ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Volume 4 - Issue 3 March 2014
Ukraine’s Sovereignty & Russia’s Near Abroad The recent developments in the Ukraine are driving the international community into a never ending cycle of Track I diplomacy, with little to show for it. What constitutes a sort of phenomenon though is the fluidity of the situation that shifts by the hour. In this issue of Atlantic Voices, our authors provide the background of the crisis and events that led from tension of political relations to escalation and action that violates international values and norms. They examine the interplay between super-
A Soldier standing guard in Crimea (Photo: European Parliament)
Contents:
and/or devolving its status within the interna-
When Does A Country Become A Gamble - The Case Of Ukraine in 2014
tional sphere.
Dr. Tiago Ferreira Lopes, provides an in-depth analysis of the situation in
powers and how Russia is currently evolving
History, narratives and ineffective political Ukraine and elaborates upon the historical background that has brought Crimea agendas drew the roadmap towards Ukraine's to the frontline. demise, while the poker game continues to be played on behalf of the people, as the interna-
The Crimea Crisis In Ukraine - The Stakes Are High
tional community remains hesitant to take Dr. Olga Burlyuk, examines the intricate situation in Crimea and sheds light on questions of national sovereignty. What are the regional and international concrete action.
stakes with the passing of this referendum and how the nuclear disarmament Edited by: Klaudia Tani Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
regime is at stake. 1
When Does A Country Become A Gamble? The Case Of Ukraine (& Crimea) In 2014 30 million and amongst the 28 European Union member-states
By Dr. Tiago Ferreira Lopes
only Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom and Spain have
W
hen the Euromaidan protests erupted in Kiev, in
bigger populations (with Spain having a slim advantage of less than
the night of 23 November 2013, no one could
1,200,000 additional inhabitants).
have predicted that less than four months later
The rallies that sprang out in Kiev were indeed pro-
issues like the secession of the Crimean peninsula would be on
European Union and that was enough to catch the attention of
the table. The protests begun as a reaction to the not so unex-
Brussels politicians and technocrats. There was a narrow chance to
pected decision of President Yanukovych to suspend the signa-
reverse the actions of a democratically elected President; there
ture of the Association Agreement and the Free Trade Agree-
was still hope to revive the almost-deceased Eastern Partnership.
ment with the European Union or the verge of the third Eastern
Uncertainty was the major player in Kiev, but it seemed definite
Partnership Summit that was going to take place in Vilnius on 28
that Ukraine was on the brink of some sort of transformation.
-29 November 2013.
Evidently we could not have predicted the path leading to the
To the European Union the defection of Ukraine was a
most recent (and still highly uncertain) developments… or could
major blow to the ambitious Eastern Partnership project that had
we?
envisioned the creation of an enlarged and multilevel partnership
Synoptic Tour Over Ukrainian & Crimean History
with Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus,
Ukraine’s “golden past” (a recurring image in post-soviet
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.
countries) occurred during X-
But in Vilnius, in November 2013,
XII centuries when the Kievan
only Moldova and Georgia signed
Rus’ (ruled by the Riurikid dyn-
the Agreements, with Armenia and
asty since the end of the IX cen-
Belarus preferring to join the Mos-
tury) became one of Europe’s
cow-led Eurasian Customs Union
largest states. In the middle of
and an Azerbaijan more out than
the XII century the principalities
in. Ukraine, however, was always
of Vladimir, Suzdal and Polotsk
considered the bigger prize of the
asserted their right to greater
Eastern Partnership project with a
autonomy, weakening the pow-
population bigger than 45 million
er of Kiev that would be de-
people and a territory with more
Cossacks by Ilya Yefimovich Repin (Photo:Wikimedia.org)
stroyed with the Mongol invasions of the XIII century. In the
than 603,000 km2. Just to give an idea of the impact of a close cooperation
last quarter of the XIII century Moscow, under the lead of the
between the European Union and Ukraine, It is worth mention-
Great Prince Daniel, replaced Kiev as the center of the Riurikid
ing that inside the European Union only, France topples the
power until the demise of Feodor I, in 1598. In the XIII-XIV cen-
territorial dimension of Ukraine. The territories of all other five
turies, Crimea was under the influence of the Italian republics of
prospective Eastern Partnership countries barely surpass
Genoa and Venetia, settled in the region to carry out merchant
427,000 km2. In what regards population, the combined popula-
activities across the Black Sea.
tion of the other five prospective Eastern Partners hardly reaches Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
In the XIV century the Italian merchants lose control over 2
the peninsula, most probably because of the Black Death that was
partition of Poland; in the East, in 1783, the Russian Empire
annihilating entire villages and towns across Europe.
claimed full control over the Crimean Khanate and over the lands
In the XV century the Tatars of Crimea, emboldened by the raids of Tamerlane that destroyed the Golden Horde’s power, raised
between that peninsula and the lower Dnieper River that were renamed: New Russia.
a new state: the Crimean Khanate that would soon become a vassal
The events of 1848, the famous “Spring of Nations”, in-
state of the Ottoman Empire. During this period (XIV-XV centuries)
spired Ukrainian intellectuals to develop a sense of Ukrainness. In
most of Ukraine’s territory, north of Crimea, was under control of
the late 1840’s the Cyrillo-Methodian Society calls for the for-
Poland and Lithuania.
