Américas Volume VII

AM ÉR IC AS

AmĂŠricas The Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies Volume VII 2018

Published By The Johns Hopkins University Program in Latin American Studies Baltimore, Maryland

AmĂŠricas, the Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies, was established in 2005 by students and faculty at the Johns Hopkins University under the endorsement of the Program in Latin American Studies. Our mission is to provide a multi-disciplinary form for students and scholars to present and discuss articles pertaining to Latin America, its issues and its diaspora.

Our website is available at http://americasjhu.org

AmĂŠricas, the Johns Hopkins Journal of Latin American Studies Published by The Johns Hopkins University Program in Latin American Studies 3400 N. Charles St. Baltimore, MD 21218 United States of America

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Table of Contents Acknowledgement and Journal Staff…………………………………………………………………………………...….4 Letter from the Editor in Chief……………………………………………………………………………………...5 Competition or cooperation? Latin America as a stage for US-China geoeconomics.....................................................................................................................6 Ashley Middleton Maternalism and Women’s Health in Revolutionary Cuba: Medical Education, Family Planning, and Feminist Strategy……………………............................................................................................. 28 Soo Hyun Kim Solid Waste Management in Rural and Urban Regions in Intibucá, Honduras…………............................................................................................................44 Lissa Neira

Evonomics: Evo Morales’s Bolivian Strategy……………...……………………………….......................................................61 Noah Martin Anti-Haitian Prejudice in the Dominican Republic…...……………………………………………………………………………..72 Joan Mella Big Debates of Development: Challenges and Opportunities of Brazil……………………………………………………………………………………..89 Daniela Schermerhorn Political Parasites: Crime and the State in Italy’s Mafias and Mexico’s Cartels……………………………………………….......................................................108 Alyssandra Valenzuela

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Acknowledgement We would like to thank our talented group of editors for dedicating so much time to each piece.

Without them, this publication would not have been possible. We would also like to thank one of our talented editors, Nicole Muehleisen, for designing the cover. A special thanks to the contributing authors, who worked closely with the AmĂŠricas staff over a period of several weeks to ensure their work was of the highest caliber. Finally, thank you to the Johns Hopkins Program in Latin American Studies for its financial and programmatic support during the publication process.

Journal Staff Editor in Chief

Sofia Schonenberg

Faculty Advisors

Eduardo GonzĂĄlez Magda von der Heydt-Coca

Managing Editor

Kiana Boroumand

Editors

Kiana Boroumand Nicole Muehleisen Margaret Kupitz Ritika Achrekar Austin Cardona Karen Sheng

Layout and Cover Design

Nicole Muehleisen

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Letter from the Editor in Chief Dear Readers, This edition of Américas showcases a combination of works by our authors that include various perspectives and fresh insights. From maternalism and women’s health in Revolutionary Cuba to examining Latin America as a stage for US-China geoeconomics, the selected pieces examine dynamics of the past and those of the present day in the region.

Throughout the year, I was fortunate enough to work with a talented group of editors who dedicated their time and efforts to reading submissions, attending editorial meetings and working together to create a cohesive collection of scholarly writings pertaining to Latin America. We worked alongside a diverse and intelligent set of authors who worked willingly to improve their thought-provoking pieces that showcased originality. I am extremely proud to publish authors from selected academic institutions and backgrounds who offer their own opinions and perspectives on issues related to Latin America both in the past and today. It was my pleasure to learn and absorb the knowledge they so generously shared.

Our authors bring unique lenses to their respective subjects. Ashley Middleton discusses Latin America as a stage for US-China geoeconomics. Daniela Schermerhorn addresses the socioeconomic and political climate in Brazil as well as the policy challenges that follow, and proposes measures for focus on growth. Alyssandra Valenzuela offers a unique comparison of Italy’s mafias and Mexico’s cartels in her assessment of crime and the state. Lissa Neira summarizes her study, interviewing 56 people across two villages and an urban town, to discuss solid waste management in varying regions of Intibucá, Honduras. Noah Martin provides his own take on ‘Evonomics’. Soo Hyun Kim sheds light on maternalism and women’s health in revolutionary Cuba through medical education, family planning, and feminist strategy.

I am excited to present seven pieces that do not shy away from addressing topics of great significance to the region and its future. The mission of Américas is in fact to provide a multidisciplinary forum for scholars and students to present and discuss articles related to Latin America’s issues and diaspora, and I believe this year’s edition accomplishes that goal. I hope you enjoy reading these articles as much as we did.

Sincerely, Sofia Schonenberg ‘18 Editor in Chief May 2018

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Competition or cooperation? Latin America as a stage for US-China geoeconomics Ashley Middleton Ashley Middleton graduated from Duke University with a Bachelor of Arts in Public Policy Studies and Political Science with a Certificate in Latin American Studies. Her focus of study included: migration, security, foreign policy, and international development. She had the opportunity to study in Geneva and complete internships in Argentina and Washing ton D.C.

Abstract: As of 2016, China has become Brazil, Chile, and Peru’s largest trading partner and remains an important financier throughout the Latin American region. Many analysts consider Chinese geoeconomics as a zero-sum game in which growing Chinese influence directly jeopardizes American leverage. However, this paper contends that Chinese economic engagement in the region has not jeopardized US grand strategy, despite American objectives to maintain economic influence in Latin America and protect the integrity of market liberalization.

The Chinese-Latin American relationship failed to provide China with significant leverage over Latin American foreign policy decisions that stand in opposition to US priorities. In response to analysts’ warnings of Chinese geoeconomics in Latin America, I propose a different understanding of the international environment and new policy options to incorporate China and Latin America into an economic infrastructure that upholds US grand strategy.

In a 2016 campaign rally, then-candidate Donald Trump lambasted China for “cheating” American manufacturers, and his successful “Make America Great Again” platform relied on historical fears of China’s superiority in manufacturing and global economic prowess.2 As Chinese investments and trade have grown substantially within the past fifteen years, some analysts describe China as a revisionist, emerging country challenging the existing global order, aiming to reshape global trading rules to align with its national interests.3 They suggest that China’s rise is unlikely to be peaceful as it continues to grow economically and extend its dominance throughout the world.4 With regard to Latin America, analysts underscore the economic and diplomatic threats to the US of increased Chinese influence in the hemisphere.5 These characterizations, however, fail to draw direct connections between how Latin American trade relationships with China would jeopardize US global leadership.

Historian Hal Brands defines grand strategy as “a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about doing so” all the while maintaining “a clear understanding of the nature of the international environment.”6 In the 21st century, the US seeks to ensure the continuity of international economic institutions—

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especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Bank—and the persistence of market liberalization. Analysts who depict the rise of China in Latin America as a threat to US interests propose confrontational means of engagement with China, which may include sanctions, tariffs, or cyberattacks targeted at economic institutions.7 However, this paper will address how Chinese economic engagement in Latin America has not jeopardized US grand strategy. China lacks significant leverage over Latin American foreign policy decisions that would stand in opposition to US priorities. The Chinese-Latin American relationship represents an opportunity for US foreign policy to move beyond skepticism and competition towards cooperation in the global economy.

In response to the perceived dangers, I propose a new understanding of the international environment. By strengthening economic systems and further incorporating China and Latin America into this infrastructure, US grand strategy can remain safeguarded. First, I will describe China’s geoeconomic strategy at large, outlining China’s primary foreign policy goals: namely, sustaining economic growth and ensuring energy security. I will also highlight the economic activities China takes to achieve these goals. Second, I will present two case studies that highlight Chinese geoeconomic improvements vis-à-vis Latin America: Brazil and Chile, countries where Chinese engagement stimulates national economies yet also draws concerns and reservations from citizens and politicians. By discussing the political economies of these countries and their histories with the US, I will illustrate how historical trends have influenced each country’s proclivity to interact with China. I will then trace the specific Chinese economic activities in each country, comparing them to those of the US. Lastly, I will outline how the US can realign its hemispheric strategy to repair and strengthen its ties with Latin American countries and provide avenues for an inclusive, cooperative rise of China.

The ‘Rise of China’ Through Geoeconomics The rise of China begins first in a context of social and economic upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s under Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution. Following the divergence and later nonalliance between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1950s and 1960s, Mao Zedong’s sociopolitical movement entailed significant economic turmoil for the Chinese people. After Mao’s death in the mid 1970s, reformers led by Deng Xiaoping set in motion economic growth via a private enterprise market system that would begin China’s

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economic rise.8 The Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger era of rapprochement and the ‘opening up’ of China during the late 1960s and 1970s presented a crucial diplomatic avenue for China to engage with the world as well.

The majority of Latin America’s non-alliance with the US or Soviet Union during the 1960s was seen among Chinese policymakers as an opportunity to forge alliances and espouse communist thought in the ‘third world.’9 While ineffective in shaping political ideology during the 1960s, the CCP was able to germinate economic and diplomatic relationships with Latin America that resulted in a normalization of relations during the late 1970s with new leadership under Deng Xiaoping.10 In the 21st century, Chinese diplomatic and economic relationships with Latin American nations deal more with securing economic opportunities and contributing to sizeable growth than attempting to export communism. From 1989 to 2017, Chinese GDP annual growth averaged 9.69 percent, an impressive rate compared to the US average of less than 2 percent in the last 10 years.11 China’s remarkable growth fuels its rising global influence. In turn, China harnesses its influence through key geoeconomic strategies to reinforce its growth.

Chinese priorities include sustaining high economic growth and ensuring energy security to meet the demands of a growing population.12 To guarantee energy security by purchasing natural resources like copper and oil, China has focused on leveraging economic tools to generate beneficial geopolitical outcomes.13 By trading with the Global South to purchase natural resources and increasing participation in international economic institutions, China has improved its global reach. China’s Policy Paper on Latin America outlines its geoeconomic approach: “utilizing trade, investment and financial cooperation as driving forces, and identifying energy and resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, scientific and technological innovation and information technology as cooperation priorities.”14 To sustain economic growth, China invests heavily abroad. In 2016 Chinese global investments set a record of $183.1 billion (a 43.5 percent increase from 2015) to make FDI outflows exceed inflows.15 In 2014, development banks in China provided more finance to Latin American governments than the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank.16 In Latin America, half of all contracts with Chinese policy banks are commodity-backed loans wherein Latin American countries use goods like oil and copper as collateral for Chinese credits or loans at commercial rates.17 These commodity-backed loans represent an attractive alternative to loans from the IMF or other economic institutions that require structural adjustment reforms,

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including good governance political reforms or austerity measures.18 Latin America is not unique as a region where Chinese investments strategically ensure long-term access to natural resources.19 For example, Chinese investment activities in Africa also focus on extracting natural resources, providing infrastructure projects, and solidifying diplomatic relations to preserve China’s role as a leading manufacturing country.20 By positioning itself as a major commodities market and a source of manufactured goods, China has strengthened its position in the global economy.21 China has become the largest export destination for Latin American goods like iron ore, oil, soybeans, copper, and other minerals.22 To mitigate risks of urbanization, desertification, population growth, and loss of farmland, China invests heavily in these international commodities markets.23 As the Policy Paper on Latin America describes, China has expanded its hemispheric strategy to cooperate with Latin America on establishing “long term supply of energy and resources products and local currency pricing and settlement, to reduce the impact of external economic and financial risks.” As the Chinese population continues to demand high-protein, high calorie foods, top Latin American exports of poultry, sugar beet, soya oil, vegetable oils, and soybeans help satisfy Chinese demand.24 By working through global diplomatic and economic institutions, China seeks to strengthen its global role. China’s priorities with regard to economic institutions include strengthening cooperation with Latin American nations to reform global economic governance and increasing representation and shareholding among developing countries in the World Bank and IMF.25 Through institutions like the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (China-CELAC Forum), the two sides work to cooperate diplomatically and complement development initiatives.26 In the first ministerial meeting of China-CELAC Forum in January 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping committed to increasing trade volume in Latin America to 500 billion USD and foreign direct investment (FDI) volume to 250 billion USD within ten years.27 China has worked to consolidate its role as a global financial power by integrating into a variety of sectors and technological trends as well.28 With the help of cheap loans from state owned banks, Chinese firms have engaged increasingly in mergers and acquisitions across Latin America, increasing Chinese stakeholders within the Latin American business landscape.29 China’s activities in Latin American commodities markets affect global supply, but the US can continue to play a key role in the region. Increased mineral extraction and Chinese

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demand for commodities increased prices for Latin American goods, which helped improve economic conditions.30 However, relying on China as the dominant export destination suggests that Latin American producers and shippers are beholden to domestic Chinese markets.31 As Chinese economic growth slowed in the past two years, Latin American exports shrank and Latin America’s trade deficit increased (see figure 1).32 Some fear that China’s long-term objectives point toward trends of Chinese state-owned enterprises cornering markets and creating monopolies of commodities to the detriment of other global actors.33 Chinese companies have not only purchased the commodities themselves but also have begun to buy land in Latin America to produce goods themselves, including soybean farmland in Brazil.34 In reality, these conditions (while potentially challenging for the US) are also considered problematic for citizens within the countries.

Even as China grows in relative strength throughout Latin America, the US continues to be an essential trading partner for the region. A stronger relationship between China and Latin America does not jeopardize the US’s relationship with the region. Some fear that the current situation is a zero-sum game wherein China’s increased trade relationship precludes US economic gains.35 But free trade raises all boats. Chinese effort to integrate into a global industrial and technological environment through acquiring industrial assets in Latin America grows the pie for all.36 Increasing terms of trade through increased commodities prices boosted investor confidence for the region and increased foreign exchange reserves.37 Insofar as Chinese relationships do not include leverage over Latin American foreign policy decisions that contradict US national security priorities, Chinese trade in Latin America is beneficial for the region and the US.

Brazilian Economic Relationship with China Brazil’s Economic Challenges of the Past Brazil’s experience over the last 35 to 40 years with the US and US-backed international economic institutions have challenged Brazilian-US diplomatic relations. During the 1950s to the late 1970s, Brazil underwent state-led industrialization that built up industrial sectors and protected national industries with high tariffs.38 Mounting economic disequilibria, extensive borrowing due to negative real interest rates, and investments that did not meet expectations on returns meant that Brazil was unable to make payments on outstanding foreign loans and was

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consequently cut off from international financial markets.39 To stabilize the Brazilian economy, the IMF offered loans under conditions that the government cut domestic social spending, increase taxes, privatize nationalized industries, raise interest rates, and increase exports by devaluing the Brazilian real.40 The World Bank offered programs for loans that required structural adjustment policies to reorganize the Brazilian economy by focusing on increasing exports and lowering tariffs to enter the global economy.41 These policies of the ‘Washington Consensus’ during the 1990s pushed Brazilian economic development toward a more open economy based on economic orthodoxy.

However, inequality, poverty, and a concentration of wealth among elites remained largely unchanged.42 The neoliberal reforms of the IMF led to a backlash among former urban and middle class industrial coalition members who had benefited from social programs and government subsidies prior to the IMF and World Bank reforms. Brazilian critics of the IMF’s structural adjustment policies argued that US imperialism was at work through imposing economic power over sovereign Latin American countries.43 This historical relationship of economic tensions between Brazil and the IMF sets the stage for Brazil’s interest in engaging with China- an alternative source for economic development.

During the 2000s, partially in response to the Washington Consensus neoliberal policies, leftist politicians in Brazil gained power and implemented policies with democratic yet antineoliberal underpinnings.44 Brazilian leftist president Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva’s policies are often categorized as moderate, working within democratic and capitalist systems to achieve redistributionist policies.45 The Worker’s Party candidate, Lula emphasized a pursuit of social equity, justice and solidarity, and a transformation of the nation’s economic structures to better fulfill the social needs of the majority.46 Much of Lula’s state social programs were possible because of the commodity boom of the 2000s, bolstered by newly flourishing ties with China.

Brazilian leftist leaders had rejected the neoliberal policies endorsed by the US, tried to implement redistributionist policies that countered the austerity measures of the past decade, and found their financier in China.

The ‘China Boom’ in Brazil In May 2004, President Lula led a delegation of cabinet ministers, state governors, and over 450 business leaders to China in an effort to establish closer ties with an expanding Chinese

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market. Leftist Brazilian economic leaders sought an alternative to the Washington Consensus policies of the 1990s defined, in their view, by slow growth and accentuated inequality. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao and Lula signed over 15 trade agreements that positioned Brazilian natural resources as attractive trades for Chinese capital to support infrastructure projects throughout Brazil.47 For the next ten years, Brazilian natural resource exporters would reap the benefits of an expanding Chinese economy in what Kevin Gallagher describes as the ‘China Boom.’ Annual trade with China increased from around $2 billion a year in 2000 to $83 billion in 2013, a 4050 percent increase in less than 15 years.48 China’s 2004 constitutional amendment to grant non-state owned enterprises legal status underscored Beijing’s encouragement for business development and the internationalization of Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).49 These Chinese enterprises turned to Brazil to purchase natural resources, supply Chinese domestic manufacturing base, and feed the country’s large population.50 Chinese trade with Brazil relies predominantly on natural resources like iron ore, soybeans, and oil in exchange for manufactured goods. During the ‘China Boom’ in 2006, 42.7 percent of all soybeans exported from Brazil and 37.8 percent of all iron exports went to China, indicating a substantial market share of China in Brazilian exports.51 China continued to purchase Brazilian natural resources, and by 2013, China was Brazil’s largest trading partner.52 Although China remains the largest trading partner on net, the US continues to be a significant partner and supplier of goods for the Brazilian market, accounting for 8.1 billion USD worth of exports to Brazil in 2016.53 In contrast to China’s appetite for natural resources, US imports from Brazil are more diverse and focused on a variety of sectors. In 2016, 34 percent of China’s imports from Brazil were soybeans and 28 percent iron ore compared to the US that imported less than 3 percent of semi-finished iron.54 The Chinese market dominance for Brazilian natural resources does not threaten US resource security. Rather, Brazil and the US compete for the Chinese market of natural resources but still collaborate in agricultural research in the US’s principal forum for bilateral agricultural discussion with Brazil, the Consultative Committee on Agriculture.55 The effects of Chinese engagement with Brazil generate significant results for all parties.

As iron ore and soybeans become scarcer, increasing Chinese demand raises the price of goods.

This helps local farmers and general economic development within Brazil. Chinese engagement has also decreased inequality within Brazil.56 However, because of Brazil’s heavy reliance on

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natural resource exports, any dip in Chinese domestic demand for these commodities could have profound effects on Brazilian producers and shippers.57 Working with China to diversify and solidify a more stable Brazilian economy could advance the US’s larger strategic goal of safeguarding stable, free market economies.

Chinese-Brazilian Diplomatic Ties Chinese-Brazilian relations extend beyond trade and investment as well. Both members of the BRICS economies (a term referring to the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) aim to strengthen political and economic ties among other developing nations and rebalance global economic power. Both states advocate for reforms to the IMF to increase emerging states’ political voice in an international arena. In reality, these demands present relatively little leverage in foreign policy against the interests of the US. A new quota allocation and voting share reform to the IMF does not jeopardize American grand strategy of economic liberalization or the adoption of international norms (protection of human rights, democracy, etc.). While these international economic systems are integral avenues wherein the US can promote its economic goals, even with reforms to the way that countries maintain voting power would not necessarily preclude US leadership in the arena. In fact, despite some delays and roadblocks posed by the US Congress, the 2010 approval of the IMF’s 14th General Quota Review went into effect in 2014 granting Brazil, China, India and Russia greater voting power in the IMF.58 While voting shares for Brazil and China increased to 2.2 and 6 percent respectively, the US maintained a voting share of 16.5 percent.59 Additionally, in July 2014, the BRICS countries launched a New Development Bank that would serve as a move away from dependence on the IMF and World Bank for country-level financing.60 Emerging nations’ appetites for a change in the balance of power continues to be an important issue. But more platforms for country-level financing are not a direct threat to American interests. So long as these new powers do not coerce other nations to turn against free markets or democracy, the US does not lose out.

Some may perceive Brazil’s rising economic strength and political rhetoric for a remodeling of international hierarchies of power as dangerously revisionist. By connecting Brazilian revisionist ideas to Brazil’s relationship with China, analysts seek to describe how the two emerging powers pose a threat to US global hegemony. Brazil’s request for permanent seat on United Nations Security Council during the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly,

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however, is an example of how China does not always support Brazil’s intent to increase its relative power. Both the US and China did not approve of Brazil’s request.61 In this case, China is not the variable that incites or encourages Brazilian revisionist views. Instead, Brazil’s push for a greater voice in the international arena is a function of its increasing power over the past 15 years and a history of US ‘imperialism’ within the international economic system according to the Brazilians.

Brazilian Pushback to Chinese Geoeconomics Despite the overall substantial economic growth that Chinese engagement in Brazil spurred, not all Brazilians are keen on China’s extractivism. Opponents to Chinese engagement in the region dispute the claim that Brazil’s relationship with China has emboldened Brazil to seek revisionist policies. Especially in the aftermath of the commodity boom and influx of Chinese manufactured goods, Brazilian manufacturers are wary of what cheap Chinese imports entail for competition at home and abroad.62 In comparison to her predecessor Lula who established a strong relationship with China, former President Dilma Rousseff complicated Brazilian relations with the emergent China. In 2011, Rousseff’s administration responded to competitive Chinese pressures by imposing import tariffs on Chinese steel products to protect domestic manufacturers and applied anti-dumping tariffs retroactively.63 Beyond the manufacturing industry, indigenous groups have put pressure on the Brazilian government to reconsider the relationship the nation maintains with China. Brazilian scholars and ecologists critique the detrimental trends of neo-extractivism, trade asymmetries of commodities and manufactured goods, and the strategies of development that exacerbate inequalities.64 Particularly, the Munduruku indigenous group in the Tapajós basin of the Amazon condemn current President Michel Temer’s decision to utilize Chinese and European financing to turn the river into a grain canal by building dams along the river system.65 The infrastructure project would allow Brazil to increase meat and grain production, supplying China with more natural resources.66 However, much like the extractivist projects in the past with rubber, logging, and mining in the Amazon, the Tapajós river transport scheme would “accelerate deforestation, habitat loss and social problems.”67 The current proposal incites centuries of history of colonization by foreign powers over local communities and indigenous struggles for land rights.

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Acceptance of Chinese dominance in Brazil’s natural resource market may not be as undisputed as some suggest.

Underneath the rapid growth in trade between Brazil and China are tensions and pushback to market domination. Moves to reform the IMF or UNSC, while telling of the foreign policy visions of each country, do not jeopardize US interests or national security. Instead, amplified engagement with China has served as a method for Brazil to further integrate into the international economic system despite some hesitations to Chinese influence. As a once closedoff country pursuing development through state-led industrialization, Brazil has come to be a frontrunner in modern global economy. By working within the free market economy and global infrastructure that the US helped define, Chinese trade and investments in Brazil have only strengthened the value of US leadership and worldview. Any discourse that some would describe as ‘revisionist’ cannot be attributed specifically to Brazil’s relationship with China.

Chilean Economic Relationship with China Chile’s Economic Challenges of the Past The 1970 election of socialist Salvador Allende in Chile was seen in Washington as a major setback to its anti-communist global interests of the Cold War. After a CIA-supported military coup against Allende in 1973, General Augusto Pinochet assumed power and a group of young Chilean economists educated at the University of Chicago (the Chicago Boys) helped shape the Chilean economic system.68 The Chicago Boys implemented market friendly policies with stabilization plans, financial, commercial, and structural reforms of raising taxes, cutting spending, privatizing firms, and deregulating key industries.69 Their market path to economic liberalization within the authoritarian regime is often described as ‘pragmatic neoliberalism.’70 The Pinochet regime centralized power, attacked the industries that had benefited from state-led industrialization of the past, abolished the trade union movement, and instituted a repressive state to impose reforms that would move Chile toward a liberalized economy.71 In contrast to Brazil, Chile was largely protected from the Latin American economic crisis and other major economic imbalances because of the Chicago Boy’s economic reforms. Although Chilean politicians also responded to the authoritarian policies of the past with a shift to the left, market oriented policies were well ingrained in Chilean economic system unlike Brazilian leftist leaders who gained power by criticizing the proposals and assumptions of the IMF.

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Following Pinochet’s violent and repressive regime, opposition leftist leaders gained power and worked within the free market economic strategy to guide the market toward schemes that would make it produce benefits for broad sectors.72 President Michelle Bachelet, elected in 2006, is a social democratic leader who works toward a socialist agenda of resource redistribution while maintaining a commitment to a neoliberal consensus that preserves the economic gains made over time. Chile’s history of success through working with an export oriented growth model demonstrates how even leftist leaders of today (who to some degree criticize US hegemony and intervention of the past) continue to work within a global economic order constructed by the US. The ‘China Boom’ in Chile Chilean trade and investment with China does not change this acceptance of the global free market. In fact, the economic relationship strengthens Chilean commitment to market liberalization. In 2005, the two nations signed a free trade agreement (FTA)- the first Latin American country to do so with China- that included provisions for free entry for 92 percent of exports from Chile to China.73 Like many other Latin American nations, Chile benefited from the ‘China Boom’ as Chilean exports to China grew an average rate of 21 percent per year from 2005 to 2013.74 Similar to Brazil, natural resources dominate Chilean exports to China. As the largest producer and exporter of copper in the world with over one-third of the global output, Chile serves as a key supplier for China, the world’s largest consumer of copper.75 Although Chile entered FTA negotiations in search of greater FDI for non-mining sectors, Chinese interests focused on natural resources and the mining sector.76 Today, refined copper and copper ore make up 45.5 percent of Chilean exports.77 It is problematic that almost half of Chile’s export economy is dependent on Chinese demand for a specific natural resource. Nevertheless, the relationship is currently stable, without signs of China leveraging its market share to make Chile support Chinese interests in international economic institutions. In addition, Chile is taking steps to diversify its economy and seek investments in non-mining sectors.78

Chilean Pushback to Chinese Geoeconomics Recently, greater pragmatism has prompted Chile and China to rethink how they do work together. “Falling revenues from exports to China, fewer Chinese petroleum and mining

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investments, and greater competition from Chinese product exporters and construction companies” shift China toward being seen as a competitor rather than a spring of economic opportunity in Latin America within the past few years.79 Much like Brazil, the Chilean government pursued efforts to combat the asymmetric flow of goods with China. However, Chilean measures have focused less on imposing protective measures, and more on implementing proactive policies to diversify their economy. The Ministry of Economy provided 2.5 billion USD worth of low interest credits to help Chilean SMEs modernize as they represent 90 percent of new jobs created in the country but account for less than 1 percent of all exports.80 Chile has also taken measures to invest in the information technology sector to attract multinational corporations through programs like Program Invest Chile of the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción and Start Up Chile of ProChile.81 Chile has had a historically different economic relationship with the US (and the global economy) than Brazil. Despite the draconian cuts to social programs, violent political repression of the Pinochet regime, and persistent inequality, the Chilean economy benefited from economic liberalization of the past. Today, Chile’s engagement with China strengthens Chile’s integration into a global system. The Chinese-Chilean relationship is not a threat to the US as the relationship has not spurred Chile to combat or counteract US policies. It seems China is not the variable that prompts nations to adopt or enhance revisionist policies in Latin America. Chilean measures to strengthen their own economies serve as an example of how Chile respects free trade, but does not allow China to maintain total leverage over the country. China’s soft power is limited here.

