling. Judges are more typically chosen based on corrupt political interests than actual qualifications, thus weakening the judicial system. Guatemalan judges are selected through a complex process in which commissions vet and choose candidates that are ultimately selected by Congress. This process, however, is often conducted behind closed doors and quietly overtaken by corrupted interests without full citizen participation.25 In 2020, fifteen candidates chosen by the Nominating Commissions “were implicated in improperly influencing their own selection process.”26 In El Salvador, too, issues have arisen around the selection of judges. In 2018, “legislators openly admitted that the months of negotiations were meant to ensure that each party got someone they felt served their interests.” And there is a complete lack of transparency in candidate selection processes for a variety of other positions, including Attorney General.27 These processes need to be made more transparent, with documents and information made available online for public access. Otherwise, the opaque status quo will continue, and the region’s judicial systems will remain weak.

Increasing transparency helps facilitate accountability, as well as research and understanding of how the judicial system functions. This better positions civil society organizations and other actors to advocate for policy and improve the system. Moreover, increased transparency and openness helps facilitate regional coordination and best practice sharing between the countries of the Northern Triangle and their neighbors. Learning from each other’s successes and failures is incredibly important, and by improving transparency, the countries of the Northern

25

“La epidemia de la corrupción en el sistema de justicia guatemalteco,” Due Process of Law Foundation, May 13, 2020.

26 “Guatemala: Congress Assaulting Judicial Independence,” Human Rights Watch, November 17, 2020.

27 Geoff Thale and Kevin Amaya, “El Salvador Makes Mixed Progress in Strengthening Rule of Law,” Washington Office on Latin America, December 21, 2018.

43

Jordi Amaral Triangle can extend opportunities for growth and development of judicial systems in a mutualistic, effective manner.

Committed and Effective Investment Justice in the Northern Triangle is dispensed inefficiently and ineffectively due to understaffing and a lack of reach. The judicial system is overburdened, and committed investment will be necessary to ensure appropriate caseloads and that access to the judicial system is achieved equitably and inclusively. While the Alliance for Prosperity called for investment focused on economic development, and was mainly funded by the Northern Triangle countries themselves, a similar level of internal buy-in and investment must be made by the region for efforts to strengthen the judicial system. Investing in their own progress ensures the governments are committed to this end.

High levels of case backlogs are a major contributor to insecurity and impunity, and are in need of greater investment. Funds should be devoted to hiring more personnel across the board, with particular emphasis placed on hiring staff dedicated to criminal justice matters and reducing prison overcrowding caused by pre-trial detention. Guatemala’s implementation of a “twenty-four hour courts” system has been instrumental in reducing backlogs,28 and hiring and dedicating personnel to similarly-styled efforts should be introduced across the region. That said, funding should not be solely devoted towards the urban areas with the highest levels of crimes. Considering rural areas and making efforts to prioritize the zones with the least equitable distribution of prosecutors, judges, and public defenders is paramount for inclusivity and overall efficacy of funding.

28

Negroponte, et al.

44

Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle In addition, it is important that the governments of the Northern Triangle protect their investments: judges, prosecutors, and members of the region’s judicial systems often experience harassment, threats, and even outright violence as a result of the vital role they play in administering justice. Last year, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights–an autonomous institution of the OAS–was forced to take precautionary measures to protect five Guatemalan judges, as they had received violent, criminal threats as a result of their work.29 Providing protection is necessary to ensure these actors’ work is not obstructed and justice may be achieved, and the onus is on the region’s governments, themselves, to supply it. The countries of the Northern Triangle need to insure their investments and efforts to strengthen the region’s weak judicial systems.

Policy Recommendations for the United States Although ultimately it is up to the countries of the Northern Triangle to take action and control their own destinies, the United States can play a guiding role in strengthening the region’s weak judicial systems. Conditional aid and other forms of assistance, such as training and technical support, are instrumental. Applying pressure on governments and maintaining a vocal presence in the region, too, should play a role in US policy vis-à-vis the Northern Triangle’s judicial systems.

Conditional Aid for the Northern Triangle’s Judicial Systems Conditional aid is the name of the game, and should be a pillar of US policy in the region.

The United States can help the governments of the Northern Triangle invest in their judicial systems, helping provide funding for any needed equipment and technology. This is a particularly salient need given the remote nature of work amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, aid from the United States can help fill in the gaps for hiring personnel and alleviate the burdens placed on

29

“Guatemala: CIDH dicta medidas cautelares a favor de jueces amenazados,” VOA Noticias, October 28, 2019.

45

Jordi Amaral understaffed and underfunded judicial systems in the region. In the past, the United States promised over $50 million to CICIG over ten years, and helped fund anti-corruption and antiimpunity initiatives. US officials have noted that “CICIG and MACCIH represented among the most cost-effective investments in the region for the United States to combat impunity and corruption, and their dismantlement is a setback for US objectives.”30 Helping fund new initiatives modeled after CICIG would be an excellent use of money.

Funding, however, must not come without strings attached: special emphasis should be placed on strict conditionality. If the governments of the Northern Triangle fail to maintain a committed approach to anti-corruption and anti-impunity, funding should be suspended until action is taken. This applies similarly to other issues such as human rights abuses and antidemocratic and authoritarian behavior. Currently, 50% of aid to Guatemala is conditioned upon the State Department certifying that Guatemala’s government is “cooperating with commissions against corruption and impunity.”31 But this conditionality must not be a bluff: it must be a committed, legitimate conditionality that is strictly upheld by the US government. While threats to cut development aid are not typically effective since most of the funds are provided directly to NGOs and private firms instead of the government, aid for security and military assistance is given directly to host governments, and proves an exception to this rule.32 As a result, linking conditional aid cuts to military and security funding will be a more persuasive method.

Assessing the impact of aid is also quite important. Diving into the numbers to examine the strength of the judicial system is an effective way to measure results and recalibrate approaches.

Some statistics that should be highlighted in analyses are personnel per 100,000 inhabitants,

30

Ernst, et al.

“Cardin Leads Colleagues, Including Leahy, In Urging Greater U.S. Leadership To Combat Guatemalan Corruption, Support CICIG,” Office of US Senator Patrick Leahy, September 27, 2018.

32 Ernst, et al.

31

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Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle average caseload per prosecutor and judge, impunity rates, and average time it takes for a defendant’s trial from the filing of charges to ruling and sentencing. Quantitative methods are not enough, though: qualitative analysis should also be conducted by interviewing members of the judicial system, members of the general public, and writing reports on the impact of aid. Although impact should be considered on a year-to-year basis, it is crucial the United States employs a longterm lens in its analysis. Structural, institutional change does not have an instant, transformative effect, but rather sets the stage for greater, more impactful change in the long run. Long term outcomes should not be sacrificed for short-term interests.

Other Forms of Assistance Conditional, financial assistance is not the only form of backing the United States can provide: technical and logistical support are crucial. The United States has already established many efforts to provide technical support and training for the region’s judicial systems in the past, and should look to double down on these existing programs. Training of prosecutors, forensic scientists, and other members of the judicial system has been a key component of US policy, particularly within the contexts of CICIG and MACCIH.33 Any new CICIG-styled initiatives would be in great need of US assistance to get up and running and start implementing change.

Furthermore, creating mentorship opportunities for young people pursuing the legal field could be a productive way of investing in future generations that will uphold the region’s judicial systems.

In the short term, the United States can additionally help by providing food and humanitarian assistance in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the devastating Hurricanes Eta and Iota. The region is suffering and in need of help feeding its people, providing health care, and rebuilding housing and infrastructure. By providing this assistance, the United States can

33

Ibid.

47

Jordi Amaral create flexibility for the governments of the Northern Triangle. This will make it easier for them to devote more of their own attention and funding towards strengthening judiciaries and institutionbuilding, which will reap the greatest benefits in the long run. Amid a plethora of issues, efforts must be made to guarantee that the region’s weak judicial systems are prioritized.

The United States can also help the Northern Triangle by wielding its immense power in the international sphere for the betterment of its smaller neighbors. With this, the United States can advocate for the interests of the Northern Triangle countries in international organizations and multilateral institutions; this could include pushing for low-interest loans and possible debt forgiveness. It is important to stress economic incentives for the region’s political elites in order to ensure they take action to strengthen judicial systems, and as a result, the financial leverage the United States holds in the global area could be an influential “carrot” factor.

Applying Pressure The United States must be a vocal actor and apply pressure on the governments of the Northern Triangle to keep them committed to the task at hand. Pressure from the United States has been instrumental in the past, and even helped stymie former Guatemalan president Pérez Molina’s attempts to impede a CICIG investigation of himself.34 But the Trump administration has stayed silent, and CICIG and MACCIH were able to shut down more easily due to a lack of concerted pressure from the United States. The United States needs to play a pivotal role in incentivizing the implementation of CICIG-like initiatives and strengthening of judicial systems in the region.

Presently in El Salvador, CICIES and the Salvadoran Attorney General’s Office have looked to hold the Bukele administration accountable for possible corruption related to the use of emergency

34

Ibid.

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Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle pandemic funds, but Bukele seeks to shut them up.35 The United States must become more vocal, advocating for independence and the continuation of investigations.

Targeted sanctions against individuals is another tool that can be utilized to create pressure, and can be particularly effective against the global elite of the Northern Triangle. Whereas sectoral sanctions or developmental aid cuts have the potential to create adverse effects for the general populace, utilizing the Magnitsky Act and a range of other diplomatic tools to apply pressure on individuals can be a more constructive form of coercion. In addition, the United States can engage the greater international community, calling for other actors to apply pressure on the governments of the Northern Triangle, both through multilateral targeted sanctions and increasing rhetorical, soft-power pressure.

Supporting civil society on the ground in the region can also be an incredibly effective way of applying pressure. This can take the form of funding civil society organizations, as well as giving them larger-scale platforms to spread their message. Currently, USAID’s efforts in governance include “five projects supporting civil society organizations to engage in public policy advocacy,” and the agency has overseen the expansion and development of civil society in the region over the last 15 years.36 The United States should expand this funding in order to help facilitate the continued development of a vocal and influential civil society that can effectively advocate for the strengthening of the region’s judicial systems. One failure of the Alliance for Prosperity Plan was that it sidelined and ignored civil society in an attempt to produce a quick response to US pressure for an answer to the unaccompanied child migrant crisis. At the time, the United States did not appropriately direct pressure towards including civil society in decision-

35

Alex Papadovassilakis, “With Pandemic Raids, Bukele Government Faces Major Investigation in El Salvador,” InSight Crime, November 23, 2020.

36 Ernst, et al.

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Jordi Amaral making. In the future, the United States should seek to adopt bottom-up approaches. Something as small as a tweet from a ranking US official can make front page news in the countries of the Northern Triangle, and amplifying the voices of indigenous civil society will grant them more power and sway. It is vital that civil society and the general populace provide grassroots pressure on their government, and the United States can play a role by supporting them–the United States can help create conditions for the region’s civil society to thrive.

Migration If these policy recommendations are put into place effectively and the judicial systems of the Northern Triangle are strengthened, this would help reduce insecurity and economic underdevelopment in the region. Ultimately reducing violence and promoting economic growth through a greater focus on creating more robust judicial systems would thus strengthen the societies of the Northern Triangle and reduce the push factors for migration. Migration flows from the Northern Triangle to the United States would likely be diminished, and become less heavily composed of asylum seekers. While economically-driven migration would have less incentives, it would still remain relevant, and need to be addressed.

Policy Recommendations for Long-term Changes to the US Migration System Although violence and insecurity are likely to fall as a result of focusing on the challenge of the region’s weak judicial systems, the United States should still expand access to asylum to include those fleeing generalized violence. Central American migrants fleeing insecurity are in desperate need of protection, and it is highly unlikely this need will diminish entirely. The current definition for asylum outlined in the Immigration and Nationality Act fails to properly respond to this major push factor, and should be expanded.

50

Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle The asylum process and immigration system should be made more equitable and inclusive.

Beyond more short-term changes, such as immediately rolling back highly restrictive policies from the Trump administration like Remain in Mexico and Safe Third Country Agreements, there are many structural changes that the United States can make in the long run. For one, expanding opportunities for community sponsorship of refugees would help refugees assimilate in the United States and facilitate protection for asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle. President-elect Biden has already advocated for growing access, stating “I will pursue policies that increase opportunities for faith and local communities to sponsor refugee resettlement.”37 More needs to be done to support migrants in the process of seeking asylum and avoiding deportation. Migrants are not constitutionally entitled to legal counsel, and, as a result, less than 40% of immigrants have legal representation during their removal cases.38 Many migrants are unable to pay for legal services, and without representation they are less likely to receive a just verdict. The United States should provide access to counsel to all those seeking asylum or in deportation proceedings so as to ensure due process of law and an equitable immigration system that does not discriminate on the basis of wealth.

Increasing access to economic migration in the long-term should be made a priority, particularly if security issues are appropriately addressed and become less relevant factors for migrants. Increasing access to work visas for persons from the Northern Triangle would be a great step to both discourage unauthorized migration and aid the US economy, with many prominent immigration experts, such as Tamar Jacoby, advocating for an employer-based immigration

37

Matthew La Corte and Laura J.W. Keppley, “Support Swells for U.S. to Expand Opportunities for Community Sponsorship of Refugees,” Niskanen Center, December 8, 2020.

38 Ingrid Eagly and Steven Shafer, “Access to Counsel in Immigration Court,” American Immigration Council, September 28, 2016.

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Jordi Amaral system.39 The Migration Policy Institute recently released a report in which they discussed temporary visas for Mexican workers and the potential to expand access for Central Americans.40 This type of initiative should be expanded to workers in the Northern Triangle and seek to match Central American job-seekers with established sectors in the United States that lack sufficient personnel, such as the agricultural sector. Biden has committed to “(working) with Congress to increase the number of visas awarded for permanent, employment-based immigration,”41 and this should be a principal goal of his administration. In addition, expanding access to student and temporary work visas for young adults and recent graduates would facilitate lasting cross-cultural exchange and strengthen human capital within the Northern Triangle, which is essential for development. This should also include scholarships for students, which would be another form of aid to the region. The United States should look to prioritize an economics-oriented lens in its approach to future migration.

Conclusion High levels of insecurity and economic underdevelopment have driven migrants from the Northern Triangle to the United States for years. While a comprehensive approach is certainly necessary in order to appropriately and effectively respond to the multifaceted nature of push factors for migrants, addressing the region’s weak judicial systems must be the lynchpin of any approach: without strong judicial systems, any efforts to stem migration through violence prevention or job creation will not reach their full potential. The countries of the Northern Triangle should grant further autonomy and authority to judicial systems, creating initiatives modeled after the successes of CICIG. Increasing transparency and investment in the judicial system, too, will

39

Tamar Jacoby, “Guest Workers Are the Best Border Security,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2013.

Andrew Selee and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, “Building a New Regional Migration System: Redefining U.S. Cooperation with Mexico and Central America,” Migration Policy Institute, November 2020.

41 “The Biden Plan For Securing Our Values As A Nation Of Immigrants,” Biden Harris, 2020.

40

52

Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle be vital. The United States, meanwhile, should seek to provide conditional governmental aid and other forms of assistance, such as training and humanitarian aid, in order to complement these efforts, while applying pressure and maintaining a determined voice in the region. In the long run, the United States should expand access to asylum, establish a more equitable immigration system, and increase pathways for economic migration. This is a historic moment amid the advent of the Biden administration, the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, and frequent natural disasters such as Hurricanes Eta and Iota: the time for action is now.

53

Jordi Amaral Bibliography “Cardin Leads Colleagues, Including Leahy, In Urging Greater U.S. Leadership To Combat Guatemalan Corruption, Support CICIG.” Office of US Senator Patrick Leahy.

September 27, 2018. https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/cardin-leads-colleaguesincluding-leahy-in-urging-greater-us-leadership-to-combat-guatemalan-corruptionsupport-cicig.

Castellanos, Gabriela, Odir Fernández, Mauricio Díaz Burdertt, Rodulio Perdomo, Leonel Eduardo Cardona, César Antonio Espinal, and Henry Alexander Salinas. “Estudio: la estimación del impacto macroeconómico de la corrupción en Honduras.” Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción. 2020. https://fosdeh.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Estimacion-de-la-corrupcion-en-hn.pdf.

“Central America Monitor: Evaluating Progress.” Washington Office on Latin America. https://www.wola.org/cam/.

Chavez, Suchit and Jessica Avalos. “The Northern Triangle: The Countries That Don’t Cry for Their Dead.” InSight Crime. April 23, 2014. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-northern-triangle-the-countries-thatdont-cry-for-their-dead/.

Eagly, Ingrid and Steven Shafer. “Access to Counsel in Immigration Court.” American Immigration Council. September 28, 2016. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/access-counsel-immigrationcourt.

“Ease of Doing Business in El Salvador.” World Bank. https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/el-salvador#DB_ec.

“Ease of Doing Business in Guatemala.” World Bank. https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/guatemala#DB_ec.

“Ease of Doing Business in Honduras.” World Bank. https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/honduras#DB_ec.

“El Salvador: World Prison Brief data.” World Prison Brief. https://www.prisonstudies.org/country/el-salvador.

“El Salvador’s Justice System.” Washington Office on Latin America and University Institute for Public Opinion. August 2019. https://www.wola.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Justicia-SV-ENG-4.1.pdf.

Ernst, Jeff, Kelly Josh, Eric L. Olson, Kristen Sample, and Ricardo Zúñiga. “US Foreign Aid To The Northern Triangle 2014–2019: Promoting Success By Learning From The Past.”

Wilson Center. December 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/LAP_201109US%20Foreign%20Aid%20Northern%20Triangle-FINALr6.pdf.

“Escalas de impunidad en el mundo. Índice Global de Impunidad 2020.” Fundación Universidad de las Américas, Puebla. August 2020. https://www.udlap.mx/cesij/files/indicesglobales/0-IGI-2020-UDLAP.pdf.

“From hope to skepticism: The International Commission Against Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES).” Due Process of Law Foundation. April 1, 2020. https://dplfblog.com/2020/04/01/from-hope-to-skepticism-cicies/.

Goodwin, Zachary and Héctor Silva Ávalos. “Guatemala’s New Anti-Corruption Body: a Mere

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Weak Judicial Systems and Migration in the Northern Triangle Smokescreen?” InSight Crime. July 21, 2020. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/guatemala-corruption-secretariat/.

“Guatemala: CIDH dicta medidas cautelares a favor de jueces amenazados.” VOA Noticias.

October 28, 2019. https://www.voanoticias.com/america-latina/guatemala-crimenamenazas-jueces-cidh.

“Guatemala: Congress Assaulting Judicial Independence.” Human Rights Watch. November 17, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/17/guatemala-congress-assaulting-judicialindependence#.

“Guatemala’s Justice System.” Washington Office on Latin America and Fundación Myrna Mack. June 2019. https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Justicia-GT-ENG3.10-1.pdf.

“Guatemala: World Prison Brief data.” World Prison Brief. https://www.prisonstudies.org/country/guatemala.

“Honduras’ Justice System.” Washington Office on Latin America, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, and Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad.

September 2019. https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Justicia-HN-ENG9.13.pdf.

“Honduras: World Prison Brief data.” World Prison Brief. https://www.prisonstudies.org/country/honduras.

Jacoby, Tamar. “Guest Workers Are the Best Border Security.” Wall Street Journal. June 11, 2013. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324634304578535823045836956.

La Corte, Matthew and Laura J.W. Keppley. “Support Swells for U.S. to Expand Opportunities for Community Sponsorship of Refugees.” Niskanen Center. December 8, 2020. https://www.niskanencenter.org/support-swells-for-u-s-to-expand-opportunities-forcommunity-sponsorship-of-refugees/.

“La epidemia de la corrupción en el sistema de justicia guatemalteco.” Due Process of Law Foundation. May 13, 2020. https://dplfblog.com/2020/05/13/la-epidemia-de-lacorrupcion-en-el-sistema-de-justicia-guatemalteco/.

Lapper, Richard. “Central America Is As Violent As Ever. What Would it Take to Change?”

America’s Quarterly. April 11, 2016. https://www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/central-america-is-as-violent-as-everwhat-would-it-take-to-change/.

Negroponte, John, Eduardo Stein, Maria Eugenia Brizuela de Avila, Luis Cosenza, and Jason Marczak, “Building a Better Future: A Blueprint for Central America’s Northern Triangle.” Atlantic Council. May 2017. https://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/northerntriangle/assets/AC_Northern_Triangle.pdf.

Papadovassilakis, Alex. “With Pandemic Raids, Bukele Government Faces Major Investigation in El Salvador.” InSight Crime. November 23, 2020. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/pandemic-raids-bukele-investigation/.

“Saving Guatemala’s Fight Against Crime and Impunity.” International Crisis Group. October 24, 2018. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/centralamerica/guatemala/70-saving-guatemalas-fight-against-crime-and-impunity.

Schneider, Mark L. “Anti-Corruption in the Americas: What Works?” Center for Strategic and

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Jordi Amaral International Studies. February 2020. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/200225_Schneider_America_WEB%20FINAL.pdf?bXE.AxCV9fKfK _p8z9JLbaaOjvqX_._o.

Selee, Andrew and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto. “Building a New Regional Migration System: Redefining U.S. Cooperation with Mexico and Central America.” Migration Policy Institute.

November 2020. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/new-regional-migrationsystem-us-mexico-central-america.

Silva Ávalos, Héctor and Seth Robbins. “A Death Foretold: MACCIH Shuts Down in Honduras.” InSight Crime. January 22, 2020. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/a-death-foretold-maccih-shuts-down-inhonduras/.

Silva Ávalos, Héctor. “Honduras’ New Criminal Code Will Help Impunity Prosper.” InSight Crime. June 29, 2020. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/honduras-newcriminal-code/.

Thale, Geoff and Kevin Amaya. “El Salvador Makes Mixed Progress in Strengthening Rule of Law.” Washington Office on Latin America. December 21, 2018. https://www.wola.org/analysis/el-salvador-makes-mixed-progress-strengthening-rulelaw.

“The Biden Plan For Securing Our Values As A Nation Of Immigrants.” Biden Harris. 2020. https://joebiden.com/immigration/.

“Transparency in Honduras.” Washington Office on Latin America, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, and Instituto Universitario en Democracia, Paz y Seguridad.

September 2019. https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Transparencia-HNENG-3.3.pdf.

“World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2020.” World Justice Project. 2020. https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020Online_0.pdf.

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Trash, Tools or Belongings?: Views of Material along the Mexico-U.S. Border

By Ian Rice ABSTRACT: Since the mid-1990s, U.S. immigration policy has weaponized the harsh landscape of the Mexico-U.S. border to deter unauthorized migration. This strategy has not only increased the risks of migration, but has also resulted in tons of material discarded by migrants throughout the border region. These objects are frequently characterized as ‘trash’, justifying their removal and laying groundwork for a political alliance between ecological and anti-migratory movements. However, artistic works by J. Leigh Garcia and Tom Kiefer provoke reinterpretations of migrants’ discarded objects as tools and belongings. Drawing out the implications of these new interpretations, I deconstruct the ‘human’/ ‘nature’ and ‘human’/ ‘material’ binaries to problematize the concept of ‘trash’ and the aforementioned political alliance. Moving away from these oversimplified binaries, I advocate a shift towards an interconnected understanding of ‘human’, ‘nature’, and ‘material’.

Introduction Migration due to wars, persecution, and economic, social, and environmental problems has increased globally, as have international efforts to reduce and control it. One region commonly associated with migration is the border between Mexico and the United States.

