ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Volume 4 - Issue 9 September 2014
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection: The Role of NATO and the EU The growing imbalance between supply and demand in the energy market has been confirmed by recent crises and will lead to more instability in the supply chain by developed economies. This month’s edition of Atlantic Voices will analyse NATO and the EU’s current stance on future energy challenges and attempt to identify the relevant energy issues for transatlantic actors. Given the fact that the majority of European states are dependent on imports of energy supply from external unstable suppliers, the energy policy has recently dominated the political and security debates. The two articles will analyse the potential risks that could affect the transatlantic community’s energy security and contribute to cumulative knowledge in a sphere of a new but critical interests. This edition will further analyse how transatlantic actors are addressing the vulnerability of the world energy markets, whether these are disruptions from geopolitical strives or natural disasters, and how strategic energy policies should go beyond the supply of oil, in order to prevent disasters to affect multiple economies simultaneously. - Magda Kocianova & Maria Mundt Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9
Solar panels and wind power plants are increasingly used by the European states to promote renewable energy production. (Photo: Institute of Energy for South-Eastern Europe)
Contents: Gas as a Source of the EU’s Interdependence: A Transatlantic Perspective on Current Energy Situation Julian Gajo explains the significance of the recent energy security debate within the European Union amid the increased tensions in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, analysing the vulnerability of the EU Member States dependent on energy imports.
NATO and the EU’s Potential Role in Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection Alessandro Niglia focuses on different policies and approaches towards the Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection within the Euro-Atlantic sphere, specifically the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union, elaborating on the prospects for future potential collaboration. 1
Gas as a Source of the EU’s Interdependence: A Transatlantic Perspective on Current Energy Situation By Mr. Julian Gajo
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n recent years, energy security has incrementally moved into the focus of public debate and up on the national and international political agendas. Especially when looking at the EU, it has furthermore become increasingly important in the field of foreign policy, given the Union’s over-reliance on imports from non-EU energy producers. This is not least due to the acknowledgment of the increasing nexus between energy security and political freedom of action as an element of independence and sovereignty. There are many reasons for these causally determined tendencies and any investigation on this matter can only capture a limited part of the greater image. Amidst the often times arbitrarily used range of multifaceted terms, such as competitiveness, sustainability, and the term energy security itself, identification or articulation of a coherent argument is the first challenge when approaching issues related to energy policy. One of the most adequate theories that reflect the current international discussion on energy security is the complex interdependence theory. This article will approach the present theme in an attempt to identify the relevance of energy issues in contemporary politics, how this affects the EU and how this in turn is linked to the EU’s transatlantic relations. As an exemplary energy resource, this article will center on gas trade to limit and hence sharpen its focus. The complex interdependence theory argues that in the context of transnational relations, political agendas lack hierarchy and nation states are not only connected through official political elites, but through numerous official and unofficial ties – as it is the case with the energy sector, which includes (amongst others) international organizations, multinational companies and NGOs. At the same time, the energy sector is of varying relevance to different nation states, depending on whether they are demanding or supplying Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9
energy sources. Both of these basic assertions approve of the assumption that the increasing importance of energy security touches upon the idea of interdependence.
Gazprom’s Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas field. (Gazprom)
This interdependence presumes a more or less balanced relationship between two or more political entities, which both have their tools or means of demonstrating leverage and power over the other (besides traditional military strength, which in times of increasing global interconnectedness has been reduced to a mere last resort of power). Interdependence is however a very fragile state of a relationship and can easily turn into an asymmetrical interdependence that is then rather considered as a one-sided dependence of one entity to another. Especially when looking at energy relations, this notion seems to hold true in the vast majority of cases. The implications this has on the EU are just as profound, as they are complex. This article intends to give a succinct insight into the EU’s energy situation with regards to this theoretical notion. Recent Trends So far, the year 2014 has revealed two major trends in transnational energy relations. Although those trends were not unexpected in their basic nature, they have marked a dramatic intensification of transnational energy relations in recent months. One trend is the 2
reaffirmation of the assertion that the EU’s energy sector does not only heavily rely on non-EU energy providers, but also that this asymmetrical interdependence creates a gap between relying on energy imports and the ability to demonstrate leverage towards non-EU actors in foreign affairs, as the EU cannot afford the risk to lose key energy providers. This holds especially true when looking at fossil energy sources such as gas. The other trend is the one of intensified efforts in minimizing possible dependence on external or non-EU energy providers. Besides more common strategies, which include measures such as diversification of providers or diversification of energy sources, a more recent tool is what is commonly known as hydraulic fracturing, or short ‘fracking’, which has the potential of exploiting yet unexplored gas reserves. This method is however highly controversial due to its uncharted impacts on the environment. The new technology represents one of the biggest differences between the US and the EU in their approach of minimizing energy dependence, as elaborated on below, and potentially represents a turn of the tides in transatlantic energy policies. The intensified awareness of dependence on external energy providers has not sprung from nowhere. With a lagging, yet increasingly determined energy strategy of approaching a sustainable and low-carbon energy sector, which also includes a long-term phase-out of nuclear energy, the EU is especially dependent on the fossil resource gas, which is commonly considered to be a ‘bridge -fuel’ – a necessary energy source that is to provide energy security in the transformation process of the EU’s energy sector. While simultaneously expanding ‘smartgrids’ and promoting the development of renewable energies, it is undeniable that the EU’s energy sector is yet characterized by a strong reliance on fossil fuels. Latest figures from 2012 indicate that the EU-28 consumes some 392.8 mtoe (million tons of oil equivalent), while only producing around 133.4 mtoe. The EU’s net import of gas is hence 258.6 mtoe, which roughly accounts for 66% of its gas consumption. This is mainly due to the fact that fossils are extremely scarce within the EU, which is why imports and hence import dependency rates remain high and in some cases even increase. Especially with regards to gas imports (import dependency rate Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9
FRACKING: Hydraulic fracturing is a high-tech method of retrieving natural gas or petroleum from deep rock formations comprising unexplored fossil energy resources by injecting high-pressure fluids (usually consisting of water, chemicals and sand). Although this technique is ecologically highly questionable, it does offer the advantage of increasing domestic gas production temporarily. 2012: 65.8%), this dependency is treacherous. Not only are the vast majority of gas resources in the hands of only a few producing states world-wide, it is also hard to transport – commonly through pipelines or more expensively in form of LNG tankers. All of these developments and characteristics, which determine the EU’s current energy situation, provide ideal circumstances for dependence or interdependence to develop. Recent dramatic political events in the European neighborhood have shown how significant it is to deal with this interdependence. The Impact of the Arab Spring on the EU’s Energy Sector One of those events was the Arab Spring in early 2011, still overshadowing current situations in affected countries. A popular uprising overthrew thitherto autocratic or quasi-autocratic regimes and – for the sake of democratic development – turned stable economic partners into unstable neighboring countries with interim governments. Whereas some countries, such as Tunisia, were able to manage this drastic political switch rather successfully, other countries, such as Libya, are still dealing with the aftermath, being strongly characterized by armed conflict and domestic unrest. To the EU’s energy sector, this is especially disadvantageous, as Libya, rich in oil resources, represented one of the most important energy partners in the region. Although Europe’s most valuable gas trade partner in the region, namely Algeria, managed to suppress a fullscale national uprising, the EU did face a serious threat to the stability of its gas imports, potentially being exposed to an era of uncertainty in energy relations to3
wards the region. A recent terrorist attack on an Algerian oil field in January 2013 is only one concrete example of the fragile security state the EU’s foreign fossil sources are in. Despite the fear of disrupted supply of fossil resources, the Arab Spring also represented a major challenge to largescale international projects in the field of renewable energies. Bilateral and multilateral agreements and contracts concluded – e.g. – within the context of the Mediterranean Solar Plan had to be reassured of validity, while at the same time major investors backed out of financial commitment due to the regional political instability. Especially in the early stages of the Arab Spring, the EU found itself in a position in which both supply of traditional energy sources and future potential supply of alternative energy sources were endangered, revealing the EU’s strong vulnerability towards energy partner countries, as the EU’s policy framework cannot, or at best, can only slowly, adapt to drastic external changes. The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on the EU’s Energy Sector Besides the Southern neighborhood, the Eastern one is at least of equal importance to the EU’s energy sector and in terms of fossil energy
German nuclear power plant Isar 2. On its way to a secure, sustainable and competitive energy sector, the EU will eventually engage in a nuclear phase-out, increasing natural gas’ relevance as a ‘bridge-fuel’ in the Union’s energy mix. (E.ON Kernkraft GmbH)
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sources even more important, with Russia still being the biggest gas supplier to the EU, providing 32% of all extra-EU natural gas imports. While in recent years post-Cold-War tensions have been very low, increasing hopes for long-term stability in EU-Russian relations, 2014 with the newly revived Ukraine Crisis has proved these hopes wrong. Using gas supply as a political tool to counter political sanctions put forth by the EU, Russia uses the presumably asymmetrical interdependent relationship to make leeway for its foreign policy. This rather unforeseen supra-regional conflict seriously compromises EU’s foreign policy with its domestic needs for energy. The spiral of sanctions that developed in the aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis of 2014 was of an economic, financial and diplomatic nature. Russia’s response, however, focused on the energy sector, as it represents its most valuable asset. Both the EU’s sanctions and Russia’s energy supply threat were not related to the original conflict that emanated from Ukraine’s revolution and the EU’s and Russia’s roles in it. In fact, it had nothing to do with it except for fulfilling the purpose of demonstrating leverage towards the respective other party. At first sight, this scenario seems like the revival of a state last experienced in the times of the Cold War, which was until recently unthinkable. In reality, however, what this situation displays is an exemplary cross -sectoral, reciprocal influence of transnational issues due to a well-developed and distinct complex interdependence in international relations. The EU is subject to this interdependence. This fact has been reaffirmed clearer than ever in recent history. Although the US takes part in tightening sanctions towards Russia, it suffers less from Russia’s counter-sanctions than the EU. Yet again, an extra-EU conflict turned out to reveal EU’s high vulnerability and sensitivity when it comes to energy-related issues. The EU has to become aware of its unique position in geopolitical energy disputes and cannot rely on third parties to resolve the conflict that it is by proxy involved in, but has to take immediate action itself.
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Carrier ships are the only alternative to conventional gas pipelines to trade gas. Although the transport is very costly, it offers the potential of receiving gas from geographically distant locations. (QatarGas)
Aggregated Energy and Foreign Policy Crisis for the EU Both conflicts rest upon the fact that the EU, from the early beginnings of modern energy markets on, has pursued a strongly integrative energy policy, linking it directly to its neighbourhood and foreign policy. This was not least due to the fact that virtually all conventional energy sources were characterized by scarcity within the EU. Tough nuclear energy did seem to promise a loophole in the later half of the 20th century, as it guaranteed domestic electricity generation; incidents such as Chernobyl and more recently Fukushima have triggered an intense public debate about serious security issues with the nowadays relatively unpopular energy source. Many national governments, above all the German one, have agreed on nuclear phase-out, which bolstered the relevance of fossil fuels, once again making the EU depend stronger on external energy providers. This most profound substructure of the EU’s energy sector does not only explain why a foreign policy issue can easily turn into an energy issue and vice-versa, but already presupposes the Union’s entanglement in complex interdependent relations. The EU’s Policy Response To manage this (asymmetrical) interdependence, the EU has engaged in several methods. To Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9
minimize dependence on single gas providers, the EU has started diversifying its gas suppliers, which decreases the exclusiveness of energy relations to major gas providers, such as Russia, as the EU is now able to consume gas from a range of different countries. Other extra-EU gas suppliers are mainly Norway (31% of gas imports) and Algeria (13%), but more recently also smaller ones, such as (among others) Qatar (8%) and Nigeria (4%). The EU has also increased its efforts in promoting renewable energy with large-scale projects within and outside the EU, which ultimately diversifies the EU’s energy mix eventually decreasing the gas share in said mix. Other ways of directly and indirectly managing asymmetrical interdependence also include (among others) the promotion of energy efficiency and the domestic gas production. In the context of the latter tool, hydraulic fracturing has become a very attractive concept, as it could potentially, but also only temporarily, increase domestic gas production, in turn making the EU’s energy sector less dependent on extra-EU gas supply. Since ’fracking’ is, however, highly disputable in terms of its impacts on the environment, its use within the EU remains rather unclear. At this point, shale gas production seems to directly disagree with the EU’s dictum of developing a sustainable and low-carbon energy sector. The EU itself has not managed to implement a binding agreement on it and hence left the responsibility of shale gas production up to national governments. Whereas some EU member states have decided to start shale gas exploration, such as Great Britain and Poland, other countries are more inclined to prohibiting ‘fracking’, as is the case in Germany. This in turn leads to an asymmetrical ‘energy exposure’ among EU member states, causing policy-making on EU level to become yet more difficult than it already is in the energy sector. Projecting this situation onto the transatlantic relations, there appear to be two main paradigms that differentiate the EU’s approach to the one of the US. Whereas the EU has made sustainability its basic and most desirable long-term aim, the US has implied independence as its main goal. Engaging in large-scale ‘fracking’ operations, the US has recently declared 5
this independence in the gas sector. Although concrete predictions of future gas production do differ in volume and time span, the US could indeed be independent of gas imports for about the next decade and could in fact become a gas exporter to other countries. As some academics have suggested, this current situation of contradicting paradigms pursued by the EU and the US could turn out to be a major parting of their ways. Whereas in the past, global energy politics have often been influenced under the same fundamental idea – namely of securing world fossil resources and ensuring access to them within a global energy market – the EU could now find itself alone in this endeavor, as the US is a self-providing gas producer. Although this idea is nothing but mere speculation at this point, the near future’s developments in this regard need to be closely observed. The EU has to become aware of the gravity of this change in world energy politics. It also needs to decide whether it wants to pursue energy politics of ‘Eurogaullism’ or ‘Euroatlanticism’. In times of supply uncertainty, an EU solo attempt in global energy politics is highly risky. Especially when considering newly arising tension in the Eastern neighborhood, a more than fragile Near and Middle East, and a Southern neighborhood undergoing major political transformation, old alliances need to be maintained, if not intensified. The transatlantic relations need to be inclusive of the energetic dimension. Diverging paths on a transatlantic level could very well be of short-term interest, but might turn out to be counterproductive in the long-run. Equally, the US has to become more aware of its global role in energy politics. It cannot withdraw from international disputes over fossil resources, as it is now more than ever in recent history independent of gas imports. Unless the US decides to offer its newly found gas production for transatlantic trade opportunities – which will be costly and difficult due to the rather elaborate transport-efforts for gas – transatlantic energy relations and interests might Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9
be at the turn of the tides. In light of recent efforts in promoting transatlantic economic agreements, in form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), it remains to be seen if and to what extent energy politics will play a role in transatlantic relations.
About the author Julian Gajo studied Communication and Cultural Management (BA) at Zeppelin University, focusing on the understanding and communication of the concept of sustainability by German energy companies. As an external consultant to different German Ministries, he engaged in several projects in the field of renewable energy politics. Mr. Gajo specialized in Political Strategy and Communication at the University of Kent’s Brussels School of International Studies, investigating on the interdependence between the EU and non-EU energy providers by analyzing and identifying ways of managing and minimizing the Union’s possible dependence on foreign gas supplies.
Bibliography Eurostat – European Commission (2014), EU Energy in Figures – Statistical Pocketbook 2014, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Goldthau, A (2012), The Politics of Natural Gas Development in the European Union. [Online], Available from: <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MO-CESpub-GeoGasEU-102513.pdf>. Kaveshnikov, N (2010), “The issue of energy security in relations between Russia and the European Union.” European Security, vol.19, no.4, pp.585-605. Keohane, R and J Nye Jr. (2012), Power and Interdependence, 4th edition, Cambridge: Pearson Publishing. Youngs, R (2009), Energy Security: Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge, New York: Routledge.
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NATO and the EU’s Potential Role in Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection By Mr. Alessandro Niglia
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nergy resources are of crucial and vital importance for any country to work properly (e.g. to generate the electricity needed for households, schools, businesses and factories). The developing economies in particular demand a strong increase in energy supply according to recent studies released by the International Energy Agency (IEA). As a result, a growing imbalance between supply and demand in the energy market might lead to more instability in the supply chain by developed economies. This offers the foundation to review the policies and strategies on future energy challenges. On one hand, drawing more attention and investment towards renewable energy sources might easily solve such a review. On the other hand, Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) now becomes an issue of international concern, as most countries in the transatlantic area are not fully energy independent; e.g. Lithuania (100%), Germany (38%), Italy (31%), Hungary (31%) are strongly dependent on the gas supply coming from Russia. Due to the call for a strong diversification of energy supplies, most NATO countries still have to rely on oil and gas (from Russia) to provide basic services (from transportation to communication, to security and health infrastructure). In addition, in the last ten years, terrorist attacks, maritime piracy, cyber-attacks, and political sabotage against interdependent energy infrastructures have resulted in making production and transportation of energy more complicated, causing instability in the financial energy market. This means that the vulnerability of the energy supply system must be viewed as a global question.
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NATO’s progression in energy security is not entirely based on the strategic concept, which is an official document that outlines NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks. It also identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s approach to security and provides guidelines for the adaptation of its military forces.
Protecting the CEIP is essential to guarantee political stability and security. (Intelligent Security Systems)
The NATO Strategic Concept in 1999 stressed that “Alliance security can be affected by […] the disruption of the flow of vital resources.” Since the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, CEIP has been one of the top subjects for discussion and the Alliance is considered a relevant player for the defense of critical energy infrastructures at large. As outlined by Mr. Michael Rühle, the Head of Energy Security Section in NATO HQ, “NATO has a legitimate role to play in energy security” and “assuring energy supply may not be a straightforward military challenge, yet it clearly has a security dimension.” The new Strategic Concept (November 2010) affirms NATO’s commitment to "develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning.” Despite this 7
innovative impetus, NATO hesitates to approach the energy security subject for two main following reasons: First, the diverging national interests on the matter justify this hesitation. Before the Bucharest Summit took place in 2008, a very heated discussion on NATO’s role in energy security was carried out. On the one hand, Poland and Baltic states called for NATO’s active role in defending vital energy infrastructures such as pipeline and marine oil terminals, in order to be more independent from Russia. On the other hand, many NATO Member States were afraid of an overlap between NATO and the EU policies as the latter is already committed to protecting energy infrastructure in the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy. Basically, these States wanted NATO to have a more limited role on the control of maritime security. Second, there are already a high number of players involved in the energy security arena, such as the EU itself, IEA, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the private sector. Therefore, diverging national political and economic interests and NATO’s structural limitations obstruct the clarity and importance of NATO’s added value in the energy security debate. Thus, many European states are reluctant to discuss this delicate issue in international forums. This requires NATO to put more effort in addressing the challenges in the following 5 key areas where relevant added value could be provided: 1. Intelligence and information sharing; 2. Projecting stability; 3. Advancing international and regional stability; 4. Supporting consequence management; and 5. Supporting the critical protection of infrastructure. With specific regard to the Critical Energy Infrastructure , NATO outlines the importance to carry out a particular policy to protect energy infrastructure, as it is a critical part of global energy security, which is a subject to a number of threats. According to recent statistics (Word Oil Transit Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9
Chokepoints Report, U.S Energy Information Administration), almost half of the total global oil production is transferred by oil tankers on permanent maritime routes with a high number of critical choke points. This means that port facilities are being more critical and difficult to be managed than before. The current situation is extremely complicated as the cyber systems (meaning the intense link between the computational and physical elements) are essential to make some critical energy infrastructure work properly. This requires the preparedness and readiness to face potential cyber-attacks. Furthermore, hundreds of terrorists attacks, such as bombing of gas and oil pipelines, attacks on fuel trucks, killing and kidnapping associated personnel, disrupting of electrical power systems, occur every year on energy-related targets. West Africa is the area where the most of these attacks are carried out. Nonetheless, one of the most critical problems to be addressed is the consequence of an attack on energy infrastructure, which can reverberate far beyond the point of origin. The attack can result in the interruption of the flow of energy, which might lead to ripple effects. As a consequence, energy markets are not immune and prices are strongly influenced even from the result coming from one single attack if the duration and extent of the attack itself are significant. The rise in the energy prices is just one of the several features that make the energy security a global issue that no Ally can ignore. At the latest NATO Summit, energy security has been one of the prominent topics discussed. Once again NATO has affirmed its role in the energy security area in the Wales Summit Declaration (Article 109): “A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks remain of critical importance(…)we will enhance our awareness of energy developments with security implications for Allies and the Alliance; further develop NATO’s competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; (…)We will also enhance training and education efforts, continue to en8
gage with partner countries, on a case-by-case basis, and consult with relevant international organizations, including the EU, as appropriate”.
NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO)
With the aim to provide the Allies with the most appropriate support in the scope of energy sector, the NATO’s Center of Excellence for Energy Security (ENSEC COE) was inaugurated in Vilnius, Lithuania, in October 2013. This NATO ENSEC COE, supported by Lithuania, Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia and Turkey, has been tasked to provide both NATO HQ and Members with analyses on energy developments. At this Center of Excellence, other relevant activities such as education, training, strategic planning and technical and academic research are conducted. As outlined by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen over the inauguration of the Center on 6 September 2013: “Energy security is not a call to arms. But when it comes to understanding the security implications of global resource developments, NATO must be ahead of the curve.” This Center of Excellence has an important mission, which is to assist Strategic Commands, nations, partners, and other civil and military bodies by supporting NATO’s capability development process, mission effectiveness, and interoperability in the near, mid and long term by providing comprehensive and timely subject matter expertise on all aspects of energy security. The mission includes cost effective solutions to support military requirements, energy efficiency in the operational field and interaction with academia and industry.
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EU’s Role in Energy Security Recalling the Article 109 in the NATO Summit Declaration just mentioned above, the cooperation between NATO and the EU and the role of the latter in the energy security field is a strategic asset. The Article 194 of the Treaty of Lisbon is considered the legal basis for a new energy policy at the EU level. In particular, four objectives are affirmed: 1. Ensure the functioning of the energy market; 2. Ensure security of energy supply in the Union; 3. Promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and 4. Promote the interconnection of energy networks. In order to achieve objectives number 1 and 2, the European Commission established strict priorities to make the energy infrastructure stable and secure for the years to come; the most relevant being the identification of European Critical Infrastructures (ECI) in different energy sub-sectors: electricity, oil and gas. Directive 2008/114/EC is the first legal instrument of an EU dimension on the subject of critical infrastructure protection and is focused on the energy and transport sectors. In particular, this directive considers the role that EU Member States and owners/ operators of European Critical Infrastructures have in identifying whether or not a particular ECI is a likely target for an attack. Key criteria for identification include: casualties, economic impact and public opinion. Once an ECI is identified through the criteria mentioned above, each EU Member State will have the duty to inform the others that might be significantly affected by a potential attack, its identity, point of origin and the reasons for designating it as a potential ECI target. Moreover, an Operator Security Plan (OSP) has been created in order to provide and implement solutions for the protection of the ECI identified. In addition, each EU Member State will possess a Security Liaison Officer or equivalent as the point of contact for security related issues between the owners/ operators and the Member State authority. Through a proper collaborative mechanism the relevant Member State and the Security Liaison Officer identify the 9
risks and threats in relation to the ECI concerned. Last but not least, the European Commission will also play a relevant role by providing the Member State authority and the owner/operators of a designated ECI all the technologies and best practices related to critical infrastructure protection.
Energy security has been on the agenda of NATO and the Allies for several years (NATO)
The Directive 2008/114 is now under revision and a heated discussion is taking place amongst European governments. The Thematic Network on Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (TNCEIP), made up of the European owners and operators of energy infrastructure in the electricity, gas and oil sectors, are contributing to the debate on the revision of the Directive with the aim of raising awareness and sharing the best practices for improving the protection system of the designated ECI. Resulting from the debate of this revision of the Directive, TNCEIP has moved to strengthening private-public partnership between the European Commission, Member States and relevant stakeholders, reinforcing contingency plans, setting a common methodology for assessing risks and threats and improving the technology on information security.
ergy companies, which own and operate energy assets, should take under their consideration the financial impacts caused by a potential threat, be it either a terrorist attack or vandalism. Moreover, other relevant threats such as natural hazards, accidental hazards, and consequential hazards might have a wide financial impact on the energy company’s functioning. Often a specific analysis of the security risk is not carried out by the private sector. In doing so, the safety of energy infrastructure and the well-being of all citizens are more vulnerable. In order to analyze, mitigate, and minimize the security risks associated with energy infrastructure, a set of guidelines has been prepared by the Harnser Group for the European Commission. These guidelines serve as an innovative tool at the disposal of private companies, in which a detailed analysis of the potential damaging effects resulting from a lack of experience and poor consideration of the issues are provided. The vital importance of a methodology for assessing risks and threats is affirmed by two strategic documents prepared by the Harnser Group. The first, published in summer 2010, titled: “A Reference Security Management Plan for Energy Infrastructure” considers the owners/operators energy perspective, giving them a useful blueprint to comply with the national and/or international legal and technical background. This document is intended to provide an overall strategy for making an effective Operator Security Plan under the Directive 2008/114 provisions. The second, published in autumn 2012, titled: “The Financial Aspects of the Security of Assets and Infrastructures in the Energy Sector” is a set of guidelines for owners/operators of energy infrastructures aiming to solicit them to take into major consideration the financial consequences of managing the security risks on energy assets. This innovative document contributes to raising awareness about the high financial value resulting from the protection of critical energy infrastructure.
Private Sector Role in Securing Energy CEIP: What’s Next? Besides the regulatory role played by the EU, the private sector is supposed to play a more relevant role in the CEIP. In particular, many enAtlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9
Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection is a joint issue for the EU and NATO since many coun10
tries involved are members to both organizations. With the Directive 2008/114, now under revision, the EU has a certain role in securing the flow of vital energy sources. However, due to a lack of coordinated European energy policies, the preeminent role of the European states remains untouched, ignoring an important component for an EU energy-related body that would specialize in the foreign relations component of providing CEIP for the Euro-Atlantic region. This has unfortunately resulted in a weak European cooperation, allowing further complications between NATO-EU relations to arise. Despite this complicated collaboration, some steps forward are being taken by NATO. Since 2008, after the NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, the Alliance has effectively provided its contribution through strategic agreements such as the Partnership for Peace and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative within the framework of Science for Peace and Security Programme. However, NATO’s leading role in energy security is difficult to carry out for three reasons. First, many countries refuse the potential overstretching to which NATO might be exposed. Second, other international organizations exist that are better designed and mandated to address issues of energy security. Third, several threats in diverse fields are considered more relevant for the Alliance. Thus, NATO should consider the energy security area as a potential field, in which a specific added value might be provided in mitigating risks to energy critical infrastructure. NATO has wide access to the best available systems of surveillance including satellite feeds, electronic intercepts and on-the-ground representation, allowing NATO to contribute securing attractive and vulnerable energy infrastructure with a very high-level of support. For example, information and intelligence sharing might represent a further strategic way to contribute effectively to global energy security. Therefore, a comprehensive new approach could look as followed: NATO should support the Member States by giving access to the best practices for managing both risks and threats to CEIP worldwide. This is the specific added value that might be extremely relevant for securing energy supply from countries facing political instability and a lack of security. On the EU side, first of Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 9
all, the problems in the designation of the European Critical Infrastructure on each EU country should be overcome by reinforcing the role of the EU Commission, which is only informed annually of the number of ECI by sector, among which is also the energy sector. Therefore, the Commission should play a stronger role of guidance even if the Member States remain primarily responsible for implementing and assessing the need to enhance protection of critical infrastructure. In order to implement the CEIP policies, the dialogue with the private sector should be facilitated by both NATO and the EU. This will lead to the involvement of companies in the evaluation of the threats and challenges facing the CEIP as well as a contribution to the reduction of the likelihood of potential attacks. This would create a sustainable long-term approach that would increase security, lower expenses, and formally develop an integrated system between the international organization and the private sector.
About the author Alessandro Niglia is Program Manager at the Atlantic Treaty Association focusing on the NATO-EU relations in the field of energy security. He is a CoDirector of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on the protection of critical energy infrastructures, contributing to an enhanced cooperation between both the public and private sectors. He has graduated cum laude in Political Science and European Studies and holds a Post-Graduate Master in Geopolitics and Global Security.
Bibliography Cornell, P (2012), “Regional and International Energy Security Dynamics: Consequences for NATO’s Search for an Energy Security Role.” GCSP Geneva Paper, Research Series no.5. NATO Parliamentary Assembly (2008), Energy Security: Co-Operating to Enhance the Protection of Critical Energy Infrastructures. North Atlantic Treaty Association Website, NATO’s Role in Energy Security. [Online] Available from: http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49208.htm. Rapisarda, A (2007), “Risk Assessment in the Private Sector.” Energy Security and Security Policy: NATO and the Role of International Security Actors in Achieving Energy Security. 11
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security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation through the cohesion of its member and partner states.
academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37 countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include to the successor generation in our work. Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security
The Atlantic Treaty Association is organizing a NATO-sponsored Advanced Research Workshop on 'The protection of Critical Energy Infrastructure against Emerging Security Challenges' in Tbilisi, Georgia, on
through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
25-28 November 2014. The main objective is to investigate the security
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
risks to critical energy infrastructure, namely cyber and terrorist attacks,
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
as well as to identify opportunities for public-private stakeholders to meet
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these risks. Using the case study of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the workshop will provide an excellent forum for experts, government stakehold-
security issues.
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ers and academia to exchange information and practices.
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch. We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of importance to the NATO Alliance. For details on how to submit your work, please, see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below. Editors: Magda Kocianova and Maria Mundt
Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.
the establishment of new and competitive programs on international
the development of research initiatives and security-related events for its members.
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the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia. The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy
activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.
This publication is co co--sponsored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization