Wind of change – but what kind of change? Campaign overview and the results of the Slovak parliament by Antall József Tudásközpont

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

WIND OF CHANGE – BUT WHAT KIND OF CHANGE? CAMPAIGN OVERVIEW AND THE RESULTS OF THE SLOVAK PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2020 ÁGNES VASS

2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Péter Dobrowiecki Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2

Contact: H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2 Phone: +36 20 310-87-76 E-mail: ajtk@ajtk.hu Web: ajtk.hu/en

2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en

WIND OF CHANGE – BUT WHAT KIND OF CHANGE? CAMPAIGN OVERVIEW AND THE RESULTS OF THE SLOVAK PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2020 ÁGNES VASS

The elections in Slovakia at the end of February this year were expected to revamp the current political system shaken after the murder of investigative journalist, Ján Kuciak and his fiancé, Martina Kušnírová in February 2018. The continuous stream of scandals, in which some of the party leaders and top politicians were also involved, mobilised new political powers, but it has remained an open question until the elections, who the voters will entrust to govern the country in the next four years. According to the last available opinion polls, the race was expected to be tight, and about nine political parties with different ideologies had the chance to take seats in the Slovak National Council. It was clear, that the winners would be able to govern only in a coalition, while these coalition negotiations could result in some unpleasant surprises, too. Following the brief overview of the last few weeks of the campaign, this article aims to summarise the results of the elections and analyse the coalition negotiations.

THE KUCIAK-KUŠNÍROVÁ MURDERS To understand the current dynamics characterising the whole campaign, it is important to go back in time to the murder of Ján Kuciak and his fiancé, as their killing can be defined as the spark that lighted the rapidly spreading flame of social outrage and acted as catalyst for new political parties and public movements. As an investigative journalist Ján Kuciak was focusing on high-profile fraud cases, and as such his articles also shed light on the ties and dealings of top Slovak politicians and businessmen with the Italian mafia in Slovakia. His last finished article for instance, published on the online news site aktuality.sk on 9 February 2018, covered the story of a tax fraud case connected to an elite apartment complex in Bratislava. The article identified suspicious transactions between five different companies.1 The interior minister of that time, Robert Kaliňák, was accused of covering up evidence of the fraud (valued approx. at 75 million euros). Kuciak also shed light on Kaliňák’s business dealings with the property developer Ladislav Bašternák, who in the end was sentenced for five years in prison in March 2019 for his role in the fraud.2 Ivan Kočner, one of the most powerful businessmen in the country, was also accused with tax evasion in connection with the same case. Kočner, together with the then Prime Minister Robert Fico

Ján Kuciak – Martin Turcek: Ďalšie zvláštne prevody okolo Kočnera. Súd chce zmazať firmu s dlhom 10 miliónov. Aktuality.sk, 9 February 2018. <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/562609/dalsie-podozrive-prevodykocnerovej-firmy-vo-five-star-residence-sud-ju-chce-zrusit/> Accessed: 23 February 2020

2 Monika Tódová: Bašternák nastúpil do väzenia, prišiel aj o byt, v ktorom býva Fico. Denník N, March 2019. <https://dennikn.sk/1409535/basternak-ide-do-vazenia-a-prisiel-aj-o-byt-v-ktorom-byva-fico/?ref=tema> Accessed: 20 February 2020

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

also rented a flat from Bašternák in the same building for a very favourable price.3 These connections are important as later Kočner was the person, who ordered the murder of the journalist. During the investigation of the murders, these facts also played an important role to discredit the party leadership of leading governmental force, SMER – SD, as some of the leading politicians of the party have close connections with Kočner, who in most of the cases was manipulating them from the background. Kuciak’s unfinished article was published by actuality.sk as it was obvious that he and his fiancé were killed because of his investigative activity. The article revealed the ties between Fico’s circles and Italian citizens associated with the notorious Calabrian 'Ndrangheta organized crime syndicate.4 Although the article was never finished by the journalist, the investigation results published after his murder led to the continued development of the story and today it is clear, that the most important decision-makers in politics and legislation were manipulated by Kočner and his allies. The fact, that in cases revealed by Kuciak’s investigative articles, the police and the prosecutor’s office remained silent and inactive, and that Kuciak and his partner were killed because of the journalist’s articles, created a wave of public demonstrations, similar only to the ones seen during the velvet revolution. The investigation into Kuciak and Kušnírová’s murder contributed to the publication of new reports concerning the deep business ties between politicians and the criminal underground. Under the public pressure firstly the interior minister, and the main ally of Robert Fico, Kaliňák resigned in March 2018. Fico followed him in this decision two days later, but he maintained his position as SMER’s party leader.

