Winstanley college history magazine revision edition by Winstanley College

Winstanley College

History Magazine Special Revision Edition!

Editorial. After a very successful year for the Winstanley History Magazine, this Edition is slightly different: - it contains well-written and highly scoring essays on topics assessed in AS and A2 History.

tion in the Winstanley History Magazine are always welcomed and can be on any history related topic email your article to the History Society or speak to a member of the editorial team.

Each topic area (The Crusades; Mussolini’s Italy; Norman Conquest; Modern Britain; Angevin Kings) contains model essay answers written by students and generously volunteered to help with revision.

A massive thank you to everyone who has volunteered their essays to this edition of the magazine! Happy revising and good luck!

Phoebe McGibbon, Maddie McDonagh and Sally Dickens (Editors)

Also in this Special Revision Edition is a ‘Top Revision Tips’ to help with preparation for the exam.

Don’t forget: Like us on Facebook: www.facebook.com/WinstanleyHistory

As ever, articles for publica-

Contents:

The Crusades Page 6….First Crusade: Knight’s Motivation by Phoebe McGibbon

Page 8…Muslim Disunity and the Success of the First Crusade by Chloe Atherton Page 10….Frankish Disunity and the Failure of the Second Crusade by Phoebe McGibbon Page 13….The Calling of the First Crusade by Lydia Newhall Page 14… The Success of the First Crusade by Edward Holt Page 16…Divisions Within the Kingdom of Jerusalem by Francesca Gormally

Mussolini’s Italy Page 20…. Mussolini’s Use of Terror by Chloe Atherton Page 23…..Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War by Phoebe McGibbon Page 25…..A Loyal Fascist Nation? By Chloe Atherton Page 29….Mussolini’s Economic Policies by Sally Dickens Page 33….Confino Sources by Phoebe McGibbon Page 34….The Use of Violence and Intimidation by Jenny McKenzie

Norman Conquest Page 38…. The Social and Political Position of the English Aristocracy by Edward Holt Page 40…. Timeline by Jak Houghton Page 42….. The Failure of Rebellion Against William by Edward Holt 3

Modern Britain

Contents (continued):

Page 45….The 1970 Election by Phoebe McGibbon Page 48….Major’s Weak Leadership vs Thatcher’s Legacy by Peter Lyon Page 50….Conservative Defeat 1974 by Phoebe McGibbon Page 53….Labour Disunity 1951 to 1964 by Tom Davies Page 56….Harold Wilson’s Election by Tom Davies Page 59…..The 1970 Election by Tom Davies

Angevin Kings Page 63….. King Henry II and Thomas Beckett by Jordan Tudor Page 66….. King Henry II’s Restoration of Royal Authority by Jordan Tudor Page 69….. The Loss of Normandy in 1204 by Jordan Tudor Page 72…. Henry II’s victory Over the Great Rebellion of 1173-34 by Jordan Tudor Page 75…. The Consequences of Thomas Becket’s Death by Hannah Taylor Page 79…. The Creation of the Magna Carta by Hannah Taylor Page 82…. The Rise of Anti-Semitism by Hannah Taylor Page 86…. The Personality of King John by Adam Hope

Page 90… Top Revision Tips from the History Mentors 4

The Crusades

How important was spiritual motivation for knights participating in the First Crusade? (24 marks) Many factors contributed to knights’ decisions to participate in the first crusade. Naturally, each knight was motivated by different factors, mainly spiritual, economic or social. Some knights were allured by the potential of gaining land, and the prospects of a better life in a land described in scripture as ‘flowing with milk and honey’. Some knights were roused to fulfil their knightly duty, and to fulfil the noble and chivalrous knightly ideal. However, some knights took up their swords in pursuit of salvation and redemption in the holy land, and the honour of liberating Jerusalem from the Muslim infidel. Religious motivation was extremely important in motivating knights to go on the first crusade, and was a common motivation to all knights. People used the idea of God to explain events in their lives. An apocalypse was expected at the end of the eleventh century, therefore people were desperate to gain salvation, and secure a pathway to heaven. Travelling to Jerusalem (the Holy City) was seen as a pilgrimage, and knights believed that their souls would be purified by the spirit of Christ there, and they would therefore be acceptable in heaven. The idea of the crusade being a pilgrimage is illustrated by Pope Urban’s words – ‘enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre’. Raymond of Toulouse, the oldest knight in France, was the first to respond to Pope Urban’s speech. He had no economic motivations, as he was rich and needed no more money – he wanted to die in the Holy Land, and therefore saw the crusade as a pilgrimage to this holy place. The knights were also motivated on religious grounds by anger at the Muslims in Jerusalem. They were keen to go and fight these infidel, and to ‘wrest that land from the wicked race’ as Pope Urban instructed. The Knights were told that Jerusalem ‘implored’ them to ‘come to her aid’. This appealed to their chivalry, as well as to their pride in their faith, and motivated them to join the fight for Jerusalem. One particular Knight, Robert of Normandy; went to defend his faith and to liberate Jerusalem – he was very pious. After the crusade, he returned home, which shows that he had no economic motivations. Pope Urban referred to Jerusalem as ‘the navel of the world’. This glorification of the Christian holy city roused knights to seek vengeance on the Seljuk Turks in Jerusalem, who had bespoiled the city and made it unsafe for Christian pilgrims. Alexius Comnenus’ letter details occurrence of sodomy, rape and circumcision of Christians in Jerusalem. By reiterating this to knights, the Pope was sure to rouse their anger against the Muslims. For many, the crusade offered a pilgrimage blessed by the pope, and with huge military protection – this was important because, as Jonathan Riley-Smith explains; the prospect of Doomsday meant that people were eager to take a pilgrimage and secure a place in heaven. However, economic factors were also crucial in motivating knights to participate in the first 6

crusade. Owing to the practise of primogeniture, many second and third sons were landless. Going on the crusade offered a possibility of gaining land in the East. Unlike the West, the East was highly cultivated and rich – knights were eager to claim some of this land. As Scott points out, if the knights failed in their attempts to gain land in the East, they would always have the consolation of the holy crown, and be seen as brave, chivalrous knights. They had nothing to lose by going on the crusade. Baldwin of Boulogne, a third son, had no land in the West. He sold all his property and took his wife and children on the crusade with him. This demonstrates that he had no intention of returning to the West. Baldwin became Prince of Edessa. Bohemond, a Southern Italian Norman, also went in search of land and power. The lure of wealth in the East, (economic motivations) were key to making Knights participate in the crusade. However, as Jonathan Riley-Smith points out, many crusaders, such as Stephen of Blois, returned to their land, which shows that they were not motivated massively by economic factors. Social factors also motivated Knights to go on the First crusade. Jotischky argues that social motivations were the most important, as knights were bound by their place in the feudal system. Knights had to live up to the Knightly ideal, and had to be brave and chivalrous. Going on the crusade was an ideal opportunity to prove themselves valiant and noble – one knight describes this motivation – ‘the onset of knightly ferocity stirred me up’. The Pope’s indulgence solved the Knight’s dilemma, as they were allowed to kill the infidel without fear of going to hell. Some knights were also inspired to take up the cross by the need to live up to family honour. For example, Robert Guiscard’s son, Bohemond, felt the need to go on the crusade in order to live up to his father. Stephen of Blois went to fight due to pressure from his wife, daughter of William the Conqueror, who wanted her husband to live up to her family name. Although economic and social factors were important in motivating knights to go and fight, they did not motivate all knights. Religious motivations, however, were common to all, and therefore the most important factor. The prospect of the apocalypse and the need to gain salvation, as well as the need to seek vengeance on the infidel, were absolutely crucial in motivating almost all knights to take up the cross .

How important was Muslim disunity to the success of the first crusade? (24 Marks) Many factors contributed to the success of the first crusade. The most important long term factor which enabled the Crusaders to be victorious was the disunity of the Muslims, and the divisions in the Muslim world. Whilst the Crusaders were a united force, there was much infighting amongst Muslims, and they were therefore unable to pose as much of a threat to the Crusaders. The Knight’s fierce religious motivation also contributed to their success – they were encouraged by religious experiences and apparent miracles, whilst the ultimate goal of liberating Jerusalem incited their energy and undoubtedly brought success. Military factors also contributed to the success of the first Crusade – the exceptional military skill and tactics shown by Knights such as Bohemond made the Crusading army a powerful force. Muslim disunity was undoubtedly a key factor in enabling the Crusaders to be successful. The Muslim world of the East was divided politically, racially and religiously. Jonathan RileySmith suggests that the Muslims were so disunited that even a threat as large as the crusade could not produce a ‘collective response’ – even in the face of their enemy; the Muslims were not a united force. This disunity was seen at the Battle of Dorylaeum in July 1097. Bohemond and his army were fighting an uneasy alliance of Seljuk Turks and Danishmends, making them easier to defeat. Furthermore, the inherent religious and political divide between the Sunni Abbasid and Shia Fatimid Muslims indirectly enabled the Crusaders to take Jerusalem. Following the Shia takeover of Jerusalem from the Seljuk Sunni Muslims in 1098, the Seljuks refused to slow the advances of the Crusaders march on Jerusalem, meaning that they met virtually no resistance on approach to Jerusalem. The Fatimids did not have enough time to gather an army to defend the city. Had the Crusaders met a united opposition, they may well have been defeated. The political chaos in the East also meant that the Crusaders were able to forge diplomatic alliances. An example of this was seen in the siege of Antioch – Bohemond formulated an agreement with a renegade Armenian Christian to allow the Crusaders secret entry to the city by night. This Armenian was willing to betray his city, which demonstrates a distinct lack of faith in Eastern leaders. The divisions in the Muslim world following the death of Malik Shah meant that whilst the Crusaders were a united army, displaying ‘espirit de corps’ and an amalgamated force, the Muslims had no such unity. Scott suggests that ‘if the Muslims had maintained the unity Muhammad had preached, no crusade could possibly have succeeded.’ The Crusaders did, nonetheless, display incredible military skill and ingenious tactics. This was a short term contributing factor to their ultimate success. Strong leadership from Knights such as Bohemond of Taranto and Godfrey de Bouillon was crucial. The fighting 8

techniques of the crusaders were excellent. In the Battle of Dorylaeum, Bohemond arranged the Crusaders in a defensive position – a circle with men at the front, to fight, whilst holy men gave blessings and women, protected by the front line of men, were able to aid the wounded. By early 1098, the crusaders had learnt to counter the Muslims’ feint and retreat tactic by encircling them. Christopher Tyerman describes how quickly the leaders of the Crusading army ‘adapted to the alien military tactics of their enemies’. In the Battle of Ascalon (1099), the Crusaders used cattle, to give the impression of a much larger army. The Crusaders also introduced the concept of pitched battles; which the Muslims were not used to – the Western forces were able to use the Muslims’ unawareness of how to fight this kind of battle to their advantage. The Crusaders displayed military skill outside of battle – Bohemond set up camp in the Asia Minor with a river, to provide water, mountains, to provide shelter from the elements, and in marshland, so the Seljuks would not attempt an attack on horseback. The Crusaders also benefited massively from the economic and military aid of the Byzantine Empire, led by Alexius Comnenus. This was particularly vital in sieges. At Nicaea, the Empire provided siege equipment, food, and ensured that the city was surrounded. The military advisor given to the Crusaders by Alexius proved enormously beneficial, in the Battle of Dorylaeum for example. The Crusaders were also aided by Genoese ships – during the siege of Antioch, the Genoese fleet provided wood for the siege engines that allowed the Crusaders to break into the city. Spiritual elements also contributed to the first Crusade. The Knights were motivated by the goal of reaching Jerusalem, and liberating the Holy City. At the siege of Antioch; Peter Bartholemew’s vision of St Andrew and the Holy Lance provided the motivation the Crusaders needed to continue fighting. At Jerusalem, the vision of Adhemar Le Puy reinvigorated the Crusaders, and ensured they did not give up at this final stage in their journey. The Pope’s promise of salvation and redemption at the Holy Sepulchre also contributed to the success of the first Crusade – it provided resilience to make it to Jerusalem; especially with the prospect of Doomsday looming. Although all these factors were instrumental in ensuring the success of the first crusade; the most important contributing factor was the military skill of the crusaders. Muslim Disunity was a massive help to the crusaders, although even if the Muslims had been a united force; the Crusaders had sufficient military skill and tactical expertise to be victorious. The divisions in the Muslim world merely acted as a catalyst to the inevitable, and made the Crusader’s fight slightly easier. Religious motivation; although important; was simply a question of belief. The military skill of the crusaders was a strong, physical factor, without which they would have failed miserably in their crusade.

How far was Frankish disunity to blame for the failure of the Second Crusade? (24 marks) Whilst the disunity amongst the Franks was partly to blame for the failure of the second crusade, the poor leadership of King Louis VII of France and King Conrad III of Germany was central to its failure. For example, their ‘ridiculous’ decision to attack Damascus ultimately led to the breakdown of the crusaders’ campaign, and Louis’ amazingly poor leadership at Mount Cadmus led to men and supplies being wiped out by the Turks. The crusading forces’ lack of allies also contributed to their failure – the Syrian Franks refused to aid the crusaders, Manuel Comnenus (Byzantine Emperor) was duplicitous, and therefore offered no real help, and Louis was forced to turn down Roger of Sicily’s offer of help, through fear of angering Manuel. Throughout the second crusade, the Franks were undeniably disunited. Since the death of Baldwin II, there had been on-going disagreement between the leaders of the Franks. There was much debate as to whether the Frankish leaders should support Melisende (Baldwin II’s wife), or Baldwin III. Melisende was acting as regent to her son, which many of the Franks disagreed with. Joscelin of Edessa and Raymond of Antioch were in particular dispute over this. These divisions amongst the Frankish leaders led to selfishness – each was protecting their own land, and was concerned only with their own political advancements. This egocentrism was seen at the Council of Acre in June 1148. Melisende wanted to attack Ascalon, to meet her own political ends. Baldwin III wanted to attack Damascus to prove his independence. Raymond of Tripoli advocated an attack on the Castle of Montferrand; Raymond of Antioch wanted to take Aleppo and Joscelin wanted to regain his lost territory of Edessa. Louis and Conrad made a decision to attack the independent trading city of Damascus – a decision described by Runciman as being ‘utter folly’. Whatever their motivation in making this ‘ridiculous’ (Mayer) decision, the completely contrasting wills of the Frankish leaders certainly did not aid pragmatic decision making. Had the Frankish leaders all stuck to the original aim of the crusade and persuaded Louis and Conrad to attack Edessa, the Crusade may not have failed. However, the Franks were selfish and concerned only with their own political pursuits. This disunity could be seen to have indirectly caused the failure of the second crusade. The Franks also had a poor relationship with the crusaders. Aside from the inherent differences in language, and subsequent communication barriers, a number of incidents worsened the already tense relations. The arrival of the crusaders alarmed the Franks – they were eager to kill the infidel – Muslims with whom the Franks had been living harmoniously. In addition, the scandal following the alleged affair between Raymond of Antioch and Queen Eleanor caused further tensions. Finally, the Franks had an alliance with the Damascenes, and were therefore angered when 10

the Crusaders attacked Damascus. The complete lack of unity between the Frankish leaders and the Franks and the Crusaders contrasted with the unity of the Muslims, and meant that the second crusade was unlikely to succeed. The most important factor resulting in the failure of the second crusade was the poor leadership of Louis VII and Conrad III. King Louis of France made many major errors, which undoubtedly contributed to the failure of the crusade. Louis’ poor leadership at Mount Cadmus led to his men and supplies being wiped out by the Turks – this was described by Jonathan Philips as ‘an amazingly amateurish mistake’. Louis displayed a complete lack of military skill. At Attalia, Louis divided his troops, sending barons by boats and making his footsoldiers walk. The foot soldiers were attacked by the Turks and slaughtered – this, again, demonstrated Louis’ incompetence. Moreover, Louis neglected his marriage bed, ultimately causing an alleged affair between his wife Eleanor and her uncle, Raymond of Antioch. This worsened relations between the Franks and the Crusaders. Louis then refused to help Raymond attack Aleppo. This was a huge oversight on Louis’ part – his personal grudge meant that the crusaders received no aid from the Franks, as Raymond of Antioch and Raymond of Tripoli refused to become involved in the crusade. Louis had made a huge tactical error in refusing to help them. In addition, Louis went on the crusade for the wrong reasons – he wanted penance for the actions of his army at Vitri, not to help the Franks to take back Edessa. Throughout the crusade, Louis failed to provide the strong military leadership the crusaders required. King Conrad III of Germany also made many huge errors throughout the second crusade. At Nicaea (October 1148), Conrad split his army. He sent the pilgrims the slower, coastal route, and took his army the direct route across the mountains. This was a huge tactical error. When travelling with the pilgrims, Conrad could have used the pilgrims as a cover, and declared his forces an armed pilgrimage as opposed to a military campaign. In addition, he left the pilgrims completely vulnerable to attack. The pilgrims were attacked, and Conrad’s army was obliterated – 90% of his troops were killed, and Conrad himself had to return to Constantinople to convalesce. This was significant defeat, and this heavy loss of troops greatly weakened the crusading force. In addition, Conrad’s decision to camp on a flood plain at Choerobacci led to disaster – Conrad’s army suffered heavy loss of equipment and some men drowned in a flash flood. Finally, Conrad’s troops were undisciplined and angered Manuel Comnenus - Conrad’s lack of leadership led to further tensions between the crusaders and the Byzantine Emperor. The poor leadership and military/tactical skills of Conrad and Louis were the main contributing factor to the failure of the second crusade – the heavy loss of men sustained at numerous points, the lack of leadership and purpose, and the ludicrous decision to attack Damascus meant that the second crusade was bound to fail.

The Crusaders’ lack of allies was also pivotal in causing the failure of the crusade. The Syrian Franks refused to aid the Crusaders after King Louis had refused to help Raymond of Antioch in taking Aleppo and Raymond of Tripoli in taking the Castle of Montferrat. Had the Syrian Franks (Raymond of Antioch, Raymond of Tripoli, Joscelin of Edessa) been allied with the crusaders, they could have provided crucial tactical advice and offered valuable military expertise. In addition, the Byzantine Emperor, Manuel Comnenus, was duplicitous – he dealt with the Crusaders, but at the same time formed a peace treaty with the Seljuk Turks. Manuel was afraid of Louis, who was allied with Roger of Sicily – he lied to Louis, saying that Conrad had won a major victory and was claiming booty, to move him on to the Asia Minor. Manuel provided little aid – he sent ships, although not enough, and provided only small amounts of food. Manuel did send guides, who were accused of treachery – Louis claimed the guides led them to ambush at Dorylaeum. Manuel was concerned with protecting his own land (understandably, after the first crusade), and therefore the crusaders lost an ally who could have ensured their success. The Crusaders had no religious leader – in the first crusade, Adhemar le Puy had provided spiritual reinvigorated at critical points – there was no equivalent in the second crusade. Perhaps a spiritual leader would have united the crusading force under a common faith, and could have motivated the men to succeed. In addition, Manuel Comnenus did not provide a military leader/guide. This was a massive problem, as the crusaders were unable to counteract the Muslims’ military tactics. Finally, although Roger of Sicily had offered to ship Louis’ troops to the East, Louis had been forced to decline. He felt it would be undiplomatic due to the on-going enmity between the Germans and the Sicilians and the Byzantines and the Sicilians. Although this was hardly Louis’ fault, it cost the crusaders yet another ally. Ultimately, the crusaders stood alone against a completely united force of Muslims – the crusaders’ lack of allies cost them opportunities of success, and meant that they were rather a weak force. Although many factors contributed to the failure of the second crusade, the most pivotal factor was undoubtedly the poor leadership of King Louis VII of France and King Conrad III of Germany. The disunity amongst the Franks was also a crucial contributing factor, although had Louis and Conrad been strong enough leaders, the long term issues within the Frankish world would not have represented such a fatal problem. The crusaders’ lack of allies was inconvenient but, ultimately merely a catalyst to the inevitable.

Explain why Pope Urban called the First Crusade. (12 marks) Pope Urban heard the news at the council of Picaenza where he received a letter from the Byzantine Emperor Alexius where he asked for help. The Pope may have been influenced by others, feared for Christians in the East and hoped for personal gain. Firstly, his predeccesor Gregory VII already had the idea of a crusade. Urban and Gregory were friends suggesting the Pope may have been influenced by him. Alexius' letter was extremely persuasive and targeted all areas of society. This letter triggered the first Crusade and Pope Urban decided to call on his people for help. Furthermore, it was the Pope's duty and responsibility to look after all Christians. The letter expressed that Eastern Christians were being attacked by Muslims; a call that the Pope could not ignore. As the apocalypse of 1100 was fast approaching, it was also vital that Urban secured a safe route into the East for his pilgrims. Finally, Urban may have also launched the crusade due to the incentive to gain power; nothing to do with religious motivation. As well as being influenced by Gregory VII and Alexius, the Monks at Cluny stressed the importance of 'expanding the borders of Christendom'. This was very attractive to Pope Urban as he was currently in a dispute with the Germa Emperor over choosing Bishops. By launching this crusade, it was a chance for Urban to highlight his superiority. Not only this, but this was Urban's chance to unite eastern and western churches. This was an oppurtinity to gain Papal Authority, especially after the schism in 1054. Overall, I think the Pope launched the crusade for fear that Jerusalem would be left in Muslim hands. He feared for the relics/shrines and felt this was a justified war, as he had seen what was going on with the reconquista in spain.

