Securing Our World by Atlantic Treaty Association

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Securing our world

An official publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association

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Securing our world Editor Simon Michell Editor-in-chief Barry Davies Managing editor Jane Douglas Chief sub-editor Victoria Green Sub-editor Amanda Simms Art director Jean-Philippe Stanway Art editor Herita MacDonald Production and distribution manager Elizabeth Heuchan Sales manager Laurie Pilate Sales executives James Johnston, Alex Kaye Publishing director Anne Sadler Managing director Andrew Howard Chief operating officer Caroline Minshell President Paul Duffen Chairman and chief executive Lord David Evans Newsdesk Media publishes a wide range of business and customer publications. For more information please contact Caroline Minshell, chief operating officer Printed by Cambrian Printers, managed by TU ink Front cover image: NATO, Sylvain Petrmand ©armée de Terre, US Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Dana J Butler/Released

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NATO Securing our world

Contents Forewords

Editor’s letter

Anders Fogh Rasmussen

The Rt Hon David Cameron MP

Secretary General of NATO

Continued evolution Simon Michell, Editor

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

NATO inside view

Douglas E Lute

Tackling today’s challenges

The enlargement conundrum – who's next?

Permanent Representative for the United States to NATO

Damon Wilson looks at ways in which NATO can adapt to the security challenges that are threatening its periphery today in order to stay relevant to the interests of its members

Introductions

General Knud Bartels

Hon Dr Karl A Lamers MP

Chairman of the NATO Military Committee

President of the Atlantic Treaty Association

NATO Securing our world

Terhi Suominen considers the potential costs and benefits of admitting aspirant members to NATO in the light of recent geopolitical developments, which have provoked fresh debate on the subject

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Smart defence, connected forces and progressive policy NATO's response to the complexity of today’s security environment must involve culturally appropriate forces and look beyond military measures to social investment, says Hugh Segal

The security challenge

The looming threat of global instability

Why is the West failing in its relations with Russia?

Andy Wong/AP/Press Association Images

Jason Wiseman explores how NATO responds to political instability around the world, and how ATA fully supports its efforts by acting as a bridge between the Alliance and civil society

Projecting a strong public image across the world will be crucial if NATO is to re-establish good relations with Russia, writes Solomon Passy

The United Kingdom and Afghanistan As the deadline for withdrawal looms, Dennis Hartshorne analyses the United Kingdom's objectives in Afghanistan, outlining the political and military approaches used to create stability

ATA’s role in the Mediterranean and Middle East aving played a pivotal role in promoting dialogue H in the Mediterranean and Middle East, ATA is set to intensify its efforts, explains Fabrizio W Luciolli

Emerging security threats The new security context, with particular regard to Russia, poses a number of short- and long-term challenges for the Alliance, explains Jamie Shea

David Fouquet looks at NATO's long-standing partnerships with countries throughout Asia, and the impact on these of a recent flare-up in tensions in the Asia-Pacific region

Promoting NATO partnerships

Alliances and the Asian security dilemma

Celebrating 20 years of the Partnership for Peace programme Now celebrating its 20th anniversary, the Partnership for Peace programme is still going strong, and has an expanding scope

Bridging the Mediterranean Sea Assessing the status of two key NATO regional partnership programmes: the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

Best of both worlds How do NATO's Response Force and the European Union Battlegroups complement one another?

Amr Nabil/AP/Press Association Images

NATO operations worldwide

Safeguarding energy supplies NATO and its partners are working to secure the safe transit of oil and gas to Europe, and in doing so, they are countering the threat of piracy

Confronting terrorism Looking at the counterterrorism role of NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism

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Moving forward on Kosovo

NATO's disaster response

Reviewing the progress of the Alliance's peacekeeping operation in Kosovo and what it means for the wider western Balkans

The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre plays a pivotal role in providing assistance during civil emergencies, operating all year round

Strengthening military capabilities

Rebalancing NATO forces

Closing the gap

After more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, what should the Alliance plan for as it contemplates its place in a dangerous 21st-century?

Assessing NATO members’ capabilities following the launch of initiatives designed to increase European cooperation, thus reducing the reliance on US assets

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Having recognised cyber as a major component of modern warfare through the adoption of a cyber defence policy, the focus is now on shared knowledge and interoperability

Taking the lead on cybersecurity The United States’ cyber-protection policies offer safeguards for both business and government. What could NATO countries gain from such an approach?

NATO ballistic missile defence: is it achievable? defensive and offensive strategy, and robust A situational awareness are essential for NATO to effectively respond to the growing threat from BMs

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Ramping up NATO cyber defence

Upwardly mobile NATO's Strategic Airlift Capability, Strategic Airlift Interim Solution and HIP Helicopter Task Force are designed to plug the gaps in its airborne-transport capabilities

Air superiority The Air Command and Control System initiative is a radical enhancement to NATO’s ability to safeguard European skies for many years to come

Alliance ISTAR NATO’s Air Ground Surveillance programme enhances its ability to gather near real time data in order to follow events on the battlefield

Maritime projection NATO members provide a suitably varied maritime capability to address the range of security threats at sea, but what ships will they need in the future?

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NATO Securing our world

Foreword

Anders Fogh Rasmussen Secretary General of NATO Summit in Wales will be a chance to demonstrate continued transatlantic  Our resolve and unified action at a critical moment for the NATO Alliance.

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We will meet as we prepare to complete International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), our longest combat mission. We have worked hard and sacrificed much to deny international terrorists safe haven in Afghanistan. Better security has made it possible for Afghans to develop their own country and decide their own future. When the relevant legal arrangements are in place, NATO stands ready to continue supporting Afghanistan to build on the gains we have made. The end of ISAF marks a significant chapter in NATO history. At the same time, we face multiple threats around our borders, ranging from terrorism to fragile states and proliferation. We see an arc of crises from North Africa to the Middle East. And Russia’s aggressive action against Ukraine has fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace. In this changed world, NATO remains ready to protect our Allies against any threat. As the crisis in Ukraine unfolded, we took immediate steps to strengthen collective defence, with more planes in the air, more ships at sea, and more troops on the ground. Every one of NATO’s 28 Allies has played its part in this defensive effort. At the Summit, we will adopt a Readiness Action Plan to ensure that NATO is fully prepared to defend any Ally against any threat. We are looking closely at how we can best deploy our forces for defence and deterrence. We are considering reinforcement measures, including the pre-positioning of equipment and supplies. We are reviewing our defence plans, threat assessments, intelligence-sharing agreements, early-warning procedures and crisis response planning. We are developing a new exercise schedule. And we want to further strengthen our multinational response force, which is designed to respond rapidly to any crisis, anywhere. We will also strengthen political and military cooperation with our partners, and provide support to those who request it so they can develop their own defence structures and military forces. This will help us prevent conflicts before they start and project stability without always having to deploy large numbers of troops. To meet the challenges we face, we need to continue investing in modern armed forces that can operate effectively together to defend NATO territory, manage crises beyond our borders and build security with our partners. Over the past five years Allies have, on average, cut defence spending by 20 per cent. At the same time, the United States’ share in total Allied defence spending represents more than two-thirds. So it is critical that we commit to reversing the trend of declining defence budgets, spending better on key capabilities, and addressing imbalances across the Alliance. Such a pledge will reinforce the transatlantic bond that has been the bedrock of our security for 65 years. And it will reaffirm our continuing and unwavering commitment to the common security of North America and Europe. NATO’s purpose in the 21st century is to keep our nations safe, the bond between Europe and North America strong, and our region and the world stable. The Wales Summit will demonstrate that NATO remains an essential source of stability in a changed world.

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Foreword

The Rt Hon David Cameron MP Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Working together for peace and stability will be the first NATO Summit in the United Kingdom since Margaret  This Thatcher hosted the London Summit in 1990, just as the Cold War was ending.

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That Summit proved a turning point for the Alliance as leaders charted a new course for NATO and for a Europe “whole, free and at peace”. In 2014, the world is more unpredictable than ever and leaders will meet in Wales at another pivotal moment in the history of the Alliance. In Afghanistan, our combat mission is coming to an end. To the East, Russia has ripped up the rulebook with its illegal annexation of Crimea and aggressive destabilisation of Ukraine. To the South, an arc of instability spreads from North Africa and the Sahel, to Syria, Iraq and the wider Middle East. This Summit will agree how NATO should adapt to respond to and deter such threats in order to ensure the continued collective defence of all its members. To do this we need to address the following areas. First, seven months into the Russia-Ukraine crisis, NATO must agree on long-term measures to strengthen our ability to respond quickly to any threat, to reassure those allies who fear for their own country’s security, and to deter any Russian aggression. While NATO has only ever sought to be a partner to Russia, it must be clear that neither it nor its members will be intimidated. Second, as the ISAF mission in Afghanistan draws to an end, allies must consider how to support the Afghan Government in the years ahead, in particular through NATO’s new mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces from the start of next year and by helping to financially sustain these forces in the near future. Third, the Alliance must agree how NATO will address the risks in an unstable world – the challenges that are posed by failed states, terrorism, cyberattacks and extremist ideologies. NATO must have the capabilities it needs to respond to changing threats. That requires investment. The UK is only one of four members of the Alliance to meet the target of spending two per cent of our GDP on defence – we want others to commit to investing more, particularly in research and equipment. As we invest in our defence elsewhere, so we should invest in security beyond the Alliance’s borders, strengthening the capacity of forces elsewhere to tackle local conflicts through new defence capacitybuilding missions, for example to Georgia or the Middle East. Fourth, as the world’s broadest security network, with partnerships with over 40 countries and organisations on four continents, the Summit offers the opportunity to demonstrate a clear commitment to working with others who share our values and to maintaining an international rules-based order that promotes freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Fifth, and finally, we should recognise the sacrifices made by our Armed Forces. In the UK, we have enshrined an Armed Forces Covenant in law to ensure that our Armed Forces get the respect and support they deserve. Building on this, it is my personal priority to establish a new ‘North Atlantic Armed Forces Charter’ to make clear our shared commitment to our Armed Forces and their families. At the London Summit in 1990, leaders agreed that “we need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades”. The Wales Summit, with these ambitious priorities, should prove that NATO continues to be a rock-solid alliance with strong partnerships around the world that fosters global peace and stability, creating a secure environment for our economies to grow.

NATO Securing our world

Foreword

Douglas E Lute Permanent Representative for the United States to NATO

NATO leaders gather in Wales on 4 September, our work is clear: heads  As of state and government will be taking decisions to ensure that NATO,

U.S. State Department

the world’s strongest, most durable alliance, will continue to meet new security challenges for years to come. The threats are real, and every day grow more complex: instability on our eastern and southern flanks, the rise of non-state actors, and emerging threats such as cyber and ballistic missile attacks. And as the bedrock of transatlantic security, NATO’s mission has never been more important. In this two-day event, President Barack Obama and other world leaders will focus on a diverse range of challenges: NATO’s evolving mission in Afghanistan; challenges on NATO’s periphery, including the Ukraine crisis and the impact of Russia’s actions on transatlantic security; the readiness of Alliance capabilities; and the deepening and broadening of NATO’s partnerships. At the Summit, we’ll focus on four main themes. First, Afghanistan. After 12 years, NATO can be proud of its legacy in Afghanistan. Our objectives remain clear: disrupting threats posed by al-Qaeda, supporting Afghan security forces and giving the Afghan people the opportunity to succeed as they stand on their own. Together with the Afghan people and international partners, NATO helped build an army and police force; and, created a secure space for improvements in health, education, women’s rights, media freedom and governmental institutions – all building blocks for a secure and democratic future – to take hold. And NATO’s commitment doesn’t end when ISAF’s combat mission draws to a close at the end of 2014. NATO will remain a partner for Afghanistan as we transition to a new mission focused on training, advising and assisting Afghan security forces. We will provide the tools and the training, and the Afghans will provide the courage and the will to succeed. Much remains to be done, but Afghanistan’s future is in the hands of Afghans, while NATO stands ready to support. Second, challenges on NATO’s periphery. NATO leaders will meet with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to discuss the crisis caused by Russia’s illegal aggression, the most severe challenge to European security since the end of the Cold War. All 28 Allies today contribute to reassurance measures in the air, on the land and at sea among the eastern Allies, signaling NATO’s unity and resolve. At the Summit, we’ll address additional reassurance measures and further adaptations to NATO’s posture in response to this challenge. Leaders will also discuss the rapidly evolving situations in Syria and Iraq, as well as persistent instability in North Africa, especially Libya. Third, capabilities. NATO’s mutual security guarantee rests on the ability of each Ally to come to the defence of the others. Leaders will consider a Readiness Action Plan that adapts the Alliance to new challenges. Our nations must ensure that NATO has the capabilities required – experienced troops, modern equipment, world-class training, regular operational exercises, and ongoing education. Military capability is the core of the Alliance, and this requires defence investments. Allies all benefit from NATO’s security guarantee and all must contribute proportionately, especially now that we are beginning to recover from the worst recession in Alliance history. Together

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Foreword

President Barack Obama speaks with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Leaders will discuss diverse challenges at the Wales Summit we must reverse the decline in defence spending, move towards the NATO target of two per cent of GDP and 20 per cent of military spending allocated to investment, and improve in meeting NATO’s agreed performance metrics. Each Ally must commit to doing its part to keep our Alliance strong, ready and able to meet current and emerging threats. Shared benefits mean shared responsibility. Finally, partnerships. With over 40 partners around the world, NATO has a valuable network that exports stability well beyond the borders of the Alliance – from Mauritania, east to Japan, from Sweden, south to the Persian Gulf. Our partners enhance Alliance operations, add critical capabilities, and provide political and geographic diversity. We believe NATO’s partners benefit, too, gaining access to world-class training, exercises and education; building capacity in their own security institutions; opening political dialogue on shared interests; and even pooling resources to gain efficiencies. NATO partnerships are a two-way street and, as we meet in Wales, our leaders will consider how this Alliance will continue to invest in NATO partnerships beyond 2014. Overall, the Summit provides Alliance leaders with the opportunity to renew NATO’s core mission: our binding obligation to Article 5, the mutual defence commitment in the Washington Treaty. As President Obama joins our Allies and partners in Wales, the world will focus again on NATO. Since 1949, NATO has been the world’s strongest, most durable and most effective military alliance. It is a family of nations from both sides of the Atlantic who are committed to peace and freedom, and determined to defend these common values. In Wales, we will reaffirm that commitment and determination, and make sure that NATO has what it takes to keep our nations secure and our citizens safe.

NATO Securing our world

Introduction

General Knud Bartels Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Wales Summit brings with it a unique set of opportunities and challenges  The for the NATO military authorities, setting the stage for NATO’s future as one

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of the most significant summits since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance will seek to build on the experiences of the past and set the conditions for the future in these turbulent times. Events in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa have reinforced the need for the Alliance’s military to be ready, relevant and responsive in an increasingly uncertain security environment, characterised by complex, so-called hybrid, and asymmetric threats. In recent months we have seen how the Alliance can effectively bring together contributions from 28 Allied Nations to deliver a series of military reassurance measures to Eastern Allies under the auspices of collective defence. In Afghanistan, the Alliance has developed unparalleled interoperability and operational experience alongside a large number of partner nations. But, we cannot rest on our achievements and must continue to evolve as the threats to NATO and global security have evolved in often unpredictable ways. Therefore, at the Summit, NATO will demonstrate its commitment to the continued evolution of its military structures through a Readiness Action Plan. This will underpin the development of more responsive, agile and capable Alliance military forces able to support the three strategic core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. In doing so, the Alliance’s military will seek to exploit the advantages of its new lean command structure, adapted NATO Response and Special Operations Forces, and nested Allied joint enablers. Delivering on the Connected Forces Initiative will be central to this ongoing transformation to retain and expand the interoperability achieved in Afghanistan, while broadening the range of activities and exercise scenarios. Education, exercises, training and evaluation will be key themes for NATO’s military, requiring both investment and commitment from nations and the Alliance as whole. As a catalyst for this process, NATO will develop a more relevant, more demanding and more inclusive programme of exercises starting with Trident Juncture in 2015, which will be the largest NATO exercise of this type in more than 20 years. Finally, NATO remains the most powerful global defensive alliance in terms of combined GDP, military spending and military technology. There is an urgent requirement to arrest the decline in investment seen over recent years in order to ensure that NATO maintains this qualitative advantage. That investment must be focused on critical capability areas and also support the associated training and enablers necessary, which have been under-resourced in the past. NATO’s military structures continue to offer the highest degree of professionalism, capability and political choice for the Alliance, and we should pay tribute to the men and women who make up these forces on a daily basis. Our challenge will be to ensure we provide the proper tools and support to maintain and build upon our strengths and ensure we are agile, adaptable and fit for purpose in an uncertain world.

NATO Securing our world

Introduction

Hon Dr Karl A Lamers MP President of the Atlantic Treaty Association beginning of the 21st century has led us to an interconnected world where  The dependence on one another has become a global imperative for our security.

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This has allowed us to share our resources and expertise while also making us vulnerable to various shared threats, compelling us to take collective responsibility for the security of our citizens, allies and partners. It is crucial to realise that not only local authorities or military institutions are responsible for global security. A wide spectrum of non-governmental actors, media and, especially, civil societies play a fundamental role in promoting security and awareness. Different actors have different functions, but they all strive towards a common goal, which is based on shared norms and values seeking to promote and strengthen a broader sense of security cooperation. In short, we all strive to contribute, one way or another, to the security of our countries, regions and the world. In order to explain security, we need a comprehensive approach that encompasses all actors in the field. This is why the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) pursues both a top-down approach from our governments and highest authorities, and a bottom-up approach from grass-roots organisations, civil societies and community leaders. Effective and long-lasting peace can only be achieved together with a common understanding that security is a necessity in our lives. We have recently witnessed that threats and challenges to our safety can happen to anyone at any time with a devastating impact on our livelihood. Living in a more prosperous part of the world does not allow us to sit back and enjoy the achievements of the past – we still have to point out why defence matters. We cannot allow the concepts of security and defence to only truly be understood once under attack. In times of peace, which many in the Euro-Atlantic region have become overly accustomed to, it becomes rather easy to give up on maintaining a defensive mindset. Today, together with the rebirth of territorial aggression and the rise of violent extremism, we find ourselves facing one of the most trying times in recent memory. This makes it necessary for NATO and ATA to explain the importance of collective and cooperative defence so that security measures can be perceived in terms of investment, rather than expenditure. Our role is to promote confidence and trust between nations, governments and security institutions such as NATO. This can only be done by improving the understanding of the need for security for everyone. Military efforts must be supplemented by those of nonmilitary structures and society, including every civilian. Therefore, we advocate for a hand-in-hand approach in order to maximise the benefits to all nations. Crucially, we encourage increased dialogue and understanding of the enlargement process of the Alliance. Effectively integrating aspiring countries through the ‘open door policy’ remains highly critical in order to abolish the dividing lines in Europe for good and unite people across the continent. In the interlinked world of today, partnerships matter more than ever before, whether they are political, economic or military. It goes without saying that cooperation leads to stability and that the inclusive approach of the Alliance is the key towards securing our world.

NATO Securing our world

Editor’s letter

Continued evolution Simon Michell, editor

years ago at the  Two Chicago Summit, NATO leaders faced a multiplicity of challenges: financial, political and military. This September, the heads of state of the 28 NATO Alliance members will face similar dilemmas, but with the added complication of a rampant and vicious insurgency led by the Islamic State (IS) forces in Syria and Iraq, and a Russia that is flexing its muscles on the eastern borders of the Alliance. Already, the United States has taken unilateral action with air strikes in Iraq to assist Kurdish forces beat back IS. NATO will need to decide what actions, if any, it will take in support of its most powerful member. Difficult decisions will also have to be made in respect of Russia’s destabilisation of Ukraine. Added to that, the nations affected by the Arab Spring are facing continued stresses as they move from revolution to the next phase of their political evolution. The implications this has for NATO partnership programmes like Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative will need to be carefully considered. NATO, however, has shown in the past that it can find consensus and act collectively to help stabilise the regional security on its outer rim. That same resolve must be found again at the Celtic Manor. However, increased military expenditure is required, particularly by those nations that are not currently able to invest the minimum target of two per cent of GDP in their defence capabilities. That said, there are already signs that the sustained budget cutbacks

NATO Securing our world

that most Alliance members have had to implement over the past years may be coming to an end – at least for some. Just as in preceding NATO summits, those gathered at Celtic Manor in Wales will once again have to grapple with the capability gap between the United States and Europe. Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya almost three years ago highlighted the continued lack of sufficient critical airborne assets in European inventories – tankers, ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) platforms and transporters. Access to a single European fast-jet aircraft carrier during OUP was also a significant reminder of the impact of legacy planning decisions.

Joint capabilities That said, NATO is making sustained headway on a number of capability programmes, whose impact, once implemented, will be huge. The Air Command and Control System (ACCS) is starting to reach operational capability – albeit over a staged and iterative schedule. The system, which will offer air operations commanders an enhanced unified air picture over Europe, will plug into the European Phased Adaptive Approach ballistic missile defence system that is continuing to reach maturity. The Air Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme is also ploughing ahead. Once in service, it too will offer NATO commanders unparalleled situational awareness. In short, the completion of these collaborative efforts by the end of the decade will deliver considerable joint capabilities for the protection of NATO’s member states. Equally as important as those capabilities, cyber defence is an area of growing concern – one in which the Alliance is now investing significant resources and planning. Together, these new, enhanced competencies focus back on NATO’s core raison d’être – collective defence.

A pro-Russian rebel at the barricades on a road leading into Slovyansk, eastern Ukraine. Russian aggression could trigger a series of conflicts, threatening European stability

Darko Vojinovic/AP/Press Association Images

NATO inside view

NATO Securing our world

NATO inside view

Tackling today’s challenges Conflict and bloodshed on the periphery of the NATO region must be dealt with head-on at this year’s summit if the Alliance is to remain relevant to its members’ interests, argues Damon Wilson

NATO leaders gather in Wales, transatlantic security  As faces the most serious challenges it has confronted since the end of the Cold War. From Ukraine and Syria, to Iraq and Libya, the frontiers of the Alliance are plagued by conflict and bloodshed. Yet, as NATO seeks to look beyond Afghanistan and chart its future course in Wales, many Allies are reluctant to face these new challenges head-on. Dodging these issues at the UK Summit would be a mistake. In fact, focusing exclusively on the defence of NATO Allies’ risks would leave the Alliance less secure over time. After more than a decade of war-fighting and peacekeeping, NATO Allies are understandably eager to bring an end to the Alliance’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and transition to a strictly training and advising mission. At the same time, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has reinforced many of the Allies’ desires to focus on collective defence of the Alliance and to ensure the credibility of the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 commitment that an attack on one Ally would be treated as an attack on all. Wales, no doubt, will reinforce Allied solidarity and commitment to each other’s defence as the most essential elements of deterrence. Yet, in the absence of a NATO strategy to deal with instability on its periphery, the Alliance will face more difficult security challenges in the future. In the East, if Russian aggression is not stopped, a series of conflicts and crises will unfold, threatening European stability. In the South, continued conflict and instability in the Arab world could not only threaten to destabilise NATO Ally Turkey and key partners in the region, but also lead to massive refugee and immigration flows to southern Europe.

Regional threats If the Wales Summit ignores these challenges, it risks creating a perception of an Alliance licking its wounds, reluctant for a fight, weakening its greatest contribution to security: deterrence. An agenda that avoids the tough issues may even embolden adversaries who oppose NATO interests and values.

NATO Securing our world

To NATO’s east, a resurgent Russia under Vladimir Putin has invaded and annexed Crimea and continues to wage a hybrid war against Ukraine, undermining the pillars of stability that have been the guarantee of peace in the region. On NATO’s south-east frontier, extremist terrorist forces are waging war in Syria and Iraq, posing a direct threat to Turkey’s security and broader transatlantic security in the near term. To NATO’s south, the collapse of civilian authority in Libya and increased repression in Egypt risk producing further instability that breeds future terrorists and sends waves of refugees seeking asylum across the Mediterranean. These challenges are daunting. There are no simple solutions. And NATO is not always the answer. Yet NATO’s strength is its adaptability – that is, the Alliance’s ability to be relevant to ensuring the security of its members. During the Cold War, NATO provided security to its members through its deterrence of the Soviet threat, helping to avoid large-scale bloodshed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO advanced its members’ security by reaching out to former adversaries, forging far-reaching partnerships and, ultimately, welcoming many as new Allies. The Alliance responded to the crises in the Western Balkans by becoming an operational Alliance, demonstrating its capability to use military force to bring peace. Since 9/11, NATO has agreed to tackle security threats from wherever they may originate, leading to its long mission in Afghanistan.

In the absence of a NATO strategy to deal with instability on its periphery, the Alliance will face more difficult security challenges in the future 29

NATO inside view

But this has also helped to transform the Alliance so that it is better prepared to defend against new threats, for example, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, as well as terrorism and cyberthreats. Today, the question is whether the Alliance has the will and capability needed to continue to adapt, in order to remain relevant to ensuring the security of its members.

Prepared for the future In the run-up to the Wales summit, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen deserves immense credit for advancing an agenda focused on precisely this necessary adaptation. He has pushed the Allies to make sure that NATO is fit for purpose, as well as prepared for the future. First, Allies have left no doubt about their commitment to collective defence, underscoring this with a focus on military deployments to NATO’s easternmost Allies, including the Baltic states, Poland and Romania. Along with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Rasmussen has led the charge to ensure that Allied forces are prepared to respond to any threat quickly, including by reinvigorating the NATO Response Force to achieve its original purpose of serving as a rapid-reaction force in the event of a crisis. NATO’s operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya have also demonstrated the value of military contributions from non-NATO members. Wales will mark a watershed in not only recognising the value of these partners, but also providing a pathway to a guarantee that the Alliance’s capabilities are permanently bolstered by like-minded partners, rather than hastily assembled in an ad hoc fashion in each new scenario. After years of difficult training missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Alliance and its militaries have developed capabilities critical to helping local forces provide security. Significant to NATO’s adaptation, the Wales Summit will launch a new defence capacity-building initiative in which the Alliance will work with other nations and organisations to help them develop the capacity to manage crises and conflicts. The idea is that NATO’s advance spadework will help prevent future crises while also making certain that partners can increasingly address their own regional security needs. In turn, NATO and the member countries themselves won’t so often be called on as the only forces capable of ensuring peace. These Wales initiatives are the key to the Alliance’s adaptation. However, it is equally important how NATO leaders agree to apply these new tools. To ensure that the Alliance is relevant, they should seek to offer and apply these to the relevant crisis the Alliance is facing today. First, they should agree to make the Alliance’s temporary measures – put in place to reassure the Eastern Allies – more permanent, ensuring that

NATO forces and infrastructure are in place to help deter a Russia that now treats NATO allies as potential adversaries. Second, the countries designated as NATO’s most capable partners should include Georgia and Ukraine, two that are on the fault line of European insecurity today. Georgia, after all, has been the partner that has contributed more than any other to the mission in Afghanistan. Ukraine, meanwhile, has participated in every NATO operation since the Balkans, and is, unfortunately, swiftly gaining credible fighting capacity. These nations, along with Sweden, Finland, the United Arab Emirates and Australia, will buttress the Alliance’s capabilities, binding them closely in a network of contributors to security. Third, NATO’s new defence capacity-building initiative will most likely be targeted to help Montenegro prepare to become an Ally quickly, and to train the African Union and its leading force contributors to better manage crises on the African continent. However, this initiative should also be offered to Ukraine and Libya, the two countries most in immediate need of stronger defence capacities to maintain security on their own territories. To be relevant, NATO’s capacitybuilding initiative should address the two countries that are most in need of greater capacity on the Alliance’s periphery. This initiative could evolve into a new strategy for the Partnership for Peace countries that now feel threatened by Russia. This kind of targeted partnership package would not address issues related to membership, but rather focus on helping partners, ranging from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, to build their capacity to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Fourth, as the Allies put a new emphasis on intelligencesharing to guarantee more common situational awareness, they should focus on ensuring shared information to inform more common strategies toward the disasters of Iraq and Syria, while preparing for potential challenges in the Arctic. This effort should form the basis of a new strategy among key NATO Allies – the United States, Turkey, France and the United Kingdom – in cooperation with Arab partners to make sure that terrorist forces hostile to NATO members’ interests do not prevail in Syria or Iraq. The Alliance will not provide the answer to all of these security challenges. But to be relevant to its own members’ interests, it must not relegate itself to a peripheral role on today’s greatest security threats.

Allies have left no doubt about their commitment to collective defence, underscoring this with a focus on military deployments to NATO’s easternmost Allies, including the Baltic states, Poland and Romania

Mr Damon Wilson is Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council of the United States. Previously, he served as Special Assistant to the President, and Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, the White House. He has been involved in every NATO summit since Washington in 1999

NATO Securing our world

nato inside view

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A NATO meeting of foreign affairs ministers. The Alliance now has 28 member countries, 22 of which are from the European Union

The enlargement conundrum – who’s next? NATO has continued to grow since the Cold War ended – a process influenced by global security dynamics – but admitting new members involves costs and benefits for both parties, says Terhi Suominen

65 years, NATO has been the premier international  For collective military and security institution in the world. It has been the sole and pre-eminent Euro-Atlantic security actor, and at the core of America and Europe’s relationship. NATO has been compared to ‘an iron fist in a velvet glove’. Throughout its existence, the Alliance changed and moved forward, but the nature of security itself has also transformed. The most apparent of these changes was the disappearance of the single threat. From the beginning, the Alliance’s military

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forces opposed a common enemy, the Soviet Union, and its existence was only seen as a balance of the Soviet threat. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO started to change, but its evolution was not all plain sailing. During NATO’s post-Cold War transformation, it continued to play a key role in transatlantic geopolitical stability. This is when enlargement emerged as a topic. Today, NATO is an organisation of 28 member countries. NATO has gone through three enlargement rounds since the

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end of the Cold War, which were in 1999, 2004 and 2009. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty describes how the enlargement process of admitting new countries is conducted. The Article states that: “the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.”

Enlargement today NATO enlargement is not only based on the requirements that the aspirant countries should fulfil, because having the will and fulfilling the criteria is not enough. Primarily, NATO enlargement is a political process and the decisionmaking is affected by international security dynamics and political considerations. Recent geopolitical developments in Eastern Europe have inevitably produced an impact on the Alliance and its future. More than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the crisis in Ukraine is driving NATO back to its original purpose: to protect its members against a perceived Russian threat. Before the crisis in Ukraine emerged, Europe was not seen as a continent of potential

threats and the United States was perceived as being less focused on matters of European security. The developments in Ukraine have sent NATO back to basics, provoking debate on NATO membership in many potential aspirant countries and rekindling discussion, especially in the non-aligned states of Finland and Sweden. Finland is known for its longstanding policy of military non-alignment. However, it wants to “keep all doors open” and preserve “an option to NATO”. In line with this, the country has not pursued membership, but has been systematically aiming at getting as close to NATO as possible. For instance, the country joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994 to work alongside NATO Allies in areas where bilateral aims converge, and also supports NATO-led operations. Finland has worked alongside the Allies in security and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Finland is politically aligned, but militarily non-aligned. While military non-alignment is technically possible, it is more complicated in practice. Since Finland joined the EU, the political link to NATO emerged. NATO and the EU are intimately linked and largely overlapped organisations. Today, the two organisations share the majority of their members – 22 out of 28 NATO member countries are also members of the EU. The EU and NATO share common strategic interests and work together in a spirit of partnership and complementarity.

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Close cooperation between these two organisations is an important element in the development of an international comprehensive approach to crisis management and operations that require the effective application of both military and civilian means. It is important to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort in the framework of the EU and NATO.

The challenge of public opinion The question of Finland’s NATO membership is not a simple yes or no issue. While there are several arguments both for and against, there is no decisive conclusion. Roughly 30 per cent of Finns are in favour of membership, with figures staying more or less unchanged since the first opinion polls. In Finland, public opinion has been divided into two groups: NATO enthusiasts and NATO sceptics. Finnish discussion has been coloured black and white, with the issue being simply whether to join or not. In order to improve the public’s understanding of NATO, there is a demand for more detailed, extensive and profound information. The challenge for Finland is that the NATO debate is seen far too often as a political battle behind the scenes. This deadlock can only be broken by political activity and commitment. A key to opening public debate is to get the politicians involved in frank discussions. However, it is unlikely that any change will occur in public opinion before

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the Finnish political establishment comes out with its concrete arguments. A similar situation emerged in the beginning of the 1990s, before Finland joined the EU. NATO enlargement and NATO’s Open Door Policy remain core elements of its overall strategy, and an important objective on the transatlantic agenda. All NATO nations concur that the Alliance’s door should remain open for new members. In the first place, NATO is a security policy instrument and a community of shared values. NATO enlargement, as well as NATO membership, entails both political costs and political benefits for NATO and potential new members alike. The question is whether benefits outweigh costs; new members should be security providers, not only security consumers. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the opinion of the Atlantic Council of Finland

Ms Terhi Suominen is the Secretary General of the Atlantic Council of Finland. Prior to her current position, she served in policy think tank Finnish Business and Policy Forum EVA, the European Business Leaders Convention (EBLC), Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Turku and Turku School of Economics. She holds Masters of Political Science and Bachelor of Business Administration degrees from the University of Turku

NATO INSIDE VIEW

Smart defence, connected forces and progressive policy Alongside acute intelligence capacity and enhanced Special Forces deployability, social and economic investment is needed in order to stop the spread of want and fear that plays into the hands of terrorist recruiters in areas of instability, writes Hugh Segal

of targets was not a dominant challenge  Complexity during the Cold War. Two world views were positioned against each other, with serious conventional military and nuclear capacity, and with all the intelligence and counterintelligence depth necessitated by the strategic challenge. Unofficial allies or non-aligned states of either the Soviets or the West were parsed for where they had stood in the event of hostilities. NATO was the focus, consolidator and aggregator of our poised military resolve to contain the Soviets in communist Eastern Europe. The end of the Cold War – while a great tribute to the essential resolve of NATO’s planning, military doctrine and joint defence concept – has produced a multilayered complexity to the issue of global security, which the simplicity of the Cold War tended to obviate. In the Middle East, for example, the Cold War was really about who the Soviet and American client states were, following the demise of the United Kingdom’s military role in the region. Subsequently, Egypt’s role as a Soviet client state versus Israel’s role as a US client state were really the underlying realities that forced a unified United Nations response to the Suez Crisis, in which countries such as Canada did more than their fair share, diplomatically and militarily, in defence of the imperative of Alliance unity, as well as reducing the threat of thermo-nuclear war. The same can be said of the conclusions reached about geostrategic priorities in Asia and Africa, for better or worse, before the unification of Germany. The Cold War provided the clarifying framework for analysis and the prioritising of strategic interests. While this conclusion may have been too blunt, too broad or insufficiently nuanced, it served well.

Nostalgia for the Cold War is misplaced. We cannot be nostalgic about the risk of thermo-nuclear destruction. Indeed, our hard reality involves a new complexity where nation states are not always the ally or the threat, while the alliances arrayed against NATO principles of democracy, individual liberty, rule of law and free markets are equally as likely to be sustained by non-state actors, foreign-funded insurgencies, or religious and denominational extremists.

Going deeper Embracing this new complexity must be a central priority of the Connected Forces Initiative and the NATO Response Force direction, which was recently agreed on by Allied leaders. This is about enhanced multilingual, culturally appropriate and rapidly deployable NATO forces, which are assisted by advanced human and signal intelligence, and are operating at a far deeper level than previously. It is about the infiltration and subversion of terrorist networks poised to attack NATO members and interests. It is about parsing Sunni and Shia factionalism in an intellectually acute and actionable way. It is about avoiding the conclusion that a military alliance can only act through exclusively military, combat or open deployment means. It is about reallocating NATO defence budget cuts in Europe, the United States and Canada with a smart-spending and diversified deployment instrumentality that was not available before now. Imagine the lives that might have been saved and the suffering that might have been avoided if, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, NATO had had the intelligence and presence of mind to deploy investment through its member states – in education, roads, healthcare and women’s rights – in Afghanistan, before the Taliban collusion with al-Qaeda

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NATO INSIDE VIEW

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Militant Islamists parade along the streets of Syriaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Raqqa province. Multilingual, culturally appropriate and rapidly deployable NATO forces will be better placed to infiltrate and subvert terrorist networks

U.S. Navy photo by HMC Josh Ives/released

NATO INSIDE VIEW

Members of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Provincial Reconstruction Team and the US Army take part in a working group in Afghanistan. Integrating social infrastructure investors such as USAID into NATO’s defence capacity has been of immeasurable value made an Article 5 military response the unavoidable option to the unprovoked 9/11 attack on American civilians. NATO relying only on derivative intelligence and the deployability of its member states is not sufficient. Instead, the Alliance must have an enhanced apprehensive intelligence and deployability capacity resident in its own operations and planning headquarters. The activities of NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Centre in support of existing operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, Operation Ocean Shield against piracy and Operation Active Endeavour against terrorism, are all worthy of respect and praise. In Afghanistan or Bosnia, NATO troops found that having the UK’s Department for International Development, the United States Agency for International Development, the Canadian International Development Agency or other deployed investors in social infrastructure integrated into their pure defence and combat capacity was of immeasurable value in terms of community relations and building trust. We have this type of capacity and myriad instruments to engage with long before a NATO military commitment is justified or unavoidable.

deployment of military forces to the west of the Iron Curtain. Today, the ruthlessness of Islamic State terrorists in Syria and Iraq, the role of Iran in funding terrorist insurgencies in Lebanon and Gaza, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are all forces aiming to destroy Western values, peaceful Muslim and Christian populations, and the Middle East’s only democracy, Israel. The active recruitment and military training of young terrorists from Europe, Asia and North America so that they might be deployed in their prior countries of residence is a direct threat to NATO values. For the terrorists and those who finance them, teenage shoppers in a town centre, innocent people of another faith or another denomination of the same religion, or young girls at school are as valid a target as the military forces of the world’s democracies. This is why a more acute intelligence and infiltration capacity, enhanced and more diversified Special Forces deployability – from the air, the seas, or land – and a real pre-deployment of social and economic investment with the scope to diminish the extent to which want and fear feed terrorist aspirations and recruitment have never mattered more. A NATO Response Force as part of the Connected Forces Initiative must be more than traditional combat deployment. It must be about being connected to reality on the ground before combat becomes the only option.

The active recruitment and military training of young terrorists from Europe, Asia and North America is a direct threat to NATO values

More than traditional combat deployment The end of the Cold War and NATO’s successful core strategy might best be summed up in this question: what did we do in terms of commitment, investment, intelligence and non-combat deployment in various places to prevent combat altogether? The answer, in different parts of the world, varies. The Marshall Plan, the US economic support after the Second World War for a Europe that was impoverished, desolate, hungry and actively courted by the Stalinist communist option, was not a combat deployment. But it had as much to do with rebuilding freedom, and containing totalitarian reach and hegemony, as did the

Hon Mr Hugh Segal, Master of Massey College at the University of Toronto, is a former chair of the Special Senate Committee on Antiterrorism and chairs the NATO Council of Canada. Mr Segal was previously Chief of Staff to the Canadian Prime Minister and Associate Cabinet Secretary in Ontario. He has also served as Senator for Ontario

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The security challenge

The looming threat of global instability Against a challenging backdrop in Europe, NATO must continue its work as a military and political actor to encourage stability. The Atlantic Treaty Association plays an important role in bridging the gap between NATO and the Euro-Atlantic region, writes Jason Wiseman

what is perhaps the most effective international  Inorganisation in history, NATO’s role over the years goes beyond security and defence. Since the Cold War, NATO has evolved into a key player on the world stage with the capacity to provide conditions for democratic development and ensure its members move towards a future of peace and prosperity. Yet NATO’s 65th anniversary comes at a time when there is widespread political instability, economic turmoil and social upheaval in various regions of the globe, plaguing the safety and security of millions. The instability this causes is contagious, and spreading along the borders of the Euro-Atlantic. In the six months leading up to NATO’s summit in Wales, the world has witnessed a dramatic escalation of hostilities in Eastern Europe, a surge of jihadist activity across North Africa and the Middle East, along with a rise of insurgent attacks in Afghanistan – just as NATO seeks to end its longest combat mission. Against these challenges, there is a backdrop of slow financial recovery and global power shifting to the East. The need for NATO leaders to address our rapidly changing security landscape will be the basis on which this summit is judged.

The foundation for the political integration and prosperity of Europe has become a reality, thanks to the common effort of the Allies and their citizens. After the Cold War, the Alliance went through its biggest enlargement, strengthening security and stability in Europe to the benefit of members and nonmembers alike. The democratisation and integration of postSoviet states has set an excellent example to countries that are still finding their way to the Euro-Atlantic community. Simply put, modern Europe would not be possible without NATO, and NATO would not have been successful without its adherence to the values and principles of freedom and democracy. Yet, as we continue to watch events unfold on Europe’s southern and eastern borders, it must be remembered that popular uprisings can quickly be accompanied by chaos and hijacked by radicals, the results of which threaten millions and test NATO’s resolve to act. In the face of these challenges, NATO must continue to balance its role as both a political and military actor by utilising the collective experiences its members have gained over the years. NATO’s military role during difficult campaigns such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, provide valuable lessons that will be necessary in any future engagement, including how to fight in urban combat zones, avoid civilian casualties and cooperate with local forces. Similarly, NATO’s position as a political actor in helping to warm relations between Greece and Turkey, assisting with the integration of East Germany and Spain into Europe, or their role in closing the gender gap in the security sector, also offers valuable experience.

NATO’s 65th anniversary comes at a time when there is widespread political instability, economic turmoil and social upheaval

Maintaining foresight Gathering amid one of the most trying times in recent memory should serve to sharpen NATO’s motivation in harnessing two of its primary assets – capability and experience. Having successfully helped to keep the peace in Europe for the past 65 years, a key challenge will be how to best address the seemingly spontaneous crises that arise when weak and fledgling states fail to provide security or well-being for their citizens.

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US Army Staff Sgt. Gary A. Witte

The security challenge

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A US soldier and an Afghan National Police officer search a hillside in Kunar province, Afghanistan. NATO planned its withdrawal for 2014 and has been handing over security control to Afghan forces, but there has been an increase in insurgent attacks this year

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ATA President Dr Karl A Lamers with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. ATA acts as a bridge between NATO and civil society As a military power, the best way for NATO to protect itself against the ongoing tides of political instability that are currently massing along its borders will be to remain committed to operations such as Ocean Shield or Active Endeavour. Furthermore, it must continue to develop the NATO Response Force (NRF), so that it can act quickly to contain and solve security crises before they spread. As a political power, NATO can draw on its network of relationships that it has spent years establishing by using the trust and confidence it has built among its members and partners to mediate and solve problems. NATO is the most reliable international organisation capable of assisting states in building their own capabilities and providing the tools, training and forums necessary for weak or fledgling states to secure their borders, disarm non-state actors, marginalise political radicalism and advance rule of law. Taken together, the political and military power of NATO are the two levers needed to steer future policy in order to effectively reduce the risks associated with political instability and assist troubled states in their pursuit to provide security and well-being for their citizens.

Building lasting security Beyond its operational role, NATO has the skill and practice as a political actor to provide far-reaching assistance in building secure and stable environments in which societies can flourish. This is where the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) – a network facilitator of NGOs between NATO and Euro-Atlantic societies – has a special role to play. As ATA celebrates its 60th anniversary this year, we look back on its joint history with NATO and acknowledge that the very idea of transatlantic unity has been the key to providing the necessary conditions for member states to develop and

consolidate their democracies. As a global network of diplomats, military officials, politicians, academics, business leaders and young professionals, we work together to promote the values of the North Atlantic Treaty and build networks of support for NATO and its policies throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. Our role is to stimulate political consultation, dialogue and cooperation across the Atlantic and between generations. Despite its best efforts, NATO’s missions are often deeply misunderstood. This puts a strong burden on leaders to explain their message in a more effective way. NATO and ATA have prepared for this by coordinating outreach to at-risk civil societies and engaging in long-term projects that highlight NATO’s political role, reduce dependency on military action, and engage the youth in issues they will soon have to face as future leaders. This, in large part, has coloured the nature of ATA, which stands as a bridge between NATO and civil society. We are proud to be part of this development and strongly believe that the long-term solution to resolving political instability is to work towards building lasting harmony among our peoples. This can only be achieved by working together in order to build the knowledge and support necessary to further develop our regional security and to continue our pursuit towards spreading the common values that unite us as people.

Mr Jason Wiseman is the Secretary General Designate of the Atlantic Treaty Association, working with the ATA Secretariat since 2012. Prior to this, he was a National Security Analyst with the NATO Council of Canada from 2011-12. He holds an MA in Government with a specialisation in counter-terrorism and homeland security and a BAH in political science. Other areas of expertise include counter-terrorism, Middle Eastern politics, state failure and transnational organised crime

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The Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow. There has been Russia-West cooperation in several areas, such as in dialogue with Iran

Why is the West failing in its relations with Russia? Solomon Passy examines the West’s approach to Russia, and how to interact with a country that has values different to those we hold

since the 10th century – when the historic state  Ever Kievan Rus adopted Orthodox faith under the guidance of Bulgarian clergymen – Bulgarians have embarked upon close yet complex relations with Russia, intertwining the evident common cultural and religious elements with ferocious conflicts and wars for dominance. Throughout the centuries, Bulgarians have understood that a good mutual understanding with Russia would depend on keeping a respectful distance, although this was sometimes inadvertently narrowed or even destroyed by historic trials and tribulations. Together with this historical experience, its present geopolitical position has

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allowed Bulgaria to introduce the European Union to two of its communication channels with Russia – the alphabet and language – which is expected to improve West-Russia dialogue. Why is it that today, despite the multitude of modern communication channels, Russia and the West are speaking different languages? The answer is simple. It is because of the incompatibility of respective value systems or, to express it in technical terms, owing to our differences in ‘default’. Russia enjoys satisfactory and open cooperation with the West in many areas. The dialogue with Iran, supporting NATO in Afghanistan, working with the US to destroy chemical

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weapons in Syria, the global fight against terrorism and joint work on the International Space Station, all bear witness to that. Yet, this cooperation is invariably based on common interest rather than common values. In other words, Russia will engage with others as long as it is reimbursed at the highest possible price and this will only change when the defaults of the West and Russia converge.

Why we get it wrong While the wealth of the West has arguably been rooted in a competition aiming at the perfection of society, Russia has predominantly built her wealth through territory. Since territory supplies the needed wealth, this explains and generates the impulsive and imperial attitude of Russia, which seems to define its actions for the time being, at least. The West allows for a recurrent error in its attitude towards its opponents, and even partners, by habitually treating all of them as ‘one of us’, thereby punishing or rewarding in a uniform manner based on its own concepts. The outcome often seems like a dialogue between inhabitants of different galaxies. Thus, the West is prone to confusion at the very core of its policy towards Russia, wrongly combining episodes of untimely neglect with pledges for eternal strategic partnership. This ultimately adds to the bargain concessions that lack principles and indulgence that defies logic. Consequently, Russia interprets this as a sign of weakness, encouraging further steps towards division and demands for further concessions. This is how Moscow reads the West’s anemic response to their effective annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, complete with the persisting refusal to invite Georgia to join NATO. We could imagine Russia thinking, ‘since NATO avoids a state with problems, it will be in our interests to create the problems’. Thus, we naturally arrived at the moment when Crimea was annexed, practically annulling any chance of NATO membership for Ukraine. The next possible victims of Russian aggression are Transnistria, the breakaway state located between Moldova and Ukraine, and Moldova itself. For all the conditionality of historic analogies, there is still psychological recurrence in political behaviour, which has been seen throughout historical periods. The annexation of Crimea is a reminder of the Anschluss of Austria, an event particularly instructive in the wake of the ‘democratic’ fig leaf of the Crimean referendum. The Munich syndrome is another of those recurring themes. At the Munich conference of 1938, the West granted Hitler the right to dispose of the fate of the Sudetendeutsche, thus encouraging him to occupy Czechoslovakia and divide Poland with the USSR in 1939. The trap that the West systematically falls into is to trying to sacrifice temporary values to gain significant advantage.

Invariably, this approach results in the loss of both, in addition to the loss of substantial human life. Just as it does not succeed to the expected degree in making concessions, the West is unsuccessful in sanctions. These are similar in essence as the ones against Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya and Cuba, and now against Russia. Sanctions undermine values that would be much closer to those of the average Western-European or NorthAmerican citizen than to the inhabitants of Kamchatka or Siberia, let alone those of the militarised region of Kaliningrad. In the overwhelming majority, Russian citizens cannot even imagine being more important than the state, hence their tolerance to material deprivation, which is far higher than that of the average Western citizen. Consequently, Western sanctions are making Russians rally behind President Putin – and Putin would be happy to offer a round of drinks for that. He is currently turning into the most charismatic Russian leader after Stalin; as much as a result of the territories annexed by him, as for the sanctions imposed on him. The heroic slogan of the Second World War “For the motherland, for Stalin!” is now being edited by history itself as “For the motherland, for Putin!” And this is all because Putin has shown a strong understanding of the rules of public relations and has a free hand in using them to suit his wishes. The West seems to be his best ally in this. Undoubtedly, the results of Putin’s current political policies today will be paid for by the children of those glorifying him now. Does the West have to wait that long until acting? The answer is no, of course it does not. If we insist on sanctions, then why not turn to a smarter approach that may prove more efficient than classic sanctions? Since Putin seeks to make a public impact through the his acts, photographs and even T-shirts, the West should decisively deprive him of such a chance. Sanctions against participation in world sports events, cultural festivals and competitions would be far more effective than any trade sanctions or financial restrictions placed on Putin’s entourage. To start with, NATO should put a stop to its wrong signals and policies. Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Kosovo ought to urgently be involved and allowed to join NATO as an opening to their midterm EU prospects. Additionally, Finland and Sweden should be energetically encouraged to develop and deepen their relations with NATO, and the EU ought to seek a new mode in their strategic relations with NATO. In the meantime, the presently neglected, yet budding, partnerships between NATO and Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Mongolia, ought to be revitalised urgently, since they all present unfinished business with traditional partners. NATO urgently needs to establish new and even unplanned partnerships. Firstly with China, secondly with

The West is prone to confusion at the very core of its policy towards Russia, combining episodes of untimely neglect with pledges for eternal strategic partnership

NATO Securing our world

Alexei Nikolsky/AP/Press Association Images

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President Vladimir Putin during a televised question-and-answer session in Moscow. Putin has demonstrated a strong understanding of public relations the Islamic world via the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and, thirdly, with Latin America and Africa. Additionally, NATO needs to communicate directly with Russian society, rather than through the Russian government. The internet will make this possible, despite all efforts to restrict access to it. The West ought to be firmer in its actions with regard to smaller dictators around the world, for example Bashar al-Assad, since every dictator is a stronghold for all dictators.

The way forward NATO’s most urgent and substantial need is to create a new public image for itself among the societies of its own member states, as well as those all over the world. Global public opinion is NATO’s most powerful ally, which will help it to win numerous battles prior to starting them, prevent enemy goals being formulated and stop criminal minds from acting. NATO also needs a new flight of qualitative imagination and the finances to boost it. Investing $100 in information can save $1,000 from being invested in war. Those ideas should not come as a surprise to NATO. The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria (ACB) launched them first in 2009 and has been promoting them ever since.

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ACB also expanded the pioneer think-tank research on ‘NATO’s Global Role in the 21st Century’, which was completed on a NATO Manfred Wörner scholarship in 1998. The research furthered the successful policies and the history-endorsed vision of the world, formulated as early as 1990 by the ACB, the first pro-Atlantic organisation set up on a Warsaw Treaty territory. Russia will be a friend of the West only when the West remains strong and follows policies of principle that are not dubious. Russia will return to the political tradition of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which will make it a good partner of NATO. This should be the daily message to the Russian society. Meanwhile, the West as a whole should take good care to ensure our global presence, as well as our appearance.

Dr Solomon Passy is the President of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria. Previously the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2001-05, he negotiated and signed Bulgaria’s accessions to NATO and the EU. In 1990-91 and 2001-09 he was an MP and chaired the parliamentary committees on foreign affairs and defence. Dr Passy has a PhD in mathematical logic and computer science

An ISAF soldier from the Royal Anglian Regiment out on patrol in Afghanistan. The UK is the second largest contributor of troops to ISAF after the US

Cpl Paul Morrison/Crown Copyright

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The United Kingdom and Afghanistan With the deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan approaching, Dennis Hartshorne analyses the United Kingdom’s objectives, outlining both the political and military approaches to creating stability

has been a key element in British foreign  Afghanistan policy during the early years of the 21st century. The overriding reason for the British presence is to protect our national security through the mechanism of helping the Afghans take control of their own security. Along with NATO and other allies, our aim has been to enable the Afghans to develop the ability to maintain security in order to prevent the return of international terrorists seeking to use Afghanistan as a safe haven. This has been the dominant objective of British foreign policy in the region. Consequently, the threat to the United Kingdom from this region has been substantially reduced. Together with allies, the UK has played a large part in training Afghan security forces and assisting Afghanistan in becoming a more viable state, thereby reducing instability. Our international partners are working in concert with the same aim of encouraging the Afghan government’s ability to provide proper governance with an effective infrastructure and the provision of essential services. The UK has worked alongside allies and partners to help the Afghan government develop in a way that will benefit the country’s future. British efforts in Afghanistan have focused on three key elements, which will be analysed below.

Military support The UK’s military activities in Afghanistan are conducted under the United Nations Mandate as part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, widely known as ISAF. The UK is the second largest contributor after the United States to this coalition of nearly 50 nations. Under the auspices of ISAF, key NATO countries that have provided more than 1,000 troops include the US and UK, which together contribute some 75 per cent of total deployment. While the majority of British forces have operated in Helmand, the province best known for its hazardous insurgent activities, the British assist in and advise on providing security and basic civilian policing services with the aim of securing safe operational bases in Afghanistan.

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This support programme will largely be completed by the end of 2014, when the ISAF mission ends and the majority of the British combat forces will have left Afghanistan.

Political and socio-economic support Apart from achieving stability through military operations, the long-term goal has been to assist Afghanistan in becoming a feasible state able to increasingly meet its people’s needs with its own resources. This activity is largely conducted by the UK’s Department for International Development, which operates in three main areas to reduce poverty and increase stability: improving security and political stability, providing economic stimulus and assisting the delivery of basic services. During the Tokyo Conference in 2012, the UK agreed to maintain development assistance of £178 million per annum until at least 2017 in order to help the Afghan government achieve long-term economic growth. This is a challenging task and will continue to be so. The overriding reason for the UK’s participation in the Afghanistan mission was to counter the threat arising from the country serving as a base for international terrorism. This situation threatened not only the UK, but also the rest of the world. The Taliban had given al-Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan, which allowed terrorists to plan and carry out attacks across the world, most notably the 9/11 atrocities in the US. The British government has consistently recognised that Afghan security cannot be achieved by military activities alone, and therefore actively supports the Afghan government’s efforts to achieve a political settlement, leading to peace and stability. These objectives are based on key historical decisions evolved from the outset of the Afghan conflict. The UN Security Council Resolution 1378 in 2001 contained a condemnation of “the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the al-Qaeda network and other terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and others associated with them, and in this context supporting the efforts of the Afghan people to

Sgt Steve Blake/Crown Copyright

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Members of the Afghan National Army carry out weapons training. Handing over security control is a vital part of NATO’s work in Afghanistan replace the Taliban regime”. The UN further authorised an international force – ISAF – with a mandate to help the Afghans maintain security in Kabul and the surrounding areas. In 2003, NATO assumed political command and coordination of ISAF and progressively, throughout 2006, assumed command of the south and east of the country. Insurgency in the following years required a greater military response from NATO. In 2011, the House Of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee reported that military pressure alone would not be enough to bring security and stability to Afghanistan. It concluded that without appropriate political leadership, the current military

Accordingly, in consultation with allies, ISAF approved the deadline of 2014 for the completion of plans to transfer security and civilian control to Afghanistan. The withdrawal process is now nearly over. Looking back, the Committee specifically placed on record that: “Her Majesty’s Armed Forces have our full support in tackling the challenges before them and their efforts are rightly described in so many instances as heroic. It is our hope that this report will be received in the constructively critical manner in which it is intended, and regarded as a contribution to the wider debate which is taking place on how to improve a situation to which there are no easy solutions.”

A way forward

Together with allies, the UK has played a large part in training Afghan security forces and assisting Afghanistan in becoming a more viable state campaign would be in danger of inadvertently de-railing efforts to secure a political solution to what, in essence, was a political problem. The report stressed that the US should not delay its significant involvement in talks with the Taliban leadership because, without US support in this respect, there could be no long-term peace in Afghanistan. The Committee report voiced doubts about whether success in Afghanistan could be achieved through a strategy of “clear, hold and build”. It concluded by stating that “there is also evidence to suggest that the core foreign policy justification for the UK’s continued presence in Afghanistan, namely that it is necessary in the interests of the UK’s national security, may have been achieved some time ago, given the apparently limited strength of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan”.

As is often the case when liberal interventionist policies are pursued, solutions are far more complex than relatively straightforward military ones. It is also more difficult for such policies to gain widespread public support. The threat is often not so readily perceived and the solutions not so readily obvious. With new global crises on the increase, running alongside the gradual withdrawal from Afghanistan, the new domestic challenge is to maintain public support for such interventions. Emerging terrorist threats and barbaric activity in the Levant, crises in North, East and West Africa, and the tensions in Ukraine, all require an extensive public information programme both from the government and NATO, not only in the UK, but throughout Western society. A new focus for ATA and support of organisations such as the Atlantic Council of the UK would go a long way towards alerting public opinion to the problems, and in the maintenance of confidence in the necessary responses from the UK and others.

Mr Dennis Hartshorne is the Director of the Atlantic Council of the United Kingdom. He is a founding member of the Council, and prior to that was the Chairman of British Atlantic Universities Committee, part of the Council’s predecessor organisation, the British Atlantic Committee. He has been the author or editor of over 120 publications of that Committee, and served as its Deputy Chairman. He is a NATO Fellow

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Anti-Mubarak protesters in Cairo during the Arab Spring, which highlighted political, social and economic instability factors

ATA’s role in the Mediterranean and Middle East The security threats arising in Eastern Europe and the Middle East are posing new challenges for NATO. Fabrizio W Luciolli explores how the Atlantic Treaty Association supports and facilitates NATO’s work

the near future, the Atlantic Treaty Association  In(ATA) and its national chapters will be called on to face increasing tasks and responsibilities. The aggression against Crimea and the subsequent escalation in Ukraine has dramatically changed the agenda of the NATO Summit and reminded the Allies of their primary commitment to collective defence and the crucial role of Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty, which must be considered in times of modern aggression, including with regards to hybrid warfare and cyberthreats. Concurrently, due to the latest developments

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in the Middle East and North Africa, the Mediterranean flank of the Alliance has become increasingly subjected to the threat of extremist forces.

NATO and ATA in 2014 NATO has promptly reacted to the reversal of relations with Russia by reinforcing the security of the member states that are more liable to be affected by the fallout of the events in Ukraine and by reasserting the collective defence of the Washington Treaty. Moreover, NATO has

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repeatedly stated it is giving its full support to the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the efforts made by the legitimate leadership to restore security and stability. Along these lines, ATA has enhanced its role in the Baltic states and has decided to organise a flag event in Kiev in 2014. This will be a sign of strong political backing to the people and government of Ukraine, and will launch a comprehensive programme of training and educational initiatives in the country and at a regional level. In this respect, ATA is conducting a NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme in Georgia, while new relations have been established with the Atlantic Council of Moldova. However, on the eve of its 60th anniversary, it is particularly in the Mediterranean and Middle East that ATA will test its traditional skills in promoting dialogue and cooperation, while fostering peace and stability in Northern and Eastern Europe. The broader region presents a variety of security threats and challenges, which are a growing concern for the EuroAtlantic and international community. Extremism and its terrorist manifestations, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, arms trafficking, religious genocides and the massive flows of refugees fleeing wars and humanitarian crises are the most crucial and evident elements affecting today’s security scenario. Nevertheless, the series of uprisings known as the Arab Spring pointed out the existence of even more relevant instability factors, which are of a political, social and economic nature rather than a military one. These instability factors are mostly damaging the new generations, and producing a dangerous fallout in the security domain. In this respect, the European Union and NATO cannot afford to disregard the ongoing developments across its southern neighborhood. In today’s increasingly globalised and interconnected world, the breakout of the uprisings that swept across the region must be considered an alarming wakeup call, urging a more constructive and effective cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

the unfinished business in the region. In this respect, in 2014, ATA celebrated its 60th anniversary with a council meeting hosted in Budva by the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, thus testifying ATA’s enduring commitment to accompany all Western Balkans nations into the European Union and NATO. Likewise, ATA intends to shore up its Mediterranean and Middle Eastern dimension. There is no Iron Curtain in the Mediterranean separating the South from the North. Yet, a combination of conflicting viewpoints and misconceptions inherited from the past and intertwined with current events, hinders the deepening of relations in a cooperative security perspective, as pointed out by the NATO Strategic Concept. In this respect, ATA has played a pivotal role by conducting numerous dialogues and cooperation activities involving the NATO partner countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and other states and entities, such as the Kurdistan Regional Government.

ATA and the Greater Middle East The present situation engulfing the Greater Middle East requires major and renewed efforts in order for the Arab and Muslim world to undertake the construction of pluralistic societies where moderation in the political and cultural domain will prevail over extremism and violence. To this end, ATA is poised to intensify its focus on the broader region, building on more than 10 years of relevant dialogue and cooperation in the form of training courses, research projects, high-level conferences, roundtables and workshops. In particular, ATA can orient its programmes in order to foster cooperative security and reinvigorate the role of NATO partnerships in the Mediterranean and Middle East. In fact, the adoption of synergistic and coordinated responses are crucial in the fight against terrorism, as well as crisis management and prevention, including humanitarian emergencies. Socio-economic issues will also be at the top of ATA’s agenda, with a view to promoting the implementation of modernisation and development strategies for the southern Mediterranean. Solving lingering issues – such as youth unemployment, food security and marginalisation – will deprive extremist forces of breeding grounds they can exploit, especially in countries that have previously, or are still, experiencing domestic turmoil. Cultural issues are also important. Sectarian divisions are the main cause of conflicts sweeping across the Greater Middle East today. To this end, crucial questions – such as the future of local religious minorities and promoting intercultural dialogue – are handled by specific ATA research programmes and relevant initiatives. ATA has always paid close attention to the successor generation through a series of initiatives, educational courses and events that are attended by young researchers,

ATA is poised to intensify its focus on the broader Middle East, building on more than 10 years of relevant dialogue and cooperation

The role of ATA In this framework, the Atlantic Treaty Association has a significant role to play. Written in 1956 by Gaetano Martino, Lester B Pearson and Halvard Lange, the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO acknowledged the role of the Atlantic Treaty Association and paved the way for NATO’s engagement in cultural and economic cooperation even beyond the North-Atlantic borders. Recalling this message, ATA can act in the Mediterranean and the Middle East by taking stock of the extraordinary experience and accomplishments achieved in cooperation with central and south-eastern European countries. The Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans has been successful. However, much work remains in order to complete

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The ATA 60th Anniversary Leadership Summit at the To Be Secure (2BS) Forum in Budva, Montenegro professionals and PhD and university students coming from Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The level of interplay has grown remarkably over the past few years, and the achievement of more structured forms of cooperation will significantly contribute to advancing the aims of ATA programmes in the Greater Middle East. These activities have allowed ATA to create, consolidate and expand a new living network of decision-makers, experts and researchers, who will be able to enhance the cooperative security perspectives in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In this respect, the level of cooperation achieved by ATA in the Western Balkans represents an inspiring model for the new generation in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and for the future programmes in Eastern Europe as well. ATA outreach in the southern neighborhood proved to be successful and was able to offer the European Union and NATO an extraordinary additional value, since it comes to fill the gap that still exists between the Euro-Atlantic institutions and the public opinions of the Arab world. In doing so, ATA intends to have an actual impact on the ongoing processes thanks to its connection with civil society and the capability to engage relevant authorities and decisionmakers from NATO member states and partners, as well as from other international organisations and entities.

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Peace, security and common progress have been the key objectives of the Alliance since its establishment, and so should it be in the present complex international scenario.

A sense of community In order to achieve this, NATO needs to promote a security culture that is able to reconnect the transatlantic community with the Alliance’s fundamental values. As stated in Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, “a sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations”. In this perspective is the strengthening of ATA, recommitting itself and the public opinion of NATO member and partner countries to the enduring Atlantic values and, after 60 years, willing and able to carry out new challenging tasks both in Eastern Europe and in the Greater Middle East.

Dr Fabrizio W Luciolli is the President of the Italian Atlantic Committee and Vice President of the Atlantic Treaty Association. He is also Professor of International Security Organisations at the Center for High Defense Studies of the Italian Ministry of Defence and lectures at a range of national and international, military and academic institutions. Dr Luciolli is also a consultant on foreign affairs and security matters to various MPs

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Emerging security threats NATO may be entering the most challenging period in its history, as it combines the demand for crisis management beyond its borders with that for collective defence in Europe. As such, it needs sustained political and public support, writes Jamie Shea

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March, many  Following commentators have been proclaiming that NATO is ‘back in business’. Certainly, this perception has been borne out of NATO’s immediate reaction to the crisis in Crimea. The United States’ leadership has been back in evidence, with Washington being the first to deploy land, sea and air reinforcements to Poland, Romania and the Baltic states. On a visit to Warsaw, President Barack Obama pledged $1 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative to cover the costs of exercises, enhanced air patrolling, and temporary troop and naval redeployments to the Eastern Allies. Other Allies – Germany, France, Denmark, Canada and the United Kingdom – have sent fighter aircraft, ships and surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance assets. By early June 2014, all 28 Allies had allocated forces or at least planning personnel to NATO’s immediate reassurance efforts. At the same time, the Alliance froze its relations with Russia – although keeping a channel for communication open through the NATO-Russia Council – and agreed to step up its defence-related assistance to its partner ‘countries in-between’: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Thus, so far, so good. The current reassurance efforts have built on plans that were already under way in the Alliance to refocus on Europe after 11-and-a-half years of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Indeed, even before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, NATO held its first major exercise in Eastern Europe for decades (Steadfast Jazz) and devised a Connected Forces Initiative that used regular exercises, training and education in order to preserve the interoperability of its forces that had been slowly acquired in ISAF. This initiative also aims to get its forces back into the culture and practice of major manoeuvres and force-on-force war-fighting skills. The return to collective defence and more traditional notions of deterrence, containment and the balance of power, however, will inevitably raise questions as to whether Allies, and the NATO organisation, are up to the job. This question

will be all the more pressing in a new security environment where everything that NATO does henceforth will be tested. The shift in global military spending towards Russia, the Middle East and Asia testifies to this. Over the past decade, Allied defence budgets have declined by 15 per cent on average, while Russia’s has increased by 150 per cent. As war in Europe goes from the previously unthinkable to the possible and conceivable, the price that the Allies will have to pay for their security has now become much higher than before the Ukraine-Russia crisis. This context poses a number of short-term and long-term challenges for the Alliance.

Two schools of thought In the first place, NATO will need to decide what long-term military posture to adopt in Central and Eastern Europe. Currently, there are two schools of thought among Allies. One group – unsurprisingly, those from Central and Eastern Europe – would like to see substantial combat forces stationed in the East, and go back to a posture of forward defence along borders. In this view, NATO’s command structure and combat brigades are stationed in countries that face no threat, instead of being on the territories where the threat is much more real. In 1997, the Alliance gave an assurance to Russia, as part of the NATORussia Founding Act, that it would not station substantial combat forces, nuclear weapons or military infrastructure on the territories of its new member states. However, many from these countries argue this assurance was conditional on Russia also respecting international law and exercising restraint. Other Allies are reticent at the thought of a major and permanent redeployment of forces from West to East. They prefer to occupy the moral high ground of sticking to the ‘three noes’ commitment, in the hope that one day Russia will come to its senses and want to re-establish a strategic partnership with NATO. In their view, the more NATO sticks to its various commitments vis-à-vis Russia and refuses to engage in a new Cold-War syndrome of confrontation, the easier it could be

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Gregor Fischer /DEMOTIX

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A Russian soldier guards the entrance to a military base in Perevalnoye, Crimea. Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s annexation of Crimea this year has led to renewed tensions with NATO members

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Swiss President and head of the OSCE, Didier Burkhalter, meets Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vienna in June for bilateral talks for Russia to rethink its position. Moreover, the advantage of rotations and exercises is that they are scalable. In other words, they can be rapidly adapted either up or down, as befits the level of threat from Russia, or the possibilities of cooperation. Naturally, the ability of these Allies to persuade Poland or the Baltic states of the merits of this reinforcement strategy depends largely on their willingness to spend money on upgrading and improving the readiness of forces in the West, so that they are able to respond quickly. However, it can be argued that the high-readiness, high-mobility reinforcement strategy will also allow the Allies to deal with other crises; for instance, an intervention in the Middle East or North Africa, or perhaps in response to a major terrorist incident.

Readiness Action Plan That said, there is a way to reconcile these two visions of reassurance within the Alliance’s proposed Readiness Action Plan. This would involve increasing NATO’s presence in the new member states through the stationing of three or four air squadrons, a permanent naval task force in both the Baltic and Black seas, and establishing a military headquarters, for instance a specific headquarters for NATO’s Rapid Response Force. The Allies could also agree to increase their fixed air defence assets and radars in this region, and upgrade ports and airfields to function as reception facilities. In addition, the Alliance could go back to standing defence plans, where headquarters involved in collective defence could have forces

already assigned to them in peacetime, which they could train and exercise for specific roles. This would avoid the timeconsuming process of generating forces from scratch, once operational plans are approved by the North Atlantic Council. Pre-delegating crisis-response measures to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to cope with an emerging crisis would also speed up NATO’s response and thus reinforce deterrence by allowing him to enhance situational awareness, and to re-deploy and rearrange forces. In this context, deterrence is a concept that needs to be rediscovered, but there is a difficult question to answer here. How far will Russia be deterred by a show of military strength by the Alliance, especially if the Russian strategy is more one of subversion and spreading influence through energy deals, business contracts and propaganda campaigns, than one of seriously thinking about challenging NATO’s Article 5 through a military attack? In the final analysis, NATO’s role in deterrence is essential, but also inevitably limited. In fact, some of the most effective tools are economic. Consequently, deterrence must involve other like-minded organisations that can complement NATO’s largely military competencies with a more diverse set of tools. The European Union is an obvious partner. But, depending on what or who is to be deterred, other Euro-Atlantic organisations will have a role to play, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). But actions and responses must be coordinated. Russia has seen the deepening of the relationship between the EU and

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Ukraine as equally acceptable as, if not even less acceptable than, the deepening of its relationship with NATO. In a new environment, where economic steps can produce major military repercussions and vice versa, NATO and the EU will have to coordinate their actions in a way they have not managed to do in the past. Yet, as Europeans look to Americans to provide the bulk of reassurance, and vice versa, old NATO debates on transatlantic burden-sharing are bound to revive. For Europeans, NATO will be about the Americans coming to the rescue once again, while the US, shifting the responsibility onto the Allies, will be able to avoid hindering its pivot to the Asia-Pacific – where the Russian assertiveness in Crimea could encourage China to act similarly in pressing its claims in the South China Sea. Unsurprisingly, at a time when it is spending 73 per cent of the total NATO budget, the US is pushing its European Allies to meet the target of devoting two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defence, and devoting 20 per cent of that to modernisation and equipment. In 2012, the Europeans spent an average of $473 per capita on defence, while Americans spent $2,057; each European soldier costs €23,829, compared with the €102,264 that the US invests. Yet, will the shock of the Ukraine crisis be enough to push the majority of Allies to increase their defence spending? Only three Europeans meet the two per cent target, while only five hit the 20 per cent target. Currently, 14 spend below 1.5 per cent, and five are spending even less than one per cent. If all the Allies met the two per cent target, NATO would have an extra $90 billion a year to spend on its armies.

better helicopters, considerable technological expertise in combating improvised explosive devices drawing on ISAF experience, and air-to-air refuelling capacities. The procurement of Global Hawks by NATO and an EU common drone programme will also gradually improve Europe’s intelligence, reconnaissance and command and control capabilities. That said, the key task for both NATO and the EU in the months ahead, and particularly with NATO’s Wales Summit in September in mind, is to identify groupings to plug the 16 shortfalls. The initiative of Germany to form a Capability Development Group and of the UK to form a group to develop an expeditionary force represents the best way ahead, as these offer the best chance for medium and small countries to plug into a framework organised by a major country, thereby providing essential niche capabilities. In a more dangerous world, NATO will need as many friends and willing partners as it can persuade to work with it. Consequently, an ‘interoperability platform’ bringing the Allies together with 24 of their most active partners can also help preserve relationships, consolidated through operations such as ISAF. Subsequently, this will increase the pool of capabilities that NATO can draw on for its missions. In return for building their forces to NATO standards, and training and exercising with the Alliance, these particularly valuable partners can be granted special privileges. These could include early consultation, intelligence sharing and liaison positions in the NATO command structure, as well as operations and planning divisions. Partners can also be involved in NATO’s efforts to build defence capacity and train local forces in North Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, as they also have experience in these regions through their participation in similar EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) or through United Nations programmes. So, in conclusion, NATO is perhaps entering the most challenging period of its history, as it must deal with collective defence in Europe and crisis management beyond for the first time. Getting the strategy right will stimulate and require debate, and the means will not be forthcoming without sustained political and public support. Thus, the role of the Atlantic Council and the Atlantic Treaty Association becomes also ever-more important: to support NATO and to be properly and adequately supported by it.

In this environment of austerity, it will be essential for the Allies to have a common view of what they need on a prioritised basis

Delivering on collective priorities However, public support for more military spending will only be forthcoming if the public has a clear idea of what the money will be spent on and how it could substantially improve the Alliance’s military posture. In this environment of austerity, it will be essential for the Allies to have a common view of what they need on a prioritised basis and then to be effectively organised in clusters or framework nations to deliver those capabilities. Instead of one European army, we are likely to see several European armies organised around lead nations or regions, such as the Benelux, Visegrad or Nordic groupings. NATO’s two strategic commanders have recently come up with a list of 16 shortfalls, which also correspond to the vital enabling capacities for all modern multinational military operations. They concern the lack of reconnaissance capabilities and joint information surveillance. The other gaps concern deployable headquarters, command and control for ground and air operations, as well as the need for better integration of air defence and ballistic missile defence. It is not all bleak news, though. Based on the European Defence Agency’s Pooling & Sharing initiative, Europeans finally have the Airbus A400M transport aircraft, more and

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

Dr Jamie Shea is Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division. He has worked with NATO since 1980 in positions including Director of Policy Planning in the private office of the Secretary General; and Assistant to the Secretary General of NATO for Special Projects

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Alliances and the Asian security dilemma The Alliance has long-standing partnerships with countries throughout Asia. David Fouquet looks at NATO’s past involvement in the region and its place in the existing and emerging security architecture

the NATO Alliance has emerged as a security player in  That regions beyond its original theatre of operation in the EuroAtlantic area is no longer in doubt following its deployments in Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden. But the issue of whether it has established a defined and consistent role or plan for its involvement in Africa, the Middle East or Asia is still unsettled and is rarely discussed on a firm basis. Occasionally, and especially in recent years, some states or political figures from the Asia-Pacific have sought to intensify relations with the Alliance and urged the latter to increase its involvement. Some members, especially the United States, have an established and defined role through a system of alliances and relationships in the Asia-Pacific and other regions as well. The United Kingdom and France, through territorial possessions or defence agreements, have a different but established presence.

A global network NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen addressed the relationship with Asia-Pacific in a presentation on the US’s west coast earlier in 2014, noting that “the US and Canada both border on the Pacific. Other Allies have territories and interests in the Pacific. And all Allies have concerns about the Pacific.” In order to meet such concerns and associated security requirements, he said: “We will also bolster our partnerships. As we prepare to complete our combat mission in Afghanistan at the end of the year, we must maintain the close ties we have forged on the field of battle. Global threats like terrorism, piracy and missile attacks cross borders. They are too big for any one country to tackle alone. We can only deal with them together. Not just as an Atlantic Alliance. But as a global network.” This network already includes partners in the region that have signed partnership agreements and been engaged

alongside NATO in Afghanistan, as well as in the anti-piracy maritime mission in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. They have expressed readiness to maintain such a relationship. The most prominent of these are Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand, while a number of other countries have also been involved and shown interest. The Secretary General at that time did not address the Central Asian region, a geographic security theatre even closer to NATO that presents its own concerns and challenges, which range from political instability to trafficking and terrorism routes. While NATO has long-established relations through the Partnership for Peace programme with countries in the region, its states and populations have more recently become the object of specific interests on the part of virtually all global or regional powers. The US, European Union, Russia, China and others have demonstrated such interests through creating their own modern versions of the Silk Road, which historically connected almost the entire Euro-Asian continent.

The rise of China While the majority of such concepts involve civilian, economic, infrastructure and other elements, the political, security and defence aspects are also evident. Possibly the most complex and far-reaching relationship between the Alliance and Asia is one carried out informally and whose objectives have yet to be defined with the rise of China. During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, which culminated in the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999, relations were characterised by suspicion and hostility. Launched as an informal series of lunches and other private meetings between the Chinese ambassadors and NATO secretary generals, the

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Cadets of the Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Liberation Army take part in bayonet drills near Beijing. Relations between NATO and China have been complex since the Cold War ended

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Chinese peacekeeping soldiers prepare to leave for Mali, December 2013. China has also hosted conferences relating to NATO’s Gulf of Aden operations later encounters have involved conferences, lectures and some maritime anti-piracy operational cooperation. The latter have been the most advanced of such military contacts. They included Alliance operations in the Gulf of Aden in recent years, when China hosted and participated in related multilateral conferences and planning. While some in the West and, to a lesser degree, China have suggested other potential areas of mutual interest, including other maritime issues, Afghanistan, Central Asia and various global security or non-traditional security challenges, these have tended to remain at the conceptual level.

Planners, policymakers, the entire security community and other stakeholders need to reflect on how to balance security concerns while maintaining productive dialogues While some NATO Member States have more official, extensive and sophisticated relations with China and its military forces, in China, as hosts, or in the context of UN peacekeeping or other multilateral concerns, at the NATO level these have been limited, in part from residual historical or ideological divisions and perceptions. As in many regions of the globe, there is a wide arc that encompasses the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Asian continent, so these are complex, sensitive and sometimes delicate issues. Planners, policymakers, the entire security community, and populations and other stakeholders all need to reflect on how

to balance legitimate security concerns while maintaining productive dialogues and relationships for stability. The security dimension is a notoriously difficult enough element to consider and deploy, but it is generally accepted that there are no military solutions to the wider political-securityeconomic-social dynamic. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the more recent flare-up of tensions in the Asia-Pacific region involving a number of countries over their historic maritime sovereignty and territorial rivalries. This friction between rival claimants to land and maritime territories in the South China Sea, East China Sea and other neighbouring waters has already involved the attention and resources of numerous countries in the region, including Western Alliance partners, other strategic partners, NATO members and international institutions. Although not entirely the stimulus and reasoning behind the recent US ‘pivot’ or ‘re-balancing’ towards Asia, these tense relationships not only have their role to play in the US decision, but are also affected by the policy adopted by Washington. The situations require more attention, time and patience, as well as further internationalisation. Although there may be no clear posture for the Alliance to be directly involved in the existing and emerging security architecture in the Asia-Pacific and the Eurasian continent, the Alliance and its member states should be intellectually and, to an appropriate degree, diplomatically engaged with organisations such as ASEAN’s Regional Forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the newly emerging Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia.

Mr David Fouquet is a Senior Associate of the European Institute for Asian Studies, and an established Journalist covering foreign, security and economic relations. He has also worked as a lecturer and as a consultant for major international companies

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Promoting NATO partnerships

Celebrating 20 years of the Partnership for Peace programme On 11 January 2014, NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme marked its 20th anniversary. Simon Michell takes a closer look at the initiative, assessing its aims and its growing scope

two decades in existence, the NATO Partnership  After for Peace (PfP) programme, which is overseen by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), is still going strong, despite the current difficulties with Russia and Ukraine. In fact, there are countries such as Cyprus and Kosovo that are lining up to join the programme in the near future. PfP is not an alliance, as each country signs a bilateral agreement with NATO that does not bind it to the other PfP members; nor does it bind them to the articles of the 1949 Washington Treaty that created NATO. It is one of three main wider forums that NATO has instigated to assist and cooperate with its neighbours, the other two being the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Also 20 years old, the MD now comprises the countries of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The ICI, on the other hand, was launched a decade later in 2004 and is made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, with Saudi Arabia and Oman also showing some interest. Each of these groupings represents a different region. As the name suggests, the MD is based around the nations bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The ICI is essentially made up of countries of the Middle East, whereas PfP is focused on Europe, particularly the former Soviet republics. Countries that sign the bilateral agreement to become a PfP participating state do so for different reasons. This was true for the first batch of 23 countries that became signatories in January 1994. Some nations signed up as a first step to joining NATO itself – Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Others – in particular those traditionally neutral countries such as Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden and Turkmenistan – are unlikely to become NATO members. They join PfP in order to reap the benefits of the programme itself

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with regard to capacity-building and cooperation, as well as to coordinate their overseas peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and conflict operations where applicable. Notably, Ireland, Finland and Sweden have played significant roles in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition in Afghanistan. Russia, however, is never likely to join NATO. That does not mean that it has not been an active participant. Russian ships have participated in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, which works to prevent terrorists using the Mediterranean Sea to transport arms and personnel.

Most PfP countries have helped NATO in its overseas operations, which, in these times of austerity, is an impressive level of commitment Just as NATO itself has gone through various stages of enlargement, so has PfP, with new signatories in 1995 (Austria, Belarus, Malta and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), 1999 (Ireland), 2000 (Croatia), 2002 (Tajikistan) and 2006 (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia).

PfP: raison d’être According to NATO, the aims and goals of PfP are simple and wide-ranging: “Based on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, diminish threats

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PfP Member States The NATO Partnership for Peace programme celebrated its 20th anniversary in January 2014

Arctic Ocean

Finland

Russia

Greenland Sea

Kara Sea

Sweden

Belarus

Kazakhstan

Barents Sea

Ukraine

Norwegian Sea

Switzerland Ireland Baltic Sea

North Sea

Moldova Austria Bay of Biscay Black Sea

Caspian Sea

Serbia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Tajikistan

Mediterranean Sea

Georgia Montenegro

Azerbaijan

Kyrghyz Republic

Persian Gulf

FYR Macedonia Malta

Uzbekistan

Red Sea

Armenia

Turkmenistan Arabian Sea

Bay of Bengal

Gulf of Guinea

Indian Ocean

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Promoting NATO partnerships

Non-NATO contributors to ISAF meet NATO’s North Atlantic Council. General Philip Breedlove (right) talks to then acting Ukrainian Defence Minister Colonel General Mykhailo Koval (left) and Major General Anatolii Petrenko (centre), Ukraine’s military representative to NATO, in June 2014

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to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries.” NATO hopes to achieve this by engaging with each country across a number of activities, which the Alliance likes to refer to as a PfP ‘toolbox’. This toolbox has more than 1,400 separate activities, from which each PfP state can choose, split into the following three main sub-themes: capacity-building, transformation support and wider issues. Not surprisingly, the fundamental focus is on defencerelated activities, but it does also pull in aspects that are more closely associated with the civilian activities of the PfP nation. Domestically, it touches on the individual country’s efforts to implement defence reform, policy and training, as well as civilmilitary relations, education, civil-emergency planning and disaster response. On the bilateral basis, it covers military-tomilitary cooperation, including participation in joint exercises and training, and cooperation within the fields of science and, more recently, environmental issues. Each country chooses its own pace and scope to suit its particular requirements.

The Turkish delegation distributes information about courses at the Turkish Partnership for Peace Training and Education Centre

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Over the past 20 years, PfP has managed to attract the vast majority of countries around the outer borders of NATO, with the result that a common understanding between these countries and NATO has been achieved, creating a far less confrontational environment than existed throughout the 20 years that preceded the programme. Moreover, most of the PfP countries have also helped NATO in its overseas operations, which, in these times of austerity, demonstrates an impressive level of commitment. Beyond operations, PfP has also supported the reform of democratic defence sectors; funded the destruction of ammunition and millions of mines and small arms; developed NATO policies on women in peace and security; and cooperated on the management of humanitarian emergencies.

Success and setbacks In November 2010, NATO leaders decided that the success of PfP had led to a need to streamline its activities in order to make them more efficient and manageable. At the same time, it was agreed that the activities contained within the toolbox should also be offered on a wider basis – they are now available to the MD and ICI partners. Naturally, there have been some setbacks along the way. One of the most challenging, but most important, relationships NATO enjoys is with Russia. Here, the fundamental premise that no PfP nation should use military aggression against its neighbour for territorial gain was not adhered to when Russia annexed the Crimea. NATO’s response to this was unequivocal. “The basic principles of PfP include the commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to respect internationally recognised borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. In that context, many participants deplored that one member of the EAPC, Russia, had violated these principles, most recently through the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and its interference in Ukrainian affairs.” No doubt, this crisis will be a major theme of the 2014 NATO summit in Wales.

Promoting NATO partnerships

Bridging the Mediterranean Sea Recent turmoil in North Africa and Syria has focused attention on two of NATO’s regional partnership programmes: the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Simon Michell assesses the current status of the two activities

them, members of the Mediterranean Dialogue  Between (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) account for 11 countries (MD: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia; ICI: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates) in two of the world’s most volatile regions. It is no surprise, then, that both the MD and the ICI have their roots in the same aspirations: NATO’s wish to help strengthen regional stability, enhance international security and improve governance along the shoreline of the Mediterranean Sea and in the strategically important waters of the Persian Gulf. While doing this, NATO is also attempting to dispel any misconceptions that MD or ICI member countries may have about the Alliance and its intentions. With the exception of Lebanon, Libya and Syria, every country that borders the Mediterranean is now a member of either NATO, the MD or the Partnership for Peace (PfP) process, which places the Alliance’s vast array of tools and expertise at their disposal. Looking specifically at the MD partners, Mauritania is currently exceptional in that it is not a Mediterranean state, but, due to the strategic importance of two nearby islands groups – Portugal’s Madeira Islands and the Spanish Canary Islands – it was invited to join the forum. This is not as strange as it might first appear as, right from the outset, the MD was open to countries beyond the Mediterranean coast. The ICI partners are made up of four of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with Saudi Arabia and Oman declining the offer to participate in the process, but nevertheless indicating an interest in it and frequently participating in discussions. Again, like the MD, the ICI is open for new members to join.

This year is an important one for the MD and the ICI, with the MD celebrating its 20th anniversary and the ICI its 10th. As well as the age difference, there are significant variations in the structures and agendas of the two organisations. The seven nation states of the MD process interact with NATO on bilateral and multilateral bases, meaning that the 28 NATO states meet with the MD countries on a 28-plus-one basis, as well as within a group: 28 plus seven. ICI, on the other hand, only operates bilaterally: a methodology more akin to the PfP model. Both programmes, however, are supervised by NATO’s new Political Partnerships Committee, as is the PfP programme. To give an example of how this works and the scope of the cooperation, political consultations in the MD NATO-plus-one format are held on a regular basis, both at the ambassadorial and working levels. These discussions provide an opportunity for sharing views on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean, as well as on the further development of the political and practical cooperation dimensions of the ‘dialogue’. Meetings in the NATOplus-seven (including the North Atlantic Council-plus-seven) format are also held on a regular basis, often following NATO summits, ministerial meetings, chiefs of defence meetings and other major NATO events. These meetings represent an opportunity for two-way political consultations between NATO and MD partners.

Both the MD and the ICI have their roots in NATO’s wish to help strengthen regional stability

A practical set of goals and activities When the ICI was established, as a result of discussions that took place during the highly successful Istanbul NATO Summit in June 2004, it was agreed that the basis for the relationship would be on the same ethical and political principles as the

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Promoting NATO partnerships

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The conflict in Syria has changed the political environment in the Middle East, prompting NATO to consider how the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative processes can be transformed

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Promoting NATO partnerships

In May 2014, a group of high-level representatives from Morocco visited NATO HQ to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Mediterranean Dialogue MD (non-discrimination, self-differentiation, inclusiveness, two-way engagement, non-imposition, complementary and mutual reinforcement and diversity), but with a more practical set of goals and activities than originally existed with the MD. However, the establishment of the ICI on this more active basis also led to a rethink of the MD model, resulting in what is known as Enhanced MD, with the consequence that the MD member states were given access to a significantly larger

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: key principles ■■

■■

Non-discrimination: all partners are offered the same basis for their cooperation with NATO; Self-differentiation: allowing a tailored approach for MD and ICI countries. Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICP) allow interested countries and NATO to frame their practical cooperation in a more prospective and focused way, enabling them to outline the short- and long-term objectives of cooperation with the Alliance, in accordance with NATO’s objectives and policies; Inclusiveness: all countries should see themselves as shareholders of the same cooperative effort; Two-way engagement: the agreements are a ‘two-way partnership’, where NATO seeks partners’ contributions for its success through regular consultations; special emphasis is placed on practical cooperation; Non-imposition: partners are free to choose the pace and extent of their cooperation with the Alliance. NATO has no wish to impose anything upon them; Complementarity and mutual reinforcement: efforts for the region are complementary and mutually reinforcing in nature; and Diversity: the agreements respect and take into account the specific regional, cultural and political contexts of the respective partners. Source: NATO

set of the activities within NATO’s toolbox that was already on offer to the PfP nations. This process continued to evolve until, at their Berlin meeting in April 2011, NATO foreign ministers endorsed the establishment of a single Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) for all partners. As of 1 January 2012, the single-partnership menu became effective, thus dramatically expanding the number of activities accessible to MD countries. In practice, this means that MD and ICI countries are able to participate in military exercises, as well as request assistance with a wide range of activities, from defence modernisation and civil-emergency planning to border security, counterterrorism and the prevention of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. To a large but perhaps differing extent, these partnerships have managed to increase stability and security in both regions. Moreover, they have helped to draw ICI members in particular into NATO operations, with Qatar and the UAE joining in the NATO-led, United Nations-mandated operation to protect civilians during the Libyan conflict. Bahrain and the UAE also participated in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. However, the Arab spring, of which the Libyan unrest was a significant element, and the Syrian civil war, which started a year later in 2011, have changed the political environment in the region. This has forced NATO into considering how the MD and ICI processes can be transformed. In addition, the Alliance will need to carefully monitor MD and ICI members as the process of revolution and counter-revolution continues to play out. The tendency for some of these governments to become more authoritarian is a risk that may lead to NATO being regarded as legitimising this trend. Despite some tangible successes over the decades, there is an undoubted need for change in the two programmes. Just as the 2004 Istanbul summit was a major turning point in NATO’s relations with these two regions, the 2014 summit in Wales should seize the moment and deliver a step change in the relationship between this growing number of NATO and non-NATO partner states.

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Promoting NATO partnerships

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A Greek Special Forces instructor shows a Spanish soldier how to perform a takedown on a hostile crew member of a suspect vessel

Best of both worlds NATO and the European Union have each created expeditionary battlegroups. Martin Temperley considers how the two units complement one another

the NATO Alliance remains the main defence  While organisation capable of collectively protecting Europe, the European Union (EU), which is primarily a political-economic partnership, has developed the EU Battlegroup (EUBG) concept. In 1999, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy emerged from earlier Western European Union agreements, and in 2004 the EU Battlegroup was agreed. The concept has been brought to a point where a solely European-composed combat force could be deployed to respond to certain emergencies. EU Battlegroups are land forces, based on battalion-sized combat formations drawn from EU member states, and can be armour or infantry based. The EU’s declared intention is to deploy BGs to conduct operations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions, or directly if, for instance, the protection and evacuation of EU citizens were required. The EUBGs were declared operational in 2007, and two out

of the 18 are planned to be held available at any time. They are not standing forces, but, instead, units are earmarked for expeditionary deployment. Live-fire exercises and combined exercises have been conducted, but no operational deployment of an EUBG has yet been made. Politicians, military analysts, academic researchers and officials have expended thousands of words in discussing the relative values of NATO forces and the EUBGs, and particularly the existence of the EUBGs alongside the developing NATO Response Force. NATO’s longest mission, the 13-year Alliance-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, is winding down, and the NATO Response Force (NRF) is now becoming more purposeful, just as the EUBGs are coming available for deployment. The risk might be that a shortage of deployable forces at a time of budgetary cutbacks across Europe and North America could make this difficult.

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Promoting NATO partnerships

Sylvain Petrmand ©armée de Terre/NATO

For member governments, there is no particular competition or contradiction, as one quotation from a recent British parliamentary report makes clear: “NATO is still the only credible defence community capable of the territorial defence of Europe, and of engaging in those conflicts that are complex, medium- or large-scale, or require sophisticated operations. It is essential that the United States continues to participate in the defence of Europe through NATO.”

Clear applications for deployment It is, for many members, a matter of scale and capability. The EUBGs’ battalion-scaled forces have clear applications for deployment in certain humanitarian missions, and mixed civilian and military operations. Such forces are suitable for short-term deployments. Limited peacekeeping rather than peace-making operations are favoured by a force of this composition. That said, EUBGs certainly require airlift capability, and possibly the support of sea-based and Special Forces elements. In certain geographical areas, for example parts of Africa and the Middle East, EUBGs may be able to be applied where US or NATO involvement would not be appropriate. In addition to humanitarian operations, EU missions might include policing, monitoring and training. The UK parliamentary report says: “In the medium term the EU should concentrate on these classes of operations, and ensure they are delivered successfully.” Operation Artemis is frequently held up as a pioneering example of this, being a French-led EU mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, before the EUBGs emerged. A small force of 1,800 operational personnel, mostly French, later boosted with some Swedish Special Forces, were deployed swiftly and decisively after a UN call for assistance. At that time, a breakdown of civil order made it necessary to secure the airport, and to protect refugees and civilians in the town of Bunia, where a massacre was feared. The operation was successfully completed in about eight weeks. Austrian, Cypriot and Irish personnel served at the Artemis headquarters. It was claimed to be the first autonomous EU military mission outside Europe. In contrast to EUBGs, the NRF is a joint-brigade, scaled formation comprising three battlegroups (defined as much larger than EUBGs) with appropriate support. It has around 13,000 soldiers, further supported by a naval force drawn from established NATO maritime groups, combat aircraft and ground support aircraft, and Special Operations Forces. If required, a task force capable of chemical, biological and nuclear defence operations can be added. A major exercise is scheduled for the NRF in 2015, and its importance will grow as the NATO Alliance transforms its military effectiveness. NATO has moved away from the concept of large massed forces. The NRF is intended to further reflect this with better training, improved leadership and the application of advanced technology. Elements of the NRF have

NATO’s Response Force will grow in importance after the military operation in Afghanistan draws to a close at the end of 2014 already been deployed on disaster-relief missions in the US (following Hurricane Katrina) and in Pakistan after a major earthquake struck the country in 2005. Operational command alternates between Joint Forces Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and Naples, Italy.

Charter stipulations While the membership of the EU and NATO mostly overlaps (with 21 nations being members of both), there are some exceptions. Non-NATO Sweden, for instance, is, in fact, an EU member. Finland is similarly EU and non-NATO. Norway is a NATO member, but not a member of the EU, and the same applies to Turkey. Part of the charter forming the EUBGs demanded that there should be no duplication of what was done under NATO (with its established headquarters and commands), and no decoupling from the US and NATO, while it is stipulated that no discrimination be applied against non-EU members such as Turkey. Some capability could be gained for Europe if countries outside NATO with a background of non-alignment or neutrality – Sweden being an example – committed to the EUBG, and it is hard to argue that this would damage NATO. It would also be hard to find any European who would deny that the exceptional military-technological capability of the US was a cornerstone of NATO’s own capability. And if the underlying long-term agenda is to uncouple European defence from the US, EU and NATO insiders alike always emphasise that it is important to remember that the North Atlantic Alliance includes a North American member that is not the US: Canada – stable, eurocentric in background and policy, and a deeply dedicated peacekeeper nation.

In certain geographical areas, EU Battlegroups could be applied where US or NATO involvement would not be appropriate

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Safeguarding energy supplies Without oil and gas, Europe would grind to a halt. Simon Michell reveals how NATO is working alongside its partners to ensure that these vital supplies get through the Strait of Hormuz to the Mediterranean Sea and then on to their final destinations

its most recent figures for the first quarter of 2014, the  InInternational Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported 49 incidents of piracy on the high seas. This was the lowest figure since 2007, when it reported 41. At its highpoint, more than 400 attacks or attempted attacks were taking place per year (445 in 2010 and 439 in 2011). Much of the reason for this reduction in the number of incidents is the increase in the number of countries cooperating to monitor the situation and send naval vessels to protect shipping – particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and the waters that connect the Persian Gulf to the Suez Canal. Although there was much to be encouraged about in the IMB report, it nevertheless cited the example of an incident in January 2014 when a tanker was fired upon approximately 115 miles off the coast of Oman from a skiff launched from a mother vessel. Thankfully, the attack was repelled and the international navies that were patrolling the waters subsequently intercepted the skiff’s mother ship – an Indian dhow that had itself been hijacked only a few days previously. Some 11 Indian crew members were freed and five suspected pirates apprehended. This incident clearly demonstrates the essential role of the international navies in containing the threat of Somali piracy. The IMB, however, is insistent that, despite the drop in pirate attacks, the international maritime presence must be maintained. In the words of IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan, “there can therefore be no room for complacency as it will take only one successful Somali hijacking for the business model to return”. These waters are of paramount international relevance, as they are perhaps the single most important transit lane for energy supplies on the planet – almost 20 per cent of the world’s oil and gas is shipped through them.

a significant part of the operations that the Alliance carries out – particularly maritime security operations. At the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008, the allies were presented with a report entitled ‘NATO’s Role in Energy Security’, which outlined guiding principles, options and recommendations for activities. Since then, the impetus has been maintained and, in 2013, the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence was opened in Vilnius, Lithuania. At the inauguration ceremony, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated: “Energy security is not a call to arms. But, when it comes to understanding the security implications of global resource developments, NATO must be ahead of the curve.”

The increased naval presence in the waters around the Horn of Africa has managed to reduce considerably the incidence of attacks In principle, there are five main areas where NATO assists in the international effort to safeguard energy supplies: ■■ information and intelligence fusion and sharing; ■■ projecting stability; ■■ advancing international and regional cooperation; ■■ supporting consequence management; and ■■ supporting the protection of critical infrastructure.

International maritime security operations As the largest military alliance in the world, NATO undertakes widespread security operations in various regional locations worldwide. Stabilisation and peacekeeping are key roles for many of these missions, but energy security also represents

That said, much of the critical infrastructure related to oil and gas is located at sea, including drilling rigs, distribution platforms, pipelines and, of course, the tankers that ship the energy supplies around the world.

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This Japanese oil tanker sustained damage as it passed through the Strait of Hormuz in what was believed to have been a terrorist attack. Some 20 per cent of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s energy supplies must transit the narrow stretch of water

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Launched in 2001, NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour keeps a close watch for terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea

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NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM) at Northwood, London, is the headquarters for the Alliance’s counter-piracy and anti-terrorist naval activity. Its main area of operations is in the Mediterranean Sea, through which 65 per cent of energy supplies to Western Europe pass either above or below the water (undersea pipelines carry oil from Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain). Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), launched in 2001, when Article 5 of the NATO treaty was invoked for the first time following the attacks on New York’s Twin Towers and the Pentagon building in Washington, has a remit to monitor potential terrorist activity in the Mediterranean. Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2 are used in OAE, with non-NATO navies now also participating. So far, more than 115,000 vessels have been hailed and, of these, some 162 have been boarded by OAE sailors. The other major NATO maritime operation – also supervised from Northwood – is Operation Ocean Shield (OOS), which patrols the waters south of the Suez Canal, the southern approaches of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea,

NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, which patrols the waters south of the Suez Canal, is helping to contain piracy off the coast of Somalia

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and along a corridor shadowing the Somali coastline. This has a specific remit to, “provide naval escorts and deterrence, while increasing cooperation with other counter-piracy operations in the area in order to optimise efforts and tackle the evolving pirate trends and tactics”. As already mentioned, the increased naval presence in the waters around the Horn of Africa has managed to reduce considerably the incidence of attacks. So much so that, in June 2014, the North Atlantic Council extended Operation Ocean Shield until the end of 2016. A vital element of the maritime security work that NATO carries out in the energy security field is that of encouraging non-NATO navies to participate. The areas involved are so vast that it requires a much broader coalition to maintain a credible presence. Both OAE and OOS regularly interoperate with foreign navies outside the Alliance, among them Australia, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine. In addition, the European Union’s own anti-piracy force (EUNAVFOR) undertakes a complementary mission under the name Operation Atalanta, which involves a considerable amount of coordination and collaboration between the two forces. Added to that is the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, which operates in the same waters under a counter-piracy remit. Controlled out of Bahrain, the CTFs 150, 151 and 152 are units within a non-political grouping of 30 countries that are also involved in maritime security operations. Many of the NATO nations also contribute to Op Atalanta and the CTFs with the result that interoperability has become a much easier process. NATO, alongside its partners and friends, has shown that it is possible to counter piracy proliferation if the political will exists. However, the waters around the Arabian Sea may be safer now, but the piracy problem remains a challenge in South-East Asia, where the majority of pirate attacks currently take place. Another hotspot that is growing in intensity is off the West African coast. It remains to be seen whether the political will that was mustered to protect shipping in the waters off the Middle East can be achieved elsewhere.

This summer saw increased airport security surrounding mobile phones following intelligence suggesting they could be used to conceal explosive devices

Imagemore Co Ltd/Corbis

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Confronting terrorism Chris Aaron reviews the development of NATO’s counterterrorism role since 2001, and the focus of its new counterterrorism policy

1999 Strategic Concept identified terrorism as a  NATO’s threat to Alliance security. However, it emphasised that the threat was as much an issue of ‘force protection’ as of national security, and was only one of a range of security concerns, such as weapons proliferation and peripheral instability, that dominated in the post-Cold War security environment Clearly, NATO’s role in countering terrorism was under discussion, but the fundamental impetus for adopting a counterterrorism policy came with the 9/11 attacks on the United States, which led to the invocation of Article 5 on 12 September 2001. Edgar Buckley’s article in the summer 2006 issue of NATO Review provides a fascinating, first-hand account of that decision. The invocation of Article 5 paved the way for NATO to bring its political and military capabilities to the table in response to the terrorist attack. On 4 October 2001, NATO agreed eight measures to support the US, measures that significantly anticipated the terrorism role and policy that the Alliance subsequently adopted, as well as forming the basis for two antiterrorism missions: the deployment of NATO AWACS to the US, and Operation Active Endeavour to patrol the eastern Mediterranean to deter terrorist activity and illegal trafficking (a mission that continues in expanded form to this day). NATO summits in 2002 further developed the doctrinal basis for its engagement with terrorism: Reykjavik ended the debate on out-of-area operations and facilitated NATO support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and operations elsewhere, while the Prague Summit approved the development of NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism (MCDAT).

The invocation of Article 5 paved the way for NATO to bring its political and military capabilities to the table in response to 9/11 NATO Securing our world

This decade-long process of resetting NATO’s stance from one of territorial defence to security guarantor reached its culmination, or at least maturity, with regard to terrorism, at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, when the organisation approved policy guidelines on counterterrorism, subtitled ‘Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future’.

NATO’s ACE The MCDAT identified four roles: antiterrorism – essentially defensive measures; counterterrorism – primarily offensive measures; consequence management, mitigating the effects of a terrorist attack once it has taken place; and military cooperation. Given that, in most NATO states, it is civil authorities – such as police, security services and customs – that have the lead on terrorism, MCDAT also stated that NATO should deepen its collaboration with civil authorities to maximise its effectiveness against terrorism, while respecting national and institutional responsibilities. The policy guidelines on counterterrorism present these roles and wider issues, under the three pillars of awareness, capability and engagement (ACE). Awareness: Given its experience of managing shared security and sensitive information among a host of national members, NATO is in a position to improve a common understanding of terrorist threats and vulnerabilities among allies through consultation, the enhanced sharing of information and intelligence, continuous strategic analysis, and assessments in support of national authorities. The Emerging Security Challenges Division, created in NATO headquarters in August 2010, acts as a locus for the assessment of non-traditional risks and challenges, including terrorism, in a cross-cutting manner. The NATO Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU), also created in 2010, has resulted in an improved flow of terrorism analysis to the North Atlantic Council. Through the ILU in Brussels, and the intelligence liaison cell at Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium, analytical approaches to terrorism and its links with other

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Capability: Providing member states with the capability to deter, defend against and respond to terrorist attacks is another core function that NATO is well placed to deliver. Its knowledge and operational experience in the fields of airspace security, air defence, maritime security, CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) response, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protection of critical infrastructure and use of special forces is well established. Through the Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work (DAT POW), NATO aims to accelerate capability developments, and innovative technologies and methods that address asymmetric threats such as terrorism in a more comprehensive and informed way. DAT POW uses new or adapted technologies or methods to detect, disrupt and defeat asymmetric threats under three capability umbrellas: incident management, force protection/survivability and network engagement. The Centres of Excellence (CoE) structure, established as part of the Alliance transformation programme, will also contribute to capability and the sharing of lessons learnt, particularly through the Defence Against Terrorism CoE in Turkey, the HUMINT (Human Intelligence) CoE in Romania, and others. The training, education and exercises based on different threat scenarios organised by CoEs, as well as bodies such as the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, will continue to improve interoperability by assimilating lessons learnt and best practices. These capabilities may also be offered to allies (on request) in support of civil-emergency planning and the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly as it may relate to counterterrorism. NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme also contributes to developing new technologies for antiterrorism. The STANDEX project has been highlighted as a particular success. In a joint development with Russia, under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council, scientists have successfully fieldtested a stand-off explosives-detection system that can be used

Displaced Iraqis receive food from a charity in a refugee camp outside of Arbil. The recent emergence of ISIS (now ‘the Islamic State’) in Syria and Iraq has set alarm bells ringing across the West

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transnational threats have been enhanced, as has cooperation among the NATO civilian and military intelligence components and intelligence-sharing with partners.

Operation Active Endeavour was established as one of NATO’s antiterrorism measures following the invocation of Article 5 in 2001 in crowded spaces, such as transit systems or sports venues, to identify suspicious packages or individuals. While the system is now being developed for commercial production, further research is planned for wider applications for the detection techniques and systems to disrupt detected devices. Engagement: Information-sharing, consultations, exercises, education and Centres of Excellence all contribute to NATO’s abilities to counter terrorism, and serve to improve the capabilities of member states, but NATO recognises that combating terrorism requires a holistic approach by the international community. The Alliance aims to strengthen its cooperation with partner countries as well as international and regional organisations, in particular the United Nations, European Union and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. The UN Global CounterTerrorism Strategy, international conventions and protocols against terrorism, together with the relevant UN resolutions, provide a common framework for efforts to combat terrorism. NATO works closely with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and its executive directorate, as well as with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and many of its relevant component organisations, and has also established close relations with the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department’s Action Against Terrorism Unit. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T), which was adopted at the Prague Summit in November 2002, provides a framework for practical cooperation between NATO and partner countries. The action plan defines partnership roles as well as instruments to fight terrorism and manage its consequences. For instance, NATO and partner countries work together to improve the safety of airspace, including through exchange of data and coordination procedures related to the handling of possible terrorist threats. Originally developed under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the PAP-T has since been opened to participation of all partner countries. With the terrorist threat rising steadily in the US and Europe, NATO has a pivotal role to play in ensuring the safety of not just its citizens, but also those of its partners.

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Ethnic Albanians flee a Serb advance through the Drenica region, Kosovo, in March 1999. The conflict turned thousands of people into refugees

Moving forward on Kosovo NATO has been leading a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo since June 1999 as part of a wider effort to bring security and stability to the Balkans. Mike Bryant reviews the progress

3 April 2014, the upper airspace over Kosovo was  On reopened to civilian flights. Hungary’s air navigation service provider, Hungarocontrol, is acting as a technical enabler, although airspace will remain under NATO/KFOR (Kosovo Force) jurisdiction. According to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “the reopening of the upper airspace in Kosovo is a significant step that benefits the entire western Balkans”. It is thought that up to 180,000 civilian flights a year could be

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better off as a result, with shorter routes meaning reduced flight times as well as various consequential economic and environmental benefits. The reopening of Kosovo’s airspace forms part of a NATOled aviation normalisation process covering the wider western Balkans region, an effort that has encompassed not only NATO and the Government of Hungary, but also many neighbouring states, the European air traffic management organisation Eurocontrol, and several other partners.

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To check on progress, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Philip M Breedlove visited KFOR in Pristina in November 2013 KFOR first deployed into Kosovo on 12 June 1999, just two days after the suspension of the 78-day Operation Allied Force NATO air campaign over Kosovo that was designed to end the conflict in the region, which had turned thousands of people into refugees.

Peacekeeping Operation Allied Force was halted following the signing of a military technical agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The same day as the air campaign ceased, 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 welcomed Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the principles of a political solution, including an immediate end to violence. UNSCR 1244 also agreed the deployment of an international force to maintain the peace, one that featured substantial NATO involvement. KFOR – a peace enforcement (more commonly known as ‘peacekeeping’) mission operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – draws its mandate from that MTA and UNSCR 1244. Today, KFOR incorporates approximately 5,000 soldiers from up to 31 countries. It has remained in situ despite Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence that was announced in February 2008; indeed, its role grew around that time, NATO agreeing in June of that year to take on the missions of both standing down the local Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and creating a new multi-ethnic, lightly armed force called the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), which has the tasks of providing crisis response and assistance to civil authorities in the case of natural or other emergencies, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and assisting in civil protection. KSF was declared fully operational by the North Atlantic Council in July 2013. NATO has also helped in the creation of the body that exercises civilian control over the KSF. While primary responsibility for that lies with NATO Headquarters in Brussels, KFOR continues to support the NATO advisory team in Pristina, the capital of and largest city in Kosovo.

There has been a gradual transfer of responsibility for security at cultural heritage sites away from KFOR and towards the Kosovo Police A further development in April 2013 saw Belgrade and Pristina ink a ‘normalisation’ agreement, which has tangibly helped to improve relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Yet, at its core, KFOR’s mission remains what it was in 1999: peacekeeping. Initially deployed to protect ethnic Albanians from ‘ethnic cleansing’ (among a number of other missions, such as to demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA] and support the international humanitarian effort in the area), it has equally sought to protect ethnic Serbs from a similar fate. Its focus on preventing ethnic strife and protecting ethnic minorities has caused it to mount regular patrols near threatened communities, as well as man checkpoints in vulnerable localities. It has also acted to protect sites of historical value, although – in what is known as a process of

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KFOR currently operates with 5,000 personnel, 10 per cent of the original force

‘unfixing’ – there has been a gradual transfer of responsibility for security at religious and cultural heritage sites away from KFOR and into the hands of the Kosovo Police.

Restructuring Indeed, the ongoing improvement in relations between the various ethnic and political parties in Kosovo (although it is worth noting that there have been a number of armed clashes and this improvement has been by no means smooth nor constant) has allowed NATO to adopt a policy of reducing KFOR’s presence on the ground as a static force wherever possible, instead focusing on operational flexibility and effective intelligence collection to cope with any threats. KFOR has gradually adjusted its force posture into what is described by NATO as a “deterrence presence”. Troop reductions are decided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the basis of conditions on the ground, and are therefore not driven by a timetable. At 5,000 strong, KFOR’s current manpower level is roughly only 10 per cent of the 50,000 troops that made up the force when it was originally deployed back in 1999. In keeping the peace, KFOR continues to cooperate closely with the United Nations and European Union, as well as other

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relevant international agencies as appropriate, in order to support the development of a democratic, multi-ethnic, peaceful Kosovo. KFOR was initially stood up as four multinational brigades (MNBs), one in the east, one in the centre, one in the northeast and the last of the quartet in the south-west. In 2006, a reorganisation brought a move to five regionally based multinational task forces (MNTFs) and further change in February 2010 saw a switch to mission-tailored multinational battle groups (MNBGs). Further change was just around the corner, however, and, in October 2010, KFOR adopted its present structure of just two MNBGs. With MNBG East headquartered at Camp Bondsteel near Urosevac, and MNBG West headquartered at Camp Villagio Italia in Pec, HQ KFOR remains at Camp Film City in Pristina. Highly mobile and able to rapidly deploy at the first signs of trouble, the battle groups are each composed of numerous companies that are based at various camps throughout Kosovo. NATO also maintains a reserve force that can quickly provide reinforcement as and when it is required. KFOR is led by Commander KFOR (COMKFOR), who reports to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COMJFCN). The current COMKFOR is Major General Salvatore Farina, who assumed the command in September 2013.

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NATO’s disaster response NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre is responsible for coordinating disaster-relief efforts among the Alliance’s member and partner countries. Mike Bryant highlights how it handles the task with fortitude and skill

NATO’s principal civil-emergency response  Representing mechanism throughout the entire Euro-Atlantic region – for 28 NATO members and 22 partner countries – the EuroAtlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Handling requests for assistance and coordinating the response to both natural and man-made disasters, EADRCC forwards any requests for assistance to NATO and partner countries that, in response, communicate any offers of help back to the centre and/or the country affected by the disaster. Using its Aidmatrix software system, it maintains a record of assistance offered, assistance accepted, assistance still required, relevant dates, and the evolving situation in disaster-affected areas. Relevant information is fed to NATO and its partner countries in the form of daily situation reports, as well as being published on the NATO website.

International operations All of the centre’s work is undertaken in close cooperation with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which holds the primary role in coordinating international disaster-relief efforts. It also liaises closely with NATO non-military authorities and with other relevant international agencies. As such, EADRCC acts as a regional coordinating mechanism, supporting and complementing UN relief operations, rather than directing them. When a disaster occurs that requires international assistance, EADRCC submits requests – it does not dictate – to NATO members and partners as to what assistance they might provide based on the information that the centre can offer. And, of course, the authorities in the stricken country will remain the primary responsible party for disaster management. EADRCC forms part of the International Staff Operations Division based at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and is headed by the director of civil-emergency planning. Established in 1998 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the

centre was created to form one half of a twin-element strategy to coordinate the EAPC’s response to international disaster relief. The other element is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU), a non-standing multinational force of civilian and military elements that are deployable in the event of a disaster in any EAPC country. In the early part of its existence, EADRCC was heavily involved in coordinating the humanitarian assistance effort of EAPC nations supporting refugees from the Kosovo War. Since then, it has responded to more than 60 requests for assistance, most frequently relating to natural disasters, and – since 2004 – has coordinated assistance from NATO and partner nations in 40 different emergencies. For example, it helped in the response to the impact of Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 and the massive Pakistani floods of 2010. Most recently, in June 2014, EADRCC received a second request for assistance from Turkey in regard to the large numbers of Syrian refugees who had crossed the border into the country, fleeing from the fighting in their country. Just a month prior to that, in May, it responded to a request for assistance from Bosnia and Herzegovina in respect to flooding in that region. EADRCC operates with a small staff of fewer than 10, but this complement can be augmented by additional civilian or military NATO personnel or with EAPC delegations to NATO. The centre also exploits the experience and knowledge of national civil experts that can be called on to provide it with advice and information as required. NATO regards EADRCC as an example of what can be achieved when Alliance members and partners work closely together. It allows smaller and poorer, as well as larger and richer, countries to actively participate in disaster-response efforts; in so doing, many NATO partners – previously purely recipients of Alliance support – have also become valued contributors to its civilian operations. The exercises conducted on an annual basis under the EADRCC umbrella are intended to foster improved

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Those affected by the 2010 floods in Pakistan received assistance from NATOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)

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Syrian refugees arrive in Turkey. EADRCC has responded to Turkish requests for assistance with the flood of refugees from its neighbour collaboration between NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP) and other partner countries participating in them. They offer practice in standard disaster-response procedures and develop the interoperability and capability skills of the EADRU. They are among the largest and most complex civilian protection training opportunities, bringing together both military and civilian teams in exercises that are designed to be as challenging and realistic as possible. They take in scenarios as wide-ranging as flooding, storms and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) threat simulations. So far, EADRCC has held large-scale exercises in NATO member and partner countries, including Armenia, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Romania, the Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Expanding mandate As well as its primary responsibilities of coordinating the responses of EAPC countries to disasters occurring in their regions, maintaining close liaison with various UN and European Union bodies, and acting as a focal point for information-sharing among the relevant bodies involved in emergency response, EADRCC also has a number of dayto-day operational tasks that it very quickly assumed after its formation. These have included working with the UN Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) to maintain a list of national civil and military elements for which EAPC members have indicated potential availability, and conditions for their involvement in EADRU operations, and facilitating the rapid deployment of EADRU into disaster areas as and when required.

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Moreover, amendments to the centre’s remit have come about as a result of changes in the military operational environment. Thus, since the terrorist attacks in the US of 11 September 2001, EADRCC has been tasked with the coordination of international assistance from EAPC countries to help deal with the consequences of CBRN incidents, including terrorist attacks involving such weapons. Then, in 2004, the North Atlantic Council widened EADRCC’s mandate to include the handling of requests for assistance from the Afghan Government in the event of a

Since the Kosovo War, EADRCC has responded to more than 60 requests for assistance, most frequently relating to natural disasters natural disaster. In 2007, that remit was extended once more to incorporate those same provisions in respect of all areas in which NATO had been involved militarily. Clearly, while the EADRCC’s mandate has evolved and grown over the years, the centre has continued to play a pivotal role in supporting disaster relief work in countries right across the Euro-Atlantic zone.

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Rebalancing NATO forces Professor Julian Lindley-French, senior fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, examines the implications of more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, and argues that NATO must go back to its first principles if it is to counter diverse 21st-century threats

enemy may be seen or unseen… it is not massed  “The tanks on the European mainland we need, but the latest in cyberwarfare, unmanned aircraft technology and Special Forces capability.” In announcing an additional £1.1 billion expenditure on the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces on 14 July 2014, UK Prime Minister David Cameron captured the essential dilemma NATO and the forces of its member states face: what to plan for? As host of the September 2014 NATO Wales Summit, Cameron is fully aware of the choices faced by the Alliance as it pulls out of Afghanistan and, for the first time, properly considers its place in a dangerous 21st century. Much of the focus remains on the struggle against Islamic fundamentalism that led NATO to deploy to Afghanistan and which remains a central security concern for almost all Alliance members. However, with Russia’s 2014 usurpation of UkraineCrimea and the growing cyber-threat from both state and nonstate actors, the very concept of ‘defence’ needs to be revisited by NATO. In other words, if NATO and its member nations are to resolve the force-planning dilemma, the Alliance needs to go back to first principles. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen pointed out in 2014 that while defence spending in several NATO nations had decreased by more than 20 per cent over the past five years, Russia had increased its spending by 10 per cent in real terms each year over the same period. Indeed, Moscow now devotes 20 per cent of all public expenditure to defence as part of the 2010 Defence Modernisation Programme. Similarly, China expanded its defence budget by 12.7 per cent in 2013, the latest year-on-year double-digit increase since 1989. As the Alliance emerges from Afghanistan and a 13-year campaign determinedly focused on stabilisation and reconstruction, it is clear that NATO’s centre of gravity will once again need to become far more strategic. In forceplanning terms, that will require a military capability that is able to operate across the mission spectrum from low- to

high-end operations. Moreover, there are likely to be far more of these operations than in the recent past. However, such an upgrade in capability and capacity is hindered by two fundamental challenges. First, the United States plans to cut its defence budget to $450 billion by 2020, which implies a cut greater than the combined annual defence expenditure of all the European allies. Second, because the US is increasingly being called upon to act as the strategic stabiliser across the Asia-Pacific region, European forces will need to become more autonomous from the Americans, while at the same time, integrating more closely with them.

European forces will need to become more autonomous from the Americans, while at the same time, integrating more closely with them The change in the essential strategic contract that such a shift implies between America and its European allies is perhaps the greatest challenge the Alliance faces. Traditionally, European forces have provided relatively weak spokes to the American force hub. That must change. Indeed, implicit in the July 2014 launch of the first of Britain’s two super-carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth, is the creation of a European force hub able to support and strengthen the Americans while acting, if needs be, as an autonomous hub over time and distance. In fact, NATO already considered its strategic future back in 2010, but simply failed to act on it as operations swamped strategy. Indeed, the 2010 Strategic Concept provides more than

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NATO forces attend the scene of a suicide carbomb attack in Kabul. As the Alliance pulls out of Afghanistan, countering Islamic fundamentalism remains a focus for most members

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strengthening military capabilities

Russian servicemen near the Ukrainian border. NATO must rebuild its conventional deterrent credibility in order to counter Russian expansionism enough strategic guidance, but has hitherto lacked sufficient political investment. An essential NATO dilemma is the extent to which ‘strategy’ will for once trump ‘politics’ in Europe. While any meaningful strategic horizon scan would suggest such a need, deep barriers remain. First, the eurozone crisis and austerity politics in Europe have tended to make governments view defence as a luxury and thus a budget to be cut. Second, sound strategy is established first and foremost on strategic unity of effort and purpose. Germany is now Europe’s strongest political power, but remains deeply ambivalent about the use of force and indeed, its relationship with the US. Third, Operation Unified Protector over Libya revealed deep capability gaps, particularly in terms of the so-called strategic enablers of ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) air-to-air refuelling and remotely piloted air systems (RPAS). And yet, implicit in the Strategic Concept, the need for the Alliance to generate influence across the mission spectrum remains and pertains. That means a NATO able to offer continuing support to a fragile Afghanistan beyond the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and at the same time capable of acting as a credible conventional deterrent and, if needs be, a war-fighter to prevent the kind of adventurism in which Russia has recently been engaged. Given the widening gap between NATO military capability and capacity, a radical approach is the most prudent one.

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NATO’s Article 5 collective defence architecture remains the bedrock of Alliance credibility. And yet, it is in urgent need of modernisation – based on the following three elements: missile defence, cyber defence and deeply joint, networked advanced expeditionary forces. However, it is the 21st-century balance between protection and projection that is the key to NATO’s continued strategic utility. It is vital that NATO helps pioneer a new type of deep, joint force able to operate across air, sea, land, cyber, space and knowledge. It is a force that must also be able to play its full part in cross-government civilian and military efforts building on the lessons from the ISAF campaign. To realise such a vision, the Alliance will need to go beyond Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative. Deep connectivity will require NATO’s command structures to be further reformed, with transformation and experimentation brought to the fore. NATO’s European allies need to undergo a profound mindset change if they and the Alliance are to deal with the harsh realities of a hyper-competitive future and the harsh strategic judgements it will impose. Life after Afghanistan will not be easy or quiet for the Alliance. At the very least, all NATO European allies must spend more and spend better. They must invest the agreed two per cent a year of their national wealth (GDP) in their armed forces and drive forward military reforms, as well as pooling, sharing and some defence integration.

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Closing the gap The United States still provides the lion’s share of a number of crucial NATO capabilities. Jim Winchester reviews how European member countries are seeking to reduce the imbalance

United States has worldwide responsibilities outside  The NATO, so comparing numbers of platforms is not always fair, but numbers provide the ability to surge resources to any region in times of crisis. For example, 80 per cent of sorties over Libya during NATO’s Operation Allied Protector in 2011 were flown by US assets. Wanting to increase their share of the contribution to operations, European NATO countries, as well as a number of partner nations, are modernising fleets and pooling assets for greater efficiency, but generally not increasing the number of airframes in their respective air arms. The United States Air Force’s Air Mobility Command operates almost 300 of the huge C-17 Globemaster III and C-5 Galaxy jet transport aircraft alone, supplemented by a large civil

reserve air fleet (CRAF). This befits America’s long-standing global missions, but with increasing out-of-area operations conducted by European countries in recent decades, moves to create a force capable of strategic reach are bearing fruit.

Capabilities: areas of focus Under the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative, NATO has operated three C-17s since 2009, with some 10 countries, including the non-NATO Sweden and Finland, participating in the Heavy Airlift Wing based at Pápa, Hungary. In addition, an overlapping group of 12 European countries is involved in the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), which charters Antonov An-124-100 aircraft from Russian

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The UK is considering leasing or buying the P-8 Poseidon as a possible replacement for the cancelled Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft

and Ukrainian companies as an interim solution pending deliveries of the Airbus A400M Atlas. The Atlas, which fits neatly between the C-17 and the smaller C-130J Hercules in terms of range and capacity, is at last entering service with France and Turkey, to be followed by Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and, finally, Luxembourg by 2018. In all, 180 A400Ms are on order for NATO countries. Again, the US air-to-air refuelling (tanker) fleet dwarfs that of Europe with around 650 aircraft in service, but, at the same time, replacement programmes for legacy aircraft have progressed further in Europe than they have in the US. For example, Italy has already introduced Boeing 767-based tankers, whereas the KC-46A Pegasus, which is also based on the Boeing 767, is not expected to enter United States Air Force service before 2017. Airbus A330 tanker/transports are beginning to enter service with the UK and France (14 each) and Spain (two). However, according to the European Defence Agency (EDA), there are only 42 refuelling platforms across Europe, made up of 12 types (as of late 2013), including some KC-130s and C-160 Transalls. Both types and numbers have since reduced with the retirement of the RAF’s VC-10 and TriStar. The EDA has made refuelling a priority and is establishing a programme of pooling and sharing, but, in the short term, has suggested leasing or contracting commercial providers. The first option has not met with much enthusiasm from member states, while the single commercial air refuelling operator has had only

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occasional European work to date. In November 2012, 10 countries (Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Spain) agreed to work towards the acquisition of a common European strategic Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT), with an initial operational capability (IOC) of 2020.

According to the European Defence Agency, there are only 42 refuelling platforms across Europe With the addition of Spain in January 2015, the European Air Transport Command (EATC), founded in 2010, will have six members. Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, France and Luxembourg have assigned transport, tanker and medevac assets to the EATC comprising nearly 150 aircraft of more than a dozen types. Missions and training events are planned, tasked and controlled from the EATC headquarters in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. The EATC has organised several exercises in 2014, including European Air-to-Air Refuelling Training (EATT), which took place in June at Bulgaria’s Plovdiv Airbase, and

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Airbus Military

strengthening military capabilities

NATO’s European members have ordered some 180 Airbus A400M Atlas aircraft to help fill the tactical airlift gap the European Advanced Airlift Tactics Training Course (AATTC), which is to be held in Spain in September. Aside from the long-standing NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) Force of E-3D Sentry aircraft, based in Germany at the Geilenkirchen NATO Air Base, European ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) cooperation is on a much more limited basis, although progress is being made. That said, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme has existed for 23 years without yet fielding any platforms. At one time, a manned platform, then a mixed manned/unmanned fleet, AGS will now comprise five Global Hawk Block 40 highaltitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operated by 12 NATO countries on behalf of all 28. The UK and France will also contribute a number of Sentinel aircraft and Heron TP UAVs to the system, which will be run along the lines of the AEW&C Force, beginning in 2016-18 and based out of Sigonella, Italy. European air arms field a small and disparate collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft used mainly for national taskings. One rare example of trans-NATO cooperation that is actually in place is the UK’s acquisition from the US of the RC-135W Rivet Joint under Project Airseeker to fill the gap left by the Nimrod R1 retirement. However, there is no replacement on the horizon for France’s Transall C-160G Gabriel SIGINT and C-160H Astarté communications relay aircraft or Sweden’s Gulfstream S102B Korpen. The utility of the UK’s Global Express-based Sentinel and King Air-based Shadow platforms

has been recognised by extending their service beyond the previously stated out-of-service date of 2015, in a decision recently announced at the 2014 Farnborough Air Show. There are no multinational arrangements in Europe at this time for the long-range maritime patrol (LRMPA) role. The US Navy is replacing its 1950s-designed P-3 Orion with the P-8 Poseidon, while most other P-3 users are in a constant cycle of reworks and systems upgrades. The Dutch, however, sold their P-3s to the Germans in 2005 and the British took a ‘capability holiday’ when the Nimrod MRA4 project was cancelled under the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Many British personnel are flying with the US and other allied nations as ‘seedcorn’ to regenerate a LRMPA capability, although a decision on whether to do this must await the 2015 SDSR. UK defence officials have reportedly been showing strong interest in the P-8 and have not ruled out leasing, an arrangement that was used to introduce the C-17 in the 2000s. In the meantime, the reprieved Sentinels are to get expanded maritime capabilities.

Conclusion In summary, the last few years have seen several new initiatives get off the ground to increase European cooperation, and these are now seeing results in terms of the more efficient allocation of resources and increased common training programmes. Not all the countries on this side of the Atlantic are participating in every one of these arrangements, but progress is being made within the constraints of defence budgets that have long been shrinking or static in real terms.

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strengthening military capabilities

Ramping up NATO cyber defence Simon Michell highlights NATO’s growing competence in the cybersecurity realm and looks at the benefits of sharing knowledge

the run-up to the May 2014 unofficial Ukrainian  Inreferendum for the establishment of independent entities in the eastern part of the country, a number of NATO’s public domain websites crashed after suffering cyberattacks. The affected sites were back up and running very quickly, and NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu confirmed that the attacks had not had any operational impact on the Alliance’s capability. NATO has long been aware of cyber vulnerability; as far back as its Prague Summit in 2002 – five years before the massive attacks that brought parts of Estonia’s national IT infrastructure to a standstill – the Alliance decided to put cyber defence firmly on the political agenda. During a NATO defence ministers’ meeting in June 2007, just a few weeks after the events in Estonia, it was agreed that a thorough assessment of the Alliance’s approach to cyber defence was urgently needed. The findings recommended specific roles for the Alliance as well as the implementation of a number of new measures aimed at improving cyber protection. The development of a NATO cyber defence policy was called for – which was particularly timely given that the 2008 conflict in Georgia highlighted the use of cyber as a major component of conventional warfare. The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) was established in Tallinn, Estonia, in 2008 with a remit to “enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO nations and partners in cyber defence by virtue of education, research and development, lessons learned and consultation”. It is perhaps ironic that Estonia had first proposed the concept of a cyber defence centre in 2004, the same year it joined the Alliance. In June 2011, NATO defence ministers approved a revised cyber defence policy and an associated action plan, the details of which were agreed the following October. From then

on, cyber was steadily incorporated into all levels of NATO infrastructure and day-to-day operations. In April 2012, cyber was integrated into the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), meaning that national and Alliance cyber activities would be harmonised in order to meet agreed targets.

Strategic steps to counter cyber intrusions The following month, the Chicago Summit ruled to bring all of the Alliance’s networks under centralised protection and set about bolstering the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC). A tight deadline was set for completion of the work. The Secretary General’s annual report that year confirmed that “2013 was a year of considerable progress in NATO’s ability to defend itself against cyberattacks. NATO has implemented NCIRC centralised protection at NATO headquarters, commands and agencies. This is a major upgrade of NATO’s protection against the cyberthreat. NATO networks in the 51 NATO locations that make up NATO headquarters, the NATO command structure and NATO agencies are under comprehensive 24/7 surveillance and protected by enhanced sensors and intrusion detection technologies.” Alongside this initiative, NATO also launched in November 2013 a ‘smart defence’ project – the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) – aimed at helping to defeat cyber intrusions. NATO said: “The ultimate goal of the project is to develop a NATO capability, available to all NATO nations, through which nations commit to sharing their information.” As such, MISP, with Belgium as the lead nation, will facilitate information sharing of the technical characteristics of malware within a trusted community without having to share details of an attack. Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, Assistant Secretary General for NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges division,

Shared knowledge and interoperability are key to implementing a comprehensive cyber defence policy and strategy

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The 2008 conflict in Georgia highlighted cyber as a component of conventional warfare

said of the significant step: “The common development of a new capability under the umbrella of NATO also helps to ensure the interoperability among those who share this capability.”

Cybersecurity exercises Shared knowledge and interoperability are key to implementing a comprehensive cyber defence policy and strategy. Another way NATO is embedding this concept into its operations is through two main series of exercises. The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) is responsible for holding the annual Locked Shields exercises, the latest of which, held in May 2014, brought together nearly 300 participants from 17 nations. Over two days, 12 teams of defenders from all over Europe were pitted against one attacking team with the aim of training the teams of IT specialists to detect and mitigate large-scale cyberattacks and handle security incidents. Although the scenarios for these types of exercises are fictitious and the events take place in a specially built selfcontained environment, the attack and defence methods used are real, thereby giving the defending teams an opportunity to test their skills under real-life conditions. Equally as important, the teams need to work together, which helps to strengthen the international security community by

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establishing trusted networks, as well as getting them used to the practice of sharing information and experience. The other main training effort is the three-day annual Cyber Coalition exercise, which is now in its sixth year. Cyber Coalition 2013 was hosted by the Estonian Defence College in Tartu. With over 30 nations (the 28 NATO member states as well as non-NATO partners: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland, plus observers from the European Union and New Zealand) taking part, it was the largest training exercise of its kind ever to have taken place. Although similar to Locked Shields, the Cyber Coalition exercises have a somewhat broader scope in that they help to train technical personnel and their leadership and to test the ability of allies and partners to coordinate and cooperate their actions in warding off multiple simulated cyberattacks. Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO, highlighted the importance of the exercise and similar efforts, by pointing out that there is a range of differing skill levels across the Alliance that all need to be brought up to a consistent standard: “In NATO we are always vulnerable through our weakest link.” By establishing a higher benchmark across the Alliance, all nations within it are better able to cope with the growing menace.

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Taking the lead on cybersecurity Peter Roberts, Senior Research Fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), reviews how the United States is evolving its cyber defence strategies and legislation to tackle increasingly complex threats

10 June 2010, Senators Joe Lieberman, Susan Collins  On and Tom Carper proposed the introduction of legislation

U.S. Air Force photo by William Belcher

entitled ‘Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset’. The aim was to provide resilience to American cyber capabilities by legalising actions against attacks that had the potential to disrupt either telecommunications or the country’s economy. This followed a series of studies by both the Bush and Obama administrations into national cyber vulnerabilities and the legalisation of potential response options. This analysis and the legislation enacted through the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, et al, resulted in the development of a US Government mandate for cyberspace that has come to be known as ‘Protect the Nation’. The actions enabled by those cyber-protection policies provide reassurance to companies physically located in the US. The ‘cyber over-watch’ of the combined presence of the National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS and the newly created US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) underpins economic protection and resilience. It also acts as a cyber safety net to the US Defense Enterprise against industrial

The 624th Operations Center at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas, where personnel conduct cyber operations for the Air Force network

and international espionage activity. The safeguards that those agencies provide are largely focused on ensuring that research and development, exquisite technological improvements and breakthroughs are not lost to competitors. They also have a secondary role in protecting US forces deployed at range from the continental US.

Developing a national cybersecurity strategy: challenges and opportunities As governments deploy smaller military force packages, there is a reliance on the connectivity between the deployed units and their home operating bases to enable operational command and control, as well as for logistical and administrative support. While undoubtedly creating efficiencies, that connectivity has now also become a critical vulnerability, which can be exploited by third parties. Attacks on cyber networks or operating systems have been demonstrated to have significant advantage in military campaigns and as with many concepts, transfer easily into a commercial construct. Unpicking the supply-chain network within any business model rapidly overcomes technological superiority and resilience, or to put another way, their competitive advantage. The past decade has seen a marked rise in disruption of the supply or distribution chain in both the military and industrial sectors through cyber failures or attacks. The role of US Government agencies in mitigating these impacts is critical to preventing wider damage across the defence, security and industrial sectors. Commercial benefits, in terms of such things as data protection, intellectual property protection, counter industrial espionage and protection of reputation are all useful by-products of the US Government mandate. Few other nations have established a ‘protect the nation’ mandate for execution by their own security and intelligence services or militaries, leaving industry to be self-sufficient in network protection and vulnerability testing. It is possible that in future, some governments may take responsibility for the cyber elements of critical national infrastructure,

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Strengthening military capabilities

The responsibility for cybersecurity is falling on companies that are bearing the costs of cyber insurance premiums networks to be tested to a given level of resilience. The resultant business model could allow an organisation to map its network architecture, system configuration, software, application accesses and current security system to ‘play’ that specific system on a cyber-range facility against a series of increasingly complex tests and threats. The resulting system analysis would demonstrate cyber vulnerabilities against an industry standard scorecard, which, in turn, would deliver analysis that would allow insurance underwriters to charge more appropriate premiums as well as providing company boards and stakeholders with reassurance. A measured assurance standard would also enable governments to award contracts with a better understanding of the cyber risk that accompanied it. There is no such system currently in use in Europe, although cyber ranges and assessment tools are indeed already available. The utility for both business and government is, however, clear. One has only to consider the impact that the Thatcham standard had on the car insurance industry in the 1990s to acknowledge the benefits that such a systematic approach could bring across the cybersphere.

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but few appear to have an appetite for providing direct cyber protection to engineering and logistics firms that service, supply and sustain government contracts, let alone other elements of their economies. This may appear a nonsensical approach given that disruption to the national supply chain could do lasting damage to a nation state. However, governments face a media environment that is fiercely resistant to increased official involvement in cyberspace, and complex issues relating to legality, resources and expertise. Thus, the responsibility for cybersecurity is falling on companies that are, in turn, bearing the costs of cyber insurance premiums. Since there is little agreement about what good cybersecurity looks like, companies are unsurprisingly at a loss as to what standard they are seeking to achieve and thus the amount of resource they need to invest by way of mitigation to protect their data and online reputation. Moreover, it is also entirely feasible that governments will start to require assurance from industry over cyber and network security when considering the awarding of government contracts. The difficulty here is how to provide that assurance when there is no established standard. Several governments have gone so far as to advocate the SANS 20 Critical Security Controls as an ‘approach’ companies may wish to adopt, but have gone no further in their facilitation of this. Various routes to achieving a cyber standard have been offered, but few have been widely adopted. They have been centred primarily on internal training and self-reporting, neither of which significantly lower premiums. An alternative path may result from a conflation of insurance premium charges and the availability of ‘cyber ranges’ that enable

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The SM-3 missile forms the backbone of NATOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s emerging sea-based ballistic missile defence capability

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strengthening military capabilities

NATO ballistic missile defence: is it achievable? Defence consultant and missile defence expert Jeffrey Allen Baxter examines NATO’s growing ability to counter ballistic missile attacks

art of warfare has always been a constant struggle  The between offence and defence. Ballistic missile defence (BMD) is no exception. Ever since Germany peppered the United Kingdom with the devastating V-2 rockets during the Second World War, offence has outpaced defence. That is, until now. Successful missile intercepts employing systems such as Aegis, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and even the Israeli Iron Dome have proven that defence is catching up and reliable BMD is an achievable goal. NATO should, and will, play a vital role in the future of BMD. The BMD playing field is beginning to even out, and the shield is now demonstrating that it can deal with the sword.

The need for NATO BMD The threat to NATO and United States-deployed forces from ballistic missiles (BMs) was highlighted at the 2011 Multinational BMD Conference by Frank A Rose, deputy assistant secretary at the US Department of State’s Bureau of Arms of Control, Verification and Compliance. In his speech to the audience in Copenhagen, he pointed out that “the threat from short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies and partners is growing, and this threat is likely to increase in both volume and complexity in the coming years. Many states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, mobile and survivable. Trends in ballistic missiles show increased ranges, more advanced propellant systems, better protection from pre-launch attack and the ability to counter BMD systems.” Inventories and capabilities of all classes of BMs are growing, not only among current states with ballistic missile capabilities, but among other countries as well. The major threats to NATO and deployed US Forces in the Middle East come from Iran and Syria, both of which have fielded short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-

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range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), with Iran also considered to be developing and testing intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Added to that, the increasing rise of well-funded non-state actors has meant that the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) delivered from SRBMs has become a more tangible menace. In short, the proliferation of BMs now threatens NATO and US defences, as well as high-value targets and key population centres. According to the 2013 National Air and Space Intelligence Center’s (NASIC) Ballistic & Cruise Missile Threat report, Iran has launched a mobile, solid propellant MRBM (2009); successfully tested the liquid-fuelled Qiam-1 (2010); fielded the third-generation Fateh-110 (2010); successfully tested the fourth generation of the Fateh-110 and an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) variant (2012); fielded the 2,000km-range Shahab 3 (2012); tested the 2,000km-range solid propellant Sejil; and conducted several launches of its Safir space-launch vehicle – a potential technology precursor to Iran’s ICBM pursuits. As extensive as this list is, NASIC cites that Iran may only have fewer than 100 SRBM and 50 MRBM/IRBM launchers. In a similar vein, Syria is reported to have fewer than 100 SRBM launchers. However, launchers can be reloaded, masking the true magnitude of the ballistic missile threat. Nevertheless, these countries are inexorably adding to their ballistic missile inventories. It is, therefore, essential that NATO continues to develop a strategy of robust situational awareness, alongside an offensive and defensive strike capability, in order to deter ballistic missile attacks on any NATO country.

Effective ballistic missile defence There are three basic phases in the flight of a ballistic missile: the boost, midcourse and terminal. Each phase generates advantages and disadvantages for missile defence systems. The boost phase is defined as lasting from launch

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Work has started on the Aegis Ashore facility with SPY-1 radar and SM-3 land-based interceptors in Deveselu, Romania to booster burnout. A ballistic missile is most vulnerable in its boost phase, given its relatively clear ballistic trajectory, large signature, lack of penetration aids (penaids), limited manoeuvring capability, and the presence of large amounts of explosive propellant. Despite these factors, intercept timelines are short and require interceptors to be extremely fast and located very close to the adversary’s launch sites. The midcourse phase starts at booster burnout through warhead re-entry. It is the longest phase of flight, thereby offering the longest engagement times. However, this phase presents significant challenges for BMD sensors in maintaining a continuous track on the target, owing to the distances compared with those of the boost phase, as well as smaller signatures and the possible deployment of penaids. Ranges and speeds require very powerful radars and large interceptors. Moreover, the BMD system may also have to deal with manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MARVs) and multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVS). The terminal phase is defined as the time from re-entry to warhead impact. While intercept timelines are short, there are no decoys to consider, allowing for terminal BMD systems – both radars and interceptors – to be smaller. That said, the threat might easily overwhelm these missile defence systems with raid saturation, MARVs and MIRVs. Furthermore, nontraditional penaids – cyberattacks and electronic warfare on key missile defence networks, sensors and communications nodes, or direct kinetic attack from terrorist actions – present further challenges to terminal defences.

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Understanding the specifics in a BMD kill chain is vital. The key steps are: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); detection; tracking; identification; threat assessment; engagement; and kill assessment or battle damage assessment (BDA). ISR refers to the collection of as much information and knowledge as possible regarding the adversaries’ capabilities (tactics, performance, numbers and so on), deployment of forces, and intent. Early detection provides greater opportunities for engagement planning and calculating the launch point, as well as a larger intercept window. Tracking refers to determining target location, speed and direction. Identification, using ISR and detection data, and intelligence estimates, helps determine target class, type and predicted impact point. Sensors involved in the first three steps include space-based infrared (IR) sensors, surface-based and airborne radars, and IR and visual sensors. As the data is collected, it must be fed into a command, control and communications, and battle management (C3BM) system that processes sufficient data to predict threat launch points (where the targets are in the battle space) and impact points, as well as to generate an appropriate response to each threat. Engagement is currently the act of firing an interceptor to destroy the target. Lastly, BDA leverages several of the same systems from the first three steps to determine whether the engagement was successful or not, and presents the next steps for possible re-engagement. Two of the biggest challenges are having enough of the right type of sensors and interceptors in the right locations, as well as access to robust and secure distributed networks to implement C3BM to all the BMD nodes.

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An SM-3 Block 1B interceptor is launched from USS Lake Erie during a Missile Defense Agency test. More SM-3 Block 1B interceptors are to be deployed as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, expanding the area defended from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles Even with a direct hit on an inbound ballistic missile, debris from the engagement has the potential to cause widespread damage, especially if the missiles are armed with WMD. The main challenges associated with debris mitigation are therefore: ■■ tracking debris over multiple theatres and coordination between theatres; ■■ predicting the direction and size of the debris field; and ■■ optimising shot strategies to mitigate the effects of debris on population centres or other countries and locations.

Along with the challenges stated above, BMD effectiveness must be balanced with affordability. To that end, several factors should be considered. First is the scalability of the overall architecture and how it is to be implemented. The principles of open architecture should be applied to the greatest extent, and consideration must be given to multinational security concerns as well as interoperability. Furthermore, the ability to rapidly integrate new and legacy systems in a ‘plug and play’ manner greatly reduces overall system integration and validation costs.

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Second, design considerations for BMD sensors, interceptors, communications, C3BM and networks must factor in not only the required capabilities for the near and far term, but also vulnerabilities at a system and subsystem level. Lastly, the effectiveness and affordability of any given architecture must take into account the adversary’s understanding of NATO and US BMD capabilities, the mobility of threat systems, components and inventory robustness.

Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence In 2005, NATO established the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme to protect deployed NATO forces from SRBMs and MRBMs. Less than a decade later, following NATO summits in Lisbon in 2010 and Chicago in 2012, the ALTBMD mission was expanded to include the protection of NATO European populations and territory from all classes of ballistic missiles. Accordingly, the ALTBMD Programme Office was renamed the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Programme Office in July 2012. Conscious of the potential impact this decision may have had on non-NATO countries – particularly Russia – NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow has categorically stated: “The NATO system is designed to be big enough to defend against limited attacks by states and non-state actors potentially threatening us, while remaining small enough not to fuel regional arms races. It is configured (in terms of the types of interceptors, their numbers and locations) to defend against the principal threats to NATO’s European territory, namely, countries in the Middle East, and is not directed against Russia’s much larger and more sophisticated strategic deterrent forces.” Under the NATO BMD programme, the system will consist of a multi-layered (space, air, land and sea) collection of distributed sensors and interceptors provided by NATO member countries, to deliver lower-layer BMD coverage. NATO itself will develop and provide the C3BM system to integrate each country’s capabilities into a collective NATO capability. In addition, the US contribution to the defence of Europe, called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), will be integrated with NATO’s BMD programme to address the upper-layer defence requirements. On 27 January 2011, the ALTBMD Programme Office delivered the first mobile and deployable interim C3BM capability to NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Germany. This interim capability allows for BMD planning, the linking of radars and interceptors from each contributing country into a lower-layered BMD capability, the provision of early warning of incoming ballistic missiles, and the limited monitoring and direction of theatre missile defence assets. Significantly, the interim capability will be interoperable with the EPAA’s command, control, battle management and communications (C2BMC) sensors and interceptors.

Full operational capability (FOC) of a NATO BMD system that will provide complete coverage and protection for all of NATO’s European populations, territory and forces is expected by 2018. This initial FOC will include an upgraded C3BM system that will be fully integrated with NATO’s air defence system; AN/TPY-2 radar(s) stationed in Turkey; the Aegis Ashore site with SPY-1 radar and SM-3 land-based interceptors stationed in Romania (2015) and Poland (2018); four Dutch air defence frigates with BMD-capable radars; the NATO BMD C3BM system hosted by Germany; and four US Aegis BMD ships to be stationed in Spain. Lastly, there are plans for possible NATO-Russian BMD cooperation, as witnessed in the 2012 simulated missile defence exercise, although recent events have put these on hold.

US European Phased Adaptive Approach In 2009, the US announced a change in its long-standing BMD approach to Europe. Under the Obama administration’s new BMD strategy, the plan for US Homeland BMD to counter ICBMs from rogue nations using ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and missile-defence radars in Poland and the Czech Republic will be replaced with a Phased Adaptive Approach, for the protection of US forces and allies from SRBMs and MRBMs. The Approach is divided into three phases. Phase One (today’s capability) is designed to counter existing SRBM and MRBM threats using current proven BMD systems, including US Aegis BMD-capable ships, forward-based AN/TPY-2 radars, as well as upgrades to the C2BMC system at NATO’s CAOC at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Phase Two (2015) expands the defended area coverage against SRBMs and MRBMs with the deployment of more capable SM-3 Block 1B interceptors (US Aegis BMD ships, a land-based relocatable Aegis Ashore site in Romania), and a longer-range, networked and interoperable regional BMD with NATO’s BMD C3BM system. This construct allows for launch on remote, leveraging forward-based sensor data for an enhanced engagement capability, and an expanded battle space. Phase Three (2018) expands BMD capability to counter SRBMs, MRBMs and IRBMs for the whole of Europe, with the deployment of the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA interceptor with a longer range and advanced seeker capabilities, an improved networked capability through C2BMC upgrades to provide engage on remote, and a second Aegis Ashore site located in Poland. Protecting NATO forces and populations from attack while maintaining cordial relations with its neighbours stands as one of the most difficult challenges facing NATO’s leadership. The summit in Wales is the perfect opportunity to underline NATO’s resolve to provide a collective defence to all its members.

Under the NATO BMD programme, the system will consist of a multilayered collection of distributed sensors and interceptors provided by NATO member countries

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STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Upwardly mobile Airborne transport is a critical feature of modern military operations. Yet, with the exception of the United States, NATO countries still do not possess enough airlift capacity. Alan Dron explains how the Alliance is pooling its resources to address this imbalance

capacity is one of those capabilities of which  Airlift military commanders never have enough. Since the end of the Cold War, as expeditionary warfare has become the norm, the need to transport personnel and heavy equipment over long distances, quickly, has become increasingly important. With this in mind, NATO has three projects in place to strengthen its abilities in this sector: the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) and the HIP Helicopter Task Force (HIP TF). The need for airlift capacity was graphically shown last year with France’s intervention to block Islamist rebels from capturing the Malian capital, Bamako. Paris requested help from Washington, London and Ottawa in order urgently to move troops and equipment to the West African country to block the advancing insurgents. Within 48 hours, two British Royal Air Force Boeing C-17 Globemaster IIIs were at Évreux airbase, near Paris, embarking men and armoured vehicles. The following day, Canada provided another C-17 and the United States Air Force (USAF) then dispatched five more to transport a French mechanised infantry battalion to Bamako from IstresLe Tubé airbase in southern France. Five other NATO countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain) provided transport aircraft, along with a further C-17 from the SAC’s Heavy Airlift Wing, based at Pápa airbase in Hungary, and were also involved in moving materiel to Mali. The incident demonstrated the vital role that airlift plays in modern military operations. It also illustrated the SAC’s ability to cater for the needs of NATO members that do not possess sufficient heavy military cargo capabilities of their own.

The Strategic Airlift Capability Ten NATO countries, plus two Partnership for Peace countries, formed the SAC in 2008. They acquired three C-17s and now manage, support and operate them on behalf of NATO. Pooling resources makes significant financial savings possible, and the SAC arrangement gives countries access to assets that would be too costly for them to acquire as individual purchasers. The Boeing C-17 Globemaster III is a strategic transport aircraft capable of carrying a payload of 72 tonnes of cargo over 4,450km (2,400 nautical miles). That capability makes it

one of the very few aircraft in the world able to carry modern main battle tanks. It has the useful ability – unusual for such a large aircraft – to use rough, short airstrips, making use of its reverse thrust to shorten its landing run, enabling it to deliver supplies close to where they are required. The SAC C-17s are configured and equipped to the same standard as those operated by the USAF. This commonality aids operational integration during multinational missions. They are used primarily to meet national requirements, but are also able to be allocated for NATO, United Nations or European Union use. The SAC Heavy Airlift Wing has been involved in several humanitarian missions in recent years, ferrying urgent aid to Haiti and Pakistan following natural disasters, as well as in supporting peacekeeping missions in Africa and NATO missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

The Strategic Airlift Interim Solution SALIS, as its name suggests, was initially conceived as a method of gaining additional heavy airlift capacity before the SAC came on line and before the new Airbus A400M Atlas heavy transport aircraft began to appear on NATO squadrons’ aprons. In order to accomplish this, a consortium of NATO countries set up the Strategic Air Lift Coordination Cell (SALCC) at Royal Netherlands Air Force Base Eindhoven early in 2006. This cell runs SALIS, which has 14 participating nations and which draws on Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan heavy transport aircraft supplied by two commercial companies: Russia’s Volga-Dnepr Airlines and Ukraine’s Antonov Airlines. The Antonov An-124s are capable of handling ‘outsize’ loads of up to 150 tons. Under the SALIS contract, the two companies guarantee availability of two An-124s for charter at any given time for any of the participating countries’ national usage, plus similar availability of up to a further six of the aircraft for rapid deployment of forces in support of NATO or EU missions. This arrangement has proved popular, with a series of contract extensions, the most recent of which runs until the end of 2014. The strained relations between NATO and Russia over events in Ukraine may have an impact on the future of the SALIS contractual arrangements, as will the introduction of the Airbus A400M tactical transport aircraft, which are

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NATOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Strategic Airlift Command (SAC) operates the huge Boeing C-17 Globemaster III jet transport aircraft

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The Strategic Airlift Interim Solution charters Antonov An-124-100 Ruslan aircraft to transport large military equipment and other supplies now starting to arrive at their units in France, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The A400M, 170 of which have been ordered by NATO members, has a payload of 37 tonnes. This is considerably lower than that of either the C-17 or An-124, but is nevertheless a substantial improvement on that of the C-130 (around 20 tonnes), which currently makes up the tactical transport fleets of most of the Alliance’s members.

Helicopters have been a critical component of NATO operations in Afghanistan, given the lack of a fully developed road system

The HIP Helicopter Task Force

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The third multinational transport capability is the HIP Helicopter Task Force (HIP TF). Nine European members, led by the Czech Republic, developed the organisation, which facilitates deployment of the series of the hugely successful Russian-built Mil Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-171

The HIP Helicopter Task Force was launched to help satisfy ISAF’s demand for tactical helicopter airlift in Afghanistan

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medium, multipurpose transport helicopters to assist with tactical lift capabilities. This assistance can take the form of pre-deployment training; command and control capabilities; base support; or financial aid. Under HIP TF, these helicopters have been deployed to Afghanistan, where their rugged construction and good hot-and-high performance have made them particularly useful in the country’s searing summer heat. Helicopters have been a critical component of NATO operations in Afghanistan, given the lack of a fully developed road system to transport troops and equipment, as well as the serious risk to surface transport of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Several countries that operate ‘HIPs’ were willing to send additional aircraft to help the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contingent, but needed assistance to deploy and operate them. The HIP TF is, therefore, part of a broader NATO helicopter initiative aimed at addressing rotary-wing shortfalls on operations. Each of these airborne-transport pooling arrangements has proven to be extremely successful in plugging gaps in NATO airborne-transport capabilities, but if the Alliance is to overcome the imbalance between the numbers of transport aircraft the US has at its disposal and those belonging to the European countries, more will have to be done.

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The new NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS) will direct NATO fighter aircraft towards suspicious incoming airborne threats

Air superiority The military loves acronyms, and NATO’s new Air Command and Control System has more than its fair share, but beneath this alphabet soup is a radical enhancement to the Alliance’s ability to safeguard European skies for many years to come. Thomas Withington explains

Air Command and Control System (ACCS) initiative  The is designed to replace a number of national air operations command and control (C2) systems with a scalable C2 system that will be rolled out across NATO’s European membership. The C2 systems that the ACCS architecture will replace enable air force personnel to see a recognised air picture (RAP) of their country’s airspace. The RAP is developed by integrating the radar pictures produced by several national radars – each of which watches a particular section of national airspace – into one big picture. It enables personnel to see exactly what is flying through and approaching their airspace. If a threat is detected, the RAP can then be used to guide interceptor aircraft or surface-to-air missiles towards the hostile aircraft

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or flying object, such as a cruise or ballistic missile. The computer software controlling the ACCS will not only allow each country equipped with the ACCS architecture to produce their RAP, it will also connect all of these RAPs together to enable NATO’s commander of Allied Command Operations at Ramstein Air Base in Germany to see a seamless European RAP depicting the airspace of NATO’s European membership. As well as updating legacy national air C2 systems with a new means of generating the RAP at the national and European level, the ACCS includes a dimension that enables user nations to plan and execute air operations, whether those operations occur above NATO members’ countries or during out-of-area operations. Presently, NATO uses its Integrated Command and

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Daniel Ochoa de Olza/AP/Press Association Images

Control (ICC) software for the drafting of the air tasking order (ATO), the extensive document that forms the bedrock of any NATO-led air campaign, detailing the activities and schedules of all participating combat aircraft over a 24-hour period. Whereas NATO members had previously used the ICC and its Multi-AEGIS Site Emulator (MASE) software for ATO and RAP generation respectively, the advent of ACCS will enable them to perform both these functions using the ACCS architecture alone. In 1999, NATO awarded Air Command Systems International, a consortium that includes United States defence contractor Raytheon and its French counterpart Thomson-CSF (now Thales), a contract worth $500 million for the development of the ACCS. These two companies are now continuing their ACCS work via their joint ThalesRaytheonSystems (TRS) venture. NATO’s ACCS Management Organisation supervises its implementation on behalf of the Alliance, with all 28 members contributing to its funding via the NATO Security Investment Programme.

ACCS architecture The ACCS architecture includes two main entities: the ARS (air control centre, RAP production centre and sensor fusion post) and the CAOC (Combined Air Operations Centre). The ARS is designed for deployment at the national level to ensure air sovereignty and to control national airspace via the production of the RAP, which is produced by fusing together a country’s disparate radars. The CAOC is used to draft and execute air operations and to produce the ATO. Both ARS and CAOC functions can be collocated into a single CARS (CAOC and ARS combined). In addition to fixed ARS and CAOC sites across NATO’s European membership, the Alliance is receiving deployable versions of the ARS and CAOC, known as the DARS and DCAOC respectively. These can be used to provide deployed airspace control (DARS), such as protection above a summit meeting or major sporting event, or to provide command for a NATO out-ofarea air operation (DCAOC). TRS and NATO have put the ACCS architecture through exhaustive testing at a number of locations, known as ‘validation sites’, around Europe. ARS validation has occurred at the Belgian air components’ Control and Reporting Centre, which performs air sovereignty control of Belgian airspace from Glons in the east of the country. Both the CAOC and the DCAOC have undergone validation at NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre at Uedem, Germany, close to the Dutch border. CARS validation has been performed at one of NATO’s CAOCs located at Poggio Renatico, northern Italy, and at the Armée de l’Air (French Air Force) CDC 05.942 air operations centre at Lyon-Mont Verdun airbase, eastern France. Meanwhile, the DARS has undergone validation at the Royal Netherlands Air Force base at Nieuw Milligen. With validation complete, these sites will have their respective ARS, CAOC, DCAOC and CARS facilities declared operational. Italy

Large-scale sporting events, and the thousands of people in attendance, will be better protected from attack by the new ACCS is expected to become the first country to declare an initial operating capability (IOC) for its CARS by the end of 2014, with a full operating capability (FOC) being declared by late 2015. Along with validating the various components of the ACCS, TRS is tasked with rolling out the ACCS software and hardware (the computers, communications links and infrastructure) across the European members of NATO that are replacing their legacy air C2 systems with the ACCS architecture. TRS is already under contract to do this for the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey – a process that should be completed by the end of 2016. Beyond these countries, the second replication phase could begin in late 2014, with ACCS architecture rolled out in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, which could be completed by the end of 2017. ACCS will also be patched into NATO’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability to enable personnel to detect and respond to a ballistic missile attack against the Alliance’s members. Canada, the United Kingdom and the US remain outside the ACCS initiative. Canada and the US do provide a financial contribution to the initiative and, as the ACCS is primarily focused on protecting NATO’s European airspace, there is less of a need for these countries to connect to it. The UK could have its air surveillance and control system modernised at a later date to patch into the ACCS, or have this system replaced altogether with the ACCS architecture.

If a threat is detected, the recognised air picture can then be used to guide interceptor aircraft or surface-to-air missiles towards the flying object

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NATO chose the R-Q4 Block 40 Global Hawk to make up the air segment of its AGS programme

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Alliance ISTAR Peter Grant reviews NATO’s Air Ground Surveillance programme and underlines its importance to the Alliance’s ability to understand what is happening on the battlefield

where the enemy is located and what he is doing  Knowing has always been a vital element in the conduct of warfare and the delivery of effect. Today, the constituent parts of this function are grouped together under the term ‘intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance’, more commonly referred to by its acronym, ISTAR. Its purpose is to give the commander of troops, whether a corporal in charge of a six-man infantry section, the commander-in-chief of an army, or a head of state, the best information to make a decision. However, not every nation within the NATO Alliance has the resources to operate a comprehensive ISTAR organisation. Originating from the Defence Planning Committee, in 1995, plans were undertaken to implement an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that will give commanders a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. NATO Defence Ministers agreed that “the Alliance should pursue work on a minimum, essential NATO-owned and operated AGS core capability, supplemented by interoperable national assets”. The AGS programme was designed to furnish NATO with a complete and integrated ground surveillance capability, offering unrestricted and unfiltered access to ground surveillance data in near real time and in an interoperable manner. The initiative was to include an air segment with airborne radar sensors and a ground segment comprising fixed, transportable and mobile ground stations for data exploitation and dissemination, all connected through high-performance data links. In 2004, before the financial crisis struck, NATO decided to move ahead with a mixed-fleet approach. The air segment was originally to include Airbus A321 manned aircraft and Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 40 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), both carrying versions of a Transatlantic Cooperative AGS Radar (TCAR), with the ground segment having an extensive set of fixed and deployable ground stations. However, when it became clear that this option would stretch the budgets of the Alliance, most of whose nations had just experienced (or were about to experience) acute financial shocks, NATO decided to discontinue the more expensive mixed-fleet approach in 2007. To this end, the A321 and TCAR elements of the mixed fleet were dropped and instead, a simplified approach, based on the off-the-shelf Global Hawk Block 40 UAV and its associated multi-platform radar technology insertion programme (MP-RTIP) AN/ZPY-2

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active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, was adopted. The ground segment, on the other hand, remained virtually unchanged, as its functional and operational characteristics were largely independent of the actual aircraft and sensor used. In February 2009, the NATO nations participating in the AGS programme (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Canada [which later withdrew], Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States), started the process of signing the Programme Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU). By February 2012, it was agreed that NATO common funding would cover infrastructure, satellite communications and operations and support. In addition, an agreement was reached that would see the United Kingdom’s Sentinel R1 manned ISTAR aircraft, which is also equipped with a GMTI capability,

AGS was designed to furnish NATO with a complete and integrated ground surveillance capability, offering unrestricted access to data and the future French IAI Heron TP UAV system, available as national contributions-in-kind, partly replacing financial contributions from those two allies. Following the signature of the procurement contract at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, the project got under way and is expected to become available to the Alliance within the 2015-17 timeframe.

System components With the changes taken into account, the air segment is now made up of five Global Hawk Block 40 HALE (high-altitude, long-endurance) UAVs, which are currently in development, and equipped with the MP-RTIP ground surveillance radar sensor, plus an extensive suite of line-of-sight and beyond-lineof-sight, long-range, wideband data links. Moreover, it will also contain the UAV flight control stations.

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The ground segment will provide an interface between the AGS core system and a wide range of command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C2ISR) systems to interconnect with and provide data to multiple deployed and non-deployed operational users, including reach-back facilities remote from the surveillance area. There will be a number of ground stations both mobile and transportable, providing datalink connectivity, data-processing and exploitation capabilities and interfaces for interoperability with C2ISR systems. The support segment, including dedicated mission support facilities, will be located at the AGS main operating base at Sigonella Air Base in Italy, which will serve both as a NATO joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR) deployment base and a data-exploitation and training centre.

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RQ-4 Block 40 Global Hawk UAVs represent a significant capability enhancement on the Block 20 version pictured here

NATO AGS Block 40 Global Hawk UAVs in production at Northrop Grumman’s Moss Point, Mississippi facility

AGS core capability The Global Hawk ISTAR platform has already proven its usefulness for this sort of intense surveillance tasking, having logged more than 115,000 flight hours supporting operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Nigeria. Once in service with NATO, each AGS Global Hawk Block 40 UAV will be able fly at 60,000 feet for more than 30 hours. The NATO-owned and -operated AGS core capability will enable the Alliance to perform persistent surveillance over wide areas from high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial platforms operating at considerable stand-off distances and in any weather or light condition. The sensors deployed include swath and spot synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and ground moving-target indicator (GMTI) capabilities to collect information that will provide decision-makers with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground. They will continuously detect and track moving objects

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throughout observed areas and will provide radar imagery of areas of interest, as well as of stationary objects. In July 2014, US Air Force Global Hawk Block 30s flew three successful full-day sorties from Orland Main Air Station, Norway, as part of NATO’s 10-day trial ‘Unified Vision 2014’, which involved satellites, aircraft, UAVs, naval vessels, ground sensors and human intelligence from 18 NATO countries. This demonstration of JISR capability was aimed at showcasing and evaluating the Alliance’s ability to deploy assets, as well as gather and fuse intelligence from multiple sources – in space, in the air, on land and at sea – at different stages of operations. The AGS Global Hawk Block 40 aircraft are now in production at Northrop Grumman’s Moss Point, Mississippi facility. Although there is no specific date released for the first flight, the company expects to attain initial operating capability in 2017 and full operating capability in 2018.

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NATO maritime task groups patrol the seas to counter threats and reassure friendly states

Maritime projection Iain Ballantyne looks at NATO’s evolving naval missions and asks what sort of ships and capability it will need to ensure maritime security in the future

vessels of Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures  The Group 1 (SNMCMG1) and SNMCMG2 have long been a familiar sight in the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Black Seas – on exercise or eliminating the residual menace posed by munitions from past wars. In recent months, both task groups have paid visits to the ports of NATO Member States that fear the Russians may have ambitions in their direction. Similarly, the frigates, destroyers and cruisers of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 and SNMG2 have been kept busy on reassurance missions. At present, NATO fields different types of vessels, even within the same task groups. For example, SNMG1, at the time of writing, comprises HDMS Esbern Snare (Denmark, a flexible

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support ship), FGS Magdeburg (Germany, a Braunschweig-class corvette) and USS Taylor (United States, a Perry-class frigate). Meanwhile, SNMCMG2 comprises ITS Avieri (Italy, an Artigliere-class frigate) as flagship, leading the mine-hunters HMS Chiddingfold (British, Hunt class), ITS Rimini (Italian, Gaeta class) and TCG Akçay (Turkish, Aydin class). Given that they share a common purpose, why not impose on these maritime task groups identical vessels that can do everything in one platform? Commonality is surely the Holy Grail for NATO, but it is not easy to achieve, for various reasons, not least the need for bespoke requirements in different countries that have sovereign operational needs, and for preserving indigenous technology and associated industries.

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The UK’s future Global Combat Ship (GCS) will be able to swap roles using a modular equipment concept Budget pressures, when combined with a still demanding portfolio of missions, do seem to drive some navies towards at least aspiring to create a ship that can do everything. The Danes, with their C-Flex ships, might appear to offer the template, should NATO strive for such a common vessel. The Esbern Snare and her sister Absalon possess an ability to switch roles via different mission modules, tackling everything from anti-submarine warfare (ASW) to mine countermeasures, task-group command, military transportation and hospitalship duties. They also make useful patrol platforms, and are fitted with anti-ship and anti-air missiles in addition to a 127mm gun. Another example is the US Navy’s radical-looking Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), which similarly aspires to achieve flexible goals. The LCS (which comes in two hull types) is a multipurpose platform that can switch from mine-hunting to anti-surface warfare (ASW) via different mission modules, while also tailoring embarked personnel for the task at hand. However, as is the case with all ships of this type, the process requires the vessel to return to port in order to switch roles by taking aboard new modules and crew. In the UK there has, in recent years, been an aversion to calling the country’s future frigate a frigate. Rather, the Type 26 is known as the Global Combat Ship (GCS). The GCS will, though, be a frigate in all but name, with the full range of the usual capabilities (anti-submarine, anti-surface, anti-air, land attack and maritime security). It will also be able to embark a

medium-sized helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Beyond the Type 26, the British have ambitions for a multi-role vessel that will take on mine warfare, hydrographic surveying and offshore-patrol tasks. A Royal Navy concept paper labelled such a platform the ‘Black Swan’ class – partly in tribute to an earlier class of the same name that provided sterling service in winning the Battle of the Atlantic. This latter-day sloop of war would have a mission bay to, in the words of the concept paper, achieve cost-effectiveness due to the manner, “in which it can be reconfigured to suit a number of roles, hence ensuring that costly capability is only deployed when required”. Unmanned air, surface and sub-surface systems would feature prominently, for as the concept paper goes on to say, “unmanned systems will have a major impact on future maritime operations”. The Black Swan concept foresees a crew of as few as 16 sailors embarked for the minehunting role, around 40 in the counter-piracy/counter-drugs mission and 40 for sea control. The concept would also offer mission packages, such as: ■■ counter-piracy/counter-drugs – Wildcat helicopter, two rotary-wing UAVs, unmanned surface systems (USSs), plus two rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs); ■■ mine hunting – USSs and unmanned underwater systems (UUSs), plus towed-sonar, and underwater launch and recovery of mine eliminators (such as Seafox) and two or three rotary-wing UAVs; and

When facing down potentially intense threats, nothing but a vessel that can truly protect itself and wage war at the high end of the spectrum will do

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Counter-mining activity from FGS Weilheim, a German mine-hunter. NATO countries field different types of vessel for the same task group ■■

sea control – Merlin and/or Wildcat helicopters, up to eight UAVs, plus, potentially, dozens of smaller unmanned systems down to ‘nano-sized’, as well as containerised mission modules for missiles/guns and containerised sensors, including ASW towed-array sonar.

It is two years since the above-mentioned Black Swan concept paper was published, and the world moves on, with threats evolving all the time. The American experience has showed that the frigate endures. Having navigated down the LCS route, the US has taken stock and changed direction, at least partially, to kick-start a programme for a new class of multi-role frigates. Although the LCS can do a lot of things, and is as big as a frigate, it has one major potential Achilles heel, that is: lack of survivability in a high-threat zone. US Secretary of State for Defense Chuck Hagel said: “The LCS was designed to perform certain missions – such as minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare – in a relatively permissive environment. But we need to closely examine

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whether the LCS has the independent protection and firepower to operate and survive against a more advanced military adversary and emerging new technologies.”

Need for a mix of vessels When facing down potentially intense threats, such as those posed by the Russians in the Black Sea and Baltic, or by the Iranians in the Strait of Hormuz, nothing but a vessel that can truly protect itself and wage war at the high end of the spectrum will do, hence the American change of direction. Therefore, the answer to the question of what sort of ships and capabilities NATO needs to ensure maritime security is all of the above. There is clearly a place in both sovereign navies and the multinational task groups for a mix of different vessels. There will be fewer platforms, but they must be capable of performing all kinds of missions. Some NATO navies will only be able to afford the Black Swan-type sloop. Other Member States will have to field frigates, destroyers and cruisers in order to protect ‘the little guys’.

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