THE AFTERMATH This article is not aiming to analyse the case of Marian Kočner, however, it is important to highlight, that his connections with judges, prosecutors and high-profile politicians are important motivations of the public outrage. The massive data, collected by police during the investigation of the murder of Kuciak and Kušnírová, including files, videos, photos and personal messages from WhatsApp and Threema applications from Kočner’s phone and computer5, revealed that Kočner not only blackmailed several judges and prosecutors, but also had very close connection with politicians. At the same time Kočner was also collecting data about journalists who were deemed to be “dangerous” to him. Among others, it was discovered that Kočner personally installed a hidden camera in the office of general prosecutor, Dobroslav Trnka6 to record confidential conversations, while also exchanging

Miro Kern: Fico už nebýva v Bonaparte, potvrdil Pellegrini. Denník N, 24 September 2019. Available: https:// dennikn.sk/1595141/fico-uz-nebyva-v-bonaparte-potvrdil-pellegrini/?ref=tema 3

4 Ján Kuciak: Talianska mafia na Slovensku. Jej chápadlá siahajú aj do politiky. Aktuality.sk, 28 February 2018. <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/568007/talianska-mafia-na-slovensku-jej-chapadla-siahaju-aj-do-politiky/> Accessed: 23 February 2020 5 Jana Cunderlíková: Vražda Jána Kuciaka: Aké dôkazy svedčia proti Kočnerovi? Aktuality.sk, 2 February 2020 <https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/759751/ake-dokazy-svedcia-proti-kocnerovi-v-pripade-kuciakovej-vrazdy-jankuciak-marian-kocner/> Accessed: 19 February 2020

The video made by a hidden camera about the installation. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bub8J2THmUA

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

over 6200 messages with Monika Jankovská, a judge and deputy justice minister, regarding bribes to her and other judges for favourable court rulings.7 These kind of connections and his different tactics made him seemingly untouchable and he always had the support of the most important politicians and executives. After the murder, the public reacted within a few days – approx. 25 thousand people flooded to the streets of Bratislava with demonstrations taking place in other cities as well in Slovakia. Following the demonstration, a group of young Slovaks from all over the country started organising weekly demonstrations to demand political changes in Slovakia and, most notably, transparent investigation of the murder. In this way ‘For a Decent Slovakia’ movement was established, who are demanding new ways of good governance, decency and the rejection of hatred and populism in public affairs and social issues.8 In this period, other political actors also came into existence, such as the Progressive Slovakia (Progresivné Slovensko) party, co-founded by lawyer and environmental activist, Zuzana Čaputová, who won the presidential elections in March 2019.9 For many, Čaputová brought the hope of long awaited systematic changes and the end of state capture by various actors that has been developing since the regime change.10 The local elections held earlier in 2018 could be also characterised as the sign of the general lack of trust of voters towards the political elites: 42% of communal heads and mayors are independent and do not belong to any political parties. While in 2014 the number of independent mayors was 110411, in 2018 this number increased to 1232. Regarding the number of representatives in the municipalities, 7301 of all the candidates is independent (35%), while four years earlier this number was only 6000. The biggest leading party, SMER lost 1500 places in 2018, and they were not able to win in any county seats. 12

THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE BEFORE THE ELECTIONS Based on the opinion polls published before the elections, the February elections would be characterised by the clash of the three main political powers or wills: the ruling political powers (mainly social democrats), the centre-right and liberal political powers currently in opposition, and the anti-system forces, that are not afraid to use populist, fascist or even neo-

7 Hospodarské noviny online: "Ja som z nej urobila to, čo je. Je čas splatiť dlh." Threema ukazuje, ako Kočner a Jankovská riadili sudkyňu. <https://slovensko.hnonline.sk/2017306-ja-som-z-nej-urobila-to-co-je-je-cas-splatitdlh-threema-ukazuje-ako-kocner-a-jankovska-riadili-sudkynu> Accessed: 23 February 2020 8 Aims of the movement of For a Decent Slovakia: <https://zaslusneslovensko.sk/o-co-nam-ide/> Accessed: 24 February 2020.

Results of the elections of the President of the Slovak Republic. Voľby prezidenta Slovenskej republiky. <http:// volby.statistics.sk/prez/prez2019/sk/data03.html> Accessed: 23 February 2020 9

10 Masha Gessen: Zuzana Caputová, the President of Slovakia, Voices Her Country’s Hopes and Frustrations. The New Yorker, 5 December 2019. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/zuzana-caputova-thepresident-of-slovakia-voices-her-countrys-hopes-and-frustrations > Accessed: 24 February 2020. 11 Results of the local elections in Slovakia in 2014. <https://volby.sme.sk/komunalne-volby/2014/vysledky> Accessed: 25 February 2020

Results of the local elections in Slovakia in 2018. <https://volby.sme.sk/komunalne-volby/2018/vysledky> Accessed: 25 February 2020 12

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

Nazi elements in their campaign. The results showed, that as it was so many times in the past, it is one thing what opinion polls predict, and it is another thing, how the reality will look like. Despite political scandals around SMER and the party leaders’ involvement in suspicious fraud cases connected to Kočner, the party was the strongest in the polls, although with a decreased support.13 For years, SMER was the only political party, that was able to achieve voter support above the 20% threshold14, however before the elections in February 2020, their support was currently about 17%.15 The Prime Minister, Peter Pellegrini was using a more consensual tone, but his position seemed rather symbolic. To make the party more attractive for the voters, different new and old tools were implemented to gain votes: in the very last minute, the government was able to put the case of 13th month pensions up for debate in a fast-track procedure, despite several opposition MPs from the PS/Spolu (Progressive Slovakia and Together) parties were blocking the main stand of the assembly hall in order to make the debate impossible.16 SMER was also criticised for buying the votes with generous, last minute social measures, while failing to implement long-term structural changes or reforms.17 Earlier last year, Fico posted a video in which he defended18 the nowexpelled LSNS MP Milan Mazurek for his derogatory statements about Roma citizens. That short video could be considered as a message for hesitating voters, who are also attracted by extremists, but still not sure how to vote. The Slovak National Party (SNS – Slovenská Národná Strana) was aiming to maintain its presence in the Slovak National Council (the party failed to pass the 5% benchmark in the 2002 and 2012 elections).19 Investigations against Kočner showed that the party’s leader, Andrej Danko was also in contact with Kočner’s closest ally, Alena Zsuzsová, with whom he exchanged several messages.20 The party’s significant fall in polls was also visible last autumn, following the scandal over the doctoral dissertation of Danko, who

Polls and party preferences before the elections in 2020. <https://volby.sme.sk/parlamentne-volby/2020/i/ preferencie-volby-2020> Accessed: 3 March 2020

In 2016, the total support of SMER-SD was 28,28%, in 2012 the party got the 44,41% of the votes, while in 2010 they won the elections with 34,8% of the votes. Results available <https://volby.sme.sk/parlamentnevolby/2010/vysledky> Accessed: 3 March 2020

Polls and party preferences before the elections in 2020. <https://volby.sme.sk/parlamentne-volby/2020/i/ preferencie-volby-2020?ref=menu > Accessed: 3 March 2020

PS/Spolu pokračuje v blokáde pléna, hľadá sa riešenie situácie. <https://www.ta3.com/clanok/1176502/psspolu-pokracuje-v-blokade-plena-hlada-sa-riesenie-situacie.html> Accessed: 28 February 2020

See the party’s programme promising 13th month pension as something that pensionists „deserve”, or promising further social benefits for young families. The programme is available in Slovak here: <https://www. strana-smer.sk/program> Accessed: 27 February 2020

Robert Fico: Protifašistická orientácia strany SMER - SD je úplne jasná a nemenná. The video in Slovak is available here: <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=external&v=531214514350722> Accessed: 27 February 2020.

While in January 2019 the support of the party was 8%, in January 2020 this number was about 5,2%. Data bassed ont he exit polls conducted by Focus Agency, results available here: <https://www.sme.sk/ps/19/sns> Accessed: 27 February 2020 19

Roman Cuprík: Danko Zsuzsovú zapieral, jej telefón ale potvrdzuje dlhý vzťah. Sme.sk, 18 January 2020. <https:// domov.sme.sk/c/22311768/danko-na-nahravke-zsuzsovej-konecne-budete-moja.html> Accessed: 27 February 2020. 20

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

was accused to have plagiarised his doctoral dissertation from a variety of texts from different textbooks.21 The second most important political block consisted of parties that could be considered centrist, centre-right and liberal parties. Two of them, the PS and Spolu (Together) formed a coalition and won four seats during the EP elections in 2019.22 The programme of these two parties puts the main focus on the reconstruction of the judiciary system, the improvement of healthcare and education as well as the fight against social injustice.23 Their aim was to reform and modernise Slovak politics, branding themselves as game-changers in their programme – which is the most transparent and environment friendly one among the Slovak political parties.24 Their program emphasizes issues, which have been ignored by the social democrats: environment and climate change, justice, representation of women or minorities. PS and Spolu both have platforms dedicated to women issues, and the first woman on their list also has Roma origins. Founded by the former president of Slovakia Andrej Kiska, Za Ľudi (For the People) is another party with a centrist profile being close both politically and ideologically to PS and Spolu. Their programme consists of 876 points which are divided into 18 main categories, including topics such as healthy life, social policy, fight against corruption, open and transparent governance or civil society.25 The Freedom and Solidarity (Sloboda a Solidarita - SAS) is a liberal party being one of the key opposition members in the parliament. The party leader, Richard Sulík is often labelled as too liberal for Slovakia, while the party is also branded as extremely liberal for aiming to legalise marijuana. Despite all these simplifying labels, the party itself has a strong vision regarding the country’s economic development26, aiming to modernise, among others, the education system and pushing through a tax reform (maximum of 19% without any exceptions for all kind of incomes.).27 Igor Matovič, a former SaS member is leading the party called Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Obyčajný ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti - OĽANO), who are well-

21 Ján Krempasky: Danko je plagiátor, len sa to oficiálne nehovorí. Sme.sk, 11 January 2019. <https://domov. sme.sk/c/22026819/danko-je-plagiator-len-sa-to-oficialne-nehovori.html> Accessed: 25 February 2020.