Dividing these countries is a nearly 2,000-mile stretch, whose terrain varies between hills, deserts, mountains, rivers and beaches. The rugged landscape plays an important role in U.S. border enforcement, as anti-migratory policies like Operation Gatekeeper convert the border environment into a weapon, a geographical tool used by the U.S. to control migration.1 Collectively called “Prevention Through Deterrence” or PTD, these border policies increased enforcement in urban areas to push migration away from cities. Migrants would be forced to cross at more rural parts of the border, so the thinking went, and would be deterred by

1

Jason De León, The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 4-5.

57

Ian Rice the much more difficult and dangerous passage.2 Although the usage of border geography to deter migration has been well documented, less examined is the link between PTD and the buildup of tons of material discarded by migrants along the border.3 These objects, frequently characterized as ‘trash’,4 and the relationship they enable between anti-migratory and environmental politics, are what I will investigate in this essay.

As a gateway to critically examining the material at the border, I refer to the artistic exhibitions of J. Leigh Garcia and Tom Kiefer. In their beautiful, powerful and inspiring work, the artists respectively offer intriguing visions of ‘trash’ as it relates to migration and the border environment.

J. Leigh Garcia is a Mexican-American artist specializing in printmaking who finds inspiration in her bicultural heritage. On one side, Garcia comes from European migrants who have resided in Texas for seven generations. On the other, she is the granddaughter of Mexican migrants, whose grandfather swam across the Rio Grande to cross into the United States.

Through her artwork, Garcia explores the tension she feels between Mexican and Texan cultures and aims to “encourage awareness of our current immigration and foreign affairs policies by confronting viewers with the gruesome reality that death occurs daily on the Mexico-U.S. border.”5 Tom Kiefer, an American photographer based in Arizona, also makes the material effects of the U.S. migration system central to his work. While employed as a janitor in a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processing facility, Kiefer began photographing detained migrants’ 2

De León, Open Graves, 6.

Lisa Meierotto, “Environmental Disruption as a Consequence of Human Migration: The Case of the U.S.-Mexico Border,” in Migration and Disruptions: Toward a Unifying Theory of Ancient and Contemporary Migrations, ed.

Brenda J. Baker and Takeyuki Tsuda (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015), 186, 188.

4 I use quotation marks to call the term ‘trash’ into question throughout the essay.

5 J. Leigh Garcia, “The Violent Environments of the Mexico-U.S. Border,” Edge Effects, February 1, 2018, https://edgeeffects.net/immigration-art.

3

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Trash, Tools or Belongings? belongings that were deemed ‘non-essential’ and discarded. His exhibition El Sueño Americano / The American Dream showcases those belongings to “explore the humanity of those who risk their lives crossing the desert into the United States to create a personal connection for the viewer and to extend compassion and empathy to those who seek a better life.”6

This essay is divided into four parts. The first analyzes the artwork of J. Leigh Garcia to understand how ‘trash’ is represented in the contexts of the border, the environment, and migration. I use the concept of defamiliarization proposed by Russian Formalist Viktor Shklovsky to show that Garcia’s art provokes a reevaluation of the concept of ‘trash’. In the second part, I demonstrate the utility of border materials through Tom Kiefer’s photography, arguing that the term ‘tool’ is appropriate to describe them. Moving forward, the third section of the essay offers yet another term, ‘belongings’, to refer to the material at the border. Finally, by developing the implications of the term ‘belongings’ with respect to the ‘human’/ ‘nature’ binary, I problematize the alliance of environmental and anti-migratory politics. Using the Postructuralist technique of deconstruction and Ecocriticism, I conclude that an interconnected interpretation of ‘material’, ‘human’, and ‘nature’ invalidates this political alliance and the concept of ‘trash’.

I: Border material as ‘trash’ ‘Trash’ is visible everywhere, from streets and houses to the ocean and in space. While it provokes a feeling of repulsion in some cases, ‘trash’ is frequently considered mundane, making it invisible, disposable, or forgettable. The theorist Viktor Shklovsky observes, “[a]fter we see an object several times, we begin to recognize it. The object is in front of us and we know about

6

Tom Kiefer, “El Sueño Americano / The American Dream,” T O M K I E F E R, access date March 28, 2021, https://www.tomkiefer.com/el-sueno-americano.

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Ian Rice it, but we do not see it--hence we cannot say anything significant about it.”7 ‘Trash’ is one such commonplace object. Even though the specific items making up ‘trash’ differ, the parts are grouped together and collectively labeled ‘trash’, meaning that people become familiar with it.

To formulate a new perspective about an object, then, Shklovsky proposes the technique of defamiliarization: “The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged.”8 Upon intensifying or varying the mode of perception, Shklovsky suggests that one can access new points of view of an object.

Although Shklovsky centers his theory in literature, his technique of defamiliarization also applies to the broader artistic world. Defamiliarization occurs when observing the work of artist J. Leigh Garcia, where common items such as gallon jugs of water become key elements that provoke a lengthier perception. For example, her serigraph Asilo (Asylum) depicts a migrant lying prone on top of cacti and wire fencing, partially covered with a blanket of plastic jugs. The fencing and the cacti interlace to become a bed, symbolizing a connection between U.S. immigration policy and the border landscape. Additionally, the plastic jugs that cover the person hint at a taxonomical tension: are they tools to survive, or are they ‘trash’? Whether the water jugs are survival tools or not, the viewer quickly realizes that the migrant will not rise again. The body of the person seems too comfortable amid the spiny nest, reminding that for some migrants the only asylum received is death.

In presenting this death, Garcia further defamiliarizes ‘trash’ through the medium of her work. Her artwork is physical, or rather, it has a material presence and calls attention to this fact.

7

Viktor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Literary Theory: An Anthology, 3rd ed., ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2017), 9.

8 Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” 9.

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Trash, Tools or Belongings?

Instead of printing Asilo (Asylum) on paper, the artist chooses to place the design on a piece of plastic tarp. Consequently, she asks the viewer to focus on the plastic and judge the value it has (or lacks). The inspiration for this work came from the 2013 controversy of the Sacred Heart Cemetery in Texas, where the remains of more than 300 migrants were discovered “buried less than six feet underground in body bags, trash bags, plastic wrap and even a milk crate.”9 Given the tragic context of Garcia’s plastic-based print Asilo (Asylum), the viewer begins to visualize some of the complex linkages between migration, the environment, and border ‘trash’.

Another of Garcia’s serigraphs that aids in defamiliarization is Santo Toribio Romo Gonzalez y Los Coyotes. This work depicts the patron saint of migrants in the middle of the desert, standing atop a mound of plastic gallon jugs encircled by coyotes. Seeing Santo Toribio not in a church but on a modern-day migrant trail draws the viewer in, which defamiliarizes the surrounding materials. In the saint’s presence, the commonplace plastic water jugs become extraordinary, even miraculous, and resist being labeled ‘trash’. By elevating the water containers to Santo Toribio’s level, Garcia frames them as a lifesaving tool, with similar importance to the patron saint’s spiritual guidance in today’s migrations. She explains, “[t]he Sonoran Desert today is littered by trails of discarded water jugs, backpacks, clothing, and rosaries left by immigrants passing through. These abandoned objects are reminders of those who have made this journey before and act as a trail for future immigrants to follow.”10 Using Santo Toribio’s presence to defamiliarize the viewer, Garcia elevates border ‘trash’ to new importance and enables an interpretation of the discarded items as survival tools.

Each of Garcia’s works strongly criticize the U.S. immigration system. In the first, the combination of the wire fencing and the cacti expose some of the risks migrants face during their

9

Garcia, “Violent Environments.”

Garcia, “Violent Environments.”

10

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Ian Rice journey. The wire fencing represents the border enforcement mechanisms put in place by the U.S., while the cacti allude to PTD’s geographical method of combating migration. In the second work, the circle of coyotes around Santo Toribio references the need to employ a human smuggler, called a coyote, to facilitate clandestine migration into the U.S. Coyotes may be skilled at navigating the treacherous borderlands that PTD has weaponized, but they are notorious for taking advantage of migrants. Garcia explains that “[t]he coyotes cower around Santo Toribio, who is there to protect the people they exploit.”11 The artist’s work attributes the scale of danger along the border to U.S. border policy that impedes migration of all types.

Garcia further criticizes the U.S. migration system from an environmental perspective, through the presence of plastic jugs in both images. Her work reminds the viewer how these jugs carry the water that migrants depend on, and alludes to the border policies that push migrants towards the desert and create that very need for water. While the containers are often discarded in the borderlands by migrants, Garcia’s representations of the jugs resist a simple migrant ‘trash’ narrative. Instead, she draws attention to the overarching political structures, where the jugs “symbolize the environmental toll of the United States’ immigration system.”12 The recurrent theme of plastic across Garcia’s work reminds the viewer how migration affects the border environment while also pointing to the system that is ultimately responsible.

II: Border material as tools The artwork of Garcia defamiliarizes the objects seen daily along the border by introducing new facets of them--for example whether they have value. Similarly, one theme that Tom Kiefer’s exhibition “El Sueño Americano / The American Dream” explores is the utility of border ‘trash’ as a survival tool. The objects displayed in the exhibition are detained migrants’

11 12

Garcia, “Violent Environments.”

Garcia, “Violent Environments.”

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Trash, Tools or Belongings? belongings, which CBP deemed unnecessary and discarded. But Kiefer pushes back against that characterization. His photo “Duct Tape Water Bottle, 2017” showcases one of the most common items found along the border: a plastic jug covered in duct tape. Instead of seeing its alleged worthlessness, Kiefer reminds the viewer of the bottle’s original purpose: carrying all-important water in arid border regions. The caption reads: “[o]ne gallon of water weighs 8.36 pounds. A bare minimum of one gallon of water per day is needed when temperatures exceed 80 degrees when physical activity is involved to avoid severe dehydration...The average number of days it takes a migrant to cross the desert is about seven.”13 The anthropologist and archeologist Jason De León explains that gallon-sized water containers are ubiquitous at the border because they are crucial survival tools for migrants. “In no uncertain terms, bottled water is what keeps people alive … Migrants favor this style because its large handle and thick walls make it durable and easier to carry on long walks.”14 Additionally, De León notes that it is common to camouflage the bottles with fabric, plastic, or paint to avoid the Border Patrol.15 In Kiefer’s photo, the duct tape likely served to reinforce the bottle while camouflaging it, suggesting that this object is more appropriately classified as a tool, not ‘trash’.

Another photo of Kiefer’s, “Trail Markers”, also demonstrates the utility of the supposedly unnecessary objects. In the photo, seven yellow rubber ducks sit on top of a black box, showing off their vibrant color. The color aids migrants as they search for the most efficient route to the U.S. in a landscape with few reference points. The caption explains, “[b]rightly colored objects are placed along a path to assist those traveling behind them. These

13

Kiefer, “El Sueño.”

Jason De León, “‘Better to Be Hot than Caught’: Excavating the Conflicting Roles of Migrant Material Culture,” American Anthropologist 114, no. 3 (September 2012): 484, www.jstor.org/stable/23322335.

15 De León, “Better to Be Hot,” 484.

14

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Ian Rice rubber ducks were used as trail markers, one of which still had a twist-tie used to fasten to a bush or tree branch.”16 Again, Kiefer exhibits the practicality of these materials, resisting their initial characterization as worthless ‘trash’.

As with the work of J. Leigh Garcia, analyzing the medium Kiefer employs to present border material illuminates important points about ‘trash’. First, his photos create a unique representation of the objects. Instead of grouping them together under a common label of ‘trash’, Kiefer uses a more focused perspective to emphasize each object’s singularity. The material that stands out is quotidian--sunglasses, tubes of toothpaste, canned tuna--but it conveys importance and necessity through this medium. Secondly, Kiefer emphasizes the importance of these objects throughout the entire collection of photographs. When seen together, the viewer realizes that these objects once traveled with migrants and may have made the difference between life and death during the crossing. The viewer can imagine the weight of the objects and the emotions experienced by those who carried them. Because of the exhibition, what was ‘trash’ to the CPB transforms into something useful and meaningful to the viewer.

While the next section will address the problematic act of creating sympathy and empathy through objects, for now it is clear from Kiefer’s artwork that border materials help migrants survive crossing attempts. Yet the various methods and tools utilized to endure the suffering of the desert have limited effectiveness. De León clarifies that “[t]he best that any migrant technique can hope to accomplish is assuage some of the suffering experienced in the desert and possibly help someone avoid an untimely death.”17 If these techniques have limited potential, it is necessary to investigate the reason, and rethink the term ‘trash’ from a higher level to observe the political structures at work. The

16 17

Kiefer, “El Sueño.”

De León, “Better to Be Hot,” 493.

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Trash, Tools or Belongings? research of archeologist Gabriella Soto helps to attain this goal. When she arrives at the border, she sees tons of ‘trash’, which inspire her to think about the forces creating such an accumulation. According to Soto: Migrant objects are continually moving into and out of archaeological contexts, used by migrants, left behind accidentally or to lighten a load, later retrieved by others, transported for deposition in a landfill, or preserved. The closest analogy I can find is community responses to war or natural disasters: picking through the debris and ruins, making decisions about what can be saved or not, each choice laden with a drive to bring order to events beyond control.18 Through the lens of ruins, Soto reveals the impact that U.S. border policy has on the landscape. It is not by chance that many tons of discarded material lie in isolated regions between Mexico and the U.S., but rather a direct result of PTD pushing migrants towards dangerous terrain. Put simply, “the markers of disaster--deaths and piling ruins--are products of border security policy.”19 Therefore, U.S. immigration policy bears much responsibility for the danger of the border landscape and the need to carry tools to survive, which are ultimately discarded at that very border.

III: Border material as belongings While one way of rethinking ‘trash’ is to see it as a survival tool, another is conceptualizing this material as migrant belongings. In this way, the objects become valuable (differentiating them from ‘trash’) and communicate an ambiguous idea of humanity. To clarify this idea, Soto describes the border objects as: everyday things made into something “more” by their presence in such massive quantities in extremely harsh landscapes. Many times, these things seemed recently abandoned, as if the owner was just around the corner. It provoked a kind of ghostly feeling to be both

18

Gabriella Soto, “Object Afterlives and the Burden of History: Between ‘Trash’ and ‘Heritage’ in the Steps of Migrants,” American Anthropologist 120, no. 3 (June 17, 2018): 461, https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.13055.

19 Soto, “Object Afterlives,” 461.

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Ian Rice clearly removed and so intimately connected to the objects’ absent owners, and to never know for sure what had happened.20 The photographer Tom Kiefer similarly finds an emotional connection to the belongings discarded by CPB. At first, he collected superficially valuable items such as food, but quickly began saving other discarded things which he found to be significant.21 To him, the objects were not disposable because of their connection to humans. They were “extensions of the human body, especially in light of their owners’ unknown fate.”22 Instead of tools that are distinct from humanity, a lost shoe or abandoned backpack suggest a connection to a human being while emphasizing the absence of one.

However, it is necessary when considering linkages between human and object to highlight a critique of artwork that re-humanizes migrants through their discarded belongings.

The purpose of this artistic style, according to academic Juanita Sundberg, is to forge connections between the viewer and those who used the objects.23 Because the viewer can relate to using a water bottle or a pair of sunglasses, the art might evoke feelings of sympathy for migrants or inspire empathy by showing a common need. Yet the scholar Vicki Squire advises against the use of art to re-humanize migrants, because this can reproduce idealized views of them.24 Garcia’s and especially Kiefer’s work--given his exhibition’s purpose to “explore the humanity”25 of migrants--might evoke dramatized ideas: a strong migrant who braves the desert to reunite with his family in the U.S.; a vulnerable and powerless person crossing through a

20

Gabriella Soto, “What Migrants Leave Behind,” SAPIENS, March 8, 2019, https://www.sapiens.org/culture/mexico-border-migrant-trails/.

21 Soto, “Object Afterlives,” 467.

22 Soto, “Object Afterlives,” 467.

23 Juanita Sundberg, “‘Trash-talk’ and the Production of Quotidian Geopolitical Boundaries in the USA-Mexico Borderlands,” Social and Cultural Geography 9, no. 8 (December 2008): 885-6, https://doi.org/10.1080/14649360802441424.

24 Vicki Squire, “Desert ‘Trash’: Posthumanism, Border Struggles, and Humanitarian Politics,” Political Geography 39 (March 2014): 17, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.12.003.

25 Kiefer, “El Sueño.”

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Trash, Tools or Belongings? hazardous border region. Squire cautions against such simplified and prescriptive narratives, arguing that re-humanization “rests on problematic over- and under-investments of migrant agency in which humans are assumed either as supreme or powerless rather than as embroiled in struggles that are both messy and difficult.”26 Nevertheless, both Garcia and Kiefer’s art is necessary and beneficial. It offers a glimpse into a world where the ambiguous sentiment of ‘something more’ conjured up by migrant belongings is not illogical. Furthermore, it successfully demonstrates that objects along the border are part of a complex and disorganized reality, and that the labels used to define those materials matter. Their powerful artwork even blurs the lines of where border ‘trash’ ends and ‘human subjects’ begin. As Squire explains, “‘human subjects’ are intimately related to the production of ‘objects of trash’--both in the sense that it is people who are conceived as producing waste and also in the sense that the production of waste destabilises the very order on which the category of ‘the human’ rests.”27 By grappling with the complexities of border ‘trash’ Garcia and Kiefer’s art respectively invites deeper queries into how that ‘trash’ orders human existence.

IV: Problematizing ‘trash’ in political discourse Despite the ambiguity and instability of the term ‘trash’, the word is hegemonic in government discourse. For instance, the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality runs the website Arizona Border Trash, which documents material along the border and organizes community events to collect and dispose of the ‘trash’. The site notes that border ‘trash’ is left by undocumented migrants, and characterizes the environmental impact with examples like “Strewn trash and piles”, “Loss of vegetation and wildlife” and “Vandalism, graffiti and site

26 27

Squire, “Desert ‘Trash’,” 17.

Squire, “Desert ‘Trash’,” 15.

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Ian Rice damage (historical and archaeological).”28 The label of ‘trash’ is also applied to border materials in federal government reports. A 2016 Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Arizona report stated: “[d]rug and human smuggling also generate thousands of pounds of garbage in the form of discarded personal items, bicycles, tires, and abandoned vehicles.”29 From the perspective of these organizations, the term ‘trash’ describes all types of objects discarded at the border by migrants.

As one might guess, using this term facilitates an ecological argument against migration.

Describing the material at the border as ‘trash’ signals that the objects are ‘unnatural’, and often presents the ‘artificiality’ of ‘trash’ alongside a pure, ‘natural’ landscape. For example, the BLM report juxtaposes the “remote, rugged and fragile” desert and the migrant routes, which “damage native vegetation and disturb wildlife on public lands.”30 This rhetoric reveals a xenophobic ecological agenda that strategically frames the desert as a victim of foreign intruders to limit unauthorized migration.

This representation of migrants is racist and dehumanizing. First, it draws on racial stereotypes with historical ties to the border, especially perceptions of Mexicans as dirty.31 Sundberg explains that within the Mexico-U.S. borderlands, “undocumented immigrants are produced as a category of people who behave inappropriately by leaving their intimate belongings in the wrong place.”32 Formulating that ‘trash’ is something inherently linked to undocumented migrants, therefore, is a racist assertion that intends to degrade them.

28

Arizona Department of Environmental Quality, “Arizona Border Trash: About,” ADEQ, accessed March 28, 2021, https://www.azbordertrash.gov/about.html.

29 Bureau of Land Management Arizona, Southern Arizona Project Report FY 2015, October 27, 2016, https://www.blm.gov/documents/arizona/public-room/report/southern-arizona-project-report-fy-2015.

30 Bureau of Land Management Arizona, Southern Arizona.

31 Sundberg, “‘Trash-talk’,” 877; Lisa Meierotto, “The Blame Game on the Border: Perceptions of Environmental Degradation on the United States-Mexico Border,” Human Organization 71, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 19, https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.71.1.y5708437tr680151.

32 Sundberg, “‘Trash-talk’,” 877.

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Trash, Tools or Belongings?

Dehumanization also emerges in this representation. An interpretation of ‘trash’ as something without value, unnatural, less than ‘human’ and ugly within a beautiful and ‘natural’ land imposes these characteristics on the people who leave objects along the border.33 The academic Philip Cafaro and biologist Winthrop Staples III establish an ecological argument for limiting immigration to the U.S. that tries to avoid such thinly-veiled racism and dehumanization. To justify limiting migration, the authors point to the United States’ worldleading environmental footprint and contend that more U.S. citizens will only mean the expansion of a pattern of pollution.34 However, there are various problems with Cafaro and Staples’ argument. The authors note that the U.S. population produces extensive pollution, and they aim to limit this quantity instead of changing the mindset and systems that facilitate it.

They answer this critique in the essay, explaining that “re-engineering the world’s largest economy and changing the consumption patterns of hundreds of millions of people are immense undertakings that will be difficult, expensive and (we may assume) only partly successful.”35 But, at the same time, limiting migration to the U.S. is an enormous task that appears just as difficult. Strategies such as building walls, using drones to monitor the border, instituting new laws or expanding the Border Patrol have their own complexities and ecological consequences.

Cafaro and Staples also emphasize the necessity of redoing trade deals such as NAFTA and investing more money into foreign aid.36 These methods are necessary despite being challenging. The academic Priscilla Solis Ybarra expresses her concordance with the authors, but responds, “I wonder why Cafaro and Staples do not shy away from these challenges the same

33

Squire, “Desert ‘Trash’,” 15.

Philip Cafaro and Winthrop Staples III, “The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration to the United States,” Backgrounder, June 2009, 5, https://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2009/back709.pdf.

35 Cafaro and Staples III, “Reducing Immigration,” 5.

36 Cafaro and Staples III, “Reducing Immigration,” 7.

34

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Ian Rice way they do from the prospect of reducing consumption within U.S. boundaries. Foreign policy changes can be just as tall an order as changing U.S. rates of consumption.”37 Cafaro and Staples’ work has important components, but its problems impede its success in justifying a cessation of immigration.

Yet the combination of ecological and anti-migratory politics is problematic for still another reason: it is based on the artificial separation of ‘human’ and ‘nature’. The theorist Slavoj Zizek critiques this style of ecological thinking, arguing that ecology is increasingly resistant to social change as it tries to defend an idealized version of ‘nature’ from ‘human’ actions.38 But this protection actually harms the environment by not taking into account the instability of the ‘human’/ ‘nature’ binary. To apply Zizek’s point, one can think of the border region that BLM Arizona wants to protect from the ‘trash’ and impacts of migration.

Immediately, difficulties emerge in defining the ‘natural’ state which ought to be protected, determining which impacts of migration are harmful, and identifying what is ‘trash’. Zizek posits that “what we need is an ecology without nature: the ultimate obstacle to protecting nature is the very notion of nature we rely on.”39 Therefore, the previously noted instability of the ‘human’ marker combines with the unstable ‘nature’ marker to deconstruct the ‘human’/ ‘nature’ binary and invalidate the ecological argument against migration.

It is not necessary to share the same perspective as Zizek to understand that the aforementioned anti-migratory ecological arguments are based in a false binary and are unsound.

However, problematizing the union of these political currents in this way does not signify that

37

Priscilla Solis Ybarra, Writing the Goodlife: Mexican American Literature and the Environment (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2016), 172.

38 Examined Life, directed by Astra Taylor (2008; Toronto: Zeitgeist Films, 2009), DVD. 39 Slavoj Zizek, “Nature and Its Discontents,” SubStance 37, no. 3 (2008): 58, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25195185.

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Trash, Tools or Belongings? global climate change should not be taken seriously. Neither does it deny or diminish the ecological and humanitarian devastation that exists on the border or the importance of regulated migration. In fact, academic Lisa Meierotto observes that “[l]arge scale migration is one of the most pressing threats to biodiversity conservation efforts today.”40 But it is key, as she identifies, that these threats do not originate from one lone actor. Meierotto suggests that “the causes of environmental harm are not so linear, and multiple actors contribute to degradation in a number of different ways.”41 It is critical to think about the systems that regulate the border environment and their role in its degradation.