Policy Implications for US Geoeconomics in Latin America As described, the US does not have to conceptualize increased trade relations between China and Latin America as a threat to US global influence. The US can strengthen its international position without undergoing combative policies, instead focusing on how China’s relationship in Latin America can be leveraged to solidify US leadership. I propose four policy options for the US to address China in Latin America. First, the current administration should work to establish a forum for connecting the national security priorities of the US with specific economic statecraft. Second, the US should strengthen the institutions and norms that underpin the international economic order in which the US leads. Third, the US should signal to China that

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it is willing to cooperate in Latin America and incorporate China into US policies for the region.

This may include Chinese-American cooperation in investing in Latin American SMEs in sectors beyond natural resources. Finally, the US should work to build better relationships through trade with Latin America that will signal to the region a new era of relationships- one in which cooperation, not coercion is the defining feature. The US can acknowledge its past mistakes, restate how the US market can offer diversity for Latin America, and cooperate with these nations in the international economic institutions. By reestablishing ties as partners not patrons with Latin America, the US can further the progress made by China in Latin America by bringing these nations further into the global economy- an outcome that benefits the US directly and can be offered as a ‘win’ for China as well.

First, without a clear structural connection between economic statecraft and national security policymaking, the US may encounter barriers to effective and efficient policymaking in the geoeconomic sphere. Former President Clinton’s Executive Order 12835 established the National Economic Council (NEC) that would “coordinate the economic policymaking process with respect to…international economic issues.”82 Former President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive emphasized the centrality of economic issues in US national security policymaking.

But rather than focus specifically on the use of economics in achieving foreign policy goals, the NEC and National Security Council would address international economic issues more broadly.83 While foreign economic policy refers to the means that may or may not be economic to achieve economic ends, economic statecraft applies economic means to ends that may or may not be economic.84 In the Chinese-Latin American case, a forum that would bring together policymakers to discuss and develop geoeconomic policies to pursue overall grand strategy priorities would be a smart option. This is not to say that the policies in this situation require combative geoeconomic responses to China’s presence in Latin America. Rather, developing a space to engage in these debates is essential when analyzing how the US should respond to the rise of China generally.

Second, by reinforcing the institutions and norms that govern the global economic system, the US can preserve its leadership and incentivize China to integrate into the system rather than oppose the system. Absorbing China into a system that favors market liberalization works to ensure the stability and survival of that system even if US relative power declines.85 With regard to the alternative financial sources for development (e.g. China Development Bank

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and the New Development Bank established by BRICS states), the US should ensure that these new institutions and alternatives align with the goals of other US institutions. Tethering these new development banks to the norms and regulations that the US first established with other financial systems would reinforce US relevance and importance. Third, the Latin America environment can serve as a stage for China and the US to cooperate in building up Latin American infrastructure and economic power. More robust economies, larger consumer markets, and increased efficiency for doing business abroad benefit all parties. Concretely, the US and China can jointly invest in Latin American SMEs and entrepreneurship initiatives in sectors beyond natural resources. This would strengthen capabilities and growth opportunities that will have lasting effects for the parties.

The past two years have signaled a possible turning point for China in Latin America. As the commodity boom fades and Latin Americans question the role that China plays in the region, China may be faced with Latin American pressures to decrease their presence. An opportune policy window, the current climate in Latin America is optimal to re-establish a relationship with the US- the final policy suggestion. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine and the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary outlined the US’s role as a ‘big brother’ for the hemisphere, but many Latin Americans rejected the paternalistic relationship throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.86 By offering diverse trade and better diplomatic relations with Latin America, the US can redefine their relationship with the hemisphere and offer Latin American economies what Chinese exports lack- diverse refined goods and machinery. Agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement can demonstrate the value of transnational trade relationships. The current administration should focus on how trade agreements can support broader foreign policy goals of maintaining international relevancy and strength. Furthermore, the US can engage constructively with Latin America in international institutions. By discussing the critiques and reforms that China and Latin America often profess, the US can quell some of the reformative rhetoric that Brazil makes. Without conceding overall dominance, the US can adjust its position in international economic institutions with little to no risks in doing so. The US can work to incorporate these countries into the global economic system while at the same time addressing Chinese concerns.

Analysts who take a more realist interpretation of the dynamics in the region posit that any relative gain by China is a significant threat to the US. Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris

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suggest that preserving US primacy in the global system should be America’s primary objective; global dominance should be America’s overall grand strategy. The forces of globalization are such that containment of Chinese geoeconomics would be futile, and the US position toward China in the past assisted (not countered) Chinese ascendancy.87 Assisting Chinese ascendency within the global economic system (even if led by the US) would be “at the expense of the United States’ global preeminence and long-term strategic interests.”88 However, Chinese geoeconomics around the world does not just face a US policy infrastructure. China faces an entire Western liberal order that is durable and easy to join.89 Insofar as Latin America intends to develop their economy and provide social programs for its citizens, the Western liberal order can continue to be the method by which they do so. China can and should join in this endeavor.

Additionally, US global cultural dominance extends into Latin America, and while the effects of reach are hard to measure, Latin Americans are still interested in maintaining strong relationship with this world superpower.90 Focusing on how China can join the US in assisting these nations in moving toward that infrastructure will be a key aspect of long-term American grand strategy.

Conclusion While it may seem counterintuitive that a more pervasive Chinese engagement in the hemisphere does not necessarily pose threats to the US, increased trade with Latin America is a route for both parties to adopt international norms that the US promotes. Trade and investment with Latin America can be viewed as a means to incorporate China more deeply into the liberal world order in which the US leads. In the Latin American case, US power and principles align to guide actions abroad by employing economic tools and trade initiatives to support a key principle of market liberalization. In other regions of the world where Chinese investments and development projects run deep (e.g. Africa and Central Asia), the Latin American environment serves as an example in understanding how the US can protect the ends of its foreign policy goals by developing means to incorporate China. As the debate about how to respond to the rise of China continues, US foreign policymakers have many paths to secure national interests.

Policymakers are compelled to challenge and question the assumptions that underlie policy decisions. Questioning China’s growing economic relationship with Latin America is an important exercise in developing comprehensive and robust foreign policy.

20

Bibliography “A Golden Opportunity.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 17 Nov. 2016, www.economist.com/news/americas/21710307-chinas-president-ventures-donaldtrumps-backyard-golden-opportunity.

Berger, Ryan. “Brazil Makes the Case for UN Reform.” Americas Quarterly, 23 Sept. 2011, www.americasquarterly.org/node/2902.

Blackwill, Robert D. and Ashley J. Tellis. “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” International Institutions and Global Governance Program. Council Special Report, 72, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2015.

Blackwill, Robert D. and Jennifer M. Harris, War by other means: geoeconomics and statecraft.

The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 2016.

Brands, Hal. What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. Cornell University Press, 2015.

Breslin, Shaun. “Access: China’s Resource Foreign Policy,” China’s Geoeconomic Strategy.

IDEAS Report, 12, London School of Economics, June 2012, pp. 19–24.

“BRICS Countries Launch New Development Bank.” Bridges, vol. 18, no. 26, www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/brics-countries-launch-new-developmentbank.

Castañeda, Jorge G. "Latin America's Left Turn." Foreign Affairs 85.3 (2006): 28-43. Council on Foreign Relations, May-June 2006. Web. Chetwynd, Gareth. “Lula Seals Deal to Feed China's Booming Cities.” The Guardian , 27 May 2004.

“China GDP Annual Growth Rate,” National Bureau of Statistics of China, TradingEconomics.com. 1989-2017.

China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 24 Nov. 2016, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml Colitt, Raymond. "Brazil Adopts China Import Tariff on Eve of Visit." Reuters. Ed. Eric Beech.

Thomson Reuters, 05 Apr. 2011. Web. Cori, Andrea, and Salvatore Monni. "Neo-Extractivism and the Resource Curse Hypothesis: Evidence from Ecuador." Development 58.4 (2015): 594-607. ProQuest. Web. Diamond, Jeremy. “Trump: 'We Can't Continue to Allow China to Rape Our Country'.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 May 2016, www.cnn.com/2016/05/01/politics/donald-trumpchina-rape/index.html.

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2018. Washington, D.C:, 2017, www.state.gov/documents/organization/271013.pdf.

Ellis, Evan. “China’s geo-economic role in Latin America,”Geo-economics with Chinese Characteristics: How China’s economic might is reshaping world politics. Report.

January 2016. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Geoeconomics_with_Chinese_Characteristics.pdf.

Etchemendy, Sebastián. “Compensating Outsiders: Chile's Market Model in the Comparative Framework .” Models of Economic Liberalization: Business, Workers, and

21

Compensation in Latin America, Spain, and Portugal, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 221–256.

Executive Order. No. 12835, 1993, p. 95.

“First Ministerial Meeting of China-CELAC Forum Grandly Opens in Beijing Xi Jinping Attends Opening Ceremony and Delivers Important Speech, Stressing Firm Grasp of New Opportunities in China-CELAC Overall Cooperation to Jointly Write New Chapter of China-CELAC Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 08 Jan. 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1227318.shtml Fornés, Gastón and Alan Butt Philip, The China-Latin America axis: emerging markets and the future of globalization. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Franko, Patrice M. The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development. Second ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

French, John D. "Many Lefts, One Path? Chávez and Lula." Latin America's Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change. Ed. Maxwell A. Cameron and Eric Hershberg.

Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ., 2010. 41-60.

Gachúz, Juan Carlos (2012), Chile’s Economic and Political Relationship with China, in: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 133-154.

Gallagher, Kevin P., and Roberto Porzecanski. China and the Latin America Commodities Boom: A Critical Assessment. Working paper no. 192. University of Massachusetts Amherst, Feb. 2009. Web. Gallagher, Kevin P. The China Triangle: Latin America's China Boom and the Fate of the Washington Consensus. Oxford University Press, 2016.

Heine, Jorge. "The Chile-China Paradox: Burgeoning Trade, Little Investment." Asian Perspective, vol. 40, no. 4, 2016, pp. 653-673, ProQuest Central; Sociological Abstracts, https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/1896828528?accountid=10598.

Hurwitz, Seth. “Economics and National Security: Six Questions for the Next Administration.

American Bar, 9 Jan. 2017, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_national_security/Eco nomics%20and%20National%20Security%20(final).authcheckdam.pdf Ikenberry, John G. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West.” Foreign Affairs, 15 Sept.

2015, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west.

“IMF Reforms: China, India, Brazil, Russia Get Greater Say.” The BRICS Post, 28 Jan. 2016.

IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors. International Monetary Fund , 22 Nov. 2017.

Kamrany, Nake M., and Frank Jiang. “China's Rise to Global Economic Superpower.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 2 Feb. 2015, www.huffingtonpost.com/nakem-kamrany/chinas-rise-to-global-eco_b_6544924.html.

Katherman, Jennifer M. “Communist China in Latin America: Political Idealism and Economic Stratagems.” Emory Electronic Theses and Dissertations, Emory University, Emory University , 2010.

Kolb, James T. “Communist China's National Strategy in Latin America.” Defense Technical Information Center, US Army War College, 1966, pp. ii-87.

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Liptak, Kevin, and Jeremy Diamond. “Trump Trades Barbs for Flattery to Win over China.”

CNN, Cable News Network, 9 Nov. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/11/09/politics/donaldtrump-china-xi-jinping/index.html.

Lyons, John, and Paul Kiernan. "Brazil's Big Bet on China Turns Sour --- Commodity Boom Lifted Nation, then Dropped it; 'Resource Curse' Induces 'Nausea'." Wall Street Journal, Aug 28, 2015, ProQuest Central; The Wall Street Journal, https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/1707745220?accountid=10598.

Mearsheimer, John J. “Can China Rise Peacefully?” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company , 2001, pp. 360–412, nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-chinarise-peacefully-10204?page=show.

Monroe, James, “Message at the Commencement of the First Session of the Eighteenth Congress (The Monroe Doctrine),” 2 Dec. 1823, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp.

OECD/ECLAC/CAF (2015), Latin American Economic Outlook 2016: Toward a New Partnership with China, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264246218-en Pilling, David. “Chinese Investment in Africa: Beijing's Testing Ground.” Financial Times, 13 June 2013, www.ft.com/content/0f534aa4-4549-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996.

"Salud!; Chile and China." The Economist, vol. 413, no. 8913, Nov 15, 2014, pp. 14-n/a, ProQuest Central, https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/1625584694?accountid=10598.

Simeos, Alexander J.G., and César A. Hidalgo. The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development. Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011.

Tegel, Simeon. “Latin America’s Delicate Dance With China.” US News, 25 Sept. 2017, www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-09-25/latin-america-is-wary-ofchina-despite-closer-ties.

United States, Department of Agriculture, Food Agriculture Service. “Brazil.” www.fas.usda.gov/regions/brazil.

Watts, Jonathan. "Brazil's Mega Hydro Plan Foreshadows China's Growing Impact on the Amazon." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 05 Oct. 2017. Web. Weyland, Kurt Gerhard., Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter. "The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues." Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings. New York: Cambridge UP, 2010. 1-17.

Wise, Carol. "Tratados De Libre Comercio Al Estilo Chino: Los TLC Chile-China y PerúChina." Apuntes, vol. 39, no. 71, 2012, pp. 161-189, PRISMA Database with HAPI Index, https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/1436980465?accountid=10598.

Zanini, Fábio. “Foreign Policy in Brazil: A Neglected Debate.” Harvard International Review, Harvard International Review, 23 Oct. 2014, hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=7486.

Appendix Figure 1. Latin America and the Caribbean, merchandise trade with China, $bn (2000-2015). “A Golden Opportunity.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 17 Nov. 2016.

23

[1] Jeremy Diamond, “Trump: 'We Can't Continue to Allow China to Rape Our Country'.” CNN, Cable News Network, 2 May 2016, www.cnn.com/2016/05/01/politics/donald-trump-chinarape/index.html.

[2] Kevin Liptak and Jeremy Diamond, “Trump Trades Barbs for Flattery to Win over China.”

CNN, Cable News Network, 9 Nov. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/11/09/politics/donald-trumpchina-xi-jinping/index.html.

[3] John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company , 2001, pp. 360–412, nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-risepeacefully-10204?page=show. See also Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by other means: geoeconomics and statecraft. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 2016.

[4] Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”

[5] Kevin P. Gallagher, The China Triangle: Latin America's China Boom and the Fate of the Washington Consensus. (Oxford University Press, 2016). See also Blackwill and Harris, War by other means and Gastón Fornés and Alan Butt Philip, The China-Latin America axis: emerging markets and the future of globalization. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[6] Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush. (Cornell University Press, 2015), 3.

[7] Blackwill and Harris, War by other means.

[8] Nake M. Kamrany and Frank Jiang, “China's Rise to Global Economic Superpower.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 2 Feb. 2015, www.huffingtonpost.com/nake-mkamrany/chinas-rise-to-global-eco_b_6544924.html. See also: James T. Kolb, “Communist China's National Strategy in Latin America.” (Defense Technical Information Center, US Army War College, 1966), iii.

[9] Jennifer M. Katherman, “Communist China in Latin America: Political Idealism and Economic Stratagems.” (Emory Electronic Theses and Dissertations, Emory University, Emory University, 2010), 40.

[10] Ibid., 42.

[11] “China GDP Annual Growth Rate,” National Bureau of Statistics of China, TradingEconomics.com. 1989-2017.

[12] Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis. “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” International Institutions and Global Governance Program. Council Special Report, 72, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2015, 9.

[13] Blackwill and Harris, War by other means, 9.

[14] China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 24 Nov. 2016, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1418254.shtml [15] OECD/ECLAC/CAF (2015), Latin American Economic Outlook 2016: Toward a New Partnership with China, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264246218-en, 29 [16] Kevin P. Gallagher, The China Triangle: Latin America's China Boom and the Fate of the Washington Consensus. (Oxford University Press, 2016), 65.

[17] Ibid., 46, 66, 74.

24

[18] Shaun Breslin, “Access: China’s Resource Foreign Policy,” China’s Geoeconomic Strategy.

IDEAS Report, 12, London School of Economics, June 2012, 22.

[19] Gastón Fornés and Alan Butt Philip, The China-Latin America axis: emerging markets and the future of globalization. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 76.

[20] David Pilling, “Chinese Investment in Africa: Beijing's Testing Ground.” Financial Times, 13 June 2013, www.ft.com/content/0f534aa4-4549-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996.

[21] OECD/ECLAC/CAF (2015), Latin American Economic Outlook 2016: Toward a New Partnership with China, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264246218-en, 30.

[22] Gallagher, The China Triangle, 169.

[23] "Salud!; Chile and China." The Economist, vol. 413, no. 8913, Nov 15, 2014, pp. 14-n/a, ProQuest Central, https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/1625584694?accountid=10598. See also: Blackwill and Harris, War by other means, 41.

[24] “Salud!”, (The Economist, 2014).

[25] China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean.

[26] OECD, Latin American Economic Outlook 2016, 13.

[27] “First Ministerial Meeting of China-CELAC Forum Grandly Opens in Beijing Xi Jinping Attends Opening Ceremony and Delivers Important Speech, Stressing Firm Grasp of New Opportunities in China-CELAC Overall Cooperation to Jointly Write New Chapter of ChinaCELAC Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership” . Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 08 Jan. 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1227318.shtml [28] OECD, Latin American Economic Outlook 2016, 11.

[29] Ibid.,31.

[30] Breslin, “Access: China’s Resource Foreign Policy,” 20. See also: OECD, Latin American Economic Outlook 2016, 30.

[31] Breslin, “Access: China’s Resource Foreign Policy,” 20.

[32] “A Golden Opportunity.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 17 Nov. 2016, www.economist.com/news/americas/21710307-chinas-president-ventures-donald-trumpsbackyard-golden-opportunity.

[33] Breslin, “Access: China’s Resource Foreign Policy,” 21.

[34] Ibid., 22.

[35] Blackwill and Harris, War by other means, 180.

[36] OECD, Latin American Economic Outlook 2016, 33.

[37] Gallagher, The China Triangle, 60.

[38] Patrice M. Franko, The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development. (Second ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 59.

[39] Ibid., 86.

[40] Ibid., 127-132.

[41] Ibid.,98.

[42] Ibid.,100.

[43] Fábio Zanini, “Foreign Policy in Brazil: A Neglected Debate.” Harvard International Review, Harvard International Review, 23 Oct. 2014, hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=7486.

25

[44] John D. French, "Many Lefts, One Path? Chávez and Lula." Latin America's Left Turns: Politics, Policies, and Trajectories of Change. Ed. Maxwell A. Cameron and Eric Hershberg.

(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ., 2010), 54.

[45] Jorge G. Castañeda, "Latin America's Left Turn." Foreign Affairs 85.3 (2006): 28-43.

Council on Foreign Relations, May-June 2006, 35.

[46] Kurt Gerhard Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter. "The Performance of Leftist Governments in Latin America: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues." Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings. (New York: Cambridge UP, 2010), 6.

[47] Gareth Chetwynd, “Lula Seals Deal to Feed China's Booming Cities.” The Guardian, 27 May 2004.

[48] John Lyons, and Paul Kiernan. "Brazil's Big Bet on China Turns Sour --- Commodity Boom Lifted Nation, then Dropped it; 'Resource Curse' Induces 'Nausea'." Wall Street Journal, Aug 28, 2015, ProQuest Central; The Wall Street Journal, https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/1707745220?accountid=10598.

[49] Fornés and Philip, The China-Latin America axis , 94.

[50] Ibid., 72.

[51] Kevin P. Gallagher, and Roberto Porzecanski. China and the Latin America Commodities Boom: A Critical Assessment. Working paper no. 192. University of Massachusetts Amherst, Feb. 2009, 9.

[52] Gallagher, The China triangle, 6.

[53] Alexander J.G. Simeos, and César A. Hidalgo. The Economic Complexity Observatory: An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of Economic Development. Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011.

[54] Ibid.

[55] United States, Department of Agriculture, Food Agriculture Service. “Brazil.” www.fas.usda.gov/regions/brazil.

[56] Gallagher, The China triangle, 62.

[57] Breslin, “Access: China’s Resource Foreign Policy,” 20.

[58] “IMF Reforms: China, India, Brazil, Russia Get Greater Say.” The BRICS Post, 28 Jan. 2016.

[59] IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors. International Monetary Fund , 22 Nov. 2017.

[60] “BRICS Countries Launch New Development Bank.” Bridges, vol. 18, no. 26, www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/brics-countries-launch-new-development-bank.

[61] Ryan Berger, “Brazil Makes the Case for UN Reform.” Americas Quarterly, 23 Sept. 2011, www.americasquarterly.org/node/2902.

[62] OECD, Latin American Economic Outlook 2016, 30.

[63] Raymond Colitt, "Brazil Adopts China Import Tariff on Eve of Visit." Reuters. Ed. Eric Beech. Thomson Reuters, 05 Apr. 2011.

[64] Andrea Cori, and Salvatore Monni. "Neo-Extractivism and the Resource Curse Hypothesis: Evidence from Ecuador." Development 58.4 (2015): 594-607. ProQuest, 601.

[65] Jonathan Watts, Jonathan. "Brazil's Mega Hydro Plan Foreshadows China's Growing Impact on the Amazon." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 05 Oct. 2017.

[66] Ibid.

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[67] Ibid.

[68] Sebastián Etchemendy, “Compensating Outsiders: Chile's Market Model in the Comparative Framework .” Models of Economic Liberalization: Business, Workers, and Compensation in Latin America, Spain, and Portugal, Cambridge University Press, 2014, 221.

[69] Ibid., 222.

[70] Ibid., 230.

[71] Ibid., 222.

[72] Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter. "The Performance of Leftist Governments,” 11.

[73] Carol Wise, "Tratados De Libre Comercio Al Estilo Chino: Los TLC Chile-China y PerúChina." Apuntes, vol. 39, no. 71, 2012, PRISMA Database with HAPI Index, https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/1436980465?accountid=10598, 170.

[74] Jorge Heine, "The Chile-China Paradox: Burgeoning Trade, Little Investment." Asian Perspective, vol. 40, no. 4, 2016, pp. 653-673, ProQuest Central; Sociological Abstracts, https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/1896828528?accountid=10598, 658.

[75] Ibid., 656.

[76] Wise, "Tratados De Libre Comercio Al Estilo,” 162.

[77] Simeos and Hidalgo, The Economic Complexity Observatory.

[78] Wise, "Tratados De Libre Comercio Al Estilo,” 184.

[79] Evan Ellis, “China’s geo-economic role in Latin America,”Geo-economics with Chinese Characteristics: How China’s economic might is reshaping world politics. Report. January 2016. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Geoeconomics_with_Chinese_Characteristics.pdf.

[80] Wise, "Tratados De Libre Comercio Al Estilo,” 170.

[81] Ibid., 172.

[82] Executive Order. No. 12835, 1993, 95.

[83] Seth Hurwitz, “Economics and National Security: Six Questions for the Next Administration.

American Bar, 9 Jan. 2017, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_national_security/Economics %20and%20National%20Security%20(final).authcheckdam.pdf, 7.

[84] Ibid.

[85] John G. Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West.” Foreign Affairs, 15 Sept. 2015, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2008-01-01/rise-china-and-future-west.

[86] James Monroe, “Message at the Commencement of the First Session of the Eighteenth Congress (The Monroe Doctrine),” 2 Dec. 1823, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp.

[87] Blackwill and Tellis, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” 4.

[88] Ibid., 6.

[89] Ikenberry, “The Rise of China.”

[90] Simeon Tegel, “Latin America’s Delicate Dance With China.” US News, 25 Sept. 2017, www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-09-25/latin-america-is-wary-of-chinadespite-closer-ties.

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Maternalism and Women’s Health in Revolutionary Cuba: Medical Education, Family Planning, and Feminist Strategy Soo Hyun Kim Soo Hyun Kim is an undergraduate student at Stanford University who hopes to engage in crosscultural dialogue on science and technology's far-reaching impact on society. Soo Hyun plans on continuing her studies in the biological and chemical sciences with the desire to enter the healthcare field in the future.

Abstract From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, women revolutionaries in Cuban anti-Batista movement adopted the political strategy of maternalism, which allowed for women to organize as grieving mothers, wives, and daughters. Regardless of their extensive contributions, however, women revolutionaries continued to be regarded as “auxiliary” and were often sexually policed by their families and revolutionary leaders. In this way, notions of women’s political activity and sexuality were characteristically intertwined. In particular, as such maternalist rhetoric emphasized the role of women as revolutionary reproductive systems, more women and society in general were prompted to become involved in women’s and maternal health. Women’s participation in healthcare was unique in their efforts to dispel traditional gender limitations and overcome the taboo nature of female sexuality by pushing for sex education, especially by promoting education on family planning. In particular, scholars often claim that healthcare and education reform of the Federación de Mujeres Cubanas (FMC) was not as simple and direct as a passive, top-down propagation model without taking into account the indirect impacts of women’s contributions to the revolution. Specifically, this paper asserts that the revolutionary ties that women had developed through their insurgency contributions and the corresponding shifts in perception of women’s sexuality and health had prompted the concrete policy changes regarding women’s healthcare. This paper examines the role of motherhood in women’s experiences in underground anti-Batista movements, which later influenced fundamental changes in women’s participation and perception of health and sexuality within a society that has been historically patriarchal and strongly values machismo.

Introduction

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As revolutionaries in Cuba fought to overthrow the corrupt Batista regime between 1953 to 1959, women played a significant yet often overlooked role in the insurgency, helping organize and strategize the anti-Batista movement in a society that valued machismo.1 By using gender norms such as dependency towards men and emotional appeal to their advantage, women effectively mobilized as mothers and wives grieving for their husbands and sons in order to gain a justified platform for political movement in a time when women’s social participation was not widely accepted. Likewise, women often adopted “maternalist” rhetoric, that is, rhetoric that appealed to motherhood and femininity as women protested state violence against their loved ones, invoking the notion of strength in motherhood. Under an overarching framework of feminist activism, a distinction must be drawn here between liberal feminism and maternal feminism.

Liberal feminism is generally characterized to directly defy and resist dominant patriarchal ideology while advocating for individualism and egalitarianism.2 On the other hand, maternal feminism combines feminist ideology with maternalism, which refers to “women’s essentialist nature as caregivers” and “the transformative power of maternal love” that tend to conform to patriarchal gender norms3. Specifically, maternal feminism holds women’s roles as mothers as the basis for their social and political participation.4 In colonial Cuba, the authority of motherhood had became deeply rooted in Cuban culture through values of Marianismo that resulted under the Spanish Empire’s heavy Catholic influence.5 Nonetheless, women revolutionaries in the antiBatista movement rarely held a liberal feminist agenda, choosing instead to focus on nationalist goals and adopting maternalist strategies that remained within a patriarchal framework.

Following the revolution’s victory, women became more empowered to get involved in groups such as Federación de Mujeres Cubanas (FMC) and champion their rights for women’s health in a more gender-centric manner, in contrast to the nationalist agenda of previous decades.6 In particular, the view of the female body as a reproductive system stemmed from the maternalist rhetoric employed during the insurgency, thereby resulting in various measures that would better ensure women’s health in relation to reproductive abilities, including usage of contraceptives, sex education, and family planning. This paper examines the revolutionary efforts of women in the late 1950s to early 1960s as well as changes in healthcare structures, policies, and advocacy

in

the

first

two

decades

after

the

success

of

the

revolution.

Conclusively, maternalist involvement in the revolution and their gendered experience in the insurgency gave impetus to the more explicitly liberal feminist goals that were pursued in post-

29

revolutionary Cuba, thereby propelling women to question patriarchal hierarchy and champion for their own healthcare rights.

Gender, Patriarchy, and Marianismo in Cuba Cuba, along with many Latin American countries, has its culture rooted in traditional machismo, which refers to patriarchal values of masculinity, strength, and virility since colonial times. Particularly prominent in the 19th century under the Spanish Empire’s influence, Catholicism in Cuba emphasized Marianismo that attributed strength and power in motherhood in accordance with the Virgin Mary’s authority in having birthed Jesus.7 Simultaneously, Marianismo established expectations of innocence and virginity in women of all ages, and as a result women were often policed by their husbands and fathers to be ensured of adherence to Virgin Mary’s authority of purity. Thus, women’s authority and power was contingent on their femininity and purity while simultaneously resting in their rejection of sexuality.

The following decades of the 1920s and 30s saw an emerging wave of feminist outcomes regarding women’s citizenship and political rights that accompanied the nationalist sentiment permeating Cuba after its liberation from Spain in 1898. During these decades, as the nation strived to distance itself from its colonial past, Cubans revolted against frequent United States intervention, governmental corruption, and economic instability, as citizens denounced the political polarization and violence of the Gerardo Machado and Fulgencio Batista regimes, respectively of 1925 and 1933.8 Women viewed themselves as part of the tool for societal change during this period, assuming the image of a “warrior” mother who was simultaneously courageous, powerful, and vulnerable.9 Thus, within a dominant culture of machismo, the prerevolutionary authority of motherhood became more culturally prominent, as the idea of a female figure who gives birth and nourishes strong men was able to politically empower women. This nationalist sentiment resulted in women actively advocating and achieving equal-work laws, the right to vote in 1934, and a legal provision in the 1940 Constitution prohibiting gender-based discrimination.10 Though national reform for women was pursued, such achievements reflected the nationwide goal for better equality and justice for all; women regarded the advocacy of their rights as merely one part of the nationalist reforms that all citizens were striving to achieve at the time.11 Accordingly, the reforms were not efforts to challenge nor subvert the

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patriarchy, and women established validity for their nationalistic reforms within the pre-existing hierarchy of machismo while employing the appeal of motherhood.

Maternalist Rhetoric as an Insurgency Strategy and the Political Activation of Women within a Machismo Society It is significant to consider the historical developments that led to Cuba’s current day healthcare system, which is often lauded as being one of the most advanced and equitable healthcare systems in the world despite Cuba being a developing nation.12 Before the success of the Cuban revolution, a public healthcare system run by the government did not exist under Batista’s dictatorship, and thus medical care was highly stratified between the minority wealthy class and the majority living in poverty.13 As Batista’s regime had been ridden with corruption and exploitation of the people, the 26th of July movement led by Fidel Castro was determined to oust Batista and bringing to fruition the Cuban revolution.

Scare documentation and statistics exist on women’s insurgency participation, but it is estimated that several thousands of women were in charge of duties such as the transportation of material, provision of housing, distribution of propaganda, and organization and participation in demonstrations. This lack of documentation is reflected in the relative shortage of scholarly articles and books regarding the topics of maternalism in the anti-Batista movement and women revolutionaries’ underground experiences; many records tended to be more focused on the work of post-revolutionary group FMC. Unfortunately during the 1950s anti-Batista insurgency, women’s efforts were undermined as “auxiliary” in that women participated in the strategic and organizational aspects of the revolution rather than being armed in direct warfare.14 Even women serving in the 26th of July movement were generally not equipped with arms despite their role residing over arms transportation, with revolutionaries citing biological and physical differences between women and men as reasons why women are not fit for combat.15 The public perception of heroic endeavor at the time was one of physical sacrifice in the face of violent, armed guerilla warfare such as the Moncada Attacks. Thus, women’s roles in the revolutionary movement simply did not fit the preconceived notions of a revolutionary hero in a machismo society and often remains overlooked even in the status quo.16 Women-run organizations such as the Frente Cívico de Mujeres Martianas (FCMM) as well as women revolutionaries in the 26th of July Movement were in fact quite active in

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contributing to the revolution despite the relative lack of national recognition given to them at the time.17 Women used their authority in the press in addition to spreading pamphlets and flyers to provide support for the insurgency. When militant men in the community were announced to have died at the hands of revolutionary violence, women gathered to publicly mourn as grieving mothers, daughters, and wives. Paradoxically, women’s participation in the anti-Batista movement elevated women’s perception of themselves as fighters in the insurgency while simultaneously consolidating their constraints as domestic figures responsible for supporting men. Organizations such as the FCMM rarely held a liberal feminist agenda as their focus for reform, rather choosing to bolster the revolution for the same reasons as men: to counter corruption, dictatorship, and indiscriminate violence.

It was impossible to detangle women’s sexuality from societal perceptions toward their political work, and thus women employed a different political strategy from their male counterparts coined “maternalism.”18 Maternalism asserted that mothers were the moral conscience of humanity, and thus ideology appealed to mothers’ moral duties to deter violence and restore familial sanctity by standing against the losses of their husbands and sons in warfare.19 Guira ascribed women’s efforts to be fighting the “crisis in moral values” and as a “desire to save domestic peace and harmony.”20 Maternalism essentially fought for the revolution through mothers’ defensive, non-threatening, and powerfully emotional rhetoric in an era of abhorrent violence. Examples of maternalism included women signing letters and petitions as widows or mothers, employing different forms of sign-offs as mothers, daughters, organization representatives, or workers to achieve the most powerful impact for each petition.21 For instance, public outcry ensued after the use of fire hoses against women protesting Smith’s visit, which resulted in Smith later issuing a statement denouncing the mistreatment of women.22 Maternalism was especially attractive in that in many cases, women’s maternalist demonstrations and petitions were not policed as severely as demonstrations led by men.

Paralleling the unity that the struggle for women enfranchisement brought in the 1930s, maternalism helped achieve solidarity amongst different classes of women as well. Women in insurgency came from various backgrounds, with some coming from teachers’ associations to others joining as a Catholic group.23 Additionally, women of all different classes made revolutionary efforts, though women in the middle and upper class were most dominant. Such unified efforts were only achievable by the fact that all women in the insurgency felt united by

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the common identity that all women possessed regardless of socioeconomic, racial, or political background — the role that they held as mothers, daughters, and wives.

Despite maternalist rhetoric that complied to the expected norms of femininity in a predominantly machismo society, women in insurgencies were neither inexperienced nor spontaneous as contemporaries tended to suggest.24 The assumption that women’s revolutionary efforts were naive or spontaneous is demonstrated by the contemporary insurgent group Organización Auténtica labeling women in demonstrations as “passerby...who had left a mass where they prayed for their dearly departed,” which minimized the women’s affiliation and dedication to the insurgency.25 Through close examination of the rhetoric of women insurgents, however, it is clear that maternalist rebellion was a pre-planned strategy rather than an impulsive expression of grievance. Though the strategies were frequently employed by actual mothers who were grieving the deaths of their sons, maternalism developed into a symbolic rhetoric for achieving a politically-justified platform available to all women, even those who were not grieving a tangible death of a loved one at the time. One signatory to a US ambassador wrote “As Cuban women and as relatives — mothers, daughters, wives, sisters — of victims of this tyranny that bleeds our country, we direct ourselves to you.”26 This rhetoric shows that the identification of women as “relatives … to the victims of tyranny” politically justifies their direct address to higher authorities such as ambassadors. Additionally, the rhetoric “victims of tyranny that bleeds this country” is emotionally impactful but rather vague, allowing for maternalism to be adopted by not just mothers mourning their son’s death but by all women. Likewise, signatories on letters and petitions often adopted a collective grievance rhetoric, and a level of generality was maintained to serve as a political platform rather than a singular instance of mourning. Moreover, though women’s ultimate goal was to denounce violence and corruption through a non-threatening platform of motherhood, these women were also tolerant of violence that took place at revolutionary demonstrations. The FCMM, for instance, saw revolutionary violence as a “necessary evil to counter annihilation of Cuban youth.”27 The acceptance of armed rebellion from a woeful mother’s standpoint further antagonized public perception towards Batista’s repression of the people. In turn, maternalist strategy helped draw a distinction between revolutionary violence and dictatorial violence, in turn justifying violence adopted by the antiBatista insurgency.

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Women’s contributions to the revolution achieved with the help of maternalist rhetoric later gradually pushed more women to adopt a more liberal feminist standpoint as the revolution proceeded. In addition to having their efforts often overlooked, women fighting in the revolution were often sexually policed by their revolutionary leaders and by their families, as women’s sexuality and political activities remained closely intertwined. Moro states in her memoir: “And we girls? The collaborators, the assistants, the rearguard, we took on apparently secondary roles … overprotected [and] undervalued . . . by our male compañeros.”28 The sentiment of being “overprotected [and] undervalued” mirrors the expectations of purity and femininity that continued to persist since colonial times, despite having women serve fearlessly and sacrificially in the revolution. Because participation in the revolutionary movement entailed long absences, unrestricted freedom of movement, and living in close quarters with single men, families often disapproved of women joining the movement. Unrestricted freedom of movement by female revolutionaries was seen as comparable to “seduction,” and revolutionary leaders feared that such seduction might adulterate the noble, morally correct cause of the revolutionary movement.29 In particular, when women insurgents encountered the police, they were subject to sexual abuse including rape and humiliation in sexualized forms.30 These occurrences dramatically distinguished the underground insurgency experience of women from that of men, which propelled women to reexamine their statuses specifically as women revolutionaries and citizens.

Maternalist rhetoric gave women the opportunity to expand their revolutionary contributions, which highlighted the injustice and policing against women’s sexuality and led to more and more women questioning patriarchal authority. A key demographic for the underground movement was comprised of young, single middle class women, who felt that liberty and freedom of movement should rightfully be theirs. Experiencing firsthand from their families and revolutionary leaders the policing of their commute and suspicions toward their interactions with men, unmarried younger women especially became drawn to the portrayal of relative independence in mobility of women that were carried over from Hollywood films during this period.31 The impact of Hollywood’s wave on urban Cuba is evident in that by 1960, 200 of the 380 movies featured in Havana were Hollywood films.32 Especially as more women began to expand their social sphere by leaving the domestic sphere to attend cinema gatherings, the impact of modernity and relative freedom of women’s mobility portrayed in these films had a

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marked impact on women.33 Unhindered freedom of Hollywood women to easily commute from one city to another without overarching protection from men proved to be enticing for the female viewers and stirred immense discontent in Cuban women who were becoming all too familiar with the discriminatory oppression and sexual policing of women through the insurgency.

Women’s Health Mobilization and Reproductive Systems in Post-Revolutionary Cuba Although Castro originally had not explicitly included a feminist agenda in the 26th of July movement, the importance of women’s insurgency work contributed to the birth of political platforms such as the FMC that women rarely had access to in previous regimes. Initially, the betterment of female health and education was not cited as one of the primary goals of the revolution. In Castro’s most well-recognized, four-hour long speech that later became the manifesto of the 26th of July movement presented at his trial on October 1953 in defense of the Moncada Attacks, there was no denunciation toward the oppression of women.34 However, following the success of the revolution, Castro soon established in 1960 the FMC, a group that would go onto make significant strides in women’s health and education. At the organization’s inception meeting on August 23th, 1960, Castro thanked the women revolutionaries in the insurgency and stated that the group was formed with intentions to further promote women’s participation in revolutionary activities.35 Soon after, FMC’s role expanded to more than simply insurgency work, as women began to expand their efforts to elevate women’s health, economic prominence, and community participation. Some scholars tend to criticize the feminist nature of the FMC, asserting that many of its policies were orchestrated from the Castro regime as a topdown method and that the FMC simply was used as a propagation tool without the power to actually influence specific policies.36 While the role of the FMC as propagators of policy changes is certainly true, it should not be neglected that the FMC had enormous power in shifting and shaping the zeitgeist regarding women’s healthcare and sexuality at the time. It is important to note that women’s political platforms that had resulted from their revolutionary contributions promoted a gradual but tangible expansion of women’s input in health and education policies.

Following the success of the Cuban revolution, women’s opportunities and participation in healthcare quickly expanded as part of Castro’s revolutionary vision of social reform for all sectors of society, including women. Women’s introduction into the medical field was boosted

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by revolutionary programs such as the 1959 Agrarian Reform and the Great Literacy Campaign that expanded education for all, with women reaping immense opportunities and benefits.37 In contrast to the Batista regime that had excluded women from medicine, 52% of Havana’s medical schools were comprised of women as of 1989.38 Additionally, more medical professions opened up for women as a result of the immediate strain in the number of available medical professional after nearly half of the country’s physicians and two-thirds of the nurses had fled the nation during the revolution. In particular, this supply of women medical workers was especially valuable in the rural areas of Cuba where availability of medical services remained severely limited in comparison with urban areas — almost half of the nation’s physicians had previously worked in Havana, and approximately 60% of the country’s hospital beds were situated in the city in 1959.39 On a visit to various rural polyclinics such as PolyClinic Plaza, Rich mentions her surprise when she saw that all of the clinics’ physicians were women and many were black, which she described as “striking to a US observer” but was considered to be the norm in the local areas.40 Thus, it is suggested that although women were initially prompted to enter the healthcare as a result of governmentally instituted societal reforms, the extent of women’s healthcare impact and advocacy was much more far-reaching than initially expected as it helped to ameliorate national concerns of medical strains and regional disparity.

As women further expanded their roles in healthcare, they organized in community health brigades which allowed them to educate the importance of maternal and reproductive health to a greater community. In 1964, the FMC encouraged tens of thousands of women to serve in sanitary and health brigades, joining the Ministry of Public Health’s (MINSAP) goals to lower infant and maternal mortality.41 Health brigades were groups comprised of civilian women who would volunteer to lead community-level health education as well as helping organize labor for building hospitals, schools, and more.42 In particular, these brigades possessed the role of persuading the community of the benefits and importance of certain procedures; for instance, when many women were reluctant to receive pap smears, health brigades played a vital role in educating the community of the importance of screening and helping women set up appointments.43 Health brigades also allowed women the opportunity to organize in grassrootslevel community discussion, as they extended their maternal qualities of care and nurture toward the community’s health in addition to having an organized platform to discuss issues in women’s health. More than 2.5 million women took part in these discussions on issues such as childcare,

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pap smears, family planning, and sex education, and these efforts were pivotal in providing care against polio, tetanus, and diphtheria.44 Moreover, efforts such as educating local communities regarding the safety of contraceptives and the necessity for men — not just women — to use protection instigated liberating conversations on sexuality, especially in a culture where men were disinclined to use contraceptives and women were generally uninformed or afraid of them.45 The work of health brigades in dispelling false beliefs regarding these then controversial topics was monumental in shifting the culture of repression and taboo nature of women’s sexuality.

Though the goal of achieving equality for women fit under the nation’s overarching revolutionary agenda, the notion of revolutionary motherhood that had been reinforced by the insurgency’s maternalist rhetoric in particular buttressed the Castro regime’s prioritization of women’s reproductive and maternal health. As Castro famously stated in the Second Congress of the FMC in 1974, Women are nature's workshop where life is formed. They are the creators par excellence of the human being. If women are physically weaker, if women must be mothers, if on the top of their social obligations, if on top of their work, they carry the weight of reproduction and child-bearing… [then] it is just that women should be given all the respect and all the inequalities in favor of women.46 Castro’s speech not only established motherhood and societal revolutionary duties to be fundamentally tied as the responsibilities of women, but also depicted the female body as a sacred reproductive system. Especially within the first few decades of having achieved the revolution, the fervor of revolutionary success allowed the notion of revolutionary productivity through prioritization of women’s reproductive health to thrive. For instance, pregnant women received extensive care and were encouraged to stay for long periods in maternity homes with better-diet, even in times during the Special Period in 1989 when Cuba’s GDP fell 35% and overall imports including medical equipment were reduced by 75%.47 Accordingly, various concrete policy changes came about to ensure women had heightened control over the health of their own reproductive systems, bolstered not only by the Castro regime’s support, but also primarily by women’s active advocacy.

The shifting societal perceptions toward women’s sexuality and healthcare as a result of their expanding participation in medicine were demonstrated in post-revolutionary changes to

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legislation relating to fertility control, namely abortion. During the pre-revolutionary Batista era, popular methods of fertility control were mostly illegal abortions, with approximately 800,000 women being admitted to hospitals annually due to complications from procedures done by nonprofessionals outside of a hospital.48 Influenced by Catholicism that had carried over from Spanish colonial rule, Cuba had banned abortion under any circumstance until 1936 when the government began to allow the procedure in circumstances of rape, endangered mother’s health, or severe birth defects.49 Abortion was not fully legalized until several years after the revolution in 1965 when the death toll due to illegal abortion complications had urged the administration to react.50 It can be inferred that Castro had not initially intended to legalize abortion, even despite Cuba’s cultural shift away from its colonial Catholicism, since this change in the 1936 law was not implemented until after three decades had passed since the revolution, and Castro continued to personally disagree with abortion even after its legalization. However, when statistics showed that the primary cause of death amongst women aged 15-44 was abortion complications, the high death toll was not only a health concern, but now a revolutionary concern.51 Despite it going against the own beliefs of the regime leader, legalization of abortion proved to be necessary for the health of female revolutionaries. Hence, it is suggested that the legalization of abortion was not solely taken as an action to stray away from Cuba’s previously Catholic roots, but rather was a result of the rising importance of motherhood in the insurgency that in fact helped accomplish this legalization. Castro’s personal disagreement with abortion is also notable in that there must have been societal currents that propelled Castro to go against his personal belief — even as a dictator — and legalize abortion, lending credibility to the claim that the development of women’s healthcare structures was not as simple as a top-down method from the Castro regime as scholars often claim.

Because maternalist rhetoric emphasized the notion that women are mothers in addition to revolutionary workers, these two roles of women remained fundamentally tied together as joint causes that resulted in the implementation of various legislation protecting women’s social, economic, and reproductive roles. FMC achieved much success in advocating the 1973 Maternity Code, which allowed for the right for women to take paid maternity leaves in addition to either the father or mother being allowed to dedicate one day per month to taking care of their children.52 Additionally, the Family Code was implemented in 1975, establishing that both fathers and mothers have equal share in domestic labor.53 Such economic and social

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empowerment of women by the FMC resulted in more women seeking expanded maternal rights and heightened control over their fertility through contraceptives. Though contraceptives had been available since the 1960s, supplies were limited especially as the US embargo had led to contraceptives becoming costly and a luxury for many women.54 In addition, contraceptives usage was not originally emphasized by the government, which viewed other health issues to be more imminent. The government only began to stress contraceptive usage in the mid-1970s as demand for greater fertility control increased, especially in 1974 when Cuba received $384,000 from the United Nations to Fund for Population Activities to promote manufacture and distribution of oral contraceptives and IUDs.55 Thus, it can be concluded that government investment into contraceptives was propelled as a result of the FMC’s work, rather than Castro having initiated such policies.

FMC’s most prominent and proactive form of advocacy was regarding sex education. In particular, sex education was singular in that the FMC independently pushed for the agenda of sex education to be adopted by the government, which was later established as a national goal in 1975 at the First Congress of Cuban Communist Party.56 Sex education not only opened up previously taboo topics of sexuality for discussion, but also afforded women significantly enhanced educational and occupational opportunities by promoting more informed choices for balancing motherhood and career. In particular, the FMC promoted sex education in schools and polyclinics, stating that such education would contribute to making sure the child will safe, be loved, and have a healthy environment to grow up in, again appealing to maternal values. This significant shift regarding sexuality is most likely a result of women’s rising contributions in the social and medical sphere that had been instigated and legitimized by women’s participation in the insurgency.

In marriage relations that were inevitably influenced by the still existent culture of machismo, women’s power as mothers afforded them greater authority in their pregnancies, in which fathers needed to earn the right to be an active participant in the pregnancy. For instance, fathers were required to attend periodic classes to learn skills such as changing diapers and how to support women during pregnancies and birth.57 If the father was unable to pass the course, he was not granted permission to be present during the birthing room during labor, which was often the case. Additionally, when Cuban women were diagnosed to be exposed to high-risk conditions or environments, including issues in nutrition or inadequate home facilities, they were

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moved to maternity homes that provided housing, meals, and care for the mother and her fetus.58 Fathers were deemed as a risk factor in the mother’s pregnancy as well, and thus women were moved to a maternity home if home life was considered an emotional risk for the mother, even in the absence of a physical risk. This authority of women in their own pregnancies was somewhat of a shift from the maternalism that characterized women’s insurgency, as women’s political rhetoric had been completely dependent upon their relationships with men; however, as women’s health became more prioritized, their ties to men, at least in the healthcare perspective, waned in importance. Likewise, the authority that women had as mothers opened doors for women to begin to adopt a more liberal feminist strategy, as women demanded and achieved greater control over their health and sexuality.

Conclusion Women’s maternalist rhetoric during the insurgency and its impacts in the development of post-revolutionary women’s healthcare structures provide a valuable yet often overlooked insight into the complexities of how Cuba’s healthcare has formed into its current state. Though some insights may be haste to deem the FMC as a passive tool solely dictated by the Castro regime, the long-lasting impacts that women’s insurgency efforts had on the possibility for women to later begin to adopt more liberal feminist stances toward health and sexuality should not be neglected. Women’s appeal to maternalism in the anti-Batista movement not only helped achieve success for the revolution, but also afforded women a justified political platform that was later used to further the independence and liberation of women, especially through healthcare advocacy. In addition to the establishment of concrete policy changes regarding family planning, abortions, and sex education, the overall perception and attitude toward women’s sexuality gradually shifted to become more accepting in the context of a traditionally machismo society. Whereas the notions of maternity served as a moral authority in the insurgency, motherhood later transformed into a powerful authority in healthcare in postrevolutionary Cuba.

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Solid Waste Management in Rural and Urban Regions in Intibucá, Honduras Lissa Neira Lissa Lucia Neira is a senior studying Evolutionary Anthropology at Duke University. She is the president of the Duke service group, Project HEAL (Health Education and Awareness in Latin America), and has been involved in leading a team of Duke students every year to volunteer and conduct research in Honduras with the help of the NGO, Shoulder to Shoulder. She hopes to continue working in Honduras and other Latin American countries in the future.

Abstract As globalization continues to expand, its products continue to reach the farthest corners of the globe. As a developing country, Honduras poses as an interesting microcosm to analyze how rural and urban communities are affected by this change. In this study, 56 people were interviewed across two rural villages and one urban town. The survey consisted of an evaluation of the quantity of plastics generated per week, and an analysis of the techniques used to manage household trash like plastic, paper, metal, glass and organic waste. The questionnaire was conducted in person going house-to-house. Further understanding of waste management practices can lead to better policy that combats the negative effects of globalization and prevents health issues as well as promote the necessary infrastructure to dispose of waste properly. In this research study, possible educational interventions were also analyzed in order to provide a background for future projects.

Keywords: solid waste management, environmental effects, education, health outcomes

Abstracto A medida que la globalización continúa expandiéndose, sus productos continúan llegando a los rincones más lejanos del mundo. Como país en desarrollo, Honduras se presenta como un microcosmos para analizar cómo las comunidades rurales y urbanas se ven afectadas por este cambio. En este estudio, 56 personas fueron entrevistadas en dos aldeas y un pueblo. La encuesta consistió en una evaluación de la cantidad de plásticos generados por semana y un análisis de las técnicas utilizadas para manejar la basura doméstica. El cuestionario se realizó visitando casa en casa. Una mejor comprensión de las prácticas de manejo de residuos puede conducir a una mejor política para combatir los efectos negativos de la globalización y prevenir problemas de salud.

Así es importante promover y crear una infraestructura necesaria para disponer de los residuos de forma adecuada. En este estudio de investigación, también se analizarán posibles intervenciones educativas con el fin de proporcionar una fundación para proyectos futuros.

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Background International Economic Relations Honduras has been a member of the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) since 2005.1 The goal of CAFTA was to facilitate trade between Central American countries like Honduras and the U.S. As a result, within just one year, Honduras received an increase of US imports by 13.3% and by 2015 US imports further increased up to 26.9%.2,3 With economic growth comes an increase of imports that are then transported throughout the country, from big cities to small towns. As a result, there has been an increase in heavily packaged goods primarily consisting of plastic in the last twelve years. The issue then is that these deliveries of goods are not providing a service to properly dispose the waste from these products. As a result of this rapid increase in imports, proper disposal of these goods has been unable to keep up with the increasing amount of processed waste leading to the accumulation of solid waste in rural and urban communities.

Honduran Legislation Although Honduras has environmental legislation, the country does not have specific policy describing the proper disposal and management of solid waste.4 The Honduran Constitution of 1982 states in Article 145 that “the state shall maintain a satisfactory environment for the protection of everyone’s health” and thus it is the state’s responsibility to ensure the proper management of the environment.5 Such responsibility is demonstrated in the Regulation on the

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Mark P Sullivan. “Honduras: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations” CRS Report for Congress. 2006. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a461337.pdf 2 “U.S. Trade with the CAFTA-DR Countries.” Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2007. https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file601 _13191.pdf 3 “Honduras.” Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2015. https://ustr.gov/countriesregions/americas/honduras 4 Mercedes Lu; Mark Chernaik; Heidi Weiskel. “Ocean Waste in the Gulf of Honduras: Where it goes and what to do about it”. Elaw. 2013. https://www.elaw.org/system/files/ELAW_Solid_Waste_and_Transport_Report.pdf 5 Republic of Honduras. Constitution of the Republic of Honduras: Decree No. 131. 1982. http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/Honduras.pdf

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Figure 1. Municipalities with sanitary landfills in Honduras from 2005. In pink are municipalities without sanitary landfills. In yellow are municipalities that have landfills. Note: the presence of sanitary landfills does not necessarily indicate that all members near these municipalities have access to a landfill, nor that services in these areas carry out proper waste management. Source: Padilla, 2005, cited by Padilla 2007.7 Management of Solid Wastes federal law that states that the management of wastes is mandatory for municipalities and for private and public collectors.6 However, such broad statements on the responsibility of the state and municipalities are vague on the specific actions and services that a municipality must provide for its constituents. These broad policies thus may be one of the reasons (aside from economic barriers) as to why Honduras does not have access to proper waste management services. More specifically, as can be seen in Figure 1, the number of sanitary landfills in Honduras are few and sparse. Only large cities like Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sulla have trash disposal infrastructure, but even then, there are many issues in sanitation and proper waste disposal.7 A report by the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) estimates that 28% of household solid waste is collected in urban areas and only 3.69% of this waste is sent to a

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Republic of Honduras. Acuerdo Ejecutivo Numero 1567-2010. http://www.cnpmlhonduras.org/doc/Reglamento_para_el_manejo_integral_de_residuos_solidos.pdf 7

R. Lopez; A. Padilla. Presentaciรณn Manejo de Residuos Sรณlidos en Honduras. 2007. http://www.academia.edu/14239676/Manejo_de_los_Residuos_S%C3%B3lidosen_Honduras

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sanitary landfill for proper disposal in urban areas4. Therefore, the presence of landfills and infrastructure in urban areas does not necessarily ensure the proper disposal of solid waste.

The Importance of the Environment in Honduras With 39.2% of the labor force relying on agriculture, Honduras depends much of its economic stability and nutritional sustenance on the health of the environment.8 From 2013 to 2016, Honduras faced mass deforestation due to a weevil infestation that infected 400,000 hectares of forested land.9 As a result of such devastation and an increase in soil erosion and widespread dishabituation of animals, the Honduran government declared a national emergency. However, such wreckage has led local governments and fellow citizens of Intibucá and other Honduran departments to become more aware of the environment and take action.

Introduction What is Considered Solid Waste?

According to the Honduran Health Code, solid waste is defined as the putrescible waste that results from preparation and consumption as well as the non-putrescible waste which is formed by substances, fuels and non-fuels.10 Therefore, solid waste in this research paper will thus be considered primarily as plastic, paper, metal, glass, and organic waste.

Research Locations There were three sites of interest in this study: two rural villages (San Juan de Dios and El Rosario) and one urban town (Camasca). These locations were chosen for the presence, or lack thereof, of urbanization. El Rosario (approximate population: 232) and San Juan de Dios (approximate population: 300) are rural communities with houses that are spread out across a wide span of sloping and forested land. Both rural sites are significantly more impoverished than

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Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. Central America and Caribbean: Honduras. Last Updated 2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ho.html 9 Karen Graham. “Honduras has 'ecological catastrophe' with Southern pine beetle.” Digital Journal.

2015. http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/environment/honduras-has-ecological-catastrophe-withsouthern-pine-beetle/article/451231 10

Código de Salud. Corte Suprema de Justicia. República de Honduras. Articulo 51, Decreto 65-91.

1996. http://portalunico.iaip.gob.hn/Archivos/SecretariadeSalud/Regulaciones(normativa)/Leyes/2015/codigode salud.pdf

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the urban site, Camasca (approximate population: 1,038). However, in comparison to San Juan de Dios, El Rosario is more impoverished and smaller in size and population.11 Methods In this study, 56 subjects in rural and urban settings were interviewed in order to understand solid waste management and environmental attitudes in the community. Of these 56, 29 people were interviewed from two rural villages: El Rosario and San Juan de Dios. The remaining 27 people were interviewed in Camasca, a small but relatively urban town close to El Rosario. Each interview was conducted going house-to-house and took about five minutes to complete. Open answers were consciously limited by providing specific multiple-choice answers in order to increase the reproducibility of this study. A similar waste management study was conducted in rural Honduras in 2016 which showed the different solid waste practices in a rural community.12 The study served as an important foundation in highlighting the waste management problems in rural Honduras and helped to craft which common solid waste disposal methods to look into: burning, burying, and selling. Open dumping, composting and property disposal were later added to the questionnaire in response to the answers from the subjects. In response to the results of this study, an educational component was also introduced in order to involve the local community and encourage environmental preventive action.

Instituto Nacional de Estadística Honduras. “Honduras: Intibucá”. Cited from CityPopulation. 2016. https://www.citypopulation.de/php/honduras-intibuca.php 12 H.A. Burrell; K. Song; D.A. Clements. “A Qualitative Survey of Trash Disposal in Rural Honduran Communities”. Journal of Public Health in Developing Countries. Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 291-296. 2016.

11

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A

B

Figure 2. Solid waste disposal methods in urban (A) and rural (B) settings. Based on the number of people interviewed, each column represents the type of solid waste, while the vertical axis shows the percentage of people who typically burn/bury/etc. the corresponding type of solid waste.

Results Urban setting: Camasca There were 27 people who were interviewed in Camasca. Of these 27, 54% thought there was more trash on the streets in the past 5 years, and 46% thought there was less trash. Additionally, 85.2% of people felt that trash disposal in their community was a recurring problem due to the fact that there were very limited resources to deal with all of the waste. 57.9% of people said their primary concern with the mismanagement of solid waste was problems in sanitation and the accumulation of trash. 88.0% of people said that the majority of litter they saw on the streets was plastic, while 12.0% said the main type of litter they saw most often was organic waste. As well, 65.2% of people said that the majority of solid waste they produced at home was plastic, while 34.8% said they produced organic waste the most.

Solid waste disposal results showed that 77.8% of people interviewed burned all of their plastic in their homes, while 22.2% threw their plastic waste into the open dumping site (see Figure 3).

For paper waste, 70.4% also burned this type of garbage and 29.6% threw their papers in the open dumping site. For glass, 57.7% of people buried their glass, 34.6% threw their glass in the

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open dumping site and 7.7% of people burned their glass. For metal waste, 43.5% of people threw their metal garbage in the open dumping site, 34.8% sold it to a metal collector for a very small amount of money, 17.4% of people buried their metals and 4.3% burned this type of trash.

For organic waste, 37.0% of people threw their organic waste into the open dumping site, 25.9% threw this waste outside on their property, 22.2% composted their organic waste, 11.1% buried their organic waste, and 3.7% of people burned their organics. As well, the number of “sacos� or sacs (roughly the size of a large 35-gallon garbage bag) of plastic waste was, on average, 0.66 per week (see Figure 4).

Rural Settings: San Juan de Dio and El Rosario There were 29 people who were interviewed in the two rural villages, San Juan de Dios and El Rosario. Of these 29, 81.5% of villagers thought there was less trash on the streets in the past 5 years, and 18.5% thought there was more trash. Furthermore, 92.9% of people felt that trash disposal in their community was a recurring problem, while 7.1% disagreed. 76.0% of people said their primary concern with the mismanagement of solid waste was the spread of mosquitos that could then infect the community with diseases. As well, 92.6% of people said that the majority of litter they saw on the street was plastic, while 7.4% said organic waste was the main source of litter. 55.6% of people said that the majority of solid waste they produced at home was organic waste, while 44.4% said they produced more plastic.

Solid waste disposal results showed that 86.2% of people interviewed burned their plastic waste, while 13.8% threw their plastics into the open dumping site. For paper waste, 89.7% burned this

Figure 3. The open dumping site situated between Camasca and El Rosario. July 2017.

As seen in the photograph, most of the waste is plastic or cardboard.

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type of garbage, 6.9% threw their paper waste outside on their property, and 3.4% buried their paper. For glass, 79.3% of people buried their glass, 17.3% threw their glass waste outside and on their property, and 3.4% of people burned their glass. For metal waste, 51.7% of people sold their metal to a collector, 34.5% of people buried their metals, 6.9% burned this type of trash and another 6.9% threw their glass on top of their property outside. For organic waste, 58.6 % of people threw their organic waste outside on their property, 24.1% burned their organics, and 17.3% composted their organic waste. Furthermore, on average, the number of “sacos” of plastic waste was 0.34 per week (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. The average number of garbage sacs or “sacos” (roughly the size of a large 35-gallon garbage bag) produced in one week. Note: the data for this graph was based on the verbal approximations of the respondent and are more relative than quantitatively accurate.

Discussion Sentiments on Trash Control Urban Setting Camasca Due to the fact that Camasca has a much more urbanized setting, there are higher risks of waste accumulation and improper management of solid waste. As a result, the mayor of Camasca has introduced efforts to help clean up the town, including the implementation of a garbage truck service and the positioning of communal trashcans near the town’s center. Such efforts have

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shown to be effective in mitigating littering in the streets. In response, there were fewer people in Camasca who thought trash disposal was a problem in their community. However, these new services were only available for homes near the town’s center. The farther away people lived from the heart of the town, the more of a problem trash disposal became. Many people who lived in the outermost parts of Camasca expressed their wishes for the services near the town center to also be available for those who lived farther away in order to prevent litter from building up. In addition, the main concern with many Camascans about improper waste management was sanitation and the accumulation of trash.

Rural Setting: San Juan de Dios and El Rosario

Figure 5. A Venn diagram comparing the similarities and differences between rural and urban sentiments on trash control, littering and waste disposal.

El Rosario and San Juan de Dios are more impoverished than Camasca and as a result the people in these villages produce less garbage from their reduced spending on goods. The houses in these villages are also more spread out leading people to burn or bury their garbage as opposed to throwing their waste in the open dumping site. In these rural villages, more people considered trash to be a problem in their communities than did Camascans. This could be due to the fact that the local governments in these areas may find it more difficult to provide services to villages 52

with homes that are situated far apart from one another. Therefore, in these communities, the biggest fear behind improper waste management was the attraction of mosquitos that led to the spread of vector-borne diseases like Zika, dengue and chikungunya. As a result, people were much more aware of the presence of waste near their homes and considered garbage a problem in their communities.

Littering Urban Setting: Camasca Most houses in Camasca are located on the main street where transportation is facilitated by a primary cobbled road. Such facilitated transportation has led Camasca to bring many packaged goods like “churros” (chips) and “fresco” (carbonated drinks) into many stores. This increase in access to quick packaged imports has facilitated the production of litter on the streets in the form of empty plastic bottles and wrappers. Majority of this litter is plastic and is what many Camascans consider to be the primary source of litter in their community. Additionally, the presence of roads has allowed for many public transit buses to drive through. As a result, Camasca has many visitors, especially during the weekends, from the nearby villages that increase the amount of litter on the streets. In response, the schools in Camasca typically hold “campañas de limpieza” or cleaning campaigns, where children and teachers take time from school to pick up litter around the town once a month.

Rural Setting: San Juan de Dios and El Rosario Similar to Camasca, both rural villages see plastic as the primary source of litter. However, in both villages the lack of major road access has inhibited large imports of plastic goods into these villages. Nevertheless, plastic litter results from the small number of “pulperias” or convenience stores present near the outskirts of the villages. Additionally, in both villages, there were no garbage truck services or public trashcans organized by the local government due to economic and geographic barriers. However, there were organized “campañas de limpieza” (cleaning campaigns) that were organized by the local government and schools to clean up the existing litter near pathways and roads. Depending on where the person lived, the cleaning campaigns took place as often as once a week or as little as once every month. Women and sometimes children were the main correspondents to the clean-up of litter.

Solid Waste Disposal Urban Setting: Camasca

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Camasca and El Rosario share an open dumping site about a ten-minute walk from Camasca (See Figure 3). This is the location where the town center’s garbage truck service disposes of the waste that was collected and where many Camascans bring their trash. Due to the presence of this open dumping site, many Camascans have utilized this site to conveniently throw out most their garbage. Despite this, the results show that majority of people burned their plastic and paper. As well, Camascans typically buried their glass near their property while a minority threw their glass in the open dumping site. With metal, many people either threw their metal in the open dumping site or sold the metal to a collector. In Camasca, homes produced an average of 0.322 more garbage sacs of plastic per week than homes from the rural villages. This may due to the fact that Camasca has more stores and thus receives more goods from other towns than the villages. As well, comparatively, Camasca is more economically well-off than the rural villages and thus more families can afford to purchase imported plastic goods.

Rural Settings The dumping site in Camasca is farther away from El Rosario and as a result, there are significantly less people who use this open dumping site on a weekly basis. Despite this, some El Rosario neighbors who live nearby and own cars typically set up ways in which to help others bring their garbage to the open dumping site in Camasca once a month. Nevertheless, this service is not as consistent and more inconvenient. In San Juan de Dios, which is situated much farther away from the open dumping site than El Rosario, none of the people who were interviewed went to the open dumping site to dispose of their garbage. This can be seen by the lack of responses for open dumping in the data for the rural villages. Additionally, the results seen in the rural settings are consistent with those found from Burrell et al. 2016. On average, people living

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Figure 6. Incomplete burning of plastic and paper near El Rosario. July 2017. It is common to find piles like these where more plastic and paper were added when the fire was too weak. As seen from the image, the waste does not completely disappear even once subjected to fire. in these villages typically burned their plastic and their paper. With glass, majority of people buried this waste while for metal it was either sold or buried. Organic waste was thrown out on property by a majority of subjects and burned by a smaller number of people.

Potential Impacts from Current Waste Disposal Methods Burning and Burying: Environmental Impacts Although burning waste may sound like a successful method to dispose of waste, it can be inefficient and harmful for the environment if not done correctly and managed properly (see Figure 6). Even once a large enough fire is made, a large pile of waste will not turn into ashes.

Instead, the waste will turn black and keep some of its original shape as shown in Figure 6.

Additionally, these fires contribute to air contamination which further increases the total amount of air pollution in the area. Similarly, burying plastic, glass and metal can be harmful to the environment as these substances are non-biodegradable and will take a long time to break down.

Unfortunately, burying waste is the only option for many people and thus is the reason this practice has persisted.

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Burning and Burying: Health Impacts: Inhaling smoke has been proven to cause cancer and respiratory problems.13 Burning plastic is especially harmful in that doing so can release organochlorine-based substances that are toxic to human beings.14 However, given that these fires occur outside of the home, it is not as common to see people with respiratory problems from burning waste alone. In contrast, burying waste does not appear to be a large health concern since most of the waste is placed underneath the ground and depending on how deep the waste was buried, the contents rarely re-emerge with heavy rain or other disturbances.

Open Dumping: Environmental and Health Impacts: As with many developing countries, proper trash disposal is difficult to accomplish without any environmental infrastructure in place. The open dumping site near Camasca is of concern and may develop into a serious environmental and health concern down the road. An open dumping site is different from a landfill in that it is not managed by workers nor does it have a landfill liner to prevent any leachate from seeping through the soil.15 When the site accumulates too much waste, it is a common practice to light the site on fire and continue to add more waste once the fire has died out. Such large fires are difficult to control and contribute to air pollution.

Additionally, these fires do nothing to prevent the contaminated leachate from reaching freshwater reserves for humans and animals. Without any precautions in place to prevent such contamination, the presence of this open dumping site can lead to environmental and health

Manitoba Health. “Smoke Exposure from Wildland Fires.” Interim Guidelines for Protecting Community Health and Wellbeing. 2012. https://www.gov.mb.ca/health/publichealth/environmentalhealth/docs/wildlandfiresmokeexposure.pdf 13

“Dangerous Health Effects of Home Burning of Plastics and Waste.” Women in Europe for a Common Future. N.d. www.wecf.org 15 “Decision-Makers' Guide to Solid Waste Management, 2nd Edition.” National Service Center for Environmental Publications (NSCEP). 1995. https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/10000VWJ.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&Index= 1995+Thru+1999&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&Toc Entry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&Xml Query=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIndex%20Data%5C95thru99%5CTxt%5C00000000%5C10000V WJ.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=h%7C&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i425&Display=h pfr&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&Maxim umPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL 14

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hazards. Future projects should take into account this site and encourage economic and physical construction from the government or large businesses.

Suggested Method for Managing Solid Waste: An Educational Approach Having examined the environmental and health effects of burning, burying, and open dumping, the most environmentally-friendly methods for managing solid waste is one of the simplest: reducing, composting and recycling. However, due to the lack of resources available, recycling may not be a feasible option for the current state of these municipalities. Nevertheless, reduction and composting remain achievable. By reducing the amount of plastic, or other nonbiodegradable substances in each household, there is a chance that the environmental and health effects of the accumulation of trash may be delayed. Once plastic has been made, it takes 450 years to break down.16 Therefore, reducing the amount of plastic waste production is key in order to prevent such accumulation.

However, once plastic waste has built up, what can be done? The second portion of this study was used to answer this question for the members of the communities visited. The goal was to educate populations in Camasca, El Rosario and San Juan de Dios on how to reduce, reuse and compost trash. Once the waste was accumulated, the second most effective way in which to manage this “trash” was to first classify it and reuse it. Efforts were made to teach women and men in public areas and children in schools how to decorate rooms with plastic containers, water plants, make piggybanks, and even how to make a broom from plastic liter bottles. Additionally, proper composting was explained to show how nutrient-rich fertilizer can be made from organic waste. Many were encouraged to at least wash and compress plastic bottles before throwing them in the open dump if no other options were available.

The educational component to this project was the most beneficial to the community as people were given the chance to ask questions on existing environmental and health issues. They were also able to actively interact with “trash” to give it another life. Future projects should strive to

U.S. National Park Service. “Approximate Time it Takes for Garbage to Decompose in the Environment.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Marine Debris Program. N.d. https://www.des.nh.gov/organization/divisions/water/wmb/coastal/trash/documents/marine_debris.pdf 16

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engage more with the community, particularly with the youth in schools, to show how trash can be useful and even economically friendly given the right amount of creativity.

Limitations of This Study This study was based on a verbal questionnaire that relies on the accuracy of the subjects’ responses. Given the nature of the survey, the choices listed may not have been accurate descriptions of the subject’s actual practices and instead may be approximations. As well, although random sampling was used, the sample size of this study was 56 indicating that the results of this study cannot be generalizable to entire communities.

Conclusion Honduras is a country with much potential and growing possibilities. Although there are environmental legislative shortcomings and a steady accumulation in the number of waste from packaged imported goods, there is much that can be done on an individual and local level to help reduce environmental and health consequences. However, as globalization and imports continue to escalate, it is with great haste that these consequences be addressed. The analysis between rural and urban settings has shown an increase in the amount of plastic waste in urban areas and the use of open dumping when convenient. Such practices are environmentally unsustainable and hence education and awareness about these issues should be continued. Thus, even without economic resources, preventive and educational methods in the reusability and the reduction of plastic waste are effective ways in which local citizens can make a difference in their communities.

Acknowledgements The towns and villages visited in this study show great potential for future projects in education and youth empowerment with environmental opportunities. In such impoverished places, one of the most accessible resources is trash. If people are able to work in tandem with the government, NGOs, or businesses to build recycling stations or other environmentally-friendly infrastructure for the proper disposal of solid waste, such an abundant yet seemingly useless resource may have a chance at becoming one of the most valuable, environmental and health-friendly assets communities have to offer.

Special thanks to Paul and Laura Manship from Shoulder to Shoulder, the NGO that made this whole study possible, and to Dr. Dennis Clements for his mentorship and guidance.

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Bibliography Burrell, HA; Song, K; Clements, DA. “A Qualitative Survey of Trash Disposal in Rural Honduran Communities”. Journal of Public Health in Developing Countries. Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 291-296. 2016.

Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. Central America and Caribbean: Honduras.

Last Updated 2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ho.html Código de Salud. Corte Suprema de Justicia. República de Honduras. Articulo 51, Decreto 6591. 1996. http://portalunico.iaip.gob.hn/Archivos/SecretariadeSalud/Regulaciones(normativa)/Leye s/2015/codigodesalud.pdf “Dangerous Health Effects of Home Burning of Plastics and Waste.” Women in Europe for a Common Future. N.d. www.wecf.org “Decision-Makers' Guide to Solid Waste Management, 2nd Edition.” National Service Center for Environmental Publications (NSCEP). 1995. https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/10000VWJ.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Clien t=EPA&Index=1995+Thru+1999&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod =1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFiel dDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIn dex%20Data%5C95thru99%5CTxt%5C00000000%5C10000VWJ.txt&User=ANONYM OUS&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=h%7C&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i 425&Display=hpfr&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&Bac kDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL Graham, Karen. “Honduras has 'ecological catastrophe' with Southern pine beetle.” Digital Journal. 2015. http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/environment/honduras-hasecological-catastrophe-with-southern-pine-beetle/article/451231 Instituto Nacional de Estadística Honduras. “Honduras: Intibucá”. Cited from CityPopulation.

2016. https://www.citypopulation.de/php/honduras-intibuca.php Lopez, R. & Padilla, A. Presentation Manejo de Residuos Sólidos en Honduras. 2007. http://www.academia.edu/14239676/Manejo_de_los_Residuos_S%C3%B3lidosen_Hond uras Lu, Mercedes; Chernaik, Mark; Weiskel, Heidi. “Ocean Waste in the Gulf of Honduras: Where it goes and what to do about it”. Elaw. 2013. https://www.elaw.org/system/files/ELAW_Solid_Waste_and_Transport_Report.pdf Manitoba Health. “Smoke Exposure from Wildland Fires.” Interim Guidelines for Protecting Community Health and Wellbeing. 2012. https://www.gov.mb.ca/health/publichealth/environmentalhealth/docs/wildlandfiresmoke exposure.pdf Office of the United States Trade Representative. “Honduras”. 2015. https://ustr.gov/countriesregions/americas/honduras Office of the United States Trade Representative. “U.S. Trade with the CAFTA-DR Countries”.

2007.

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https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset _upload_file601_13191.pdf Republic of Honduras. Acuerdo Ejecutivo Numero 1567-2010. http://www.cnpmlhonduras.org/doc/Reglamento_para_el_manejo_integral_de_residuos_solidos.pdf Republic of Honduras. Constitution of the Republic of Honduras: Decree No. 131. 1982. http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/Honduras.pdf Sullivan, Mark P. “Honduras: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations” CRS Report for Congress. 2006. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a461337.pdf U.S. National Park Service. “Approximate Time it Takes for Garbage to Decompose in the Environment.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Marine Debris Program. N.d. https://www.des.nh.gov/organization/divisions/water/wmb/coastal/trash/documents/marin e_debris.pdf

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Evonomics: Evo Morales’s Bolivian Strategy Noah Martin Noah Martin is an undergraduate at Duke University studying Economics and International Comparative Studies, with a concentration in Latin America and the Caribbean. He has also studied at University College London and the University of Buenos Aires. He is particularly interested in the political economies of countries underreported by the US media and plans to continue studying emerging markets.

Bolivia’s economy, for many years, followed the general Latin American trend: countries export raw materials until a world economic recession reduces global demand, and this plunge in demand for raw materials among developed nations sends the Latin American exporters into a financial crisis. More notable among these typical Latin American economic trends, however, has been a pattern of accepting loans to invest in production, and ultimately defaulting on these loans when interest rates suddenly spike. This cyclical set of economic responses has created stagnant Latin American economies, which then struggle to adjust to an environment with little investment. Although Bolivia carries a significant debt and remains only one of four Latin American Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), since 2006, a new Bolivian player in the political game scrapped the unregulated market approach to economic development. Evo Morales, the first indigenous president of Bolivia and the staunch socialist leader of the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) party, has adopted a hybrid private/statist approach to alleviate Bolivia’s problems. Morales has been highly critical of Western-style policies, including those in the Washington Consensus, such as privatizing state enterprises and allowing for high levels of deregulation. While many past leaders of the country have been wealthy, fiscally-conservative governors, Morales has billed himself as a man of the people, looking to use all that Bolivia has to offer for the good of its citizens. While political economists have criticized Morales’s economic policies as socialist and unorthodox, his economic plans have

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been more effective in supporting Bolivian growth than previously-attempted free market policies. Morales has ushered in new levels of economic prosperity and stability in Bolivia, and has advocated for the modernization of institutions and the development of specifically Bolivian specialization and expertise.

When Morales was elected in 2006, Bolivia was entrenched in a decades-long debt crisis and years of social unrest. Like other Latin American countries, Bolivia in the 1970s and 1980s had pursued policies of unregulated investment. Bolivia received a major economic shock when the international price of tin fell from $6.00 per pound to $3.50 per pound between 1982 and 1985, decreasing income and tax revenue for the country. Bolivia’s debt service requirements rose from 0.4% of GDP in 1979 to 10.8% in 1983, which cut off the country from access to foreign funding. To curb the instability, the Bolivian government pegged the exchange rate to the dollar, but this caused the currency to be overvalued and increased the amount of black market exportation. Moreover, because this exportation was not taxed by the government, the state saw a decline of potential government revenue. To stop the hyperinflation, President Paz Estenssoro announced in 1985 that state-led development was finished and that measures such as a devaluation of the currency would be implemented. While these measures controlled inflation, GDP levels did not reach their 1982 levels again until 1994, effectively robbing Bolivia of more than a decade of growth.1 In the 1990s, Bolivia embraced unfettered market activity, just as other Latin American nations had done previously. These policies were characterized mainly by mass privatization of economic and social sectors. This often involved multinational corporations buying portions of South American industries, only to funnel the resources right back to their own countries and shareholders, with little long-term benefits for the host country. This period of traditional

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Western economic policy proved to stymie, not boost, Bolivia’s economic growth. The subsequent period was defined by even more extreme neoliberal measures, which in turn failed to produce growth. Mystifyingly, Bolivia “failed to thrive” under IMF- and IADB-led economic restructuring.

Take two failures of the privatization of Bolivian public sectors between 1995 and 2005: the water supply and sanitation department, and the natural gas industry. Although water does not seem like a logical candidate to move from the public to the private sector, the World Bank and the International Development Bank emphasized to the Bolivian government that the country would not receive state loans unless it privatized its water department. 2 The privatization of the Cochabamba water system led to increased prices for water, resulting in a 2% increase in poverty. The policy was quickly reversed, but people remained outraged by this government action. The deregulation of the country’s natural gas industry and the exploitation of its massive reserves followed a similar pattern. An industry that had previously provided a source of government income was now being siphoned off to benefit foreign corporations. Bolivians, especially indigenous people, were angered at the selling out of the country’s resources, sparking more protest.3 Evo Morales emerged during these years as a vocal indigenous critic of the country's economic policies. In addition to leading protests against the privatization of the water supply and gas industries, he supported protecting the livelihoods of indigenous coca growers, many of whom faced hardship as the government sought to comply with international regulations against coca production.4 To placate those nations critical of coca growth, Morales has advocated the motto “Yes to coca, no to cocaine” to emphasize his belief that coca is vital for more than just drug production. His fight made him extremely popular with the farming and indigenous

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populations of Bolivia, and his support of the maintenance of the coca industry has provided jobs for many lower income and farming workers.5 Public outcry increased as the protests were met with violence, resulting in the death of 70 civilians.6 Ultimately, both his stance on coca and the “gas war” contributed to Evo Morales’s elevated public stature and provided him the popularity and publicity that he leveraged in a successful presidential campaign.

As a populist president elected on a platform of land reform and the redistribution of gas wealth, Morales pursued a hybrid private/statist approach to fixing the nation’s problems.

Popular frustration had lingered for many years as growth stagnated due to the failure of neoliberal economic policies, and Bolivians saw an opportunity for change under the leadership of the MAS party. Morales believed that the existing political order had “only brought hunger and misery, plundering and privatization,” and, when elected in 2006, quickly began to nationalize many of the country’s formerly-privatized industries.7 As Cunha Filho et al argue, Morales focused on four objectives targeting societal change.8 He focused on dignity, attempting to empower Bolivians with public services and other inequality reversing policies; democracy, emphasizing what Morales saw as Bolivia’s derided and undervalued multicultural roots; productivity, a change in the economic structure of the country to create a more equal distribution of wealth; and sovereignty, the movement for Bolivia to make its own decisions and act in its own self-interest.9 Within the first three years of being elected, Morales had begun his comparatively-statist approach to jumpstarting Bolivia’s economy. He nationalized the gas and mining industries, as well as the country’s pension program, transferring much of the control of these industries from foreign firms to government-controlled organizations. Morales’s model was not to reject outright all forms of foreign investment, but rather to allow specific investment in an industry while

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controlling the industry’s resource management through a state company. While the hydrocarbon industry, for instance, still turns to private companies for its capital and heavily relies on direct foreign investment, the state company, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), controls the inner workings of the natural gas industry and maintains the bulk of the profits to benefit the government and, by extension, the people.10 The state mining company, COMIBOL, likewise, has revamped the mining industry in Bolivia.11 Rather than ceding total control to foreign investment or running all aspects of the business itself, the mining industry involves many partnerships with foreign companies both public and private, such as the South Korean and Indian state mining companies and relies relatively heavily on foreign direct investment. These partnerships not ameliorated entirely the sub-par working conditions, which continue to endanger miners, its low salaries, and its reliance on youth labor. Interestingly, there have been no full nationalizations in the electricity industry, which remains dominated by private corporations, with half the stock still controlled by the government.12 Bolivia’s partial nationalization of the electricity industry puts the country at an advantage since it permits foreign direct investment in the industry. Morales has taken the middle road between privatization and complete state ownership with respect to the electricity industry. In March of 2017, for example, Japan signed a loan agreement with Bolivia to provide funds for the country’s first geothermal energy project.13 Through these foreign joint efforts and partial state ownership of this industry, the government has increased access to electricity of people living in remote areas by 14% and continues to move towards a more stable electricity supply.14 The industries supported by foreign investment are still vulnerable to potential political corruption and manipulation by multinational corporations.

Yet, Morales has addressed his four areas of priority – dignity, democracy, productivity, and

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sovereignty – by working to receive foreign investment but simultaneously protecting the financial interests of the country and its people.

Morales has used his government’s increased revenue to bolster social programs within Bolivia. Arguably, one of Morales’s greatest achievements has been his land redistribution initiative, which has transferred 20 million hectares of unused land to underdeveloped farming communities.15 In addition, he has subsidized the distribution of tractors to many farming villages. His reformed taxation policy increased taxes on the remaining private energy companies, increasing production tax revenues from 50% to 82%. The increased tax revenue has been used to benefit the people of Bolivia by implementing more advanced social programs.

Pensions were increased 33%, and the receiving age of pensions dropped from 65 to 60 under the “Renta Dignidad” program. Evo also started a Conditional Cash Transfer program called “Juancito Pinto” to incentivize families with school-age children to send their children to primary and middle school.16 Highway construction has increased rapidly during Morales’s presidency as well, facilitating transport between the capital of La Paz and some of the more remote Amazon provinces. By putting money back into infrastructure programs such as education and highways, Morales has shown that he is invested in the economic future, as well as the economic present.

One important piece of Bolivia’s economic picture is Morales’s support of the coca industry, a practice frowned upon by both the European Union and the United States.17 Morales has differed from his predecessors by supporting small scale production of coca, the most profitable of Bolivia’s agricultural products.18 This policy is extremely controversial, as coca is the raw material and a main ingredient in the production of the illegal drug, cocaine; the U.S. and Bolivian governments have frequently worked together to try to eradicate the growth of the

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plant, especially as part of the America’s War on Drugs.19 Morales, in turn, has waged a fullscale war against these institutions, refusing to let them gut the coca industry, since he believes that the plant has inherent value aside from its drug production uses. The coca industry employs thousands of Bolivians, especially indigenous, low income families that rely on the plant’s cultivation for a living. As coca is a valuable agricultural product, its production and sale by small scale farmers helps to decrease wealth inequality within Bolivia. Growing up in a small village as a coca grower himself, Morales views the coca industry as not only an important source of income for many farming communities or as an ingredient for economic success, but as an important element of indigenous Bolivian culture that should not be inhibited. As recently as March 2017, Bolivia passed legislation to expand the legal area in which coca can be grown even further.20 There is, however, an unavoidable tension between supporting small-scale coca farmers and fighting the production and distribution of cocaine, which has been historically fraught. Morales may also tacitly support Bolivian drug production as it provides more money for small farms and bolsters the GDP of the country. This is an uncomfortable stance criticized

by Bolivia’s trading partners.

The Morales-led Bolivian programs and governmental actions are far from an orthodox model for increasing economic growth. Western nations and organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have continued to advocate for neoliberal Washington Consensus policies, such as the privatization of most industries and the opening of the ownership of these industries to foreign investors. While not all economists advocate for such free market policies, statist programs such as Morales’s are also unpopular with many economists since these types of policies have historically caused countries to experience economic contraction. The success of Morales’s programs, however, has surprised most economic analysts. According to

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Flores-Macías in After Neoliberalism, government spending “was the sole indicator in which the Morales administration adhered to market cannons”.21 In all his other indicators–privatization and nationalization, taxation, trade/financial/monetary liberalization, and poverty alleviation– Morales elected to enact policies perceived to be statist. Even though his government spending in a time of recession has been largely successful, a country with such major debt problems would also need to be wary of a too-significant increase in spending. Contrary to expectations, Morales’s policies have managed to build a fiscal surplus after many years of severe fiscal deficits. Per capita GDP has gone from $1200 at the beginning of his presidency to almost $3200 in 2014, with an average growth rate of 3% per year.22 In addition, Bolivia’s foreign reserves quadrupled as a percentage of GDP from 2003 to 2013.23 Bolivia has the highest percentage of Foreign Direct Investment in South America, and both poverty and extreme poverty decreased by around 15% each from 2005 to 2011. Income inequality has also decreased during Morales’s presidency due to large increases in the minimum wage.

Evo Morales has proved that it is possible to leverage relatively statist policies, rather than entirely unregulated market policies, to bring a developing nation’s economy out of recession. Through the implementation of policies that allow the state to direct some of Bolivia’s most profitable industries, he has taken back financial control and has brought more wealth than ever into the Bolivian economy. Rather than thumbing his nose at foreign investors, Morales has selectively embraced foreign money in service of national industries and infrastructure. FloresMacías is correct to point out that Bolivia’s privatizations and nationalizations follow a generally statist trend. Yet, if we look more specifically at each industry, we see that Morales has allowed foreign companies, both public and private, to invest heavily. These policies protect Bolivian interests at home while providing an influx of foreign money that boosts the industries far faster

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than solely domestic investment. While many free market approaches result in increased wealth inequality, Bolivia’s comparatively statist approach and subsequent recovery has increased the wealth of lower income families. Cunha Filho et al would argue that Morales’s policies are inherently democratic, but a sharper critique would focus on his apparent disdain for the democratic process, including his increase of the presidential term limit, his use of the judiciary to remove opposition leaders,24 and his planned re-election campaign, despite constitutional mandates.25 While Morales’s economic policies have produced significant growth in the short run, we have yet to see if this speed of growth and partnership with foreign countries are sustainable in the long run and whether overstimulation will result in economic contraction.

Despite these valid criticisms, Morales’s policies have garnered widespread benefits to the Bolivian economy, increasing tax revenue for the government and simultaneously providing Bolivians with higher standards of living and economic opportunities.

1.

Franko, Patrice M. 2007. The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 128.

2.

Gordon, Frederick D. 2008. “Freshwater Resources and Interstate Cooperation: Strategies to Mitigated and Environmental Risk.” 2008.

3.

Gordon, Frederick D. 2008. “Freshwater Resources and Interstate Cooperation: Strategies to Mitigate an Environmental Risk.” 2008.

4.

Garcia Linera, Alvaro. 2006. “State Crisis and Popular Power.” New Left Review, II, no. 37, 76.

5.

Forero, Juan. 2006. “Bolivia’s Knot: No to Cocaine, but Yes to Coca.” The New York Times, February 12, 2006, sec. Americas.

6.

Calloni, Stella. 200. “Una historia de saqueos y lucha.” La Jornada. Accessed February 5, 2018.

7.

Flores-Macias, G., and American Council of Learned Societies. 2012. After Neoliberalism: The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America. ACLS Humanities E-Book. Oxford University Press. 130.

8.

Filho, Clayton Mendonça Cunha and Rodrigo Santaella Gonçalves. 2010. “The National Development Plan as a Political Economic Strategy in Evo Morales’s Bolivia: Accomplishments and Limitations.” Latin American Perspectives 37 (4), 180 9.

Ibid., 180-184 10 . Ibid., 184 11.

Ibid., 185 12.

Ibid., 186 69

JICA. 2017. “Signing of Japanese ODA Loan Agreement with Bolivia: Supporting the First Geothermal Power Generation Project in Bolivia toward a Stable Power Supply | Press Releases | News & Features | JICA.” n.d.

14.

Filho, Clayton Mendonça Cunha and Rodrigo Santaella Gonçalves. 2010. “The National Development Plan as a Political Economic Strategy in Evo Morales’s Bolivia: Accomplishments and Limitations.” Latin American Perspectives 37 (4), 186 15.

Flores-Macias, G., and American Council of Learned Societies. 2012. After Neoliberalism: The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America. ACLS Humanities E-Book. Oxford University Press, 40.

16.

Ibid.

17.

Bonello, Deborah. 2016. “UN Reports Small Decrease in Bolivia Coca Cultivation.” InSight Crime (blog). July 6, 2016.

18.

“Bolivia : A Country Study.” n.d. Online text. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. USA. 19.

Gutsch, Jochen-Martin. 2006. “South America’s New Hero: Indian, Coca Farmer, Bolivian President.” Spiegel Online, May 2, 2006, sec. International.

20 . Hond, Mareana. 2017. “Bolivia Approves New Bill Expanding Legal Coca Production.”

Accessed February 5, 2018.

21.

Flores-Macias, G., and American Council of Learned Societies. 2012. After Neoliberalism: The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America. ACLS Humanities E-Book. Oxford University Press, 243.

22.

World Bank. “GDP per Capita, PPP (Current International $) | Data.” n.d.

23.

Lefebvre, Jake Johnston and Stephan. 2014. “Bolivia’s Economy Under Evo in 10 Graphs.”

24.

Latin News. 2017. “Opposition Raises Familiar Complaints.” n.d.

25.

Buenos Aires Herald. “Bolivia’s Morales Mulls Run for Re-Election, Starting 2019 Race Early.”

13.

Bibliography “Bolivia: A Country Study.” n.d. Online text. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. USA. Accessed February 5, 2018. https://www.loc.gov/item/90026427/.

Hond, Mareana. 2017. “Bolivia Approves New Bill Expanding Legal Coca Production.”

Accessed February 5, 2018. http://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/03/boliviasapproves-bill-expanding-legal-coca-production-170309133216704.html.

Buenos Aires Herald. “Bolivia’s Morales Mulls Run for Re-Election, Starting 2019 Race Early.” n.d. Accessed February 5, 2018. http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/224163/.

Bonello, Deborah. 2016. “UN Reports Small Decrease in Bolivia Coca Cultivation.” InSight Crime (blog). July 6, 2016. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/bolivia-cocacultivation-drops-closer-to-legal-crop-allowance/.

Calloni, Stella. 200. “Una historia de saqueos y lucha.” La Jornada. Accessed February 5, 2018. http://www.jornada.com.mx/2003/10/18/036a1mun.php?origen=index.html&fly=2.

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Filho, Clayton Mendonça Cunha and Rodrigo Santaella Gonçalves. 2010. “The National Development Plan as a Political Economic Strategy in Evo Morales’s Bolivia: Accomplishments and Limitations.” Latin American Perspectives 37 (4): 177–96. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X10372513.

Flores-Macias, G. and American Council of Learned Societies. 2012. After Neoliberalism: The Left and Economic Reforms in Latin America. ACLS Humanities E-Book. Oxford University Press. https://books.google.com/books?id=x2SWAQAACAAJ. Forero, Juan. 2006. “Bolivia’s Knot: No to Cocaine, but Yes to Coca.” The New York Times, February 12, 2006, sec. Americas. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/12/world/americas/bolivias-knot-no-to-cocaine-butyes-to-coca.html.

Franko, Patrice M. 2007. The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Garcia Linera, Alvaro. 2006. “State Crisis and Popular Power.” New Left Review, II, no. 37: 73– 85.

Gordon, Frederick D. 2008. “Freshwater Resources and Interstate Cooperation : Strategies to Mitigate an Environmental Risk.” 2008. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10575846.

Gutsch, Jochen-Martin. 2006. “South America’s New Hero: Indian, Coca Farmer, Bolivian President.” Spiegel Online, May 2, 2006, sec. International. http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/south-america-s-new-hero-indian-cocafarmer-bolivian-president-a-414036.html.

JICA. 2017. “Signing of Japanese ODA Loan Agreement with Bolivia: Supporting the First Geothermal Power Generation Project in Bolivia toward a Stable Power Supply | Press Releases | News & Features | JICA.” n.d. Accessed February 5, 2018. https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2016/170327_02.html.

Latin News. 2017. “Opposition Raises Familiar Complaints.” n.d. Accessed February 5, 2018. https://www.latinnews.com/component/k2/item/71577.html?period=2017&archive=8066 09&Itemid=6&cat_id=806609:bolivia-opposition-raises-familiar-complaints.

Lefebvre, Jake Johnston and Stephan. 2014. “Bolivia’s Economy Under Evo in 10 Graphs.”

Accessed February 5, 2018. http://cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/bolivias-economyunder-evo-in-10-graphs.

Spronk, Susan. 2007. “Roots of Resistance to Urban Water Privatization in Bolivia: The ‘New Working Class,’ the Crisis of Neoliberalism, and Public Services.” International Labor and Working-Class History, no. 71: 8–28.

World Bank. “GDP per Capita, PPP (Current International $) | Data.” n.d. Accessed February 5, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=BO.

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Anti-Haitian Prejudice in the Dominican Republic Joan Mella Joan Mella is a student from the University of Toronto.

Abstract: Haiti and the Dominican Republic share the island of Hispaniola and a history of violence and cooperation. Works on Haitian-Dominican relations tend to emphasize instances of conflict between the two. This contributes to the perception that both countries are natural enemies, and that anti-Haitian prejudice among Dominicans is the inevitable result of a bloody past and incompatible cultures. I argue that anti-Haitianism is founded on historical distortions and an imagined Dominican national identity that highlights Hispanic values and suppresses Afro-Caribbean elements. An overview of the origins of anti-Haitian prejudice reveals racism and xenophobia against Haitians exist but are not universal in the Dominican Republic. This suggests anti-Haitian biases may one day lose influence, opening opportunities for improved relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

This paper delves into the origins of anti-Haitian sentiment among Dominicans to identify ways this prejudice can be undermined. I argue that Spain's colonial rule, the Haitian Occupation, and the initial nature of Haitian immigration have been purposefully distorted by scholars like Manuel A. Peña Batlle, Joaquín Balaguer and Antonio Sánchez Valverde. Their purpose is to portray events in a way that casts Haiti as an enemy of the Dominican Republic, and Haitians as a pernicious presence. Next, this paper identifies the regime of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo as a decisive period in spreading the ideology. Trujillo incorporated racism and xenophobia into governmental institutions and employed propaganda to transmit it. He also relied on intellectuals to reproduce anti-Haitianism in scholarly literature. These authors constructed a national identity that glorified Dominicans' Spanish heritage while neglecting their African roots, facilitating the imagining of Dominicans as almost purely white. This ideology fabricated by elites became entrenched in the minds of Dominicans from all social classes. Yet Afro-Caribbean elements, in the form of Dominican Vodou and folkloric celebrations are present in Dominican culture. A sizeable sector of Dominican society embraces its African heritage and is thus impermeable to the anti-Haitian discourse of elites and its racist undertones. The discontinuity between reality and anti-Haitian narrative suggests that it is possible for this ideology to be overturned. Anti-Haitianism does not doom Haiti and the Dominican Republic to confrontation because unapologetic accounts about Spain’s colonial rule, historical works that

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accurately portray Haitian-Dominican relations, and an emphasis on the common AfroCaribbean cultural legacy of both countries can, with time, destroy this racist ideology.

The Distorted Origins of Anti-Haitianism Colonialism: 1492-1821 Colonial authorities imagined the identity of the island's inhabitants as Hispanic and predominantly white. To portray a history that supports this view, conservative scholars idealized Spain's colonial rule. Pro-Spanish historical accounts attempt to encourage nonwhite segments of the Dominican Republic to adopt Spanish culture. In addition, clashes with France and Haiti are emphasized, portraying Spanish Santo Domingo as continuously threatened by the alien forces on the west of the island. Others have simply denied or downplayed African influence in the Spanish side of Hispaniola, characterizing Santo Domingo as European and Saint-Domingue and Haiti as African.

This view is evidenced in Manuel A. Peña Batlle's Historic Essays. Peña Batlle characterizes the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Santo Domingo as times of conflict against French smugglers, French buccaneers, France itself, and Haiti.1 The author construes the history of Santo Domingo as a struggle to preserve Hispanic culture against the western half of Hispaniola.2 This historic analysis is simplistic and rather inaccurate. It depicts Santo Domingo as a homogenous Hispanic and white community facing an external cultural and economic threat. His view overlooks the fact that the biggest problem of the people of Santo Domingo was not France but Madrid's neglect. From the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, contraband commerce benefitted the inhabitants of Santo Domingo and only hurt the Spanish crown and its representatives in the island. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Madrid focused investment in bullion-rich regions of its continental empire and in Cuba. Santo Domingo became economically stagnant, and Spain's influence in Hispaniola waned. Most of the population in Santo Domingo lived in the countryside, so the resource-starved colonial authorities that agglomerated in the capital had little control over its subjects.3 This period saw free racial mixture between whites and blacks, the peasantry's disregard of colonial authorities, and the coalescence of Spanish, African and to a lesser extent Taíno culture into a creole identity unique to Santo Domingo. Peña Batlle overlooks these nuances to depict an imagined Dominican nation

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whose values are almost purely Hispanic, and who have struggled to defend their Spanish heritage which has been "permanently threatened by Calvinist imperialism, by materialism [referring to the French] and by the basic Africanism of the Haitian social formation".4 In his historical account, the French and later the Haitians are a threat to what he considers Dominican national identity.

Peña Batlle also idealizes the legacy of colonialism under Spain to lend credibility to his characterization of national identity as Hispanic. The author argues that "caste problems did not exist nor life was made on inhuman forms of exploitation". He also claims that "the slaves of 1795 Santo Domingo did not struggle for their liberty, which they did not need, because they were not victims nor treated inhumanely".5 Peña Batlle turns a blind eye to the institution of racially justified slavery as a social problem. Slaves did enjoy better treatment in Santo Domingo than in Saint-Domingue, but his claim that they did not want emancipation is still baseless. In 1822, when Hispaniola was unified by the Haitian Occupation, the issue of slavery is precisely what made blacks and mulattos favor rule under Haiti rather than a European power, or even under an independent Dominican state governed by white elites.6 In addition, the author mentions only in passing the extermination of the Taínos after Colombus's arrival.

Anti-Haitianism is a racist ideology, so it seems curious it is accepted in a country that is predominantly nonwhite. For centuries, scholars have downplayed the African origins of Dominicans to claim European ancestry. Antonio Sánchez Valverde, an influential mulatto intellectual born in Santo Domingo, denominates the inhabitants of the colony as "IndoHispanics" in his 1785 book.7 By using this term Sánchez Valverde implies the population of Santo Domingo is a mixture between Spaniards and Taínos. His purpose is to hide the African heritage of his people. Sánchez Valverde could not claim the inhabitants of Santo Domingo are predominantly white because the falsehood of the statement would be obvious to anyone who visited the colony. Probably reasoning under the logic of a "hierarchy of race", he preferred to label creoles in Santo Domingo as Indo-Hispanic rather than Afro-Hispanic, even though the latter describes more accurately the ethnic composition of the colony. Many in the Dominican Republic have repeated Sánchez Valverde's refusal to acknowledge their ancestry, which facilitates the adoption of a national identity that emphasizes Hispanic values. Ignoring African elements and defining Dominicans as mostly Hispanic exaggerates differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which exacerbates xenophobia towards Haitians.

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JoaquĂ­n Balaguer goes further than SĂĄnchez Valverde by equating "race and nation".

Balaguer concludes that Haitians' "primitive" culture and reproductive patterns "similar to those of vegetable species" are a product of their race.8 Under his logic, Haitians practice Vodou because they descend from Africans. Dominicans practice Catholicism because they descend from Europeans. Balaguer presents Haiti as a threat to the cohesion of the Dominican nation. If culture is determined by race, the influx of blacks via Haitian immigration is inherently destructive to the Dominican Republic's Hispanic customs. According to Balaguer, coexistence of Dominicans and Haitians jeopardizes the cultural (and racial) integrity of the Dominican Republic, which makes the two peoples incompatible. His view lends to discrimination against Haitians, because they are perceived as racially inferior and as a mortal threat to Dominican nationhood. Balaguer also facilitates racial self-denial, because even black Dominicans can consider themselves "whiter" simply for being Catholic and speaking Spanish. By strengthening the perceived racial distinctions between Haitians and Dominicans, Balaguer creates an unbridgeable rift between Haiti and the Dominican Republic that is necessary for the production of an anti-Haitian narrative.

The Haitian Occupation In 1822, President Jean-Pierre Boyer and the Haitian army marched unchallenged into the city of Santo Domingo. Until 1844, Haiti controlled the entirety of Hispaniola. The occupation is usually portrayed as a decisive period in turning the two nations of the island into enemies. PeĂąa Batlle describes the occupation as "a denationalizing regime" in which Dominicans "suffered the empire of the horde, completely impermeable to sentiments of moral progress and spirituality".9 For him, the most significant aspect of the Haitian Occupation was the attack on Hispanic values.

Other historians focus on recounting the worst acts committed by Haitians during their rule.

According to Juan Bosch: The works of [traditional Dominican] historians leave the reader with the impression that the 22 years of Haitian rule in our country were years of savage unbearable crimes and outrages, of great suffering, poverty and looks at what first-hand witnesses said of the period, it

tyranny, of

ignorance. But when one

emerges that nothing happened in the

way that these historians would like one to believe.10 Historians that want to perpetuate the misconceptions regarding the Haitian Occupation emphasize the attitudes of nineteenth century Santo Domingo elites. The ruling minority of Santo

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Domingo lost the social and economic privileges that authority and elevated administrative positions confer. Boyer's land reform hurt wealthy land-owners and the Catholic Church because it redistributed parts of their territory among the destitute masses. Finally, being subjugated by a country comprised of blacks was intolerable for racist elites.11 The Haitian Occupation was certainly noxious for the wealthy and powerful of Santo Domingo. For most though, living under Haitian rule had significant benefits.

Boyer's first measure after integrating the island was to abolish slavery. The land reform the elite repudiated improved the economic situation of the poor. Because of this, black, mulatto, and peasant segments of the nation initially supported the occupation. Revisionist historians like Roberto Cassá and Frank Moya Pons contend that 1822 saw a humanitarian intervention rather than an invasion. In 1821, José Núñez de Cáceres declared Santo Domingo's independence from Spain. But his government was opposed by most in Santo Domingo because it maintained slavery. Local leaders throughout the nation invited Boyer to take over eastern Hispaniola and spare thousands from slavery.12 Eventually, dissatisfaction with the Haitian administrators became widespread. Imposition of French as the official language was not popular, and a global recession coupled with high taxes strained the economy. Nevertheless, the fact that initially most Dominicans embraced the intervention contradicts traditional conceptions of the period. For blacks and mulattos in Santo Domingo the Haitian Occupation was inclusive and progressive, not abusive and repressive. Traditional portrayals of Haitian rule are purposefully distorted to fuel animosity towards Haitians.

The Sugar Industry and Haitian Immigration In the Dominican Republic, discussion of Haitian-Dominican relations is inseparable from the topic of Haitian immigration. Due to prejudices, Haitian migrants and their Kreyòl language and Vodou religion are perceived as a problem for Dominican society. In addition, Haitian immigrants, particularly those living in the borderlands, preserve their traditions and language, causing fear that Haitians would destroy Dominican culture by flooding the country.

Hardcore nationalists continue to oppose immigration for xenophobic reasons, while the mainstream relies on arguments that may sound familiar, like "Haitians are stealing Dominicans' jobs" or "poor immigrants are prone to steal".

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But Haitian immigration, today as much as in the past, benefits economic elites that depend on low-wage labor. The first Haitian immigrants were recruited as seasonal workers —or braceros— by sugar cane plantations in the late nineteenth century. The sugar industry required workers that were obedient, resilient to hardship, and cheap. Dominicans had alternatives to the harsh conditions and low wages of sugar estates. Cocolos from the West Indies and Haitians did not speak Spanish, lacked social connections outside of plantations, and had limited means of seeking passage home. Without other employment opportunities, immigrant workers accepted lower wages than Dominicans. The difficulty of leaving the Dominican Republic meant they were likely to endure poor work conditions, at least for some time. Immigrant workers were a key aspect of the sugar industry's business model, because they worked for cheap and were easy to exploit. By the 1910s, few Dominicans toiled in sugar cane fields. Initially, imported labor mostly came from the Lesser Antilles. As the twentieth century advanced, plantation owners realized the benefits of recruiting workers from across the border. Easy access and a large supply of labor meant braceros increasingly came from Haiti.13 Anti-Haitianism allows for and is reinforced by misconceptions about Haitian migrants.

They came to the Dominican Republic in search of employment opportunities and improved living standards, yet racist nationalists portrayed their influx as a "peaceful invasion".14 For Balaguer, Haiti conspired to reunify the island by populating the east. Alarmists like Balaguer identified Haiti's more numerous population and Haitians' high birth rates as prove of the gravity of the immigration issue.15 Among those persuaded by the concept of "peaceful invasion", the presence of Haitians and Haitian influence in the borderlands prior to the 1937 massacre was evidence of Haiti's expansionist agenda. Even today, extreme anti-Haitians claim that Haitians immigrate with the ulterior motive of unifying Hispaniola. By distorting Haitians' motivations for migrating, some have portrayed them as invaders that jeopardize the cultural integrity and survival of the Dominican Republic.

The Trujillo Era: Creation and Dissemination of Anti-Haitianism During Trujillo's regime, from 1930 to 1961, racism and nationalism were combined to articulate an anti-Haitian narrative that presented Haitians as a backward people and as a threat to the Dominican Republic. Highlighting the differences between the two countries allowed the portrayal of Haiti and the Dominican Republic as enemies. The regime encouraged antiHaitianism through scholarly works, the Catholic Church, the Partido Dominicano (PD

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[Dominican Party]) and governmental institutions. Scholars like PeĂąa Batlle and Balaguer produced literature that lent intellectual legitimacy to the state's anti-Haitian policies and propaganda. These authors warped historical facts to portray Haiti as a perennial threat to Dominican security and culture and relied on racism to prove the inferiority of Haitians. Trujillo also made the state a vehicle for anti-Haitian sentiment. Consolidating prejudice against Haitians in the minds of Dominicans was official policy during the dictatorship.

The most horrifying anti-Haitian policy in Dominican history was the 1937 massacre at the borderlands known as El Corte (the "mowing down"). This state-sponsored ethnic cleansing campaign targeted Haitians and Haitian-Dominicans living on Dominican soil. Had the perpetrators wielded automatic rifles the regime's role in the genocide would have been too obvious. El Corte was carried out with machetes and knives. When the killings stopped in mid 1938, between 10,000 and 40,000 Haitians and Haitian-Dominicans were slaughtered, while thousands fled to Haiti.16 Facing international outrage over the massacre, the Trujillo regime initially refused to admit responsibility, but eventually resolved the debacle by offering reparations to Haiti.

The Trujillo regime used its power over all aspects of life in the Dominican Republic to spread anti-Haitianism and justify El Corte. The Catholic Church and the PD were active in propaganda campaigns that glorified Trujillo and defended his totalitarian regime. In addition, they promoted anti-Haitian sentiment among Dominicans. The Catholic Church was an ally to the dictatorship until the last years of the Trujillo era. The Church was important in legitimizing the regime, because Catholic authorities hold a lot of sway in the Dominican Republic. Aware of this, Trujillo either bribed or coerced priests to preach sermons that reflected the state's official narrative. "Catholic priests stressed the Hispanic and Catholic character of the Dominican people in their sermons". They also organized "'spiritual retreats'" which employed "brainwashing techniques" to engender opinions consistent with the regime's interests.17 This further consolidated national identity as Hispano-Catholic in the imaginations of many Dominicans, strengthening the assumption that the Dominican Republic is devoid of influence from Africa. This view makes the differences between both countries appear more marked, facilitating the portrayal of Haiti as a threat to Dominican culture.

The PD was also essential for the dissemination of pro-Trujillo and anti-Haitian propaganda. It was the only legal political party during most of the dictatorship, and most adults

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were obligated to be members. The PD operated throughout the country, even in remote rural areas. "Between 3.5 to 4 million Dominicans attended the party's events every year", and "meetings, rallies, and marches" were often held: "2,976 public acts in 1940 alone". The PD tirelessly praised Trujillo, spread anti-Haitian ideology and emphasized the Hispanic and Catholic nature of Dominicans.18 Its frequent and widespread events meant that all classes of Dominicans were exposed to the party's propaganda.

Education was another important vehicle for anti-Haitianism. History textbooks during the Trujillo era sought to reinforce myths about Dominican national identity. This was made official policy in law 2909, which states that "'the content of the education provided by Dominican schools will be based on the principles of Christian civilization and Hispanic tradition that are fundamental in the formation of our historical physiognomy". Textbooks included racist illustrations were Haitians were depicted as "apelike". They also exaggerated the suffering Dominicans experienced during the Haitian Occupation.19 In schools near the border, education was especially focused on preserving aspects of Dominican culture and patriotism. In order to prevent intercultural mixing in the region, the regime wanted to erect "'an absolutely impassable social, ethnic, economic, and religious fence'" along the frontier.20 Inculcating a nationalist education that antagonized Haiti in Dominican youths contributed to laying the first bricks of such a wall.

In addition, scholars like Peña Batlle and Balaguer were close allies to Trujillo. Balaguer for example, was even appointed as puppet president in 1960. The work of these authors mirrored the official discourse of Trujillo. They characterized Dominican culture as Hispanic and depicted Haitians as an inferior people that somehow represented a threat to the Dominican Republic. Both were apologetic of the regime's repression and viewed El Corte as a necessary measure to preserve Dominican culture in the borderlands and halt the "peaceful invasion".21 Sceptics of the primordial role of the Trujillo era in the spread of anti-Haitianism would argue that the ideology’s dissemination was the culmination of the Haitian Occupation, war between Haiti and its neighbor during the 1860s, and a centuries old tradition of antiblackness among the Santo Domingo elite. Common wisdom in today’s Dominican Republic views antiHaitianism as the consequence of a bloody past and mass immigration.22 A violent history and racist xenophobia could also explain the propagation of prejudice against Haitians during the Trujillo era. But as Martínez, Cassá and Moya Pons show, the antiblackness required to produce

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anti-Haitian discourse was absent in most Dominican mulattos and blacks throughout the nineteenth century. A prime example would be those who favored Haitian rule because of Portau-Prince’s opposition to slavery. Influential politicians like Gregorio Luperón adhered to Hispanic values but also to racial unity among the Dominican people, in opposition of elite segments the perpetuated Spain’s legacy of racism. Moreover, contemporary authors Pedro Francisco Bonó and Eugenio María de Hostos engaged with other writers in debates about the role of race in Dominican national identity. Bonó and Hostos embraced the young republic’s mixed ethnic composition while emphasizing the Hispanic culture of its people.23 This demonstrates that racism was not universal in the late nineteenth century, which reveals that assuming Dominicans are historically racist is inaccurate. It is also consistent with the idea that Trujillo’s policies were necessary for racism and anti-Haitianism to become so pervasive among nonwhites in the Dominican Republic.

Racism and other elements essential to anti-Haitian ideology were already present in Dominican society before Trujillo seized power, but under his rule, the state itself carried out an attack on everything Haitian. The myths and misconceptions that form the basis for anti-Haitian sentiment were developed by intellectuals who were supported by the regime. These ideas were spread by the Catholic Church and the PD and taught in classrooms throughout the country. It was impossible to escape anti-Haitian propaganda. Under a dictatorship that punished dissent harshly, any attempt at undermining this ideology was practically suicidal. The Trujillo era was pivotal in shaping anti-Haitianism because the entire state machinery was dedicated to spreading it.

Anti-Haitianism: From Trujillo to the Present Since the collapse of the Trujillo regime until the present anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic is manifested in abuses committed against Haitian migrants by the government and sugar corporations, as well as in the indifference of Dominicans towards these transgressions. In 1966, President Balaguer and Haitian dictator François Duvalier signed an agreement for the employment of Haitian braceros by the Consejo Estatal del Azúcar (CEA [State Council of Sugar]). The accord neglected working conditions and worker rights. 24 In addition, a small portion of each worker's salary was retained and only disbursed when they returned to Haiti. The workers never received this money, instead it was captured by the Duvaliers.25 The agreement only allowed CEA plantations to legally hire Haitian laborers, so

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most Haitian braceros arrived at private plantations like Central Romana illegally through trafficking networks. This process involved Haitian recruiters in the west side of the border, the complicity of high ranking military and political officials of both countries, and generous bribes from plantation owners.26 Haitian migrant workers are generally undocumented and poor. In the Dominican Republic they are disenfranchised and susceptible to abuse. In some cases, Haitian braceros have been deported without being given time to gather their belongings or have waited for repatriation for days without being provided shelter. In more extreme cases, force has been used to coerce braceros to work, resulting in one death in 1974 and another in 1975.27 The Dominican Republic became the center of international controversy in 1989. Americas Watch reported how Haitian braceros were trafficked and provided evidence of forced labor and inhumane working conditions in plantations. Facing the threat of trade sanctions from the United State, Balaguer implemented a set of reforms that slightly improved the conditions and treatment of Haitian braceros. Nevertheless, Americas Watch and the US Lawyers Committee for Human Rights cited violations to human rights even after the reforms were enforced.28 The Dominican Republic retaliates to Haitian immigration with sporadic deportation campaigns. In June 1991, Balaguer ordered the deportation of illegal Haitians under the age of sixteen or over sixty. After three months, 50,000 Haitians had been removed from Dominican soil. It was reported that Dominican soldiers robbed and beat up Haitians, separated families, and that Dominicans of Haitian descent were also deported.29 In 1999, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS criticized President Leonel Fernรกndez for deporting Haitians en masse, in violation of a 1978 multilateral agreement of which the Dominican Republic is party.30 In 9 May 2005, again under Fernรกndez, 2,000 Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent were deported. In June of that year, the president himself admitted that "what we [the Dominican Republic] traditionally do are mass deportations, that certainly do violate the human rights of Haitians".31 The Dominican Constitutional Court passed judgment 168-13 in September 2013. The ruling established that people born on Dominican soil to illegal foreigners were not entitled to Dominican nationality, leaving 200,000 individuals stateless.32 It applied to people born since 1929, even though Dominican law granted citizenship to anyone born in national territory until 26 January 2010. The judgment was followed by a regularization plan of the status of irregular immigrants that lasted eighteen months, ending on June 2015.33 The regularization plan was welcomed. It provided denationalized Dominicans a chance to keep their

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citizenship and granted time for Haitian immigrants to acquire legal status. Between the end of the regularization plan and 26 May 2016, the International Migration Organization reported that 19,000 and 21,000 Haitians had been "unofficially" and "officially" deported, respectively.

Haitian authorities acknowledged improvement in how the Dominican Republic carried out "official" deportations. Nevertheless, "unofficial" deportations carried out by the army failed to meet international standards. Lack of transparency during the expulsion process casts doubt that Dominican authorities assessed each case individually, as is required by international law. In addition, irregular migrants were not allowed to challenge their expulsion in court, and nearly 1,000 unaccompanied minors were deported between June 2015 and May 2016.34 Over 1,000 exDominicans of Haitian descent were "unofficially" expelled, and over 6,000 arrived "spontaneously" to Haiti fearing mistreatment by Dominican migration authorities.35 Weaknesses of Anti-Haitianism Anti-Haitianism remains influential in the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, according to Samuel MartĂ­nez and Milagros Ricourt, the foundations of this ideology are not as solid as SagĂĄs and Ferguson maintain. Anti-Haitianism is grounded on historical distortions and on the self-denial of most Dominicans' ancestry. Truthful historical accounts and an embrace of Dominicans' real roots can undermine anti-Haitianism's relevance in Dominican society. The role of elites in creating and spreading anti-Haitianism also suggests segments in the Dominican Republic do not share the prejudices of nationalist Dominicans.

Contrary to traditional conceptions of Dominican national identity, Afro-Caribbean elements are present in Dominican culture. Since colonial times, the elites of Santo Domingo have exaggerated the racial and cultural homogeneity of Dominicans to consolidate national identity as Hispanic, Christian and white. The political ruling class hid Dominicans' African ancestry through institutionalized racial self-denial. For example, identification cards carried by all Dominicans denominate most individuals with black skin as indios (Indians), in a lazy attempt to pass Dominicans of African descent as the progeny of TaĂ­nos.36 Moreover, the Dominican state has actively suppressed Vodou and other Afro-Caribbean practices. Vodou was made illegal in 1862 and penalized with jail time and fines in 1943. Drumming rituals were banned in 1874 and 1881 in the hinterlands of Santiago. Oliborio Mateo, a prominent figure in Dominican Vodou was persecuted and assassinated in 1922, and hundreds of his followers were killed in 1962.37

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Despite this, the descendants of Maroons preserve their traditional religion, and continue living in towns founded in the sixteenth century by escaped slaves. Vodou is the amalgamation of West African, Taíno and Christian religions. Due to the enforcement of Catholicism on the nonwhite peoples of Hispaniola, Vodou practitioners adopted Catholic saints to represent their own deities. "The luas/mysteries or spirits of the Africans were assigned the names of Catholic saints, their rituals and prayers were incorporated into Christian ritual forms, and the cross of Jesus's crucifixion was reimagined".38 Traditional Dominican literature presupposes that the presence of Vodou in the Dominican Republic comes from Haiti. In reality, it is likely Vodou emerged in the Spanish side of Hispaniola, because the first Maroons settled the mountains in the southeast of the island.39 Furthermore, Vodou beliefs often hide behind Catholic prayers, ceremonies and saints. Therefore, the practice of Dominican Vodou should be more common than is apparent. It also suggests that some characterizations of figures like the Virgin of Altagracia and John the Baptist by working class, nonwhite Dominicans could originate from luas. The Catholic practice of lower class Dominicans may be somewhat compatible with Vodou, despite its demonization by Church authorities.40 Ricourt offers that "religion is one of the strongest, if underacknowledged, links uniting the island's Dominicans and Haitians".41 It may be that the peoples that share an island are not culturally incompatible after all.

In towns like Najayo, Matas de Farfán and Santa María, Dominican Vodou is practiced both behind a Catholic facade and overtly.42 This proves that Dominican national identity is not as devoid of Afro-Caribbean elements as elites like to pretend. Vodou in the Dominican Republic shows cultural continuities exist between Haitians and working class, nonwhite Dominicans. Anti-Haitianism relies heavily on highlighting cultural differences and incompatibilities between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, yet this cultural rift is small for Dominicans from towns like Santa María, undermining one of anti-Haitians' core arguments.

The 1994 and 1996 presidential elections reveal that many Dominicans are not swayed by anti-Haitian propaganda. In 1994 Joaquín Balaguer, José Francisco Peña Gómez and Juan Bosch faced off. Peña Gómez, a dark-skinned black, was the target of a defamatory propaganda that sought to appeal to some Dominicans' disdain and fear of Haitians. Opponents of Peña Gómez alleged he was Haitian or of Haitian descent. They questioned his loyalty to the Dominican Republic, and spread rumors that he would encourage Haitian immigration, that he secretly planned to unify Hispaniola, or that he wanted revenge for the 1937 massacre.43 The grossly

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racist attacks against Peña Gómez are often correctly cited as evidence of anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic. But it is important to emphasize that nearly half of Dominicans voted for him in both elections, despite his skin tone and his supposed Haitian origins. Martínez asserts that racist propaganda cost Peña Gómez votes and that in 1994 he may have actually won the election, but electoral fraud in favor of Balaguer spoiled his victory.44 These presidential campaigns show a divide in Dominican society. On the one hand there are nationalist, racist Dominicans clearly susceptible to anti-Haitian discourse. On the other there are Dominicans who would elect a black man of presumed Haitian descent as president.

Divided reactions to judgment 168-13 shows cracks in the grasp of anti-Haitianism over Dominicans. Nationalists and anti-Haitians applauded the denationalization of descendents of irregular immigrants, who are almost all Haitian in the Dominican Republic, as well as the promise of deportation of illegal migrants. Echoing Balaguer, they viewed the Constitutional Court's decision as necessary to stop Haitian efforts of unifying Hispaniola through a "peaceful invasion". The archbishop of Santo Domingo criticized opponents of the ruling for being "inauthentic Dominicans". But opponents were numerous, vocal and influential. Prominent journalists like María Isabel Soldevila (editor-in-chief of Listín Diario, the most read newspaper in the Dominican Republic) and Juan Bolívar Díaz published articles critical of the ruling, joining the fierce debates over judgment 168-13. Julia Alvarez and Junot Díaz, probably the most renowned Dominican-American novelists, condemned the decision in the New York Times.

Dominican nongovernmental organizations like Centro Bonó, Participación Ciudadana and Reconocido also denounced the Dominican Republic's transgression. These helped denationalized Dominicans recuperate their status and assure that Haitian migrants were given a fair chance to become regular immigrants.45 Judgment 168-13 polarized Dominican society, proving that even though anti-Haitianism remains pervasive, a significant segment of the Dominican Republic shuns the ideology.

Conclusion Anti-Haitianism continues to shape Dominicans' imaginations in ways that pose problems for Haitian-Dominican relations. Yet we have also seen that important factors within the Dominican Republic undermine this ideology. A historical overview of the origins of antiHaitian prejudice and how it has changed reveals racism and xenophobia against Haiti exist but are not universal in the Dominican Republic.

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Disdain and even fear of Haitians was spread though historical distortions that portray Haiti and the Dominican Republic as natural enemies and produce resentment among Dominicans towards Haitians. Traditional Dominican historians describe the Haitian Occupation as a denationalizing period of repression and dissatisfaction. However, they only emphasize the opinions of contemporary elites, and ignore that blacks and mulattos initially supported unification with Haiti because this meant freedom from slavery. Peña Batlle illustrates a romanticized picture of colonialism under Spain to portray a history that supports the notion that Dominican national identity is predominantly Hispanic. Sánchez Valverde hides the African heritage of the inhabitants of Santo Domingo. He portrays them as a mix between Spaniards and Taínos to "whiten" Dominicans and set them apart from Haitians, who are perceived as pure Africans. This reflects the tendency of elites to downplay their African origins, which continues to fuel anti-Haitian discourse today. As a scholar, Balaguer furthered the imagined notion that Dominicans are mostly white by highlighting cultural differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He also strengthened the irrational fear of a Haitian "peaceful invasion" by overlooking sugar corporations' role in starting and perpetuating Haitian immigration, as well as by portraying Haitian immigrants as invaders rather than migrant workers.

The Trujillo regime combined racism and xenophobia to produce a narrative that portrayed Haitians as inferior and as a threat to the cultural and physical survival of the Dominican Republic. The creation of anti-Haitianism permitted Trujillo to justify the slaughter of Haitians in 1937 as a necessary measure to protect Dominican security and culture. The dictator encouraged scholars like Peña Batlle and Balaguer to write the intellectual foundations of anti-Haitianism. Under his rule, historical distortions that fomented resentment and animosity towards Haitians were incorporated into public education. In addition, the Catholic Church and the PD disseminated anti-Haitian sentiment throughout the Dominican population. During the Trujillo era, the creation and spread of anti-Haitianism was state policy. This demonstrates that the ideology was produced by elites and became accepted and internalized by working and middle-class Dominicans through propaganda during Trujillo's three decades as dictator.

The top-down spread of anti-Haitianism and the fact that the ideology is largely based on lies about Haitian-Dominican history and the racial and cultural homogeneity of Dominicans suggests significant segments in the Dominican Republic reject the nationalist and racist discourse of elites. Contrary to traditional assumptions, new research offers that Vodou

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originates in the Dominican Republic, even if it is more widely practiced in Haiti. The presence of Vodou in the Dominican Republic proves that Dominican national identity is not only Hispanic, but also Afro-Caribbean. This means Haitian culture and the beliefs of working class nonwhite Dominicans are more compatible than is apparent, undermining anti-Haitianism and the notion that the two peoples are too different to get along. In addition, mixed responses to defamatory campaigns against Peña Gómez and ruling 168-13 demonstrate that a sizeable portion of Dominicans are not susceptible to anti-Haitian discourse. Nevertheless, many still view Haitians with disdain and consider them a pernicious presence in the Dominican Republic.

It is likely that anti-Haitian attitudes will continue to be influential in the Dominican Republic, which is one of the biggest obstacles for improvement in Haitian-Dominican relations. But if accurate portrayals of history surface, and if Afro-Caribbean elements of Dominican culture are embraced, it is not so farfetched to imagine a future where anti-Haitianism loses all relevance in Dominican society.

1

Peña Batlle, Manuel Arturo. Ensayos Históricos. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Fundación Peña Batlle, 1989, 60-61.

2 San Miguel, Pedro L. The Imagined Island: History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005, 85.

3 Roorda, Eric, Lauren Hutchinson Derby, and Raymundo Gonzalez. The Dominican Republic Reader: History, Culture, Politics. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014.

4 Peña Batlle, Ensayos Históricos, 61.

5 Peña Batlle, Ensayos Históricos, 62.

6 Martínez, Samuel. "Not a Cockfight: Rethinking Haitian-Dominican Relations." Latin American Perspectives 30, no. 3 (May 2003): 80-101, 85-86.

7 San Miguel, The Imagined Island, 72.

8 San Miguel, The Imagined Island, 90-91.

9 Peña Batlle, Ensayos Históricos, 229.

10 Ferguson, James. Beyond the Lighthouse. N.p.: Latin American Bureau, 1992, 15.

11 Martínez, "Not a Cockfight;" 85.

12 Martínez, "Not a Cockfight," 85-86.

13 Martínez, Samuel. "From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State, and Migrant Labor in Haiti and the Dominican Republic." Latin American Research Review 34, no. 1 (1999).

14 Martínez, "From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand."

15 San Miguel, The Imagined Island, 91.

16 Fumagalli, Maria Cristina. On the Edge. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015, 141.

17 Sagás, Ernesto. Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000, 59.

18 Sagás, Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic, 60-61.

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19

Sagás, Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic, 61-62.

Sagás, Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic, 57.

21 Franco Pichardo, Franklin. Ensayos Profanos: Sobre Racismo, Pesimismo e Izquierdismo.

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Sociedad Editorial Dominicana, 2001, 37.

22Wucker, Michele. Why the Cocks Fight: Dominicans, Haitians, and the Struggle for Hispaniola. New York: Hill and Wang, 1999.

23 Mayes, April J. The Mulatto Republic: Class, Race, and Dominican National Identity.

Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2014, 17 and 23-24.

24 Castor, Suzy. Migración y Relaciones Internacionales (El Caso Haitiano-Dominicano). Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Editora Universitaria UASD, 1987, 131.

25 Castor, Migración y Relaciones Internacionales, 145.

26 Castor, Migración y Relaciones Internacionales, 132-33.

27 Castor, Migración y Relaciones Internacionales, 136-37.

28 Ferguson, Beyond the Lighthouse, 86-89.

29 Ferguson, Beyond the Lighthouse, 89.

30 Franco Pichardo, Ensayos Profanos, 53.

31 Amnesty International. Dominican Republic: A Life in Transit - the Plight of Haitian Immigrants and Dominicans of Haitian Descent. N.p.: Amnesty International, 2007, 14.

32 Ricourt, Milagros. The Dominican Racial Imaginary: Surveying the Landscape of Race and Nation in Hispaniola. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2016, 151.

33 Amnesty International. 'Where Are We Going to Live?': Migration and Statelessness in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. N.p.: Amnesty International, 2016, 9.

34 Amnesty International. 'Where Are We Going to Live?', 20-23 and 25.

35 Amnesty International. 'Where Are We Going to Live', 29-30.

36 Wells, Allen. Tropical Zion: General Trujillo, FDR, and the Jews of Sosua. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009, 45.

37 Ricourt, The Dominican Racial Imaginary, 112.

38 Ricourt, The Dominican Racial Imaginary, 107.

39 Ricourt, The Dominican Racial Imaginary, 106.

40 Ricourt, The Dominican Racial Imaginary, 104.

41 Ricourt, The Dominican Racial Imaginary, 135.

42 Ricourt, The Dominican Racial Imaginary, 103-04 and 137.

43 Sagás, Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic, 108.

44 Martínez, "Not a Cockfight," 87-88.

45 Ricourt, The Dominican Racial Imaginary, 151-52.

20

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Bibliography Amnesty International. Dominican Republic: A Life in Transit - the Plight of Haitian Immigrants and Dominicans of Haitian Descent. N.p.: Amnesty International, 2007.

Amnesty International. 'Where Are We Going to Live?': Migration and Statelessness in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. N.p.: Amnesty International, 2016.

Castor, Suzy. Migración y Relaciones Internacionales (El Caso Haitiano-Dominicano). Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Editora Universitaria UASD, 1987.

Ferguson, James. Beyond the Lighthouse. N.p.: Latin American Bureau, 1992.

Franco Pichardo, Franklin. Ensayos Profanos: Sobre Racismo, Pesimismo e Izquierdismo. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Sociedad Editorial Dominicana, 2001.

Fumagalli, Maria Cristina. On the Edge. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015.

Martínez, Samuel. "From Hidden Hand to Heavy Hand: Sugar, the State, and Migrant Labor in Haiti and the Dominican Republic." Latin American Research Review 34, no. 1 (1999).

Martínez, Samuel. "Not a Cockfight: Rethinking Haitian-Dominican Relations." Latin American Perspectives 30, no. 3 (May 2003): 80-101.

Mayes, April J. The Mulatto Republic: Class, Race, and Dominican National Identity. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2014.

Peña Batlle, Manuel Arturo. Ensayos Históricos. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Fundación Peña Batlle, 1989.

Ricourt, Milagros. The Dominican Racial Imaginary: Surveying the Landscape of Race and Nation in Hispaniola. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2016.

Roorda, Eric, Lauren Hutchinson Derby, and Raymundo Gonzalez. The Dominican Republic Reader: History, Culture, Politics. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014.

Sagás, Ernesto. Race and Politics in the Dominican Republic. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000.

San Miguel, Pedro L. The Imagined Island: History, Identity, and Utopia in Hispaniola. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005.

Wells, Allen. Tropical Zion: General Trujillo, FDR, and the Jews of Sosua. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

Wucker, Michele. Why the Cocks Fight: Dominicans, Haitians, and the Struggle for Hispaniola. New York: Hill and Wang, 1999.

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Big Debates of Development: Challenges and Opportunities of Brazil Memo to the Incoming Administration.

Daniela Schermerhorn Daniela N T Schermerhorn is a Rotary Peace Fellow at the Duke-UNC Rotary Peace Center. She holds a master’s degree in international development policy with focus in peace and conflict resolution from the Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University. She is a Brazilian Police Major with eighteen years of academic and practical experience in public security management interested in all factors damaging the social fabric and disrupting peace and development. This work was originally written for “Big Debates of Development”, a course taught by Economist Indermit Singh Gill, Ph.D. Professor of Practice of Public Policy and Director of the Duke Center for International Development (DCID), with support of professor Dean Storelli, Coordinator of Writing and Communication Services of the DCID. She would like to thank the professors for their time and guidance in the process of publishing this work.

THE PROBLEM The last decades have shown great development followed by significant downfalls in Brazil. The current economic and political crises represent a great threat to government legitimacy and political stability. With the end of the commodity super-cycle in 2011 and a pervasive corruption scandal that resulted in the impeachment of the President and prosecution of many historical important political leaders, Brazil entered into a great recession in 2015, which is causing a reverse effect on development. The current administration is suffering from an overall existential crisis, lacking popular support to undertake necessary socio-economic reforms. The next political cycle, will face the same constraints plus new challenges. The decisions to be made will define whether or not Brazil will retake the path to inclusive growth and development and assume its rightful position as a great nation on the world scene.

POLICY CHALLENGE The next administration must walk the tightrope of regaining international trust by undertaking economic and institutional reforms, while ensuring the socio-economic rights of Brazilian citizens, rights that are an essential pillar to Brazil’s political stability, peace and securityxlvi. The main development challenges are (1) fiscal and monetary inefficiencies, (2) protracted structural constraints, and (3) globalization effects.

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(1) Fiscal and monetary inefficiencies and unsustainable public expenditures have resulted in inflation, high interest rates, depreciation of currency, low savings, and overall fiscal imbalances, which are preventing government investments. This unstable scenario worsens public and private debt and discourages foreign investment. Those most affected by the economic distress are the vulnerable and poorxlvii.

(2) Protracted structural constraints such as low productivity, poor infrastructure, and the high cost of capital hinders the development of a healthy business environment and overall growth. Those issues have been discussed since the 1980s, and many policy recommendations have been made – but overlookedxlviii.

With the recession, there is a great need for economic diversification, the recovery and expansion of formal job markets, improving consumption, and additional spending on social welfare. This process will require government commitment to “creative destruction�xlix, by establishing a solid vision for the future. This vision must prioritize businesses that can achieve growth by adding value to the national product and cut inefficiencies in the delivery of public benefits. Success will depend on specific skills development able to support those businesses to grow and be productive.

(3) Globalization affects every sector of the economy. It is an unstoppable process in which global markets form an intertwined engine, affecting and being affected by each other. Political decisions and international terms of trade are constantly changing, and those changes have the ability to cause economic shocks to developing countries, which must learn to recognize external threats and opportunities and more rapidly undertake measures to prevent and prepare for international prospects that may influence domestic progress. Brazil, for instance, still needs to adapt to the new commodity market realityl.

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BRAZIL’S GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORY: WHAT HAPPENED IN THE LAST DECADES? 1960s and 1970s: Diversification and Progress Brazil was one of the fastest growing economies in the last century. Between 1960 and 1980, the average GDP growth rate was 7.3%, twice as fast as many comparable countries in Latin Americali. This growth was initially spurred by entrepreneurial trends such as industrialization and public private partnerships. Productivity in Brazil continued to increase as steady migration and rapid urbanization fostered concentration of the labor force in new urban centers promoting increases in labor productivity. Investments and protectionist policies also helped boost productivity by encouraging national infant industries such as the aviationlii. State enterprises and infrastructure development also thrived during this time, supported by the authoritarian political rule enforced by the military regime from 1964 to 1985. New roads connected the country from North to South and hydroelectric power plants were built, providing electricity in both urban and rural areas. Major ports were constructed or renovated, and the telecommunication sector was established with the creation of Telebras and Embratelliii. These developments created a conducive environment for growth, setting the stage for advancements in governance and institutions.

Brazil Annual GDP Growth Rate (%) - 1961 to 2016 15 13

9 7 5 3 1 -1 -3

2015

2012

2009

2006

2003

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1985

1982

1979

1976

1973

1970

1967

1964

-5

1961

GDP Growth (annual %)

11

Year (1961 to-2016)

91

However, paying the bill for laying the basic infrastructure for development, led to a steady increase in public and private debt, debt that was further aggravated by the oil crises in 1973 and 1979. High inflation rates and austerity measures, intended to contain public expenditures undermined public welfare, and

5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0

increased

inequalityliv.

The

unpopular

outcomes of these measures prompted demand among Brazilians for democratic participation, socioeconomic

rights

and

government

accountability and fostered a progressive political opening which would result in the termination of 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015

Public Debt Service (% of GNI)

Brazil's Public and Publicly Guaranteed Debt Service Per Year (% of GNI)

the military regime and the reestablishment of democracy in 1985.

Source: Calculation based on data available at WB Databank

devaluing the national currency and exponentially

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

50

1990

further

1989

power,

1988

purchasing

550

1987

Brazil’s

1050

1986

eroded

1550

1985

country’s main imports. High levels of inflation

2050

1984

due to high prices of petroleum, one of the

2550

1983

market prospects were not auspicious for Brazil

3050

1982

macroeconomic and social instability. Global

Brazil Inflation Rates - 1981 to 1995

1981

The 1980s in Brazil was marked by high

Inflation, Consumer Prices (annual %)

1980s: High Debt, Inflation and Democracy

Year Source: Calculation based on data available at WB Databank

increasing the fiscal deficit. Fiscal and monetary policies aiming to prevent capital outflows boosted the cost of capital, undermining the expansion of sectors on the rise in the 1970s, and diminishing savingslv. Political instability and social unrest were also remarkable during this period, resulting in the reestablishment of democracy and constitutional guarantees of socioeconomic and political rights to the Brazilian people. In1989, the advent of the Washington Consensuslvi fostered new global policies that promoted the beginning of a fragile stabilization process.

1990s: Gradual Stabilization and Stagnation Throughout the 1990s, the main strategies for regaining Brazil’s stability were stabilizing the national economy and keeping a tight public budget. With the 92

implementation of “Plano Real” in 1994, an initial fiscal adjustment took place, along with monetary stabilization and real exchange rate appreciation. Public expenditures and investments were overall low, but inflation started to go down, favoring an increase in public trust. To adjust the current account and fiscal deficit to the new monetary reality, an overall increase in debt was assumed, with great tax burden transferred to the private sectorlvii. Main development achievements stagnated as a result, with low investments to infrastructure and an increase in obstacles to entrepreneurship, including the establishment of complex legal frameworks that increased the bureaucratic and financial burden of establishing a business. Many policy options that could have increased productivity and participation in the global trade market were overlooked, with low implementation of trade liberalization, hindering the development of the industrial sector. The external environment also imposed constraints that restricted Brazil’s opportunities to explore comparative advantages, as the main consumer markets of national commodities, such as the US and the EU, assumed protectionist policieslviii.

2000s: Commodity Boom During the 2000s, Brazil experienced considerable growth and remarkable human development. The “Plano Real” controlled inflation, and other measures such as the fiscal responsibility law and the system of budget surplus improved credibility, allowing a decline in real interest rates. Three main policies ensured macroeconomic stability: inflation target regime, floating exchange

YEAR

2016

2014

2012

2010

0

2008

0

5 2006

500

10

2004

1000

2002

1500

15

2000

2000

20

1998

2500

Brazil Inflation Rates (1996 2016)

1996

3000

1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017

INFLATION, CONSUMER PRICES (ANNUAL %)

Brazil Inflation Rates - 1981 to 2016

INFLATION, CONSUMER PRICES (ANNUAL %)

rates and fiscal soundnesslix.

Year Source: Calculation based on data available at WB Databank

93

The commodity super cycle ushered in a prosperous time of consumption-led growth,

Progress in Poverty and Inequality Reduction in Brazil

accompanied by a rapid increase in employed labor force, especially with the expansion of the public sector and formalization of low skill jobs. The basic infrastructure developed during the 1960s and 1970s allowed improvements in service

delivery.

Household

credit

and

government transfers through social safety

Source: World Bank, 2016, p. xx.

nets promoted the expansion of consumption, assisting many to overcome poverty. Great attention to wealth redistribution by promoting human development helped to decrease inequalities. Finally, a favorable internal and external environment allowed growth and prosperity for many Brazilianslx.

However, rising wealth led to rent seeking and deep state corruption, firstly exposed in 2005 through the “Mensalão” scandallxi, which implicated many traditional political personalities. The “voracity effect”lxii increased the public burden, starting to destabilize the fiscal account. Resources acquired from commodities exports (oil, coffee, sugar, iron, steel…) promoted currency appreciation, increasing consumption and reducing competitiveness of export-reliant enterprises, what is considered by many as a significant trend of “Dutch Disease”lxiii. Also, although the labor market had an impressive growth till 2015, especially with the expansion of the public sector, there was no increase in labor productivity, suggesting persistence of structural constraintslxiv.

Source: Rodrik, 2013, p. 3.

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The global recession of 2008/9 was a harsh moment with late effects. At the time, Brazil sustained a fast recovery through adjusts in monetary and fiscal policies and maintenance of low interest rates. Tax breaks and the expansion of domestic credit allowed continued consumption. An external environment with stable commodity prices and global stimulus to investment in emerging markets encouraged the recovery of the growth pattern in 2009. However, overall reduction on terms of trade and pre-existing structural issues affected sustainability of progresslxv.

2010: Reverse Path of Growth In 2011, a new political cycle started trouble by external instability and internal economic imbalances. To maintain political alliances, deep state corruption advanced, depleting the patrimony of Petrobras, the most important semi-public multinational corporation of Brazil in the petroleum industrylxvi. Leading organizations in the area of construction, engineering, chemicals and petrochemical, such as the Odebrechtlxvii, were also involved in corruption schemes. With the end of the commodity super cycle in 2015 and the formal announcement by the US Federal Reserve of existing tampering in bond purchases, a persistent recession period consolidated, marked by erosion of international trust and a negative shift in foreign investmentslxviii.

Political instability rose as new corruption scandals were revealed. The operation “car wash�lxix, which exposed one of the biggest corruption scandals in history, undermined public trust in political leadership.

Social unrests influenced the impeachment of the President in 2016, suggesting overall public dissatisfaction with the government, which persists in the present administration. Current challenges include the need for unpopular measures, which were taken along compromises assumed to recover external trust and economic stabilization. However, lack of legitimacy prevents the advancement of difficult restructurings, stirring public opposition.

POLICY IMPERATIVES: THREE STRATEGIC MEASURES FOR GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT The overall political and economic turmoil exposes macroeconomic constraints, unsolved structural problems and new global challenges to be addressed by the incoming administration. Present prospects show high debt and rising inflation, depreciation of currency, increase in interest rates, decrease in purchasing power and a decline in consumption. Trends of rising unemployment, low investments, decaying infrastructure, and overall social insecurity affects daily life, causing backslides in important development indicators. An unfavorable internal and external environment discourages foreign investment, forecasting stagnant prices of agricultural commodities, an important source of exports 95

revenue for Brazillxx. All those trends reveal a concerning reverse path of growth. Yet, the incoming administration main challenge still is to find the right balance between rescuing public faith and support to the government ensuring political stability, while implementing unpopular austere measures that may be the only sustainable path towards growth and development.

1) Macroeconomic and Fiscal Adjustments Although many measures have been taken to adjust fiscal and monetary policies and restore fiscal imbalances, they have proven insufficient. The new administration will be challenged with highly sensitive structural issues. Some of those issues include: reform of social security to address inequalities on public expenditures; improvements on public taxation; and control of inflation and real interest rates.

Population Ageing Will Add to Spending Pressures

Source: OECD, 2015a, p. 17.

Social Security International financial organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD frequently refer to high public expenditures with social security as a great burden in the public budget in Brazil, together with inflexibilities in expenditure commitments provided by the Constitution lxxi. Any reform that may affect social security and the worker’s law will likely encounter severe resistance and may undermine popular support. This is a very difficult issue; however, compromise in undertaking this

96

structural change is necessary. An increase in retirement age or adaptation of pension index to consumer prices are policy recommendations to respond to the substantial increase in life expectancy and rapid aging labor force, especially considering that Brazil is still a middle-income economylxxii. Those measures will serve as a response to external aspirations, correcting an unsustainable pattern with unfavorable prospects, and attending to market pressures to strong commitments to debt sustainability. Those shifts in the pension system can also allow for reallocations of public expenditures that may favor wealth redistribution by investing in health and education, helping to address inequalities.

Taxation Increase taxation is also an unpopular measure. However, an incremental action that have minor resistance but allow for greater efficiency on raising revenue is improving capacity on tax collection. A recommended improvement includes diminishing of compliance costs by simplifying processes. Also, there is a need for the consolidation of existing fragmented indirect taxes, moving towards a single value added tax, which may help industrial development, improving business prospects. Those measures promote clarity, fostering accountability, making tax evasion difficult, encouraging entrepreneurship, ultimately raising revenuelxxiii.

In support to improving capacity on tax collection, the successful implementation of the National Civil Identification database by the incoming administration can represent a great improvement on simplifying the taxation system. This project was approved by the Senate in April 11, 2017. The main objective is to unify the identification system of Brazil by establishing a unique biometric document that integrates the general state registration number (RG), the national individual registration (CPF) and the voter registrationlxxiv.

Inflation and Interest Rates Another main concern for the new administration is to control inflation and exchange rates maintaining fiscal and monetary soundness, an important condition to restore external credibility. It is also a main pillar of government legitimacy, as Brazilians still fear hyperinflation, a reality that haunted the country until the mid 1990s, achieving a staggering rate of 2,708% in 1993lxxv.

Currently, monetary and fiscal policies are designed to allow the inflation rate to fluctuate around national target of 4.5% with 1.5% tolerancelxxvi. Interest rates must be constantly adjusted to monetary rates, with a special care for controlling the devaluation of national currency. The new government will need to advance those policies to experience desired achievements.

97

Inflation and Exchange Rates

Source: OECD, 2015a, p.19.

Moreover, a main expectation related to monetary stability regards to previous policy recommendations towards assuring autonomy of the Central Bank and the establishment of a fixed term appointment for the president and its board. Currently, this discussion is advanced, with two specific legislative projects in debate in the Congresslxxvii. The new administration will be challenged to consolidate this change, which may assure great credibility to Brazil’s Central Bank and overall monetary system.

2) Improving the Business Environment and Productivity Unaddressed structural challenges have a great impact on the development of a conducive business environment to growth and development in Brazil. Bureaucratic inefficiencies, excessive regulations, fragmented taxes, lagging infrastructure and low integration with global trade markets are some examples of existing problems that discourages entrepreneurship, making it difficult to establish and maintain a business. The lack of a clear vision consolidating national priorities in promoting productive sectors and efficient enterprises, encourages pervasive inconsistencies on incentives to businesses. It also jeopardizes competitiveness and the development of an entrepreneurial environment able to add value to the national production. Divergences between available skills among the labor force and the needs of the job market is also a problem affecting overall results. These issues have consistently impacted productivity, discouraging the expansion of internal businesses and foreign investment. For instance, the industrial sector faces low competitive pressures, and existing protectionist practices hinder the use of available technology and innovation to enhance outputlxxviii. The incoming administration has the opportunity to change this pattern, addressing those protracted problems affecting growth and development.

98

Some policy options to address those issues include: implementing measures to improve terms of trade; cutting inefficient public incentives favoring unproductive sectors; fostering improvement on general conditions for doing business; and promoting adaptations of individual skills to meet the need of job markets.

Terms of Trade Industrial Performance and Integration into Global Trade

Source: OECD, 2015a, p. 26.

A significant reform that may encounter political resistance relates to improving terms of trade. Brazil is still a fairly closed economy and can have numerous benefits by improving trade flows reducing barriers on Brazilian exports, imports, production, employment, investments and consumption. The new administration has the chance to improve internal trade and gain access to external consumer markets to relevant export products. A gradual liberalization on terms of trade can promote Brazil’s participation in 99

Global Value Chains, foster competitiveness, improving productivity by adopting new technologies, innovation and leapfrogging from external successful practices, addressing both macroeconomic and structural issues. Some policy recommendations for trade liberalization include “lifting import tariffs, applying a zero-rating to exports and reducing existing local content requirements�lxxix.

Cutting Inefficiencies To improve business and productivity it is necessary to start by cutting inefficient public benefits to unproductive sectors, identifying and promoting the development of main areas that may lead Brazil to a prosperous future. As the country increases its participation in the global market, the incoming administration must implement measures that favor the development of sectors that have comparative advantages, adding value to national production. One example is promoting public private partnerships to develop the extraction and processing of mineral resources, since metal prices are expected to experience increases on global markets in upcoming yearslxxx. Progressive and environmental sustainable deregulation, fostering decreases in costs of production can allow the unleashing of scale economies, improving overall competitiveness and productivitylxxxi. It also can represent positive impact to the job market, fostering creation of job opportunities, what can increase overall consumption, reduce vulnerabilities and improve quality of lifelxxxii.

Improving Ways of Doing Business Another focus of the new administration should be improving overall conditions to the development of a health business environment. It includes improvement in overall infrastructure and addressing bureaucratic inefficiencies and distortions in government interventions, making it easier, quicker and less costly to establish and maintain a business. Those conditions are imperative to promote inclusive growth and development, as it can positively impact the job market, offering a more sustainable option to employ the increasing labor force, yielding desirable social benefits.

It also improves productivity and can attract foreign investments, complementing necessary public expenditures in times of economic crises. Improvements on terms of trade and consolidation of taxes are other measures that can benefit businesseslxxxiii. And measures that may promote innovation, either by providing direct support or offering grants and tax incentives to research and development, are desirable trends to enable businesses.

For example, a point the incoming administration should consider is the expansion of concession mechanisms and other public private partnerships that may improve overall infrastructure. For instance, road concessions can ensure proper maintenance of roads with minor commitment of public expenditures, fostering decrease in overall costs with transportationlxxxiv. Also, expanding the implementation of the

100

“REDESIMPLES” lxxxv to all states can allow entrepreneurs to open or legalize a business online reducing time, costs, duplicated procedures, increasing transparency and preventing corruption. This technological advancement is a federal network which can combine in a single platform all services provided by the state and Federal agencies responsible for opening a business, which was implemented in the Federal District in December 2017, reducing the necessary time to open a business in Brazil’s capital from up to 120 days to five dayslxxxvi.

Source: Doing Business in Brazil 2018

Skills Development Another key policy approach should focus on developing a lifelong training structure to prepare the labor force to attend the requirements of a new world of work. It may entail expansion of vocational training and the development of relevant programs to address shortages in technical skillslxxxvii.

Those measures can ensure that the active labor force is prepared to help the development of businesses, promoting optimum productivity levels, and fostering decreases in rising unemployment levelslxxxviii.

3) Controlling for External Factors Although Brazil has adopted a protectionist position, maintaining its economy fairly close, it is necessary to recognize that any change in the global scenario impacts national growth and prosperity. Globalization is an irreversible phenomenon, and it is necessary to accept this truth, adapting to present realities, while trying to explore the highest benefits from comparative advantages. Also, in times of prosperity, it is essential to establish sound strategies to prevent rent seeking, and trends of “Dutch Disease”.

101

A main challenge that the new administration will need to acknowledge and manage is the declining prospects for the agricultural commodity market, which has a great importance to Brazil’s exports. For instance, according to the 2017 Commodities Market Outlook, agricultural prices will remain fairly unchanged in upcoming years. Yet, metal prices are expected to rise in 2018, except for iron ore. As Brazil is rich in natural resources, the incoming administration can profit from those prospects, which may result in economic recovery. One option can be by supporting the establishment of public private partnerships that may foster the development of extractive industries, while committing to environmental sustainability. Advances in other areas such as macroeconomic stability, business environment and productivity will complement this approach, creating conditions of possibility to overcome the economic recession, improving quality of life for Brazilian’s, and enabling growth and prosperity for all.

CONCLUSION Internal and external instable scenarios have affected Brazil’s path of growth and development, causing a persistent recession which threatens socio-economic advancements acquired in the past decade. This memo provides an overview of development challenges faced by Brazil, addressing main causes, consequences and policy implications. The main conclusions are: Brazil’s current context results from macroeconomic and fiscal inefficiencies, aggravated by unaddressed structural constrains. Those constraints affect the development of the private sector, slowing overall productivity and restraining Brazil’s participation on the global market. Another issue prolonging the recession relate to unfavorable external prospects to the commodity market, especially for agricultural products, affecting an important source of exports revenue.

The incoming administration will face all those challenges plus an unstable political environment marked by popular distrust in government and institutions. Yet, it will be necessary to undertake unpopular reforms to address difficult structural constraints, while ensuring socio-economic and political rights to the population in times of tight budget and international pressure for commitment to debt sustainability.

Main policy recommendations focus on maintaining fiscal and monetary discipline, while promoting improvements on the business environment by progressively expanding terms of trade. Other measures include encouraging entrepreneurship by correcting overall inefficiencies making it difficult to establish and maintain a business, fostering the development of productive sectors, and supporting partnerships to improve infrastructure. In addition, focus on improving human development

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conditions, promoting adaptation of skills to match the need of the labor market, and protecting the natural environment will be essential conditions of government legitimacy. Moreover, Brazil will need to recognize the effects of globalization, adapting and integrating to the global market learning to manage its own comparative advantages and benefits from partake of global resources.

From 2019, the new administration will have the chance to leave their mark on history by conducing Brazil to a prosperous desired future for all, finally achieving its high potential. The decisions to be made can change the path of growth and development improving livelihoods of people in the fifth largest nation in the world. The new administration must implement progressive measures to address internal and external expectations by improving governance, achieving economic stability, adapting to the global market scenario, and exploring comparative advantages that will boost competitiveness and reduce dependence on raw commodities. At the same time, to ensure political stability and popular support for difficult restructurings, strategic decisions must prioritize the wellbeing of Brazilians. And overall, any action aiming at socio-economic prosperity must protect the environment, ensuring the existence of Brazil’s distinct natural patrimony for future generations.

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Bibliography Araújo, S. and D. Flaig. (2016). "Quantifying the Effects of Trade Liberalization in Brazil: A Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE) Simulation", OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1295, OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at: http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.duke.edu/10.1787/5jm0qwmff2kf-en Cascione & Aires. (June 29, 2017). Brazil cuts inflation target for first time in over a decade. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-cenbank-inflation/brazil-cuts-inflation-target-forfirst-time-in-over-a-decade-idUSKBN19K1X1 Deacon & Rode. (2012). Rent Seeking and the Resource Curse. Available at: http://econ.ucsb.edu/~deacon/RentSeekingResourceCurse%20Sept%2026.pdf Figal Garone, L., Maffioli, A., de Negri, J. A., Rodriguez, C. M., & Vázquez-baré, G. (2015). Cluster Development Policy, SME's Performance, and Spillovers: Evidence from Brazil. Small Business Economics, 44(4), 925-948. Available at: http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.duke.edu/10.1007/s11187014-9620-2 Garcia, Everton. (April 26, 2017). Algumas das milhares de obras realizadas no Regime Militar. (Some of the thousands of works carried out in the Military Regime). Available at: http://www.conservadorismodobrasil. com.br/2017/04/algumas-das-milhares-de-obras-realizadas-no-regime-militar.html IDB. (2015). Vocational Education and Training in Brazil. Available at: https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream /handle/11319/6996/Vocational_Education_Training_Brazil.pdf IMF. (July 2017). IMF Country Report No. 17/215: Brazil. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/ Issues/2017/07/13/Brazil-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-andStatement-by-the-45081 OECD. (2015a). OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Brazil-2015-overview.pdf OECD. (2015b). OECD Policy Memo: Pension Reform in Brazil. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/reforming-brazil-pension-system-april-2017-oecd-policymemo.pdf OECD. (2017a). OECD Reform Agenda for 2017: Overview and Country Notes. Economic Policy Reforms, 109-316. Available at: https://login.proxy.lib.duke.edu/login?url=https://searchproquest-com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/1882005479?accountid=10598 OECD. (2017b). OECD Labor Force Statistics 2016. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.duke.edu/10.1787/oecd_lfs-2016-en OECD (2017c), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2017: An OECD Scoreboard. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.duke.edu/10.1787/fin_sme_ent-2017-en Pereira, Carlos & Frederico Bertholini. (2017). Beliefs or Ideology: The Imperative of Social Inclusion in Brazilian Politics. New York: Routledge. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/ 10.1080/14662043.2017.1327100 104

Rodrik, Dani. (September 2013). Productivity Growth: Lessons for Brazil. Available at: http://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/productivity-growth-lessons-for-brazilfrom-other-countries.pdf Rouzet, D., & Spinelli, F. (2016). The Role of Services for Economic Performance in Brazil. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.duke.edu/10.1787/5jlpl4nx0ptc-en Schumpeter, Joseph A. (2017). The Theory of Economic Development. Translated by Redvers Opie.

New York: Routledge.

SEDICT/DF. (February 16, 2018). Em dois meses DF vira o melhor lugar do país para abrir uma empresa. (In Two Months the Federal District Becomes the Best place in Brazil to Open a Business). Available at: http://www.sedict.df.gov.br/em-dois-meses-df-vira-o-melhor-lugar-dopais-para-abrir-empresa/ Williamson, John. (January 13, 2004). The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development. Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.118.9690&rep=rep1&type=pdf World Bank. (December 31, 2002). Brazil: The New Growth Agenda. Volume I – Policy Brief.

Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/906911468744100952/pdf/multi0page.pdf World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. Retaking the Path to Inclusion, Growth and Sustainability. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/180351467995438283/pdf/101431-REVISED-SCDBrazil-SCD-Final-version-May-6-2016.pdf World Bank. (October 2017). Commodities Market Outlook. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28589/CMO-October-2017-FullReport.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y World Bank. (2017b). Doing Business 2018: Economy Profile of Brazil. Available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/wbg/doingbusiness/documents/profiles/country/bra.pdf

1

Pereira, Carlos & Frederico Bertholini. (2017). Beliefs or Ideology: The Imperative of Social Inclusion in Brazilian Politics.

New York: Routledge.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic.

1 Schumpeter, Joseph A. (2017). The Theory of Economic Development. Translated by Redvers Opie. New York: Routledge, 2017.

1 World Bank. (2017). Commodities Market Outlook.

1 Average growth based in data available at the World Data Bank: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx? source=world-development-indicators 1 Garcia, Everton. (2017). Some of the Works Carried Out in the Military Regime.

1 Garcia, Everton. (2017). Some of the Works Carried Out in the Military Regime.

1 World Bank. (December 31, 2002). Brazil: The New Growth Agenda. p. 8-10.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxv.

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The Washington Consensus was described by John Williamson (author) as “A list of ten specific policy reforms”, which he claimed “were widely agreed in Washington to be desirable in just about all the countries of Latin America, as of 1989.”

More information can be found at Williamson. The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development. 2004.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxv.

1 World Bank. (December 31, 2002). Brazil: The New Growth Agenda. p. 13.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxii- xxiv.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxii- xxiv.

1 More information about the “Mensalão” scandal can be found at The Economist, 2013.

1 Deacon & Rode. (2012). Rent Seeking and the Resource Curse.

1 The Financial Times (February 2006) provide an analysis of Dutch Disease in Brazil.

1 Rodrik, Dani. (September 2013). Productivity Growth: Lessons for Brazil.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xv.

1 More information about the Petrobras can be found at Petrobras Homepage 1 For more information please refer to the Odebretch Homepage 1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxvii.

1 More information can be found at Operation "Car Wash" 1 World Bank. (October 2017). Commodities Market Outlook. p. 1.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxviii.

1 OECD. (2015b). OECD Policy Memo: Pension Reform in Brazil.

1 OECD. (2015a). OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. p. 32.

1 More information can be found at G1 - National Civil Identification Database 1 Data available at the World Data Bank.

1 Cascione & Aires. (June 29, 2017). Brazil Cuts Inflation Target for First Time in Over a Decade.

1 More information about the legislative project that provide autonomy to the Brazil Central Bank can be found at Senado Noticias 1 OECD. (2015a). OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. p. 31.

1 Araújo & Flaig, OECD. (2016). Quantifying the Effects of Trade Liberalization in Brazil. p. 3.

1 World Bank. (October 2017). Commodities Market Outlook. p. 1.

1 OECD. (2015a). OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. p. 32.

1 OECD. (2017b). OECD Labor Force Statistics 2016.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic.

1 OECD. (2015a). OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. p. 48.

1 The Simples network (REDESIMPLES), recently implemented in the Federal District - Brazil, is an online integrated platform that was made available to Brazilian citizens which seek to initiate the process of registration and legalization of a business in the national territory, to be implemented by States and Municipalities, as provided in the Complementary Law 123 of 2006 and Law 11,598 of 2007. More information can be found at: http://www.redesimples.gov.br/conheca-aredesim/o-que-e-a-redesimples.

1 SEDICT/DF. (February 2018). In Two Months the Federal District Becomes the Best Place in Brazil to Open a Business.

1 IDB. (2015). Vocational Education and Training in Brazil.

1 World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. 107.

1

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Political Parasites: Crime and the State in Italy’s Mafias and Mexico’s Cartels Alyssandra Valenzuela Alyssandra Valenzuela is in her final year of a Cognitive Science bachelor's degree at Johns Hopkins University, where she has focused on the topics of cognitive neuropsychology and linguistics. Currently, she works in the Neurology Department of the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine assisting with a project focused on mapping linguistic function in the brain. Her interest in international issues began from hearing her father's stories of growing up in Mexico and from her own experiences during the time she spent in Italy throughout their recent elections. She would like to thank her professor, Dr. Matteo Cantarello, for his support in the writing of this paper.

Groups of organized criminal activity are not modern constructs by any means—mentions of dealings perpetrated by organizations with the characteristic structure and illegitimacy of today’s organized criminal factions date back to the 1840s in Europe and the mid-1850s in America1.

Conventionally, these organizations are defined as enterprises constructed by a systematized hierarchy aiming to pursue profit through illegal means, with significant emphasis placed on the role of violence, corruption, and protection permeating all of their transactions2. The groups originally included under this definition were implied both to be most strongly motived by a desire to maximize their profits— predominantly by “providing goods that were demanded by society” but could not be obtained through legal means—and also to be connected to lawful society in such a way that as legitimate businesses grew, so too would these criminal ones3. This concept is illustrated quite effectively by the mafias of Italy—most notably La Cosa Nostra in Sicily, the Camorra in Naples, and the ‘Ndrangheta of Calabria—as well as the numerous cartels of Mexico, as in both locations these criminal groups developed expansive underworld empires that matched the economic growth of their respective home countries.

Although groups of organized crime exist all over the world, the Italian mafia and the Mexican cartels have unquestionably enjoyed the greatest success as organizations able to command an influential network of relationships within their societies. In Italy, the mafiosi character is a requisite part of the country’s history—a part that, until recently, has been relegated into obscurity through resolute government denial and unusual public cooperation. Similarly, in Mexico, though the cartels are much less cautious about remaining outside of the government’s notice their sheer newness seemed to protect them as they grew from rural insignificance. Nevertheless, recently both the mafia and the cartels have received an increasing amount of scrutiny as attempts have been made to describe the origins of

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these criminal organizations, their internal structures, and the web of corruption that attaches them so definitively to Italian and Mexican culture “thanks to the collusion of more than one element of the state itself”.4 As more information becomes available it is increasingly apparent that neither the mafia nor the cartels built themselves up in complete isolation from—or in complete defiance of—their individual government and political systems. Rather, they have founded themselves upon a functional “convergence of interests” between the operations of the legal, public sector and their own more covert, criminal domains.5 Despite the evident involvement of the mafia and the cartels in political, economic, and social arenas, it still does not seem appropriate to label these organizations as ‘alternate states’ lying in wait behind the existing governing systems in Italy or Mexico. Instead, these groups fill a more auxiliary role in national politics and economics—operating from a position deeply embedded in society yet careful to always remain separate from the country’s official structures. Notably, this distinction can be seen paralleled in both countries first through the mafia and cartel’s unique relationship with their governments, and second through the way their interactions with the public of their respective regions are manipulated to preserve their construction and authority. Furthermore, in Italy, the subordinate role of the mafia is demonstrated by their associations with the country’s influential political terror groups, and in Mexico the relationship between the cartels and the United States supports the idea that this criminal organization fills a role that is supplementary to and dependent upon the state itself rather than competitive with it.

The primary answer to the question of how criminal organizations became so powerful typically focuses on the failure of the local government to establish authority meaningfully throughout the entire country. From this explanation, it follows that in Italy the mafia developed to fill the “gaps left by an ineffective state” in order to “impos[e] some form of rudimentary order” in Italian society—particularly in the southern-most regions.6 One of the earliest and most widely accepted definitions of the term “mafia”—particularly in Sicily—was in fact an expression representing a friend’s capacity to protect, defend, and remedy damage done to another.7 In the early years of the organization this definition was extremely important, as it helped outline the connection of the groups with the Italian community at large. This definition was only viable, however, because of a long-standing and well-known distrust of the Italian state already present throughout the country—especially in the southern regions. From the dramatic rise and fall of fascism to the more gradual corruption of the police forces, the Italian public found themselves firmly in a position of being “victims of the state’s violence” for decades, with little hope for things to ever change.8 From these conditions the mafia was able to cultivate a “general attitude 108

towards the State” that grew increasingly more skeptical as eventually years of being “traumatized by actions committed by the state” led the public to accept—or at least, to tolerate—the establishment of these factions of organized crime which claimed to work for them and against the government.9 Nevertheless, this technique of interpreting the state as a remote enemy fails to account for the fact that the Italian government and the various mafia groups are effectively constructed upon the same system of organization—a nepotistic “parentela system” that delegates positions based not on principle or merit “but on the loyalty and trust owed to an individual”.10 This system reflects the sentiment that the family is the “enduring unit of Italian society” for both legal and illegal arrangements, yet this manifests very differently when practically applied to government administrations and those of the mafia.11 Nepotism in the government leads to an inefficient and unreliable organization, which in turn cultivates distrust between the people and their government, as well as a sort of economic stagnation that comes from a public refusing to do business with their state.12 On the other hand, this same practice in criminal groups allows their internal dealings to run more smoothly and also permits them to then utilize this shared distrust in the government as a means of forming the networks of corruption upon which they thrive.

Rather than ‘filling in’ where the government is lacking in terms of constructing better-organized or dependable governmental structures, the mafia has simply developed into a parallel and parasitic organization that utilizes the same administrative structures that failed their government to sustain their uniquely illegal businesses.

Correspondingly, in Mexico, a similar “general skepticism” of the people towards the “actions of the central government” is maintained primarily in the most rural parts of the country, which lies far from the ruling capital city.13 The Mexican army’s entry into these rural lands is regularly characterized as being “brutally violent”, with the majority of the victims being “defenseless peasants” who have no way of combating these government-supported attacks.14 In these regions, supposed raids on cartelowned plantations and other sites of cartel activity are seen merely as “government propaganda” which actually target “small producers and independent farmers” far more than they do the large planting fields of the narcotraficantes.15 Such “traumatic memories” of this sort of government-ordered violence has caused the affected peasants to view the state’s solution to the issue of drug trafficking to be almost more harmful than the presence of the narcotraficantes themselves. In addition to this, the “low wages, low advancement potential, and poor accountability mechanisms” present in the country’s police forces combine to produce a law enforcement agency which is entirely unmotivated to persecute cartel leaders when working alongside them is far safer and much more lucrative.16 Given both the prevalent suspicion 109

of the government among Mexico’s citizens and the growing pervasiveness of “social norms enabling corruption” among the assumed enforcers of Mexican law, there is a remarkable absence in legitimate administration which seems primed for exploitation by any cartel with a desire to set itself up as an alternative ruling body.17 Because of this, the cartels have taken cover in these chaotic zones where a culture of “impunity and lawlessness”, a “fearful and inadequate police force”, and a population oppressed by poverty and fear of violence have combined to produce a complete lack of governing influence.18 However, while the cartels might be highly organized internally, they show little interest in commanding the society in which they are immersed as long as they are allowed to conduct their businesses without disruption. Moreover, any success on the Mexican government’s part in actually arresting or killing cartel leaders simply leads to increased violence on the drug trafficker’s former land as the disruption “throws the cartel into confusion” and causes the groups to “splinter into smaller, rival organizations” which then fight viciously over territory and profits.19 This sort of turmoil makes these criminal groups extremely dangerous to the civilians around them, as their far-reaching connections and allied subsidiaries allow them to operate literally across their country—from Central and South America up into the United States—where they maintain almost complete command of the communities located in crucial positions such as on the borders and near ports. Despite the power these groups hold, however, it is clear that the primary focus of their associations and influence is intended to support their business endeavors above all things as they operate alongside the Mexican government, tied to it primarily through bribes and coercion.

Furthermore, the relationships of both the mafia and the cartels with the communities in which they operate display their inability to function as unique actors independent from the support of the existing state. Despite the similar structures of control employed by both the Italian government and the criminal groups located there, the mafia failed to ever make attempts to set itself up as another governing body—the idea of an “order-keeping mafia” only ever extended as far as their business transactions and never into the domain of social administration.20 Instead, the mafia depended entirely on the presence of the current Italian state to facilitate their incorporation into society—the people’s hatred of the government could easily be manipulated into lenience in judgment towards their criminal activities. This tolerance of the mafia’s undertakings also marked the existence of a strange paradox between the public’s fear of and simultaneous passive complicity with the criminal organizations with which they coexist. As previously implied, the mafia’s principal strategy for maintaining its position on the periphery of society was to pose the Italian government as the enemy of the public and mafia alike— 110

and to firmly suggest that theirs was a business of mutual aid between the criminals and society.

Nevertheless, as organized crime spread from the south into the northern parts of the country and beyond, the nature of the mafia began to change as it adopted a much more “impersonal” organizational structure that—instead of fighting for the safety of its neighbors—was now solely concerned with the “large-scale financial activities” that supported it.21 This transition—which originated in the 1970s with the initiation of a flourishing market for drugs in America—led the “honorable old agricultural” values of the mafia to give way to a “ferocious urban gangsterism” that, while much more suited to their new role as a transatlantic commercial industry, moved further from the traditional attitude of ‘mafia’ that the Italian people had so long ago come to terms with.22 Given these developments the idea of the mafia as an organization aimed solely at mediating the disputes of local residents appears even more impossible.

Now, not only has the mafia turned away from a public that had shielded it out of a misguided sense of community, but it has also given up on its own traditional sense of honor—choosing instead to replace both of these with a single-minded pursuit of commercial profit and so isolating itself in the process.

Noticeably, however, this changed marked the beginnings of a restructuring within the Italian mafias that resulted in their much more closely resembling the Mexican cartels than ever before. This evolution further shifted the mafia away from the possibility of serving as a distinct ruling body in the same way it did for the drug trafficking groups, as their focus grew increasingly centered on the “communications and guarantees” necessary for the “very high-risk operations” involved in the transoceanic drug trade.23 From this point on, individual mafiosi had the opportunity to become “entrepreneurs in their own right”, and over the years the “age-old virtue” of groups which before had flaunted their dedication to protection, brotherhood, and family, had now become “disfigured by violence and greed” as income from the drug trade made the mafia millions practically overnight.24 The Mexican cartels, meanwhile, have essentially founded themselves right from the beginning upon these same opportunistic business strategies—with alarmingly little regard for the people and communities with which they coexist. In the early days of their establishment and growth, drug traffickers utilized sizeable drug profits to “neutralize government opposition” and to ensure a network of corruption that included secure “distribution rights, market access, and even official government protection” to wield influence over Mexico’s political systems and set themselves up as the most powerful influence within their society.25 Whatever form the Mexican government’s alleged drug war takes on, cartel bosses are able to exploit a sort of passive cooperation within the neighborhoods in which they operate that is based principally upon a fear of retaliatory violence against anyone who might challenge them.26 Unlike the 111

supposed concern of the Italian mafia for the well-being of their local communities, the Mexican cartels are infamous for their disregard for the lives of young people, working civilians, and families alike.

Civil liberties groups, journalists, and student protesters have long criticized the Mexican government’s methods in confronting cartel activity, as their tendency to immediately call in the military simply serve to add to the thousands of deaths that already lay in the wake of the cartels’ turf wars, kidnappings, and general enforcement of punishment.27 Rather than endeavor to gain any semblance of support from the citizens of the territories they claim, cartel bosses prefer to coerce public cooperation through massive amounts of bloodshed and so are shockingly unfit to form or apply their own rules to the societies in which they exist as they cannot claim to be working for the interests of the people the way the state must. Although their reputation and strength lets them control the Mexican population to some extent, this control is focused solely on allowing their business operations to run smoothly and takes little notice of who is being harmed in the process.

Additionally, the mafia’s role in Italy’s decades-long struggle against the influence of both extreme right-wing and left-wing terrorists further illustrates how these criminal groups serve much more to support the existing state than they do to supersede or undermine it. First, the pressure leftist terrorist groups placed on the Italian public and government cannot be understated as this desperate fear of communism, which “has always explained and justified everything”, eventually came to include even negotiations between the government and the mafia with the hope of eliminating potential political threats.28 For years, the Italian political structure was exceptionally tolerant of the mafia’s presence as they continued to maintain that the mafia did not exist. However, when the Italian government did finally start to acknowledge the presence of organized crime throughout their country—beginning with Anti-Mafia Commission of 1963—the ensuing crackdown on Mafiosi and their illicit activities was remarkably underwhelming. This unusual leniency can likely be attributed to several sources, the most significant being “the symbiosis between the Mafia and politics” that manifests mainly through the mafia’s ability to “mobilize votes”.29 Despite the mafia’s blatant disregard for established laws and social principles, and although Italy’s democratic state is officially “hostile to such a power as the mafia”, the Italian government never truly viewed the mafia as a threat to their own power because the mafia’s resolute focus on “crime and private enrichment” made it “incapable of producing professional revolutionaries”.30 Since the mafia is supported by the “regulation of existing social relationships” between its own interests and those of the government, the “rise of revolutionary movements” and terrorist influences that break down these interactions threatened to weaken it—and so it remained 112

closely allied with the government as political conflict expanded in Italy throughout the 1960s and 1970s.31 From this position, the mafia could do what the government could not: conduct relations with right-wing terrorists to secure connections and make plans that would ultimately weaken far-left revolutionary groups. Although the mafia, particularly in Rome, was “offered the chance to take an active part in violent, right-wing politics” they consistently “declined the offer but exchanged weapons for favours instead”.32 This choice makes it clear that the businesses of the Italian mafias are so strongly maintained by relations with the existing system that even when offered the chance to engage in revolutionary activities that could create their own formidable ‘anti-state’, the mafia declined in favor of maintaining the status quo. Their influence within the country’s political sphere is already strong enough that their propensity to remain a-political allowed them many more benefits as they could approach and be approached by both the state and the terrorists with the sole expectation of furthering their prevailing goal of pursuing profit with the least amount of interference.

The relationship between Mexico and its powerful neighbor the United States also functions to demonstrate the ways in which the cartels only endure as derivative of the existing state itself. The drug and arms trade that has grown with an incredible swiftness since the 1960s boom in the American drug market largely characterizes the cartel’s role in this association so far as much of today’s public is concerned. However, in certain regions of Mexico and the United States—primarily, the 3,000-kilometer border between the countries—this connection between the economies and societies of the two nations is not only supported by the trafficking of drugs, but also by the profitable transactions required to sustain any number of illegal activities. In fact, cities located along the Mexican-American border are often considered to be the original sites of organized crime in Mexico, as years ago a great opportunity for wealth in selling Mexican-produced black market goods in America was discovered there. The transportation and distribution of this contraband required the bribing of customs officers and the illegal entry of Mexican citizens into the United States that was, at first, coordinated by small criminal groups living in border towns. From this foundation however, the economy of communities along the MexicanAmerican border became almost entirely focused on the give and take established by the availability of goods and services restricted in one country but legal in the other. For example, when Prohibition suddenly made alcohol inaccessible to Americans in the 1920s, the main sources of wealth in Mexican border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez became “casino gambling…the sale and open consumption of alcohol, and organized prostitution”.33 And later, when Prohibition was abolished and relaxed moral values became more popular in America, cities on Mexican side of the border suffered 113

“serious economic collapse” as Americans no longer came to Mexico for quick divorces, alcohol, or prostitutes.34 The importance of this border to the Mexican cartels cannot be overstated—these marginalized cities in the far Northern regions of the country provided the ideal environment for the growth and development of local gangs, and from these smaller organizations came the extensive cartel structures that presently command the US-Mexican perimeter. Because this manner of trade remains the norm today, the cartels have no exceptional desire to facilitate legal trade between the two neighboring nations as they stand to gain so much more by dealing exclusively in black market contraband. In this way, the cartels’ business is wholly dependent on the existing restrictions and regulations of both Mexico and the United States that help to drive up prices of their illegally transported goods.

Starting from their conception, the role of the mafia in Italian culture and the narcotraficantes in Mexican society has been increasingly intricate and wide-ranging. What began as a “state of mind” of the family-oriented southern Italians, and the unassuming production of poppy by the impoverished gomeros of South America, eventually developed into “machines of organized power” that now span across both countries with the strength to influence every aspect of society—be it personal, political, or commercial.35 In Italy, the mafias operate astonishingly well in the clandestine peripheries of the current regime, where their unobtrusive control of political figures and the hushed support of their communities effectively shield them from punitive government actions. And in Mexico, the aggressive application of both violence and bribery keep members of the cartels protected from potential defectors and legal repercussions alike. In spite of this apparent strength however, both the mafia and the cartels have ultimately failed to take the next logical step: they have by no means developed into an alternate ruling power of their own. Although it might appear that these groups of organized crime hold a unique monopoly on the management of Italy and Mexico, as of yet they have still refused to exploit available opportunities to move further into their countries’ administration—preferring instead to remain quietly behind the government where they can facilitate their businesses with impunity. Although this displays unusual restraint for organizations established on control and gratuitous violence, it is possible that the mafia and the narcotraficantes appreciate the distinction that comes with having tremendous power over—but no responsibility for—the people living in their communities. Perhaps it is a dedication to their businesses that precludes the possibility of their expanding into an administrative role, since their narrow focus on profit makes them unlikely candidates for managing operations meant exclusively to provide for others the way a state is expected to. It is interesting to note however, that as the authority of these criminal groups continues to develop they will no doubt come to clash with the existing 114

government of their countries more and more as they cross further into the realms of political, economic, and social influence. The question seems to remain then, of how much these organizations can antagonize local law and drive the government out of their way while still refusing to fill in the responsibilities of a legal authority or source of welfare that is left behind as the dominance of the state progressively weakens.

1

Varese, Federico. General Introduction: What is organized crime? Routledge, 2010, 3.

Ibid, 4.

3 Ibid, 4.

4 Ginsborg, Paul. Italy and its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State (1980-2001). Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 195.

5 Subau Pop, Aurelian Olimpiu. The Emersion of Corruption and Organized Crime in Italy. The Judicial Current, 56 (2014), 90.

6 Abadinsky, Howard. Organized Crime. 6th ed., Wadsworth, 2000, 107.

7 Ibid 8 Duenas, Gabriela Polit. Narrating Narcos: Culiacan and Medellin. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013, 27.

9 Ibid, 24.

10 “Italy: The odd country”. The Economist, 26 May 1990. Pp. 3 – 19, 14.

11 Ibid.

12 Gambetta, Diego. Mafia: The Prince of Distrust. Basil Blackwell Inc., 1988, 163.

13 Duenas, Gabriela Polit. Narrating Narcos: Culiacan and Medellin. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013, 25.

14 Ibid, 27.

15 Ibid, 25.

16 Gauthier, Jean-Philippe et. al. The War on Meixcan Cartels: Options for US and Mexican Policy-Makers.

Harvard University Institute of Politics, September 2012, 17.

17 Ibid, 14.

18 Ibid, 17.

19 Ibid, 11.

20 Lupo, Salvatore. History of the Mafia. Translated by Antony Shugaar, Columbia University Press, 2009, 15.

21 Ibid, 14.

22 Ibid, 13.

23 Ginsborg, Paul. Italy and its Discontents: Family, Civil Society, State (1980-2001). Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 199.

24 Lupo, Salvatore. History of the Mafia. Translated by Antony Shugaar, Columbia University Press, 2009, 14.

25 Lee, Brianna, Renwick, Danielle. Mexico’s Drug War. Council on Foreign Relations, 25 May 2017, 2.

26 Ibid, 2.

27 Ibid, 4.

28 Welgen, Nicole. Novels About Mysteries = Mystery Novels? The Years of Lead in Contemporary Italian Literature. McFarland & Company, Inc, 2014, 31.

29 Gambetta, Diego. Mafia: The Prince of Distrust. Basil Blackwell Inc., 1988, 167.

30 Hobson, E. J. Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc, 1963, 53.

31 Hobson, E. J. Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc, 1963, 53.

32 Dickie, John. Blood Brotherhoods: a History of Italy's Three Mafias. Public Affairs (2014),149.

2

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33

Ruiz, Francisco Javier Molina. Organized Crime and Democratic Governability at the US-Mexican Border.

University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000, 180.

34 Ibid, 181.

35 Hobson, E. J. Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc, 1963, 32.

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Pereira, Carlos & Frederico Bertholini. (2017). Beliefs or Ideology: The Imperative of Social Inclusion in Brazilian Politics. New York: Routledge. xlvii World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. xlviii World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. xlix Schumpeter, Joseph A. (2017). The Theory of Economic Development. Translated by Redvers Opie. New York: Routledge, 2017. l World Bank. (2017). Commodities Market Outlook. li Average growth based in data available at the World Data Bank: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx? source=world-development-indicators lii Garcia, Everton. (2017). Some of the Works Carried Out in the Military Regime. liii Garcia, Everton. (2017). Some of the Works Carried Out in the Military Regime. liv World Bank. (December 31, 2002). Brazil: The New Growth Agenda. p. 8-10. lv World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxv. lvi The Washington Consensus was described by John Williamson (author) as “A list of ten specific policy reforms”, which he claimed “were widely agreed in Washington to be desirable in just about all the countries of Latin America, as of 1989.”

More information can be found at Williamson. The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development. 2004. lvii World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxv. lviii World Bank. (December 31, 2002). Brazil: The New Growth Agenda. p. 13. lix World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxii- xxiv. lx World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxii- xxiv. lxi More information about the “Mensalão” scandal can be found at The Economist, 2013. lxii Deacon & Rode. (2012). Rent Seeking and the Resource Curse. lxiii The Financial Times (February 2006) provide an analysis of Dutch Disease in Brazil. lxiv Rodrik, Dani. (September 2013). Productivity Growth: Lessons for Brazil. lxv World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xv. lxvi More information about the Petrobras can be found at Petrobras Homepage lxvii For more information please refer to the Odebretch Homepage lxviii World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxvii. lxix More information can be found at Operation "Car Wash" lxx World Bank. (October 2017). Commodities Market Outlook. p. 1. lxxi World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. xxviii. lxxii OECD. (2015b). OECD Policy Memo: Pension Reform in Brazil. lxxiii OECD. (2015a). OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. p. 32. lxxiv More information can be found at G1 - National Civil Identification Database lxxv Data available at the World Data Bank. lxxvi Cascione & Aires. (June 29, 2017). Brazil Cuts Inflation Target for First Time in Over a Decade. lxxvii More information about the legislative project that provide autonomy to the Brazil Central Bank can be found at Senado Noticias lxxviii OECD. (2015a). OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. p. 31. lxxix Araújo & Flaig, OECD. (2016). Quantifying the Effects of Trade Liberalization in Brazil. p. 3. lxxx World Bank. (October 2017). Commodities Market Outlook. p. 1.

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lxxxi

OECD. (2015a). OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. p. 32.

OECD. (2017b). OECD Labor Force Statistics 2016. lxxxiii World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. lxxxiv OECD. (2015a). OECD Economic Surveys: Brazil. p. 48. lxxxv The Simples network (REDESIMPLES), recently implemented in the Federal District - Brazil, is an online integrated platform that was made available to Brazilian citizens which seek to initiate the process of registration and legalization of a business in the national territory, to be implemented by States and Municipalities, as provided in the Complementary Law 123 of 2006 and Law 11,598 of 2007. More information can be found at: http://www.redesimples.gov.br/conheca-aredesim/o-que-e-a-redesimples. lxxxvi SEDICT/DF. (February 2018). In Two Months the Federal District Becomes the Best Place in Brazil to Open a Business. lxxxvii IDB. (2015). Vocational Education and Training in Brazil. lxxxviii World Bank. (May 6, 2016). Brazil Systematic Country Diagnostic. p. 107. lxxxii

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