I N F O C US
2021. 2nd Issue ISSN 2677 -111X
The Eastern Mediterranean
Major challenges
Country strategies
Energy landscape
Security issues
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Welcoming Words
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2 Introduction and Interviews 6 The Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean Region 8 Egypt, the Largest Country in the Eastern Mediterranean—Interview with HE Péter Kveck Former Ambassador of Hungary to Egypt, Presently Director General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 14 Israel’s Eastern Mediterranean Strategy— Interview with HE Yacov Hadas-Handelsman, the Ambassador of Israel to Hungary 17 The Situation of Christianity in the Middle East— Interview with State Secretary Tristan Azbej 24
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6 Antall József Knowledge Centre The Eastern Mediterranean: Between Rivalry and Alliance Building
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7 Authors 135 Guest Authors 135 Authors of AJKC 136
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Country Studies Endgame in Syria? The Dilemmas of Reconstruction Israel’s Strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean Step by Step: Cairo’s Maritime Ambitions and the Build-up of the Egyptian Navy Jordan: In between the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean Threats and Challenges in the Post-Qaddafi Libya Cyprus in the EU: From Integration to Present-Day Challenges and Opportunities Greece: Return to the Eastern Mediterranean Crises and a Search for Reforms in Lebanon
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Horizontal Topics The Importance of the Eastern Mediterranean for the Gas Supply Security Endeavours of the European Union Migration in the Eastern Mediterranean— Key Trends and Challenges
TABLE OF CONTENTS
References of Pictures and Used Data
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Interests of External Actors Influencing the Eastern Mediterranean: Where Do the US, Russian, and Chinese Interests Collide? French Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean
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WELCOMING WORDS
Dear Readers,
Editor’s Note
Although the European Union many times tends to see itself as an island of calm, geopolitical realities have always been springing up on its fringes. These may sometimes seem to be fraught with dangers but can equally create opportunities if scrutinised minutely and understood correctly. One of such hotspots riveting public attention in recent years is the Eastern Mediterranean, a place that joins three vast and powerful continents. This region poses several risks as a fertile ground for conflicts that can affect the EU both directly, through maritime border disputes involving its member states, and indirectly, through the influx of migrants and refugees, for instance. However, it can also open up a wide scope for action, by having a possible role in Europe’s energy diversification plans and by providing many excellent investment opportunities. As the region is not likely to wane in importance—on the contrary, it is expected to compel even more attention in the coming years—we decided to dedicate our present issue to some of its timeliest and most challenging questions. We hope that, browsing through the articles and interviews, our readers can stay au courant with the unfolding affairs of this territory and become aware of its importance.
The Eastern Mediterranean is, without a doubt, home to diverse ambitions, fault lines, challenges, and opportunities. This region is not only a geographical meeting point of the Balkans, Southeast Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, but it is also a region in which the potential for cooperation and conflicts among and within states exist in parallel and where complex geopolitical and security realities can be identified. The year 2020 was especially eventful, and the Eastern Mediterranean often grabbed the headlines. This also motivated our institution to give the region’s present dynamics a closer look. By publishing this issue, the Antall József Knowledge Centre’s goal is to give a comprehensive insight into the realities of a complex region: we offer interviews with diplomats and many articles aim at bringing the Eastern Mediterranean closer to our readers. Topics like the dilemmas of the reconstruction in Syria, the internal and external challenges of Libya, the crises and the quest for reforms in Lebanon, or Israel’s strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean are just some of the many others our issue covers. Tamás Kozma—Editor
Zsombor Szabolcs Pál—Editor-in-Chief
WELCOMING WORDS
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ISRAEL’S EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY— INTERVIEW WITH HE YACOV HADAS-HANDELSMAN, THE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL TO HUNGARY Zsolt Csepregi, 20 January 2021, Budapest
Your Excellency, let us start with a broad question. How do you see Israel’s position as both an Eastern Mediterranean and a Middle Eastern state? How can these two aspects complement each other? And where do they collide if they collide at all? Well, first of all, Israel is not the only country that could be described as having one leg here and one leg there. The Eastern Mediterranean has gained additional importance in recent years, and some of its importance stems from its connection to the Middle East. What do I mean by this? We have been witnessing the ongoing civil war in Syria, where, in order to prevent Assad’s regime from being destroyed by ISIS and all the other rebels, the Russians returned to the region. In some sense, they have returned with greater military capacity than they used to have there during the Cold War, and, now, they are in control of this area.
Then, you have the gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean: a financial bonanza and an energy resource which is also a solution to the problem of climate change—or, at least, a partial one because, while being a fossil material, gas is still less contaminating than oil or, of course, coal. This is also why the area has gained more importance than it used to have before. In my interpretation, Israel’s position has in recent years improved. It has happened so because we have been the first to extract the gas deposits. Apart from Egypt, of course, as they have been dealing with offshore gas for years but mainly in the western side of the region near the Alexandria area. Israel is economically better off today because we have started to develop our fields, and we have been swift to utilise them, so the Israeli economy can now switch rapidly from all kinds of energy sources to either renewable energy or, at least, energy extracted from natural gas. Israel’s position has also changed significantly in light of the so-called Arab Spring, which was, of course, not an “Arab Spring.” I have to mention that it was very depressing to watch on television recently that people in Tunisia or Libya are missing Ben Ali or Qaddafi. In this complex region, Israel is like a huge lighthouse in the middle of a stormy ocean where you can find shelter. One just has to look at the process of Israel’s normalising or, in some cases, renormalising its relations with the states of the Gulf and North Africa. It has not just come out of a void. It is the result of the changes in a world where the Arab countries understand that, on the one hand, the US is not that interested in being the world’s police anymore, and, on the other hand, the “bad guys” are still on the march. By INTERVIEWS
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THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN HAS GAINED ADDITIONAL IMPORTANCE IN RECENT YEARS, AND SOME OF ITS IMPORTANCE STEMS FROM ITS CONNECTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST. “bad guys,” I mean mainly Iran in this region. And you have, of course, unexpected developments like the coronavirus pandemic, which leaves many countries and communities helpless, as they do not know what to do. Meanwhile, there is no progress in the Palestinian–Israeli track. However, people feel now a bigger need to deal with daily life. Primarily, you need to look for something to bring home, food to feed your family. Therefore, many people in the region say, “Look at the Israelis there, in the midst of us. They have a western country.” I am not even mentioning that we are a democracy but that we are a western country. They say, “Israel is a start-up nation.” The Arab states have actually been cooperating with Israel under the table for many years. I can tell you this by first-hand experience: I was part of this because I was the director of the Middle East and Peace Process Division at the ministry, in Jerusalem, for almost six years. Having served as the head of the Israeli office in Qatar, I think that it is about time we bring our relations with the Arab countries out into the open. We are not a “mistress” anymore, we are ready to come out of the closet and say, “Yes, we 18
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are in love.” The matchmaker was Donald Trump with his ideas and with the “deal of the century.” Some Arab leaders asked, “What are we waiting for? Why can we not cooperate with Israel? Why can we not talk to Israel? Why can we not work with Israel? It is for our mutual benefit. The Israelis get what they want, and we get what we want.” From their point of view, they will tell the Israelis and the World that the Palestinian issue is still there. Yes, it is there. However, the major change now is that, for the first time, the Palestinians were practically denied their virtual veto right, as they could claim for many years: “If you want to cooperate with Israel, you have to get the seal of approval from us because the Israelis are only interested in normalisation and they do not want to deal with the territorial problems and give us a state. If you give something to Israel, they will not give us a state.” I think the European Union is the only one that does not understand this ongoing new process, because, for it, the old paradigm regarding the peace process is still there. The tension between Israel and the Union did not start under Netanyahu because of this or that policy. It started when we were in the midst of the Annapolis Process, in 2008. I was there, so I know it. During this process, the European Union wanted to upgrade Israel’s position not only as a token of appreciation, but also because achieving closer relations with Israel would suit the European Union. However, the European Union has other, politically motivated intentions in mind, and it checks you, tests you, and treats you according to your merits. If you are good by their standards, they let you cooperate, but, if you are not good enough, they say “So what should we cooperate on? We will not take you into our scientific and research programme Horizon 2020.” In 2008, the European Union wanted to upgrade Israel’s position to something unique, but the Palestinians and the Egyptians stopped the process. They convinced the EU that, if they upgraded the relations with Israel, it would discourage the Israelis from completing the peace process. Now, the peace process remains locked in stalemate, and this is not our fault. Ehud Olmert was like Ehud Barak, he
offered everything to achieve peace with the Palestinians, and they rejected even this offer. People saw this, and they were almost ready to ask: “OK, but why? Why do we have to put up with it? Enough is enough.” So this is a new era, you see a new era of cooperation. And we have a win-win situation here. As I have said, Israel is a lighthouse in this stormy water of the Middle East, and this fact is even becoming much more relevant today. Israel’s position, therefore, improved, but, naturally, we should not sit idle and say, “We do not have to do anything now.” Another reason for the importance of this region today is Turkey and Turkish policy. It does not matter whether you like or dislike these policies. Turkey is a major factor that you have to take into consideration now in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East. Only a last thought about this question. You know, in Arabic, and especially in Egypt, there is an expression. Former Egyptian foreign minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit, who is the secretary general of the Arab League today, always refers to the Middle East as the Arab Middle East. Why is that? Because, in the Middle East, all countries are Arab except for three: Iran, which is Muslim but Shiite, not Arab, Turkey, which is Sunni, but not Arab, and Israel, which is none of the above. We are like a fish bone stuck in your throat. However, the Arabs know that we do not have any aspirations to dominate the Middle East. In the propaganda, people might say otherwise, but they know it is not true. You cannot say the same about Iran and Turkey. Iran is not an Eastern Mediterranean country, but Turkey is. It is not for nothing that relations between Turkey and Egypt have been so strained since the Arab Spring. The relations were strained even under Mohamed Morsi but for a different reason, because Erdoğan tried to lecture him. He went there for a visit, and he told him, “Listen, there is no contradiction between Islam and modernisation. Just take the Turkish example.” And the Egyptians told him, “You can go home, we do not need your advice. Who are you?” And here you can see that it all comes down to the issue that Arabs think Muslims who are not Arabs are inferior.
The Eastern Mediterranean has gained a lot of importance in recent years. Each of its countries has important factors and trends, like Libya and its instability, then Egypt with its hardships, but Egypt, of course, also controls a very significant international gateway, the Suez Canal. Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus all are very important. And as I said, currently it is not less important what is under than what is over the water. The undersea natural gas deposits are the wealth of the region, and, by the way, they are also the wealth of Europe. Why is that? Because it is an alternative supply channel, which means that you, even Hungary, will be in a better position to bargain for a lower price per unit of natural gas, which means that, at the end of the day, you will pay less for your heating bill. You mentioned the European Union, and you also mentioned old-new friends in the Arab world. However, Israel also has new friends in the Eastern Mediterranean part of the European Union: Greece and Cyprus. How do you see the partnership between these states and Israel? Does it only focus on the economy? We have recently seen that Israel and Greece also signed military agreements. What potential do you see in this cooperation? First of all, let me correct some things to be accurate. The thing you have referred to is not a military agreement, it is a contract. It is a major contract for modernising the Greek training aircraft and the connected capabilities, worth USD 1.8 billion. It is not a military pact between Israel and Greece. Regardless, we have everything for a comprehensive partnership, including economic cooperation. Israel and Cyprus have gas resources. Cyprus is connected to Greece, which serves as a major hub and a terminal for gas transit. Through Greece, as it is located on mainland Europe, the road to Budapest, for example, is open, so Hungary also has an interest in this connectivity. The cooperation, however, is not limited only to this economic partnership. It is gradually extending to all domains, which is natural, as we are neighbours with Greece and Cyprus. INTERVIEWS
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Similarly, we also cooperate very closely with the Egyptians when it comes to security. We see things eye to eye because the Egyptians and President Sisi understand exactly what the threatening potential of terrorism is in the Sinai Peninsula and the rest of the country. Let us not forget that Egypt, at a certain stage, declared Hamas to be a terrorist organisation. They did it because they were more than convinced that Hamas had been cooperating with Daesh, with ISIS, and other extreme groups in the Sinai Peninsula. The nature of the relations between Egypt and Iran also shows that they are perfectly aware of the reality. I know that, in the end, it comes down to politics, which means that sometimes you turn a blind eye, and sometimes you do not. You have to make a compromise. A compromise does not mean that I change my mind on you. At the end of the day, there are many shared interests between Israel and Egypt. Talking about Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece, they also have their own triangle focussing on the economy, trade, and Turkey. Finally, everyone is alarmed by the Russians, as the Americans are not happy with their current geopolitical actions. We have lots of operations in Syria, so we must coordinate them together all the time in order not to have an accident. We had one once, and even that one was too painful, although it was not us who caused this tragedy. A Russian military transport aircraft was shot down by a Syrian missile, as Israeli jets were operating somewhere there. The Syrians missed the target. Many Russian soldiers were killed; it was a catastrophe. Apart from Greece and Cyprus, we see that Italy, France, and many other countries are also active in the region. Do you think that the European Union can have a new role in the Eastern Mediterranean? How can Central Europe contribute to a more cooperative Mediterranean neighbourhood? First of all, of course, Europe has an interest in this, an economic interest—and also a political one—because nobody wants instability. Stability is important for everyone and especially for Europe these days. Second, Europe has two 20
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member states in this area, which are Greece and Cyprus. Cyprus is occupied by Turkey; 3040% of its territory is controlled by Turkey, a state not belonging to the European Union. Then, there are further EU member states in the outer circle but still in the region: Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania. Therefore, the EU has an interest in the region; it has an interest because Europe needs to secure its energy sources, and the supply routes and some of the pipelines come through Turkey to Europe, while new energy resources will come to Europe from the deep sea. Now, if you ask me about the role of the V4, let me tell you that, first of all, what we witness today in the European Union is a crystallisation of small alliances and small blocks. It is natural that this happens because each block has common interests. Hungary’s interests are much closer to the interests of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and maybe even Austria. In the end, there is no common European foreign policy stance, there are only compromises. Such an example was the Palestinians’ application to become a member of UNESCO. We, the Israelis, lobbied against it in the EU, and, regardless of the position of some of the member states due to French pressure, the EU abstained during the vote instead of voting “no.” At the end of the day, the most important matters on the EU’s agenda are the daily, relevant topics, first and foremost economic questions, and not necessarily foreign policy issues. The European Union is the single biggest trade market in the world, an economic giant, which is the greatest asset it has. Condemning Israel for some of our government’s decisions like a bid for additional 800 housing units in East Jerusalem or some similar matters is not the real issue for the EU. The European Union has an interest in the region, and, as I said, this interest is mainly economic, but there is also a political aspect to be considered, because some member states of the European Union are located in the Eastern Mediterranean. I will just mention that one can only imagine where Greece and Cyprus would be today without the European Union. If it had not been important for the Germans, both countries would have gone bankrupt five years ago, but
the necessary funds were pumped into Greece under the leadership of Merkel. The Greeks benefitted from their EU membership, but, again, Merkel did not do it only because she loves the Greeks. She did it out of interest because, if Greece had fallen over the cliff, it would have dragged Germany and others with it. Therefore, Merkel was ready to give the Greeks more money so it could recover and settle the account later. This is a kind of mutual responsibility and group work. That is why they have invested a lot in Greece. And they do not want to lose their investment. So this is the long answer to the question what the role of Europe is in the region. It has a significant role, but the problem is that, as in many other cases, it focusses its activities on the wrong aspects. Do not try to educate everyone, because it will not work. Try to cooperate with everyone, and then you can get, in my humble opinion, the same result but in a different manner. Your answer leads us to my last question. It might be a bit of science fiction; still, the European Union always insists on creating regional frameworks and regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. There were very positive signs coming from the Israeli–Lebanese indirect negotiations. How do you see, can the Eastern Mediterranean benefit from overcoming the conflicts it used to face and from having some kind of regional cooperation beyond what you have already mentioned? Certain triangles have already emerged in the region. First, regarding the Lebanese–Israeli rapproche ment, I must tell you it is stuck again. It is like dancing what I would call a “reverse tango”: tango is two steps forward, one step back. In this case, it is always one step forward, two steps back, or, at least, sideways, and not towards a solution. However, the main reason why the Lebanese agreed was the economy, as Lebanon is bankrupt. It is not for nothing that you also have all these demonstrations against Hezbollah. The Lebanese are fed up
IN THIS COMPLEX REGION, ISRAEL IS LIKE A HUGE LIGHTHOUSE IN THE MIDDLE OF A STORMY OCEAN. with their situation. Hezbollah has exhausted the country, and it has taken the whole country hostage. However, the last straw that broke the camel’s back was what happened in the port of Beirut several months ago, that catastrophe. It was a disaster bound to happen. Hezbollah, which controls the port, has its own interests. They kept dangerous materials there, and they exploded. So this is for one thing. For another, Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, got mixed up in this confusion during the Syrian Civil War. His Iranian masters ordered him to help Assad and the Syrian army, or what was left of it, through Hezbollah, along with Iranian soldiers, mainly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Afghan and Iraqi militias. We made sure that they could not move. Nobody knows exactly how many but at least hundreds of Hezbollah members were killed and thousands were injured. They suffered heavy losses. And people in the 21st century start asking questions even in dictatorships. They say, “I am ready to accept that my son will sacrifice his life to fight the Zionist infidels, but I am not ready to accept that my son will sacrifice his life, fighting for Assad against whoever he is fighting.” This is why Nasrallah finds the current situation very difficult. Now, Nasrallah can say that he has 100,000 missiles and he is working on developing their accuracy, but the equipment needed for this work, for some reason or another, is bombed from the sky all the time. We are now almost fifteen years after the Second Lebanon War. I INTERVIEWS
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THE EU HAS AN INTEREST IN THE REGION; IT HAS AN INTEREST BECAUSE EUROPE NEEDS TO SECURE ITS ENERGY SOURCES. can still remember that day when the war broke out, I was in charge of the Middle East, and I ran the situation room during this war in the ministry from 12 July 2006. Now, in half a year, on 12 July 2021, it will be the fifteenth anniversary of the day when the war broke out. Where has Nasrallah lived since then? He now lives in the gutters somewhere. He does not live like us. He remembers, he knows very well what happened fifteen years ago and what can happen again. And he is in dire straits because his Iranian masters are pushing him in one direction, while he is in Lebanon, and he understands that there is a limit. He is like a lemon: the Iranians keep on squeezing him, but, in the end, they squeeze every last drop from him, and nothing more comes after that drop. And he is getting there now. So the Lebanese agreed at the end of 2020 to indirect negotiations with Israel mediated by the UN and the US in an attempt to settle the line of the maritime borders. There are three or four internationally recognised methods to measure boundaries, and surface boundaries and maritime boundaries are not always the same. Why does this matter? Because there are a number of legitimate solutions, but the involved parties, Israel and Lebanon, have to agree on something. However, we have already been extracting natural gas there, and they have not. We do not extract directly from the disputed area, but the Lebanese do not recognise political boundaries; they recognise geological 22
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boundaries. So when we pump gas out of the sea, the gas sometimes comes from their part to our part. This is what bothers them, and it bothers them rightfully. The Lebanese are ready to negotiate because they need money. They badly need money. And this condition promotes a kind of regional partnership. Concerning regional cooperation, we are in favour of it because we think that, first of all, we can help others. It is not that we want to patronise anyone. We treat everybody as an equal party, and we are ready to help, especially in agriculture and water management. We are a very developed country, and we can help and cooperate, and not only on this. We are there, we know the climate, we know the people, we know the culture. So can regional cooperation work? The paradox is that cooperation can work between Israel and Arab countries much more than between Arab countries themselves, and that is for two reasons. First of all, Israel does not have the barriers between its country and any other Arab countries that other Arab countries have between them. Look at the rivalries between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. When I was the head of our trade office in Qatar between 2001 and 2003, there was no Saudi ambassador there, just like currently there is none. So when at the beginning of 2021 the Americans managed to square the circle and to facilitate a kind of reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar it seemed that the Saudis were going to send an ambassador to Qatar, and Qatar was going to send an ambassador to Saudi Arabia. And hearing this, I said I was having déjà vu. You see, when I was there, Al Jazeera and everybody was talking about that the Israeli were there, while the Saudi were not. You know the Qataris are traitors according to some other Arab countries. In a way, Saudi Arabia and Israel have much more in common than Saudi Arabia and Qatar. It is not that they do not have common issues to cooperate on, but they have a significant barrier between them. Let me tell you another personal example. In the autumn of 1993, I was the counsellor at our embassy in London. It was after the
Oslo Accords, the big euphoria, when, on 13 September 1993, late Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli minister of foreign affairs Shimon Peres were standing with the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation Yasser Arafat and signed the agreement. Everybody was talking about a new Middle East, the vision of Peres, and cooperation. Then, there was a one-day seminar organised in London by the European Commission about the prospects of peace in the Middle East. And the person who was at the time the director of the directorate general, which dealt with external relations and with the European neighbourhood, poured cold water on our enthusiasm. We were passionate about the new prospects, but he dampened our enthusiasm. He looked at me and said: “There will not be any cooperation.” And what was the reason for that? It was not politics or prejudice, nothing like that. The reason for it was the fact that, at the time, only 7% of the Arab trade was conducted in the region. I talk about 1993. I am sure that the figures have changed, but, unfortunately, I do not think that they have changed drastically. The majority of Arab trade happens with external markets. They trade with Europe. At that time, only 7% of the total trade was among themselves. He also said at the time that the only thing the Arab countries could offer was energy. And energy works in a way that the Saudis will not sell oil to Algeria, and vice versa, because they have their own resources for their own consumption. They give some donations to poor brothers like Jordan or Mauritania, but the rest goes to Europe, the United States, China, or whoever is ready to pay more. They do not have anything else to sell. So I do not know whether one could expect effective cooperation among Arab countries. There is Egyptian–Greek cooperation, but what about an Egyptian–Libyan or Egyptian– Sudanese one? Other parties which could be involved in greater cooperation with the Arab countries could be either Israel or Europe. But do not try to teach the Arab countries what is best for them. Even if you know better, and sometimes we do know better, they have their dignity. They have their pride, and, even if they
make their own mistakes sometimes, let them make their own mistakes because those are their mistakes and they will learn from them. However, they have a different culture, and sometimes it is going backwards. It does not matter whether we agree with it, or not. It does not matter whether it matches your democratic standards, but you have to understand the cultural differences. Actually, you, in Hungary should understand it better than others because sometimes you also face this situation at your meetings with your fellow members in the European Union. There are lots of differences you have to respect, and it is a long process to learn how to respect them. It takes a long time because everyone has their own tradition, their own culture, and you have to understand this. Now, to answer your question, I think that, today, in the era of globalisation, our future and our welfare depend on cooperation. You cannot do things on your own. The boundaries have shrunk, and the world has become a global village, so there is no doubt that the future lies in regional cooperation. It can help to save raw material, money, reduce expenses—and we have not even touched the issue of climate change and the Sustainable Development Goals, which are gaining more and more weight because of overpopulation or other reasons. This pandemic we face now is a great example: with today’s technological advances you can fly to the Moon, but then one virus or a minor change in the worldwide precipitation regime can cause everything to come to a standstill. There are people who tell you that it is another proof of God, while others tell you it is nature. At any rate, it shows how small we are and to what extent our plans and visions could be disrupted by something unexpected. Therefore, I believe that, today, more than ever, the future lies in regional cooperation. You cannot stand on your own, and this also refers back to your first question, because this is one of the reasons, if not the main reason, that motivates these countries, especially in the Gulf, to come out of the closet and openly cooperate with Israel. They need us, and we also need them geo-strategically and economically. INTERVIEWS
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THE SITUATION OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST—INTERVIEW WITH STATE SECRETARY TRISTAN AZBEJ Tamás Kozma–Zsombor Szabolcs Pál, 14 January 2021, Budapest
As a State Secretary, you are tasked with coordinating Hungarian aid programmes aimed at helping persecuted Christians all around the world. Could you sum up your activities and the main principles of the Hungarian government’s humanitarian efforts? What can a small country like Hungary do for the millions of persecuted Christians all around the world? The Hungary Helps programme is Hungary’s international aid programme that has been running under this name since the beginning of 2017. As Hungary is an emerging donor in terms of international aid, it became important to set a solid framework for the government’s international aid activity within the state structure. A few decades ago, Hungary was on the receiving end of aid, but we have since stepped up our share in international solidarity. Now, what makes a notable difference between the Hungarian 24
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international aid activity and many other national or international aid programmes is that we were the first to recognise the extent of Christian persecution in the world. We found that it was not only one of the most pressing human rights crises of our age but also the least addressed one. We also think that this situation, the lack of freedom of religion and belief, which makes it difficult for Christians around the world to follow their religion, is also connected to humanitarian crises in many instances. For example, in the Middle East, it was quite well known that ISIS carried out genocide and mass atrocities based on religious intolerance and religious hatred against the Yazidis, Christians, and other faith groups which created a humanitarian crisis that was very specific to those groups who were attacked or oppressed because of their religious identity. Christians are the most persecuted belief group across the globe: we have just received statistical data showing that 340 million Christians are persecuted or discriminated around the world for their faith. That is why we have become committed to dealing with this issue on a governmental and, more importantly, on an international level. Therefore, the Hungarian government decided to identify aiding persecuted Christians as one of the key priorities of its international aid policy. There is a common misunderstanding that Hungary Helps means aiding persecuted Christians. Through its programme, Hungary does not help Christians exclusively; that would not be consistent with Christian values. However, our support for persecuted Christians is explicit— non-exclusive, but explicit. Moreover, for this programme, the Hungarian government set up a dedicated department that has the term “aid for
persecuted Christians” in its title—we were the first government to dedicate a governmental unit to this overwhelming global phenomenon. During the last four years up until now, when we are making this interview, we started eighty-five aid projects in more than thirty countries, and the total number of our persecuted Christian beneficiaries has just exceeded one hundred thousand. This means that, through humanitarian aid, rehabilitation aid, and educational programmes, we have contributed to more than one hundred thousand discriminated or persecuted Christians and members of a few other religious groups. Our support gave them the opportunity to be able to remain in their ancestral homelands or, in many cases, return to their homelands from migration or from refugee status. You started your career in diplomacy in the Middle East and have had various trips there as the responsible for the Hungary Helps programme. How do you see the situation of Christians in this region, and where are their communities most at risk? Where do they have the most supportive circumstances? As you have mentioned, I spent four years in diplomatic service in Israel, and it gave me personal experience on the complex social structure and history of the Middle East, and the different attempts, success stories, and failures of people from various ethnic or faith backgrounds, living together in such a patchwork of cultures, traditions, languages, and ethnicities. That was my first encounter with the different groups of Middle Eastern Christians. Today, one of the greatest assets that we have at this state secretariat is that we have a widespread, lively, and direct contact with Christian churches in the Middle East, Africa, and some other parts of the world. This way, we can form a good, clear, and detailed picture of their situation. Based on that, I can say that Christians and other Muslim denominations—the latter being usually in majority—found a stable way to live together over the centuries. What has changed this modus vivendi was the appearance of a modern political ideology: political Islamism. It is not always well known that political Islamism
is not an ancient tradition, as it started, some would say, around the 1970s, and its political beliefs are based on the perverted religious theses of some more radical Islamist theologians. And, since the Middle East has always been fraught with tense political and ethnic conflicts, the quasi-state-like organisation ISIS’s appearance in the region ignited something that resulted in armed conflicts and destabilisation almost to the extent of genocide. What we see when we look at the conflict in Syria and Iraq is that today, with the collapse of ISIS as a quasi-state-like entity, the situation of Christians is not as severe as it was before. However, Christians are a minority everywhere except for Lebanon, where they make up a significant portion of society. It is almost a historical cliché that, whenever there is conflict, minorities usually suffer more than the majority population. Now, we saw what happened in the Middle East in the near past. What is more, statistics show an absolutely tragic tendency among Christian communities in the region. One example is Syria, where the number of Christians was 2.3 million only a decade ago. However, even the most optimistic estimates say that they hardly reach one million today. The more realistic and pessimistic estimates, on the other hand, say that there are only about 800,000 Christians left in Syria. In Iraq, the situation is even more dramatic. According to the statistics, the number of Christians before the 2004 war in Iraq was 1.5 million. Today, this number is dramatically low, around 200,000. It is less than one-fifth of the number they had there one and a half decades ago. Some people would think that Christianity may have had a short-lived presence in the Middle East, but the truth is that Middle Eastern Christian communities are among the most ancient groups in which all Christian civilisation is rooted, and they have been present in this region for two thousand years. They have not just survived two thousand years there but even flourished. There is, however, a dramatic tendency that suggests, if there is no international collaboration or intention to save the Christians of the Middle East, they will disappear—first in Iraq within a very few years or, at best, within our INTERVIEWS
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lifetime. We are talking about a 200,000-strong Christian group that has survived two millennia and is now disappearing within our lifetime. I think that would be a true shame on our generation and the international community if we could not save these Christians. If they are not saved, then they will have the same fate as, for example, the historical Jewish community had in Iraq. They were a strong group back in the past, but today, they are almost gone. That is the situation in Iraq and Syria, but there is also Lebanon, which could be regarded as the last bastion of Christianity in the Middle East. There are no sectarian groups oppressing or persecuting Christians in Lebanon. However, the many different types of crises in that country can easily cause the Christian population to reduce— its members can choose to migrate elsewhere because of their high level of education and the lack of perspective in the country. On the other hand, there are other cases, for instance, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan, where Christians are treated as an equal part of society: they are respected, and their human rights are protected. What forms of hardships do Christians need to face in the region? Is there any difference between different Christian denominations? Does violence against them come mainly from the state and authorities or from nonstate actors and the wider society? Our approach to support Christians is that we try to meet their needs. Some international aid programmes commit the mistake that they try to be smarter than the people they support. They follow their own agenda instead of listening closely to the actual community they try to support. We work the other way round. We go to the site, and we ask the representatives of the community about how we can help. And they generally answer, “Provide us aid and support so we may be able to remain in our homeland.” Christian communities are usually the last ones to migrate from a crisis-hit zone because, most of the time, they are patriotic, and they feel a special responsibility towards their wider community, including people of other faiths and other communities they live together 26
INTERVIEWS
with. That comes from the Christian world view and from how Christians think about a person’s responsibilities. However, to help them remain in their societies and homelands, we need to secure three things, that is, their lives, their homes, and their livelihood. When I say, “secure their lives,” I mean it literally because they have suffered armed conflicts, violent persecution, and even genocide. Therefore, within the Hungary Helps programme, one type of the aid we provide is humanitarian fast relief after terrorist attacks or other armed crises. Secondly, they need help to secure the places where they live. This means that there has been a tremendous loss in infrastructure in Syria or in some other countries such as Lebanon, where the economic and financial crisis impaired the maintenance of infrastructure and social services. Therefore, we support the rehabilitation of these communities’ infrastructure, educational and healthcare institutions, and even churches because that is what they need. Thirdly, they need help to secure their livelihood. Christians in the Middle East have always contributed to their communities and to the economy to a great degree. They are well educated, so they are present in trade, industry, and other important areas. However, because they had to flee and because of the war, they have lost their livelihood. Consequently, they also need support in economic rehabilitation. Finally, there is a special need that we have also recognised. In some cases, the local Christian youth has limited access to higher education. That is why we offer them scholarship programmes at Hungarian universities with the aim that they come here, study at our institutions, and, after graduation, they return to their communities and help rebuild them. Now, let me come back to your question if there is any difference between denominations. The Islamists and jihadists all attack the believers and followers of Christ, so there is no big difference between the Orthodox Church, Eastern Catholics, and Protestants. That being said, there is still a slight difference because the Orthodox and the Eastern Catholics have a longer historical presence in the region. As
a consequence, slightly less radical Islamists would treat them as communities that, contrary to the whole Islamic world view, still belong to the People of the Book, the Abrahamic religion. And that resulted in a different level of persecution, which means, in some cases, these Christians were offered the opportunity to flee before being murdered. Protestant churches, on the other hand, are often regarded by these jihadist and Islamist groups as agents of the West and, particularly, the US because they usually have a very close relation with their sister churches in the US. Consequently, they sometimes face harsher discrimination. All in all, it is mostly non-state actors that persecute Christians in the Middle East. Regarding the states and the authorities, most of them have tolerance towards Christianity in recent history. There are countries and governments that are non-Christian but still value the presence of Christianity very much and are committed to preserving their Christian communities. We know only about very few instances when some authorities turned a blind eye to the cases of non-state actors committing atrocities against Christians. But that is usually not the case, and these are mainly authorities not belonging to the central government. Do you have help programmes drawn on your own initiative, or do you organise your activity listening to local needs on all occasions as you have already suggested? We are not doing anything for the communities without the communities. And what the community needs is that we help them stay in their country. In Hungary, one of the most important principles in our migration policies is that we are against mass migration. We think that it is harmful to all parties involved, for the source and the receiving communities and the migrants themselves. We believe that, instead of bringing people facing social challenges or being in trouble to Europe through migration, it is in everybody’s best interest to bring help and aid where the problem is to stabilise the country and to help people stay there and have a prosperous life with human dignity.
CHRISTIANS ARE THE MOST PERSECUTED BELIEF GROUP ACROSS THE GLOBE: 340 MILLION CHRISTIANS ARE PERSECUTED OR DISCRIMINATED AROUND THE WORLD FOR THEIR FAITH. Do you have partners, either state or nonstate actors in the Middle East or globally, who you can cooperate with in helping these Christian communities? What is special about our programme is that, whenever it is possible, we do not use middleman agencies or international organisations. While we are fully transparent to local authorities, we do not involve them in the chain of transferring money or sending donations. In most cases, our beneficiaries are local church institutions or local faith-based organisations, charities, and missions. This is the most efficient and direct way. We do have partners in Hungary: all major historical churches are partners to our programme. Besides, we cooperate with well-referenced Hungarian faith-based charity organisations, for instance, the Hungarian Interchurch Aid or the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta, and many others. On an international level, we seek cooperation and form alliances with other governments and state actors, and we look for governments and like-minded organisations who would align with our idea of providing humanitarian aid to persecuted Christians and other religious INTERVIEWS
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communities, because we also have a programme for the persecuted Yazidis and the persecuted Muslim communities just like for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. And who can you cooperate with in a European context? Is there any V4 cooperation in this regard? Do you have partnerships with other European states or worldwide? Within the European Union, we have formalised cooperation with Poland. Perhaps it is not surprising because we have much common ground not only in our policies but in our views on solidarity as well as humanitarian and migration policy. We have also formalised cooperation and joint projects with, for example, Estonia, Greece, and the Netherlands. Moreover, we are very close to starting joint projects with Germany and Slovenia. So, within the European Union, we have many allies. However, perhaps our most important diplomatic achievement was outside Europe, because the Hungary Helps programme also has a cooperation with USAID. We have not only cooperation but joint large-scale projects in northern Iraq for the persecuted Christian and Yazidi communities. As you have mentioned, stopping migration and helping people locally is one of the main building blocks of the Hungarian government’s migration strategy. In your view, how much could you achieve through your programme in the Middle East in this regard? In the Middle East and mostly North Africa, we have passed the mark of 100,000 direct beneficiaries. Of course, this sort of aid always has a cascade effect, so the indirect beneficiaries of our programme could be a multiple of that. Yet, even if we are talking about hundreds of thousands, that is only a minority of the people in need and the people who could be a target for organisations promoting migration. Since we are a small country having a relatively young aid programme, no one could expect from us to solve the problem of persecuted Christians. However, I also see it 28
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as a major achievement that we could put the whole issue, and the possible response to it, on the international diplomatic community’s agenda. We have raised issues together with other governments and international organisations and inspired other governments to introduce new policies and programmes. We hold international conferences every two years. The first conference had about a few hundred foreign attendances from less than twenty countries with no high-level official government representation. On the last one, we had more than four hundred international participants from over thirty countries, and high-level government representation from twelve countries. That was the second conference on the persecution of Christians, which means that we managed to thematise the international humanitarian and diplomatic discourse. Therefore, I think we can greatly contribute to the preservation of these communities if we can further mobilise other governments and form this international alliance. How do you see the future of your programme? How could you develop it? Do you see the directions you should follow in the future? I think that the Hungarian government dedicates reasonable resources to this programme. Of course, we are responsible for maintaining the well-being and the future of the Hungarian people. However, we have taken on a moral obligation to show solidarity internationally, and we can expand our efforts. The way to go forward is to be persistent in representing the case of persecuted Christians in the world and to increase the scale of our efforts by involving other governments and possible donors while inspiring the European Union’s foreign aid policy to better meet the needs of those people who suffer the humanitarian crisis because of religion-based intolerance. Do you think that your cooperation with Middle Eastern Christian or other religious communities can create a problem for their governments or other local authorities?
Well, the keyword is respect. Respect from both sides. As I have already said, it is not typical that state actors persecute Christians in the Middle East. Most of the governments and authorities protect and value their Christian communities and Christian compatriots. Therefore, they have no objection to our aid activities. There is a requirement, of course, that we should be transparent, which we are always willing to comply with because we are also against the practice when Hungarian organisations are supported under the mask of charity but with a clear intention to interfere in our country’s internal politics. We want to avoid even a suspicion about that; therefore, our cooperation with local governments is transparent and mutually committed. Finally, let me ask you: which has been your most successful programme in the region, and which was the most special and unforgettable to you? Perhaps the most successful project, the project that carries hope for the future, is our support programme for reconstructing the northern Iraqi town Telskuf. This town is inhabited by members of the Chaldean Catholic Church, and it is on the Nineveh Plains. Talking of Chaldeans and the Nineveh Plains, you can see how ancient this Christian community is. This town was overrun and conquered by ISIS in 2014, so all its Christian population had to flee. And ISIS did a lot of damage, they destroyed the local church and all religious monuments. And, when they were driven out, more than nine hundred buildings were damaged in the fight. So, it became a ghost city because no one lived there and nine hundred of its buildings were severely damaged. We decided to provide aid to these Chaldean Christians in Iraq through the Hungary Helps programme so that they can reconstruct Telskuf. As a result, almost one thousand have returned out of the 1300 families that had fled from the city, which means that about threequarters of these people have returned to this completely abandoned town. Meanwhile, as I mentioned earlier, the whole Christian
population in Iraq has decreased to one-fifth of the size it had one and a half decades ago. We managed to save the community with a not too large but very targeted donation worth about EUR 2 million. When people returned, life found its way again. It was very touching when the priest of the community told us that the town was renamed Telskuf, the Daughter of Hungary. Whenever I have a diplomatic meeting with other governments, I always explain that, of course, we take great pride in having a town called the Daughter of Hungary on the Nineveh Plains, but it would be equally wonderful to have there, for example, another one called the “Son of the European Union” or the “Grandchildren of the United Nations.” This is how we want to mobilise other governments for this cause. However, for me, personally, the most touching occasion was when I visited another site we supported in Beirut, Lebanon. Lebanese people take care of almost two million refugees. So, today, about half of the population in the country is made up by refugees. They are all in a difficult situation—still, Lebanese people show solidarity and take care of such a large crowd of people. And Lebanese churches are at the forefront of this charity service. Now, together with the Syrian Catholic Church, we supported a school called the Angel of Peace, where the students are all refugees from Syria and Iraq. I once visited this school and talked to the children, and I could learn about their tragic lives. Many of them were traumatised. I told them about Hungarian people’s solidarity along with our programme. What happened then was that the children and their priests stood up and started to pray for Hungary and Hungarians. It was not a prayer of gratitude for providence; as they explained, they were praying so that Hungarians, and I think all the people in the West, have strong faith. I figure they meant that we should have strong faith in our identity. I think it was really touching but it was also a very important message from the Middle East, from those people who preserve their identity, their traditions and belong to their homeland even in times of persecution. INTERVIEWS
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7 AUTHORS
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S GUE OR
AUTH ST
AUTH ST
Csicsmann, László Vice-rector for faculty at the Corvinus University of Budapest, and the head of the Department
The Endgame in Syria? The Dilemmas of the Reconstruction
of International Relations
Éva, Ádám Non-resident research fellow of the AJKC
Crises and the Search for Reforms in Lebanon
Ionnides, Isabelle Fellow at the Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, a research associate at the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy in Athens, and a non-resident Europe’s
Cyprus in the EU: From Integration to Present-Day Challenges and Opportunities
Futures fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna (2019–2020)
Kacziba, Péter Assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and International Studies,
Greece—Return to the Eastern Mediterranean
University of Pécs
Kádár, József Doctoral candidate at the University of Szeged
Jordan: In between the Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean
N. Rózsa, Erzsébet Senior research fellow at the Institute of World Economics of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies in the Hungarian Academy
Threats and Challenges in the Post-Qaddafi Libya
of Sciences and professor at the University of Public Service
AUTHORS
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C AUT JK
C AUT JK
RS OF A HO
RS OF A HO
Csepregi, Zsolt Deputy Director for International Affairs
Interview with HE Yacov Hadas-Handelsman Strategy of Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean
Korpics, Fanni International relations manager
French Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean
at the European Relations Department
Kozma, Tamás Research track leader and head of the Global Relations Department
Krajcsír, Lukács Historian and international relations expert at the Global Relations Department
Miklós, Nobert International relations manager at the Global Relations Department
136
AUTHORS
Interview with State Secretary Tristan Azbej The Importance of the Eastern Mediterranean for the European Union's Gas Supply Security Endeavours
Interview with HE Péter Kveck Step by Step: Cairo’s Maritime Ambitions and Build-up of the Egypt Navy
Influencing the Eastern Mediterranean: Where Do the American, Russian, and Chinese Interests Collide
C AUT JK
C AUT JK
RS OF A HO
RS OF A HO
Pál, Zsombor Szabolcs Historian and senior research fellow
Restás, Bianka International relations manager at the European Relations Department
Szilágyi, Laura Research fellow at the Talent Management and Innovation Department
Szilvási, Simon Research fellow at the Global Relations Department
Interview with State Secretary Tristan Azbej
Migration in the Eastern Mediterranean—Key Trends and Challenges
Influencing the Eastern Mediterranean: Where Do the American, Russian, and Chinese Interests Collide
Influencing the Eastern Mediterranean: Where Do the American, Russian, and Chinese Interests Collide
AUTHORS
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