The political movements that try to protect the environment by problematizing migrants need to take into account the criticisms this essay illuminates, and consider existing PTD policies which contribute to ecological harm. Unfortunately, it is easier to call an object ‘trash’ and concentrate a critique on one actor instead of reforming the entire system. Still, this essay intends to clarify the problematic nature of doing so. Through the deconstruction of the categories of ‘human’ and ‘nature’, there are new opportunities to rethink the environment and find effective ways of advocating for it.

These epistemes and ontologies are not new. They have been part of Chicanx and Latinx environmentalism for generations, according to Solis Ybarra, although they acquire new importance today. She explains that “Latina/o environmentalism is inextricably linked with social justice issues in the twenty-first century as much as, if not more than, in the past.”42 Considering the combination of political, socioeconomic and cultural tensions that have resulted

40

Meierotto, “Blame Game,” 14.

Meierotto, “Blame Game,” 19.

42 Solis Ybarra, Writing the Goodlife, 180.

41

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Ian Rice in the buildup material at the border, it is clear that any attempt to separate ecology from ‘the human’ and from social justice will not last.43 I return to the work of Garcia, where ‘humans’, ‘objects’, and ‘nature’ are visibly and symbolically interlaced in the borderlands. Her art echoes the powerful Latinx environmentalism discussed by Solis Ybarra, forefronting “social and political change to end this mass displacement and loss of life.”44 In the space of her artwork, ‘the material’, ‘the human’, and ‘the natural’ break free from their categories. They become interwoven, challenging hegemonic notions of the U.S. immigration system and emphasizing the need to critique border ‘trash’, not merely dispose of it.

43 44

Solis Ybarra, Writing the Goodlife, 187.

Garcia, “Violent Environments.”

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Bibliography Arizona Department of Environmental Quality. “Arizona Border Trash.” ADEQ. Accessed March 28, 2021. https://www.azbordertrash.gov/about.html.

Bureau of Land Management Arizona. Southern Arizona Project Report FY 2015. October 27, 2016. https://www.blm.gov/documents/arizona/public-room/report/southern-arizonaproject-report-fy-2015.

Cafaro, Philip, and Winthrop Staples III. “The Environmental Argument for Reducing Immigration to the United States.” Backgrounder, June 2009. https://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2009/back709.pdf.

De León, Jason. “‘Better to Be Hot than Caught’: Excavating the Conflicting Roles of Migrant Material Culture.” American Anthropologist 114, no. 3 (September 2012): 477–95. www.jstor.org/stable/23322335.

De León, Jason. The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail. Oakland: University of California Press, 2015.

Garcia, J. Leigh. “The Violent Environments of the Mexico-U.S. Border.” Edge Effects, February 1, 2018. https://edgeeffects.net/immigration-art.

Kiefer, Tom. “El Sueño Americano / The American Dream.” T O M K I E F E R. Accessed March 28, 2021. https://www.tomkiefer.com/el-sueno-americano.

Meierotto, Lisa. “Environmental Disruption as a Consequence of Human Migration: The Case of the U.S.-Mexico Border.” In Migration and Disruptions: Toward a Unifying Theory of Ancient and Contemporary Migrations, edited by Brenda J. Baker and Takeyuki Tsuda, 179–95. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015.

Meierotto, Lisa. “The Blame Game on the Border: Perceptions of Environmental Degradation on the United States-Mexico Border.” Human Organization 71, no. 1 (Spring 2012): 11–22. https://doi.org/10.17730/humo.71.1.y5708437tr680151.

Shklovsky, Viktor. “Art as Technique.” In Literary Theory: An Anthology, 3rd ed., edited by Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, 3rd ed., 8–13. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2017.

Solis Ybarra, Priscilla. Writing the Goodlife: Mexican American Literature and the Environment.

Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2016.

Soto, Gabriella. “Object Afterlives and the Burden of History: Between ‘Trash’ and ‘Heritage’ in the Steps of Migrants.” American Anthropologist 120, no. 3 (June 17, 2018): 460–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/aman.13055.

Soto, Gabriella. “What Migrants Leave Behind.” SAPIENS, March 8, 2019. https://www.sapiens.org/culture/mexico-border-migrant-trails.

Squire, Vicki. “Desert ‘Trash’: Posthumanism, Border Struggles, and Humanitarian Politics.”

Political Geography 39 (March 2014): 11–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.12.003.

Sundberg, Juanita. “‘Trash-talk’ and the Production of Quotidian Geopolitical Boundaries in the USA-Mexico Borderlands.” Social and Cultural Geography 9, no. 8 (December 2008): 871–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649360802441424.

Taylor, Astra, dir. Examined Life. 2008; Toronto: Zeitgeist Films, 2009. DVD. Zizek, Slavoj. “Nature and Its Discontents.” SubStance 37, no. 3 (2008): 37–72. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25195185.

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No Más Bebés: Puerto Rican Women as “Misfits” in the Experimentation and Exploitation of Population, Fertility and Birth Control By: Paige Skaff ABSTRACT: This analysis examines the history of forced sterilization and birth control testing of Latina women by using Puerto Rico as a case study. By examining this historically important case, I clarify the reasoning that perpetuates the exploitation of the Latina female body. Specifically, I argue that the United States is a neocolonialist nation that has practiced eugenics on the Puerto Rican female population through fertility control and birth control testing as a continued form of exploitation and desired eradication of Puerto Rican people and their culture. The United States, upon conquering the nation used the land and people of Puerto Rico, for experimentation of their medications and used eugenic practices to Americanize the Puerto Rican culture. This analysis begins with the ratification of Law 116 in 1937 that legalized and funded coercive and forced sterilization in Puerto Rico, follows with “guinea pig” birth control testing on Puerto Rican women, and finishes by discussing the continuation of fertility control practices on Latina women in the continental United States. Data has been collected through American and Puerto Rican scholarly journals, eugenics archives, and documentaries with direct documentation of Latina women's voices. This analysis uncovers the root causes of forced sterilization and works to use this information as a political and sociological basis for eradicating the practice and preserving the Puerto Rican and, further, the Latina culture in the United States.

Introduction Puerto Rico’s sadistic patterns of forced sterilization of its female population are without parallel. While other nations have witnessed considerable sterilization that should not go unacknowledged, Puerto Rican women have held the record for the highest sterilization rates in the world by population since 1968 at 35%.1 The two other leading nations in sterilization rates are India and Pakistan who have had similar programs implemented - though their initiatives

1

Nancy Ordover, "Puerto Rico: Law 116." Eugenics Archive, 24 Feb. 2014,eugenicsarchive.ca/discover/connections/530ba18176f0db569b00001b#:~:text=In%201937%2C%20Puerto%2 0Rico%20enacted,116%2C%20but%20by%20US%20colonialism.

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No Más Bebés have only resulted in 5% and 3% of the total population sterilized, respectively.2 This paper will examine the political and socio-political causes for such rates of sterilization, focusing on the colonial and neocolonial relationship between the United States (US) and Puerto Rico, and the eugenic attitudes and practices within this relationship. Specifically, I argue that the United States is a neocolonialist nation that has practiced eugenics on the Puerto Rican female population through fertility control and birth control testing as a continued form of exploitation and a means to achieve the desired eradication of Puerto Rican people and their culture. Through this lens, I will explain US-promoted sterilization of Puerto Rican women, examine how the United States justifies these policies and practices, and describe how these legacies and practices live on today. It will incorporate the voices of Puerto Rican women to do this; challenging many United States scholars that have argued that sterilization was for other reasons than the colonialist and eugenic reasons that I will argue in this essay.3 Understanding the root causes of forced sterilization in Puerto Rico requires understanding the neocolonial practices of the United States. The economic impact that the United States has had on Puerto Rico follows the pattern of Spanish colonial rule in Latin America. James Mahoney has studied the phenomenon and concluded that a regional hierarchy

2

CWLU Herstory Project, “35% Of Puerto Rican Women Sterilized,” CWLU HERSTORY (CWLU HERSTORY, September 19, 2016), http://www.cwluherstory.org/health/35-of-puerto-rican-women-sterilized.

3 Kurt W. Back, Reuben Hill, and J. Mayone Stycos, “Population Control in Puerto Rico: The Formal and Informal Framework,” Law and Contemporary Problems 25, no. 3 (1960): p. 558, https://doi.org/10.2307/1190755.

Black and his fellow authors write about the occurrence in Puerto Rico from a US perspective. They make claims contradictory to Puerto Rican citizens including the following: the case study of Puerto Rico can be used to justify the success of US interference in issues of other nations (p. 560); comparing sterilization to other forms of disease control and vaccination to justify measures that go against social norms to sometimes be the most beneficial options (p. 562); claiming that since the change from agricultural to industrialized industry the limitation of family has been favored solely because there is no need for agricultural workers while Puerto Ricans express wanting the same amount of children or reduced numbers of children because they are unable to financially provide in industrialized occupations (p. 567); and that birth control was favored in the nation even with its Roman Catholic history because it is a “greater sin if children having nothing to eat” without acknowledging the US changes that increased nationwide poverty (p. 569).

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Paige Skaff has remained stable over time. Areas that were peripheral to the colonial centers became more developed while those areas that were in colonial centers became less developed.4 Puerto Rico has similarly suffered with its close attachment to the United States. After obtaining the land in 1898 following the Spanish American War, the US transformed the agriculturally based economy into a sugar monoculture, which caused high unemployment, uneven employment, and increasing poverty rates. Within the first 25 years of US hegemony over Puerto Rico, the economy was altered to mimic the US capitalist system premised on industrialization and manufacturing. This system spurred internal migration among the Puerto Rican population to condensed areas of the island creating the false image of overpopulation. United States’ officials would come to base their argument for the use of sterilization and birth control on this fallacy.

This “overpopulation,” however, was “more the result of U.S. capitalist, policy and legislative interests than of uncontrollable growth in population.” 5 To elaborate this analysis, the first section focuses on foundational language by setting out the differences between “population control,” “fertility control,” and “birth control.”

Showing the misuse of this language by the US, I characterize the United States as a nation that has adopted eugenic mindsets and practices over the nation of Puerto Rico and the Latina population within the states as well. The next section examines the history of Puerto Rican women as “guinea pigs” in American birth control experimentation focusing on the role of wellknown educators like Margaret Sanger. Next, I look at forced sterilization as a means of addressing Puerto Rico’s “overpopulation.” The final section examines the continued exploitation of the Latina body and seeks to give voice to the sterilized women, whose 4

James Mahoney, “Colonialism and Postcolonial Development,” 2009, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511750328.

Iris Lopez, "Agency And Constraint: Sterilization And Reproductive Freedom Among Puerto Rican Women In New York City." Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development, vol. 22, no. 3/4, 1993: pp. 299-324, 302.

5

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No Más Bebés perspectives are often exempt from or misrepresented in US-based discussions on the matter. 6 I end by noting that sterilization is “an issue that tends to be viewed as a tragic-but past occurrence, [that] continues today,” urging addressment of the issue before Puerto Rican and Latina cultures and peoples are fully eradicated. 7 Population, Fertility, and Birth Control and the Exploitation of their Meanings as Contributions to the Exploitation of Puerto Rican Women The terms birth control and fertility control have both been used in discussion of an “overpopulation cure.” To better understand the forced sterilization, it is important to distinguish between these different forms of control, which had coercive implications in the case of Puerto Rico. I will use population control and fertility control interchangeably in this case. Since efforts to control population were done mostly through fertility control, I make the two terms synonymous. Fertility control is a policy that grants the government control of fertility as opposed to the individual right to control one’s own fertility. By using a more euphemistic term like population control, the United States was able to circumvent accusations of eugenics that are historically tied to the term fertility control. As I will show in the next section, Thomas Malthus and Law 116 adopted the language of population control for this very reason. Eugenic language has explicitly used the mechanisms of fertility control on “burdens of society they believe should not procreate.” 8 Birth control is instilled with the idea of choice over reproduction; however, I will argue in the next section that this choice was stripped from the Puerto Rican population as well. Birth

6

Black et al., 558-566; Ana María García, La Operación (Latin American Film Project, 1982).

Kathryn Krase, “The History of Forced Sterilization in the United States,” Our Bodies Ourselves, September 21, 2020, http://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book-excerpts/health-article/forced-sterilization/.

8 Lopez, "Agency And Constraint,” 304.

7

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Paige Skaff control is a means by which an individual is able to control their own fertility. They are classified as reversible contraception methods that temporarily eliminate or reduce the ability for an individual to reproduce. Unlike fertility and population control, forms of birth control are temporary and reversible, still allowing for the ability to reproduce once birth control is stopped.

Sterilization cannot be considered a form of birth control, as it was often advertised, because it takes away the ability to reproduce entirely, therefore rendering it fertility control. The second wave of population control urged by the US after 1960 promoted sterilization as the “best form of birth control” misleading the choice of Puerto Rican women to “voluntarily” be sterilized.9 Eugenics and the Making of the Puerto Rican Woman into the “Misfit” In addition to the exploitative policies enacted under colonialism, eugenics was the foundational motivation behind the sterilization of and experimentation on Puerto Rican women.

The United States sought to occupy the territory of Puerto Rico during a time when politics was invested in the work of Thomas Malthus, an Englishman who has been termed the father of population control policy by applying Darwinism to poor populations. He was a strong believer in the “great biological law,” which argued that the rich were genetically superior to the poor.

His theory directly blamed poverty and underdevelopment on overpopulation caused by “unnecessary” and “excessive” birth within the poor communities. Neo-Malthusians, including those in the US, combine Malthusian beliefs of the poor, eugenics, and social Darwinism. The United States sought to cover their eugenic identity by calling their Neo-Malthusian movement “Operation Bootstrap,” which alludes to the meritocratic and neoliberal idea of the American term “pull yourself up by your bootstraps.” Through this operation, sterilization was advertised

9

Katherine Andrews, “The Dark History of Forced Sterilization of Latina Women,” Panoramas, October 31, 2017, http://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/health-and-society/dark-history-forced-sterilization-latina-women.

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No Más Bebés as the only means of controlling the population, and overpopulation was blamed on individual action.10 I will extend this idea that the rich are more biologically and socially fit to reproduce than the poor, defining the Puerto Rican woman as a “Misfit,” a term often used in Disability Studies.

The historical description of a woman that is to be sterilized as “unfit” makes the program inextricably eugenic as the physically and intellectually disabled community were those sought out for reproduction prevention. The eugenic movement in the US sought to sterilize any individual that was considered genetically or intellectually inferior. López has noted that in the case of Puerto Rico and all of the United States, eugenics has been “inexorably tied to racism.11 Margaret Sanger, the leading promoter of birth control testing, used the language of eugenics and partnered with self-proclaimed eugenicists. In her book, The Pivot of Civilization, Sanger argues that the use of birth control and sterilization was “nothing more than the facilitation of the process of weeding out the unfit, of preventing the birth of defectives or of those who will become defectives." 12 A documentary recording Latina women in the United States who were forcefully sterilized without consent claimed themselves to be “Misfits”: “the US was ridding the state of us so called misfits.” 13 The political and social realms are inextricably linked - how you are viewed socially is indicative of how you are treated politically. I argue that this labelling of the Puerto Rican woman as a social “Misfit” allows us to examine the issue through the lens

10

Iris Ofelia López, Matters of Choice: Puerto Rican Women’s Struggle for Reproductive Freedom. Rutgers University Press, 2008.

11 López, Matters of Choice.

12 Anne Barbeau Gardiner, "Unfit to be Tied: Review on Margaret Sanger’s Eugenic Legacy: The Control of Female Fertility." Touchstone: A Journal of Mere Christianity, July 2006, 229.

13 No Más Bebés (Independent Lens, PBS, 2016).

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Paige Skaff of disability. Since disability is a political issue often seeking to be cured, I argue that eugenics becomes the route to eradicate the world of this “disability.”

In 1937, Law 116 was passed by the United States, which established a sterilization program in Puerto Rico. It was eventually repealed in 1960, retaining the title of the last eugenics sterilization law passed under United States territorial jurisdiction. Though information on Law 116 is scarce, the Eugenics Archive notes the colonial impact of eugenics stating that sterilization was “assured not merely by Law 116, but by US colonialism” and further begins to unpack the deeply rooted racially and ethnically biased eugenic properties of this law and sterilization practices at large. 14 Law 116 signified the institutionalization of US efforts for population control as a proclaimed effort to “catalyze economic growth and respond to depression-era unemployment.” 15 In 1939, two years after the passing of Law 116, US doctor Clarence Gamble was granted permission by the United States under Franklin Roosevelt’s Puerto Rican Relief Administration to establish recruiting sites for sterilization in Puerto Rico. He flew Puerto Rican doctors to New York to learn the latest sterilization techniques. Gamble, who was a self-proclaimed eugenicist, was a main contributor to sterilization and birth control testing. Gamble was actively supported to spread his work to Puerto Rico, specifically the highly industrialized region of San Juan, opening pharmaceutical companies and testing trials funded by the United States when it was illegal in the United States at the time.16 Further, the entire medical apparatus was formed by the

14

Ordover, "Puerto Rico: Law 116."

Krase, "Forced Sterilization United States."

16 Ordover, "Puerto Rico: Law 116."

15

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No Más Bebés US, hospitals were funded with US money, and most doctors were trained in or are directly from the United States, especially those that performed the sterilizations.

Secretive Birth Control Testing with the Puerto Rican Woman as the “Guinea Pig” The first birth control pill was called Envoid, a “pill that has a bright future, but its past – one intertwined with eugenics and colonialism – was fraught.” 17 I posit that this pill was another attempt, following the waves of mass forced sterilization, to eradicate the Puerto Rican population by the United States.

Margaret Sanger was the pioneer of modern birth control. Through her lifetime she refused to call herself a eugenicist, though the language she used was common in the eugenics movement. American historians and scholars have challenged those who call Sanger a racist and a eugenicist; however, they still admit that she did make some “deeply disturbing” statements in support of eugenics. She wrote in 1921 that “the most urgent problem today is how to limit and discourage over-fertility of the mentally and physically disabled.” 18 She argued that birth control could help wipe out “the greatest menace to civilization,” which she believed to be people living in extreme poverty and those with mental illnesses and physical disabilities.19 Therefore, if we understand the Puerto Rican woman as a Misfit, she represents a population Sanger would be likely to target for birth control. Sanger took economic implications into consideration as well.

López argues that

17

Erin Blakemore, “The First Birth Control Pill Used Puerto Rican Women as Guinea Pigs,” History.com (A&E Television Networks, May 9, 2018), http://www.history.com/news/birth-control-pill-history-puerto-rico-enovid.

18 Jennifer Latson, “Margaret Sanger, Race and Eugenics: A Complicated History,” Time (Time, October 14, 2016), https://time.com/4081760/margaret-sanger-history-eugenics/.

19 Blakemore, "First Birth Control Pill.”

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Paige Skaff Sanger used eugenics as a rationale to convince the powers-that-be that even though all women needed birth control, the state would greatly benefit if poor (and non-white) women, in particular, had access to it. As a result, while birth control was considered a privilege for upperclass white women, it was deemed mandatory for poor black and some white women, especially those considered “mentally challenged.20 Her book The Need of Birth Control in America invokes eugenic language as she speaks of the “wickedness of large families” and birth control’s potential ability to eliminate “cheap human beings.” 21 Overall, Sanger can be noted as having an “inhumane life’s work.” 22 Gamble and Sanger also collaborated with Gregory Pincus, an innovative researcher in mammalian sexual physiology and therefore a questionable choice to partner with for a birth control trial on humans. Testing was done simultaneously on rats, rabbits, and Puerto Rican women, dehumanizing these women in a form of reproductive oppression. Pincus was able to receive funding for initial testing by obtaining US permission for a trial on “fertility control” instead of birth control given the illegality of and controversy surrounding birth control in the United States at the time. Puerto Rico’s birth control history has strong ties to the US as movements for both occurred during the same time period. President Roosevelt supported birth control testing instead of further emigration of the Puerto Rican population, therefore funding the trial in whole through US government sponsorship.23 For these reasons, permission was given to test the human population in the non-continental United States, rendering Puerto Rico as the testing site.

20

López, Matters of Choice, 5.

Gardiner, "Unfit to be Tied,” 229.

22 Latson, "Margaret Sanger Really Said.”

23 López, Matters of Choice.

21

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No Más Bebés Birth control testing in Puerto Rico began in the 1950s under intense secrecy. The women participating were not told that the pill they were taking was a trial and that the visits following were to monitor the pill’s success. The women were also not told of any potential risks of the drug. Three women died during this test phase though their deaths were never investigated.

Many scholars claim that women were purposefully given substantially high doses that physicians knew would cause issues and be lethal in certain cases, illustrating the role of colonial exploitation and eugenics.24 Nancy Ordover, a member of the Eugenics Archive, found that “side effects, which included nausea, dizziness, headaches, were dismissed by researchers as psychological or blamed on Puerto Rican women themselves who were constructed as lacking the intellectual sophistication to follow directions.” 25 Forced Sterilization in Puerto Rico By 1968, Puerto Rico held the title for highest rates of sterilization by population globally. By 1976, 37% of females were sterilized.26 Throughout the 1960s, women in Puerto Rico were ten times more likely to be sterilized than women in the United States [this statistic, however, exempts the Puerto Rican and other Latina populations residing in the US who will be examined in the next section].27 The sterilization was forced in two ways: (1) as an uneducated “choice” and (2) as performed without consent after birth by cesarean delivery.

1. Verbally documented accounts of Puerto Rican women taken in 1982 claimed that there was an unclear communication on their chosen sterilization. A multitude of women were falsely told that the procedure was temporary or reversible. Others were led astray by the

24

Blakemore, "First Birth Control Pill.”

Ordover, "Puerto Rico: Law 116."

26 Ordover, "Puerto Rico: Law 116."

27 Krase, "Forced Sterilization United States."

25

83

Paige Skaff euphemism for tubal ligation: “tying the tubes” and its equivalent ligaron in Puerto Rican tongue. Ligaron has traditionally been used to describe the act of tying to children – often tying with rope, handcuffs, or tape which are all reversible forms of tying – which contributed to the false sense that the procedure was reversible.

Many women were initially led to choose sterilization because there was no form of birth control available, while the instated impoverished conditions and factory jobs made sterilization the only way to economically survive. Sterilization was free, which made it even more appealing to the industrially working poor. Sterilization offices were established in factories where women worked, through the funding of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the women were given time off to go to the clinic and have the procedure done.28 I state that US policy was therefore promoting the use of permanent sterilization instead of safe, legal, and reversible contraception. Encouragement was given by door-to-door visits and financial subsidies awarded to women who had completed the procedure and employers who were given grants for employee favoritism toward hiring sterilized women.29 Therefore, these factors rendered sterilization not a choice, but a means of survival within the conditions that the US generated in Puerto Rico. While other women were given more of a choice - choosing sterilization as an “element of resistance” against constraints of patriarchy and female subordination which created a double standard of the women in the private and public realm - these women were in the numerical minority.30

28

Andrews, "The Dark History”; García, La Operación.

Krase, "Forced Sterilization United States."

30 Lopez, "Agency And Constraint.”

29

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No Más Bebés 2. I use the term forced here as a form of violence. Operations performed without consent in hospitals characterized most of the sterilizations of Puerto Rican women. A 1965 survey estimated that one-third of all Puerto Rican mothers between the ages of twenty and forty-nine were sterile, most of them being sterilized after giving birth in their midtwenties.31 Sterilization by this method was prevalent in Puerto Rico from the 1930s to the 1950s. Doctors in training, many of which were Gamble’s students, were instructed that any woman coming into the delivery room with two or more children was to have her tubes tied after giving birth.32 The peak of postpartum sterilizations was in 1947.33 In 1949, 17.8% of hospital births were followed by sterilization; this did not account for home births with complications resulting in hospitalization after birth that resulted in sterilization to “fix” the complications. It is believed that many of the sterilizations performed were never documented in hospital records making the statistic lower that the percentages found through interviewing the women. Hospital birth rates were at 10% in 1940, 37.7% in 1950, 77.5% in 1960, and reached 90% in 1965.34 I note here that compulsory sterilization was outlawed in 1945, however, abuse still continued, and as the statistics above show, rates actually increased by substantial amounts.35 Continued Exploitation of the Latina Body in the United States The continuation of sterilization abuse was not only occurring in Puerto Rico but also among Puerto Rican migrants and other Latina women in the United States. Sterilization in the states became prevalent in the 1950s, ironically at the same time of Puerto Rican influx caused

31

Krase, "Forced Sterilization United States."

CWLU Herstory Project, "Puerto Rican Women Sterilized."

33 Andrews, "The Dark History.”

34 CWLU Herstory Project, "Puerto Rican Women Sterilized."

35 López, Matters of Choice.

32

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Paige Skaff by forced migration, intensifying in the 1970s with the second wave of migration. Between the years of 1945 to 1964, one million people migrated, which accounts for more than one-third of the population; the levels of migrants and those sterilized in Puerto Rico had become equal.36 Sterilization only occurred in twelve states – those with the highest levels of Latina populations – but most of it was centered in New York, the main migration location of Puerto Ricans; and California, which had a larger population of Latina women, specifically Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.37 Abuse of this nature still occurs to this day. In this section, I explore the Latina woman’s voice by using accounts from a documentary episode called NO MÁS BEBÉS in a Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) series called Independent Lens that was directed by Renee Tajima-Pena.38 “They said you signed for it. I said me? I do not remember.” 39 This was a common iteration among the Latina women who faced the second type of sterilization discussed in the previous section: sterilization after birth without consent. Most of the sterilizations in the United States’ hospitals were in public spaces that housed a crowded number of women in the hallways on gurneys, unlike the separate rooms found in private hospitals. The film stated that this was because private physicians did not seek to take care of “these people [Latina women].” 40 Most of the women who were sterilized were on welfare and without legal citizenship; they were also mainly Spanish speaking with little comprehension, if any, of the English language. The legal documents that had to be signed for the procedure to be done were only provided in English.

Doctors would instruct nurses to have the women sign these papers at the peak of labor pain

36

García, La Operación.

Lopez, "Agency And Constraint.”

38 Tajima-Pena, "NO MÁS BEBÉS." 37

39 40

Tajima-Pena, "NO MÁS BEBÉS." Tajima-Pena, "NO MÁS BEBÉS."

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No Más Bebés promising that the procedure would take away their agony. Many signed because they believed that this was a means of taking care of themselves and their baby. If the mother was hesitant, the nurses threatened that refusing the procedure could cause their baby’s death.

Sterilization abuse also occurred in other ways: women were uneducated of the procedure, if they were educated at all, and there was much misunderstanding of the term ligaron and another Spanish phrase that made many women equate sterilization with a form of cleaning.

While these women were sterilized at later dates, most occurring in the 1970s, the demographics were similar: sterilization taking place in the woman’s mid-twenties and with most of the women holding industrial occupations as factory workers. Unlike in Puerto Rico, the Latina women of the states openly described their experience as traumatic and experienced symptoms of PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), although very little has been documented from the perspective of the Puerto Rican women. Women in the states have compared their sterilization to the “first tactics of the Germans [in the Holocaust]” and described the examinations before the procedure as being “like rape.” Sterilized women with small families who were asked when they were going to have another child stated it was “enough to make them cry.” 41 I argue that the colonial eugenics mindset followed the Latina women into the United States. While these sterilizations were performed on the colonial homeland, the vision to eradicate the Latina culture and population was still vividly present. Sterilization in the states was even more socially engineered and organized. In the words of some doctors, “What I gained this year was a new kind of prejudice. I never had anything against Mexicans [read the Latina population at large] when I came here.” 42 The United States was teaching a form of racism and

41 42

Tajima-Pena, "NO MÁS BEBÉS." Tajima-Pena, "NO MÁS BEBÉS."

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Paige Skaff eugenic practices to their doctors who treated Latina women. Within the closing statement of Madrigal v Quilligan - a lawsuit based in Los Angeles, California debating the legality and humanity of the sterilization of Latina women without consent or through misinformed coercion - Judge Jesse W Cutis stated on June 3, 1973 that “the cultural background of these particular women contributed to the problem [of sterilization that was being fought against].” 43 Importantly, while the population demographic affected by this eugenic sterilization was broadened to all Latina women, the Puerto Rican population still suffered the most, which strengthens the colonial implications of these practices. Puerto Rican women in New York still have the highest sterilization rates in all of the United States. Further, 93% of the Puerto Rican New York residents who were sterilized were born on the island, migrated to the states in their youth, and were sterilized there between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one - a significantly lower age than those on the island. This therefore hindered the ability for any children to be born to the Puerto Rican population in the Contiguous United States.44 Conclusion Sterilization abuse in Puerto Rico and against Latina women more broadly is a political and cultural phenomenon. The US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare spends $750,000 of their $900,000 budget for Puerto Rican Relief Funds on family planning still today.

Sterilization continues in the continental United States, especially in California, and is focused primarily on Latina populations.45 Population and fertility control are socio-political oppressions, in this case, caused by the eugenic colonialism of the United States. Social and economic forces have limited fertility options for Puerto Rican and Latina women, as a direct result of US control

43

Tajima-Pena, "NO MÁS BEBÉS." Lopez, "Agency and Constraint.”

45 CWLU Herstory Project, "Puerto Rican Women Sterilized."

44

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No Más Bebés over the reproductive female body. While abuse continues, so does this hidden reality, silencing the voices of sterilized women in another form of eradication. As sterilization and exploitation of the Latina body persists “the dark history of these operations remains understudied and hidden in the shadows of history.” 46

46

Andrews, "The Dark History.”

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Paige Skaff Bibliography Andrews, Katherine. "The Dark History of Forced Sterilization Of Latina Women." Panoramas Scholarly Platform: Center for Latin America at the University of Pittsburgh, 30 Oct. 2017, www.panoramas.pitt.edu/health-and-society/dark-history-forced-sterilizationlatina-women.

Black, Kurt W., et al. "Population Control in Puerto Rico: The Formal and Informal Framework." 25 Law and Contemporary Problems, Summer 1960, pp. 558-566.

Blakemore, Erin. "The First Birth Control Pill Used Puerto Rican Women as Guinea Pigs: Eugenics and Unethical Clinical Trials are Part of the Pill's Legacy." History Chanel, 11 Mar. 2019, www.history.com/news/birth-control-pill-history-puerto-rico-enovid.

CWLU Herstory Project. "35% of Puerto Rican Women Sterilized." CWLU Herstory Project, 2016, www.cwluherstory.org/health/35-of-puerto-rican-women-sterilized.

García, Ana María. La Operación. Latin America a Film Project, 1982.

Gardiner, Anne Barbeau. "Unfit to be Tied: Review on Margaret Sanger’s Eugenic Legacy: The Control of Female Fertility." Touchstone: A Journal of Mere Christianity, July 2006.

Krase, Kathryn. "The History of Forced Sterilization in the United States." Our Bodies Our Selves, 1 Oct. 2014, www.ourbodiesourselves.org/book-excerpts/health-article/forcedsterilization/.

Latson, Jennifer. "What Margaret Sanger Really Said About Eugenics and Race." TIME, 14 Oct. 2016, time.com/4081760/margaret-sanger-history-eugenics/.

Lopez, Iris. "Agency And Constraint: Sterilization And Reproductive Freedom Among Puerto Rican Women In New York City." Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development, vol. 22, no. 3/4, 1993, pp. 299-324.

López, Iris Ofelia. Matters of Choice: Puerto Rican Women’s Struggle for Reproductive Freedom. Rutgers University Press, 2008.

Mahoney, James. Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Ordover, Nancy. "Puerto Rico: Law 116." Eugenics Archive, 24 Feb. 2014, eugenicsarchive.ca/discover/connections/530ba18176f0db569b00001b#:~:text=In%2019 37%2C%20Puerto%20Rico%20enacted,116%2C%20but%20by%20US%20colonialism.

Tajima-Pena, Renee, director. "NO MÁS BEBÉS." Independent Lens, PBS, 1 Feb. 2016.

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Democracy or Dictatorship? Juan Manuel de Rosas and English-speaking Perspectives of the River Plate, 1816 – 1852 By: Kevin Ramsey In 1853, an English merchant and traveler named William MacCann published his findings from an eleven-year journey during which he crossed over two thousand miles on horseback through the Argentine provinces. What would become the Argentine Republic in 1860 was, at the time of MacCann’s journey, a very loose Confederation of autonomous provinces. Juan Manuel de Rosas was twice Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, the most important province, first between 1829 and 1831, reelected in 1835, and ousted from power in 1852. As Governor, he was in charge of the foreign relations of the Confederation. Rosas was the most famous caudillo in Latin America – a military leader from the countryside, who was granted extraordinary power by the legislature to deal with the ongoing internal conflict between the two parties that had emerged after the Wars of Independence, the Federalists and the Unitarians, as well as with international conflicts with external conflicts with foreign nations. To end the constant turmoil, the caudillo governor cemented his hold on the divided country using methods of despotic rule. State terror silenced political opponents, who were threatened, exiled, tortured, or killed. In an interview with Rosas on his legacy, the Governor told MacCann his one desire: “All he wanted – all the country wanted – was that the real truth should be told.”1 Though he successfully resisted a blockade between Britain and France in the 1840s, Rosas later fell from power in 1852 after internal rivals challenged his rule. After his fall, MacCann reflected that even those “who deemed the policy of that Dictator inimical to the political freedom and commercial prosperity of the countries on the

1

William MacCann, Two Thousand Miles’ Ride Through the Argentine Provinces, Vol. 2. (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1853). 6.

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Kevin Ramsey Plate” must be convinced that the problems of the country lay “deeper than any system of government or the policy of any dictator.”2 The initial perception of Rosas after his downfall was shaped by his political rivals, who focused on the brutal methods by which he held on to power. In the twentieth century, many historians argued that Rosas was a democratic leader who did what was necessary in order to restore order to the country. Recent scholarship has found a third consideration of Rosas that lands in neither camp. In the late 1980s century, historian John Lynch argued that Rosas embodied all of the aspects of a personal dictatorship, yet enjoyed a legitimacy derived from “republican principles and virtues.”3 What has become clear from these debates is that writing off the years of Rosas’ rule as an aberration of democracy and an example of pure despotism ignores the popular support that he enjoyed amongst common people, particularly the gauchos of the countryside and the Afro-Argentines. Recently, historian Ariel de la Fuente posited that caudillo culture and the caudillismo system represented a type of democratic mobilization of the gauchos, the poorest residents of the countryside. Argentine political scientist José Luis Romero described this type of support as a kind of “inorganic democracy,” born out of an opposition to the liberal ideals espoused by revolutionary leaders in Buenos Aires during the post-independence period.4 The scholarly debates on the Rosas era have fittingly relied on a myriad of primary sources from within the provinces themselves. Most notably, Domingo F. Sarmiento, a politician and second president of Argentina (1869-1874), unleashed a scathing critique of Rosas, caudillos, and his effect on life in Argentina. What has largely been unexplored, however, are the perspectives of

2

MacCann, Two Thousand Miles, Vol. 1, xiii.

John Lynch, Argentine Caudillo: Juan Manuel de Rosas (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2001), 164.

4 José Luis Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963). 93.

3

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Democracy or Dictatorship?

English-speakers from the United States and Great Britain, as well as the value of their perspectives for understanding political life under Rosas’ rule and in assessing his legacy. This paper will examine whether these sources help find a place Rosas, one of the most central figures in Argentine history, within these debates.

This thesis posits that ultimately, both contemporary American and British perceptions of Rosas are nuanced and mediated by economic and political interests, yet still offer helpful characterization on Rosas’ impact on the River Plate. While in power, the British were willing to look past Rosas’ despotic tendencies so long as trade went unhindered and the government eagerly enlisted him as a diplomatic partner. The British perspectives grapple with the legacy of Rosas, albeit within a prejudicial context that is clouded by their economic interests in the region. On the other hand, perspectives from the United States are extremely telling, as a significant dichotomy emerged between the attitudes of American diplomats and the letters and editorials from the general public. Ultimately, both perspectives offer a valid consideration when examining Rosas and his place within Argentine history, as they help to triangulate the conversation around his legacy.

The majority of the collected primary sources examined here come from reports in American periodicals and British newspapers on the affairs of the River Plate from 1829 to 1852.

These journals and chronicles include the publications of travelers, political commentators, military officers, and immigrants to the River Plate. American diplomatic correspondence was often published in these same periodicals, while I relied on the Parliamentary Papers to provide the perspectives from the British government. Finally, the extensive archives of the Baring Brothers bank help to illustrate the significant financial interests Great Britain held in the region, as well as the general frustration felt towards the constant turmoil in the River Plate.

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Kevin Ramsey This thesis will begin by thoroughly examining the origins of Rosas’ rule and how scholars have characterized his government, particularly as it relates to the history and development of democracy in Argentina. In order to effectively consider the relevance of English-speaking perspectives of life under Rosas, a detailed description of post-independence life in Argentina must be examined. Specific attention will be devoted to the conflict between Federalists and Unitarians, the country’s two political factions, as well as to considering what democracy and political participation meant for the time period. From there, the discussion will move into the prevailing Argentine perspectives of Rosas, both from his contemporaries and how he has been viewed in recent years. Finally, the collection of primary sources will be examined in relation to how the events of Rosas’ regime unfolded, comparing the British and American perspectives.

Federalists, Unitarians, and Provincial Authority The provinces of the River Plate were certainly not united in 1816. The declaration of independence by the Congress in the city of Tucumán brought to light divisions within the political leaders that would last for the next several decades. An attempt to pass a constitution proposing to unite these territories under a centralist republic failed in 1819, and the provinces became politically divided into two groups. Unitarians were largely made up of liberals who espoused the ideals of Enlightenment figures like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke and believed in the power of a strong, central authority based in Buenos Aires.5 Meanwhile, Federalists valued the autonomy of the provinces and proposed a decentralized, federal republic, following the model of the United States.

5

Jorge Myers, “‘Democracy in South America,’ The ‘New Generation’ and the Reception of Tocqueville's De La Démocratie En Amérique: The Path of River Plate Liberalism, 1840-1852,” in Imported Modernity in Post-Colonial State Formation: The Appropriation of Political, Educational, and Cultural Models in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, ed. Eugenia Roldán Valdera and Marcelo Caruso (New York City: Peter Lang, 2007), 156.

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Democracy or Dictatorship?

Buenos Aires enjoyed status as the “principal province” of the River Plate. It held a natural geographic advantage due to its position on the coast where it could control and tax international trade coming into the Plata River, the river that gives the region its name, through the main port of the region. Additionally, the provinces of the River Plate were sparsely populated, with the majority of the population concentrated in the city of Buenos Aires, the old capital of the Viceroyalty. In 1816, there were only 507,591 people in the provinces; even in 1850, the population density was barely more than one person per square mile.6 The caudillos of the surrounding provinces around Buenos Aires – known as the littoral – were particularly concerned about the provisions within the failed constitution that they believed infringed upon the “sovereignty of the people.”7 One of their central demands was that the revenues from the international port of Buenos Aires should be shared with the remaining provinces. This was not a minor request as international trade was the main source of revenue for the region. Since it comprises 80% of the budget of the province of Buenos Aires, its leaders were not willing to share the revenue with the other provinces.

In 1820, the governors of the provinces of Santa Fe and Entre Ríos marched their armies to Buenos Aires and effectively put an end to the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata. This move kicked off a decade of interprovincial warfare, where various provincial leaders emerged as caudillos, backed by their own troops who were willing to fight to the end. These troops – known as montoneras – were loose militias that rose in an armed disturbance, and engendered the ability of caudillismo to firmly take hold in the provinces.8 In the wake of the dissolution of the United Provinces, while political leaders in Buenos Aires attempted to reorganize the country along some 6

Lynch, Argentine Caudillo, 35.

Shumway, A Woman, 104.

8 The term montonero refers to “one who rebelled for political reasons against the departmental, provisional, or national authorities. De la Fuente, Children of Facundo, 77.

7

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Kevin Ramsey semblance of a national unity, the caudillos, determined to keep their autonomy, remained a powerful and destabilizing force.

Rivadavia, the Banda Oriental and the Emergence of Rosas During the 1820s in the River Plate, amidst a series of external conflicts, there was a second attempt for national unity. In the years after 1816, the threat of war with Spain kept the peace amongst the provinces. This time, the threat was much closer, and stemmed from a conflict over the status of the Banda Oriental (present-day Uruguay), which had been a point of contention between Spain and Portugal for centuries. Like the Argentines, Uruguayans had fought for independence from Spain in the wake of the May Revolutions of 1810. The city of Montevideo, positioned along the northeastern bank of the Río de la Plata, emerged as a rival to the city of Buenos Aires and it briefly affiliated itself with the provinces of Santa Fe and Entre Rios of the United Provinces of the River Plate before the Portuguese Empire’s annexation in 1822. In 1825, a local group of Uruguayans met and declared their allegiance to the United Provinces of the River Plate, and in response, newly independent Brazil declared war.

It was within this context that a second attempt at an Argentinian constitution began, under a new Congress in Buenos Aires in 1824. In 1826, the Congress proposed a centralist republic and elected President Bernardino Rivadavia, a Unitarian porteño who believed that a strong, central authority could coexist with the caudillos.9 He was wrong, and almost immediately after the new constitution was approved, the provincial caudillos rejected it, and in the face of insurmountable challenges with the war with Brazil, Rivadavia resigned in 1827.10 Many thought that only a very strong figure could bring order to the internal chaos and protect the region from external threats.

9

Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought, 90.

Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought, 93

10

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This power and person manifested in Juan Manuel de Rosas, who was appointed to his first term as Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires in 1829 and given extraordinary powers – facultades extraordinarias – for a period of six months to deal with the crisis. By this time, Rosas had cemented himself as a capable military leader and extremely successful rancher accumulating over 300,000 cattle and 420,000 acres of land.11 As Governor, even though he was a Federalist, Rosas claimed to eschew political affiliation stating “I don’t belong to any party but my country,” and promising that the will of the people would serve as the “fundamental base of the organization of the Republic.”12 With the extraordinary authority given to him by the legislature, Rosas dealt with the problems facing the country: Unitarian forces had united under the banner of the League of the North and troops rallied under General José María Paz, and Federalists were divided over how much power Rosas should have. Additionally, large public debts, deficits, and a severe drought wreaked havoc on the economy.13 By the completion of Rosas’ first term in office in 1832, the financial concerns were largely settled, General Paz had been captured, and the Unitarian threat had been largely eliminated thanks to Rosas’ unification efforts that brought Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Corrientes and Entre Ríos into a confederation after they signed the Federalist Pact.14 In 1834, General Facundo Quiroga, an ally of Rosas from the province of La Rioja, was assassinated, and the country yet again teetered on the edge of Civil War. While Rosas left office after his first term to lead a large campaign against the Natives in the south of Buenos Aires, a “Revolution of the Restorers” clamored for him to

11

Lynch, Argentine Caudillo, 27.

Shumway, A Woman, 147.

13 Lynch, Argentine Caudillo, 16.

14 Shumway, A Woman, 151.

12

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Kevin Ramsey return to office.15 To the relief of the “restorers” – a coalition made up of both the common people and the landed elite – Rosas returned to power in 1835.

Rosas’ second ascension to national office differed from his prior in one significant way: this time, his extraordinary powers were more expansive and permanent. Rosas initially refused the appointment unless the legislature granted him the suma del poder público – the sum of all public power – all-encompassing control of the executive, legislature, and judiciary. But approval of the legislature wasn’t enough. In March 1835, he asked all males in the province, regardless of wealth or color, to vote on his governorship.16 The electoral law passed in 1821 had granted the right to vote to all men over 20 years of age, without any further qualifications, an unusual “universal suffrage” law for this time period. The large electoral support from the male population, jointly with the subsequent Plebiscite in 1835, gave Rosas the approval he desired: authentic power from not only the legislature, but the people.

Rosas and Contemporary Ideas of Democracy In April 1835, Rosas addressed a crowd of thousands that had gathered to witness his inauguration into office. In his speech, Rosas stated that he had been authorized to wield “limitless power, that despite its odious nature” he had “deemed to be absolutely necessary to pull the country out of the abyss of misfortune in which it [was] sadly immersed.”17 The use of this power over the next twelve years – representing the remainder of his time in office – is at the center of the debate over his legacy. Was this power absolutely necessary? Was Rosas actually interested in upholding republican virtues? Was he a threat to democracy or a necessary means to achieve it?

15

Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought, 117.

Shumway, A Woman, 166.

17 Shumway, A Woman, 167.

16

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While these questions remain to this day, what is clear is how Rosas’ political opponents saw him and his effect on the future of democracy in the River Plate/Argentina. Esteban Echeverría, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Bartolomé Mitre,18 and others made up a group of liberal intellectuals that would eventually become known as the 1837 Generation, named after the year they began to coalesce their opposition to Rosas’ regime.19 To these men, Rosas was the result of an “erroneous” conception of democracy. In Echeverría’s mind, true democracy was not “the absolute despotism of the masses, nor of the majorities” but the “rule of reason” exercised by “the sensible and rational part of the social community.”20 The critique that ultimately had the most lasting effect on characterizing the phenomenon of Rosas’ time in office came from Domingo Sarmiento, another member of the 1837 Generation. From his exile in Santiago de Chile, Sarmiento authored Facundo: Civilization or Barbarism in 1845, which lay the blame for Rosas at the feet of the racial composition, the habits, and the general social structure of those who lived in the rural provinces. The system of a montonera supporting a caudillo, the one that had resulted in Rosas, was for Sarmiento the root cause of all problems in the River Plate: This is the way, through such strange practices, that brute force came to predominate and the rule of the strongest, and authority without limits and without responsibility among those in command, and justice administered without system or discussion, came to be established in Argentine life.21

In the eyes of Sarmiento and his contemporaries, the country man – the gaucho – was representative of the “barbarism” that was endemic in the countryside and could not coexist with the “civilization” of the cities.

18

This group had a tremendous influence on the modern Argentine State. Alberdi drafted the Argentine Constitution in 1853 while Mitre became the first President of the Argentine Republic (1862-1868).

19 Myers, “‘Democracy in South America,’” 159.

20 Eduardo Zimmermann, “Caudillos, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in mid Nineteenth-century Argentina,” The Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies 26, no. 2 (July, 2020): pp. 191.

21 Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought, 135.

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Kevin Ramsey Within this context, it is clear that while they existed in opposition to the Rosas regime, the attitudes of the 1837 Generation are in line with prevailing views on democracy at the time, mostly deriving from the European doctrinairs whose writings widely circulated amongst this group.

Echeverría analyzed where his Unitarian predecessors erred and concluded that “in giving the ballot and the lance to the proletariat...put the destiny of the country at the mercy of the mob.”

Alberdi agreed – the law that established universal suffrage in the province of Buenos Aires in 1821 resulted in a system that “bore the fruits it will always bear: as long as the mob is called on to vote, the mob will elect children who mouth pretty phrases.”22 After the downfall of Rosas, this generation would largely frame the narrative of his time in office along their own terms, and their writings and politics would guide the actions that would shape modern Argentina in the following decades.

Juan Bautista Alberdi wrote that if you take away the Revolution of May 1810, “and leave the counter-revolution that today grips the Argentine Republic…you will have not democracy, but only despotism.”23 Alberdi was the author of the 1853 Constitution that (with some changes) has been in place in Argentina ever since, with the objective to achieve democracy and leave despotism behind. His critique of Rosas, as well as of other members of his generation, heavily framed the views of his rule in the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth. However, this view contains an inherent flaw – it completely ignores the very real political life that was occurring in the interior provinces and in the cities.

Recent scholarship has begun to re-examine political participation in the time of Rosas.

Ariel de la Fuente made the connection between the state, clientelism, and politics during the

22 23

Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought, 137.

Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought, 141.

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Democracy or Dictatorship? caudillismo era, particularly as it took place in the northwest province of La Rioja during the 1860s, after Rosas downfall. De la Fuente identified the relationship of the caudillos and their montonera base and the significant power that the latter held over the former, “The decisive factor in the political life of the province was, indeed ‘the people.’”24 It was the caudillos’ ability to mobilize the montonera that gave them their power, and thus the mobilization of the individual montonero was itself a political act. Valentina Ayrolo and Eduardo Míguez identified the critical importance of this relationship stating that the “caudillo regimes that sought to establish themselves firmly in power had to make concessions to the subaltern sectors that had supported them, in order to retain their loyalty.”25 In the era of Rosas and caudillismo culture, popular participation was the basis of power.

Additionally, Sarmiento’s description of a dialectical opposition between the civilized cities and the barbaric interior provinces was grossly misrepresented. Despite the constant chaos that was endemic before, during, and after the time of Rosas, law and legal practices were maintained by residents in the interior and borderlands provinces. Trading ties, particularly along the Uruguay river, created an ecosystem of cross-border connections where merchants and landowners strived to increase their economic opportunities and prospects.26 As these networks became more developed, legal norms fell into place that were maintained without the influence of any centralized authority from Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, the war between Buenos Aires and Montevideo caused frequent incursions in the borderlands, where residents depended on these

24

De la Fuente, Children of Facundo, 21.

Valentina Ayrolo and Eduardo Míguez, “Reconstruction of the Socio-Political Order after Independence in Latin America. A Reconsideration of Caudillo Politics in the River Plate,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas – Anuario de Historia de America Latina 49, 1 (2012): 131.

26 Joseph P. Younger, “‘Monstrous and Illegal Proceedings’: Law, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Río de la Plata Borderlands, 1810-1880” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2011), 62.

25

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Kevin Ramsey legal norms to protect their rights in a world of violence. Local judges and magistrates were regularly relied on when one party asserted his property rights over another.27 The impact of the 1837 Generation on the narrative of state formation during and after Rosas can be seen in the porteño orientation of scholarly discussion that lasted into the twentieth century. The view of Sarmiento that civilization lies in the cities of the River Plate, and the frontier life is at the root of the barbarism that made the Rosas regime possible, discounts the political participation of those in the countryside who used mobilization to demonstrate their power.

It also fails to recognize the makeup of the montoneras themselves. In addition to gauchos, Afro-Argentines, who were most likely libertos (freed slaves) seeking to find a place in society, found a home in monteneras.28 These groups combined with the interests of the wealthy landowners to form a coalition that would serve as the primary base of Rosas’ political support, and were the ones who confirmed his extraordinary power with their votes in the 1835 Plebiscite.

British Perspectives of the River Plate From the outset of independence, British citizens both inside and outside of the government took a vested interest in the happenings of the river plate. First and foremost, among items of interest concerned matters of trade, which largely centered on the city of Buenos Aires. A characterization of the history of the relationship between Great Britain and published in the Dublin University Magazine recognized that “a government so sharp-sighted as ours in all matters relating to commercial interests…has occupied men for many years; and so far back as 1806, when Sir Home Popham attacked Buenos Ayres.”29 The merchant community recognized and 27

Younger, “Monstrous and Illegal Proceedings,” 206.

Ayrolo and Míguez, “Reconstruction,” 116.

29 “Rosas and La Plata.” The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature (1844-1898), Jul 1852. 409. American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries. 1806 refers to the first British invasions to the River Plate 28

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Democracy or Dictatorship? appreciated Rosas’ reputation as a stabilizing force, and the liberalization of trade attracted many British entrepreneurs to Buenos Aires.30 In 1825, a treaty was signed between the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata and the United Kingdom that recognized the “extensive commercial intercourse” that had been established for years between the two countries.31 In the wake of the treaty’s approval by the House of Commons, merchant banks took the opportunity to lend the United Provinces a significant sum of credit. In March of that year, L.M. Simon, Agent for the Purchase and Sale of Foreign Securities Stock at Barings Bank, described “the state of Buenos Ayres” as possessing the “improved state of financial political resources of South America…The advantages of such a financial operation in so prosperous a country, were too obvious to escape the attention of the Capitalist.”32 As the regime of Rivadavia collapsed and the conflict between the federalists and unitarians engulfed Buenos Aires, the optimism felt by the British community towards developments in the River Plate turned to a pessimistic notion that the region, due to the makeup of the populace, was incapable of selfrule and threatened the further development of trade.

British commercial agent and travel writer William MacCann reflected on the Rivadavia government several decades after his exit from power and did not mince words when it came to evaluating his legacy. Although MacCann believed “this personage was influenced by the most enlightened views,” he also “totally misunderstood the character of his fellow citizens.”33 Here, it

30

Iain A.D. Stewart, “Living with Dictator Rosas: Argentina through Scottish Eyes,” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, no. 1 (February 1997): pp. 24.

31 “Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between H.M. and United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, Buenos Ayres, February 1825.” February 2, 1825. 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online 32 “Typed Letter from L.M. Simon, Agent for the Purchase and Sale of Foreign Securities on Buenos Aires Stock.”

Public Statements on the Financial State of Buenos Aires, House Correspondence Latin America 1817-1929, The Baring Archive 33 MacCann, Two Thousand Miles’ Ride, vol. 2, 160.

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Kevin Ramsey is important to contextualize MacCann’s perspective of the Rosas regime within the grander scheme of how he viewed the development of political and economic life in general within the region. The very same gaucho that was outfitted with British goods as described by Parish was incapable of being governed, in MacCann’s mind. MacCann described the term gaucho as “offensive to the mass of the people, being understood to mean a person who has no local habitation but lives a nomadic life.”34 Echoing the criticisms of Sarmiento in Facundo, in MacCann’s mind, much of the country’s problems in the 1820s can be blamed on the gaucho’s “primitive habits of idleness” that confined him to a “state of comparative barbarism.”35 The deviation between Sarmiento and MacCann is that the former equates Rosas’ regime with this barbarism, while the latter views it as an answer to the turbulent conflicts of the 1820s.

British perspectives of Rosas increased in frequency as he rose to power after his first term as Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires. In 1833, he met the naturalist Charles Darwin, who was left with quite an impression of the governor. Darwin reflected that Rosas was “a man of extraordinary character, and he has a most predominant influence in the country, which it seems probably he will use to its prosperity and advancement.”36 The first real test of Rosas’ regime was over the status of the Banda Oriental, after former Uruguayan President and Unitarian Fructuoso Rivera rebelled against his successor and Rosas ally, Manuel Oribe. The status of the Banda Oriental had been a contentious issue since independence, and in 1837 it became a proxy conflict between the Federalists and Unitarians. Despite the tension in the conflict, the perspective of the British within the provinces was that there was little threat to Rosas’ regime. Writing to his brother, Scottish pastoral farmer Robert Gibson remarked “If the people of the country would not now

34

MacCann, Two Thousand Miles’ Ride, vol. 1, 154.

MacCann, Two Thousand Miles Ride, vol. 1, 158.

36 Lynch, Argentine Caudillo, 29.

35

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Democracy or Dictatorship? follow [Rosas] from love, they would do so from fear.”37 Gibson’s attitude reflected a common condescension that appeared in other sources, including MacCann. In his mind, Rivera’s revolt was “further proof…of the futility of thinking that these people are in a state to govern themselves by constitutions and laws.”38 The conflict within the Banda Oriental would spell the beginning of the end for Rosas.

While British merchants in the early 1830s lauded his return to power, towards the end of the decade his meddling in Uruguayan affairs was viewed as a source of disruption in the region.39 As Rivera gained some initial successes in his rebellion, MacCann recorded that “fresh elements of discord daily augmented the strife.”40 As the 1830s came to an end, Rosas was facing enemies from three sides: Rivera’s troops, who had successfully removed Oribe from power in the Banda Oriental; a renewed force of Unitarians that organized in opposition to Rosas; and now the French, who intervened on the part of Rivera to protect their own mercantile interests in Montevideo.

French naval forces blockaded the city of Buenos Aires in 1838. The situation became so perilous for Robert Gibson, that the only remedy in his mind was for Rosas’ removal, The storm now threatens Rosas on all sides, and I suspect not all his talent…will be sufficient to carry him through with success. He must fall, and the sooner the better. He has shown his obstinacy in the affair of the Blockade, brought distress and ruin upon many of the Country and his bloodthirsty prosecution of all those who dared to think for themselves will be a damnable stain on his memory.41

However, Rosas was able to survive – albeit only for the time being. While the conflict in the Banda Oriental escalated into the Guerra Grande (Great War), Rosas was able to put down the Unitarian invasion and find peace with the French in 1840.

37

Stewart, “Living with Rosas,” 34.

Stewart, “Living with Rosas,” 31.

39 Shumway, A Woman, 201.

40 MacCann, Two Thousand Miles’ Ride, vol. 2, 215.

41 Stewart, “Living with Rosas,” 39.

38

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Kevin Ramsey While Rosas incurred the wrath of the French in the early part of the conflict with Uruguay, he was able to maintain his relationship with His Majesty’s government. Although the Baring Brothers aggressively sought payment for their loan, the government considered Rosas a steadfast partner. In September 1837, the bank wrote a letter to Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, pleading with him to intervene on their behalf with the government in Buenos Aires. The letter states, “We beg respectfully to request your Lordship will again instruct the British minister to communicate with the government of Buenos Ayres on behalf of the many sufferers from their defalcation.”42 As the conflict over the Banda Oriental escalated, the British recognized that Rosas’ attempts at expanding his sphere of influence were infringing upon their mercantile operations.

The Parana River allowed for trade into the previously inaccessible Paraguay, and the British would not accept any limits on its accessibility. The British imposed a blockade with the French in 1845. However, even with the intervention of their navy, the British did not consider themselves at war with Rosas or the Argentine Confederation. In his instructions to the new minister in Buenos Aires, William Gore Ouseley, Lord Palmerston made it clear that the attitudes from Great Britain to Rosas was “not one of hostility to that State, or the influential individual who is at the head of it,” it was one of “friendship, in true regard for the interests of the Republic.”43 Yet still Rosas refused to budge, and the independence of the Banda Oriental became the sticking point between the two parties.

As the 1840s drew to a close and the blockade reached its fifth year of existence, questions began to emerge within the British government on the progress of Her Majesty’s mission in Buenos

42

“Draft of a letter from an un-named writer to Lord Palmerston” Public Statements on the Financial State of Buenos Aires, House Correspondence Latin America 1817-1929, The Baring Archive 43 “Instructions to H.M. Minister at Buenos Ayres, for Guidance in Joint Intervention by England and France between Buenos Ayres and Monte-Video, 1846.” Command Papers, 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online

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Aires. With the cost of the blockade stacking up, the British were eager to come to terms with Rosas and bring a resolution to the blockade. In 1849, a convention was signed between Rosas and the British government that officially brought an end to the conflict. The treaty was a triumph for Rosas, who had successfully imposed his will on not one, but two European powers, and asserted his control in the River PlateThe treaty called for the “restoring of perfect relation of friendship” between Great Britain and the Argentine Confederation and made no demands on Rosas for ceasing the conflict within the Banda Oriental.44 This loss was recognized in Great Britain. A letter to the editor of The Morning Chronicle, signed “a British sufferer,” was extremely critical of the compact, arguing that “it contains nothing but concession and invitations to the Governor of Buenos Ayres” and Great Britain would discover “how her honor is paltered away, and her treasure squandered to gratify the caprices and the cruel ambition of that bad man.”45 The pessimism of this forecast did not come true, as the acclaim that Rosas achieved from defeating the blockade was short lived. Without an external force threatening the provinces, internal conflicts yet again emerged. By 1852, Rosas was out of power and on a steamship headed to England.

British retrospections of Rosas’ rule started almost immediately after his downfall. While some newspapers focused on how he “ruled in solitary terror” and “blood flowed by his commands as freely as water,” the questions about his legacy emerged. “Had General Rosas employed his authority differently,” posited the same editorial, “he might now be regarded as the Washington of

44

“Argentine Confederation. Convention between Her Majesty and the Argentine Confederation, for the settlement of existing differences and the re-establishment of friendship. Signed at Buenos Ayres, November 24, 1849.”

Command Papers, 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online 45 “The River Plate Question and Lord Palmerston’s Convention with General Rosas.” Morning Chronicle, March 30, 1850. British Library Newspapers, Gale Primary Sources

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Kevin Ramsey South America.”46 In particular, British residents in Argentina were willing to excuse Rosas as a necessary evil. Reflecting on his time in the Buenos Aires province during the Rosas era, the Anglo-Argentine author W.H. Hudson remembered Rosas’ legacy as complex: People were in perpetual conflict about the character of the great man. He was abhorred by many, perhaps by most, others were on his side even for years after he had vanished from their ken…all the crimes and cruelties practiced by Rosas, were not like the crimes committed by a private person, but were all for the good of the country, with the result that in Buenos Ayres and throughout our province there had been a long period of peace and prosperity.47

Hudson’s attitude was the perception of Rosas in a nutshell: a dictator, but an acceptable one at that. The prejudicial attitudes that the British held towards the ability of Argentinians to selfgovern in a democracy made them more willing to accept Rosas with all of his flaws.

After his downfall, the British considered the turbulent period that followed to be indicative of an inherent anarchy that plagued Argentinians. In 1853, one British editorial lamented that “the time…has not even yet arrived for the formation of a great State in the interior” and it may be that the provinces turn into a sad example “of the dangers and embarrassment of precipitating constitutions before the people to be ruled are fit for them.”48 The influence of Sarmiento and Facundo can be seen throughout many authors, including MacCann, who claimed that the provinces’ inhabitants “never possessed with themselves the capabilities of steady progression.”49 In the end, while heavily influenced by their own economic interests in the region, the British perspectives of the River Plate are still crucial to understanding Rosas’ regime. When properly contextualized, the merchant community within Buenos Aires, the banking community in the

46

“Rosas and La Plata.” The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature, 419.

Stewart, “Living with Rosas,” 43-44.

48 “Rio de La Plata - Its Latest History.” The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature (1844-1898), Apr 1853. 497.

American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries 49 MacCann, Two Thousand Miles Ride, vol. 2, 219.

47

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United Kingdom, and the positions of the British government provide an extensive amount of material with which to analyze and understand the rule of Juan Manuel de Rosas.

The United Provinces and the United States In contrast to the British, the United States maintained a much more distant relationship to the United Provinces before, during, and after the time of Rosas. The turmoil that immediately preceded Rosas’ time in office did not go unnoticed, and the American view of the Provinces after 1816 was largely that the country started off promising, before descending into chaos. A letter from Mr. Gilbert H. Rogers of New York, sent from the city of Buenos Aires, reported in 1819 that “It might naturally be concluded that a people living in so fine a climate, and enjoying so many natural advantages, required nothing but their independence to make them happy…but the time is far distant when they will acquire this great and invaluable blessing.” 50 In particular, the conflict between Federalist and Unitarians as well as the contest between Buenos Aires and Montevideo, dominated the conversation. Still, letters from travelers like Mr. Rogers, as well as diplomatic missives sent from American diplomats, help to triangulate the perspectives of life under Rosas’ rule.

Despite the physical distance between the two countries and the differences in culture, there was – at least initially – a sense of kinship between the United States and the people of South America. In 1822, in a letter to the first session of the Seventeenth Congress, President James Monroe described an affinity for the “revolutionary movement in the Spanish provinces in this

50

“Buenos Ayres: Extract of a letter from Mr Gilbert H Rogers, of New York, dated Buenos Ayres, April 20th, 1819.” The Weekly Recorder; a Newspaper Conveying Important Intelligence and OTher Useful Matter Under the Three General Heads of Theology, Literature, and National Affairs (1814-1821), Jul 23, 1819. 400. American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries

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Kevin Ramsey hemisphere” which garnered the “sympathy of our fellow-citizens from its commitment.”51 In 1827, an American Captain F.B. Head described the political situation post-independence as “analogous circumstances that compelled us to a separation from Great Britain.” Yet in the same writings that described his journey across the provinces, Head realized the conflict between Federalists and Unitarians doomed any chances of Rivadavia’s government.52 An assessment of the pre-Rosas period includes the many assassinations that seem to permeate the country and are symptomatic of the anarchy that preceded him. An American naval officer’s perspective published in 1838 described Rosas’ ability to “put a stop, to great measure, the assassinations which were formerly so numerous.”53 Indeed, as soon as Rosas came into power in 1829, the diplomatic messages sent back to the United States were full of optimism. John M. Forbes, the chargé d’affaires stationed in the city of Buenos Aires from 1820 to 1831, wrote prolifically as he witnessed the rise of Rosas. After a private meeting in November 1829 where they discussed Rosas’ political hopes for his country, Forbes was convinced that Rosas was a man of “magnanimity and moderation.”54 Forbes passed away in 1831 and his successor, Francis Baylies, disagreed vehemently with him, and indicted not only Rosas but all of his subjects. In Baylies’ mind, the Argentines “have no idea of that feeling which we call love of country…the revolutions of these people are seditious…their patriotism, bluster; their liberty, a farce.”55 Baylies’ attitudes influenced the

51

“Seventeenth Congress - first session.” Niles’ Weekly Register (1814-1837), Mar 16, 1822. 42. American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries 52 “Buenos Ayres and the Pampas.” The American Quarterly Review (1827-1837), Dec 1 1830. 253. American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries 53 “Leaves from My Journal.” The Gentleman’s Magazine (1837-1839), Oct 1838. 263. American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries 54 William Dusenberry, “Juan Manuel de Rosas as Viewed by Contemporary American Diplomats,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 41, no. 4 (November 1961): 497.

55 Dusenberry, “Juan Manuel de Rosas,” 499.

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Democracy or Dictatorship? diplomatic relationship between the United States and Rosas. In 1832, after a dispute over American fishing vessels, relations were broken for more than a decade. The actions of Rosas clearly had an influence on the perspectives of Americans, who quickly associated his despotic tendencies with the support given to him by his base.

Despite President Monroe’s statement in 1822 of public support and empathy for the independence of the Argentine provinces, the overall American perception of gauchos and their way of life was negative. In 1817, Forbes’ predecessor, Henry Brackenridge, noted that the gauchos had a “passion” for liberty (a cause near and dear to the United States), but a kind of liberty that enabled “unbounded licentiousness” which existed with “the most absolute submissions to their chiefs…which depended on popularity.”56 This characterization is ubiquitous in American portraits of gauchos at the time, and Rosas is often described as “the leader” of the gauchos, in personal style as well as behavior. When attention is given to Rosas, the man, however, attitudes are as disparate as the ones previously examined from Forbes and Baylies.

In 1841, an unauthored account published in The Monthly Chronicles of Events, Discoveries, Improvements, and Opinions of the political situation in Buenos Aires anticipated the challenges of characterizing Rosas’ regime: “Probably he is not so black as he has been painted; few men are…He has great energy…for good as well as for evil, and is evidently a man of strong native talent.”57 Even Baylies could not help but give Rosas some compliments, stating that he “possessed much personal beauty, having a large, commanding figure and a fine face.”58 A common comparison to President Andrew Jackson appears especially amongst the American

56

Romero, A History of Argentine Political Thought, 99.

“Article XVII: Buenos Ayres. Its Recent Contest With France, and its Present Political Situation.” The Monthly Chronicle of Events, Discoveries, Improvements, and Opinions. (1840-1842), Nov/Dec 1841. 511.

58 Dusenberry, “Juan Manuel de Rosas,” 498.

57

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Kevin Ramsey diplomatic community. In 1844, Harvey M. Watterson was charged as “Special Agent” of the State Department to Buenos Aires. After Watterson was received by Rosas, he described him as a “real General Jackson of a fellow”, who was “a man of the people”, and “one of nature’s noblemen.”

An article in the Maine Farmer also described Rosas as “much like old General Jackson – obstinate, self-willed, and resolute to desperation.”59 The sympathy and affection given to Rosas

by Watterson and other American diplomats are endemic in this period and would only increase after the British and French blockade in 1845.

At this time, there was a stark disconnect between the perspectives of Rosas from these diplomats and those of the general American public. Rosas was described by Edward A. Hopkins, chargé d’affaires to Paraguay, as “a man who loves American principles and liberty” and, as the situation worsened under the blockade in 1846, the belief by the American diplomatic community in Buenos Aires was that Rosas was the only one who could hold the country together.60 In 1845, the editors of The American Review grappled with the situation in the River Plate.

Rosas’ government was described as “A pure dictatorship, established and upheld in a Republic by violence and blood, speedily makes it anything else than a Republic.”61 To reinforce their claim, an accompanying letter from Mrs. S. P. Jenkins, an American who lived in Buenos Aires, was included with their assessment. Mrs. Jenkins compares Rosas to a “modern Nero” who is responsible for “the annihilation of every germ of morality, civilization, and intellectual advancement.” The same editorial in The Albion that complimented Venezuela and Páez stated

59

“Important from the River of Plate.” Maine Farmer (1844-1900), April 1, 1852. 2. American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries 60 Dusenberry, “Juan Manuel de Rosas,” 504.

61 “Buenos Aires and the Republic of the Banda Oriental.” The American Review: A Whig Journal of Politics, Literature, Art and Science (1845-1847), Feb 1846. 160. American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries

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Democracy or Dictatorship? that “the career of Rosas has been signalized by acts so atrocious as to mark him for a fiend rather than a man.”62 While American diplomats stationed in Buenos Aires were increasing their sympathy to the Governor’s plight, their fellow citizens thought him the worst kind of dictator.

The uniqueness of the American perspective of the River Plate lies in the frequent comparison between the recent histories of the two countries. When examining these analyses in context with the views of the 1837 Generation, particularly those expressed by Sarmiento in Facundo, a clear relation can be seen. An editorial in The United States Magazine and Democratic Review in 1846 states that “the interior of the country of the Argentines has had a peculiar influence upon their civilization.”63 Frequently, the problems for the current situation in the River Plate, irrespective of the author’s view of Rosas, are placed upon the perceived deficiencies rooted in gaucho culture. When comparing the development of the political system of the United States to that of the River Plate, American editorials identified the gaucho as the outlier. In 1851, an article in the New York Daily Tribune described gauchos as “savages” who were “accustomed to civil war” and were “merciless and ready to take life.”64 American attitudes identified with Sarmiento and, by association, with the Unitarians. Any semblance of similarities between the United States and the provinces were associated with the administration and aspirations of Rivadavia. The same article in the New York Daily Tribune identified the Unitarians as the “the men to whom civilized life and cultivation were not unknown…they were emulous of the freedom and growth of the great Republic of North America.”65 Despite this abrogation of any similarity between the two countries,

62

“Affairs of the River Plate,” The Albion, 454.

“Rosas.” The United States Magazine, and Democratic Review (1837-1851), May 1846. 369. American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries 64 “The War on the River Plata.” New York - Daily Tribune (1842-1866), Nov 1851. 4. American Periodical Series Online, The Center for Research Libraries 65 “The War on the River Plata.” New York - Daily Tribune, 4.

63

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Kevin Ramsey American examinations about Rosas’ legacy after his fall from power continued to raise the question about how he would be remembered.