PS/Spolu gained 20,11% of the votes (4 elected MEPs), while Smer-SD 15,72% (3 elected MEPs), People’s Party – Our Slovakia 12,07% (2 elected MEPs), Christian Democratic Movement 9,69% (2 elected MEPs), Freedom and Solidarity 9,60% (2 elected MEPs), Ordinary People and Independent Personalities 5,25% (1 elected MEP). Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic: <http://volby.statistics.sk/ep/ep2019/sk/data03.html> Accessed: 25 February 2020 22

Bod zlomu: Zlomovy program pre zlomové volby. <https://progresivnespolu.sk/bod-zlomu> Accessed: 25 February 2020

Transparency International Slovakia: Najtransparentnejšiu kampáň vedie PS/Spolu, najhoršiu Strany Vlasť a Smer. <https://transparency.sk/sk/najtransparentnejsiu-kampan-vedie-ps-spolu-najhorsiu-strany-vlast-a-smer/> Accessed: 25 February 2020 24

Mapa dobrých riešení. <https://za-ludi.sk/program/ > Accessed: 25 February 2020

Návod na lepšie Slovensko – 1144 konkrétných riešení, aby sa tu oplatilo pracovať, podnikať a žiť (Manual for a better Slovakia – 1144 solutions to create viable conditions to work, invest in enterprise and live in Slovakia). <https:// www.flipgorilla.com/p/26183111565907491/show#/26183111565907491/0.> Accessed: 25 February 2020 26

Four most important measures to be taken for taxes. Available in Slovak <https://www.sas.sk/detail/5747/12dane/obsah> Accessed: 25 February 2020 27

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

known for their theatrics and hectic behaviour, scandalous statements and sudden turns in their politics. Although it is sometimes hard to take them too seriously, latest polls before the elections measured them in the second place just after SMER.28 A few days before the moratorium on polls became valid, Matovič announced that they would launch an online vote about the party’s programme.29 The latest poll results signalled, that this form of voter mobilization seemed successful: the vote started on 8 February and as the result, the party was only 1,5 percentage points behind the leading SMER party, according to the last poll conducted before the moratorium.30 The most significant anti-system party is Kotlebovci - The People’s Party Our Slovakia (Kotlebovci – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko – ĽSNS), a nationalist political party often building on neo-Nazi traditions and xenophobia. The General Prosecutors’ office filed an application to dissolve the party on the grounds of its extremist and fascist political stance, but after two years, the Supreme Court rejected this application in 2019. Their rhetoric is highly anti-Roman, with the clear intent of politicising decade long tensions within the society. After Bulgaria, Slovakia has the largest Roma population within the EU, with an employment rate of about 25% – this fact is causing serious social conflicts especially in the underdeveloped regions in Central Slovakia, where ĽSNS has gained a lot of followers in recent years, partly due to the poor performance of political opponents. What is more, during the last few years the party softened its rhetoric, putting more emphasis on the protection of national pride and traditions, which has made them able to broaden their electorate and gain voters from SNS as well. The problem is, that only a few political parties realised that even though they reject and criticise ĽSNS on the main political stage in Bratislava, this will resonate mildly (if at all) in a small village near Banská Bystrica for example, where the party successfully engages angry, disappointed and sceptic voters directly.

IS IT REALLY NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT HUNGARIANS? Latest polls predicted that neither the governing Most-Híd, nor the new Hungarian party, the MKÖ (Magyar Közösségi Összefogás – Maďarská Komunitná Spolupatričnosť) would get enough votes to pass the minimal threshold required to enter the National Council.31 From 2010, Most-Híd has been the only party in the Slovak parliament representing the interest of the Hungarian community living in Slovakia. The party has been going through several tough periods, and is harshly criticized for being inactive after the murder of Kuciak and Kušnírová (party leader Bugár, initially denied, meeting with Kočner a few days

Prieskum pre TA3 potvrdil nástup Matoviča, časť strán je na hrane. <https://www.ta3.com/clanok/1175632/ prieskum-pre-ta3-potvrdil-nastup-matovica-cast-stran-je-na-hrane.html> Accessed: 24 February 2020. 28

29 The programme is 220 pages long and is available in Slovak: <https://www.obycajniludia.sk/wp-content/ uploads/2020/02/OLANO_program_2020_FINAL_online.pdf> Accessed: 24 February 2020

Lucia Praus: Prieskum preferencií: OĽaNO opäť narástlo, je tesne za Smerom. Sme.sk. 14 February 2020. <https:// domov.sme.sk/c/22325068/preferencie-politickych-stran-ako-februar-2020.html> Accessed: 24 February 2020 30

31 According to the latest poll, MKÖ would receive 4% of the votes, therefore the party would not be able to get into the National Council. Data based on the last exit poll conducted by Focus Agency. Available: <https://www. sme.sk/ps/4829/mko-mks> Accessed: 24 February 2020

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

after the murders in a Maldivian restaurant did not help either). According to Bugár, they have met by a coincidence, while the chat conversation in the Threema mobile application between Kočner and Zsuzsová about Kočner’s meeting with Bugár reveals that their meeting was more than an accidental greeting.32 The fact, that after the elections four years ago the party finally decided to join the government coalition with SMER and SNS caused huge disappointment among their supporters33 and since then, their support has started to plumet.34 It was visible before the elections, that the party will not get into the parliament, however, an option was raised to create a coalition with other Hungarian political actors to form an election coalition, that was in the end rejected by the Most-Híd leadership. Last autumn, all the political parties representing the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia planned to create a joint slate, however, the leadership of Most-Híd, MKP and the Hungarian Christian-Democratic Party (MKDSZ – Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Párt) were not able to agree on the formation of a joint party named Party of Regions Most MS. Witnessing the failed negotiations among Hungarian parties, a new movement came into existence, the Togetherness (Összefogás). Another aim of the Hungarian Forum lead by an ex-MostHíd MP, Zsolt Simon, and MKP and Összefogás was to create a new party, that will not join forces with SMER, so in this way, Most-Híd was already excluded from this scenario for being a current coalition partner of SMER. After long negotiations, Hungarian political parties except Most-Híd were able to create the party named Magyar Közösségi Összefogás (MKÖ– Maďarská Komunitná Spolupatričnosť), whose aim was to unite Hungarians, overcome cleavages within the community and eliminate the inside race in the community for the votes of those who identify themselves as Hungarian. The programme of the party was focusing mainly on those regions where Hungarians live, and has messages especially for ethnic Hungarian voters: economic development of those regions where Hungarian community lives, establishing independent self-regulation system in education, minority group rights or introducing Hungarian as regional official language.35 Although Togetherness, MKP and the Hungarian Forum were all trying to attract Hungarian voters, despite Most-Híd’s weak positions in this regard, they also had to compete with other Slovak parties, who seemingly realised the weight of the votes of individuals belonging to the Hungarian community in Slovakia.36 PS/Spolu created a platform within the party’s structure addressing exclusively Hungarian voters, while SaS was also dealing in details with the situation of ethnic minorities in Slovakia in their programme. How ethnic Hungarians vote,

32 Andrej Kuzmány: Nepoznám ho. Bugár odmieta spájanie s Kočnerom. Sme.sk, 15 August 2019. <https://domov. sme.sk/c/22190377/reakcia-belu-bugara-na-stretnutia-s-marianom-kocnerom.html> Accessed: 23 February 2020.

Marianna Onuferová: Most-Híd ide definitívne do vlády so Smerom, Zsolt Simon vystúpil zo strany. Denník N, 19 March 2016. <https://dennikn.sk/411666/most-hid-ide-definitivne-do-vlady-so-smerom-zsolt-simon-vystupilzo-strany/ > Accessed: 22 February 2020 33

34 While in January 2019, the party has the support of 5,8% of the voters, in January 2020 they received only 4% of preferences. This information is based on the exit polls conducted by Focus Agency. For more details see: <https://www.sme.sk/ps/16/most-hid > Accessed: 3 March 2020 35 Programme of the Magyar Közösségi Összefogás. <https://www.osszefogas.sk/magyar-kozossegiosszefogas-programja/> Accessed: 24 February 2020

This means approx. 8-10% of the total votes.