mation of a federation of Slavic nations. In the second half of the
Pause! As we can see, the History of Crimea was played be-
1860’s and during the 1870’s, stirred by the Valuev Edict of 1863
tween Ukraine/Russia and Turkey (to use the contemporary designa-
and by the Ems Decree of 1876, that prohibited most forms of publications in “Little Russian” (original
tions) for centuries and although merchants from the Italian Genoa and Venetia republics also played some role in the region, their concern was purely economic without meaningful political dominium over the Tatars,
The intention of Tsar Alexander II on limiting Ukrainian language and culture was the catalyst to the spreading of feelings of Russophobia and Ukrainness.
populist activists and members of several semi-clandestine cultural associations faught to protect, promote and develop Ukrainian folklore, literature and
the Bulgarians and the remaining Khazarians inhabiting the peninsula.
name given to Ukrainian language),
(evidently!) language.
The XVI century is one of the most interesting periods in the
The intention of Tsar Alexander II on limiting Ukrainian
region, with the Crimean Khans’ de facto disputing control over the
language and culture was the catalyst to the spreading of feelings
Caucasus with Moscow and Istanbul. Khans Mehemmed Giray I and
of Russophobia and Ukrainness. That explains why in 1917-1919,
Sahib Giray I were in fact able to extend their influence to the Khan-
with Russia engulfed in a string of continuous revolutionary pro-
ates of Astrakhan and Kazan and forged diplomatic links with several
cesses, which would lead to the Civil War, and with the Austro-
Circassian principalities and Nogay dominated lands.
Hungarian Empire dismembered, several Ukrainian short-lived
In the second-half of the XVI century, with the appearance of
republics would emerge and claim independence.
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Union of Lublin, 1569),
Ukraine was, once more, in the middle of tensions be-
Ukraine experiences a deepening of its social division with the elites
tween West and East. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1917) posi-
in Kiev and the western provinces becoming more “polish-like” and
tioned Ukraine inside Germany’s growing sphere of influence; but
converting to Catholicism; while the peasants and farmers living in
the defeat of Germany in World War I motivated Lenin to nullify
the eastern provinces retained its Slavic language and its Eastern Or-
the Treaty and to invade Ukraine.
thodox faith.
The Peace of Riga in 1921 incorporated Ukraine in the
The rising social tensions lead to an armed uprising that re-
newborn Soviet Union, without the western provinces of Volhyn-
sulted in the formation of the Cossack Hetmanate. With the Otto-
ia and Galicia, which were still under control of Polish forces. In
man Empire controlling the Crimean Tatars and the ghost of the
1939 the western provinces were returned to Ukraine and in
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the West, the Hetman Khmel-
1956 the Crimea was annexed by Nikita Khrushchev to Ukraine,
nytskyi signed a Treaty of protection with Aleksey I, Tsar of Russia
after more than 500 years of de jure and de facto separation. It is
(Treaty of Pereyaslav, 1654).
this Ukraine, without a sense of meaningful National Unity, highly
During the XVII century the Crimean khans became media-
divided by the continuous West/East divisions, and gifted with
tors par excellence between the Ottoman and Russian Empires with
Crimea thirty five years ago, that claimed full-fledged independ-
the best example being the negotiations that led to the Treaty of
ence in the 1990’s.
Bakhchisarai, in 1681. With the signature of the Treaty of Küçük
On the 5th of May 1992, the Crimean Republic adopted
Kaynarca, between Russia and the Ottomans in 1774, the Crimean
the Act on Proclaiming State Independence of the Republic of
Khanate is relieved of its vassalage to the Ottoman Empire.
Crimea breaking away (at least de jure) with Ukraine. On the 6th
At the end of the XVIII century, Ukrainian lands face (once
of May the Parliament of the Crimean Republic re-asserted its
more) a division between two Empires. At the West the Austro-
sovereignty, stating however that some powers (like territorial
Hungarian Empire controlled the region of Galicia, following the
jurisdiction) where voluntarily delegated to Ukraine’s govern-
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
3
ment. The legal/constitutional contradictions between Cri-
Kuzio goes a step further distinguishing stateness (state-
mea’s government and Kiev were only settled in March
building) from nationhood (nation-building) when defining the
1995.
idea of quadruple transitions. Without a focus on a harmoniza-
A Troubled Post-Soviet Road
tion and consensus about the National idea, transitions are
The new sovereign Ukrainian republic that emerged
doomed to fall into a difficult-to-end cycle of power shifts
after the collapse of the Soviet Union was dominated by the
amongst different proto-identitarian projects competing to cap-
continuous tensions that divide the country. The ruling elites
ture political power in order to protect themselves.
knowing these tensions, preferred to ignore them enchanted
The continuous crisis in Kyrgyzstan; the ongoing unrest
by the procedural (misleading) idea of democracy presented
in Uzbekistan; the difficult pacification of Tajikistan and the
by Schumpeter, according to whom if you have relatively
tense relation between Georgia and its autonomous regions are
free and just elections when you have a democratic govern-
proof of this fact: without a medium-to-long-term program of
ment in place.
nation-building policies (able to highlight commonalities, with-
Schumpeter’s model of “prêt-à-porter” democracy,
out erasing the specificities of different psychosocial collectivi-
combined with a
ties),
horde of enthusi-
stabilization
astic acolytes of
of the politi-
Lipset that be-
cal game in
lieved in a strong
identity-
interconnection
complex
between
eco-
societies
nomic develop-
tends to be
ment and suc-
almost
cessful democra-
possible.
imIt is a
tization, mislead several
the
deeply divid-
ruling
elites across the
ed
post-soviet
that sees the
space. The im-
Westernized
portance of cul-
elites seizing
tural
reforms
Ethno-linguistic Map of Ukraine (Photo: Washington Post)
Ukraine
the power in
prior and/or during the political-institutional-economic
2004, via the Orange Revolution. Although some politicians,
reconstruction of Ukraine was downsized undermining in-
analysts and experts seem to have forgotten, during its mandate
definitely the prospects to achieve any sort of meaningful
as Prime-Minister Yulia Timoshenko was not exempt of errone-
political stability.
ous moves. In January 2009, in a clear usurpation of power,
Ukraine attempted to modernize and to democratize
Timoshenko signed a gas-deal with Russia’s Gazprom that alleg-
itself without aiming to create some sort of National Unity
edly damaged the country in, at least, 1.5 billion hryvnas (close
idea. According to Rustow the forging of an idea of National
to $162 million).
Unity (that should not be mistaken with unanimity and ho-
At the end of May 2009, news surfaced about a potential
mogeneity) is the sole prerequisite needed to begin a success-
alliance between Timoshenko and her rival Mr. Yanukovych in
ful transition, towards a substantive democratic regime. In a
order to amend the Constitution so that the President would not
reflection about the specificities of the post-soviet space tran-
be elected by popular vote and the next parliamentary elections
sitological cycle, Offe calls for a triple transition: liberaliza-
would be postponed, at least, until 2014 allowing Timoshenko
tion (politics); modernization (economics) and stateness
to cling on to power. Yanukovych’s withdrawal from the puta-
(state/nation-building).
tive alliance damaged the image of Timoshenko in the Western regions.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
4
It is this Ukraine that, disappointed with its pro-Western leader, reversed the failed Orange Revolution (unable to curb
sidered with greater importance. Paris, these days, is relegated to the role of host country of high level discussions.
corruption and to limit the power of the oligarchs, which are still
To the European Union it is essential that Ukraine signs
the biggest shadow-players in the country) with the presidential
the Association Agreement with Brussels or, at least, that
elections of February 2010. Amongst its electoral promises,
Ukraine does not sign any Agreement that would lead into the
Yanukovych never hid that he was going to reproach Moscow,
rival Eurasian Customs Union that President Putin is trying to
freezing the approximation with NATO but not with the EU. In
build (in order to replace the CIS project). The European Union
2010, for example, Yanukovych extended the permission of the
already lost the pipeline race to Russia, with Nabucco being
Russian Black Sea Fleet to be based at Sevastopol until 2042.
deemed as a dead (or at least comatose!) project, even if the
Yanukovych promised, and accomplished, a review of the polemic Gazprom deal of January 2009, in order to ease the troubled finances of Ukraine. Yanukovych’s
France, whose only real intention seems to be a competition with Berlin, offered its capital to the negotiation round, just like it had done in August 2008, when Sarkozy was in power.
politicians and technocrats in Brussels’ corridors insist that the project might still happen in a nonpredictable future. Additionally,
loosing
party tried to force him, during the presidential elections cam-
Ukraine to Russia would kill the prospects to reshape and rebuild
paign, to promise the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
the Eastern Partnership project in a moment in which Baku is
but in May 2010 the president said no because the preservation
still an uncertain partner and Chisinau might need to reproach
of territorial integrity was important to him. Moscow was dis-
Moscow due not only to its economic and energy dependency,
pleased with the move.
but also to the fears that the Kremlin might stir Gagauz separa-
In August 2012, President Yanukovych signed a polemic diploma that made Russian the official language in several eastern
tism to undermine the viability of Moldova as a sovereign state. 2) United States of America!
provinces of Ukraine. Academicians, analysts and politicians
United States of America’s sudden interest in Ukraine’s
warned the President that the move might lead to a deepening of
events is less clear, if we downplay the clear fact that several
the West/East tension that drives the country since the XIII
politicians in Washington and the Pentagon are still living within
century. Moscow was satisfied with Kiev’s bold initiative, espe-
the Cold War mentality. Ukraine is not even a member of
cially after the referendum of February that year, which denied
NATO, so any intervention in the region will be difficult to jus-
Russian to be raised to the status of national language in Latvia.
tify in the international community.
So when in the end of November 2013, Yanukovych
It seems clear that Obama’s Administration wants to
withdraw Ukraine’s participation from the Vilnius Summit and
show some political capability in Europe’s Eastern Neighbor-
proudly presented the aid package offered by Russia and the new
hood, in order to compensate the loss of the Middle East to Rus-
gas deal brokered with Gazprom, the Western-minded elites and
sia during the Arab Spring. Although several top-politicians and
activists took to the streets of Kiev frustrated with the route to
analysts in the USA are still in denial, it is clear that the Arab
Moscow that the country was following.
Spring projected the power of Russia in the Middle East at the
A Poker Game Called Ukraine
expenses of the USA.
1) European Union!
The decision to intervene in Libya, the prolonged silence and
The enrollment of the European Union in Ukraine’s
support for the deposition of an elected President in Egypt, and
events is clear. The visits of Vitali Klitschko and Arseni
the inability to reach a multilateral agreement in Syria dimin-
Yatsenyuk to Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, in Febru-
ished the credibility of the White House across the Middle East.
ary 2014 showed the complicity between Berlin and the Euro-
In a seemingly childish move, the White House wants to “take”
maidan activists.
Ukraine from entering into Moscow’s backyard even if to do that
France, whose only real intention seems to be a competi-
it has to support a coup, once again against an elected President,
tion with Berlin, offered its capital to the negotiation round, just
led by far-right parties.
like it had done in August 2008, when Sarkozy was in power.
3) Russia!
The new President however, has shown an incapacity to be con-
Ukraine is vital for Putin’s dream of a Eurasian Union that will replace the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
5
Ukraine’s inclusion into the Eurasian Union would not only vali-
tion. Crimean Tatars are a Turkic ethnic group sharing a series of
date the European credentials of the project (confirmed by Ar-
socio-cultural connections with Turkey. Ankara however, de-
menia’s decision to join the group), but would also pressure
spite the common cultural heritage and Davutoğlu’s theory of
Moldova and Turkey to join.
one common Turkic Nation, has remained mostly silent during
The ethnic card, by prompting the cessation of Crimea,
the last few weeks.
was used with intelligence by the Kremlin. After the short war
The timing of the Crimean crisis could not be worse to
against Georgia, in August 2008, Russia recognized the claim for
Erdoğan’s government, making it difficult to see a more pro-
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia being followed, so
active stance from Ankara’s decision-makers! Turkey is in the
far, by five other UN-
middle of a campaign for regional elections (that will happen on
member states. The use
30 March) that has been
of violence, coupled
rippled with a series of
with the feeling that
scandals involving the
both republics will join
Prime-Minister and its
the Russian Federation
associates.
in medium-term, un-
In addition, there
dermined the prospects
is also an open confron-
of a wider recognition
tation between Erdoğan
of the two breakaway
and Gülen that started
regions.
to gain shape last year
When the Cri-
after the Gezi Park pro-
mean Parliament called
tests. In the last few
for a referendum to
days, Erdoğan has spo-
secede from Ukraine, it
Russian Troops in Ukraine (Photo: Reutersmedia)
ken at the telephone with Putin
was clear that the Kremlin was using the same tools that West-
and
Davutoğlu
ern countries used in Kosovo in 1991. US and EU officials have
stating that Turkey was watchful and concerned with the events
said that the referendum is not legitimate because it violates the
unfolding in the Crimea, but it is not predictable that anything
territorial integrity of Ukraine and its Constitution, but the same
will happen in the short/medium-term.
argument might also be used when referring to the case of Koso-
5) Ukraine! The new government in Kiev now has a series of mo-
vo. Is Ukraine’s (and Georgia’s) territorial integrity more
mentous tasks ahead of it. First it needs to claim some degree of
important than Serbia’s? Aren’t sovereign states supposedly
legitimacy; we can dislike Yanukovych’s ruling style and deci-
equal in the international arena? Even further: if Western coun-
sions, but he was elected by popular vote. Second, it needs to
tries maintain the denial to acknowledge the results of the Cri-
forge an enlarged consensus regarding the political, economic
mean referendum, they will be undermining one of democracy’s
and psychosocial transformations that the country needs.
fundamental pillars: self-determination by popular vote. In that
Third, the intention of the new government to deny
case, of clear double standard, it will be more difficult to pro-
Russian as the official status of a regional language might have the
mote/impose certain democratic standards and to backlash sanc-
reverse effect of XIX century’s Valuev Edict demoting Ukrain-
tions to countries not following the Western-pattern of democ-
ness and leading to a raise in Ukrainophobia in the Eastern prov-
racy.
inces. Fourth, if Timoshenko gains preeminence in the new gov-
4) Turkey!
ernment the Russian-minded population might give up on stick-
Crimean Tatars that ruled the Crimean peninsula for more than three hundred and thirty years, are the third biggest ethnic group comprising about 12% of the peninsula’s popula-
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
ing to democratic tools and procedures causing tensions to rise again. Fifth, and last, even if the new government wants to
6
reproach Brussels and sign the adherence to the Eastern Partnership, Kiev cannot forget that it shares a border with Russia that still remains the country’s biggest provider of energy and second biggest export partner. No expert, politician, academic or analyst is in the position to rightfully predict what will happen in Ukraine, but it seems reasonable to assume that there is a need to take into consideration the complexity of the psychosocial identitarian projects that compose contemporary Ukraine. The West/East dynamic of Ukraine is not unique, being ultimately shared by its neighbors Russia and Turkey, but needs to be seen with cautious and unbiased intentions. There is, indeed, a clear need to take into account the West/East dynamic, looking without using a manichaeistic lens but in a complementary manner in order to achieve a consensus that will allow the formation of National unity that will bring some stability to the country.
About the author Dr. Tiago Ferreira Lopes is a lecturer at Kirikkale University in Turkey on International Relations and a Researcher at the Orient Institute at Lisbon University in Portugal. He works further-
Kuzio, Taras, 2010. The Crimea: Europe’s Next Flashpoint? Washington: Jamestown Foundation Kuzio, Taras and D’Anieri, Paul (eds.), 2002. Dilemmas of Stateled Nation Building in Ukraine. Westport: Praeger Publishers Meyer, James, 2007. In Migration, Return, and the Politics of Citizenship: Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1914. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 39, N.º 1, pp. 15-32 O’Brian, Brickford, 1953. Russia and Turkey, 1677-1681: The Treaty of Bakhchisarai. Russian Review, Vol. 12, N.º 4, pp. 259-268 Peacock, A., 2006. The Saliūq Campaign against the Crimea and the Expansionist Policy of the Early Reign of 'Alā' al-Dīn Kayqubād. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, Vol. 16, N.º 2, pp. 133-149 Poppe, Andrzej, 1976. The Political Background to the Baptism of Rus': Byzantine-Russian Relations between 986-89. Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 30, pp. 195-244 Prizel, Ilya, 1998. National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Saunders, David, 1995. Russia and Ukraine under Alexander II: The Valuev Edict of 1863. The International History Review, Vol. 17, Issue 1, pp. 23-50 Schönle, Andreas, 2001. Garden of the Empire: Catherine's Appropriation of the Crimea. Slavic Review, Vol. 60, N.º 1, pp. 1-23 Vardys, Stanley, 1971. The Case of the Crimean Tartars. Russian Review, Vol. 30, N.º 2, pp. 101-110 Vasiliev, A., 19362. Was Old Russia a Vassal State of Byzantium? Speculum, Vol. 7, N.º 3, pp. 350-360 Wanner, Catherine, 1998. Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Williams, Brian Glyn, 2001. The Crimean Tatars: The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV Wolchik, Sharon and Zviglianich, Vladimir, 2000. Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
more as a senior analyst at WikiStrat in Washington DC.
Bibliography: Croskey, Robert, 1984. The Diplomatic Forms of Ivan III's Relationship with the Crimean Khan. Slavic Review, Vol. 43, N.º 2, pp. 257-269 Dvornik, Francis, 1956. Byzantine Political Ideas in Kievan Russia. Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 9/10, pp. 73-121 Fisher, Alan, 1978. The Crimean Tatars. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press Fisher, Alan, 1967. Şahin Girey, the Reformer Khan, and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Vol. 15, N.º 3, pp. 341-364 Griffiths, David, 2008. Catherine II Discovers the Crimea. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Vol. 56, N.º 3, pp. 339-348 Hillis, Faith, 2012. Ukrainophile Activism and Imperial Governance in Russia's Southwestern Borderlands. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 13, N.º 2, pp. 301-326 Himka, John-Paul, 2002. The Ukrainian Idea in the Second Half of the 19th Century. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 3, N.º 2, pp. 321-335 Katchanovski, Ivan, 2005. Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, N.º 6, pp. 877-894 Kortepeter, M., 1966. Ġāzī Girāy II, Khan of the Crimea, and Ottoman Policy in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, 1588-94. The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 44, N.º 102, pp. 139166
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
7
The Crimea Crisis In Ukraine: Stakes Are High By Dr. Olga Burlyuk
T
ther may be violated for some reason or it may not. The UN Charter stands on the latter. Ironically, Russia and Putin person-
he break-up of Ukraine and the separation of Crimea,
ally have been an ardent defender of the latter too. Russia’s inva-
as well as Eastern and Southern provinces has been a
sion in Crimea is thus an act of aggression against Ukraine. If the
classic topic of security and identity analyses on
inviolability of a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is a
Ukraine ever since its independence. Yet, few experts (if any)
matter of degree, then the question is what reason – in the case
anticipated the present crisis and Russia’s “covert” invasion in
of Crimea, what number of citizens, ethnic representatives or
Crimea. Even fewer experts anticipated this would happen now,
language-speakers of a country in a third state oppressed, in
presuming Putin would be exemplary of the time of Winter
which ways and to what extent – would justify military invasion
Olympic Games in Sochi and his nomination for the Nobel Peace
of that third state. This is where Russia’s official discourse is
Prize. Indeed, an intervention following the Presidential elec-
pointing at. Accepting this track means opening Pandora’s Box
tions in Ukraine, which were initially scheduled for March 2015
and risks setting on fire the world rich in mismatches between
and which Viktor Yanukovych would lose given the decline of his
border and ethnic lines.
popular support reaffirmed by recent protests, would have been
Even if one was to accept the logic of degree and not
less surprising. However, Putin had to react to Euromaidan and
principle, thrust by Russia upon the world, the Crimean case
the change of power in Ukraine, and he had to react fast, in any
would hardly meet any reasonable threshold. The Russian narra-
case before the Russians could consolidate ideas of launching a
tive of Crimea as a traditional Russian territory with an over-
“Maidan” in Russia itself. Getting back at Ukraine and intimidat-
whelming Russian population that became part of Ukraine in
ing some parts of Russian domestic audiences while soothing
1954 is largely accepted in the West and constitutes a part of the
others is more and more frequently named by Ukrainian, Rus-
standard coverage in the Western and especially European me-
sian and international experts as the ultimate motivation of
dia. This narrative plants the seeds of acceptance of Russia’s
Putin’s invasion in Crimea, which otherwise makes no economic
aggression and possible annexation of Crimea. However, this
sense. Notably, Russian opposition leaders (Boris Nemtsov,
narrative manipulates history and negates the history of all non-
Mikhail Kasyanov, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and others) were
Russian peoples. It is also a crude misrepresentation of the pre-
among those few who predicted that Putin would “turn the
sent. According to the All-Ukrainian population census of 2001,
screws” internally and eventually invade Crimea “to get back at
ethnic Russians constituted merely 58% of the population of
Ukraine”. Whatever Putin’s original intention has been, the
Crimea. This percentage has decreased significantly since the
crisis in Crimea today is much more than the crisis about Crimea
previous census of 1989 and can be assumed to have decreased
and threatens the post-war and post-Cold-war world order and
further in the past 13 years, because the death rate exceeds the
security. This paper focuses on a number of key issues at stake
birth rate in all but the Crimean Tatars community of Crimea.
and the possible costs of failure of the international community
The results of the public opinion poll conducted by the Interna-
to resolve the crisis.
tional Republican Institute/USAID support this inference: only
International Law And The Foundations Of World
45% of Crimean residents in 2011 and 40% in 2013 considered
Order
themselves to be Russian. So, ethnic Russians constitute at best
First, the Crimea crisis challenges once again international law and the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity as the foundations of contemporary world order. Is the inviolability of a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity a matter of principle or degree? This is the question at stake. If it is a matter of principle, then the territorial integrity of a state eiAtlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
half of the population of Crimea and roughly 1 million people. For reference, ethnic Russians constitute about 17% of the total population of Ukraine, which is a smaller share than in the Baltic States; and there were about 6 million Russian-speakers in Germany as of 2003, according to a report by the Russian MFA. It is 8
needless to mention that a Russian-speaker does not equal an ethnic
ter of Crimea, who, by the way, received merely 3% of the votes
Russian and that an ethnic Russian does not equal a Russian citizen
in 2012 local elections and is a criminal authority under the nick-
(to the question of who may and is to be “protected”). What is im-
name “Goblin”. The Ukrainian authorities and the international
portant to point out, is that a Russian-speaker or an ethnic Russian
community have declared the referendum illegal and its future
does not equal a supporter of separation of territories from Ukraine
results illegitimate. The OSCE Chair ruled out even the possibility
and their integration into Russia. According
of an OSCE observation mission at the referendum. Second, the
to the public opinion poll conducted by the
territory is occupied and isolated
Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foun-
from mainland Ukraine by Rus-
dation in February 2014, only 12% of the
sian military, the population is
Ukrainian population supported the idea of
terrorized by armed gangs,
“closer integration with Russia”, with the
Ukrainian TV channels are off the
highest rates of 41% in Crimea, 33% in
air, and the two options on the
Donetsk, 24% in Lugansk and 15% in
referendum ballot are, essential-
Kharkiv (the three Eastern provinces of
ly, “I want Crimea to join Russia
Ukraine). Similarly, according to the public
now” and “I want Crimea to join
opinion poll conducted among the residents
Russia later”. Holding a legiti-
of Crimea by the IRI/USAID, only 33% in
Caricature of Crimean Referendum (Photo: startribune.com)
mate referendum on any question
2011 and merely 23% in 2013 responded that Crimea should be
in such circumstances would be impossible. The only purpose of
separated from Ukraine and given to Russia. At the same time, 49%
this referendum seems to be feigning popular support for the
and 53% respectively believed that Crimea should retain its current
earlier decisions of the self-proclaimed Crimean authorities to
autonomous status within Ukraine and 6% and 2% believed that the
separate from Ukraine and join Russia.
autonomy was altogether unnecessary. Even weaker separatist moods
Whichever way you look at the situation in Crimea – a
stem from the public opinion poll conducted by Razumkov Centre in
matter of principle or a matter of degree – the existing system of
December 2013. Only 6.5% of the population of Ukraine supported
checks and balances and the fundamentals of international law and
the idea of “separation of some regions”, with merely 9% in the East
world order are neglected and thus at stake. The success of
and 13% in the South (which includes Crimea). In other words, there
Putin’s annexation of Crimea will send yet another signal to the
is not a single region in Ukraine where the majority of the population
world that might is right.
supports the idea of separation and unity with Russia, also not in
International Law And The Foundations Of World
Crimea itself. Importantly, all three polls were conducted before
Security
Russia’s military invasion. Now that a separation has become a real
The Crimea crisis also challenges public international
possibility and Russia’s methods have become clear, the support rates
law and the foundations of world security. Under the Budapest
can be reasonably expected to decrease, as traditionally fewer people
Memorandum on Security Assurances of 1994, Russia, the UK
favor the idea of “a separation by war”.
and the USA, later joined by France and China, reaffirmed their
So, Russia’s claims on the all-Russian population of Crimea
commitment to respect the independence, sovereignty and the
that unanimously wants to join Russia simply do not hold. And the
existing borders of Ukraine, to refrain from the threat or use of
nature of the threat this population faces, other than the invaders
force against the territorial integrity and political independence of
themselves, is yet to be identified, for there is no evidence of any
Ukraine and to seek immediate action to provide assistance to
Ukrainian government ever persecuting Russian or Russian-speaking
Ukraine should it become a victim of (or threat of) an act of ag-
citizens of Ukraine. The results of a local referendum scheduled for
gression. These guarantees were reaffirmed by the USA and Rus-
16 March 2014 will have neither legal nor moral value. First, a local
sia in a Joint Declaration in 2009. Under the Memorandum, the
referendum of such sort is against the Constitution of Ukraine
five countries, arguably the world’s security super-powers, are
(whichever version) and the Helsinki Final Act 1975. Furthermore,
explicitly obliged to protect Ukraine. Yet, one of the guarantors
the referendum was scheduled by a decision of a closed session of the
(Russia) is the aggressor and breaching its obligation by action,
Crimean Parliament on the initiative of a self-appointed Prime Minis-
while the other four (the USA, the UK, France and China), should
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
9
they fail to step in for Ukraine, will be breaching their obli-
Ukraine itself, the suggestions are voiced to revive immediately
gation by inaction. Theoretically, in case Ukraine looses
the old infrastructure and enrich the remaining uranium before it
effective control over parts of its territory, it could take the
is too late (i.e. before Russia invades mainland Ukraine). In the
case to the International Court of Justice and seek repara-
case of failure, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agen-
tions from the five guarantors.
cy will be reduced to an entirely toothless watchdog.
What is more, the case of Ukraine challenges the
The Costs Of Failure
value of all similar existing or future security arrangements.
If Russia succeeds, Ukraine and the world will at best
The future role of the main Western security actors is at
and at least get another inact conflict. Ukrainian experts predict
stake. What is a security guarantee by the USA, the UK or
the potential of a conflict in Crimea to be similar to the one in
France worth, if they fail to protect Ukraine? How trust-
Transnistria, with elements of inter-ethnic tensions similar to the
worthy are similar bilateral and multilateral collective secu-
Northern part of Kosovo. As discussed above, ethnic Russians
rity provisions? Belarus and Kazakhstan concluded identical
constitute about half of the population in Crimea and do not
Budapest Memoranda in 1994, and their own security is
unanimously support annexation to Russia. In turn, the highly
now, basically, at Putin’s
organized minority of Crimean Tatars (15-20%) and the remain-
discretion. It is premature
ing largely Ukrainian population
to speak of the crisis of
(35-40%) are explicitly opposed
trust within NATO yet,
to the current developments.
but the similarities of the
As the experience with Cyprus,
two
Kosovo
collective
security
and
Transnistria
arrangements are all too
demonstrates, this frozen con-
obvious. Moreover, securi-
flict may obstruct or altogether
ty is one of the areas where
block future integration of
the West is still in the lead
Ukraine into European and
globally, and the loss in
Russian Soldier in Crimea (Photo: Deutsche Welle)
this domain may hurt the West in other areas. In the end, a failure of the Western guarantors to
international structures, above all into the EU and NATO. This
in itself might be one the aims of Putin. It will also portray a possibility of armed conflict to the very borders of the EU.
protect Ukraine will send a clear signal to the world: rely on
Besides, it is uncertain whether the Crimea conflict
yourself and yourself alone. This is where the next issue
will remain frozen. Despite the official end of the recent training
comes to the fore: nuclear arms.
of Russian military, Russia continues to pool forces to Ukraine’s
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation And The Nuclear
Eastern and Northern borders. And while it is unclear how far
Future Of The World
Ukrainian authorities and the population of mainland Ukraine are
The crisis in Crimea puts the success of the dis-
ready to go, they are unwilling to give Crimea up without a
armament and non-proliferation regime and the nuclear
fight. Ukrainian military in Crimea have so far not fired a shot
future of the world at stake. In 1994, Ukraine renounced its
only for direct commands not to shoot, in order to avert the
nuclear arsenal and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-
realization of the so-called Abkhazia scenario. This restraint shall
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in exchange for the firm
not be seen as reluctance, however. To the contrary, Russia’s
guarantees of its security under the Budapest Memorandum.
invasion only further consolidated the Ukrainian population and
Now Ukraine, once the third-largest nuclear power in the
boosted patriotism. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense reports that at
world, is under attack by one of the guarantors and, if the
least 40,000 men voluntarily conscribed in the army over the
other four do not step in, is left without protection. What
past weeks (which is in itself extraordinary for Ukraine, where
will the non-proliferation regime be worth then? The plain
evasion of compulsory military service has developed into an
signal for the rest of the world would be to continue devel-
art). Furthermore, the Ukrainian Reserve Army and the National
oping or strengthening their nuclear arsenals. Even in
Guard are being formed, to reinforce the regular army or to take
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
10
action in case of the authorities’ indecision. Thousands of women follow nursing courses, which state and private clinics offer for free. The people seem driven by sheer patriotism, as well as a sense of duty towards the people of Crimea (and especially Cri-
About the author Olga Burlyuk is an independent expert on Ukraine and EU
mean Tatars) and a clear realization that, if successful, Putin will
external policies towards its (Eastern) neighbourhood. She holds
not stop at Crimea and invade mainland Ukraine. Indeed, Rus-
a PhD in International Relations degree from the University of
sia’s impunity in the case of Crimea will cancel out the existing global mechanisms of checks and balances and may encourage Putin to go further than initially in-
Kent. Her doctoral research focused
In the end, a failure of the Western guarantors to protect Ukraine will send a clear signal to the world: rely on yourself and yourself alone.
on EU rule of law promotion in Ukraine. See Olga’s latest publications:
tended, in places other than Ukraine. It may also activate frozen or covert conflicts in other regions of the world and, as discussed earlier, may boost nuclear activity. There is little sense in guessing how the Crimea crisis will end and in assessing what the international community is doing right and wrong: the situation changes by the hour and, for any serious prognosis, one needs access to classified information. Currently, the crisis is being dealt with in the domain of Track I diplomacy, and there is no way of knowing how adequate the world’s response is and will be. Yet, the signals from the extraordinary sessions of the UN Security Council, NATO, the EU Council, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and domestically in the USA, strong diplomatic language of the documents adopted at these meetings and tough rhetoric of Western leaders, the withdrawal from participation in the G8 Summit in Sochi and others demonstrate broad involvement and serious commitment of the West to resolve the crisis, at least publicly. The much believed original scenario of Putin – a blitzkrieg in Crimea à la Georgia in 2008, followed by a smooth and welcomed invasion in the Eastern and later Southern regions of Ukraine – has already failed. Undoubtedly, this has something to do with the international reaction to the events. One may only hope that the measures of the international community will prove to be sufficient on the whole. Otherwise, a fresh joke that “the warmest ever winter in Europe ended with a Cold War” will become a reality. And a successful annexation of Crimea by Russia will end with a true humanitarian crisis: in addition to the dependence of the local budget on state subsidies (65%) and the reliance of 90% of Crimean residents on income from tourism (70% from Ukraine), the peninsula receives 100% of its gas, 100% of its railway connections, 85% of its drinking water and 80% of its electricity from mainland Ukraine. There is presently no infrastructure in place for providing any of these from Russia.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 3
Bibliography BBC. (2014, March 10). Crimea referendum: What does the ballot paper say? Retrieved March 13, 2014, from www.bbc.com: http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-26514797 Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation. (2014). Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation. Retrieved 2014, from How relations between Ukraine and Russia should look like? Public opinion polls’ results: : http:// www.dif.org.ua/en/events/ukrainieyu-nehochut.htm Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2003). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Retrieved 2014, from Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation "Russian language in the world": http://www.mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/ B6BE784B3E2ABD1343256DF8003AC21C? OpenDocument Nemtsov, B. (2014, February 22). Echo Moscow. Retrieved March 13, 2014, from Maidan Lessons: http:// www.echo.msk.ru/blog/nemtsov_boris/1264336echo/ Nemtsov, B. (2014, February). live journal - Boris Nemtsov. Retrieved March 2014 Nemtsov, B., & Kasyanov, M. (2013, December 11). Radio Svoboda. Retrieved March 13, 2014, from Boris Nemtsov and Michail Kasyanov on Maidan: http:// www.svoboda.org/media/video/25197032.html Ostapchuk, V. (2014, March 07). The Global Mail. Retrieved March 13, 2014, from Don't let Russia abuse Crimean history: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globedebate/dont-let-russia-abuse-crimean-history/ article17357913/. Razumkov Centre. (2014, March 10). Public opinion survey "Citizens attitude towards different types of territoorial organisation". Retrieved March 13, 2014, from Razumkov Centre: http://www.uceps.org/eng/ news.php?news_id=451. Rettman, A. (2014, March 11). euobserver. Retrieved March 13, 2014, from Khodorkovsky: Putin fears Ukraine 'revolution': http://euobserver.com/foreign/123419 State Statistics Comittee of Ukraine. (2001). State Statistics Comittee of Ukraine. Retrieved 2014, from All Ukrainian population census 2001: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/ nationality/ U.S. Department of State. (2009, December 04). U.S.-Russia Joint Statement on Expiration of the START Treaty. Retrieved March 13, 2014, from Diplomacy In Action: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/ dec/133204.htm United States Agency for International Development. (2013). Public Opinion Survey Residents of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Washington: US AID.
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