The retrospectives of Rosas after he was deposed vary widely, from complete condemnation of a brutal dictator to a man doing the best he could given the circumstances. The former view is typified by the last American chargé d’affaires to Rosas’ government, John S. Pendleton, who wrote in 1851 that the Rosas regime was “the most simple and rigorous despotism in the civilized world.”66 The latter is exemplified by one opinion expressed in The New York Daily Times: But who supposes for a moment that his Government, or any other, in such a condition of society, could be conducted on peace principles? Rosas has been reckless in his cruelties, and indiscriminate in their bestowal…His atrocities, if they deserve the name, have been committed in self-defense, and have been magnified beyond all reason by the inveterate animosity of those who suffered beneath his iron rule.

It is evident that the debate over Rosas’ legacy started even then, which is all the more reason why English-speaking perspectives are worthy of consideration.

Conclusion In the context of the demands for decolonization in Academia, it may be trivial, or even wrong to write about English-speaking views on Rosas. However, the use of these sources in offering contemporaries’ perspectives from travelers, foreign residents and diplomats is extremely relevant in adding to the debate on Rosas’ place in Argentine history, a debate that continues until today. This debate can only be fueled by adding new perspectives, local and foreign, on one of the most controversial figures in Argentina. Furthermore, the analysis of these sources is also pertinent

66

Dusenberry, “Juan Manuel de Rosas,” 504.

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Democracy or Dictatorship? as they help to shape the views held in the English-speaking world about Rosas and South America as a land of violence and terror, where it would be impossible to achieve democracy.

Despite the brutality of Rosas during his twenty years in office, Argentinians remain split over his legacy. In 1989, over one hundred years since the end of his rule, Rosas’ body was returned to Argentina, received in a repatriation ceremony by President Carlos Menem and hundreds of thousands of Argentinians.67 In 2007, President Nestor Kirchner’s announcement that his wife, Senator Cristina Kirchner, would be his presidential successor was met with cries that this was an act of despotic rule, evocative of the time of Rosas. Critics claimed that one could draw a straight line from the Kirchners to Juan Manuel de Rosas, with Carlos Menem and Juan Domingo Perón bridging the gaps.68 Depending on who you ask, and which political party they support, one may say he was a man who was given extraordinary power with popular support, while others will say he was a despotic tyrant.

What is clear from the recent scholarly debates around Rosas’ base of support is that the common people of the River Plate considered him their champion. At the time, Argentinians like Domingo Sarmiento and Esteban Echeverría denounced the gauchos as the cause of all political problems in their country because they embodied a kind of barbarism that had enabled Rosas. In the mind of the 1837 Generation, the 1821 law of universal suffrage legitimized Rosas’ rise to power supported by the “mob”. Yet as Ariel de La Fuente and others have explored, the mobilization of the gauchos was a type of political participation in and of itself. Furthermore,

67

Eugene Robinson, “Argentines Cheer Returning Hero – 112 Years After Death,” The Washington Post, October 2, 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/10/02/argentines-cheer-returning-hero_112-yearsafter-death/854362bd-2df1-4a12-84e9-9cc92e14a72f/ 68 Martin Lagos, “Rosas, Perón, Menem, los Kirchner: esa vieja manía de querer perpetuarse en el poder,” La Nacion, September 15, 2020, Opinion, https://www.lanacion.com.ar/opinion/rosas-peron-menem-kirchner-esa-viejamania-nid2450101

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Kevin Ramsey contrary to what was depicted in Sarmiento’s Facundo, a society of rule and law did exist in the Argentine interior. As Argentinians developed complicated networks of trade and expanded property ownership within the interior, local magistrates and judges were called upon to arbitrate litigious disputes.

In this context, the perspectives of English-speaking diplomats and merchants of life in the River Plate under Juan Manuel de Rosas are highly relevant to fully understanding his legacy.

They were not directly involved in the fight between Unitarians and Federalists nor in Rosas’ rise to power. Their views can help triangulate the Argentine perspectives of Rosas, so long as their own biases and intentions are contextualized. The British immediately developed a significant economic interest in the country and were willing to excuse Rosas’ behavior while he did not stand in the way of their mercantile goals. As soon as he did, they were not afraid to intervene, and they would continue to entrench themselves in the development of Argentina’s economy throughout the nineteenth century. On the other hand, the Americans were far more removed from the River Plate’s economic interests. Yet nearly every diplomat in Buenos Aires, even if they defined Rosas as a brutal dictator, praised him personally. Editorials published in American newspapers and periodicals, as well as letters from travelers who have returned from Buenos Aires, contain the same dichotomy and ambiguity. Frequently, Juan Manuel de Rosas is described as Jacksonian in nature – an apt comparison, given the complexity of the legacy of the seventh President of the United States. However, the same editorials published condemnations of the method by which he held on to power.

The views of the merchants and diplomats from Great Britain and the United States must be held in concert with those from the country itself. Certainly, these views should not be given more weight than those of the Argentines – ultimately, the question of where Rosas falls in the

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Democracy or Dictatorship? country’s history deserves an Argentinian answer. However, given the sheer magnitude of political developments in the post-independence River Plate, it would be folly to not consider Englishspeaking perspectives of the Rosas regime. The thirty-six years in the River Plate from 1816 to 1852, from the call for independence to the start of the institutional organization of the county, was a period that saw a tremendous amount of transformation. With that transformation came a significant degree of complexity – a kind of complexity that is missed when simply categorizing Rosas in a dichotomy between brutal dictator, or a populist with the support of the common people.

English-speaking perspectives of Rosas cannot answer whether the “Restorer of Laws” belongs to either camp. They can, however, add several significant brush strokes to the picture of the River Plate as it existed under Rosas’ rule, offering nuance and perspective that are critical to evaluating his legacy.

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Kevin Ramsey

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Dusenberry, William. “Juan Manuel de Rosas as Viewed by Contemporary American Diplomats.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 41, no. 4 (November 1961): 495-514. https://doi.org/10.2307/2509936.

De la Fuente, Ariel. Children of Facundo: Caudillo and Gaucho Insurgency During the Argentine State-Formation Process. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000.

Hernando, Diana. “Casa y Familia: Spatial Biographies in Nineteenth-Century Buenos Aires.”

PhD diss., University of California, 1973.

Lynch, John. Argentine Caudillo: Juan Manuel de Rosas. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2001.

Myers, Jorge. “‘Democracy in South America,’ The ‘New Generation’ and the Reception of Tocqueville's De La Démocratie En Amérique: The Path of River Plate Liberalism, 18401852.” in Imported Modernity in Post-Colonial State Formation: The Appropriation of Political, Educational, and Cultural Models in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, edited

by Eugenia Roldán and Marcelo Caruso, 154-201. New York City: Peter Lang, 2007.

Reber, Vera Blinn. “British Mercantile Houses in Buenos Aires 1810-1880.” PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 1972.

Romero, José Luis. A History of Argentine Political Thought. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963.

Shumway, Jeffrey M. A Woman, a Man, a Nation: Mariquita Sánchez, Juan Manuel de Rosas, and the Beginnings of Argentina. Albuquerque, NM: University of Mexico Press, 2019.

Stewart, Iain A.D. “Living with Dictator Rosas: Argentina through Scottish Eyes.” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, no. 1 (February 1997): 23-44. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X96004622.

Stewart, Watt, “The Diplomatic Service of John M. Forbes at Buenos Aires,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 14, no. 2 (May, 1934): 202-218 https://doi.org/10.2307/2506354.

Younger, Joseph P. “‘Monstrous And Illegal Proceedings’: Law, Sovereignty and Revolution in the Río de la Plata Borderlands, 1810-1880.” PhD diss., Princeton University, 2011.

Zimmermann, Eduardo. “Caudillos, Democracy, and Constitutionalism in mid Nineteenthcentury Argentina.” The Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies 26, no. 2 (July, 2020): 189-203. https://doi.org/10.1080/14701847.2020.1789378.

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Lenin Moreno’s Path to the Middle: An Institutional Development Model for Ecuador By: Felipe Deidan ABSTRACT: In the aftermath of Ecuador’s 2017 presidential election, the country stood at a crossroads as to whether Lenin Moreno would continue Rafael Correa’s populist agenda or reverse his predecessor’s legacy. The Correa administration had strengthened the role and capacity of state planning and the central government.1 Lenin Moreno shifted towards a neoclassical development model, which centers the role of development on the market with limited state intervention. This paper explores Ecuador’s vacillation between two developmental extremes, and the extent to which their failures prompted large debt obligations and social unrest. Recent trends indicate the need for a development model centered on the structure of its institutions. This paper discusses the value of an institutional model and its central focus on transparency, efficiency, and middle-ground institutional incrementalism through social policy.

Moreno faces a monumental period in his country’s future; a development model centered on government institutions is fundamental for structural change that would stabilize the country’s trajectory away from its populist past.

Rafael Correa’s National Development Plan Rafael Correa stepped into power on January 15th, 2007, at a time of political instability and economic stagnation. Dressed in a colorful poncho for a ritual blessing by indigenous elders in the provincial town of Zumbahua, the populist leader recounted to his supporters the social advancements of Simon Bolivar and Che Guevara, and the start of a “new homeland,” giving the “reigns of development” to the people.

Correa’s first revolutionary steps centered on his 2007 National Development Plan (NDP), which placed emphasis on sustainable human development, national sovereignty, and citizen participation in the public sphere.2 The planning model focused on his Buen Vivir initiative, which

1

Sonia Fleury and Hugo Navajas, “Assessment of Development Results: Ecuador,” United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2008, https://www.oecd.org/countries/ecuador/46810541.pdf.

2 Rafael Correa Delgado, “National Development Plan / National Plan for Good Living, 2013-2017. Summarized Version,” Buen Vivir, 2013, 17-19.

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Felipe Deidan by design held the state to a larger role in economics, politics, and society through labor policies and trade restrictions. In accordance with his National Development Plan, Correa took a stand against Western and international financial influences to build Ecuador's economic independence.

He confronted the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in an effort to stray away from the neoliberal policies that plagued the nation prior to his term; the country faced austerity measures that had been set in place after the 1998–1999 financial crisis when severe inflation and devaluation of the Ecuadorian sucre led then-President Jamil Mahuad to announce the US dollar as the national currency on January 9, 2000.3 The fiscal stabilization of the new currency allowed steady economic recovery, but a fixed exchange rate of 25,000:1 resulted in a six percent GDP contraction. Without a national currency, however, the country lost its monetary policy as a macroeconomic tool.

In response, Correa removed the Central Bank’s independence and implemented a planning model. He established capital controls by making banks hold "45 percent of their liquid assets domestically in 2009" and increasing the threshold to “60 percent” by August of 2012. The policy reduced capital flight substantially after nearly $30 billion exited the country between 1983 and 2008.4 Increased savings allowed Correa to spend against a countercyclical period in 2009 and reduced Ecuador’s recessionary period as other countries tied to the U.S economy staggered.

Correa then began his assault against the West. Between 2008 and 2009, Ecuador faced debt obligations from bond holders as bonds reached maturity. Despite the country’s ability to pay its American debt, Correa deemed two-thirds of debt obligation from bonds to be illegitimate,

3

Luis Ignacio Jácome, “The Late 1990's Financial Crisis in Ecuador: Institutional Weaknesses, Fiscal Rigidities, and Financial Dollarization At Work,” IMF Working Papers, no. 12 (2004): 1-12, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451842937.001.

4 Rebecca Ray and Sara Kozameh, “Ecuador’s Economy Since 2007,” CEPR, May 2012, https://cepr.net/documents/publications/ecuador-2012-05.pdf.

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Lenin Moreno’s Path to the Middle citing the doctrine of odious debt, which denotes that any debt incurred by “corrupt and despotic prior regimes” should not be repaid by the subsequent regime because it is immoral and essentially illegal debt. Correa cited three main catalysts of “aggressive indebtedness”: the military dictatorships of Guillermo Lara and Alfredo Poveda during the 1970s which started Ecuador’s debt cycle; the Brady Bonds issued in 1989 which were “imposed on the country”; debt restructuring and austerity measures after the 1998-1999 financial crisis.5 International law does not accept any procedural application of odious debt due to the ambiguity of the term ‘odious;’ there are no procedures to identify which specific actions taken by a tyrannical regime are considered deplorable. Regardless, Correa offered to purchase the defaulted bonds at a 35% discount. With little other recourse, 91% of the bondholders sold their bonds in the exchange.6 Western lenders, who relied on their trust structure to come to their legal aid, were ignored by the US trustee venture. The populist leader won a political victory against the West at grave costs; he pushed away a valid debt obligation and ostracized his country’s credibility.

Correa’s continued alienation against Western capital prompted a need for alternative investment: Chinese loans, particularly on infrastructure programs. Shunned by most lenders from debt default in 2008, Ecuador relied heavily on Chinese funds that covered 61 percent of the government’s $6.2 billion in financing in 2013 and claimed as much as 90 percent of Ecuador’s

5

Cécile Lamarque, “Chapter 1: Ecuador's Illegitimate Debt,” CADTM, August 15, 2007, https://www.cadtm.org/Chapter-1-Ecuador-sIllegitimate#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20latter%2C%20a,absence%20of%20consent%20and%20benefit.

6 Ibid.

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Felipe Deidan oil shipments.7 Oil concessions on the Yasuní National Park, which were once protected by Correa through the ITT initiative, were opened for drilling.8 In Ecuador’s case, Rafael Correa’s leniency towards China’s growing influence in the region sparked nationalist resentment against the country’s mounting debt. The country took a total of 15 loans estimated at US$18.4 billion, and currently faces $6 billion in debt.9 Chinese loans maintain high interest rates and require that Ecuador use Chinese companies in construction instead of local industry.10 These construction projects, however, have faced severe concerns about their capacity and quality. The most notorious example is the Coca Codo Sinclair dam, located at the base of the Reventador volcano. Expected to power one-third of Ecuador’s electricity, the dam received wide approval from Correa and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Currently, the dam runs at half capacity, dependent on rain or dry seasons, and faces 7,648 cracks across its structure due to poor construction oversight by the Chinese construction firm, Sinohydro.11 The dam, along with other projects, also represent points of corruption and bribery. Vice President Jorge Glas and Energy Minister Carlos Pareja are currently serving prison sentences due to receiving bribes from Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction giant. Pareja embezzled $44.8 million from construction contracts at the Esmeraldas oil refinery.12 A lack of transparency in these projects’ proceedings

7

Joshua Schneyer and Nicolas Medina Mora Perez, “How China Took Control of Ecuador's Oil,” Reuters, November 26, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-ecuador-oil-special-report/special-report-how-chinatook-control-of-an-opec-countrys-oil-idUSBRE9AP0HX20131126.

8 Kimberly Brown, “Heart of Ecuador's Yasuni, Home to Uncontacted Tribes, Opens for Oil Drilling,” Mongabay Environmental News, July 9, 2019, https://news.mongabay.com/2019/07/heart-of-ecuadors-yasuni-home-touncontacted-tribes-opens-for-oil-drilling/.

9 Raquel Carvalho, “How Chinese Projects Are Tearing Communities in Ecuador Apart,” South China Morning Post, May 25, 2019, https://multimedia.scmp.com/week-asia/article/3011618/beijing-conquest-latinamerica/chapter02.html.

10 Nicholas Casey and Clifford Krauss, “It Doesn't Matter If Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still Gets Paid,” The New York Times, December 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-chinadam.html.

11 Ibid.

12 James Bargent, “Oil Company Corruption Scandal Threatens Ecuador's Political Elite,” InSight Crime, September 20, 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/oil-company-corruption-scandal-threatens-ecuador-political-elite/.

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Lenin Moreno’s Path to the Middle facilitated concessions and bribes on failing infrastructure projects. Oil blocks in the Ecuadorian Amazon pose grave environmental risks for the country. Once protected by Correa, the Yasuni National Park faces oil concessions as Ecuador struggles to pay off its development projects.

Along with project debacles, burdening loans, and corruption, Ecuador also faces payment obligations: loan-for-oil contracts provide 80 percent of the oil the country produces to China until 2024, leaving the country with substantially less revenues to pay off their debts.13 The country continues to suffer from low oil prices, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, increasing external financing costs, and growing commodity dependency. Ecuador faces 26 percent of its central government’s external debt from Chinese credit, making China the country’s largest creditor and its most formidable debtor.14 Essentially, Correa’s NDP shifted Ecuador’s reliance on foreign markets to Chinese economic hegemony.

Under Correa’s state planning coordination, autocratic political reforms limited the capacity for public protest and veto power. He cracked down on reporters who spoke against his economic largesse, often shaming them publicly in his Sunday speeches. Professor Roberto Izurieta, Director of Latin American Projects for the Graduate School of Political Management at the George Washington University and former campaign advisor for 2017 presidential candidate Guillermo Lasso, believes that this new push for press restrictions is a recurring theme for Latin American populists. Despite implementing “stabilizing systems” to mitigate the destabilizing factors of “post-imperialist stigmas,” Latin America faces an uphill battle against “extensive rightwing nationalism reemergence.” Izurieta also notes that Correa’s policies “constituted a shift from

13

Chris Kraul, “Ecuador Faces a Huge Budget Deficit Because of Loans It Received from China,” Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2018, https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-ecuador-loans-china-20181210-story.html.

14 Stephen Kaplan, Globalization and Austerity Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 175.

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Felipe Deidan legal norms,” guaranteeing certain aspects of a neoliberal agenda to “difficult-to-change constitutional laws that increase state planning, intervention, and regulatory power, all while prioritizing state-building over quick economic recovery.” For example, state-building initiatives increased the number of civil servants from 230,185 to 510,436 since 2004, driving the country into deficit spending to maintain this government labor pool.15 Increasing the number of public servants provided more opportunities for Ecuadorians, but resulted in bureaucratic backlogs and large inefficiencies.16 Backlash arose due to the structure of Correa’s spending and his increasingly authoritarian leadership. Regardless, the 2017 general election, noted Izurieta, “tested the resilience of Rafael Correa’s grasp on Ecuador’s fragile democracy” in spite of Correa’s spending failures.

By distracting the population from his policies and putting the spotlight on targeting opposition leaders and reporters, Correa “hid himself from the country’s impending economic downfall.”17 With Lenin Moreno narrowly winning a run-off election under Correa’s Alianza Patria Altiva i Soberana, Proud and Sovereign Homeland Alliance, (PAIS), the populist Ecuadorian leader secured political influence for another four years; however, his opponents tapped into Correa’s legacy and created “resistance stemming from feminist, indigenous, and environmental groups that refused to be folded into Mr. Correa’s ruling party,” which later unraveled under the 2019 October protests.18

15

Catherine M. Conaghan, "Surveil and Sanction: The Return of the State and Societal Regulation in Ecuador", Revista Europea De Estudios Latinoamericanos Y Del Caribe, no. 98 (2015): 7-27.

16 Ibid.

17 Deidan, Felipe. Interview with Roberto Izurieta. Personal interview. Washington, D.C., February 25, 2019.

18 Ibid.

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Lenin Moreno’s Path to the Middle Lenin Moreno's Neoliberal U-Turn While expected to act independently from Correa, Lenin Moreno surprised the global community by turning against his predecessor, going as far as imprisoning his vice president and barring the former president from a likely reelection run in 2021. Moreno immediately shifted the developmental trajectory of Rafael Correa by removing his centralized planning model to place more emphasis on neoliberal policies as a step into restoring credibility with foreign investors and the United States and by steering the country into a much-needed austerity period. Moreno laid off government workers, attempted to slash gas subsidies, and relaxed financial regulations.19 While Correa isolated Western influence through improved relations with China and Iran, Moreno embraced Western institutions and sought to repair diplomatic relations with the U.S and the Organization of American States.

Moreno immediately removed restrictions on the media, emphasized compromise in congress, and improved anti-corruption measures, thus improving democratic proceedings within his government. On July 6th, 2020, Moreno’s preliminary agreement with some of Ecuador’s largest bondholders and the IMF worked to restructure $17.4 billion in outstanding debt, a feat accomplished through restoring confidence with foreign lenders.20 By cutting bureaucratic oversights on economic sectors, Moreno’s policymaking severely affected the state’s capacity to monitor, control, and regulate private economic activities. While Moreno argues that cutting the deficit is paramount in combating corruption and stemming growth, his policies have had limited effects and have only pushed social sectors of society away from him.

19

Charles Ripley, “From Rafael Correa to Lenín Moreno: Ecuador's Swing to the Right,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), November 21, 2019, https://www.coha.org/from-rafael-correa-to-lenin-moreno-ecuadors-swing-tothe-right/.

20 Ben Bartenstein and Stephan Kueffner, “Ecuador Reaches Debt Deal in Principle With Major Creditors,” Bloomberg, July 6, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-06/ecuador-reaches-debt-deal-inprincipal-with-major-bondholders.

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Felipe Deidan They have been particularly unpopular in poor communities, and have further alienated indigenous populations, who were previously exploited by the Correa administration through the establishment of mining programs on ancestral lands, the revocation of individual rights to control one’s own irrigation system, and disregard for judicial proceedings relating to claims of genocide carried out by foreign oil corporations against two native communities in the Amazon.

Under Moreno’s neoliberal policy, markets do not have the incentive to promote transparency, especially in privatization. Therefore, the Moreno government needs to set a precedent for stronger governmental structures that incorporate the market in a controlled manner.

Given Ecuador’s dollarized economy, Moreno should continue Correa’s Central Bank incorporation. Even with stronger government structures, Moreno will need to allow for specific privatization, such as within the transportation sector and privatizing airports and roads. These privatization efforts must be vetted and require an oversight committee. Each committee must be rotated depending on how long the project will take. This provides an alternative to neoliberal investments because it places greater accountability on foreign investment. However, these policies may disincentivize foreign investors that refuse to concede these conditional measures.

Given the commodity market in the region, developing countries compete by providing concessions to foreign investors. I argue that incorporating transparency as a fundamental aspect of Moreno’s development plan will allow for a more diverse foreign investment portfolio in the long term.

If Moreno continues with a neoclassical model through the IMF, there will be a fiscal tightening of about 6 percent of GDP over the next three years; given that Ecuador’s current GDP deficit runs at 0.3 percent, these measures seem excessively austere.21 In a country with minimal

21

Mark Weisbrot, “Ecuador Reaches a Deal-but Unrest May Return,” The Nation, October 16, 2019, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/ecuador-protests-imf/.

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Lenin Moreno’s Path to the Middle social safety nets, years of economic progress could be wiped out in a few months. On February 29th, 2020, the coronavirus pandemic reached Ecuador, wreaking havoc in the coastal city of Guayaquil. Ecuador’s medical resources were vastly unprepared for this disease and quarantine measures restrained many informal markets that rely on physical interactions for their transactions.

According to Goldman Sachs, Latin America’s GDP is expected to retract at a minimum average of 9%, the worst contraction in modern history; for comparison, the worst performing GDP in the 1980’s debt crisis ranged between a 5-6% retraction.22 About 22 Latin American countries could potentially default within the same timeframe; for comparison, the 1980’s debt crisis saw only 16 countries episodically default between a 10 year period.23 The coronavirus pandemic continues to ravage Ecuador, forcing the government to consider social expenditure. Austerity fails to meet the social responsiveness needed to deal with a pandemic and precarious markets bode uncertainty for future foreign direct investment.

Given the explosion of protests in Ecuador this past year, Moreno’s neoliberal push has demonstrated few signs of economic success and caused significant social unrest. His favorability fell from above 60% in 2017 to 33% in mid-2019. If Moreno is to gain legitimacy and continue his reformist policies, he must follow a more institutional model that focuses state intervention on strengthening judicial, legislative, and provincial organizations.

The Institutional Model in Ecuador Moreno’s credibility must be restored through trust in his government’s institutions. An institutional model in Ecuador serves as the backbone for transparency and sustainability within the country’s government. Ecuador’s vacillation between central planning and neoclassical

22

David A Wemer, “IDB President Warns of a Looming COVID Debt Crisis in Latin America, but Also Highlights Opportunities,” Atlantic Council, September 14, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/idbpresident-warns-of-a-looming-covid-debt-crisis-in-latin-america-but-also-highlights-opportunities/.

23 Ibid.

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Felipe Deidan development polarized the country and prompted long-standing consequences that persist beyond any regime. Accountability serves as the center point of any institution and implementing practices that reflect transparency and political reform are key steps in restoring trust between foreign investors and Moreno’s constituency.

Since 2017, Moreno widened the divide within his Alianza País party and placed significant blame on Rafael Correa for the political and economic problems facing the country while himself failing to address institutional problems. To improve trust within his government, Moreno must look to implement a national government ethics board to provide nonpartisan accountability and to create policy transparency for open-source information with government procedures. In theory, the ethics board would consist of people voted in by the general public.

Furthermore, the ethics board would have the capacity to oversee state-owned enterprises such as PetroEcuador, the national oil company, which was plagued with corruption under the Correa administration and was the epicenter for Operation Car Wash’s corruption probe in Ecuador.

Whereas Brazil’s impromptu ethics board has been selected by the ruling party and has recently been accused of partisan prosecutions, Ecuador’s directly elected board must be accountable to its electorate rather than its party. While efforts have been made to combat corruption, including the arrest of Moreno’s vice president, Jorge Glas, Moreno’s banning of a Correa-backed political party puts into question the partisan implications of accountability. An institutional ethics board must implement lasting transparency measures on both the government and its enterprises, and it must be removed entirely from binary cycles between planning and neoliberal models.

Given Moreno’s betrayal of Correa's emphasis on human development and Ecuadorian sovereignty, there is uncertainty regarding his commitment to the people. The long-lasting effects of IMF austerity in Ecuador have created a negative public sentiment towards neoliberal policies

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Lenin Moreno’s Path to the Middle because of the rollback of social policies. After enjoying economic growth and the decrease of inequality rates under Chinese investment, the Ecuadorian people are unwilling to return to strict austerity measures, a point that Moreno learned after cutting fuel subsidies. As a result, a sharp push for a more neoliberal approach could threaten Ecuador’s stability and transparency.

In response to the cut of fuel subsidies in October 2019, sizable protests consumed the region, forcing Lenin Moreno to temporarily move his capital from Quito to Guayaquil, and revoke Decree 883, a cut in subsidies to energy that would have saved the country $1.3 billion a year.24 While Ecuador struggles with diminishing revenue from oil production, the future of social programs remains a key issue for the indigenous community, which has placed pressure on Moreno to find an alternative solution outside of the typical neoclassical agenda. An institutional model allows for a transparent, merit-based programmatic governance, which aligns directly with my recommendation for conditional cash transfers similar to Brazil’s Bolsa Familia (BF). Conditional cash transfers (CCT) seek to reduce poverty by providing money to households on the condition that they comply with certain requirements.25 CCT works to build the country’s institutions by placing both the federal and provincial governments in charge of administration. Furthermore, providing conditional cash transfers as an institutional part of the state corresponds with promoting long-term human development. It also fits with Correa’s education and health reforms, as families would receive a monthly stipend from the government under the conditions that their children attend school and receive vaccinations.

24

Alexandra Valencia, “Ecuador's Moreno Scraps Fuel Subsidy Cuts in Big Win for Indigenous Groups,” Reuters, October 14, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-protests/ecuadors-moreno-scraps-fuel-subsidy-cutsin-big-win-for-indigenous-groups-idUSKBN1WT265.

25 World Health Organization, “Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Nutritional Status,” World Health Organization, February 11, 2019, https://www.who.int/elena/titles/cash_transfer/en/.

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Felipe Deidan In regard to combatting the informal market, the Bolsa Familia style debit card could encourage integration with the state because these families would need to register with the state in order to receive certain benefits.26 This social inclusion allows for a multiplier factor, which has been successfully demonstrated in Brazil’s economy. Additionally, it provides a safety net for the middle class, whose progress has been backsliding within the past decade. The people would have more agency with their provincial electorate, which would administer the program. Bringing in indigenous populations through this program would allow for a more representative democracy and the promotion of more socially and politically engaging policies. An institutional model that effectively employs these programs can subdue the rising unrest among marginalized groups.

While these programs might create short term deficits, their investment will seed economic development if they are placed under the right institutional conditions. While CCT can provide potential economic benefits, excessive cash administration could raise local community prices, which would yield negative externalities for non-participating households.27 Furthermore, CCT requires a considerable budget that can be heavily mismanaged without proper institutions in place to limit leakages.28 The institutional model would allow for an easier transition from Correa’s planning model because of its central focus on the state and the market. It allows for more accountability to the ruling government while also encouraging state-backed liberalization. However, the planning model is more effective because it bypasses checks and balances, therefore implementing policy

26

Centre for Public Impact, “Bolsa Família in Brazil,” Centre For Public Impact, September 2, 2019, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/bolsa-familia-in-brazil.

27 Eeshani Kandpal, “In Fighting Poverty, Cash Transfer Programs Should Be Wary of Negative Spillovers,” The World Bank, December 27, 2019, worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2019/12/27/cash-transfer-programs-should-bewary-of-negative-spillovers 28 Ariel Fiszbein and Norbert R. Schady, “Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty,” (Policy Research Reports: World Bank Publications, 2009), 41.

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Lenin Moreno’s Path to the Middle faster, but obscuring its effectiveness, as seen through the failed construction of the Coca Codo Sinclair Dam.29 While creating strong institutions could provide a more established government able to ensure consistent government behavior, it can also be expensive and slow progress due to increased bureaucracy. For comparison, in Brazil’s extensive bureaucracy, it takes almost 2,000 hours per year for a medium-size company to make their tax payments.30 Many Latin American countries face an overbearing state with little capacity to execute policy. These excessive bureaucracies also deter people from starting up their own business, thus keeping a large part of the population in the informal market. Increasing bureaucracy also reduces international incentive to invest, given that bureaucracies can delay the processing of documentation and strengthen red tape. Correa’s bureaucratic expansion increased people’s reliance on the informal sector and embedded more opportunities for corruption.

As the economic forecast for the country dwindles, social pressures from the coronavirus pandemic and the collapsing middle class have caused insatiable civil unrest that will manifest itself through populist leaders and large-scale protests. Fortunately, Ecuador's ability to reach a rather quick debt restructuring deal with creditors poses an optimistic sign for bondholders and potential future defaults. Ecuador is expected to create $1.4 billion in savings this year and free up $16 billion in the coming decade. Furthermore, bond payments are expected to stay below $2 billion per year through 2030 at 50 cents on the dollar, essentially giving Ecuador a two year grace period with no principal payments.31 Moreno has been accused of neglecting social contracts with

29

Krauss, “China Still Gets Paid.”

David Biller, “Filing Taxes for 80 Days: A Window into Brazil's Bureaucracy.,” Bloomberg, March 31, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-31/filing-taxes-for-80-days-a-window-into-brazil-s-bureaucracy.

31 Sydney Maki, “Ecuador’s Speedy Debt Deal Underscores Argentina’s Hang-Ups,” Bloomberg, July 9, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-09/ecuador-s-speedy-debt-deal-underscores-argentina-s-hangups.

30

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Felipe Deidan his people by creating more acceptable conditions in his first proposal in favor of creditors.

Ecuador’s development plan must balance the demands of foreign investment and social policy alienating either group has proven fatal.

Conclusion If Ecuador continues to allow social conditions to deteriorate, it risks sliding back into the political and economic instability it faced in the late 1990s. While Lenin Moreno faces economic and social pressures from marginalized groups because of his neoliberal policies, he should implement an institutional model that incorporates both his market principles and Correa’s planning initiative in order to create a smoother transition path, including an ethics board to serve as an insulated layer against divisive partisan politics that deter political stability. By creating a structure of governance centered away from the populist turbulence that plagues the region, Ecuador can steer through crisis without political instability. Institutions can serve as the backbone for social safety nets and adequate distribution of conditional transfers. Ecuador’s institutional model guarantees stability and transparency, which would attract risk-averse foreign investors; lower risk would then entail fewer concessions in austerity and policy intervention. As COVID19 devastates Ecuador’s ill-prepared institutions, Moreno must change his development model.

Opting for an institutional model will help the equatorial country navigate through troubling times ahead.

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Lenin Moreno’s Path to the Middle

Bibliography Bargent, James. “Oil Company Corruption Scandal Threatens Ecuador's Political Elite.” InSight Crime, September 20, 2017. https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/oil-company-corruptionscandal-threatens-ecuador-political-elite/.

Bartenstein, Ben, and Stephan Kueffner, “Ecuador Reaches Debt Deal in Principle With Major Creditors,” Bloomberg, July 6, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0706/ecuador-reaches-debt-deal-in-principal-with-major-bondholders.

Biller, David. “Filing Taxes for 80 Days: A Window into Brazil's Bureaucracy.” Bloomberg, March 31, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-31/filing-taxes-for80-days-a-window-into-brazil-s-bureaucracy.

Brown, Kimberly. “Heart of Ecuador's Yasuni, Home to Uncontacted Tribes, Opens for Oil Drilling.” Mongabay Environmental News, July 9, 2019. https://news.mongabay.com/2019/07/heart-of-ecuadors-yasuni-home-to-uncontactedtribes-opens-for-oil-drilling/.

Carvalho, Raquel. “How Chinese Projects Are Tearing Communities in Ecuador Apart.” South China Morning Post, May 25, 2019. https://multimedia.scmp.com/weekasia/article/3011618/beijing-conquest-latin-america/chapter02.html.

Casey, Nicholas, and Clifford Krauss. “It Doesn't Matter If Ecuador Can Afford This Dam. China Still Gets Paid.” The New York Times, December 24, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/ecuador-china-dam.html.

Centre For Public Impact. “Bolsa Família in Brazil.” Centre For Public Impact, September 2, 2019. https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/bolsa-familia-in-brazil.

Conaghan, Catherine M. "Surveil and Sanction: The Return of the State and Societal Regulation in Ecuador." Revista Europea De Estudios Latinoamericanos Y Del Caribe, no. 98 (2015): 7-27.

Deidan, Felipe. Interview with Roberto Izurieta. Personal interview. Washington, D.C., February 25, 2019.

Delgado, Rafael C. “National Development Plan / National Plan for Good Living, 2013-2017.

Summarized Version.” Buen Vivir, 2013. https://www.planificacion.gob.ec/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2013/12/Buen-Vivir-ingles-web-final-completo.pdf.

Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert R. Schady. Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty. World Bank Publications, 2009. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-7352-1 Fleury, Sonia, Hugo Navajas. “Assessment of Development Results: Ecuador.” United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2008. https://www.oecd.org/countries/ecuador/46810541.pdf.

Jácome, Luis Ignacio. “The Late 1990's Financial Crisis in Ecuador: Institutional Weaknesses, Fiscal Rigidities, and Financial Dollarization At Work.” IMF Working Papers, no. 12 (2004): 1-12. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451842937.001.

Kaplan, Stephen B. Globalization and Austerity Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139086196.

Kraul, Chris. “Ecuador Faces a Huge Budget Deficit Because of Loans It Received from China.”

Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2018. https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-ecuadorloans-china-20181210-story.html.

Lamarque, Cécile. “Chapter 1 : Ecuador's Illegitimate Debt.” CADTM, August 15, 2007.

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Felipe Deidan https://www.cadtm.org/Chapter-1-Ecuador-sIllegitimate#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20latter%2C%20a,absence%20of%20con sent%20and%20benefit.

Maki, Sydney. “Ecuador’s Speedy Debt Deal Underscores Argentina’s Hang-Ups.” Bloomberg, July 9, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-09/ecuador-s-speedydebt-deal-underscores-argentina-s-hang-ups.

Ray, Rebecca, and Sara Kozameh. “Ecuador’s Economy Since 2007.” CEPR, May 2012. https://cepr.net/documents/publications/ecuador-2012-05.pdf.

Ripley, Charles. “From Rafael Correa to Lenín Moreno: Ecuador's Swing to the Right.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), November 21, 2019. https://www.coha.org/from-rafael-correa-to-lenin-moreno-ecuadors-swing-to-the-right/.

Schneyer, Joshua and Nicolas Medina Mora Perez, “How China Took Control of Ecuador's Oil,” Reuters, November 26, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-ecuador-oilspecial-report/special-report-how-china-took-control-of-an-opec-countrys-oilidUSBRE9AP0HX20131126.

Valencia, Alexandra. “Ecuador's Moreno Scraps Fuel Subsidy Cuts in Big Win for Indigenous Groups.” Reuters, October 14, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuadorprotests/ecuadors-moreno-scraps-fuel-subsidy-cuts-in-big-win-for-indigenous-groupsidUSKBN1WT265.

Weisbrot, Mark. “Ecuador Reaches a Deal-but Unrest May Return.” The Nation, October 16, 2019. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/ecuador-protests-imf/.

Wemer, David A. “IDB President Warns of a Looming COVID Debt Crisis in Latin America, but Also Highlights Opportunities.” Atlantic Council, September 14, 2020. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/idb-president-warns-of-a-loomingcovid-debt-crisis-in-latin-america-but-also-highlights-opportunities/.

World Health Organization. “Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes and Nutritional Status.”

World Health Organization, February 11, 2019. https://www.who.int/elena/titles/cash_transfer/en/.

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Access to Healthcare and Health Services in Puerto Rico Following Landfall of Hurricane Maria

By Andrea Newman-Rivera Introduction Wind howling like a lost and lonely spirit in the distance, rivers flooding, bamboo creaking — and suddenly snapping — along with the constant hum of rain pounding cement buildings and zinc-roofed homes embedded among tropical terrain are all characteristic of the Atlantic hurricane season. The season can be observed every year, starting in June through the end of October, as rainstorms and high winds gather in the Atlantic Ocean to travel west towards the Caribbean Islands, Central America and up to the southeastern coastal United States. It is during this season when many well-known hurricanes have taken form, including Hurricane Andrew in 1992, Katrina in 2005, and Sandy in 2012 — September of 2017 was no different. Hurricane Maria, a category 5 storm, made its way through the U.S Virgin Islands before making landfall in Puerto Rico and Florida, causing power outages, home losses, increases in adverse health outcomes, and even death. Puerto Rico, a U.S territory since 1898 and known as “La Isla del Encanto,” is located just east of the Dominican Republic and 1,000 miles southeast of Florida’s coast. Factors such as voting rights and an economic crisis that has lasted for decades have contributed to reinforcing the role of modern colonialism on the island, which has made Puerto Rico especially vulnerable to the effects of major hurricanes. Hurricane Irma, another category 5 storm preceding Maria, had already predisposed Puerto Rico to the challenges of post-hurricane recovery. Nonetheless, even before Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico experienced a decades-long economic crisis, with a debt of

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Andrea Newman-Rivera over $100 billion, including bond and pension owes. This growing debt has affected the proper funding of many public services such as healthcare and education.1 Not only has a growing debt and an economic crisis on the island affected services essential to the well-being of these U.S citizens, but unequal treatment from the U.S Federal government has also had a major impact on the decisions and services that island-residing Puerto Ricans can access. All 3.5 million U.S citizens who live on the island are denied the right to vote for U.S president and have no congressional representation. This comes despite Puerto Ricans voting for statehood repeatedly, with the most recent vote for “Yes” being the 2020 elections. Yet Congress has never done anything to approve statehood status.2 Additionally, Puerto Rico serves as a guaranteed consumer for large U.S corporations due to the Jones Act of 1920. The Jones Act restricts imports to Puerto Rico from other countries. Therefore, Puerto Rico can only receive products if they come directly from the mainland United States, which often causes heightened prices for common electric appliances and automobiles.3 Healthcare, which serves as another consumer product in the U.S., follows many of the same patterns as an automobile — the best car is often available only to those who can afford it, while populations without the financial means are often left behind. However, one could argue that health is different from a gas-combustible automobile depending on how you answer this fundamental question — is health a human right or a commodity reserved for those in power?

1

Carlos E. Rodríguez-Díaz, “Maria in Puerto Rico: Natural Disaster in a Colonial Archipelago,” American Journal of Public Health 108, no. 1 (2018): pp. 30-32, https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2017.304198.

2 Rashid Carlos Jamil Marcano Rivera Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, “Puerto Rico Wants Statehood – but Only Congress Can Make It the 51st State in the United States,” The Conversation, January 20, 2021, https://theconversation.com/puerto-rico-wants-statehood-but-only-congress-can-make-it-the-51st-state-in-theunited-states-150503.

3 Colin Grabow, Inu Manak Research Fellow, and Daniel J. Ikenson Former Director, “The Jones Act: A Burden America Can No Longer Bear,” Cato Institute, January 22, 2021, https://www.cato.org/publications/policyanalysis/jones-act-burden-america-can-no-longer-bear.

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Access to Healthcare and Health Services in Puerto Rico Access to healthcare and health services in the U.S varies from state to state and county to county depending on income, health status, and transportation availability. Even under normal circumstances, Puerto Rico is not exempt from the differences already present on the mainland.

Many of these differences are exacerbated on the island. I argue that Hurricane Maria did not create new problems, but instead allowed individuals and leaders from across the country to see the funding disparities in health services already present on the island. These disparities can be attributed to Puerto Rico’s colonial status and lack of representation in the U.S Federal government. Colonial status has led to neglect by the Federal government before and after Hurricane Maria. Furthermore, the lack of Puerto Rican representation in the U.S congress has tied the island down into a constant cycle of oppression, which has remained unchanged since the start of U.S presence in 1898. I aim to take a historical and present-day approach on access to healthcare since the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid in Puerto Rico in 1965 to understand how health services were impacted by Hurricane Maria in 2017.

Methodology Overview In this paper, I consider research analyzing federal healthcare programs in Puerto Rico as compared to U.S states, in addition to articles that analyze health outcomes after the hurricane.

Moreover, I prioritize interviewing current Puerto Rican residents who are actively experiencing the challenges and benefits of the Puerto Rican healthcare system before and after hurricane Maria.

Interviews were conducted with residents who I met through my school, family, or neighborhood in Puerto Rico. Interviews were conducted in Spanish, and interviewees were contacted via phone in order to understand their potential interest in participating in the interview. Before questions were probed, all participants verbally consented to the interview, and verbal consent was recorded via video and/or audio (questions can be found in Appendix A).

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Andrea Newman-Rivera State of Medicare and Medicaid pre-2017 Medicare and Medicaid are both federal healthcare programs providing medical coverage to low-income and/or senior populations in the U.S. However, funding for these services differs between states and territories. The costs of Medicaid in states are often matched up to 83% with federal dollars. Yet, in Puerto Rico, federal matching is capped at 55% despite having a poverty rate of 44% — twice that of Mississippi.4,5 Moreover, Medicare reimbursements were 25% lower for hospitals located on the island compared to those on the mainland. However, this changed in 2009 with the passing of the Medicare Reimbursement Equity Act.6 Furthermore, Puerto Rico bases Medicaid eligibility on a “local poverty line that is only about 40 percent of the federal poverty line.” This means that an individual with an income below the federal poverty line of $17,236 but above $9,000 a year would not qualify for Medicaid on the island and would have to resort to more costly private providers instead.7 How can only a fraction of the 44.4% of Puerto Rican residents falling below the federal poverty line qualify for Medicaid when other U.S states would provide coverage for all of them?

These numbers provide evidence of discrimination and the paternalistic nature of the federal government towards the resident Puerto Rican population. Instead of granting the island funds to assure quality healthcare as the federal government does with its states, they resort to a mindset of

4

María Portela and Benjamin D. Sommers, “On the Outskirts of National Health Reform: A Comparative Assessment of Health Insurance and Access to Care in Puerto Rico and the United States,” Milbank Quarterly 93, no. 3 (2015): pp. 584-608, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0009.12138.

5 U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Puerto Rico,” accessed April 20, 2021, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/PR. 6 Marc N. Elliott et al., “Are There Differences in the Medicare Experiences of Beneficiaries in Puerto Rico Compared with Those in the U.S. Mainland?,” Medical Care 50, no. 3 (2012): pp. 243-248, https://doi.org/10.1097/mlr.0b013e3182408027.

7 Judith Solomon, “Puerto Rico's Medicaid Program Needs an Ongoing Commitment of Federal Funds,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April 22, 2019, https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/puerto-ricos-medicaid-programneeds-an-ongoing-commitment-of-federal-funds.

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Access to Healthcare and Health Services in Puerto Rico “good enough.” A mindset that functions as a form of maintenance instead of care. A quote by John Gunther from Inside Latin America written in 1945 states, “Puerto Rico has been a headache to the United States for 40 years. Its poverty is a disgrace to the Stars and Stripes.” It is not surprising that Puerto Rico receives oppressive treatment — the island is denied a vote in the Congress where important funding decisions are being made. The silencing of Puerto Rican voices has ensured the United States’ ability to maintain a powerful colonial relationship with “La Isla del Encanto.” Not only does this mindset from the Federal government affect healthcare itself, it further instills an inferiority complex within the Puerto Rican population. As Gunther’s quote suggests, the Puerto Rican population has been belittled and treated as a nuisance. When a group of individuals is told time and time again that they are not worthy of quality care, or of the same federal assistance as other U.S states, there comes a point when those individuals start to believe in their— false—inferiority. Although these feelings may not resonate with everyone, the lack of concern from the Federal government itself is guaranteed to cause individuals to question if they truly deserve the care they see fit — a right that should not be in question.

Despite the fact that Puerto Rico spent only one-third per capita, or roughly $3200, compared to the United States on governmental healthcare in 2012, the island shows greater overall healthcare coverage with only 7.4% uninsured, compared to those in the mainland United States where 15.0% are uninsured.8 The island’s push for coverage shows their unwavering commitment to helping the resident population. The island is willing to work with the limited resources they are given to ensure that everyone has some sort of healthcare coverage, even if the benefits themselves are of lesser quality compared to those on the mainland. As already mentioned, federal

8

María Portela and Benjamin D. Sommers, “On the Outskirts of National Health Reform: A Comparative Assessment of Health Insurance and Access to Care in Puerto Rico and the United States,” Milbank Quarterly 93, no. 3 (2015): pp. 584-608, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0009.12138..

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Andrea Newman-Rivera funding is a major limiting factor to Medicare and Medicaid access on the island, however it does not speak to the quality of healthcare services themselves. One study comparing quality of care between Puerto Rican and mainland Medicare beneficiaries found that Puerto Rican clients got necessary care less frequently than their U.S counterparts. The same study found Puerto Ricans experience more challenges when receiving essential prescription drugs even though they experienced more positive communication with their doctors than those residing on the mainland.9 These findings are consistent with an interview conducted with my neighbor from Barrio Abras Mavillas in Corozal, Puerto Rico. Seventy-five-year-old Ángel de Jesús Santiago, who suffers from diabetes, high blood pressure, and ulcerative colitis, has two health insurance plans: Medicare, provided by the government, and Triple-S, a private plan provided by his previous employer PepsiCo. Foods. He says that if it were not for the private plan he receives, he would have to pay $4000 a month for medication treating ulcerative colitis. He further elaborates on the downfalls of the Medicare Advantage plan which rarely covers the costs of prescription medication. When asked about the importance of the type of health insurance one receives, Ángel responds, “If you have a good plan, you are good. But if you have the Advantage plan, or the plan provided by the government, then you already know that’s to ‘mendigar’ — something they give to you only if you are lucky.”

The definition of “lucky” often depends on perspective. But for necessary services such as healthcare, luck should not be a determining factor to obtaining access. The concept of luck for healthcare access is not exclusive to Puerto Rico but is also a prevalent issue in the mainland United States given their 15% uninsured rate. Since the type of health insurance one receives

9

Marc N. Elliott et al., “Are There Differences in the Medicare Experiences of Beneficiaries in Puerto Rico Compared with Those in the U.S. Mainland?,” Medical Care 50, no. 3 (2012): pp. 243-248, https://doi.org/10.1097/mlr.0b013e3182408027.

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Access to Healthcare and Health Services in Puerto Rico depends greatly on the jobs secured throughout a lifetime, it is easy for other determinants to influence access to care. For example, an individual with low-income may resort to working a minimum wage job instead of obtaining a secondary degree due to the already high costs of a college education. The lack of a high school diploma or bachelor’s degree can quickly disqualify an individual from careers that can provide generous healthcare packages. That said, being born into a low-income household is not a choice. While it is possible to climb up the socioeconomic ladder despite low socioeconomic status, it is more challenging. When healthcare access is obtained because of luck, it means that individuals must battle, fight and try repetitively for the access they know they deserve and need. However, this effort does not guarantee a win in the case of healthcare due to barriers that cannot be controlled.

Another example of how luck plays a role in access to health services is evident through 17-year-old Adrianna’s experience. I know Adrianna from my time in high school and she has since become close to my family after forming a tight friendship with my younger sister. Adrianna is a type-1 diabetic from Toa Alta, Puerto Rico and was grateful for her mom’s employer Boston Scientific following the hurricane. Boston Scientific was able to provide Adrianna with the medication she needed to treat her diabetes when her local pharmacy was unable to due to power outages and loss of running water in the neighboring area. Had Adrianna’s family lacked these employee benefits, she would not have been able to continue this essential treatment.

Not only can we understand the importance of raw luck when accessing health services through Adrianna’s experience, but we can also understand the influence that private companies have on the health and wellbeing of Puerto Rican residents. Many of these companies are pharmaceuticals from the U.S that establish business on the island due to tax incentives. After the Tax Reform Act of 1976, many pharmaceutical companies established themselves in Puerto Rico

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Andrea Newman-Rivera in exchange for a 0% corporate tax rate. However, Section 936 the Tax Reform Act was repealed in 2006 launching the start of an economic downturn on the island as drug manufacturers fled.10 Despite the repeal, companies such as Boston Scientific, Eli Lilly and Pfizer still have a major influence in Puerto Rico by providing essential services and benefits to families through the private sector, instead of through the indebted local government.

To further comprehend the state of health and healthcare services on the island, I contacted a couple of frequent visitors to my grandparents’ old bakery, which closed in 2019. Sixty-threeyear-old Ana “Anita” Rolón-Salgado lives with her husband, Geraldo Carrión-Carrasquillo, 77, in Barrio Quebrada Cruz, Toa Alta, Puerto Rico. Anita had been diagnosed with breast cancer and has since been receiving treatment every year. Before the hurricane, Anita would drive Geraldo to a dialysis center located in Dorado, Puerto Rico approximately 25 minutes from her home.

Geraldo, in addition to living with occupationally obtained pulmonary fibrosis from his time working as a welder, suffers from a genetic condition called polycystic kidney disease. This disease requires Geraldo to receive dialysis treatment three days a week for four hours a day.

However, not everyone had major health issues prior to the hurricane. I reached out to my uncle, Victor Rivera-Rosado, who used to live in Corozal, Puerto Rico. He moved to Florida in 2018 after the storm with the hopes of starting a new life in the continental United States. While in Puerto Rico, he worked 12-hour days, seven days a week managing the family bakery. Although he did not have any physical ailments before or after Maria’s landfall, he still struggled mentally as he tried to manage a small business that needed electricity and water to function.

10

José A. Cabranes, “Opinion | Bring the Drug Industry Back to Puerto Rico,” The Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones & Company, May 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bring-the-drug-industry-back-to-puerto-rico11590015910.

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Access to Healthcare and Health Services in Puerto Rico Outcomes After María as a Product of Modern Colonialism Every person residing on a state or island affected by Hurricane Maria suffered differently.

However, this does not discount the major common consequences found across the island following the hurricane, including an estimated 1000-5000 excess deaths despite an original report of 64 deaths by the Puerto Rican government.11, 12, 13 Additionally, 80% of power lines were damaged after the storm leading to the use of generators as a primary source of power for those who were lucky enough to afford one.14 Secondly, 41% of rural areas underwent more than 120 days without power.15 Potable water was also limited, with some populations waiting three months after the storm to receive running water to their homes.

One could say the loss of electricity, water, and access to essential services are expected consequences of a category 5 hurricane. Puerto Rico’s mountainous terrain and already underfunded healthcare infrastructure before the storm was bound to make recovery more difficult.

While this may be true, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided less relief to Puerto Rico after Maria compared Texas after Hurricane Harvey. Within the first nine days following both storms, FEMA approved $6.2 million for Puerto Rico, but $141.8 million for Texas according to a report published by Politico.16 The funding disparities in post-hurricane relief are a

11

Nishant Kishore et al., “Mortality in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria,” New England Journal of Medicine 379, no. 2 (December 2018): pp. 162-170, https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmsa1803972.

12 Carlos Santos-Burgoa et al., “Differential and Persistent Risk of Excess Mortality from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico: a Time-Series Analysis,” The Lancet Planetary Health 2, no. 11 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/s25425196(18)30209-2.

13 Raul Cruz-Cano and Erin L. Mead, “Causes of Excess Deaths in Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria: A TimeSeries Estimation,” American Journal of Public Health 109, no. 7 (2019): pp. 1050-1052, https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2019.305015.

14 Alexia Fernández Campbell, “It Took 11 Months to Restore Power to Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria. A Similar Crisis Could Happen Again.,” Vox (Vox, August 15, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/15/17692414/puerto-rico-power-electricity-restored-hurricane-maria.

15 Miguel O. Román et al., “Satellite-Based Assessment of Electricity Restoration Efforts in Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria,” PLOS ONE 14, no. 6 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218883.

16 Danny Vinik, “How Trump Favored Texas over Puerto Rico,” POLITICO, March 27, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/27/donald-trump-fema-hurricane-maria-response-480557.

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Andrea Newman-Rivera strong indication of Puerto Rico’s secondary status under the Federal government’s eyes. Some may argue the funding dollars approved was fair. However, the dollar amount provided was not the only difference. It took FEMA 43 days to approve permanent disaster relief for Puerto Rico, which is four times longer than Texas, and allows for an influx of Federal funds to be used for emergency supplies and other relief efforts.17 As discussed previously, lack of interest and the “good-enough” mentality from the Federal government continue to promote a cycle of marginalization towards the Puerto Rican population. This evidence also further supports the necessity for political representation within the institutions where these financial decisions are made. In order to guarantee fair and adequate funding, Puerto Ricans would need representation in positions of power to advocate for its individual needs — a right they are not granted.

Regardless of the funding disparities mentioned, we must ask ourselves: How did the absence of basic services affect the health of the Puerto Rican population after Hurricane Maria?

The hurricane was associated with an overall increase in depression, anxiety and PTSD symptoms across all age groups. Males 65 years and older being the most adversely affected population, accounting for the most excess deaths due to the hurricane.18, 19 Puerto Rico is experiencing an aging population of which 21.3% is over the age of 65 according to U.S Census data — about 4% higher than the national average of 16.5%. Many elderly residents are diabetic and are in need of ventilators which require power, which was lacking after the hurricane due to power outages.

Delays in receiving necessary medical equipment was also an issue that primarily affected the

17

Danny Vinik, “How Trump Favored Texas over Puerto Rico,” POLITICO, March 27, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/27/donald-trump-fema-hurricane-maria-response-480557.

18 Carlos Santos-Burgoa et al., “Differential and Persistent Risk of Excess Mortality from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico: a Time-Series Analysis,” The Lancet Planetary Health 2, no. 11 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/s25425196(18)30209-2.

19 Raul Cruz-Cano and Erin L. Mead, “Causes of Excess Deaths in Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria: A TimeSeries Estimation,” American Journal of Public Health 109, no. 7 (2019): pp. 1050-1052, https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2019.305015.

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Access to Healthcare and Health Services in Puerto Rico senior population. One man from Lajas, a small town located on the southwestern corner of the island, said it took him almost two weeks to receive an oxygen tank.20 Anita and her husband Geraldo had a very difficult time after the hurricane. Unfortunately, the dialysis center Geraldo attended, located in Dorado, closed due to loss of power and shortages in running water supply. With too few centers to keep up with the dialysis patient population on the island, many were being translocated to hospitals on the mainland. According to Anita, centers were offering free plane tickets for those affected. Consequently, Geraldo was flown to Boston, Massachusetts for two months to receive treatment while Anita stayed in Puerto Rico. Thankfully, Geraldo was able to stay with his son in Boston while he continued dialysis treatment. But what would access look like if patients had no family in the mainland, or a job that required them to stay on the island? Again, luck is a determining factor to healthcare access especially under U.S. colonial status. This speaks to the constructed dependence of Puerto Rico on the U.S. The weak healthcare system on the island due to lack of federal funding has contributed to this dependency.

Had Puerto Rico received more funding for health services at the start of this colonialist affiliation, maybe this dependence would not be as damaging to its resident population. Over time, however, Puerto Rico has formed a reliant relationship with its colonizer, which has made it nearly impossible for the island to progress on its own.

Conclusion Puerto Rico is a melting pot of talent, with world renowned artists and academics making impacts all across the globe, including Dr. Antonia Coello-Novello from Fajardo, Puerto Rico who served as the 14th Surgeon General of the United States. Most of the time, unfortunately, the talent

20

Molly Hennessy-Fiske, “In One Puerto Rican Nursing Home, a Struggle to Get Power and Keep Patients Alive,” Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles Times, October 1, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-puerto-ricohealthcare-20170930-story.html.

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Andrea Newman-Rivera migrates offshore, depriving the island of the people who can make a difference for those who stay behind. As Anita shared with concern during her interview, “A lot of good doctors leave here because they aren’t paid well. They study, study, study, and what they make here isn’t sustainable, whereas in other states they can get paid double or triple what they would make here.” The secondary status of Puerto Rico compared to U.S. states, as well as the rising unemployment rates on the island after the hurricane have caused many to leave family and friends behind with hopes of progressing on the mainland. After Maria, 14% of residents were projected to leave the island between 2017 and 2019, further limiting the human capital available on “La Isla del Encanto.”21 Not only does the U.S restrain Puerto Rico’s federal funding and voting representation, it has also helped drain the medical talent from the island. Puerto Rico is essential to the prosperity of the entire country, especially as we prepare for mass manufacturing of the COVID-19 vaccine.

According to the FDA, “Puerto Rico produces more pharmaceutical products for the U.S. ($40B) than any foreign country,” making it a crucial player for the success of the U.S pharmaceutical industry.22 The selfishness presented here by the U.S. is telling of the country’s underlying intentions, which has led Puerto Rico to fall in a rut despite the resources it provides to its colonizer.

But not all Puerto Rican residents focus on the plethora of negatives tethering down the island from progress. “Gracias a Dios” — which in English means “Thanks to God” — was a common phrase repeated by all interviewees. When probed on their views regarding quality of healthcare in Puerto Rico compared to the U.S, many of the interviewees were hesitant to complain

21

Edwin Meléndez and Jennifer Hinojosa. "Estimates of Post-Hurricane Maria Exodus from Puerto Rico (Research Brief)." Center for Puerto Rican Studies (2017).

22 U.S Food and Drug Administration, “Securing the Future for Puerto Rico: Restoring the Island's Robust Medical Product Manufacturing Sector,” accessed 2021, https://www.fda.gov/media/108975/download.

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Access to Healthcare and Health Services in Puerto Rico entirely. Anita discussed that while healthcare in Puerto Rico is not up to par to the healthcare offered in the mainland U.S., it is still better than that of what she’s seen from other Latin American countries. Moreover, Angel states, “I’ve been told the services are very good over there (U.S. mainland), that they work differently than how they work here.” He goes on to add, “But I am not complaining of the treatment I receive here. It’s been very good.” Adrianna and Victor had similar perspectives, but they did not elaborate further.

Although these thoughts speak to the resilience and gratefulness of the Puerto Rican people, it brings into question the reasons as to why they are thankful for the services received, despite the inferior quality. Based on evidence discussed previously, the U.S has only provided support for temporary maintenance on the island, rather than adequate funding to permanently address the failing healthcare infrastructure. Yet, conditions could always be worse, which is something the humble community in Puerto Rico keeps in mind. However, the dependent relationship that has been formed between Puerto Rico and the U.S is sometimes a toxic one, as is visible throughout the public services on the island. With that said, it is a relationship that will only improve for “La Isla del Encanto” if Puerto Ricans are granted voting rights in Congress. Until Puerto Rico is granted a position of power in their colonizer’s government to advocate for themselves, the cycle of oppression is destined to continue and will refrain Puerto Rico from progressing to the prosperity it deserves.

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Andrea Newman-Rivera Bibliography

"Hurricane Maria’s Official Death Toll is 46 Times Higher than it was almost a Year Ago. here's Why." -08-30T17:50:20+00:00 [cited 2020]. Available from https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/hurricane-marias-official-death-toll-is-46times-higher-than-it-was-almost-a-year-ago-heres-why.

Cabranes, José A. Opinion | Bring the Drug Industry Back to Puerto Rico.2020.

Campbell, Alexia Fernández. "It Took 11 Months to Restore Power to Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria. A Similar Crisis could Happen again." -08-15T12:40:02-04:00 [cited 2020]. Available from https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/15/17692414/puerto-rico-power-electricityrestored-hurricane-maria.

Census Bureau QuickFacts, U.S. “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Puerto Rico.” Census Bureau QuickFacts, 2019. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/PR. Cruz-Cano, R., and E. L. Mead. "Causes of Excess Deaths in Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria: A Time-Series Estimation." Am J Public Health 109, no. 7 (2019): 1050-1052.

Elliott, Marc, Amelia Haviland, Jacob Dembosky, Katrin Hambarsoomian, and Robert Weech-Maldonado. Are there Differences in the Medicare Experiences of Beneficiaries in Puerto Rico Compared with those in the U.S. Mainland? Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2012.

Grabow, Colin, Inu Manak, and Daniel J. Ikenson. "The Jones Act: A Burden America can no Longer Bear." 2018-06-28T14:00:00-0400 [cited 2020]. Available from https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/jones-act-burden-america-can-nolonger-bear.

Hennessy-Fiske, Molly. “In One Puerto Rican Nursing Home, a Struggle to Get Power and Keep Patients Alive.” Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, October 1, 2017. https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-puerto-rico-healthcare-20170930story.html Kishore, N., D. Marqués, A. Mahmud, M. V. Kiang, I. Rodriguez, A. Fuller, P. Ebner, C. Sorensen, F. Racy, J. Lemery, L. Maas, J. Leaning, R. A. Irizarry, S. Balsari, and C. O. Buckee. "Mortality in Puerto Rico After Hurricane Maria." N Engl J Med 379, no. 2 (2018): 162-170.

Meléndez, Edwin, and Jennifer Hinojosa. "Estimates of Post-Hurricane Maria Exodus from Puerto Rico (Research Brief)." Center for Puerto Rican Studies (2017).

Portela, M., and B. D. Sommers. "On the Outskirts of National Health Reform: A Comparative Assessment of Health Insurance and Access to Care in Puerto Rico and the United States." The Milbank quarterly 93, no. 3 (2015): 584-608.

Rivera, Rashid Carlos Jamil Marcano. "Puerto Rico Wants Statehood – but Only Congress can make it the 51st State in the United States." [cited 2020]. Available from http://theconversation.com/puerto-rico-wants-statehood-but-only-congress-canmake-it-the-51st-state-in-the-united-states-150503.

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Rodríguez-Díaz, Carlos E. "Maria in Puerto Rico: Natural Disaster in a Colonial Archipelago." American journal of public health (1971) 108, no. 1 (2018): 30-32.

Román, Miguel O., Eleanor C. Stokes, Ranjay Shrestha, Zhuosen Wang, Lori Schultz, Edil A. Sepúlveda Carlo, Qingsong Sun, Jordan Bell, Andrew Molthan, Virginia Kalb, Chuanyi Ji, Karen C. Seto, Shanna N. McClain, and Markus Enenkel.

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Santos-Burgoa, C., J. Sandberg, E. Suárez, A. Goldman-Hawes, S. Zeger, A. GarciaMeza, C. M. Pérez, N. Estrada-Merly, U. Colón-Ramos, C. M. Nazario, E. Andrade, A. Roess, and L. Goldman. "Differential and Persistent Risk of Excess Mortality from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico: A Time-Series Analysis." Lancet Planet Health 2, no. 11 (2018): e478-e488.

Solomon, Judith. Puerto Rico’s Medicaid Program Needs an Ongoing Commitment of Federal Funds. Washington D.C:2019.

U.S Food and Drug Administration. “Securing the Future for Puerto Rico: Restoring the Island's Robust Medical Product Manufacturing Sector.” U.S Food and Drug Administration. Accessed 2021. https://www.fda.gov/media/108975/download.

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Appendix A: Interview questions 1. ¿Tenemos tu consentimiento para grabar tus respuestas a estas preguntas? (Do we have your consent to record your answers to these questions?)

2. ¿Tenemos tu consentimiento para utilizar tu nombre, edad, e ubicación municipal? (Do we have your consent to use your name, age and municipal location?)

3. ¿Tenemos tu consentimiento para utilizar la información discutida hoy en un proyecto de salud pública hecho por estudiantes de Johns Hopkins University? (Do we have your consent to use the information discussed today for a Public Health project done by students at Johns Hopkins University?)

4. Recordatorio: Si no quieres contestar alguna pregunta, notifícalo. No estás obligado a contestar las preguntas que se llevarán a cabo en esta entrevista. (Reminder: If you do not want to answer one or more of the questions, please notify us. You are not required to answer the questions that will be discussed in this interview.)

5. ¿Cuál es su nombre, edad y en qué municipio resides? (What is your name, age and in what municipality do you reside in?)

6. ¿Eres paciente de Medicare o Medicaid? (Are you a patient of Medicare or Medicaid?)

7. ¿De qué problemas de salud padeces? Puede ser mental o físico. (What health ailments do you suffer from? They can be mental or physical.)

8. ¿Por cuántos años has padecido de estos problemas de salud? (For how many years have you suffered from these health ailments?)

9. ¿Cuántos minutos te toma llegar al hospital más cercano? (How long does it take you to arrive to your nearest hospital?)

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Andrea Newman-Rivera 10. ¿Cuáles aspectos del acceso a servicios de salud en Puerto Rico son buenos? ¿Cuales necesitan reestructuración y por qué? (Which aspects of access to health services are good? Which aspects need restructuring and why?)

11. ¿Qué piensas de los sistemas y servicios de salud en los Estados Unidos comparados a los de Puerto Rico? (What do you think of the healthcare system and health services of the United States compared to those in Puerto Rico?)

12. ¿Cuál era tu tratamiento antes de María? (What was your medical treatment before Maria?)

13. ¿Cómo afectó el huracán María el acceso a estos tratamientos? (How did hurricane Maria affect your access to these treatments?) a. ¿Cuál fue la parte más difícil de obtener el acceso necesario a servicios de salud después del huracán? (What was the most challenging aspect when obtaining necessary access to health services after the hurricane?) b. ¿Qué servicios fueron proveídos y por quiénes después del huracán María?

(Which services were provided and by whom after hurricane Maria?) c. ¿Qué servicios de salud necesitabas que no fueron proveídos por el gobierno?

(Which health services did you need that were not provided by the government?) d. ¿Cómo afectó tu salud la pérdida de la luz y agua después del huracán? (How was your health affected due to the loss of electricity and water after the hurricane?) e. ¿Cómo cambiaron los servicios de Medicare y Medicaid después del huracán María? (How did Medicare and Medicaid services change after hurricane Maria?)

14. ¿Hay algo más que quieras añadir sobre tu experiencia con tu salud mental o físico después del huracán María? (Is there anything else you would like to add regarding your mental and/or physical health after hurricane Maria?)

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about the authors Emily Sanchez Emily Sanchez is a rising senior at Princeton University from Clifton, NJ. She is pursuing a concentration in History and certificates in Latinx Studies and Latin American Studies. She is interested in researching the relationship between the development of Latino identities in urban spaces and the context of the Civil Rights Movement and urban decline in the 1960s and 1970s . Emily is currently studying the development of Peruvian identity in the city of Paterson, NJ from 1960 to 1980.

Jordi Amaral Jordi is a George Washington University undergraduate double majoring in International Affairs and Latin American studies, with a concentration in International Development and a minor in Spanish. His interests include politics, migration, human rights, conflict and security, economics, and the hispano-lusophonic world, and he hopes to leverage his studies in order to gain a holistic grasp of migration’s contexts and causes. He currently works with the Latin America Initiative at the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), and has previously worked with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Central American Resource Center (CARECEN DC). All views expressed here are his own, and not those of any current or former employers.

Ian Rice Ian graduated in 2020 from Pacific Lutheran University with a B.A. in Hispanic Studies and Global Studies (Transnationalism emphasis). As a student, Ian studied away multiple times, including a semester at Oxford University researching forced migration and a semester in Oaxaca, Mexico studying Indigenous literature and anthropology. In Oaxaca, he interned with SiKanda, a non-profit focusing on community empowerment and sustainable development.

Ian hopes to volunteer or work internationally, and is interested in pursuing graduate research on migration, borders, materiality, and green colonialism.

Paige Skaff Paige is a rising senior at Otterbein University majoring in Sociology and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies (WGSS) with minors in Political Science and Race and Ethnic Studies (RES). She is interested in the exploitation of the human body at the intersections of identity, especially as it pertains to the history of colonization and economic exploitation. Her work on forced sterilization and birth control testing in Puerto Rico was presented at Rollins College’s 2021 Latin American and Latinx Studies Symposium. She is hoping to continue her studies on this topic by interning in Puerto Rico at a politically affiliated women’s rights and survivor support organization, applying her trauma informed training certification from the Sexual Assault Resource Network of Central Ohio (SARNCO). She is trained and practices in peer counseling and non-mandatory reporter trauma response at Otterbein’s Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Resource Center. Before graduating in December 2021, Paige will have completed an undergraduate thesis that examines the phenomenon of sexual violence from a global perspective, through an intersectional lens of Critical Animal Studies, WGSS, and Psychoanalysis.

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about the authors Kevin Ramsey Kevin Ramsey is in the final year of his B.A. History degree at The George Washington University. Originally a member of the Class of 2013 at GW, he left school and ended up finding a calling for hospitality. After five years of managing restaurants and business operations in the Washington, D.C. area, he decided to return to GW and complete his degree.

He currently works at the American Hotel & Lodging Association, where he has combined his passion for hospitality with his business acumen and knowledge of public affairs. He lives in Washington, D.C. with his wife, dog, and two cats.

Felipe Deidan Felipe Deidan, a rising senior at The George Washington University from Quito, Ecuador, is majoring in International Affairs with concentrations in Latin America and a minor in Economics. He has actively worked on several initiatives in the region, including social and development projects for indigenous groups through the Fundación Simon Bolivar in Quito. Furthermore, Felipe has interned at several Latin American organizations including the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, and the Citizens' Climate Lobby Hispanic Outreach branch. As a native of Ecuador, he focuses on a people-first development approach and structured distributive leadership models influenced by marginalized communities. He hopes to promote social responsiveness through policy advocacy in Latin America.

Andrea Newman-Rivera Andrea is a rising senior at Johns Hopkins University pursuing a B.S/B.A degree in Molecular and Cellular Biology and Public Health Studies. Born to a Puerto Rican mother and Pennsylvanian father in Corozal, Puerto Rico — while residing in Ames, Iowa for both her elementary and middle school years in between — she has had the privilege of experiencing a bicultural upbringing. Andrea’s interests include understanding the root causes of education and health disparities as they pertain to United States and, more specifically, Puerto Rico. Following her studies, she intends to return to Puerto Rico as a physician-scientist and mentor to serve her community in Corozal and other rural municipalities on the Island.

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