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

can decide a lot, however, according to the political realities, Hungarian parties were in a totally different situation as they were in 1998: a governing coalition could be easily formed without being pressured to involve Hungarian political forces into the coalition.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS VS REALITY Before the elections, three scenarios seemed possible: democratic opposition parties will win the elections and create a governing coalition, alternatively SMER remains the strongest party, however, to be able to form a government, they would have to form a coalition most probably with ĽSNS and Sme rodina.37 The third scenario foresaw that neither of the political parties receive enough votes required for a minimum majority also failing to create a coalitional government. Votes of Slovaks living outside the country could also significantly affect the results – some of the parties acknowledged this fact in their programmes as well, offering solutions either for their return to the country, or to help them to maintain their relations with their homeland (e.g. solving the question of dual citizenship in favour of Slovaks living abroad). SMER, however, in the last days of the campaign criticised Slovaks living in other countries for using only the benefits of the Slovak social system, claiming that as such they should not participate in elections. Also, people living in the capital were criticized by the Minister of Interior, that they are living in a bubble, not having an idea about real life of people living in the countryside. This could be interpreted as a kind of final call of SMER to mobilise voters living in rural areas. As the situation around the Hungarian parties seemed to be complex and some of the Slovak parties also realised the potential of Hungarian votes, there are two possible scenarios for the political representation of the Hungarian minority: either any of the parties dedicatedly representing Hungarians in Slovakia will not be able to get into the parliament, or ethnic Hungarian voters will vote for traditional Slovak parties in bigger numbers as they did before. The results of the elections, however, brought some unexpected surprises. As previous predictions suggested, the turnout was high: 65,8% of eligible voters cast their ballot on 29 February 2020.38 This turnout was the highest in nearly in two decades. As one of the activists of the movement of For a Decent Slovakia subscribed, these elections could be understood as a referendum about what kind of country Slovak people really want.39 Although the last ballots predicted that SMER will be able to keep its position as the strongest party, the results showed that the decisive majority of voters were in favour of ousting the social democrats. The most popular party among voters became OĽANO, who won the 25,02% of the vote, that means, that the party will have 53 seats in the parliament. With this result, Igor Matovič’s party was able to quadrupling its seats in the Slovak National Council.

37 It is a new political party led by a businessman, Boris Kollár. The party identifies itself as a centrist party, however, they are rather conservative, who established good relations with other far-right parties in Europe.

Results of the parliamentary election in 2020: <https://volby.sme.sk/parlamentne-volby/2020/vysledky> Accessed: 2 March 2020 38

39 Veronika Folentová: Karolina Farská: Smeru majú plné zuby aj ľudia, čo žijú v jeho bývalých volebných baštách. Denník N. 20 February 2020. <https://dennikn.sk/1765224/karolina-farska-smeru-maju-plne-zuby-aj-ludia-ciziju-v-jeho-byvalych-volebnych-bastach/> Accessed: 2 March 2020

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

This can be understood as the skyrocketing victory of a party established by a self-made millionaire and a former media boss, not predicted by any kind of analysts or polls. Based on predictions from the end of last year, OĽANO was supported by 5-6% of the voters, while in January, the party was able to inch up to 8%40 and two weeks before the elections, their support was around 13-15%.41 Due to several campaign moves of the party leader, OĽANO was able to gain popularity within voters as Matovič found those messages and tools, by witch people were mobilised easily. In January 2020, for instance, he posted a video on Facebook42 standing in front of a villa owned by the former minister of finance, Ján Počiatek, who had been involved in several corruption cases but never prosecuted.43 “Bonjour, mafia” he said in the short video, and left a message in front of the house saying, that the property should belong to the Slovak state and not to Počiatek. Another notorious act was, when he threw a bag full of empty syringes over the head of an opposition lawmaker, showing his disapproval about a newspaper interview that was given by the lawmaker about drugs.44 Analysing OĽANO’s campaign strategy, it can be highlighted, that instead of fighting against extremism (as PS/Spolu did especially during the last days of the campaign), the party clearly communicated towards voters their ability to win over SMER. The message, that they are able to defeat current party in power and that they bring change together with people was able to attract more voters in the last days before the elections. As Matovič himself explained: extremism cannot be stopped by yelling at Kotleba’s supporters during their legally organised rallies, earning the trust of Kotleba’s voters and promising fairness for all could be more effective in the fight against Kotlebovci.45 The party’s success is also connected to the fact, that Matovič has been using very simple, very clear messages and tools to explain his aims for the majority of the voters. The second strongest party was SMER, with 18,29% of the vote, losing about 10% compared with its results from last elections. None of SMER’s coalition parties, SNS and Most-Híd were not able to pass the threshold and get into the parliament: SNS was supported by 3,16% of the votes, while Most-Híd gained only 2,05%. For both of the parties, these are the worst election results so far. The third strongest party getting seats in the Slovak National Council was Boris Kollár’s Sme rodina (We are family) with 8,24% of the votes. Kotlebovci – LSNS gained 7,97% of the vote, which is a slightly worse result

Smer pod 20 percent, silní Kotlebovci. Zverejnili nový prieskum. TA3. 12 December 2019. <https://www.ta3.com/ clanok/1171359/smer-pod-20-percent-silni-kotlebovci-zverejnili-novy-prieskum.html> Accessed: 24 February 2020 40

41 Prieskum pre TA3 potvrdil nástup Matoviča, časť strán je na hrane. TA3. 7 February 2020. <https://www.ta3.com/ clanok/1175632/prieskum-pre-ta3-potvrdil-nastup-matovica-cast-stran-je-na-hrane.html> Accessed: 24 February 2020

The video is available here: <https://www.facebook.com/obycajni.ludia.a.nezavisle.osobnosti/ videos/208531743522194/> Accessed: 14 February 2020 42

43 Eva Mihočková: Polícia preveruje Počiatkov majetok. Trvá jej to už dva roky. Etrend.sk. <https://www.etrend. sk/trend-archiv/rok-2020/cislo-2/policia-preveruje-pociatkov-majetok-trva-jej-to-uz-dva-roky.html> Accessed: 17 February 2020 44 Miro Kern: Matovič sa už pohádal s väčšinou možných spojencov a často sám začal (zoznam). Denník N. February 2017. <https://dennikn.sk/688398/matovicove-ostre-konflikty-pohadal-sa-s-vacsinou-moznych-spojencov-a-castosam-zacal/> Accessed: 4 March 2020

RTVS – O 5 minút 12. 26 January 2020. < https://www.rtvs.sk/televizia/archiv/14036/210997> Accessed: 3 March 2020

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

than last election, but it was still enough to ensure three extra seats for the party, for a total of 17 seats. Freedom and Solidarity gained 6,22% and Za Ľudí 5,77% of the votes. Another big surprise is the failure of PS/Spolu coalition: although the ballots predicted 10% of the votes for them, at the end, they were not able to make it to the parliament. With the narrowest defeat in history (926 votes lacking), the coalition gained 6,96% of the votes, while the minimum threshold for coalitions is 7%. As a response to this unexpected surprise, the party collected discrepancies in the counting reported by voters and in the first time in history, turned to the Constitutional Court for recounting the votes. The Constitutional Court has 90 days to make a decision about the election complaint.46 To clinch the majority (78 seats) or the constitutional majority (90 seats) in the 150-member Slovak National Council, parties getting into the parliament started their coalition negotiations right after the elections. The four parties, OĽANO, Sme rodina, Freedom and Solidarity as well as Za Ľudí quickly reached a compromise and the new government will have a comfortable constitutional majority of 95 seats. Forming the new cabinet lasted only 13 days, which is a record in Slovakia. As the new prime minister admitted, the breakout of COVID-19 virus and the escalating emergency situation in the country affected significantly the speed of the negotiations. The four parties agreed on the distribution of the governmental posts at the ratio of 8:3:3:2, however, there were several issues parties had to solve during negotiation. One of these issues was the position of Finance Ministry post that created a clash between OĽANO and SAS, as Sulík wanted to get this post. The final agreement is, that OĽANO will get the post of the finance minister and the leader of SAS, Sulík, will be the first deputy prime minister for economy and the Minister of Economy.47 Another issue during the coalition negotiation affected the past of Sme Rodina leader, Boris Kollár. According to a document prepared by the secret service from 1990, Kollár was in close contact with his childhood friend, Peter Steinhübler, who maintained different illegal activities during the 1990s. In this document, Kollár’s name is mentioned, as an associateof Steinhübler responsible for organising transport of drug trafficking. Steinhübler later became the leader of Bratislava underworld and was murdered in 1999.48 Despite Kollár’s rejection of the claims as lies and the fact that the authenticity of the document is not proved, he confirmed that during the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia, he had business with Steinhübel and they were childhood friends. These kind of past contacts of Kollár seemed problematic for some of the coalition parties, especially for Kiska and Za Ľudí party, but at the end, they were able to accept the party as their coalition partner.

46 Ústavný súd prijal sťažnosť PS-Spolu na výsledky volieb. Sme.sk. 12 March 2020. < https://domov.sme. sk/c/22357180/ustavny-sud-prijal-staznost-ps-spolu-na-vysledky-volieb.html> Accessed: 13 March 2020

Daniela Hajčáková, Lucia Praus: Bude štvorkoalícia, oznámil Matovič. Sulík vzdal ministerstvo financií. Sme. sk. 13 March 2020. <https://domov.sme.sk/c/22358048/matovic-oznamil-ze-bude-stvorkoalicia-sulik-vzdalministerstvo-financii.html> Accessed: 16 March 2020 47

Cez čiaru: Boris Kollár a bratislavské podsvetie, aká je pravda? Sme.sk. 19 June 2019. <https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=Y41njOQ20Bc> Accessed: 14 March 2020 48

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

SEPARATELY TOGETHER None of the Hungarian parties were able to get into the parliament, and due to this, first time in the modern history of Slovakia, the Slovak National Council will function without a Hungarian representation. There are several reasons of this situation. First of all, the missing agreement between the Hungarian political forces and the failed initiative of a joint Hungarian electorate motivated Hungarian voters to support Slovak political parties instead. The clash between the leaders of Híd-Most and MKP just a few days before the elections, blaming each other of being a liars, in the Slovak television Ta349 also had negative effects on hesitating voters. Another reason is, that the identity of Hungarians living in Slovakia cannot be described as an identity based only on ethnicity: elections after 1993 has showed, that members of the Hungarian minority are supportive regarding democratic values – given the fact that a minority community cannot exist in a society in which democratic values and rights are missing. The circumstances developed in the campaign period and in the later results also showed that policy based only on the ethnicity of the voters is not effective enough. The need for failing the government also has taken voters from the Hungarian parties: the programmes of these parties were not offering alternatives to the current situation within the Slovak society effectively enough, and as a result, a lot of voters with Hungarian ethnicity vote for Slovak parties, mainly for OĽANO and PS/Spolu.50

Dunajská Streda district

Komárno district

Nové Zámky district

Levice district

Velky Krtís district

Lucenec district

Rimavská Sobota district

Revúca district

Roznava district

Kosice district

Trebisov district

2020 Elections

MKÖ (43,01%), OLANO (16,12%); PS/SPOLU (4,43%)

MKS (41,1%; OLANO (17,62%); SMER (6,23%)

OLANO (22,61%); MKÖ (17,74); SMER (15,28%)

OLANO (25,04%); SMER 15,59%; MKÖ (12,62%)

OLANO (20,35%); SMER (18,59%); MKÖ (14,11%)

OLANO (23,75%); SMER (17,63%); LSNS (8,93%) AND MKÖ (8,93%)

MKÖ (17,17%; OLANO (16,96%); SMER (14,15%);

OLANO (20,88%); SMER (19,62%); LSNS (13,08%)

OLANO (24,64%), MKÖ (16,26%); SMER (13,64)

OLANO (29,37%); SMER (15,31%); SME RODINA (9,28%)

OLANO (23,01%); SMER (19,95%); MKÖ (11,41%);

2016 Elections

MKP (41,08%); MOST-HÍD (33,06%); SMER (5,20%)

MKP (39%); MOST-HÍD (27,9%); SMER (9,60%)

SMER (23,74%); MKP (13,39%); MOST-HÍD (13,05%)

SMER (26,13%); MKP (16%); MOST-HÍD (11,90%)

SMER (26,03%); MKP (12,54%); MOST-HÍD (10,89%)

SMER (21,47%); MKP (20,66%); MOST-HÍD (17,71%)

SMER (30,27%); LSNS (13,63%); MKP (11,74%)

SMER (21,84%); MOST-HÍD (16,81%); MKP (14,83%)

SMER (25,66%); OLANO 11,14%; MOST-HÍD (9%)

SMER (33, 43%); MKP (12,6%); MOST-HÍD (11,51%)

Results of the elections in 2020 compared to the election results from 2016 in districts, where the size of the Hungarian community is significant. The results show, that in 2020, more Hungarians voted Slovak parties, while four years before, the number of Hungarians voting for Hungarian parties was significantly higher.51

49 Diskusia v Téme dňa: Soročinová, Bárdos, Drucker a Bugár. TA3. 25 February 2020. <https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=ny5pDSqn0j8> Accessed: 14 March 2020

Jakub Habas: Ako volili okresy v parlamentných voľbách 2020? (volebná mapa). Sme.sk. 1 March 2020. <https:// domov.sme.sk/c/22329819/volebna-mapa-ako-volili-okresy-parlamentne-volby-2020.html> Accessed: 2 March 2020. 50

51 Data is based on the election results from 2016 and 2020 available on the website of Slovak Statistics. <http:// volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2016/sk/data01.html> Accessed: 3 March 2020 and <https://www.volbysr.sk/sk/ data02.html> Accessed: 3 March 2020.

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

Analysing preferential votes, we can see, that Gyula Bárdos (39 thousand preferential votes), József Menyhárt (29,7 thousand preferential votes) and Béla Bugár (29 thousand preferential votes) gained the most votes, and there are several other politicians that got preferential votes around 10-15 thousand. That means, that there is no political leader in the Hungarian community at this moment, who can unify splintered voters, instead there are politicians supported on a regional level only, who are in direct competition with each other. Despite the current government of four political parties is already compared to a fourleaf clover, we cannot see OLANO’s win as an outright defeat of populist politics in Slovakia. Also, the presence of Boris Kollár and Sme rodina indicates that voters are still interested in sometimes completely demagogue messages, while ignoring politicians’ possible ties with organized crime. Being in a coalition with three other parties it is never easy, especially when the cleavages are visible at the very beginning. In this case, these cleavages – currently – are mainly in regards with economic questions: while the leading government power, OĽANO puts emphasis chiefly on the fight against corruption, Za Ľudí is rather centrist and SaS is openly liberal, Sme rodina based their campaign on promises about massive state investments. Regarding foreign policy of the new government, the country will most probably maintain its Euroatlantic orientation under the leadership of Ivan Korčok. Also, we can expect, that the Slovak-Hungarian relations will remain stable without any kind of tensions based on nationalist elements.

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences