ISSN 2294-1274
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Volume 2 - Issue 3, March 2012
NATO AND MISSILE DEFENSE: ROCKET SCIENCE OR GLOBAL SECURITY NECESSITY? A ballistic missile defense architecture for Europe is one of the current priorities in NATO’s capability development, as strengthened on the occasion of the 2010 Lisbon Summit and within the 2010 Strategic Concept. Allies are cooperating in building up the necessary infrastructure for the protection of the European citizens, and NATO’s Heads of State and Government are supposed to announce an important interim missile defense capability at the upcoming Chicago Summit. Without it be-
The proposed system is to protect NATO Allies from a perceived growing threat from countries like Iran (Photo: The Guardian)
ing officially confirmed the missile shield in progress is currently mainly directed against a
Contents:
potential missile threat from Iran. However, several questions have to be asked in an age of austerity, “Smart Defense” and new security challenges: Will the missile defense undertaking become just another example for the US providing European Allies with essential capabilities? How can NATO manage to finally integrate Russia into the project in a way that missile defense can serve as cornerstone of further NATO-Russia partnership? And: What are the alternatives to building up this program?
Global Pulse: The Euro-zone Crisis and the Future of Greece. A Youth Perspective A new feature of Atlantic Voices. Maria Stamatopoulou explains her understanding of the Euro-zone crisis and the effect it is having on the present circumstance and future outlook of the Greek youth.
Missile Defense: A Hazardous and Ineffective Indulgence In his article, Oliver Jones provides a critical perspective on NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense. He looks at the system that is currently being developed by different Allies, from a technical and strategic perspective, while also including political aspects into his assessment. He argues in favour of an adaptation of the program in order to effectively protect citizens on NATO territory, and not limit the capability to the protection of military forces in theatre.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
1
GLOBAL PULSE The transatlantic partnership was forged in war two generations ago and maintained for decades under the looming threat of renewed conflict. With the Alliance now at a crossroads, its future depends on the active engagement of its members’ young citizens. Committed to this endeavor, YATA is proud to partner with Atlantic Voices and help bring the opinions, analysis, and commentary of young Atlanticists to the forefront of international debate. By presenting security, economic, and diplomatic issues through the eyes of future policy and decision makers, Global Pulse aims to build a bridge between the challenges of today and the solutions of tomorrow. — James M. Bridger, Editor, Global Pulse
The Euro-zone Crisis and the Future of Greece: A Youth Perspective By Maria Stamatopoulou The Crisis
now faces serious problems. It has the second largest annual state
For the past three years, Greece has been experiencing complete
budget deficit and the second largest public debt in the European
economic turmoil. It is a national test that all the Greek people
Union.
have to "pass." The greatest
Greece’s current loan was
burden, however, falls on the
secured by an agreement
youth of the country as they
between Athens and the
are expected to come of age
Troika (a group of represen-
and begin their careers in a
tatives from the European
much more pessimistic eco-
Commission,
nomic climate than that of
tional Monetary Fund, and
their parents.
the European Central Bank).
the
Interna-
On January 1st 2002,
The conditions that Greece
Greece and eleven other
must fulfill until 2015 in-
countries in the Euro-zone
clude: a 15% reduction in
acquired one common cur-
The discontent of the Greek youth is palpable (Photo: Reuters)
main pension insurance for workers in the Public Power
rency, the Euro. Following this integration, the Greek gross domestic product (GDP) con-
Company and national banks; a 7% reduction in pensions for
tinued to grow at rates above the European average, in part be-
members of the Mariners' Retirement Fund; reduction of state
cause of investment in infrastructure, associated with the 2004
salaries at all levels by 22% and a 32% reduction for employees
Olympic Games, and because of easy credit access for consumer
under 25 years of age. It was further insisted that the maximum
spending. However, between 2001 and 2005, Greece continu-
duration of collective agreements between unions and employers
ally violated the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact as
not exceed three years.
its deficit to GDP ratio climbed well above the 3% rate established by the Maastricht convergence criteria.
The Economic Future For the Greek Youth
Greece’s fiscal security has continued to deteriorate since
One of the central problems Greece faces, and the main concern
late 2009 due to a combination of global economic recession and
of young people, is a lack of confidence in the country’s politi-
the local effects of uncontrolled spending. The Greek economy
cians. Corruption and nepotism amidst economic downturn
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
2
tough enough. The concern that Athens will fail to meet its targets has caused deep frustration and divided Greek society. Since the late-2000s financial crisis, the Euro-zone has established and used provisions for granting emergency loans to member states in return for the enactment of economic reforms. In addition, the Euro-zone has enacted measures such as limited fiscal integration and peer reviews of each state’s national budgets. So even if the current Greek politicians did not correctly An elderly woman begs outside the Athens headquarters of the Bank of
exploit the money entering the country by making real invest-
Greece. The graffiti reads “Police, your children will eat you.”
ments in the internal economy, and even if they over-borrowed
(Photo: AFP)
from banks and other countries inappreciably, that doesn't di-
combined with high levels of unemployment, has resulted in widespread disenfranchisement amongst the youth.
minish the responsibility of other members of the Euro-zone. Speaking at the annual meeting of the International Monetary
When young people were asked, "what are your plans
Fund, the head of the Eurogroup, Jean-Claude Juncker, made a
for your future?" as part of a Deal News poll, 36% answered "to
controversial statement: "The Greek crisis could have been
create my own business," 34% "to work as an employee in the
avoided, but not with the address of the last one or two years,
private sector," 10.7% "to move to a rural area and engage in
but two or three decades before. I knew that even France and
agriculture," while only 5% desired “to work in government.”
Germany have earned huge sums from their exports to Greece,
Expressing a similar sentiment, 67% of respondents saw the
but I could not say in public what I knew...” This was a state-
public sector as "the main obstacle to economic development of
ment that shone new light on the problem and added a new layer
the country.” Given that 64% of respondents answered that
to the Greek debate about Euro-zone confidence.
“unemployment” was the “biggest problem facing young people in the country,” the threat exists that Greece will experience a “brain drain” of its young bright minds. When asked, "if you had the
As young people, we don't want to be-
While lacking a direct role in policy formation, it is the youth of Greece, and the wider continent, that will have to live with the consequences.
chance, would you leave Greece?" 66%
lieve that our membership in the Eurozone was fruitless and that all these years of a flourishing economy were an illusion. It is a fact that the common currency and the cooperation in financial
of young people answered "yes," while only 22% answered
policy were very helpful for our country. It was seen as a great
"no." As a Greek youth, it is true that these circumstances make
boost to our economic stability and it was the main pillar of our
us even more pessimistic about our future, but it also makes us
financial activities.
strive even harder for a just society full of opportunity. We real-
This economic crisis has hit all of Europe hard, so it means
ize in our everyday life that many people have lost their jobs and
that the economic framework which all Euro-zone members
that recent graduates with remarkable degrees, skills, and poten-
followed has failed. It is up to today’s leaders to make necessary
tial remain unemployed.
changes to reform basic principles and policies in order to safeguard the economic stability in the future. While lacking a direct
Continental Dimensions
role in policy formation, it is the youth of Greece, and the wider
It is also important to examine the European dimension of the
continent, that will have to live with the consequences.
problem. Many young people who are skeptical of the EU’s response to the Greek debt crisis refer to the “European responsibility” to assist Greece. At the same time that Greece tries to settle its debt crisis, there is the persistent threat of wealthy EU members revolting against the Greek rescue package if its conditions are not seen as
Maria Stamatopoulou is a graduate student in the International and European Relations program at the University of Piraeus, Greece. She is a member of Youth Atlantic Treaty Association, interning at the Greek Association for Atlantic and European Cooperation (G.A.A.E.C).
tough enough. The concern that Athens will fail to meet its tarAtlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
3
Missile Defense: A Hazardous and Ineffective Indulgence by Oliver Jones
T
cally examine the program that there has been a lack of serious consideration for its implications. he North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
In addition to this missile defense is likely to become one of
Must re-think its missile defence program, failure
NATO’s defining missions over the coming years, yet the cur-
to do so will result in unacceptable long term
rent scale of the threat may not warrant such significant invest-
strategic and political developments that will do far more to
ment and, conversely, such investment may actually encourage
jeopardize the security of the Alliance than the already vague
the development of capabilities possessed by those deemed a
threat of ballistic missiles launched from “rogue” states in the
“threat” in addition to manufacturing or enhancing other
international system.
“threats” based upon notions of perceived NATO hostility. For
A clear mission married to an apparently tangible capability
example, the current focus of NATO’s missile defense efforts is
may be a political dream-come-true for NATO, but the missile
almost certainly Iran, however Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities
defence program, like the fabled “Maginot Line” represents a
are currently relatively limited. In addition, if attack from Iran is
retrogressive step, a last hurrah of an Alliance that will struggle
feared against Europe, then Iran is far more likely to utilize other
to find its place in the modern world. It is an expensive and ulti-
methods, such as proxy terror groups or state instigated terror-
mately obsolete exercise in self-justification that will forestall a
ism in order to strike. Iran has a history of utilizing both of these
necessary process of introspection, and NATO investment in
methods to strike targets in Europe and globally. This idea will
other, more relevant and important programs. In an age of finan-
be explored in greater depth in some of the latter portions of this
cial austerity and “Smart Defense”, it is a program that certainly
article, as it is directly linked to the consequences of the pro-
does not represent a smart choice for the allocation of resources,
gram, as well as the rationale.
political capital, and funds.
Problems with the rationale behind the missile defense program
Implementing ballistic missile defense – an unsatisfactory solution Recently NATO announced the first successful test of its Theatre
In 1961, President and statesman Dwight D. Eisenhower, the
Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) shield, apparently demonstrat-
first man to hold the position of Supreme Allied Commander
ing that the technology is now theoretically capable of neutralis-
Europe (SACEUR), the highest military authority in command of the Western Allies’ liberation of Europe, gave his farewell address. During this famous speech President Eisenhower warned
ing ballistic missile attacks. However
The missile defense program, like the fabled “Maginot Line” , represents a retrogressive step.
against the emergence of a military-
despite the obvious pleasure expressed by NATO officials at this achievement, the “success” of the test in-fact proves very little in terms of demonstrating that NATO is now well on the way to devel-
industrial complex, and whilst to invoke the comments of such a
oping an effective system of BMD that will protect civilian popu-
figure here in a discussion of NATO’s ballistic missile defense
lations from the scourge of “Ballistic Missiles”.
program may be considered excessive hyperbole, surely it must
Firstly, the system as it currently exists is a system developed
be true that Eisenhower would likely be worried that a NATO
and designed to provide protection for military forces deployed
feasibility study into ballistic missile defense (BMD) was
to a combat zone, rather than to defend civilian populations.
“executed by a transatlantic, multinational industry team, which
Whilst on the surface this might not seem like a huge distinction,
concluded that BMD is technically feasible.” [my emphasis].
it is in-fact significant, for it determines the acceptable capabili-
Whilst it is highly unlikely that “industry” deliberately mislead
ties of what a missile defense shield is. Military forces, are unde-
NATO, asking them to lead a review into the feasibility of a
niably more “hardened” than civilian population centers.
BMD shield was almost guaranteed to reach a positive conclu-
Through a combination of training, dispersal of personnel, provi-
sion. This should provide a first clue to anyone seeking to criti-
sion of NRBC defensive equipment, and ability to absorb
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
4
“acceptable” numbers of casualties, military forces are already
Obama lent his backing to the naval Aegis system over the de-
relatively well prepared to absorb the impact of ballistic weap-
ployment of BMD platforms in Eastern Europe, in part to allay
onry. Civilian populations lack this “hardening”, making them a
Russian anxiety and anger, the naval systems may also prove to
much harder target to defend. NATO has declared the current
be equally controversial.
system based, on the military TBMD, to be the initial phase of
Obama’s deployment of Aegis Cruisers to Europe and the
the program. However, the development of a shield able to de-
Black Sea remain controversial when the “defense” shield assets
fend civilians will require more ad-
in question have dual use and are potent
vanced capabilities.
military assets in the own right. As a
In terms of the capabilities missile
result their deployment can have tricky
defenses operate three envelopes of
diplomatic consequences – US tours of
interception:
Phase”,
the Black Sea are always controversial
“Midcourse”, and “Terminal Phase”.
with Russia and its Black Sea fleet, espe-
The current NATO defenses are based
cially when combined with Russian sus-
around the Patriot SAM system which
picions over NATO/Western intentions
consists of Mid-Course/Terminal Phase
in Ukraine, which in turn is vital for the
interceptors, primarily the PAC 2
maintenance of the Russian (ex-Soviet)
(Patriot Advanced Capability 2) and the
Black Sea fleet. In addition, the Russian
PAC 3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3)
government has warned the US govern-
and the Aegis Naval Missile defense
ment and NATO that the deployment of
system. Both the PAC 2 and PAC 3
these systems to Northern waters will
have differing characteristics. Broadly
not be taken lightly by Russia. What this
speaking the PAC 3, the more recent
demonstrates is that NATO cannot view
development, operates on a “hard kill”
missile defense in isolation, the deploy-
basis, whereby the interceptor physi-
ment of missile defense assets will have
“Boost
cally impacts the incoming missile, destroying it. The PAC 2 operates using
Dutch launch crew preparing he Patriot battery for firing
diplomatic consequences, and may therefore be limited by these. In addi-
a proximity fuse system, carrying a warhead that detonates
tion to the issue of pressure from external powers, the placing of
within a given distance of the incoming missile, damaging it,
missile defense capabilities on vital and limited naval assets will
disrupting its flight, or destroying it. In very simple terms, each
also have consequences for the deployability and flexibility of
interceptor has its own advantages and disadvantages, with PAC
forces, forcing NATO members, especially those with more
3 interceptors needing a far greater level of accuracy to hit the
limited numbers of vessels, to choose between the deployment
incoming missile (such interceptions have been likened to trying
of assets and other mission sets or crisis response.
to shoot down a bullet with a second bullet), but also guarantee-
Without the maintenance of a missile defense equivalent of a
ing it and its payload’s destruction. But both systems remain
“Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD)”, a concept familiar to
vulnerable in their current guises. The “Medium Extended Air
nuclear deterrence, a missile shield will prove hard to maintain
Defense System (MEADS)” is intended to replace the now aging
effectively. However this in itself may turn out to be a tricky
Patriot system in the future, though this system is broadly speak-
solution. Potential competition for limited resources for differ-
ing based upon the PAC3 Patriot. In addition to this, the RIM-
ing missions has already been mentioned, but the task of main-
161 SM3 Missile (employed on the naval Aegis Ballistic Missile
taining a continuous missile defense patrol in itself requires huge
Defense System) also employs a kinetic warhead (hard kill).
resources. For the United Kingdom to maintain its current single
Although the Aegis system is widely believed to be more capable
boat CASD, it requires four Vanguard Class nuclear submarines
than the land based Patriot, it carries with it its own drawbacks,
(though recent defense reviews have proposed that this may be
both in terms of its capabilities and in terms of the political im-
cut to three). At the very least, a CASD equivalent would need
plications and disadvantages of its use.
at any one time, one vessel undertaking patrol, one undertaking
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
Although President
5
re-fit and repair, and one undergoing training and leave in prepa-
acutely from the issue of limited interceptor stockpiles due to
ration of deployment. Unlike submarine based nuclear CASDs, a
the restrictions on their carrying capacity and their need to be
missile defense CASD would also remain vulnerable (despite the
flexible in the capabilities they can bring to bear against a variety
potency of the ship’s weapon systems), with surface vessels un-
of targets.
able to “get lost” like their submersible counterparts, this in turn
The current defenses are also woefully inadequate in terms
would require additional assets to be deployed in support to
of their inability to deal with other threats. In particular the re-
strengthen this potential weak link in the defense chain. In regards to all systems, the limited number of interceptor launchers, and current procedures calling for multiple
cent 2003 Iraq war, in which both sys-
In many ways, the primacy of such a program serves to re-impose a kind of siege mentality, largely absent since the end of the Cold War.
interceptors to be launched per target,
tems were deployed, saw both light aircraft and cruise missiles fail to even be picked up by the systems, let alone intercepted. Whilst it may be possible to dismiss these failings by arguing other tradi-
the system is vulnerable to “swarming” by opponents. In order to
tional NATO air assets should be able to adequately deal with
counter this blatant vulnerability the system will require signifi-
such threats, such crowding of air space, using craft from multi-
cant expansion in its scope. The “success” of the recent NATO
ple states, and with a defense system that requires very fast deci-
test of the system has been pointed to as a vindication of the
sions to be made is a recipe for friendly fire casualties, as oc-
program, yet the system remains vulnerable under “combat”
curred in the 2003 Iraq war for just this reason.
conditions. The particular characteristics of the PAC 2 and PAC 3 systems have been discussed already, but previous experiences
The consequences of a shield
of missile defense during the wars in the gulf have shown that,
However, beyond these weaknesses, which can be potentially
remarkably often, the poor quality of missiles manufactured
rectified with massive increases in the scope and cost of the pro-
makes them undertake unpredictable flight paths. This makes
gram, there are more concerning potential implications, espe-
them hugely difficult for PAC 3 hard kill missiles to hit, and still
cially where expansion of the program is concerned.
difficult for PAC 2 to neutralise. In addition to this, as midcourse
A major point of contention between NATO and the Russian
interceptors, both risk the contamination or collateral damage
Federation has been NATO’s plan for a missile shield. Russia
from their interceptions within NATO territory for example as
fears that such a shield is designed to challenge its continuing
wreckage or payloads from successfully intercepted missiles fall
nuclear parity with the North Atlantic Alliance, and the United
over NATO territories. Naval assets are likely to suffer more
States in particular. This is a point of serious contention for a
US missile cruisers launch test missiles (Photo: US Navy)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
6
Russian leadership, which in many ways still mistrusts the
NATO’s relations with Russia, uneasy at the best of times, is one
NATO Alliance, and fears its expansion into what it deems its
that may be far in excess of the benefits of such a shield. In fact it
“sphere of influence”.
may prompt the Russian Federation to embark upon a range of
Russian concerns are not entirely unfounded, especially
policies designed to not only undermine the shield itself, but also
given their interests. For a NATO missile shield to be even close
to actively pursue NATO “containment” in an international set-
to effective as a protector of civilian populations, its capabilities
ting. This could include threats (explicit or implicit) to NATO
would need to be significantly enhanced. It would require the
partners and potential candidates for expansion, or perhaps more
ability to intercept significant numbers of incoming targets, si-
troubling diplomatic opposition to matters that are of impor-
multaneously, and with a very high probability of kill ratio. As
tance to NATO, wielding its UN Security Council veto to great
has already been discussed, the current system remains vulner-
effect. Already Russia’s protection of the Syrian regime has trou-
able to “swarming” attacks, unable to cope with large numbers of
bled international efforts and the desires of NATO members,
targets, especially given the fact that doctrines are likely to call
and its 2008 war with Georgia was seen by many commentators
for the firing of two or more interceptors per target to ensure a
as partly prompted by Georgia’s close relations with NATO.
“kill". Such a shield therefore would seem to begin to threaten
For other emerging global powers a NATO missile shield
Russian capabilities, as it may well blunt, if not negate, its ability
may also prove hard to stomach. In particular China and India
to threaten nuclear strikes on targets in Europe.
may well feel challenged by such developments, especially if they
Some analysts have proposed that it is unnecessary to worry
are seen to move the goal posts for achieving a place at the “Great Power” table.
about Russian fears, as the scale of investment required for Russia to implement its own missile defense program which maintains similar capabilities to NATO’s would be huge. However this is a mis-
A real consequence of a missile shield may be an increase in interest by the Iranian government in the support and promotion of terrorism.
guided notion. A NATO defense pro-
But for NATO also there are worrying political consequences of pinning our colours to missile defense. In many ways the primacy of such a program serves to re-impose a kind of siege mentality,
gram would not be in competition with a Russian shield, it
largely absent since the end of the Cold War. Explicitly aiming
would rather be in competition with Russian missile technology.
the program at states such as Iran also undermines NATO’s po-
In this arena the playing field is far more level, if not sloped in
tential relations with such states, normalising a view within
Russia’s favour. The recent deployment of Iskander missiles to
NATO of these states as active threats waiting to strike. Other
Kaliningrad highlights a Russian understanding of this, with these
policies aimed at preventing an attack upon NATO, i.e. conven-
relatively sophisticated weapons presenting a real threat to
tional and nuclear deterrence, do not single out opponents in the
NATO’s missile defense and to its civilian and military popula-
same fashion, and are less damaging in terms of shaping percep-
tions. Russia could easily choose to enhance the threat NATO
tions of other states. Despite relying on “offensive” weapons,
faces from missiles in the future through exports, especially to
these policies are far more defensive in their outlook.
states of concern to NATO, spreading NATO’s defenses further
In practical terms NATO could see the development of a
whilst opening up potential revenue streams for Russian missile
missile defense shield becoming a major obstacle to the preserva-
programs.
tion and strengthening of international non-proliferation re-
As a result of this, NATO’s relationship with Russia may
gimes. Major powers such as China, Russia, and potentially In-
well suffer. Although Russian fears of such a missile defense
dia, could see the proliferation of ballistic missile technology as a
system were somewhat appeased by the 2010 Lisbon Summit,
cost effective, indeed a lucrative, means of out-manoeuvring
where moves were made to include Russia in the NATO defense
NATO’s defenses, and ensuring that the program becomes expo-
architecture. The decision to approach this through the concept
nentially more expensive for NATO to maintain as a viable de-
of two systems working in cooperation, but not dependent upon
fense. Even outside of international arms shipments, the states
one another is one that has almost destroyed any diplomatic pro-
that NATO seeks to use the shield to counter “threats”, namely
gress on the issue. The political cost of this system vis-à-vis
Iran, are more than capable of using the shield to their advantage
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
7
in terms of engaging NATO in costly asymmetric arms races,
geting strategies and other policies which are liable to have direct
where relatively cheap ballistic missiles (as discussed earlier, the
implications for the relative safety and security of NATO citi-
cruder the better) pitted against expansive and complex defense
zenry. Arguably such a shield encourages a regression in terms of
systems. In addition, more technologically capable states are likely to
targeting priorities. Faced with a real possibility that when calcu-
increasingly rely on the development of countermeasures such as
lating the impact of a strike, it cannot be guaranteed that weap-
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capa-
ons will get through, or that larger numbers of cruder weapons
ble ballistic missiles, which, due to their fragmentation into mul-
may be required to counter the threat of a defense shield, states
tiple warheads (or decoys and warheads), are infinitely more
are more likely to opt for strategies which focus on counter-
difficult for NATO systems to neutralize, requiring the develop-
value (i.e. the targeting of civilian population centers) opera-
ment of far more complex and invasive “boost phase” intercep-
tions. This goes for all ballistic missile deployable weapons, be
tors in order to deal with such a threat.
they non-conventional weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or conventional warheads. As an addition to
States are almost certain to seek to develop alternative strategies to outflank a missile shield. During the 2003 Iraq war it was noted that ballistic missile defense systems are poorly equipped to
At best, the program does little to alter the levels of security provided to NATO citizens; more likely is it actually undermines that security.
deal with the threat of cruise missiles and
this, the potential for such a capability in the possession of NATO may have worrying consequences in terms of lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons, and encouraging their proliferation.
light aircraft. Both of which are actually more effective mecha-
States may consider the use of ballistic missiles a safe method of
nisms for the deployment of chemical and biological agents.
“signalling” resolve and intentions to NATO powers. Whilst this
Whilst light aircraft attacks may seem highly unlikely and easy to
may be seen as a somewhat extreme idea, with more states in
counter with conventional air-power, the threat of cruise mis-
possession of such weapons (as a result of the active proliferation
siles developed for long range attacks is certainly not one to be
of technologies by NATO’s global strategic “rivals”) the possibili-
taken so lightly. These systems are potentially cheaper to manu-
ties become more likely. In 1986, Libya launched ballistic missile
facture than ballistic missiles and easier to deploy.
attacks on the US Coastguard station on the Italian island of
The potential for missile defense shields to become a vehicle
Lampedusa. The missiles overshot their intended target, but
for the militarisation of space must also not be overlooked. The
were fired in retaliation for the US bombing of Tripoli. So far
importance of communications and satellites in NATO’s missile
this has been the only incident of NATO territory being targeted
defense system cannot be stressed enough in the numerous
by hostile ballistic missile forces.
NATO web-pages, booklets, and graphics. Targeting this weak
It must be noted that any effective missile shield may carry
link may become the primary focus of those who feel threatened
with it a certain opportunity cost. Successfully creating an effec-
by such a shield. This is a trend NATO should not be encourag-
tive shield will actively incentivize states to adopt new strategies
ing, in the same vein as it should not be attempting to encourage
which will allow them to achieve some form of strategic parity
the abandonment of other internationally agreed arms limita-
with adversaries. For the primary target of NATO’s missile
tions.
shield, Iran, this could almost certainly involve greater support
Additionally, NATO needs to consider some of the ways in
for terror groups. In the early years of the Cuban revolution, in
which a civilian missile defense shield may actually prove counter
response to fears over believed US hostility, and in the knowl-
-productive in creating a safer environment for the citizens of
edge that Cuban conventional forces would have great difficulty
NATO states.
in imposing costs on the US and its civilian populations, the Cu-
As has now been examined in some detail, a costly and com-
ban government embarked upon a number of measures designed
plex missile defense shield is vulnerable to technological shifts by
to redress this situation. Best known are the agreements made
adversaries, however it is also important to examine how such a
between Cuba and the USSR, which led to the Crisis in 1962,
shield may also impact adversaries and potential adversaries tar-
but less well known is the Cuban support for terrorist groups in
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
8
ACTIVA
spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially if the weapons
REVOLUCIONARIA, and Operation BOOMERANG) orches-
were to remain under the control of the existing NATO nuclear
trated large training programs for “urban and rural guerrillas”,
weapons states, and if measures are taken to ensure that the up-
who, in return, would attack US citizens, military installations,
dating of arsenals is accompanied by a rigorous effort to reduce
and interests in the event of a US invasion of Cuba. Iran already
overall weapons numbers and to strengthen international meas-
possesses known ties to several terrorist organisations. Iranian
ures against the spread of nuclear weaponry. Conventional capa-
intelligence services performed a number of terrorist attacks and
bilities are also deserving of the investment that the missile de-
assassinations throughout Europe in the 1990s against political
fense program promises. NATO would be well advised to use
opposition movements, and Iran is also accredited with close
the resources to invest in important new shared assets such as its
involvement in the Hezbollah attacks against Israeli and Jewish
recently acquired AWACs aircraft. The funds could also be in-
targets in Argentina in the early 1990s. This kind of history
vested in the groundwork for “Smart Defense” policies, coordi-
strongly suggests that a real consequence of a missile shield may
nated by NATO Headquarters.
the
region.
Two
operations
(DEFENSA
be an increase in interest by the Iranian government in the sup-
NATO should also look towards solidifying consensus within
port and promotion of terrorism. Such groups are far more
the Alliance, and externally, on the risk posed by ballistic missile
prone to “accidental” use than a ballistic missile, and represent
weaponry and potentially on the threat posed by states that are
real problems for NATO’s security, and for sparking hostilities.
thought hostile to NATO. The Alliance is hardly in agreement
Whilst the threat of WMD terrorism is a subject which is often
on how to resolve problems with states such as Iran, and whilst a
wildly over-speculated upon, with ill-founded fears of violent
missile shield may seem like an easy solution to a problem that
and/or extremist sub-state groups actually managing to acquire
does not seem to require political introspection or consensus
some kind of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear
building, NATO should also begin to examine what its role in
(CBRN) weapon, attempts to redress an imbalance may encour-
the world may be. For years, NATO has conducted operations
age foolhardy leaders to consider this option in the future.
which reflect the values of ideas such as the responsibility to
In determining the alternatives for NATO’s expenditures of
protect. NATO can use this commitment to international values
“blood and treasure” on a missile shield, there are many factors
in order to expand international security, firmly supporting in-
to consider. These involve both the examination of measures
ternational arms control treaties. A defense shield will not only
designed to directly face the threat posed by Iran, and other such
distract NATO resources from this, but also looks set to seri-
states, who possess ballistic missile technology and are on the
ously harm existing voluntary accords on the prevention of the
cusp of developing weaponries nuclear capabilities, and address-
spread of missile technologies. NATO would be far better served
ing what would be better programs for NATO to invest its re-
attempting to gain solid international commitment to these.
sources in, and how the Alliance should evolve in the future.
In conclusion then, a number of potential problems directly
In dealing with the “immediate” (or at least apparent) threat
associated with BMD are highlighted here. Although it would be
that the entire system is avowedly aimed at countering, that of
easy to dismiss the thought offered here as a variety of “What Ifs”
states such as Iran gaining access to more advanced ballistic mis-
and counter-factual argument, the crux of the point being argued
sile technology, and coupling this with nuclear, chemical or bio-
is that a BMD shield will certainly do little to improve security
logical weaponry, there are other options.
for NATO members. The project as it currently exists offers
The development of existing deterrence capabilities: conven-
relatively little protection, and may easily be out-manoeuvred or
tional and nuclear. In particular this will likely involve the con-
overrun. Making the kind of improvements necessary to prevent
tinued basing of US nuclear weaponry in European states and the
this requires not only huge expenditure, but represents an ex-
continuation of France and the United Kingdom as nuclear
pansion that would begin to seriously threaten other global pow-
weapons states. It should also involve the continuation of the
ers, and could fundamentally change the international political
development of a flexible and diverse nuclear arsenal employable
landscape.
by NATO and its member states under Article 5. The develop-
Politically it is clear that missile defense is important to
ment of such forces may also not necessarily contravene the
NATO for a variety of reasons, not least because as an initiative
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
9
that has been primarily championed by the United States, it provides an opportunity for European Allies to demonstrate their
About the author
commitment to the Alliance and a means to placate American demands for greater demonstrations of political and financial
Oliver Jones
commitment. Publically it is also somewhat easier to sell to do-
Oliver Jones holds a Masters Degree in Intelligence Studies
mestic audiences than similar investment in more overtly aggres-
and International History from Aberystwyth University. He is
sive weapon systems may be (A new fighter squadron or tank
currently a research coordinator for the United Kingdom De-
regiment is harder to sell as purely defensive given many of the
fence Forum and a Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, a geo-
Allies’ recent operations have been expeditionary in nature).
strategic analysis firm. Previously, he worked as Program Assis-
However, even though this is a seductive aspect of the defense
tant for the ATA.
shield, it is not a justifiable reason for investment in it. Despite this, European leaders remain committed in an effort to prove their commitment to the US. At best, the program does little to alter the levels of security provided to NATO citizens, but more likely is it actually undermines that security. Whilst it can be argued that many of the scenarios hypothesized within this article are ones which may come to pass regardless of the existence of a shield, nevertheless, this still calls into question the point of the shield in the first place. This is not a peripheral program; it represents huge costs to NATO in development, deployment, and resources, which in this time of austerity could be far better spent. It also represents a program that does more to undermine the development of NATO, and NATO’s evolution in the post-Cold War world. The political consequences of this program in alienating key international actors, in imposing a siege mentality upon NATO thinking, and in undermining already fragile international consensuses on arms control would be tragically corrosive to NATO and the security of the Alliance’s members. In a time of limited resources NATO should not waste its funds on unnecessary defenses, fundamentally NATO is currently less at risk from ballistic missiles than it has been during the majority of its existence. Traditional mechanisms of deterrence are more than adequate to deal with emerging ballistic missile states, who will not be foolhardy enough to attack NATO powers, and face the threat of destruction should they do so.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
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Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
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ATA Programs On March 18th to 23rd March 18th 2012, winners of the Transatlantic Research Study Award Tour joined the ATA in Brussels for a week long study tour. The winners of this compe-
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
tition were chosen by a panel of judges based on an essay that they submitted. The essays focused on new security challenges such as energy, food security, and cyber space. During their study tour, the winners, in conjunction with a few Europeans, visited a number of key Transatlantic institutions and individuals representing the EU, and NATO. Participants also heard from a variety of speakers which challenged participants to think about the future of security, and their countries’ impact on the world. Another key component of the Transatlantic Research Study Award Tour was a discussion which revolved around the future of NATO, and Transatlantic Security. The purpose of this activity was to facilitate a lively discussion on the future of security with a diverse set of views.
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international nongovernmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 39 countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include the successor generation in our work. Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security, through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valu-
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goal
able contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch.
include:
We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues
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of importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your work please see our website.
international security issues.
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Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below.
the establishment of new and competitive programs on
the development of research initiatives and security-related events for its members.
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the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia.
Editor: Florian Bauernfeind All images published in this issue of Atlantic Voices are the property of NATO, reproduced with NATO’s permission, unless otherwise stated. Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources.
The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.