Explain why the First Crusade was successful (12 marks) One of the reasons that the first crusade was successful was down to military factors, mainly due to the fighting techniques of the crusaders, the leadership within the crusading armies and the allies of the crusaders. The fighting techniques contributing to the success of the crusade is perhaps best shown at the battle of Dorylaeum in July 1097, when a mass charge of knights won the battle and saved the crusade from an early failure. There are several good examples of inspirational leadership which helped the crusade succeed. At Jerusalem, Godfrey moving his siege tower to a less defended section of the wall assured the crusaders victory, while Bohemond convincing one of the tower commanders to betray his city at Antioch meant the crusaders avoided being wiped out by the Turkish relief army. Tyerman suggests it is the flexibility of the leadership which ensured the crusade’s success. Finally, the allies of the crusaders helped them to succeed. The Byzantine Empire’s support meant the crusaders had military help and expert advice, guides, supplies and transport towards the start of the crusade. This gave the crusaders knowledge of the unfamiliar land and enemy which meant they fared significantly better in earlier battles than they might have done. However, military factors were probably not the main reason for the crusade’s success. The technique of the knights’ charge which was so effective was rarely used, and sieges were the main type of battle, which resulted in long confrontations which often lost the crusaders many men, and so cannot be counted as a reason for success. Leadership was also impaired, particularly after Antioch where Adhemar died. With him gone, the other leaders bickered amongst themselves, showing that the leadership of the crusade was in fact a fragile entity, which was not a valid reason for the success. Finally, the Byzantine empire, although quick to help at first, soon started withdrawing help, and tensions increased after disputes over captured land at Nicaea in 1097 and Antioch in 1098. Therefore the Byzantine influence was short live. Another reason for the success of the first crusade were the religious experiences of the crusaders. Tyerman also argues that religious piety among the crusaders was a key feature of the first crusade, and one which led inevitably to its success. The people genuinely believed that they had God’s support, and that what they were doing would gain them a place in heaven. This kept them motivated through the many tough parts of the crusade, and endowed them with courage when they reached Jerusalem in 1099. The act of penance before the walls of Jerusalem shows that the crusaders believed that they had angered God. However, visions and supernatural experiences also helped the crusaders to victory. The discovery of the Holy Lance by Peter Bartholomew at Antioch inspired the crusaders to go out and fight the Turks, leading them to victory, as did the ghostly army which 14

rode with. Though perhaps not true, these experiences, and the vision of Adhemar at Jerusalem kept the crusaders on track and motivated. However, it is clear that not all the crusaders were quite as motivated by religious piety as some others. The leaders of the crusade in particular seemed less than keen to get to Jerusalem after Adhemar’s death, and the fact Baldwin and Bohemond never moved on to Jerusalem after they had captured their own land shows their motivation was more economic. For these reasons, religious feelings cannot be the main reason for the crusader’s victory.

In fact, as Jotischky rightly points out the main reason for the crusader’s success was not down to them but down to the Muslims. Riley Smith says that “even a threat of this magnitude could not produce a collective response” ad Sidney Painter agrees that this is also the main reason. The Muslims were split politically, with the Abbasids and the Fatimids vying for control, as well and religiously with the Sunni and Shia. The Turks were split tribally between the Seljuks and the Danishmends. These divisions meant that the crusaders faced lots of smaller forces, who were themselves trying to get rid of the other Muslims forces. This made it easier for the crusaders to capture the holy land. For example, after the collapse of the Seljuks the Arab Emirs offered guides and gifts to the crusaders on their way to Jerusalem and in 1099 after Jerusalem was taken, the Emirs of Hama and Tripoli brought gifts to the crusaders in an attempt to pacify them. This then is the main reason for why the crusade was successful.

To what extent did divisions within the Kingdom of Jerusalem lead to its collapse in 1187? (24 marks) The year 1174 saw the deaths of two great leaders of the time, Nureddin of Syria and King Amalric of Jerusalem. For the Muslim world, Nureddin’s death introduced the champion of Jihad himself, Saladin, as their leader. Unfortunately for the Christian world, Amalric’s death left his leper son, Baldwin IV, as his successor. Unlike he muslim world, Baldwin’s reign arguably created mass divisions and factions within the Kingdom of Jerusalem which is a principal reason as to why it collapsed in 1187. However, the growth of Muslim unity under Saladin; a decline of Byzantium and strategic weaknesses within the Kingdom were also contributing factors. Firstly, divisions within the Kingdom of Jerusalem were undoubtedly a cause for the fall of Jerusalem in 1187. In 1174 Baldwin IV succeeded his father, Amalric, as the King of Jerusalem. Unlike his father who had endured and strong and successful reign, Baldwin was a minor and had leprosy which, as Runciman stated, meant that he “held on to reigns of power in his decaying hands.” Although Asbridge argued he was “one crucial piece in an overall picture.” Baldwin’s suffering as a leper was the principal cause as to why factions (the Hawks and the Doves) developed under his reign. Baldwin’s impending death meant that finding a husband for Baldwin’s sister Sybilla was vital in order to find both a strong leader and to create a heir. The prolonged succession crisis created mass disunity within Christendom as both factions supported a different choice for Sybilla. Throughout Baldwin’s reign the factions also disagreed on how to oppose Saladin; the Hawks (most of whom were new settlers in the East) favoured violence whereas the Doves favoured alliances or, at the most, Fabian tactics. Civil disputes within the Latin East allowed for the growth of Muslim Unity as barons and knights were too distracted with conflicts within Jerusalem to deal with Saladin. Although Baldwin’s weak leadership caused the initial rise of the factions, when Baldwin V and eventually Guy of Luisignan (Sybilla’s husband and a a supporter of the Hawks faction) Christian disunity was still ripe. This was largely due to a “rancourous succession dispute,” when Guy was elected as the King of Jerusalem even though Count Raymond of Tripoli had schemed to seize the throne. Furthermore, the inherent conflict between the Hawks and the Doves eventually played a part as to why Guy decides to attack at Hattin in 1187; arguably the most important cause for the fall of Jerusalem. In a previous battle against Saladin at the Pools of Goliath in 1183 Guy (a member of the Hawks faction) decides to follow Raymond of Tripoli’s (a member of the Doves faction) advice and partakes in Fabian tactics rather than attacking Saladin. Although this lead to Saladin retreating Guy was labelled as a coward. At the Battle of Hattin, after remembering his act of cowardice 16

Guy ignores the advice of Raymond, thinking his actions are primarily to lose support for Guy, and attacks Saladin which then lead to a Christian massacre and the taking of Jerusalem. Evidently the development of Christian disunity was majorly contrasting to the united Muslim East, giving Saladin a large advantage if he wished to attack Jerusalem. Although Christian disunity was a principal cause for the loss of Jerusalem, Muslim Unity was also a vital factor. The rise in Muslim Unity initially began after the Crusaders had captured Jerusalem and, as Asbridge describes it “a rampaging torrent of...indiscriminate slaughter,” began. The barbaric actions of the Crusaders fueled a unified hatred amongst the Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims, providing them with a common enemy. A further reason for unity arose when a string of charismatic leaders seized the Muslim east, starting with Zengi, the atabeg of Mosul, in 1127. Through Zengi’s continued preaching for Jihad (which represented unity and Holy War) he had succeeded in gaining enough supporters to unite Mosul, Aleppo and the first established crusader state of Edessa in 1144. The defeat of Edessa proved to the Muslims that the Crusaders were not invincible, giving them a large boost in morale. Zengi’s son and successor Nureddin was also an advocate for the religious doctrine of Jihad; he established Madrases throughout Baghdad and emphasised the importance of Jerusalem as a Holy place. This successfully reminded the Muslims of the atrocities committed in 1099 and further united them. Moreover, after defeating the Christian forces at Damascus in 1148, Nureddin successfully united Damascus into his empire in 1154, almost surrounding the Crusader states. In order to fully surround Outremer and fully threaten the Christians, Nureddin needed the riches of Egypt, which was still under Shi’ite rule. In 1164 the opportunity arose when Shawar, the vizier of upper Egypt sought refuge with Nureddin. After his general Shurkuh (along with his nephew Saladin) successfully secured Egypt for the previous Vizier, Shawar betrayed the pair leading to Shurkuh and Saladin defeating the Vizier in 1169. However, after Shurkuh died Saladin was proclaimed as Vizier. Although after Nureddin’s death in 1174 Saladin faced conflict with the Zengids he soon became the “champion of the Sunni Orthodoxy” and overthrew the Shi’ite forces in Cairo in 1171. By 1186 Saladin had proven himself to be a true successor of Nureddin and had masterminded the subjugation of Near Eastern Islam, extending his authority over Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo and large stretches of Mesopotamia This fully surrounded Outremer leaving them strategically weakened and giving Saladin a military advantage if he wished to invade Jerusalem. Muslim unity also aided to consolidate the divisions within the Kingdom of Jerusalem as they argued over the best way to defeat Saladin, leaving the Kingdom in a state of civil disruption when compared to the strongly unified Muslim world. However Saladin could not yet attack due to previous truces make with the Latin East for example,in 1180 he agreed a truce as Syria was suffering from the effects of a continuing drought. The fragmented leadership of Baldwin IV could not control the actions 17

of Reynald of Chatillon ( a member of the Hawks faction) whom broke truces with Saladin and allegedly raped his sister. This personal attack gave Saladin the excuse he needed to attack Jerusalem with the unified troops of the Muslim world. Ultimately, Muslim unity provided the Muslims with a stronger force and motivation than the Christians. A final contributing factor to the fall of Jerusalem in 1187 was the steady decline in Byzantium. Disputes had arisen between the Byzantine Empire and the crusader states since the victory of the First Crusade in 1099. Despite the oath made to give back all land to Alexius Comnenus at the beginning of the Crusade, Bohemond refused to give back the military advantageous city of Antioch as Alexius did not help when the crusaders seiged the city. For the Byzantines, this was a direct betrayal of trust and fuel for a deep feud between the two christian faiths. This carried into the second crusade when the crusaders rampaged towards the city of Constaninople without Manuel Comnenus requesting a crusade. In order to secure his eastern frontier the Emperor agreed a temporary truce with Ma’sud, the Seljuk Sultan of Anatolia which was seen as an act of treachery by the Crusaders. The relations worsened when, due to weak leadership within the East, Reynald of Chatillon raided Cyrprus and tortured the Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch. The lack of respect for Byzantium created hostility and unwillingness to be allied with Outremer, which was vital for the crusaders to be protected against unified Muslim forces. However, an unwillingness to help changed to an impossibility to help when the Byzantines were defeated in the Battle of Myriocephalum in 1176 by the Seljuks. The defeat left the Byzantines with a severe lack of troops and resources which stopped them from being able to help the crusaders in 1187 when Jerusalem was defenseless due to the crusaders’ defeat at Hattin. With the help of the Byzantines, Jerusalem may not have been conquered due to an increased number of troops. The Byzantines’ unwillingness to be allied with the crusaders was finalised in 1184 when the Byzantines made a truce with Saladin and in 1187 congratulated him on his taking of Jerusalem—without the help and support of Byzantium the Crusaders were left with a lack of man power and resources which were vital in order to maintain the Holy City. Ultimately, the principal reason for the loss of Jerusalem in 1187 was the fractious nature of the Crusader states, in particular the divisions between the Hawks and Doves factions. Without the deep rivalry within the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Guy may not have made the decision to attack Saladin at Hattin and would therefore have preserved the Kingdom of Jerusalem by keeping it defended. Also, if the Kingdom had been unified, it could have provided a sufficient defense against Saladin’s unified forces or even ceased Saladin’s campaign for unity rather than being too distracted with the Kingdom’s civil disruption. This would have prevented the unification of the Muslim world and would therefore have lessened the threat of the Muslim forces, as with the First Crusade, ultimately maintaining the Kingdom in Christian hands. 18

Mussoliniâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Italy

Use sources A, B and C and your own knowledge. How far did the use of terror consolidate the fascist dictatorship in Italy between the years 1922- 1929? (24 marks) The use of terror and repression was a major factor used in order to consolidate Mussolini’s fascist dictatorship in Italy between the years 1922 and 1929, however there were other elements that were also key such as the use of propaganda and compromises. The most important factor to consolidate Mussolini’s power was compromises, both with the elite and the church. One way in which Mussolini created and consolidated a dictatorship within Italy was by the use of terror and repression. This was used to neutralize any opposition towards the new fascist regime aswell as to dominate Mussolini’s own political party (the PNF) and to have what is known as a police state. One way in which terror and repression was used, was by confino. This method arose in 1926 and involved imprisoning the opposition on an island, isolating them from Italian society. Source B says that ‘the fear of Confino stopped many an Italian from even complaining about the fascist regime’. This shows that it was an effective method used in order to ensure that there was no resistance to his new system, as it caused a state of fear in which nobody was willing to stand up against their new leader. However, it is said in source A that the use of Confino was not effective at all, saying that after escaping the island they would make their way to france where they would ‘plot against the fascist regime’. This suggests that the use of confino and therefore terror and repression was not effective at all in consolidating the fascist dictatorship in Italy as it did not stop members of society from acting out against the government. Therefore other factors must also have been used in order to maintain Mussolini’s fascist regime. Another way terror and repression was used in order to consolidate the fascist dictatorship was by having an informer culture. This is where the people of Italy would ‘spy’ on each other and inform Mussolini’s secret police, the OVRA of anything negative said about his new regime. This would cause a lack of trust amongst the people and the fear of being imprisoned would allow no opposition to fascism. Silone says that ‘the fascist dictatorship is based on the manipulation of fear’. This suggests that very little violence was used but it was the fear of violence itself that allowed Mussolini to receive the support he needed from the people. Therefore terror was a key factor used to consolidate a fascist dictatorship in Italy, however other factors must have taken place to ensure that there was no resistance at all. Another way in which a dictatorship was consolidated was by the use of propaganda. This was used in order to sell a desired image of Italy and their Il duce, retain the support to Mussolini, ensure the state was strong and indestructible and finally create a sense of na20

tionalism. Source C says that ‘Mussolini had to manufacture support through propaganda, bribery and compromises’, suggesting that it was not terror used to consolidate Mussolini’s power but in fact propaganda. One way propaganda was used was by speeches. Linking in with terror and repression, after the Matteotti crisis of 1924, Mussolini’s speech of January 1925 ensured the support he desperately needed in order to stay in power. By saying that he took full responsibility for fascism and that he could have done the murder of Matteotti, he used a manipulation of propaganda, by saying he was the only one who could control fascism, and fear he guaranteed that nobody was oppose him in his rise to a personal dictatorship, creating a cult of Il Duce. Another method of Propganda used was by influencing the people through the media. Radio, Newspapers and Cinema were all used to show Mussolini in a positive light and that he was the one who would make Italy a successful power. These propaganda tools subjected the people to Mussolini constantly, however all had flaws. Newspapers, since the press laws and Legge Fascistissme of 1925 meant that they were censored to only have positive portrayals of Mussolini; however the illiterate wouldn’t be able to read these articles and so were ineffective to create a dictatorship. Similarly, Italians didn’t have to go to the cinema or listen to the radio, meaning although many were under the influence of propaganda presenting Mussolini as their leader, it could not be completely the reason as to why Mussolini was able to create a dictatorship as there was no way in which all the population could be controlled by this method, therefore other factors must have been used as well. Finally, the main way in which the fascist dictatorship was consolidated was by the use of compromises, with the industrialists, elite and the church. By compromising with the more powerful people in society he was able to gain the support required. To compromise with the church, in the early 1920’s, Mussolini himself made marital concessions as well as having his children baptized. By doing this he gained the support of the church as well as the majority of the population who were practicing catholics. The support of the pope and the church was essential and the Lateran pact of 1929 ensured the end of the Roman Question so that the population could support the new regime. Source C states that the most crucial way of gaining a broad base of support within the country was by ‘ the support of the Italian Elite.’ One way in which he compromised with the elite, in particular the king, was by meeting with the him once a week to maintain his support. As he was the only person who could remove Mussolini from power, it was essential that he had his full support and trust. He also gave him the army in 1925 following the Matteotti crisis, again showing that he was willing to compromise in order to gain his support. Finally, to gain the full support of the industrialists, he issued de Stefani as being In charge of Economy, in which he promoted a capitalist economy. This meant that all businessmen could keep any profits made to themselves, this gained there support as they could now have full control of their businesses 21

and gain more money. The promise of normalization and keeping businesses in their hands ensured their happiness. Therefore as a result compromises was essential as without them, the most successful of the population would be able to overthrow him as their leader, and so it was vital to gain their support and increase his own personal power. To conclude, terror was important in order to gain a fascist dictatorship, however as source C states it â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;was inadequate to keep the lid on a society so deeply and economically dividedâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and so the use of propaganda and most importantly compromises was essential in order to gain the widespread support of the nation to consolidate his personal dictatorship in Italy.

‘Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War was the key turning point in Italy’s relationship with Germany.’ Explain why you agree or disagree with this view of Italian foreign policy in the years 1934 – 1939. (24 marks) The Spanish Civil war was undoubtedly the point at which Mussolini’s relationship with Hitler and Nazi Germany began to grow closer. Although the strength of the relationship fluctuated throughout the late 1930s, a secondary turning point in fact came in 1939, when Mussolini actually committed himself to a military alliance with Nazi Germany through the Pact of Steel. After his conquest in Abyssinia, Mussolini’s relationship with France and Britain was considerably worsened, owing to their imposition of economic sanctions and his annoyance with their seemingly hypocritical objection to Italian imperial expansion. As a result, he began to look to other European powers as potential allies for the inevitable imminent war, and Hitler was an obvious prospective partner. When both dictators sent troops to aid General Franco in the 1936 Spanish Civil War, a close relationship between the two countries began – the German and Italian soldiers were fighting alongside each other against Bolshevism and for the continuation of the Fascist legacy in Europe. The two leaders inevitably began to forge a closer relationship, as was officialised in October with the signing of the Rome/Berlin Axis. In September 1937, Mussolini visited Berlin and was impressed by the level of obedience of the masses. Following this, Mussolini and Hitler signed the AntiComintern Pact together in November 1937; and both withdrew from the League of Nations. These events were caused by the close relationship forged during Mussolini’s intervention in the Spanish Civil war. The Munich Conference of September 1938 further indicated Mussolini’s desire to maintain his alliance with Hitler. Although he acted as a mediator between the democracies (Britain and France) and Germany. As well as improving his stance as an internationally respected figure, Mussolini demonstrated at this point that he was still capable of maintaining a steady and diplomatic relationship with both the democracies and Nazi Germany, thus indicating that he had not chosen to take a particular side at this stage. However, it could also be argued these small pacts and agreements do not actually constitute any real kind of alliance – it was only natural that the two Fascist dictators of similar ideologies should form a close relationship. Hitler openly disregarded his relationship with Mussolini when he signed the Nazi-Soviet pact with Russia in August 1939; which directly contradicted the 1937 Anti-Comintern agreement he had signed with Mussolini. Moreover, 23

in November 1938, Mussolini entertained the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain in Rome, further demonstrating that he was not actually committed to Hitler at this late stage even, and was still keen to form an alliance with Britain and France. The signing of the Pact of Steel in 1939 provided the final turning point in Mussoliniâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s relationship with Hitler and Nazi Germany â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the point that ultimately led Germany to a war it was unprepared for and could not afford to fight. This military agreement committed Italy to an aggressive war, and indicated that Mussolini had now completely lost control of Italian foreign policy â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Hitler was the senior partner in the relationship and Mussolini merely a puppet.

‘Mussolini’s attempts to create a nation of loyal fascists completely failed.’ To what extent do you agree? (24 Marks) There is much debate amongst historians as to whether Mussolini did in fact create a nation of fascists due to the different aspects of Italian society being treated in different ways, it is crucial to consider whether the population of Italy was following fascism for their own benefits, whether they were made to or whether they were genuinely loyal to fascism and to Mussolini himself. Mussolini did not completely fail in creating a nation of fascists as there were aspects in which he succeeded. The Italian youth were influenced greatly by Mussolini’s fascist regime and there were ways in which Mussolini ensured that he had created a nation of fascist youths that would follow him and allow Italy to become a great power in the future by using policies, propaganda and censorship to indoctrinate fascist ideology into the younger members of society. One way in which he did this was by manipulating education to his advantage. An example of this is by placing an emphasis on educating children in accordance to fascist ideas; this was especially enforced by the introduction of a uniform state issued text book titled the ‘Libro Unico’. By issuing this textbook in all schools within Italy, Mussolini ensured that fascist history and ideology was indoctrinated into the minds of the youth, allowing them to believe in a sense of nationalism and pride in their country. Although fascist ideas were taught in education it does not necessarily mean that the children as well as the teachers believed in it, meaning they may have been supportive of Mussolini not fascism. As well as this education was strictly controlled by the state to ensure that teachers adhered to fascist ideology in practice. In 1925 teachers who displayed views incompatible with fascism were dismissed, by doing this Mussolini guaranteed the support of teachers making them loyal to him by taking an oath of loyalty. This means that the teachers were in fact loyal to fascism and to their il duce, however it does not mean that they were actually fascists, and it was in fact the fear of dismissal that gained their support, not true belief. Therefore Mussolini was successful in creating a national of loyal ‘fascists’. Also, to ensure that the youth were trained in fascist culture, the ONB or the Balilla became compulsory in 1935. This meant that the youth were forced to attend these groups in order to learn militarism, obedience and loyalty to the regime. By enforcing the youth groups, Mussolini confirmed that there would be no opposition in the future from the youth as well as nurturing them to become soldiers and mothers in order to make Italy a great power like England and France. However, the fact that Mussolini was forced to radicalise after 1935 shows that his previous attempts to fascistise Italy had failed. The fact that Mussolini even had to radicalise proves that he did fail in creating a nation of loyal fascists as if they were loyal to him and 25

the regime he would not have needed to force people to follow his policies. This suggests that one of the only reasons as to why people followed the regime was because they were forced to and not out of genuine belief and will. Another reason as to why Mussolini did completely fail in creating a nation of loyal fascists is that the teachers were not true supporters of fascism and it was the oath of loyalty they had to take that made forced their support. Duggan states that the teachers support for the regime was ‘often superficial and based on pragmatism more than real faith.’ This suggests that the nation weren’t actual fascists but were supporting fascism in order to gain the benefits and the fear of Mussolini and their potential dismissal. Finally, a way in which Mussolini completely failed to create a nation of loyal fascists was that he didn’t in fact monopolise the minds of the youth due to the Lateran treaties of 1929 with the church. These treaties stated that religious education would become compulsory in secondary schools. As religious education preached love and forgiveness it did not support the ideology of fascism and so prevented fascism from ever being a true ideology that would continue after his reign. At most ‘the fascist regime seemed tolerable.’ Another part of society that Mussolini attempted to turn into a nation of fascists was the workers, who played a major part in the support of fascism. One way in which the state tried to convert the workers to fascism was through the creation of the OND (the dopolavaro). This society organised many leisure activities that would provide a successful distraction from the lower living standards that were currently occurring. By giving the workers, sporting activities, holidays and many more activities it ensured their support as it portrayed the benefits of fascism and made their standard of living far happier. It also allowed Mussolini to control them whilst they were not working, which again ensured they were loyal to him and fascism as without their life would be similar to that of when the liberals were in power. On the other hand, the OND did not indoctrinate the workers with fascist ideology and so did not show real aspects of the ideas and did not convert them in anyway. It is also necessary to ask as to whether the people were showing their support to fascist ideas and their Il Duce or that they simply wanted to reap the benefits that fascism gave them. This shows that Mussolini did create a nation of fascists however they were not loyal. Another way in which Mussolini succeeded in creating a population of Italian Fascists is that the OND membership had increased from 1,711,000 in 1931 to 3,831,331 in 1939. The sheer increase in membership insinuates that people were in fact supporting the regime and were willing to attend to show their support to fascism. William argues that there was a ‘broad acceptance of the fascist state.’ The fact that so many of the Italian workers went to the OND proved that little by little the hearts and minds of the people were captured by fascism and by 1939; 4 million adults were members of the dopolavaro. In general the working classes were supportive of the regime as knight says that ‘the majority of the ur26

ban and rural working class were not sufficiently discontented to mount any more than the occasional sporadic protest. Although they were not dissatisfied it does not mean that they were happy with the working industry as a whole, and as there were occasional protests it proves that they were not completely pro- fascist and were not loyal to Mussolini and fascism as they were willing to revolutionise against him. Also, as only one quarter of businesses were monopolies in certain industries such as fiat and Pirelli. As these businesses were privatised, Mussolini did not have full fascist control over all of the worker force and so as a result did not create a nation of fascists as he did not have totalitarian control over all of the population. Furthermore, Mussolini both succeeded and failed in winning the support and loyalty of the elite towards fascism. A way in which he succeeded was that the monarchy and aristocracy were completely overshadowed by Mussolini and landowners were not strong enough to object to fascist policies, although they did not attempt to why things were going well. Mussolini henceforth had full control over Fascist Italy and so could get the full power over the people and with the aid of the emergency powers he could remove opposition at will to ensure that no one opposed the regime and he had full totalitarian control. Also, the elite were in support as long as they were happy with the regime, therefore it proves they were not in support of fascism fully, only when it suited them. The church only spoke out against the regime on issues which affected itself or moral concerns, such as in 1931 against the dissolution of catholic action and the 1938 race laws. By compromising with the elite such as the church, Mussolini gained their support in his attempt to create a nation of fascists, and with the support of the church he also gained support from the majority of the country due to 93% of the people being practicing Catholics. If he neglected to gain this support he would have a harder time trying to achieve a nation of fascists, as Catholicism opposed certain fascist ideas. However, it was the compromises with the elite that meant he could never have a totalitarian dictatorship that would allow him to completely oppress the people to follow the regime and therefore as a result of this the people could not be true fascists who were loyal to him. Another part of society that was treated differently in order to gain a nation of loyal fascists was the women. Mussoliniâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ideal women were one that was simple and practical and that increased the population. A way in which Mussolini succeeded in creating fascist women was by creating the massaie rurali (which was a federation of rural housewives), founded in 1933 which provided training programmes, lectures as well as competitions in order to support mothers. By supporting mothers it made them more inclined to support fascism, as they now had more benefits than when under the control of the liberals. By the end of the 1930â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s the federation had nearly 1.5 million members, proving that Mussolini had gained the support of millions in this social group. As well as this, Mussolini launched 27

the battle for Births and it was encouraged through the civil service which were reserved for men who had fathered children. Also in 1927 a tax was placed on unmarried men and in 1929 women received maternity pay and welfare benefits. By enforcing these policies, Mussolini increased the population. As a result of this he created a nation of future soldiers and mothers who would indeed support fascism like their parents. By issuing a tax on unmarried men, he increased the rate of marriage and again the benefits gained by the women in Italy at that time also helped them believe in fascist ideology. However, the birth rate under Mussolini’s rule continued to decline steadily until 1936 and later marriages became more common. This insinuates that the leader was not effective in creating a nation of loyal fascists as despite his exhaustive efforts, the people were not following his policies. Also, his attempts to remove women from employment had to be reversed towards the end of the 1930’s as the mobilization of men for war meant that women were needed to replace men in the workplace. Therefore the radicalisation attempts to remove women from the industry was wasted and he had no power and influence over women at the time. To conclude, Mussolini’s regime was not successful in creating a nation that were committed to fascism, however he did achieve submission from the population through the use of fear of confine and the OVRA as well as benefits that were not gained whilst under liberal control such as welfare programmes. Thompson argues that ‘without an effective alternative most ordinary Italians just outwardly accepted fascism.’ This suggests that Mussolini did not create a nation that was completely loyal to him and fascism, the support was superficial in order to reap the rewards they did not gain under previous rule. Also, Mussolini could never have full control over the population due to the compromises he was forced to make with the traditional institutions of Italy, meaning there was always an alternative ideology such as Catholicism. Mussolini may have gained a nation of fascists if he had not intruded so greatly in the lives of the people as Clark states that ‘the fascist regime seemed tolerable and was even popular at least until 1937-8.’

“Mussolini’s economic policies completely failed to prepare Italy for war.” Explain how far you agree with this statement. (24 marks) Mussolini’s many ‘battles’ and the emphasis on the need for military victory under Mussolini’s reign was highly persuasive for the Italian people, however, in terms of being prepared for a war against the highly equipped allied powers of Britain and France, Mussolini did completely fail. However, if Mussolini had developed his warfare technology earlier and had been fighting the type of battles he expected (wars of an imperialistic nature), the economic policies would have been greatly successful. Perhaps Mussolini’s greatest success regarding his economic policies was his modernisation and communication improvements. Mussolini built the first motorway system in Europe (the Autostrada) by 1940. This connected the North and the South and enabled quick transportation of armaments, thus preparing Italy for war well. Also, by 1939, 31% of all Italy’s railways were electrified. This improved communications in Italy and allowed the transportation of goods, which would be essential during wartime. Furthermore, Mussolini improved aviation by producing many fighter planes, which further prepared Italy for war. Mussolini proved his prowess in aviation by demonstrating two mass flights; one to Brazil in 1930, and the second to the USA in 1933. These schemes increased national pride for Italians and encouraged them to prepare for war. However, some modernisation policies failed to prepare Italy for war. Mussolini failed, as he had in his other domestic policies, to integrate the south into his aims. The south did not become modernised and remained ‘backward’ and rural compared to the modern, industrialised north. The rural back roads in the south made it impossible for armaments to be transported there and thus if Italy was attacked from the south, they would not be prepared for war. Another failure of modernisation is that Italy developed its modernisation policies too early. Mussolini stated building planes/tanks/armaments in 1931; 9 years before Italy entered World War Two. By this time, their weaponry was far outdated compared to British and French forces and through Mussolini’s many military conquests in the 1930’s, a lot of his weaponry had been used and destroyed. Mussolini also exaggerated the volume of weaponry he had. He boasted to have ‘8 million bayonets’ when in reality he only had under 1 million, also, Mussolini had no submarines or bomber planes; Mussolini’s attempts to modernise were complete failures and totally failed to prepare Italy for war. Mussolini’s main economic policy was making Italy self-sufficient. This would be accomplished through the policy of Autarky, which was somewhat successful in making Italy self29

sufficient. The draining of the Pontine marshes provided more fertile land on which crops could be grown in Mussolini’s ‘Battle for Grain’ (announced in 1925). This would help Italy achieve autarky and if they did so, they would be prepared for war as they would not have to rely on imports. Furthermore, autarky was successful as between 1925 and 1935, wheat imports fell by 75%, showing that the Battle for Grain was a success as Italy became selfsufficient in grain. Another success of autarky is that the industrial companies changed their produce to prepare Italy for war so they didn’t have to rely on imports and therefore improve the efficiency of Italian economy. Companies such as Olivetti changed their normal production of typewriters to producing machine guns. This decreased the funds that would be spent on imports so that more money could be spent on preparing Italy for war. However, autarky was not completely successful. In 1939, when the aims were supposed to have been met, domestic production of goods only met one fifth of the demand, and so Italy still had to heavily rely on imports, and so Italy was not prepared for war as it relied so heavily on other countries. Also Mussolini’s Battle for Grain failed miserably in the end as in 1933, 500 million tonnes of grain had to be imported, showing that Italy was far from self-sufficient and the battle for grain ultimately hindered Italy as it provided Italians with a very poor diet and so soldiers were unfit and less prepared for war. The economic policy was also a failure as it meant that farmers had to grow grain instead of other produce and so got less profit, therefore the economic policy in fact hindered the economy for agricultural workers, and did not improve it. Also the small economic benefits from policies of autarky did not benefit Italy for long as they were wasted in conquests in Abyssinia and the Spanish Civil War which Mussolini said “bled Italy white” and drained their economy. Autarky was ultimately pointless and a failure in preparing Italy for war. Mussolini tried to further prepare Italy for war by influencing industry. This economic policy was successful in that Italy became the industrial leader in many fields; automobiles, aviation, merchant ships and chemicals in the 1930’s. This improvement in industry helped prepare Italy for war as it enabled Italy to produce armaments and develop its military technology to be ready for war. Mussolini was further successful in his controlling of the industries. The state controlled 80% of ship building industries and 50% of steel manufacturing industries to encourage preparation for war. They encouraged industrial companies by giving huge government contracts, causing a more efficient economy and increasing the creation of products for war. Gearing Italy for war was successful as industrial production rose from 28.7% in 1911-1920 to 32.8% in 1931-1940. This increase in production increased the amount of product made and therefore prepared Italy for war successfully. However, the economic policy of improving industry was not totally successful in preparing Italy for war. Mussolini failed to gear industry to produce raw materials needed for war, 30

and so Italy still heavily depended on imports of coal, oil and steel. These imports reduced drastically after Italy’s conquest in Abyssinia because of the economic sanctions imposed upon Italy by the League of Nations, and so Italy was unprepared for war as they didn’t have sufficient amounts of raw materials. Industry further failed because of how outdated it was compared to British and French industrial production; in 1940, Italy produced 1.2 million tonnes of steel whereas Germany produced 19.0 million tonnes of steel, proving that Germany was clearly the dominant partner in the alliance and Italy was the ‘junior partner’, and Italy was not at all ready for war. Furthermore, Mussolini failed to prepare Italy for war by directing industry as through his devaluation of the Lira, it meant that exports from Italy decreased, which was opposite to what Italy needed – increased exports to improve the economy and pay for raw materials. Mussolini contradicted himself through his ‘battles’ for autarky and the Lira and through this he failed to make his economy efficient. Rowe argues that Mussolini didn’t face up to the ‘realities of total war’ and therefore failed to prepare Italy for war. Mussolini, although successful in modernising Italy’s transport and communications, did fail to prepare Italy for war through his economic policies. This was because Mussolini’s preparations for war had started far too early and therefore his weaponry was very outdated. Also, the policy of autarky was meant to prepare Italy for war but it was only achievable through war and conquest; it contradicted itself. However, the main reason that Italy was unprepared for war was that Italy was involved in so many conflicts. Mussolini involving Italy in the Spanish civil war and invasion of Abyssinia “bled Italy white” and Ciano said that they “virtually exhausted” Italy’s stock of materials. It seems that Mussolini didn’t truly understand the demand of war; he just used it as a tool of propaganda. He used war to gain more popularity and promote his Cult of Il Duce, without truly preparing Italy for the total war; World War Two.

Use sources A and B. Explain how far the views in Source B differ from those in Source A in relation to Confino. (12 Marks) SOURCES: JUNE 2013 PAST PAPER Both source A and source B state that the conditions and treatment of inmates in Confino were nowhere near as grim as those suffered by victims of the Nazi regime, or of Stalinism. Source A states that the victims of Confino ‘were not worked to death like the inmates of Stalin’s labour camps or subjected to the calculated cruelties of Hitler’s concentration camps. Source B agrees with this opinion, stating that ‘compared to the German Concentration Camps, conditions on the islands were somewhat better.’ This demonstrates that although the sources then express differing ideas as to what the conditions in Confino were actually like, both sources agree that comparatively, they were not as horrendous the sufferings inflicted on opponents by other 20th Century dictators. However, whereas source A depicts Confino as being rather pleasant, source B portrays a far more brutal situation. Source A states that apart from attending roll-call twice a day, prisoners could ‘move at will on the island and do what they wished.’ It also states that ‘prisoners could be granted leave of absence for compassionate reasons.’ This is indicative of a more lenient regime, and suggests that the conditions on the islands were not at all strict. Source B, however, describes how prisoners were ‘subjected to complete house arrest’. This statement entirely contradicts Source A, however this could perhaps be due to differences in the level of strictness experienced on different islands. Furthermore, having explained that prisoners were often allowed to leave the island for compassionate reasons, Source A goes on to state that ‘some prisoners took advantage of this, and made their escape to France.’ This implies that no stringent security measures were put in place in order to prevent prisoners from escaping. In contrast, Source B states that one particular prisoner ‘escaped’ from the ‘sadistic tyranny of a Fascist lieutenant’, which suggests that the prisoners were running from fear and danger. This makes Confino seem more serious than the farce portrayed by the antics of escaping prisoners described in Source A. The sources disagree due to the differing opinions and perspectives of the two historians. Jasper Ridley takes a far lighter view of Confino, although does acknowledge the serious nature of Mussolini’s regime. E.K Branstead, however, takes a much darker view of Confino. The differences could also be due to the different conditions experienced on different islands.

How important was the use of violence and intimidation in the consolidation of Mussolini’s Fascist regime between 1922 and 1929? Use Sources A, B and C and your own knowledge. (24 marks) SOURCES: JUNE 2009 PAST PAPER

From its beginnings in Milan in 1919, Mussolini’s political career was marked by violence and intimidation. However, after he was appointed Prime Minister in 1922 Mussolini sought to normalise his party and fascist violence became somewhat of a nuisance to the Duce, threatening to destroy his increasingly respectable reputation. The other methods Mussolini adopted to consolidate his regime were arguably more significant, for example the use of propaganda and the repressive nature of the regime, but most importantly the compromises he made with the political elites, the South and the Church, that gained him the support he needed to survive political crises such as the Matteotti Affair in 1924. Violence and intimidation in Mussolini’s Italy took the form of the squadristi, a paramilitary organisation of “thugs in black shirts” (Townley) controlled by the ras, often radicals like Roberto Farinacci and Italo Balbo. Therefore although Mussolini was able to threaten opponents with the wrath of the blackshirts, (as he did in his 1922 speech to the Chamber of Deputies, in which he described “300,000 young men, fully armed, ready for anything and almost religiously prompt to obey any command of mine”) the squadristi became a liability: during the summer of 1922 Farinacci attacked non-fascists in Cremona and Balbo went armed with machine guns into Parma to oppose the general strike. To try and curb this sort of violence, which undermined Mussolini’s attempts to appear respectable, the Duce created the Fascist Militia in 1923. This was “one of Mussolini’s most creative political moves” according to Townley, as it maintained the threat of fascist violence whilst ostensibly keeping it contained, making Mussolini seem like strong and able leader. However, in 1924 the violence again got out of hand and as Source A states “almost toppled Mussolini’s government” when the prominent socialist Giacomo Matteotti was murdered by Mussolini’s own men; it was only the support from “mainstream conservative opinion” (Source B) Mussolini had obtained through compromise that allowed Mussolini to emerge from the crisis largely unscathed. Mussolini’s regime was characterised by its extremely effective use of propaganda, especially the cult of Il Duce. The title Duce, meaning leader, gave the Italian people a figure to rally around (worship, even) and his personal prestige meant that government scandals could be blamed on the fascists and not Mussolini himself. Fashionable new forms of media like radio and cinema were used to promote Italy’s, and of course Mussolini’s, greatness, and were especially effective in that they appealed to Italy’s large illiterate population. However, Italian media was unable to completely dominate popular culture in that in 34

the 1920s Italian cinema largely consisted of Hollywood imports and private radio listeners were able to tune into foreign broadcasts from the Vatican and BBC for example. The real problem with Mussolini’s use of propaganda however was that he came to believe in his own myth, and it can be argued that much of his popularity came not from his ostentatious propaganda but from his links to the old, respected elites and the Catholic church which he established through compromise. As Source C states, “in the years that followed [the Matteotti affair], the old political parties were dissolved, the trade unions brought under control, a secret police established and school textbooks placed under strict government supervision.” The source is describing Legge Fascistissme (introduced in 1925), which introduced a series of repressive measures as described, as well as increased control of the press and the establishment of a new court to try political offences. Repression was important in Mussolini’s consolidation of power in that it meant the people lived in fear and were therefore easier to control, although arguably repressive measures did not go far enough in order for Italy to be truly totalitarian: underground newspapers continued to circulate and opposition posters could still be seen on city walls. Most notably, under agreements made in the Concordat in 1929 Mussolini allowed the Church to continue the activities of Catholic Action, which provided an alternative source of support for Italians; many people sent their children to private Catholic schools in order to avoid them being indoctrinated by fascist ideas. Therefore repression, like propaganda, gave Mussolini a false sense of security: he believed that the Italian people were supporting him out of devotion, when in fact it was out of fear of the militia and OVRA. As one man in Milocca was heard to say following the plebiscite regarding the Lateran Pact, “We will vote as they tell us, but God knows what is in our hearts.” From his first days in office Mussolini was forced to make compromises with his coalition government, and managed to secure the support of the old liberal elites like Giolitti, Salandra and Orlando through the process of normalisation. However a coalition is not what he wanted, not at least one that contained only four fascists. Therefore before the 1924 election, the Acerbo Law was introduced that stated the winning party, provided it won at least 25% of votes, would win 2/3 of seats. Mussolini’s party won the election and his government subsequently won 374 seats. The implementation of the Acerbo Law itself was down to compromise (Mussolini chose not to use the violence of the squadristi to shut down parliament all together and instead acted constitutionally), and so was Mussolini’s “landslide” (Source C) victory in the election: from 1922-1924 he had been at work convincing the South and the Church to support the regime. The Duce visited the South of Italy in 1923, where he struck a deal with the old families of the region: they would continue to receive government funds and contracts and could go on living in the old ways, as long as they ostensibly supported to regime. The vast majority agreed and the election went par35

ticularly well for Mussolini in the South of the country. However the most significant compromises Mussolini made were with the Catholic Church and the Pope, Pius XI. In 1923 Mussolini introduced a series of measures that pleased the church, (despite not being an enthusiastic churchgoer himself), such as a ban on birth control and religious education being introduced in schools. The Lateran Pact made between church and state in 1929 (that stated Vatican City would become a tiny independent state, that church would receive a financial settlement for lands lost in the unification and that Catholicism was the state religion of Italy) arguably solved the “Roman Question” and according to Townley “secured [the Italian people’s] unquestioning acceptance of the regime”. In conclusion, although violence and intimidation played a vital role in Mussolini’s rise to power and the militia continued to be a valuable threat to opposition, the ras proved to be far too volatile and Mussolini realised this, dismissing many of the most radical blackshirts (including Balbo and Farinacci, who was banished to Cremona) and choosing instead to use repression, propaganda and compromise in order to consolidate his regime; thus, violence and intimidation was not as important as other factors. Both repression and propaganda proved very effective in consolidating Mussolini’s power but it can be argued that they had a negative effect on him as a leader, distancing him from reality so that he came dangerously close to believing he was invincible. The compromises he made however ensured that he managed to survive the Matteotti crisis which otherwise would have ended his political career in 1924: both Source A and Source B agree on the severity of the crisis and A mentions “an outraged anti-fascist opposition” that “withdrew from parliament in the socalled Aventine Secession”. Mussolini’s survival the Secession was also due to his compromises with the Church and King, (Source B states “The Vatican’s newspaper preached forgiveness. The King did nothing.”), in that the church-pleasing measures introduced a year before the crisis meant the church felt somewhat obligated to defend the Duce, and the king was persuaded not to act when Mussolini changed the oath militia members swore so that their allegiance was now to the king and not Mussolini. The compromises Mussolini made with trusted figures in Italian politics like Giolitti and Pope Pius XI helped convince the Italian people that he could be trusted as a leader, and ultimately compromises was the most important factor in the consolidation of his regime between 1922 and 1929.

Norman Conquest

How far did the social and political position of the English aristocracy change in the years 1066 – 1087 as a result of the Norman conquest? (24 marks) William, duke of Normandy was crowned King of England on the 25th December 1066, leaving the native English aristocracy to wonder what would become of them. Over the course of his reign, William oversaw the almost complete extinction of English aristocratic power. However, there is clear evidence that at the start, William did not want this change. Between William’s coronation and 1070, there was actually very little change in the position of the English aristocracy. This is due to the fact that William was obviously keen to create an Anglo – Norman society at first, clearly shown in his kind treatment of the English earls that remained. As source B says, he gave Waltheof the county of Northampton and his niece Judith in marriage in an attempt ot win his loyalty. Source C also mentions Edwin and Morcar being treated well and there were plans to marry Edwin to one of William’s daughters, further cementing the intended permanency of the English aristocracy. Source A also talks of the fine treatment of the English nobility. William’s kind treatment of the English was not just limited to nobles thought, but also to officials and churchmen. As source C says, they were used widely (until 1070). Tofi of Somerset and Edmund of Hertfordshire were both English sheriffs and Archbishop Stigund, one of the reasons why William invaded, was not removed from his post until 1070. Wulfstan, bishop of Worcester outlived William and was a council to his son, William Rufus. The fact that the English remained in positions of authority is shown by how writs were issued in English and Latin until 1070. All this shows that at least at first, change in the English aristocracy was almost non – existent, and when it did occasionally happen, was necessary. Most of the changes in the position of the aristocracy up to 1070 were due to the deaths of nobles at Hastings, mainly the Godwinsons, Harold, Gyrth and Leofwine, who between them held most of Southern England. This land was divided up and given out as rewards for people who had helped William in battle. Other deaths from Hastings that lead to widows owning large tracts of land also resulted in some change to the aristocracy, as Norman married English widow or daughter to legalise the holding of land. Countess Lucy brought her estates to a succession of 3 Norman husbands while the daughters of Wigot (castellan of Oxford) and Colswein of Lincoln were married to Norman husbands. William was mainly able to achieve this lack of change because of the support of many of the English. To many of the English aristocracy, William had a good a claim to the throne as Harold had, and since he had now beaten Harold in battle and being anointed 38

and crowned King in front of God, it seemed second nature to support him. As source A and C suggest, many of the English were willing to fight for William. When Harold’s sons attacked the Bristol channel in 1067, Eadnoth the staller fought and died for William. All these factors suggest that up to 1070, the English aristocracy did not have a major change of position, mainly because William did not want one. However, after 1070, the situation changes dramatically. This was because of the rebellions up to this point, particularly the northern rebellion of 1069 which had involved amongst others, Edwin, Morcar and Waltheof. After these rebellions, William felt he could not trust the English, and so began the extermination of the English aristocracy’s power. Local official became Norman, with Roger de Pitres and Robert d’Oilli taking over as sheriffs. As source A says, Castellans had mostly always being Norman. The change to Norman officials is shown by how writs stopped being issued in English and were merely issued in Latin as there were no English officials left. The English earl’s position also changed as well, with Edwin and Morcar falling from favour and having their lands confiscated and given out before they were killed or imprisoned. Other English earls, such as Aethelric were exiled and went to join the Varangian guard, as source B says.

Perhaps the biggest change to the position of the English aristocracy was the introduction of the system of military feudalism, which is talked about in source B. The English now found themselves under Norman masters, with courts to answer to. The introductions of fiefs, manorial courts and other Norman terms were entirely new to the English. By the doomsday book of 1086, there were only two English landholders left. This shows a huge change in the position of the English aristocracy. To conclude, at first the English aristocracy underwent very few changes. However, by 1087, they had almost being completely cut out of power, mainly due to their rebellions. William’s dream of an Anglo – Norman society had failed and it must be concluded that the position was changed greatly.

How Edward Became King Timeline... 1002- Ethelred marries Emma, the sister of Richard ll who is the duke of Normandy. 1013- Svein invades England after Ethelred’s promise to exterminate all Danes in Britannia. Ethelred flees to Normandy in exile after the Viking takeover. Only benefit to feeling to Normandy is that Emma was related to the Duke, lots of connections. 1014- Ethelred goes back to England after Svein dies. Has to promise to rule England more “justly” then he had in the past. He soon goes back to his old ways. He gets a henchman called Eadnc the grubber- basically a horrible cruel man who destroyed all of Ethelred’s opposition and increased divisions in England. Edmund- eldest son by first marriage. By 1015 Ethelred was ill. 1015 Cnut, the new Viking war lord returns! King Edmund ironsides puts up a fierce resistance, but was betrayed by Ethelred’s own henchman, who joined Cnut’s side. Edmund died in 1016 in the battle of wounds. Edward the confessor and Alfred and his sister Godgifu fled. It was lucky they did as Cnut was as ruthless as a dog chasing a squirrel. Battles etc. had reduced Edwards’s halfbrothers from 6 loving brothers ready to take the throne at any notice down to 1. Cnut killed the final remainder by using Eadwig and another suspect, Eadnc the grubber. He also ordered Emma, Ethelred’s wife to be his own. (Cnut took Ethelred’s widow)

In his youth Edward, Richard ll wasn’t really bothered about his sister marrying Cnut. In 1026 Richard ll died and was replaced by his son who was Richard lll, who in turn died in 1027, apparently poisoned by his dear brother Robert. How loving are royal families. The main point is Robert did support Edward and Alfred; they were cousins and so got on well. They were the same age and brought up in the same environments. Robert didn’t put together and invasion fleet, but when he apparently did he went to Jerusalem for some obscure reason. Maybe penance? Either way he died on the way back home and was buried in Nicaea. In 1035 Cnut died, he had respected and observed English traditions and despite the way he took the throne, he offered England 19 years of peace. He left his one son to take his place, known as William the Bastard. Cnut’s reign saw the death of most of the Ealdormen, replaced initially by Jarls, who in turn 40

were replaced by Earls. Also saw the rise of Godwine who was the king’s closest advisor. Also involved in the butt kissing were Leofric (who got Mercia) and Siward (who got Northumbria) these were the “new guys” without any aristocratic roots. By early 1020’s Godwine controlled the entirety of South England and Wessex. Leofric was the second power of England (the strongest was Godwine) as they Danes had been redeployed, and Leofric’s main power was in Northumbria. They were both rivals. They both met at Oxford after Cnut’s death. The north went to Harold Harefoot and the south to Harthorcnute. But Harthorcnute did not show up, so the rivalries intensified. In 1036 Edward popped into England but turned back. He may have come for some booty and to test the scope for an invasion. Godwine had supported Harthorcnute but when he didn’t show up at Oxford he quickly switched sides to Harold Harefoot. In 1036 Alfred came into England and Harold offers to take him into his “protection” and attacks him and his followers at night. Some people were sold as slaves, some were murdered and even more were mutilated (anything from a cut off finger to a missing tongue.) Alfred was taken to Ely and was blinded (someone gored his eyes out) and was taken into the monk’s care. In Feb 1037 he died of his injuries, Godwine being responsible. Godwine then sucks up closer to Harold Harefoot. Emma (still alive!) then flees to Flanders and gets Harthorcnute, the King of Denmark to invade. Harold Harefoot dies March 10th 1040 for reasons unknown, and then Harthorcnute digs up the dead body of his brother and decapitates him! According to the A/S chronicle “he never did anything worthy of a king while he reigned) Godwine had to swear what happened to Alfred- said Harold did it! Harthorcnute then tried to raise huge sums of money to pay for his troops, to keep his ships, 62 compared to England’s 16. This led to a massive inflation (too much tax) and so Harthorcnute sent housecarls to act as tax collectors! Two were sent to Worcester- closed into a cathedral and killed by an angry mob, and so the king spent 4 days happily burning the city to the ground (people escaped and spread news) they ran to an island in the middle of the river severn. Obviously public relations weren’t good. “gripped by brotherly love” H/C, Edward and Emma “holy trinity” or did Earl Godwine give a decision faced upon H/C by his angry subjects.

“It was the unreliability of allied support that cause the failure of rebellion against William in the period 1067 – 1075” Explain why you agree or disagree with this statement. (24 marks) William, Duke of Normandy was crowned King of England on the 25th December 1066. However, his claim to the throne was heavily disputed and other potential candidates and English people unhappy with a foreigner on the throne rebelled against him. All rebellions failed, and the unreliability of allied support is one of the main reasons for this failure. However lack of unity was the main reason for the failure and the Norman military superiority also played a part. Unreliability of allied support played a large part in the failure of the rebellions. Without allied support the English struggled to match the military might of the Normans. The reasons why the allies were so unreliable was because they had very different agendas to the English rebels. This mean that sometimes when the English would have carried on fighting, the allies would leave them as their interests did not march, meaning rebellion failed. This is shown in 1069 when the Vikings left the Northern rebellion after negotiating a treaty with William allowing them to plunder the East Coast. The Vikings’ desire merely for loot was also shown in 1071 when they deserted Hereward the Wake on Ely after gaining the loot they wanted from Peterborough cathedral. Another ally, Malcolm Canmore, also proved to have merely an agenda of acquiring land as in the Northern rebellion of 1069 he retreated back to Scotland when threatened. This culminated in him signing the treaty of Abernethy in 1072 which stopped him helping the rebels. When the allies didn’t have a different agenda, they were just plain unreliable. In the noble’s rebellion of 1075, the Vikings, although they had gathered their biggest ever fleet of 200 ships, arrived too late to help any of the rebels, meaning they went straight to Flanders, having been no help at all. The allies focus on their own agenda caused English rebellion to falter, and in the end fail, when the allies were not prepared to go to the same lengths as the English. However, while the lack of strong allied support was a large factor in the failure of rebellion, other factors also played a key part. The superiority of the Norman military machine also helped the Normans succeed in quelling rebellion. The Normans superior military tactics when dealing with rebellions played a large part in this, as they quickly and conclusively crushed the English and put in measures to stop them rebelling again. Tis is shown by their use of castles, such as when William build two castles in York in 1069 during the Northern rebellion and the use of castelries along the Welsh marches, which stopped rebellion there. Also the harrying of the North in the winter of 1069/70 acted as a deterrent to the rest of the country, since all Northern infrastructure was basically de42

stroyed. Other regions did want this to happen to them, and this is why the Northern rebellion was the last full scale English rebellion. This was further compounded by the weakness of the English rebels which meant the Normans had an easy battle. The rebels’ lack of a firm base meant they had to adopt ineffective guerrilla tactics such as Hereward the Wake did in 1072 from Ely. Also Orderic Vitalis cites the English’s lack of experience in siege warfare as another reason, meaning castles were difficult to take. While Norman military superiority played a part in the failure of rebellion, lack of unity posed the greatest problems for the rebels. The leaders’ selfish goals meant that they couldn’t connect with normal people, meaning they lack support. Hereward rebelled in 1072 over loss of land and Edwin and Morcar rebelled in 1069 when they realised they had little to gain from being in Williams court. In 1075, all 3 leaders were highly privileged nobles, with only minor gripes that caused them to rebel. All of these reasons were not reasons for the commoners to rebel. Many English supported William, as they saw him (after the 25th December) as the true anointed King, chosen by God and quite fit to rule their country. This meant that while some English were fighting against William, the majority accepted his rule or actively defended it, adding to the Norman military might. For example, when Harold’s sons attacked the Bristol Channel in 1067, they were repelled by Eadnoth the staller, an Englishman who died for William. When they attacked Exeter in 1069, Exeter fought back and won. Also, many were tempted to turn to William after seeing the futility of rebellion. In 1075, Waltheof fled to William in Normandy to betray his fellow conspirators, a major setback for the rebellion. The almost complete lack of unity among English rebels was due to the lack of true leaders that all could unite behind. The most seeming candidates for this had been the Godwinsons, all of whom had been killed off at the battle of Hastings. Edgar Aetheling, Swegn of Denmark or any of the lesser nobles could not hope to drum up the support the Godwinsons would have received. This caused the many uncoordinated rebellions, and ultimately the failure of all rebellion. To conclude, lack of reliable allies caused problems for the rebels and it meant they were outmanned by the Normans. However, the main reason for the failure of rebellions was down to the lack of unity between rebels, which meant none of them ever mustered enough power to defeat William. To many Englishmen, William was their anointed King which begged the question, why rebel?

Britain 1951â&#x20AC;&#x201D;2007

‘Labour lost the 1970 election because of their poor economic record.’ To what extent do you agree with this statement? (45 marks) In spite of having inherited a poor economic situation, Wilson’s Labour Governments between 1964 and 1970 actually managed to handle the economy surprisingly well. Wilson’s devaluation of the pound in November 1967, for example, was widely opposed, but was in fact the kick-start needed to revitalise the British economy, so that even by 1970 the economy was beginning to recover. Labour actually lost the 1970 election due to their underdelivery of promises such as the ‘White heat of technology.’ The electorate was thus disillusioned with Wilson’s Labour government. Tactical failures and Wilson’s deteriorating leadership also contributed to their defeat in the 1970 election: Wilson was so concerned with his image that he became paranoid – he was a victim of his own success as a ‘master of spin’. The economic situation that Wilson’s government had inherited in 1964 was desperate. Economic decline and a massive balance of payments problem, due to foreign policy commitments and spending on defence, meant that the value of the pound was too high. Exports were expensive, restricting trade. However, Wilson’s government was successful to a certain extent, in its handling of the economy. Between 1963 and 1970, exports increased by 40%, and economic growth was at an average of 2.7% per annum. By 1969, the deficit of £1.96 billion in 1968 had been transformed into a trade surplus of £600 million. Wilson’s decision to devalue the pound by just over 14% in November 1967 was widely unpopular. It was seen to be an unnecessary and overly dramatic response to the economic situation. Devaluation was effective however, and made exports more competitive overseas. Between 1967 and 1970, exports increased by 70%. Sked and Cook argue that had Wilson made a brave decision to devalue the pound sooner, his government could have achieved even more. Roy Jenkins was arguably the most successful Chancellor since the Second World War and by 1970, the economy had begun to stabilise – the timing of the election was unlucky for Labour. In the build up to the 1970 election, the Conservatives exploited the idea of Labour being poor at handling the economy. Heath promised to bring an end to ‘six long years of hard Labour’. In May 1967, retail prices increased by a record 2.1%, leading Heath to call for a ‘shopping basket election’. This attack on Labour’s economic record was reinforced by the Home Secretary, James Callaghan, who made remarks indicative that there might have to be wage freezes after the election. It was somewhat ironic that the Conservatives criticised Labour’s economic record, given that Wilson’s government had spent six years attempting 45

to improve the failing economy the Conservatives had left them with, and the destabilising impact of their ‘stop-go’ economic policy. Labour’s economic record was average – it was certainly not poor enough to cause them to lose the 1970 election; especially when compared to the Conservative’s economic record. The impressive economic record of the Wilson government between 1966 and 1970 is described as ‘one of the great under-reported stories in British post-war history’. Wilson had been voted in with optimism, promising a technological revolution and a ‘New Britain’. Although projects such as the BT tower were delivered, many of these ideas were hijacked by the Conservatives. Wilson had promised to end class conflict and social divisions – again, this was not delivered. Youth culture clashed with the older generation, and social tensions erupted due to mass immigration. In 1968, Enoch Powell’s ‘Red Rivers of Blood’ speech won the Conservatives the votes of working class men – Wilson had failed to tackle the ongoing issue of racial tension, and as a consequence, the semi-skilled working classes swung the vote to the Conservatives in key marginal constituencies. Wilson also failed to curb the power of the Trade Unions. By 1969, 7 million working days had been lost to strike action. The Trade Unions, and the far-Left of Labour saw ‘In Place of Strife’ in January 1969 as an assault on their movement. Wilson was isolated, and capitulated to the Left in what Marr describes as a ‘toothless compromise’. The economy limited social reform: plans to raise the school leaving age to 16 in 1968, and plans to restructure state pensions in 1965 had to be put on hold. This left core Labour voters feeling betrayed, and let down by Wilson’s government. On the other hand, Wilson’s government was arguably effective in enabling social change. A cascade of liberalising legislation gave Wilson’s government a progressive image. Beneath the surface, however, this reform happened in spite of Wilson’s government, not because of it. The 1965 Abolition of the Death Penalty Act was the result of a private member’s bill, as was the 1967 Sexual Offences Act which legalised homosexual activity. The 1967 Abortion Act was the achievement of David Steel, a Liberal MP. Thus, much of the liberalising reform during Wilson’s time in power was not actually the work of his Labour government. Wilson failed to deliver all that he had promised – in spite of undeniable social change, Labour voters felt betrayed. This betrayal of traditional Labour voters led to a decline in membership and activity at a grassroots level. A record of a Manchester Labour Party ward organisation shows how sharp this was. In Newton Heath, average attendance in 1965 was 30 and total membership was 280. By 1967, average attendance was 18, and in 1968 average attendance was 9. National membership fell from 817’000 in 1965 to 680’000 in 1970. It could even be argued that Wilson’s government was destined to fail in 1963, when he made such grand promises of the ‘white heat of technology’. 46

Finally, Wilson was, in many ways, a victim of his own propaganda. The 1967 devaluation of the pound was an unpopular move. However, it was Wilson’s subsequent ‘pound in your pocket speech’ which did more harm to his reputation and political position. The speech fundamentally damaged Wilson’s personal credibility. Devaluation was also a U-turn in policy, demonstrating a lack of consistent ideology. Wilson’s leadership was purposefully divisive in order to maintain his own political position, which lessened party unity, and the government’s ability to pass reform. Wilson created the DEA, in an attempt to modernise the economy, but this department was in direct competition with the Treasury to run the economy – the Treasury nicknamed the DEA the ‘department of extraordinary aggression’. This intentional divisiveness made Wilson’s government less effective, and therefore less electorally appealing. Wilson was seen to be an underhand and untrustworthy Prime Minister. Although initially effective, this soon became unappealing to the electorate. Over the issue of the Vietnam War, Wilson played a ‘typically slippery game’; refusing to send troops, but not condemning US intervention. This ultimately inflamed youth culture and led to the 1968 AntiVietnam protest at Grosvenor Square. Wilson lost his radical reputation, and his tactical scheming cost him the youth vote in the 1970 election. In contrast, Heath is described as a ‘dominant and forceful politician’ – a far more electorally appealing image than Wilson’s in the build up to the 1970 election. Wilson’s government had quite simply promised too much. His failure to live up to the famous ‘white heat of technology’ speech and to truly modernise Britain meant that Labour voters felt betrayed, and many sections of society were disillusioned with his government. Thus, in the 1970 election, Heath was a more appealing prospect, offering a fresh approach to politics, and intending to break with consensus. Additionally, Wilson’s scheming internal policies had weakened the party’s unity, whilst his tactical failures such as Vietnam lost him the youth vote. His handling of the 1967 devaluation damaged his personal reputation and credibility – although this did kick-start the economy, Wilson was not well-trusted following his infamous ‘pound in your pocket’ speech. Finally, although Labour’s economic record was far from perfect, it was not poor enough to cost Labour victory in the 1970 election. Wilson’s defeat was primarily due to his failure to deliver, and voter’s disillusionment with him. Wilson’s slippery image acted as a catalyst to his defeat in the 1970 election.

How far were the problems faced by the Major administrations between 1990 and 1997 a consequence of his poor leadership, rather than the legacy of Margaret Thatcher? (45 marks) During his 7 years as Prime Minister, John Major’s government was beset by social, economic and political problems which were a major factor in the Conservative party’s 13 years in opposition that followed Labour’s landslide election victory in 1997. These crises included a recession, party divisions over Europe and what some political commentators called the destruction of the social fabric. While Major may have at times shown poor leadership, such as on Black Wednesday, his ability to tackle the problems of the 1990s was hampered by factors beyond his control, primarily Thatcher’s economic legacy and vocal Euro-scepticism during his period in office. By the time of John Major’s replacement of Thatcher as Prime Minister in November 1990, the “Lawson boom”, a period of economic expansion attributed to the Chancellor Nigel Lawson’s tax cuts and increases in government spending which had swept Thatcher to a third successive election victory in 1987, had faded away, leading to a recession between 1990 and 1992. This recession made Major very unpopular as it affected traditional Tory voters – Southern middle class homeowners, many of whom now found themselves in negative equity, unlike previous recessions which had mainly affected the post-Industrial North (traditional Labour heartlands). Yet it would be wrong to blame Major for this recession since he was left to pick up the pieces after the unsustainable fiscal expansion of Lawson and Thatcher. Indeed, it could be argued that Major showed strong leadership in his election campaigning before the 1992 election victory which resulted in a higher Conservative vote than any of Thatcher’s victories, despite the recession. After the 1992 election, the events of 16 September 1992, now known as Black Wednesday, when international speculators made billions by selling off pounds on the foreign exchange markets (which they saw as overvalued) while the Bank of England lost £4 billion trying to prop up sterling, seriously undermined the Conservatives’ reputation for sound economic management. Major, with the support of key Cabinet colleagues like Norman Lamont, Douglas Hurd and Kenneth Clarke, showed weakness and even desperation by making emergency interest rate rises to 12% then 15% on the same day. Major was also criticised for waiting 8 months to sack Lamont. However, it was Thatcher who made the decision to enter Britain into the ERM and did so at an overvalued rate. After Black Wednesday, with the pound floating on foreign exchange markets, the economy picked up as unemployment fell to less than 2 million and 48

inflation stayed below 4%. Major’s choice of Ken Clarke as Chancellor led to some restoration of the Conservatives’ economic reputation. In other areas such as the privatisation of British Rail, market reforms in health, education and the civil service, and the replacement of the Poll Tax by the new Council Tax, Major showed strong leadership even when Thatcherites in the party were critical. Although the economic situation after 1992 improved, the unity of the Conservative party diminished considerably. The Tories were divided over European integration, in particular whether to sign the Maastricht Treaty, between Europhiles like Michael Heseltine and Ken Clarke and Eurosceptics like Michael Portillo and Bill Cash. Despite Major’s achievement of British opt-outs from the monetary union and the social chapter, Thatcher was still opposed and her followers organised the Maastricht Rebellion which undermined Major’s authority, showing how Thatcher was seen as a “backseat driver”. Moreover, she gave a loose endorsement of Major’s 1995 leadership challenger John Redwood and even spoke positively of Blair in 1997. Her vocal Euro-scepticism in the 1990s was in spite of the fact that she passed the Single European Act in 1986 which brought Britain closer to Europe. Some criticise Major’s response to the divisions, especially his off-mic description of the “bastards” in the Cabinet but the divisions should be blamed on the influence of Thatcher, rebellious MPs and a critical press. Thatcher’s economic policies, such as combatting trade union power and accepting a natural rate of unemployment (unemployment surpassed 3 million in the 1980s) led to a sharp rise in unemployment in many Northern cities such as Liverpool and Newcastle. Her critics claim this entrenched regional unemployment, as well as her claim that “there is no such thing as society” led to a breakdown of the social fabric as seen with events like James Bulger’s murder. However, the press largely blamed Major due to his poor leadership over the “Back to Basics” campaign, seen by many as out-of-date. However, the failure of the campaign was principally due to the hypocrisy shown by various Tory sex and corruption scandals, implicating MPs such as Tim Yeo, Stephen Milligan and Neil Hamilton, which cannot be blamed on Major. Furthermore, Major did make important progress on the Northern Ireland peace process, while in foreign policy his involvement in the First Gulf War proved popular. Overall, the “weak and indecisive” Major (Dobson) was not the strong leader the country had seen under Margaret Thatcher and he made serious errors such as on Black Wednesday. Yet the legacy of Margaret Thatcher’s economic policies were the main factor in many of the economic and social problems faced by Major, such as the recession and social breakdown. In addition, Major pursued his own set of policies such as market testing in the civil service which showed strong effective leadership. 49

“The Conservative defeat in February 1974 was a result of the legacy of the Wilson government, rather than the personal failings of Edward Heath.” To what extent do you agree with this statement? (45 Marks) The difficult legacy of the Wilson government made Heath’s premiership difficult from the offset. Although the economy was not in thoroughly dire straits when Heath became Prime Minister in 1970, Wilson’s failure to tackle issues such as a rise in Trade Union power, meant that Heath’s government was never destined to achieve great things. Most significant, was the legacy of Wilson’s weak capitulation to the Trade Unions – their increasing power in government would prove to be the main cause of Heath’s downfall in 1974. This was a direct result of Wilson’s legacy. Although referred to as a ‘somersaulting moderniser’ and ‘politically incompetent’, Heath was in fact a pioneer. Wilson’s legacy was the crucial factor that cost the Conservatives the 1974 election. Heath was also hampered by external factors that seemed to be constantly working against him – he was singularly unlucky, which also contributed to the Conservative’s defeat in 1974. In terms of the economy, in spite of having inherited a poor economic situation, Wilson’s government had actually succeeded in modernising the economy to a certain extent. By 1969, the deficit of £1.96 million had been transformed into a trade surplus of £600 million. Although widely unpopular, Wilson’s decision to devalue the pound in November 1967 provided the necessary kick-start for economic recovery: exports were less expensive, meaning that between 1967 and 1970, exports had increased by 70%. Roy Jenkins was arguably the most successful Chancellor since the Second World War and by 1970, the economy had begun to stabilise – the timing of the election was unlucky for Labour, but, for the Conservatives, things were promising. Hennessy states that ‘there was a sense of optimism as Heath moved into Number 10.’ It is entirely possible that the economic recovery would have continued under Heath’s government, were it not for the lasting legacy of Wilson’s government, not so much in terms of the economy, but in terms of his total failure to confront major issues. In 1969, Wilson capitulated to the Trade Unions in a toothless compromise. Heath had been determined to succeed where Wilson failed, in curbing Union powers. On January 9th 1972, the Miners began a General Strike in response to a government pay freeze. Had Wilson not left the Trade Unions unchecked, and not pandered to their every request, Heath’s time in office could have been spent resolving new issues, rather than confronting the Trade Unions as should have happened almost a decade before. As Grenville states the, ‘the undoing of the Heath government was its bitter clash with the 50

Trade Unions’. Even external factors working against Heath would have been less damaging were it not for the legacy of Wilson’s government. On November 12th 1973, Miners began an overtime ban – their timing was crucial as it coincided with an oil shortage due to the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East. Wilson’s failure to confront the Trade Unions in the 1960s meant that by 1973, they were essentially bring the country to a standstill. On December 5th 1973, Heath introduced a 50mph speed limit, lighting and heating restriction in shops and factories, and told people to ‘share baths’ and only heat one room at a time in their home. Heath also introduced a three day week. In February 1974, the Miners began another General Strike. By the time of the February 1974 general election, the number of working days lost to strike action had reached 14’750’000. To an extent, Heath was unlucky in facing an oil shortage due to the Yom Kippur War. Crucially however, the problem was intensified to crisis point by the power of the Trade Unions – a clear lasting legacy of Wilson’s government. A hostile press made matters even worse, running headlines such as ‘Country of Chaos’ and ‘Economic Crisis’. Between 1950 and 1974, a state of emergency had been declared just twice – Heath declared a state of emergency five times during his time in office. This apparent failure of government was in the minds of the electorate at the 1974 election, working to the Conservatives’ detriment. Wilson’s concern with tactics had meant that there was a lack of consistent economic policy during his term in office, having pitted the DEA and the Chancellery against each other. The extent of economic instability was beginning to show in 1970, in spite of apparent recovery. When Heath came to power in 1970, inflation was running at 12%, and unemployment had reached 628’000 - Wilson’s devaluation of the pound by 14.3% in 1967 had failed to prevent high inflation and rising unemployment. Britain was lagging behind the rest of the world in terms of economic recovery. Between 1964 and 1972, unemployment rose continually – peaking at 929’000 in 1972. However, between 1972 and 1974, unemployment fell, reaching 628’000 again in 1974. The rising inflation for the first two years of Heath’s premiership were a direct consequence of Wilson’s government. Unfortunately for Heath, these high unemployment figures were at the forefront of the electorate’s mind in the February 1974 election, and whilst it appeared at face value to be the Heath government to blame, unemployment had in fact just begun to decline following the aftermath of Wilson’s time as Prime Minister. Heath’s greatest failure is seen to be his willingness to U-turn on policies. However, this was in fact Heath’s greatest asset. Rather than demonstrating political incompetence, it actually showed his readiness to adapt to the situations unfolding around him. Heath had come to power ‘rejecting the philosophy of compulsory wage control’, and abolishing the National Board for Prices and Incomes (NBPI) in line with this. However, in 1972, Heath’s government introduced a Statutory Incomes Policy, in order to curb inflation. This major U51

turn demonstrates responsiveness, in this case a response to rampant inflation, and the ever-increasing power and threat of the Trade Unions, and was necessary due to the failure of the previous government to tackle these issues. However, to the electorate, this inconsistency appeared weak – Heath’s government did not project an electorally appealing image in the build up to the 1974 election. The rising unemployment figures did not do Heath’s government any credit in the 1974 election, and, coupled with the lack of a consistent economic policy, the Conservatives were not an electorally promising prospect. However, whilst it was the Conservatives that suffered, the blame actually lies with the Wilson government, and their lasting impact. Given the circumstances, Heath’s government as a whole was surprisingly successful, and was not a time of failure. Heath’s greatest achievement was gaining entry into EEC. In spite of his U-turns, Heath’s major aim of gaining British entry into the EEC was achieved. As late as September 1973, the Economist reported that ‘Britain is two-thirds of the way to an economic miracle’, as the benefits of entering Europe were stimulating the economy. Heath himself was far more trustworthy and open than his scheming predecessor, Harold Wilson. Therefore, Heath’s ‘personal failings’ were few and far between – he did a surprisingly praiseworthy job of handling a period of ‘unremitting crisis’ (Budge and McKay). Heath was, as Sandbrook explains, ‘extraordinarily, incredibly unlucky’. Heath’s new right wing policies were continuously blown off course by factors outside of his control, such as the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent oil crisis of 1973, which indirectly caused the downfall of the Conservative government. Heath’s government suffered major internal blows – Ian Macleod, Heath’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, died after just weeks in office; a terrible blow to the Conservative party. Heath’s bad luck was not the most significant cause of the Conservatives’ downfall in 1974, but was a contributory factor. In conclusion, Heath was not a ‘compulsive U-turner’, but in fact adaptable. He became Prime Minister at the beginning of an immensely turbulent period. Heath was undoubtedly extremely unlucky—external factors hampered the progress of his government, and prevented the change he had promised to bring. However, these external factors would have been far less detrimental were it not for the difficult legacy of the Wilson government. Whilst external factors slowed, and even prevented progress, these issues could have been addressed without national emergency, had Wilson had the courage to confront ongoing issues such as inflation, and the Trade Unions during his time as Prime Minister. The factors which ultimately caused the Conservatives defeat in the 1974 election, were a result of the previous Labour government, and the legacy of Harold Wilson.

'Internal divisions were the most important reason for Labour's exclusion from power between 1951 and 1964.' To what extent do you agree with this statement? (45 marks) Divisions within the Labour Party ran deep on a very fundamental level through the period 1951 to 1964, and this no doubt was a major factor as to why the Conservatives were able to be victorious in three successive elections during this dismal period for Labour. Furthermore, the Tories of the 1950s were quite the antithesis of their political opponents; recently reformed, they appeared united and strong whilst Labour MPs were infighting and failed to appeal to the electorate. However, the most important reason for Labour's exclusion from power was that until 1961, Britain was enjoying a period of apparent affluence, and the electorate saw no reason for change. The 1951 election saw Attlee's Labour Party narrowly beaten by the Conservatives: the Tories won 321 seats to Labour's 295. As Labour cabinet minister, Jay. D, recalls, one of the main reasons for this result, and for their long-term exclusion from power, was "the Bevanite quarrel". He refers to Aneurin Bevan, a hard-left socialist who resigned over a row with the more right wing members of the party, namely the 'Gaitskellites' (named after Hugh Gaitskell) about the introduction of prescription charges in the NHS in 1951. This was a well -publicised event and Labour were criticised heavily by the British press and the Conservative Party, and then punished by the electorate for not being uniform in their decisions and beliefs. More years of infighting saw issues about Britain's close links with the USA questioned by hard-left members of the party, as well as its plans for nuclear deterrence against the Soviet Union. The 'Bevanites', as they became known, did not want to distance Britain from the USSR, and many voters despised their apparent links with communists in Russia. This also led to a lack of voter confidence in the Labour Party, who appeared disillusioned with the general public throughout the 1950s, and this resulted in election defeats in 1955 and 1959, as well as their overall exclusion from power from 1951 to 1964. Despite Bevan being granted positions as shadow foreign secretary and as deputy party leader under Gaitskell in the later years of the 1950s, the electorate would not quickly forget the deep political and personal divisions which plagued the Labour Party throughout that decade. Marr refers to these divisions as a "gang war", which serves to highlight just how damaging such an image could be to a political party. It is evident from the results of the 1959 election, where the Tories gained an impressive 100-seat majority, that the electorate were reluctant to vote for Labour. It is therefore argued by many that internal divisions within the Labour Party meant that many of its core voters felt alienated; they could not vote for a Party for which they could not be sure exactly what said party stood for. This 53

is one of the most crucial reasons why Labour failed to regain power after its narrow defeat in 1951 for thirteen years. As prominent members of the Labour Party argued amongst themselves over policy, the Conservatives were fresh from reform under Lord Woolton. This reform focused on grassroots politics, and ensured that the Conservative Party was more in touch with its voters within individual constituencies. It also restructured the Party, which meant that it had clear leadership at a time when its main opponents Labour were notoriously disunited and lacked strong guidance. This made the Conservatives notably more electable, and resulted to a large extent in Labour's remaining in opposition between 1951 and 1964. As Seldon puts it, "Lord Woolton picked the Party out of the gutter in 1945, and by 1950 had rendered it an efficient and liquid fighting machine." Thus it is argued by many that the Conservative Party's appeal to voters played a big role in ensuring Labour would remain in opposition between 1951 and 1964. Marr comments that "When the Conservatives have been out of power, they have tended to think and work hard to change themselves and win it back... When Labour has lost its power it has tended, after due thought and consideration, to tear itself into small pieces." This popular argument follows that the Tories are the natural party of government. In the 1950s, the general public still tended to defer to their 'betters', who were the aristocratic middle and upper classes, and therefore voted Conservative. Furthermore, because the Tory MPs were trained to be leaders, they were better organised; whereas the Labour Party consisted not mainly of Oxbridge graduates, but primarily of working and middle class people who may have experienced hardship - such as Nye Bevan. This contrast to the Conservatives proved very unpopular during the 1950s: the electorate found it difficult to comprehend a Labour government which could handle the economy and other issues as well as the natural Tory leaders. It is therefore important to recognise that the Labour Party were always seen as below their rivals, and thus did not regain power for such a lengthy period of time. In addition to this, the image and reputation of the two parties played a vital role in deciding who was in power during this period. Labour was traditionally known for high taxation, which would enable them to introduce social reforms in line with their socialist policies. The Conservatives had conventionally adopted policies which reflected somewhat their laissez faire ideal - meaning minimal state intervention. The 1950s saw the first consumer boom since the war, with a rise of 45% from 1952 to 1964. The annual economy growth rate was 2.6% and the national income was up 40% in 1955 compared with 1950. Moreover, the end of rationing brought about a real feel-good atmosphere around the country. Quite simply, the voters of Britain were pleased with their lives, and how it was improving 54

on the whole, and saw no reason to elect a different party, especially one whose principles relied on increases to taxation. The affluence of the general British public is therefore the main reason why Labour found itself stuck in opposition right up to 1964. It is important to remember that this so-called 'age of prosperity' in Britain was mainly confined to the consumer markets alone. The above mentioned figure of 2.6% growth was lower than any other developed nation at the time. There was a sterling crisis in 1957 over fears about government spending; by 1963, unemployment was at a record high of 2.6% since the welfare system began; Britain's share of world industry had dropped in 1966 to below 10% from 16% in the 1950s and the number of jobs in mining had shrunk from 712,000 to 517,000 between 1949 and 1974. To an outsider, the country was an economic mess. However, it is this fact, this idea that the country was not truly affluent, but the consumers, the general voting public were, that really underpins why Labour couldn't get back into power during this period. This was when deference still existed, when the media wasn't readily available, when TVs were only just introduced. The electorate saw and heard mostly what the government wanted them to hear. They heard very little from other sources because there were no means of doing so. It is this reason, that the government put on a front of prosperity and affluence to the voting public, that Labour spent so long in opposition. Harold Macmillan is far too often misunderstood in his "You've never had it so good" speech. He goes on, after he says this, to talk of "rising prices", "maintaining full employment" and "inflation". He even references the hardships suffered by millions in the Great Depression of the 1930s as a real possibility. However, the reason people do not remember the rest of his speech is that voters of that time were caught up with the idea that they were becoming better off. They chose to ignore, or possibly never really understood, the fact that affluence wasn't really real in terms of the wider economy. Thus, it is the appearance of economic affluence which ensures Conservative dominance and Labour's exclusion from power from 1951 to 1964. In conclusion, though the divisions in the Labour Party drastically damaged the Party's image and it's electability; and although their Tory opponents did some great work on their own image and voter appeal, during a time which many considered to be affluent, it made no sense for ordinary voters who were benefiting from the economic boom to vote out the party which, by its very nature, aimed to keep things constant. As a result, Labour was criticised heavily for not modernising its seemingly outdated socialist policies and thus it was denied power between 1951 and 1964. The facade of economic affluence, and to a certain extent, Labour's inability to adapt to suit a changing economy, therefore, are the most important reasons why Labour were excluded from power in this period. 55

"Conservative weaknesses rather than Labour Party strengths were they key reason why Harold Wilson was elected Prime Minister in 1964." To what extent do you agree with this statement? (45 marks) The Conservative Party's image was by far the most important reason that it lost power to Wilson's Labour in 1964; it appeared out of touch and unwilling to adapt to suit a changing society, its poor handling of economic and foreign affairs was heavily criticised and numerous high profile scandals served to secure its fate in the 1964 election. It is commonly contested that Labour Party strengths were vital to Wilson's victory, but a thorough analysis of the actual result, as well an understanding of the deep-rooted divides which plagued the Labour Party proves this argument invalid. In fact, the rise of the Liberal party as a result of cultural change was more responsible for the Labour victory because it took vital 'swing seat' constituencies away from Tory grasp. The rise of the Liberal Party is often understated as a reason why Wilson won in 1964; though it is not as consequential as the Tory Party's image, it is far more significant than supposed Labour strengths. The general election of October 1964 saw Labour take a narrow four-seat majority with 317 seats to the Tories' 304 and the Liberal's 9. This should be contrasted to the results in the period of Tory dominance in 1951-1964, where, for example, the Conservatives won by a convincing 60 seats in May 1955 and 100 seats in 1959. In 1955, however, 2.7% of the electorate voted Liberal, whereas 11.2% did so in 1964. Despite this much greater proportion of votes, they gained only three extra seats. This can be attributed to the number of defecting Tory voters, who, deterred from their normal voting habits, chose to vote Liberal because they felt the Conservative Party no longer reflected their views, or because they had recently undergone much bad press over a number of issues. This meant that in so-called 'swing-seats' (or constituencies where the outcome of an election was very uncertain), the Tories lost many votes whilst their counterparts in Labour did not suffer. This is exemplified in Tory and Labour voter proportions; in 1959, the Conservatives had 49.4% of the votes, and this dropped dramatically by 6% in 1964. Furthermore, it is evident that the number of Labour voters didn't change much - in 1959 they achieved 43.8%, and in 1964 it rose by a meagre 0.3% to 44.1%. These figures show that the rise in the Liberal vote was highly responsible for the drop in Conservative votes, and thus the popularity of the Liberal Party was a highly important factor in Wilson's victory in the 1964 election. In stark contrast to 1951, it seemed in 1964 that the Labour Party were now the organised and united party that the Conservatives once were, and that it was now the Conservatives 56

who were out of touch and lacking strong leadership. Both Aneurin Bevan and Hugh Gaitskell, whose petty squabbles had damaged Labour's image throughout the 1950's, were now dead and the party was therefore able to take a more united line in the run up to the 1964 election. They appeared to understand the everyday troubles facing most working and middle class people and this is important because it ensured that Labour appealed to much more of the electorate. Harold Wilson's 1963 speech on the 'white heat of technology' connected with voters because it showed how in touch his party was with the modern world. However, it was never enough for the Labour Party to appear strong, it was in the comparison to the Conservatives' weaknesses that Labour strengths became relevant and useful to an election victory. One of Labour's strengths was that it was able to connect with a working class which had lay dormant for most of the period that the Conservatives were in power. The early 1960s saw "The social balance of the 1950s began to break up with much cultural and psychological upheaval in its train." Shanks goes on to argue that there was a "rediscovery of the working classes" during this period. During the 1950s, it is argued that there was a decline in the numbers of working class people because affluence meant more people identified themselves as middle class. When the Tories became unpopular in the early 1960s, these people quickly reverted back to their working class heritage in protest against the Conservative 'toffs'. Labour were able to capitalise on this by aiming to appeal to such voters, and this certainly aided their victory in 1964.

In the early 1960's, the Conservative Party was suffering badly from an image problem, and this was the main factor in their 1964 election defeat. Numerous scandals involving top Tory ministers, such as the defence secretary John Profumo, tarnished the reputation of the Conservative Party. In this particular instance in 1963, both the personal lives of a number of respected individuals as well as scares over national security were scattered all over the national news. This served to end a culture of deference with the press, meaning that newspapers could expose and embarrass politicians as they pleased. With their image in ruin, the Tory Party stood little chance in the 1964 election because voters' confidence in the men who were running the country evaporated rapidly. The electorate were simply unwilling to vote for a party whose reputation consisted primarily of sleaze and public disgrace.

Furthermore, the Conservative Party had suffered because of what some, especially Labour Party publications, referred to as the 'thirteen wasted years', which is a reference to the years 1951-1964. As Fisher states, "The public wanted an expanding economy but the Con57

servatives gave them restraint to economic growth in 1961." This statement reveals how the Tory politicians seemed out of touch with mainstream society, and this gave them an image problem of a different kind to the sleaze issues which they also faced. The evidence for the argument that the Conservatives did waste their time in power is quite abundant. For instance, the economy was growing at an annual rate of just 2.6%, which was far lower than any other developed nation at the time. This also conforms with what Michael Shanks says in The Stagnant Society, where he argues that the Tories focused on short-term prosperity rather than sustained economic growth. Some would argue that the economy was nonetheless still growing, and they would be right, but the fact is that Britain could have been doing much better in terms of growth and industrial output during this period. The 1964 Labour manifesto really highlights that "Britain could and should have had it a whole lot better." This feeling embodies the nation's thoughts on the issue, and is reflected in Wilson's victory in 1964.

On the subject of image, it becomes apparent in this era that Britain herself, not just the Tories, was having an identity crisis. Though victorious in World War II, Britain was in decline as a political world power, was losing her Empire seemingly overnight, and was being overlooked as a global economic power. Many voters felt the loss of identity and blamed the Conservatives for not doing enough to maintain the empire or the country's world standing. There were two failed attempts at joining the European Economic Committee under the Conservatives, which was embarrassing for the British people, who were once part of one of the largest global economies. Further embarrassment ensued over the Suez Crisis and with the Polaris incident, where Britain was seen to be America's subordinate. Many referred to Britain as 'America's lapdog', and the electorate were keen to punish the party that was in charge during such crises. Clearly, the image problem of the Conservative Part in the run up to the 1964 election not only affects the party itself, but also extends to the country as a whole. This encompassing image problem was the main reason why Wilson was able to achieve a Labour victory in 1964.

In conclusion, though Labour did present themselves to a bitter working or lower-middle class voter as a strong, united party in the 1964 election, this idea relies upon the comparison to the sleaze-stricken, unpopular Conservative Party, and therefore is not the most important reason. The increase in the number of voters for the Liberal Party accounts to some extent for the demise of the Conservative Party, but not necessarily Labour's victory. It is the weakness of the Conservative Party, which is embodied in internal image problems within the party itself, but also the image crisis the Tories were blamed for externally, with 58

"Labour lost the 1970 election because of their poor economic record." To what extent do you agree? (45 marks) Though their economic record was certainly poor, this in itself is not the key reason as to why Labour lost power in the 1970 election. In fact, the main reason for this defeat was a combination of Harold Wilson's tactical failures as Prime Minister and the resulting appearance of disillusionment with the electorate. Moreover, this disillusionment came at a time when the Conservative Party was revelling in the popularity brought about by Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech. Labour's poor foreign policy and failure to fulfil their promise of modernisation also lost them many votes from members of the electorate who felt betrayed by Harold Wilson and his government. Perhaps the most damning decision which Wilson's government made was the devaluation of the pound in November 1967. In principle, this reduction in the value of the pound against the American dollar from $2.80 to $2.40 would make it easier to sell British goods abroad, and it did. Just two years later, Britain was running a budget surplus. This evidence proves that it was not primarily their poor economic record which caused Labour's 1970 defeat, because there were recent successes. Despite this, Wilson's public broadcast, in which he told the British public that the pound in their pocket was not worth any less, proved to most people that the Prime Minister was out of touch, and somewhat clueless. It is therefore Wilson's tactical failures which are responsible for the outcome of the 1970 election. It would appear also that the timing of the measure was wildly miscalculated. As Lynch argues, "if devaluation had been introduced earlier... it could have been passed off as a mere financial adjustment." It is therefore far more appropriate to say that Labour lost the 1970 election because of Wilson's tactical failures; namely that he misjudged when to devalue the pound, and in his speech which attempted to re-assure the public and managed to achieve quite the opposite. Both of these factors prove also that the Labour Party appeared disillusioned with the electorate, and with current economic affairs. In terms of foreign affairs, the failed attempt at securing Britain's membership to the EEC haunted Wilson's Labour Party right up to the election in 1970. Wilson feared that Britain, now a declining world power, would be left well behind of other countries which seemed to flourish economically while Britain, dubbed 'the sick man of Europe', plodded along slowly and reluctantly. Four years after the first failed attempt to join the European Economic Community, Wilson tried again. The French Premier Charles De Gaulle humiliated Britain once again by vetoing the application and Wilson suffered as Macmillan had done four years before. Just as the Conservatives then went on to lose the 1964 election, Labour lost the forthcoming 1970 election. Wilson's failure to provide the electorate with a foreign 59

policy success and address the growing need for a new sense of national pride meant that many voters defected to either the Liberals or the Conservatives. Britain had all but lost its Empire, its economy seemed to be struggling, inflation and unemployment were rising, and the British voters saw a government which continually failed to provide sufficient measures for recovery. It is of no surprise then, that in 1970, the Tories won by a majority of 30 seats. Wilson's tactical failures affected many voters on a domestic level, and this was to influence the outcome of the 1970 election much more than any foreign blunders. The 1969 White Paper 'In Place of Strife' was, in principle, a sound idea. It would curb the power of the trade unions by enforcing a mandatory 28-day 'cooling off' period before any strike action could take place. The reaction from the unions was devastating to Wilson's image. Flying pickets sprung up around the country to protest the imposition of the legislation and the unions effectively held the government to ransom. Once again, what was a perfectly sensible piece of legislation was implemented at the wrong time, and the reaction of the Unions was very much underestimated. Traditional Labour voters now felt as though their party, which after all was born out of the unions, had double crossed them; they would take their frustrations to the polls with them and ensured that Labour were to lose power in the 1970 election. The trade unionists had already made an unlikely ally in Enoch Powell, a fiery Conservative MP who in 1968, made one of modern Britain's most notorious speeches. His 'Rivers of Blood' speech sympathised with the "ordinary fellow-Englishman...says...that this country will not be worth living in for his children." He was referring to the high levels of immigration that Britain could and to an extent, was experiencing due to Callaghan's immigration bill which was passed only three weeks previously. Many trade union members marched in support of Powell and the Tories because they feared for their jobs, which they believed would be given to foreign workers who would accept a lesser wage. The combination of sympathy for a Conservative MP and the action Labour was taking against the trade unions ensured that a considerable percentage of the trade union voters would swing to the right in the 1970 election. Though this is important to Labour's downfall in itself, it also symbolises Wilson's failed tactics as Prime Minister, as he did not recognise what a negative impact 'In Place of Strife' would have just a year after Powell's speech had made such an impact on the unions.

In 1663, Harold Wilson opened the Labour Party Conference with his famous 'White Heat' speech, in which he promised that the Labour Party would focus heavily on the science industry and modernise the British economy to keep up with the fast-growing European states. In the eyes of the electorate, Labour failed to deliver on this front. Working class 60

people did not see any real change in their lives, or in their workplaces. In fact, despite Roy Jenkins' best efforts in his Chancellorship, the media constantly covered stories which focused on the dire balance of payments crisis from which Britain was suffering. Even though Wilson had called an early election when a budget surplus of ÂŁ600million was declared at the end 1969, it seems the electorate would not quickly forget Wilson's inability to make good on his ambitious promises and therefore voted Labour out.

To conclude, Wilson failed to provide the nation with a foreign policy success, such as securing Britain's place in the EEC - where instead he was humiliated by the French Premier Charles De Gaulle. Wilson also failed to provide any form of technological revolution, as he had promised in 1963. Though important, these two failings were non-actions, and it was to be his miscalculated actions which would eventually secure Labour's defeat in the 1970 election. His timing of otherwise sensible legislation such as the devaluation of the pound and 'In Place of Strife', made him appear a fool, and ultimately lost him crucial votes from trade unionists, as well as disillusioned members of the electorate.

Angevin Kings

The Conflict between King Henry II and Thomas Becket was caused more by issues of principle than by a clash of personalities. Assess the validity of this view. (45 marks) Thomas Becket’s rise to power was initiated by King Henry II, it was he who had “plucked him from obscurity and promoted him to the face of the most ambitious royal family in Europe” as Jones puts it and it is this which would later act as the catalyst for the dispute. Becket’s sudden change from the “courtier who romped with the king to the proud and austere priest” is no doubt a clear portrayal of his ability to become completely absorbed by his role; his change ultimately antagonised Henry who saw Becket as “a bridge between two worlds: Church and Crown,” and who instead became the greatest obstacle to creating a symbiotic relationship between the two establishments. Becket saw himself as the protector of the rights of the church and the representative of the ideals of the papacy. It was Becket’s goal to consolidate the independence that the church had gained under Stephen, through the use of the Charter of Liberties and the increase of communication with Rome. Contrasting with this Henry wished to stop papal influence growing and wished to reclaim the rights of the incorporeal crown, he used appeals to Rome and exercise of canon law in order to do this as was custom before it had been eroded by Stephen’s rule. The church has been open to exploitation through lay control, and this was shown clearly in the reigns of Rufus and Henry I and the reform papacy along with Becket, were determined to stamp this out the “lay abuses of ecclesiastical power”. Henry’s greatest mistake then can be seen to be trying to return the “rights of his ancestors” ignoring the developments of canon law and the papacy. It was understandable however that Henry wished to keep the church under royal control, considering the role of churchmen as government officials, more so for Henry who wished to centralise with government and increase royal authority in England in order to concentrate on the his continental territories such as Anjou and Normandy. Becket’s full commitment to a singular role can be seen to be his defining principle, as Chancellor he live a life of splendour and diplomatically helped Henry and as Archbishop he rejected the chancellorship saying, “I am unfit for one office, let alone two,” It is easy to see then why Becket and Henry had such a catastrophic relationship which rapidly spiralled out of control and ended with such controversy. Becket proclaimed that “rules who seek to subordinate the Church to secular power are tyrants whom the Church must resist”, clearly stamping his objection to Henry II and his Angevin despotism. Equally Henry, in writing the Constitutions of Clarendon in 1164 left no room for compromise between the two jurisdictions and even Empress Matilda, Henry’s mother, thought that Henry had gone too far in 63

forcing royal authority. However this is may not be the case. Henry II and Thomas Becket had known each other throughout their lives with Henry being the man who promoted “the face of the most ambitious family in Europe”. It is clear to see the personal relationship between the two men expressed in their actions toward each other as the affair began to spiral out of control. William fitzStephen is known to have said, “the king regarded it as an affront that the man whom he had first made chancellor and then archbishop should now withdraw from his obedience and oppose him” and this can clearly be seen in getting the Archbishop of York to crown Young Henry in an attempt to insult Becket, who at this time had fled to France. Evidently there is a much more personal clash at work here than a mere issue of principle. There is considerable evidence of co-operation between Henry and the papacy prior to the Becket conflict. Previously the king had allowed judicial appeals to the Curia and had worked with Alexander III’s legates who authorised the marriage of the Margaret of France to Henry the Young King in 1160. It appears that Becket antagonised Henry, excommunicating barons without Henry’s permission. In 1162 Becket and Henry began to argue over the appointment by Becket of a clerk to a parish church of Eynsford, already claimed by William of Eynsford. When William violently removed Becket’s nomination, Becket retaliated with excommunication. However an old custom governed that the king’s tenants-inchief could not be excommunicated without first consulting the king and Becket had to give in. In 1164 at Northampton, Becket lived up to his description as a “showman” by Guy by entering the court bearing the cross in his hands, signifying that he claimed the protection of the church against the violence of the king. Becket’s pride seemed to control his policies more than political reasons or matters of principle. His stubbornness has been described as “trying the patience not only of his enemies but even of his intimate friends” by Poole and the lack of support from the English Church suggests little liking for Becket’s personality or ideals, with even the Bishop of London publically criticised Becket in September 1166. Becket’s attitude shattered Henry’s ‘ideal of king and archbishop in harmony’ and his feelings of betrayal lead to his vindictive treatment of Becket’s family, all four hundred of whom were forced to leave England. Historian Guy blames Henry for the ordeal, describing him as “overbearing, bullying and vain” and though this can be seen at times such as the Council of Northampton wherein his actions were “both outrageous and undignified,” it is hard not to find the blame in Becket who in sharp contrast to the “honourable, charismatic” man that Guy sees him as, is described by Poole as a “great actor superbly living the parts he was called upon to play.” It is clear that a clash of personality is the cause of the Becket affair. As Weir describes, “what had begun as a dispute over a legal principle had turned into a battle of wills over 64

whose was the greater authority”. Becket’s violent death was “brought upon himself because he could not bring himself to admit that his reading of the situation had been mistaken” but this does not excuse Henry’s actions, his mistreatment of Becket’s family is a clear personal blow and by trying to unite crown and church and extend royal authority he brought his rule upon the brink of a disaster.

How successful was Henry II in restoring royal authority in England by 1166? (45 marks) The early years of Henry II’s reign were driven by the desire to restore “ancestral rights” and the rights of the incorporeal crown. Henry is undoubtedly successful in restoring royal authority to England by 1166, using different methods he manages to control the barons, regain the royal coffers and create an effective system of law that he could utilise in order to rule the kingdom without actually being present. There is however the issue of the church and the fact that Henry was unsuccessful in regaining the control Henry I had over it. This cannot discredit Henry’s success though as the church had undergone a reform and had increased in power dramatically. It has been claimed that Henry II was unsuccessful in restoring authority over the Barons due to the great revolt of 1173. This revolt has been used as evidence that Henry’s attempts to control the Barons gave the illusion of being successful but ultimately failed. Carpenter argues that Henry’s rule was “dangerously abrasive” and his actions “spawned the baronial malcontents who joined the rebellion of 1173-74”. These ‘baronial malcontents’ may not have been spawned by the restoration of royal authority but instead the extension of it, with Henry’s centralisation of power leading to him being seen as an ‘Angevin Despot’. These men would no doubt have resented the loss of their castles and Henry’s role as an absentee king “bred insecurity” as White put it, with Archbishop Theobald pleading with Henry to return as otherwise there would be “no hope of quiet for countrymen”. However, the truth is most likely that the Barons who chose to rebel, did not do so out of discontent but rather opportunism. Baronial power was a major threat to Henry’s reign due to the concessions given during the Anarchy and this leading to them having ‘semi-regal’ powers. Henry’s success in dealing with this problem no doubt came for his reactionary policies. In order to appease the Barons he removed the Flemish Mercenaries in 1154, though in later years they would return in order to intimidate them. He continued to appease them by allowing new earldoms to exist and allowing important figures such as William of Ypres, to keep their estates. Henry would not hesitate to stamp his royal authority if he had to however. In 1155 he began an inquest into the purprestures and began to destroy adulterine castles. The removal of castles from Barons such as Hugh Bigod and William of Boulogne may have angered them but it undoubtedly weakened them and strengthened royal authority. Henry also began to build castles such as Orford castle, described by Warren as “a bold move which struck at the roots of Baronial control”. These castles would act as a symbol of authority as well as being useful for defence and ad66

ministration. In 1166 Henry introduced the Cartae Baronum which was used to assess the financial demands of the Barons and allowed him to demand more scutage. Royal Authority had no doubt increased by 1166 and some may argue that it had not only been restored but had been extended and would continue to grow in the future, with actions such as the inquest of sheriffs in 1170 which Clanchy states was used to “reassert [Henry’s] authority”. Henry’s legal and administrative reforms also played a role in his restoration of Royal Authority and the success of these policies would allow him to maintain his control. Brand argues that his legal changes were “driven to make royal justice available to all,” though I would disagree with this point, the appearance of Henry coming across as a just king had the advantage of increasing his popularity and this would be useful later in the Great Rebellion of 1173-74, with many towns refusing to rebel. The legal reforms such as the assize of novel disseisin and morte d’ancestor “enhanced the King’s role as provider of justice,” and were important in retaining and improving Henry’s reputation. His ‘Curia Regis’ and travelling justices furthered strengthened his legal power and ensured that laws were reinforced throughout the realm, as Barlow states “it was Henry’s reign that there began to issue from the royal court a coherent and common body of law”. The strength of the laws was also doubled as they were written down and this codification granted them a great amount of power in this period. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 was a final act of restoring authority over the realm through the law, this act elevated the status of the knights and allowed them to check and balance baronial power. The law system was of the utmost importance to Henry as it was a way of ensuring his royal authority during his absence between 1158 and 1168. During this time Justiciars such as Richard de Lucy ruled. It could be claimed then that Henry himself was not responsible for the restoration of royal authority but instead that was down to the Justiciars who ruled in his stead. Though Henry did create the system it was up to these men to ensure that it worked and was carried out correctly. It could then be said that Henry’s ability to delegate effectively was one of the main reasons for the success of his restoration of royal authority, choosing loyal men such as De Lucy and Robert of Lester. The key reason for his use of legal reforms was not as Brand states “driven to make royal justice available to all” but instead as Barlow argues many “reforms had a financial purpose” and were issued in order to increase the royal coffers and the restoration of wealth was an integral part of restoring royal authority.

Henry’s manipulation of the coinage was a key part of his administration strategy and allowed him to gain and retain control over the populace. During the “shipwreck” that was Stephen’s reign, Barons infiltrated moneyer families and local magnates would issue independent coinage. This had the effect of splitting the economy and granting the magnates 67

power and control. Henry began to reissue the coinage in 1158 and used it as henrician propaganda and to increase taxation. This unified currency can be seen as a symbol of Henry’s centralisation policy and his effort to restore royal authority. Throughout his reign Henry reduced the number of mints from forty-six in 1154 to twenty in 1158 and finally to eleven in 1189, increasing his command over the economy. The section of society that Henry could not fully bring under his control was the Church. As Jones says “there was a long running stalemate between Henry and Archbishop Theobold over their respective jurisdictions” and the benefit of the clergy had been restored to the church during the anarchy. Henry’s first move was to produce ‘acta’ which confirmed the church’s possessions. This meant that the church recognised Henry as the source of justice in a secular dispute, however it was often the case that ecclesiastical jurisdiction overlapped royal jurisdiction and this was the cause of a great deal of problems that would haunt Henry throughout his reign in the form of Thomas Becket. Despite this Henry was determined to show his royal authority by intervening in ecclesiastical cases such as the murder in 1156 of The Archbishop of York as well as exercising control over church councils and church decrees. In 1164 Henry issued the Constitutions of Clarendon, an attempt to bring ecclesiastical jurisdiction under royal control and continue his centralisation policy. Henry’s error in 1164 may have been to overstrain the loyalty of his clerical advisers and this lead to discontent. The church had grown dramatically in power in recent years, with Pope Innocent III’s successful first crusade garnering a great amount of support for it and the Gregorian reform increasing its influence further, meaning it was almost impossible for Henry to fully restore the rights his father had over it. Despite the fact that the church disagreed with and would often challenge his actions, Henry can still be seen to be successful exerting royal authority over them. Cheney draws attention to the fact that Henry “usually got the prelates he wanted, the papal legates only entered the country with his approval; his permission was needed to attend papal councils and he could intervene in ecclesiastical cases if he wished to”, revealing that the church still respected his royal authority. Overall Henry II was successful in the restoration of royal authority in England by 1166. He managed to weaken Baronial power through the use of policies, intimidation and appeasement and in turn this strengthened his own authority. His legal reform gained him respect and increased his reputation in a way that gave him the appearance of being a righteous king gaining him support and allowing him to further extend his control in the years after 1166.

How far was the personality of King John responsible for the loss of Normandy in 1204? (45 marks) It is often interpreted that the main reason for the loss of Normandy was John and his own personal failings. Roger of Wendover discusses John’s “incorrigible idleness” and this opinion has permeated throughout history with even modern historians such as Green denouncing him as “the worst outcome of the Angevins”. It may be however that this opinion of John as a “softsword” and tyrant is due to an overreliance on contemporary chroniclers and that it is instead true that John was an itinerant king whose “overriding objective was to rule his inheritance in peace” but failed to hold together his increasingly fractured kingdom. It seems that it was inevitable that the Angevin Empire would crumble due to it being built on shaky foundations, as Henry had always planned to divide the territory between his sons. It is true that John’s reign was “marred by the flaws in [his] character” as Warren states. The greatest of these it seems is his impatience. John was unable to gain the support of his vassals which may be due to the fact that the lands he inherited had a legacy of longstanding resentment which was compounded by Richard’s enormous taxation. John seemed to recognise these issues but made no attempt to resolve them and instead focused his attention on increasing the treasury coffers. These tensions it has been argued could have been resolved with tact and patience but instead were allowed to spiral into eventual rebellion. Similarly John won a great victory and respite in 1199 at the Treaty of Le Goulet but, as Warren says, he “threw it away with reckless provocation of the Lusignans” and that “victory made him fool hardy and corrupted his judgement”. His foolishness in marrying Isabella of Angoulême and ignoring the effect this would have on the Lusignans brought his empire to its knees as it gave Philip an excuse to remove his lands and to dub him a “contumacious vassal”. John’s apparent cowardice is often cited as a reason that he lost Normandy. Many Scholars believe that “John made enormous allowances to Philip” at Le Goulet and it is due to this that Philip was able to gain the power to legally take Normandy from John. However details of the treaty of Le Goulet have been a great source of contention to historians and this has led to an uncertainty as to who gained the most from it. Carpenter is under the impression that it was Philip who made the “major concession” and Norgate describes Philip’s recognition of John as the lawful heir to the Angevin territories as a “personal triumph”. It would appear then that the treaty was not enacted due to John’s cowardice but his own political ingenious. Similarly the critical “softsword” name can be quickly denounced due to John’s early military success and his victory at Mirabeau in 1202 shows that he was a military leader able to inspire his men when necessary. John’s mar69

riage to Isabella has been seen to mar his character in two ways. On one hand it allows critics to accuse John as Vincent says “not only of cruelty and murder but even, possibly, of child molesting” though this can easily be dismissed as John’s marriage “in no way offended against contemporary law or contemporary morals”. The other argument that John is reckless in his mistreatment of the Lusignans is more substantial however there are explanations for John’s apparent arrogance and pride. The Lusignans had long been rebellious vassals, such as in 1168 when they slew Patrick Earl of Salisbury and John had reason to suspect that they had kidnapped his mother in 1168. It has also been suggested that Philip’s accusation that John was a “contumacious vassal” was unprecedented and has been described as “quite revolutionary” by Seel and seems to reveal the true power of Philip Augustus rather than the failings of John. John faced an able opponent with King Philip II, a man who had transformed the administration and finances of the Capetian domain. King Philip was able to play Arthur off against John to increase the terms of the treaty of Le Goulet which he was able to use as a “springboard” as Holt describes. Philip is clearly intensely manipulative and was able to use Angevin rivalries to Capetian advantage. Capetian propaganda was a powerful force which created a sense that the Capetian monarchy epitomized a social, intellectual and cultural renaissance. This fact alongside the benevolent attitude toward the church was used to draw a contrast between Philip and John and this meant that the Norman clergy were much more supportive of Philip. To draw another contrast between the pair Philip was much more accepting towards baronial fortresses than John with the Capetian accepting “the legal recognition of his overlordship without pressing for the same personal domination that his enemies preferred.” Though it is clear that Philip’s power and cunning allowed him to succeed against John it can be argued that his strength is often exaggerated. During 1202 he was mired in a struggle with the church over his bigamous marriage to Agnes of Meran, a sharp contrast to his supposed holy reputation. Similarly Philip’s supposed financial strength has been called into question by Gilingham who states that “there can be no doubt that c.1200 the overall resources of the Angevin Empire were a good deal greater than those at the disposal of Philip Augustus”. In terms of finances it is often argued that John lost Normandy due to the financial exhaustion his lands suffered. Even before John acceded to the throne it appears that England was suffering, with the contemporary chronicler Howden describing the conditions “whether justly or unjustly, the whole of England from sea to sea was reduced to poverty.” The great financial demands made by Richard, both in funding the third crusade and his extortionate ransom, effectively crippled the country. The war with Philip was just as ex70

pensive due to the long frontier which needed to be defended, the building of the Chateau -Gaillard cost the equivalent of one third of John’s revenue. According to Holt however “England was bled white because of the impoverished condition of Normandy”. According to Turner by 1203 if not earlier, the Norman treasury was empty and money had to be found in England for its defence. It seems that it is more than just financial failure that led to the loss of Normandy however as Moss states “any Plantagenet ruler, however able, would have failed to defend the Angevin “empire” in the first decade of the thirteenth century”. It is instead the cumbersome political structure, which was administratively incoherent and over-extended that caused the Angevin Empire to fall and this is in part due to Henry II refusal to enforce a universal identity for those in the Empire and instead allowed it to be a loose coalition of smaller culturally different provinces. It is for these reasons that John was unable to mobilize the huge resources of his empire despite the Norman poverty. Overall it appears that there are many reasons for the fall of Normandy and the collapse of the Angevin Empire. John’s reputation has been stained by his personal faults but his ability as a king is unquestionable, his financial, political and military genius can be seen throughout his reign. It seems however that he suffered greatly due to his terrible luck, with his allies such as Adhemar and the counts of Flanders and Boulogne both being incapacitated during his war with Philip and his mother’s death allowing Philip to overcome a significant legal obstacle. The main reason for the loss of Normandy however is clear, the Angevin ‘Empire’ was not designed to be an Empire and for this reason was destined to collapse.

“Henry’s II’s victory over the Great Rebellion of 1173-34 owed more to good luck than good management.” To what extent do you agree with this statement? (45 Marks) The Great Rebellion of 1173-74 contained some of the major leaders of the time who outnumbered Henry and should have been a substantial threat to Henry’s reign. The victory of Henry II did not come as a shock to contemporaries however; his treasurer had claimed he was “the greatest of the illustrious rulers of the world” and his victory proved this. Luck may have played a part in his triumph; his recent pilgrimage to Canterbury suggested to people at the time that the supernatural may have played a part in his consecutive success over the rebels and demoralised them. It is undoubtedly true however that the main source of his success was due to his own military and administrative tactics, the many reforms he had made earlier in his reign proved to be fruitful at this time, and his superior organisation allowed him to win despite the odds. There is an argument that Henry’s victory was due to “supernatural good luck” though it cannot be denied that his own abilities and management also aided his success. The fact his opponents were weak meant that despite their overwhelming odds, they would swiftly be defeated. The rebellion was sporadic and there was an overall lack of co-operation between different parties, with many individuals having different reasons for rebelling. William the Lion rebelled in order to take back some of the lands that Henry had seized after becoming king, other disgruntled Barons such as Hugh Bigod rebelled after Henry’s “dangerously abrasive” actions such as destroying adulterine castles spawned “baronial malcontents” as Caprenter puts it. McLynn also argues that had there been a “first class military mind” leading the rebellion then Henry’s situation would have been “perilous indeed” and it was Louis VII’s tactics and lack of organisation that led to the rebellion’s failure. This “elementary” strategy can be seen in early May when Louis and Henry the Young King split their forces in order to attempt a ‘three-pronged probe’ into eastern Normandy, spreading their forces too thin and leading to a series of lightning counter-attacks by Henry which decimated some of their forces. The fact the rebellion was composed of a loose coalition of disparate forces, enticed only by the bribery of Henry the Young King (who offered the counties of Kent, Mortan and Touraine) not only shows the foolishness of Henry the Young King but also that a single figure can seriously hinder the rebels; such is the case with William the Lion. The “wild rashness” of the King of Scotland meant that he was unsuccessful in capturing castles due to his lack of siege engines and it was this, along with good luck on Henry’s part, that led to his capture at Alnwick. 72

This capture proved massively detrimental and “tore the heart out of the rebellion” as McLynn claims, leading to the rebels feeling they were “accursed”. The longer the war waged on, the more it became clear that Henry was not a force to be reckoned with and Henry’s enemies quickly began to lose their nerve and surrendered, with Earl Hugh and Ralph de Fougeres being surrendering and being captured. Though it may appear that good luck was the reason for Henry’s success, it is most likely that his intelligent use of military tactics and management were so strong that they appear to be masquerading as luck. During his reign Henry proved that he was a master at manipulating and undermining baronial power. Having seized castles from barons such as Hugh Bigod and William of Boulogne, and building castles such as the powerful Orford Castle, he was able to use them in order to defend the realm and allowed them to act as bases for his men. He also used the Cartae Baronum and Assize of Claredon in order to further strengthen himself and undermine the Barons through increasing scutage and the power of the knights. The castellans he chose were also loyal to him, continuing their resistance even when outnumbered and threatened. These bonds of loyalty enabled Henry to crush the rebels. Geoffrey, Henry’s illegitimate son, stayed loyal to him and as did Reginald of Cornwall, who won a decisive battle at Forham despite being immensely outnumbered. His ability to select competent administers such as justiciar Richard de Lucy gave him the massive advantage of being able to fully focus on France and prevent Louis VII from advancing. Henry’s legal and administrative reforms always meant that the population was loyal to him and that public opinion was against the rebellion, fearing a return to the anarchy prior to his reign. Woman and children threw stones at rebel forces in their march from East Anglia to the Midlands in 1173 and towns such as Rouen and London remained loyal to their king with the codification of laws, such as the assize of novel disseisin and morte d’ancestor, ensuring their rights; Londoners in particular were praised as men “who never failed their rightful lord.” His popularity was such that even the church, in spite of the Becket Affair, continued to support him and did not aid the rebels and this was due in part to his presentation as a just and righteous king and the fact his legal policies were “driven to make royal justice available to all”. Similarly his legal changes allowed him to regain control over the economy and his clever use of the coinage meant that his economic power had grown exponentially. His vast amount of wealth was utilised during the rebellion and allowed him to recruit fearsome Barbanter mercenaries. Described as “Henry’s secret weapon” these men were recruited from the Low Countries, where there was a surplus population. His wealth also allowed him to buy the allegiance of men who otherwise would have been unwilling, such as the French barons. Henry used his military organisation to great effect, he kept a permanent standing navy 73

which controlled the crossings. He oversaw his fleet with great concern as he realised its value as a link between his separate territories, he ensured that his seamen were loyal and was known to pay them large sums after wreckages, despite it not being common practice to do so. Inland his men never lost control of established routes and this was crucial to the fact that Richard de Lucy could quickly manoeuvre his men to meet the rebels. It is clear that Henry II’s victory was not just due to luck and his effective management led to his success. Henry “showed himself a confident, able, and energetic general, inspiring his followers, dismaying his enemies” as Barber states, and it is for these reasons that his tactics, such as having a loyal standing navy and the bonds of loyalty he demanded, ultimately allowed him to defeat the patchy ‘Great Rebellion’.

‘The consequences of Thomas Becket’s death were a victory for King Henry II.’ Assess the validity of this view with reference to the years 1170 to 1179. (45 marks) Becket was of far greater importance after his death than before it; he became a silent Saint who while alive had antagonised his peers and fellow churchmen - dead, he became a rallying point about which clericalists could gather. Henry was forced to acquiesce, and the failure to establish the policies of the Constitutions of Clarendon signals a clear defeat of his goal to bring the church under secular control. He maintained some legal rights – land cases and forest laws were still tried in royal courts, and he could still profit from vacant sees – but his attempt to try criminous clerks in royal courts was forcibly rejected, and his private penance added further humiliation. Though the church appeared to gain the most from the Becket controversy in the short-term, as the archbishop’s murder provided them with the opportunity to challenge the State and reaffirm their position within society, the affair ultimately led to a ‘compromise which best suited the two parties’. A symbiotic relationship was formed in which both the Church and the Crown strengthened their alliance, as ‘kings cannot obtain salvation without the church, nor can the church without royal protection get peace’ (Arnulf of Lisieux).

Henry’s victory after the death of Becket is limited: the most important aspects of his reign were maintained, but his authority had been challenged, and he had been forced to resign himself to the Church’s commands. His kingship remained largely undamaged, but the ongoing conflict between Church and Crown did not result in a definite success for Henry. He retained the right to authorise the entry of papal legates and the excommunication of royal officials, an important advantage over papal connections with the church in England; Henry needed to maintain a strong relationship with the Pope, as papal support would prove crucial during the rebellion of 1173-4. Yet the Archbishop of Sens forced an interdict on Henry’s continental fiefs in 1171, and the king himself was issued a personal interdict by Pope Alexander, who prohibited Henry from taking mass until he did penance for his sin – but did not excommunicate him. The short-term gains are deceptively few, but in the years after 1170, Henry began to reap the benefits of his humiliating public surrender. His permission was still required for councils abroad to commence, and papal legates remained under his control, allowing him to carefully monitor the occurrences within the Angevin Empire - his royal authority remained intact, and he retained the substance of control and power. Henry also confirmed bishops in their office, affording him authority over who entered the church; the merging of secular and ecclesiastical influence within the church was 75

an important aspect of Henry’s reign, as it satisfied his need for absolute control over his kingdom. He could even have his own candidate elected: he could exercise political influence upon the church indirectly if he could confirm a royal candidate in an ecclesiastical office, meaning that while the battle for supremacy may have been lost, Henry was ultimately still able to exert royal influence upon the clergy, if not publicly. Indeed, the next Episcopal elections were all of royal clerks, though it can be argued that this required papal cooperation, which Alexander graciously gave – it is perhaps due to the pope’s complaisance that Henry retained any authority at all. All bishops excommunicated by Becket had been restored and absolved by 1172, excepting Salisbury, reducing the action to merely a gesture of power, which, while important to the king’s public image, did little to affect the running of the sees. The royal coffers profited from vacant sees; five church positions remained open for five years, and Canterbury itself was vacant until 1174, when Richard, prior of Dover, was elected. Though perhaps negligible consolations in comparison to Henry’s initial Constitutions, the pope allowed the clauses that insisted that all land cases, and clerks guilty of forest offences, should be tried in royal courts in 1178. But despite apparently losing little in the long run from Becket’s death, it is in principle that Henry suffered most: he was forced to give in on the problem of criminous clerks, rendering the grand statement of royal authority over the church made by the Constitutions of Clarendon null and void. The church-state conflict was more than a dispute over disagreeable clauses and the means of justice: it was ideological warfare, and the Constitutions amounted to little in regards to asserting royal authority over the church that had been lost during Stephen’s reign. It is the church that seemed triumphant in the public eye – contemporary chroniclers labelled Henry a murderer and his enemies clamoured for his excommunication. Rather than vindictively demonstrate his supremacy over the king, the Pope saw an opportunity for reconciliation between King and Church, and was careful not to overexploit the advantage which Henry's contrition gave him – Pope Alexander excommunicated the four knights directly responsible for the murder, but not the king himself. He did not insist upon a repudiation of the Constitutions of Clarendon, but formed an agreement which allowed Henry to renounce the Constitutions without seeming to. At the Compromise of Avranches 1172, Henry promised to undergo private penance(a promise fulfilled in 1174 at Canterbury), in addition to promising to provide money for 200 knights to go on Crusade and to accompany them to the Holy Land, to abolish customs prejudicial to the church and to return all property to the church of Canterbury. The church’s victory would extend beyond the immediate gratification of private penance and temporary ecclesiastical triumph over state matters: Henry’s concessions saw the end 76

of royal restriction on judicial appeals, as well as the abolishment of customs prejudicial to the church. These customs were brought to the attention of the church to be scrutinised and undermined, a double victory on their part, as they were able not only to inspect the customs of the realm on their terms, but to damage the royal public image in the process, affording them substantial ideological dominance. The controversy reanimated the church in defence of its rights with a saint to rally behind – ultimately, they were able to redefine their rights in their own interests. Henry was forced to relinquish his full control over elections (though he retained some), further releasing the church from the grasp of the king. Perhaps the most important victory, in principle, is the Henry was forced to abandon his aim of trying criminous clerks in royal courts: Thomas Becket had been deeply opposed to the idea of ‘double jeopardy’, and while the church found many of the Archbishop’s views intolerable and even disgraceful, this was one that they could use to their advantage. It could be argued that it would be near impossible to subject something that insisted on a special, secluded mode of life to secular law, and so Henry was asking too much . Furthermore, Henry had to allow the freedom of appeals to Rome, with significant reservation that they must not result in harm to his crown or kingdom – no longer was the connection between the papacy and the English Church to be indirect through the king, thus defeating the essential purpose of the Constitutions of Clarendon. Yet the church recognised the importance of not penalising Henry too harshly; the pope needed Henry’s support, as he faced rivalry from Frederick Barbarossa’s Antipope Calixtus III at the time. Authority was asserted, but the measures dealt were reasonable: Henry’s ego was significantly deflated, but not shattered. The Constitutions were settled by negotiation from 1176-1180, rather than being denounced in a grandiose public statement. Both crown and church were aware of the importance of public image and ideology, and were careful to only bruise one another’s reputations – this was enough to remind Henry of the church’s authority without damaging their fragile liaison. Hence, Henry was allowed to retreat relatively quietly, his concessions gratefully given. Freedom of intercourse between English province and Rome was a right that the church had never ceased to strive for – this was achieved, but Henry kept right to supervise prelates, and did not remit the protection he gave his barons and servants from ecclesiastical sentences. The death of Becket did not result in a clear victory for neither State nor Crown, but allowed Henry and Alexander to reinstate ‘the alliance, advantageous to both, that each had always desired’ (Barlow). In fact, Barlow argues that after the ‘polemic and violence were stilled’, little had changed, merely minor adjustments made and doubtful matters defined. However, it is feasible to suggest that Henry was sufficiently chastened by Thomas’s death, and as a result treated the church generously; the same leniency and focus on ‘peaceful subsidence’ (Barlow) would resurface in the treatment of his sons after the revolt of 117377

74. On a superficial level, the church can be seen as the victorious party: Henry’s attempt to manipulate ecclesiastical procedure and Thomas’s opposition had forced the church to redefine the law in their own interests, which benefitted them enormously. Yet if we consider the aftermath of the controversy to span a decade, it is easy to see the steady development of a secular and ecclesiastical collaboration that devised the framework of organised government and the foundation of systematic ‘common law’ in England, a result that benefitted both Henry and the church.

How far was the creation of Magna Carta in June 1215 a baronial reaction to the personal behaviour of King John? (45 marks) Considered a damning indictment of King John’s reign, the Magna Carta immortalised the grievances of the baronage and attempted to impose limits on royal absolutism in retaliation to John’s ‘tyrannical’ rule. His personality, exercise of royal will, and harsh financial exactions stirred the barons to rebellion in 1215, with the defeat at Bouvines in 1214 being considered the trigger for revolt in a succession of failures and hardships. However, upon closer inspection, the document is a reiteration of ancient laws and customs of the realm, a commentary of the system of Angevin government as a whole. Though John undoubtedly antagonised particular barons such as William de Mowbray and Robert Fitzwalter, it was the Angevin revolution in government that ‘generated a broad baronial reaction’ (Turner) – John was merely the catalyst . John’s personal behaviour infuriated and repelled his subjects, in particular the barons; his reputation was clouded by rumours of murder, infamously that of his own nephew Arthur of Brittany in 1203, which caused many of the Norman barons to swear allegiance to Philip. William de Briouze’s wife and eldest son starved to death in 1212 after his fall from favour, and John was responsible for the hanging of twenty-eight sons of Welsh barons as punishment for allying with Llewellyn. Such displays of cruelty were accompanied by rumours of debauchery, namely the seducing of the wives and daughters of barons: Eustace de Vesci claimed that John had taken his wife by force, while Robert Fitzwalter said the same of his daughter. A medieval monarch was expected to take mistresses, but selecting noblewomen had political ramifications and undoubtedly soured baronial relations, incurring personal resentment and suspicion. Indeed, both de Vesci and Fitzwalter were involved in an assassination plot with the Welsh in 1212, and the latter would lead the ‘Army of God’ in renouncing their fealty to John in 1215. The Magna Carta contained a clause prohibiting sentences of exile except as the result of a lawful trial, particularly relevant to Fitzwalter's case in 1212, when he fled to France after his intrigues with Llewellyn and was subsequently exiled until 1213. John’s personal behaviour inspired clauses specifically relating to contemporary incidents and grievances, but these constitute a minor percentage of the whole Magna Carta, which was largely an accumulation of clauses expressing long-standing dissatisfaction with Angevin rule . Arbitrary laws and policies issued by John also played a part in the creation of the Magna Carta: extortionate import and export duties were made directly payable to crown, which enabled John to confiscate lands of barons unable to pay. The foreign mercenaries he was 79

reliant upon were expensive, resulting in higher taxes and the usurpation of the roles of political elite by ‘aliens’: Peter des Roches replaced Geoffrey FitzPeter as justiciar in 1213, and was highly resented because of his occupation of such a role, while Gerard d’Athee and Engelard de Cigogne were both sheriffs of Gloucester during their lifetime. A clause of the Magna Carta specifically asks for removal of alien officers from royal service, exemplifying the xenophobia of the barons against such figures. John’s capricious patronage also incurred suspicion: William de Briouze was invested with the trilateral castles of Ghent and the lordship of Limerick while in John’s favour, but was chased into exile in 1210 and dead by 1211 after rumours regarding the murder of Arthur began to circulate. Painter calls this the greatest mistake of John’s reign, as it demonstrated his ‘capacity for cruelty’ to all barons. However, the animosity of the baronage was not entirely directed towards John: throughout Angevin rule, the barons began to consider themselves a ‘corporate body with collective rights and responsibilities’ (Turner), an identity that blossomed in Richard’s absence . Henry had received equally damning reports as an oppressor of the nobility, while Richard too used despotic methods of raising revenue. The inevitable result of this build up of discontent was revolt, and John had the misfortune of inheriting long-standing resentment that finally peaked in 1215 . The financial exactions John imposed upon the barons were also deeply resented: he was regarded as a ‘pillager of his people’, as the methods he employed were increasingly arbitrary, particularly prior to the 1214 campaign. In order to pay for Richard’s debts - the Third Crusade, his 100,000 ransom, his wars with France – fund his own military campaigns to regain Normandy after 1204, and after 1213 to pay 1000 marks annually to the papacy, rigorous and extreme measures were used. Two taxes were levied in 1203 and 1207, and scutage collected 11 times in 17 years, compared with 11 times overall during the reigns of his three predecessors. Fines, relief payments and rights to marriage were also used to raise revenue: Geoffrey de Mandeville paid £20,000 for his marriage to Isabel of Gloucester, and John de Lacy paid £7000 for a succession. The tallage of 1210 exacted £44,000 from the Jews, which subsequently put pressure on all those who had borrowed money from the Jewish community, primarily barons – Holt asserts that the Magna Carta was essentially a ‘rebellion of the king’s debtors’ so widespread were the financial extractions. Yet Gerard of Wales described Stephen and Henry II as ‘wasters of the royal demesne’, and Richard saw England as little more than a milch cow; John’s methods may have been more extreme than his predecessors, but only because of the increasing pressures that came with his inheritance of a financially exhausted empire. John invented ‘no new instruments of oppression, but he applied the final and paralyzing turns of the screw’ (Warren): baronial reaction to such measures was long overdue, and had been simmering since the reign of Henry II .

The barons were further antagonised by John’s reign, which was far more personal than that of his absentee predecessors; after the loss of Normandy in 1204, he was a constant presence in England. The Northerners in particular found John’s reign abrasive, as they had little felt the effects of reform since 1154 and were now experiencing unwelcome alterations to their way of life. John visited every year bar four, and his personal kingship was resented given that the North was unused to effects of reforms, though this can be attributed to their distance from the centre of government. The North was also subjected to John’s most ruthless agents, such as Brian de Lisle who took over Knaresborough. Northern baron William Mowbray paid £2000 in order to come off favourably in a land case with the Stutevilles, yet John sentenced him despite the bribe, incurring personal resentment that led to Mowbray’s participation in the rebellion in 1215. The financial burdens of the Northern barons resulted in widespread refusal to pay the scutage necessary for the October 1214 campaign, an openly hostile act that foreshadowed the uprising after the Battle of Bouvines July 1214. ‘The road to Runnymede began at Bouvines’ according to Holt, suggesting that the Magna Carta was the result of John’s military ineptitude and reliance upon the barons to fund his campaigns: however, he had inherited a legacy of long standing resentment and flagging loyalty as well as a fast-diminishing empire with a fissiparous tendency. Hence, the road to Runnymede should be envisaged as long and winding, its origin lying in the oppressive reforms of Henry II’s reign that sparked baronial discontent . Arguably, John’s personal behaviour in relation to the operation of the machinery of government can be considered too effective; he approached reforms with zeal and energy, and was bitingly efficient. However, this interference in administration came after years of administrative rejuvenation: John’s reign fell to an inescapable position of unfavourable comparison, as both Richard and Henry had reinforced a legal system designed to function without a monarch. He had inherited a kingship based on the exercise of royal will, and it is this that the barons resented above all, irrespective of the king that wielded it. The innovation of the government in response to new and volatile circumstances was necessary; John had the misfortune of being the one to set the gears in motion, and his dubious reputation, personal behaviour and exactions necessitated by his damnus hereditas meant that the conditions were ripe for revolt against fifty years of ‘Angevin despotism’.

The rise of anti-Semitism between 1154 and 1216 was mainly the result of Christian crusading fervour’. Assess the validity of this view. (45 marks) The Crusades did ‘more than anything to turn prejudice into violence’ according to Barber: the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin certainly stimulated anti-Semitism given the Jews’ role as ‘Christ killers’, close to the Muslim infidels in this respect. The fervour they inspired escalated into a series of violent pogroms, culminating in the disaster at York in 1190; they provided a catalyst that allowed long-term religious resentment to burgeon into mass murder. However, though the Crusades may have stimulated increased violence against the Jews, the York pogrom shows that the motivation was far from singular: a mix of heightened Christian piety, financial greed, jealousy and xenophobia also contributed the rise of antiSemitism and to the eventual expulsion of the Jews in 1290. As in the First and Second Crusade, Jews found themselves targets of violent attacks at the hands of Christians imbued with uncontrollable religious zeal: just as there were pogroms in Northern France in 1096, and the preaching of French monk Rudolf against the Jews in the Rhineland, Cologne and Mainz in the Second Crusade, the Jews were persecuted in England after the fall of Jerusalem to Saladin in 1187, as furious Christians sought to attack the infidel closer to home, Jews being their nearest enemy. The ambiguous attitude of the church did little to assist their plight: there was great ambivalence as to the dual nature of Jews as ‘Christ killers’, and simultaneously reminders to Christians of God’s salvation – given Christianity’s Jewish roots, the church struggled to set out a clear view of how Jews should be treated, allowing resentment to grow unchecked by theological authority. Poole argues that the 12th century view of Jews was as the ‘infidel, God-murderer, usurer, desecrator of the host and killer of Christian children’: this made accusations of ritual murder plausible, given that this description depicts Jews as devoid of all morality, and therefore entirely capable of murdering Christian children. The hatred of Jews stimulated by the Crusades only justified the blood libel; the murder of William of Norwich in 1144 lead to consequent reports of ritual murders in Gloucester (1168), Bury St. Edmunds (1181), and Bristol (1183) as hostility increased, further spreading fear and disgust of Jews across England. Yet these accusations were of limited importance, as they were localised and had little widespread impact, certainly not enough to cause virulent anti-Semitism across the whole of England. No longer ‘peripherally involved’ (Bartlett), England’s Jews were subject to religious hostility and persecution that their European counterparts had suffered prior to the third Crusade. 82

The first years of Richard I’s rule coincide with an outburst of violence that had not existed before the 11th century, as even at his coronation in London 1189 the Jews were victims of an attack by a Christian mob that resulted in their houses being plundered and burned. Richard’s ineffective action against these rioters left the Jews in a vulnerable position upon his departure for the Holy Land in December, triggering a wave of anti-Semitism that swept through the country unchecked. The most horrific of these pogroms is that of York in 1190, in which 150 Jews died, by their own hands as well as the Christians’. The expense of Crusading was seen as an additional insult, as many had to borrow four or five times their annual income from Jews, the infidel at home, in order to defeat the infidel in the Holy Land – taking loot from murdered Jews was far easier, a motive confirmed by the fact that the leading conspirators went straight to York Minster (‘combining barbarity with business’ (Huscroft)) after the pogrom and destroyed copies of Jewish loans kept there, thus eradicating any debt owed. It is this bitter resentment of Jewish wealth that fuelled much of the brutality of the 12th century – it should be noted that no outbursts of violence towards Jews were recorded during the Fourth Crusade (1202-1204), which coincides with significant changes to the Jews’ position as royal financiers. Given that there was a Crusade with no anti-Semitic violence in the 13th century, it could be said that Crusading fervour was merely the scapegoat for far more complex, deeply-ingrained attitudes towards the Jews as culturally and religiously distinct outsiders. Economic resentment reached its peak as Christians prepared to go on Crusade: religious passions and economic motives combined to create an explosion of animosity. The privileged position of Jews in society only stimulated further enmity – they were property of the king, and the Leges Edwardi Confessoris of 1130 decreed that ‘all the Jews wherever they are in the kingdom must be under the guardianship of the King’. As they were social outsiders and a vulnerable religious minority existing outside of feudal society, they required royal protection from Christian barons, an uneasy relationship from the beginning. Barons felt that the wealthy Jews did not deserve their protection, as they received nothing in return and were often indebted to them; though a practical measure that ensured that the king’s property and crown’s financial resources were protected, Christians saw it as indecent favouritism, and grew jealous. King John’s Charter of 1201 gave the Jews of Normandy and England the right to reside in the kingdom, hold property and retain all liberties and customs they enjoyed under Henry I - in the same year, they were afforded legal privileges, such as pares Judei, in which they had to be judged by their own customs and practices, swearing oaths on the Torah rather than the Bible and subverting the laws of the realm that all others were subject to. Yet this exemption from Christian oaths excluded them from entering religious and monopolistic guilds and developing careers in occupations other than money lending; they faced discrimination in employment and could not 83

enter careers in major urban trades and crafts, being forced to make most of their ability to practice usury. This heightened Christian suspicion, as the Third Lateran Council of 1179 had barred Christians from the practice. They became associated with times of hardship, often becoming pawnbrokers that Christians had to begrudgingly pawn their valuables to, another relationship that resulted in discord between the two social groups. This role in finance proved to be the greatest cause of anti-Semitism. The role of Jews as royal financiers provoked hostility at every level of English society, not just in Crusaders. Allowed to lend money at interest, they grew extremely wealthy as a result of their exclusive position, unrivalled by Christians in the 12th century. In 1160, Aaron of Lincoln, the wealthiest man in England besides the king himself, assumed the role of principal royal creditor – by 1164, Jews had become central to the Angevin empire, and barons saw them as the agents of grasping kings. The increase royal lending led to increased visibility of Jews within society, drawing attention to them as a minority group. Aaron’s death in 1186 resulted in the confiscation of his property by Henry II and the creation of the ‘Exchequer of Aaron’ to oversee the royal collection of debts. He was owed £18, 466 by over 400 debtors in 25 counties, all of whom were directly indebted to the king upon Aaron’s death. Jews were the king’s ‘milch-cow’ from the late 12th century: for example, Richard I imposed a tallage of £1,333 on Jews to fund the Third Crusade, and they had to contribute a further £2,000 to his ransom; King John employed similar tactics in 1204 after the loss of Normandy, taxing the Jews heavily in order to build a substantial war chest. The crown pressure of Jewish financiers directly affected the Christian borrowers: baronial resentment of this is evident in Chapters 10 and 11 of the Magna Carta of 1215, which redress the fate of heirs and widows left indebted to the Jews, and hostility towards them grew as they were considered agents of John’s hated financial policies. The turning point in the role of Jews as financiers began in the early 13th century, as the crown began to take over - in 1194, the ‘Exchequer of the Jews’ was created in order to prevent the events of 1190 – copies of Jewish bonds were kept at Westminster, removing the financial motive for anti-Semitism and centralising records of Jewish transactions, making them more accessible to royal exploitation. In 1207, the lenient attitude to debita Judeorum was abandoned as King John ordered those indebted to Aaron of Lincoln to pay, or else forfeit their lands. He levied a tax of £2,666 from Jews and demanded 10% bond value, and in 1210, imposed a tallage of £44,000 in Bristol; they were arrested and their records confiscated, accused of tax evasion by the king. The crown turned on the Jewish community, no longer affording it protection, but exploiting it to the point of impoverishment – the rise of Christian banking in the 13th century threatened the Jews’ primary occupation, as they were no longer financially useful and consequently unnecessary and unwanted within a Christian society, allowing Edward I to expel them from the country in 1290. The rapid change in the role of the 84

Jews was a direct result of a shift in their economic importance: just as the pogroms of 1190 had financial motives, so did the increasing hostility of the 13th century, which was exacerbated by royal exploitation. While the Jews had long been hated by Christians for their role in the crucifixion, a role brought into focus by Crusading fervour and increased religious piety stimulated by the Third Crusade, the religious motive does not explain the leap from simmering resentment to outright violence in the late 12th century, as anti-Semitic feeling had always existed within Christian society. Economic motives underpinned most acts of anti-Semitic violence in the 12th and 13th centuries, and even the Crusadersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; hatred of the infidel at home can be linked to their need to borrow money for the expedition from Jews, not the case in the Fourth Crusade. The deep-rooted hatred of Jews only increased the hostility that had been provoked by economic and political resentment, providing a useful scapegoat for violent assaults with a clear financial motive.

How far was the personality of King John responsible for the loss of Normandy in 1204? (45 marks) The loss of Normandy in 1204 by King John was largely due to his abrasive personality. He was though hindered by other factors, such as the financial legacy of King Richard, the strength of the Capetian monarchy under Philip II Augustus, and also the argument that ‘Normandy was not John’s to lose’. Put forward by Turner, this asserts that the Angevin Empire was irrevocably drifting apart, as its various components were not integrated. The bulk of the blame must rest with John however, for his reckless and harsh treatment of his vassals, Arthur of Brittany and the Lusignans in particular, his cruelty towards prisoners, and apparent inability to manage his resources effectively. As McLynn says ‘John, and John alone, because of his vices and failings, lost Normandy.’ One argument put forward first by J.C Holt is that the loss of Normandy was not due to John’s personality, but inevitable as the Angevin Empire was merely a ‘convenient invention by modern historians’, more a collection of territories ‘brought together by time and chance’ than a real union. He uses the absence of an emperor, ‘no common coinage, almost no ‘imperial’ acts’ and ‘no political elite’ comprising representatives of every territory as evidence for the fragile state of the empire. Regarding Normandy specifically, Turner writes ‘family and tenurial ties no longer bound the Norman and English nobility together’, in other words, the Anglo-Norman realm created in 1066 was no longer a political reality, and the two realms had been diverging for a considerable time. The roles of King of England and Duke of Normandy were no longer synonymous, with the Norman church in particular looking towards Paris rather than Canterbury for spiritual leadership. Philip II was seen as lenient towards the church where the Plantagenets were oppressive, and this view was shared with the nobility, who say Philip’s feudal system as more bearable than that developed by Henry II. Henry’s practice of seizing all castles for the crown (continued under his successors) for example, had no equivalent in France, where Philip allowed vassals to keep their castles; on condition he could occupy them when required. But whilst there is no denying there was support for the Capetians within Normandy, this was by no means universal. Rouen, bastion of the merchant classes eager to protect their English interests, held out against the French until June 1204, almost the end of the war. It must also be emphasised that this creeping dissatisfaction with Angevin rule had been developing under Henry II and Richard, and so, as A.W Southern says, John was powerless ‘to create any warmth of sentiment’ towards his rule in Normandy by 1199, such was the legacy he was left with. John cannot be fully blamed for this state of affairs, and so other reasons for the loss on Normandy must be sought. 86

John faced an uncertain financial situation after his brother’s death, and this has been cited as a reason he lost Normandy. Richard had extracted £200,000 from England to finance his crusade and subsequent ransom, together with many other expenses on his return, including 30,000 marks to build Chateau Gaillard in the Norman Vexin. The contemporary chronicler Ralph of Coggeshall claimed ‘no one can remember any king who took so much money from his kingdom as this king [Richard] extorted.’ John therefore faced a major monetary crisis. The English and Norman barons were becoming resentful of incessant demand for taxes, rising inflation decreased the value of his revenue, and it was becoming increasingly expensive to defend the long frontier of the ‘Empire’, which stretched from the English Channel to the Mediterranean. V.D. Moss asserts John ‘could only extract [from Normandy] about approximately half the revenue that was raised by King Richard I in 1198’. It therefore seems that Philip’s invasion of Normandy had an extreme impact on John’s resources, as England and Normandy provided the majority of his revenue, so declining revenue in either realm would of course reduce his ability to wage war. There is also a sharp contrast between the declining finances of the Plantagenets, and the increasing wealth of the Plantagenets. J.C. Holt believes French revenues by 1202-3 were ‘roughly the equivalent of £73,000’ whilst the English total may have been only ‘£30,000’. Gillingham disputes the English total, claiming it was between ‘£63,000 and £77,000’, however unlike Holt he takes an anti-John view, and claims his failures were due more to an inability to ‘mobilise the huge resources of the empire’ than a disparity in income. Though it is impossible to accurately determine the true incomes revenues of either monarch, it is likely that John did not have the same resources to draw on as Philip. Even if he had the same actual income, his usable income was less due to difficulties transporting resources across the scattered Angevin lands- continental Europe, Britain and Ireland-and it can be claimed John’s financial problems were more a matter of logistics than a lack of income. Whatever the cause, whilst John’s fiscal difficulties undoubtedly made waging war more difficult, it should not have caused the fall of Normandy. We must therefore look to his personality for a cause. As McLynn succinctly puts it, ‘John was a shit’. His abrasive personality and unlikeable demeanour did more damage to his efforts in Normandy than any other single factor combined. His failings on this front can be traced back to his marriage to Isabella of Angouleme in 1200. Isabella held the inheritance of the strategic county of Angoumois, so John had good political reason to marry her. Yet Isabella had been betrothed to Hugh IX de Lusignan, head of a family of ‘rebellious vassals’ (Seel). John’s major mistake was not compensating the Lusignans for the political disadvantage his marriage caused them. The fact that the family had murdered the Earl of Shrewsbury, sent to govern Poitou, and had political power as Kings of Jerusalem and Cyprus made John’s decision to charge them with treachery 87

unwise. Rather than placating his most troublesome vassals, he antagonised them, attacking the Norman lands of Hugh’s brother. Hugh swiftly appealed to Philip, who declared John forfeit of all his French lands, beginning the war John would ultimately lose. It would have been a simple matter to pay Hugh compensation, but it appears John felt he could do as he wished, failing to play the part of a feudal overlord. The Treaty of Le Goulet, signed in May 1200, can be seen as another of John’s personal failings, as it made concrete the hitherto theoretical position of the King of France as the overlord of the French Angevin lands. Though at the time it may have been politically expedient, as after years of war it allowed John to succeed relatively peacefully to his French lands whilst also making Arthur of Brittany his vassal, seemingly resolving the long-running dispute between the duchies, it was unfavourable in the long term. Turner asserts it ‘opened the way for the French royal court’s jurisdiction within John’s territories’, ultimately leading to the unfavourable outcome of his dispute with the Lusignans. John was also forced to recognise the counts of Flanders and Boulogne as Philip’s vassals, negating the possibility of an alliance with them in case of war, which may have been a deciding factor in the loss of Normandy John could not open multiple fronts as his brother and father had done. John was forced to pay 20,000 marks in recognition of his overlordship of Brittany, straining his already fragile finances, and Philip also retained possession of those parts of Normandy he had captured, weakening its defensive capabilities and placing John at a disadvantage when war did break out. All in all, John did not sign the treaty on favourable terms, a fact which is almost entirely his own fault. John was not only a bad master to the Lusignans. He has a track record of mistreating vassals. One of the worst mistakes of John’s reign was the murder of his nephew Arthur, count of Britany, as well as twenty-two sons of barons taken as hostage. Though not conclusively murdered at John’s hands, Arthur’s death sparked a wave of defections. By 1203 John faced a ‘steady haemorrhaging of support’ claims Seel, and it can be argued that a lack of allies ultimately caused the fall of Normandy. One notable example is William des Roches, seneschal of Anjou, who deserted John after the murder. William was lord of vast estates in Anjou and Maine, and his defection effectively cut off Normandy from Aquitaine, hindering communications and making the defence of the regions more difficult. The lords of the Loire valley also switched allegiance, further fragmenting the empire. The count of Anlecon swore allegiance to Philip even after John had dined with him just two days previously. John’s temper and vengefulness caused him a catastrophic loss of support. It also caused John to hire mercenary captains, who were almost universally unpopular. The impact of their ‘brutality, rapacity and destructiveness’ (Turner) was made worse by the increased taxes needed to pay for them , and the way John used them to fill adminis88

trative positions usually taken by the nobility. The senechalship of Anjou was split and given to two mercenary captains, for example. Ultimately the lack of faith he showed in his barons made them unwilling to fight for him, and they opened their gates to Philip one by one, until by 1204 all that remained was Chateau Gaillard. Again, Johnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inability to heed counsel and treat his vassals well led to crippling losses, in this case Normandy itself. There are a myriad of reasons that lead to the loss on Normandy in 1204. Finance, the legacy of Richard I and Henry II and the strength of Philip Augustus played sometimes major parts in the eventual downfall of the Duchy. But no one factor was greater than Johnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s personality. He was cruel, vindictive and alienating towards his vassals, seemingly unable to manipulate the feudal system to his advantage. Had he been able to hold on to potential allies such as William des Roches and Hugh de Lusignan, the outcome of his war with Philip could have been very different. As it is, he succeeded in losing the Angevin empire once and for all.

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