ISSN 2294-1274
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Volume 2 - Issue 7, July 2012
LIBYA, THE DAY AFTER Future political and security developments and Euro-Atlantic security July 7th 2012 marks an important date for the people of Libya. They were called to elect their General National Council (GNC). The GNC will now appoint a Prime Minister and cabinet for the country. This means that the country has started its long and winding transition path towards democracy. The post-Qaddafi transition must ensure an effective rule of law which translates, among others, into democratic security governance. For this difficult undertaking, however, Libya will need help from the outside in order to cover the full picture of security challenges when building up security authorities. How can Western institutions, above all NATO, EU and OSCE, provide appropriate support?
What future for the Libyan security sector after the end of the Qaddafi regime?
C
ivil wars usually create a profound schism among populations. In the case of the Libyan civil war, the upshot of the conflict goes beyond the provincial and tribal divisions since the influx of conventional weapons sparked a
Following the political events in Libya and in
new security concern: weapons trafficking. The extent of post-conflict efforts to be made
the framework of its Mediterranean Program, the
could be surely compared to the Afghanistan case given that the challenges ahead for the
Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) dedicates the
transitional authorities are substantial. The non-Arab countries, whose help was welcomed
entire July issue of its monthly publication Atlantic
by the Qaddafi opposition, should act very carefully in the aftermath in order not to repeat
Voices to the future of Libya from a security angle.
mistakes made in the past. Certainly, they possess many national and institutional tools
The article by Samir Battiss examines the current
which could end up being useful. Likewise, Arab countries could also play a significant role
political, economic and security situation in Libya
in re-building the country. However, it is up to the current and future Libyan representa-
and draws several scenarios for future security
tives to ask for help should they need it.
governance. He thereby especially looks at the role NATO and EU could play. Florian Bauernfeind Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
The development of the relationship between the West and the southern part of the Mediterranean area has never really given satisfaction to any of the protagonists, though this was punctuated by positive outcomes over an extended period. Several reminiscent issues 1
sustain. From the perspective of the south rim, the interference
ment fails to give the Libyans their lost dignity. It certainly took
of western countries and to some extent the attitude of superior-
several decades for the previously named political parties to take
ity often displayed by some can rather be perceived as paternalis-
office in their related country because they first had to protect
tic. Consequences of such behavior often undermine cooperation
themselves from autocratic regimes or to be strictly screened.
in many areas including democratization, liberalization of the
But politics in old as in new democracies is based on the relation-
economy, and effective protection of human rights. A truth to be
ship between the leaders and the people yet the basic democra-
told, the western countries have lost their dominant influence in
cies imply coalitions, disagreement among political allies, and
international affairs, especially over the last two decades, by
sooner or later the possibility to opt for a change in power. The
being constantly challenged by other actors. Yet it would be
Muslim nationalists are also influential. The Salaafists remain a
presumptuous to categorize the challengers as a homogenous
minority and should not be compared to the “Al Qaeda in Islamic
group of countries or a whole. Besides, it would be premature to
Maghreb” (AQIM). The influence of Abdelhakim Belhadj, ini-
consider the “emerged powers” as able or as prone to fill in the
tially supported by Qatar, and commanding about 300 men
vacuum caused by the progressive withdrawal or inability of the
(“defenders of the faith”) has been greatly overestimated by Al-
western countries when coping with crises.
Jazeera as well as in the western media because he met Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
The perception of Libya’s security challenges
In addition to the religions and tribal factors, it should be
Political and economic developments
remembered that the cities historically played a role in political
The future political system of Libya remains uncertain because of
life in Libya by contributing to the self-identification of the peo-
diverging views on several aspects. However, the different Lib-
ple. According to Libya experts this factor is decisive and will
yan groups unanimously recognize that political reforms must
have the strongest influence on the future of the country. The
not be “remote-controlled” from outside. Secondly, the future
western analysts often seek a transferable “model” but Libya is
political system will enshrine the tenants of a traditionalist, fun-
neither Iraq, nor Afghanistan, nor Somalia even if we can find
damentally Muslim country, where “lay extremists” (lay progres-
some similarities. Unlike the previous examples, the country has
sives) have no real power
no problem of religious
even if they are motivated
sectarianism. The role of
and strive to be present on
the cities could be more
the
media
influential than the com-
stage. The Islamist move-
monly shared perception
ment is today dominated
by western media accord-
by the Libyan equivalent of
ing to which the Libyan
the Muslim Brotherhood.
political life is only domi-
The victory of the Muslim
nated by the tribes. Geo-
Brotherhood in Egypt, the
graphical data will play a
international
Ennahda party in Tunisia
Libyans celebrating the end of the Qaddafi regime at Martyrs Square in Tripoli
and the PJD in Morocco
major for the next stage of evolution of Libya. As the
could have represented a trend for what could happen in the
recent political declarations show, the division between Tripoli-
elections in July 2012 initially aiming at setting up a body to
tania and Cyrenaica is still very clear and transcends the tribal
draft a constitution and oversee a referendum on the draft. But
sphere of influence.
pre-election tensions led the National Transitional Council
Political developments are tightly linked to the following
(NTC) to rule that the constitutional panel would be elected by
issue: Which groups will control the economic leverage, i.e. oil
late spring 2013 (election of a Prime Minister and appointment
and natural resources’ revenues and financial assets abroad?
of a legitimately elected representative government). In the long
Libya’s average oil estimates are about twenty years of oil re-
run, the traditionalists could feel themselves strengthened and
serves (43 billion barrels) and foreign banks hold around $150 bn
more influential than local politicians if the legitimate govern-
of Libyan assets. To date, the NTC has recovered $21 bn from
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
2
As far as the political system is concerned, the confederalist constitutional
model
(Canadian
or
Swiss), often discussed within academia, could provide a starting point but could not be an end per se. No western model could ever entirely catch the local characteristics and balance of powers. But western models could provide a basic framework for equal entitlement to revenues from natural wealth among different
Rocket-propelled grenade heads held at National Transitional Council HQ in Abu Sleen
the council's sanctions committee, and the UN Security Council
areas. Meanwhile, they enable the country to embrace the reality
lifted sanctions on Libya's central bank and its offshore subsidiary
on the ground. At the end, only the Libyans can choose the path
bank. Later, the US Treasury Department said it had unblocked
they want to follow. But without a proactive policy approach of
more than $30 bn in Libyan government assets. This was to face
this kind among the allies, rivalry to control oil revenues and
growing demands for wages, medication and reconstruction as
assets will inevitably lead to renewed violence and to the estab-
well as inflation. Despite the current difficulties, this country
lishment of a political system different from the one initially
will remain a robust rentier state in the foreseeable future. Ac-
“promised” by the NTC1.
cording to the expectations of the NATO/European allies of a democratic regime (regime change was the final end state), the
Security developments
questions remain whether the revenue will be fairly redistributed
The border question
among the population and if some mechanisms will ensure an
Today, the transitional Libyan central authorities have the sup-
appropriate use.
port of the neighboring countries in democracy development.
Economically, Libya will face several challenges to overcome
Foreign troops also take part in this challenge, not directly but
the problems well known by rentier states, namely economic
through the training of forces. Well before Operation Unified
diversification. As far as the financial assets held by foreign banks
Protector, the border between Tripolitania and Tunisia has been
are concerned, there are some risks of political confrontations/
subject to countless crossings by legal and illegal migrants. No
competition within the country – between those who will claim
real natural frontier has marked the border, and the ethnic com-
to be its representatives, and between the financial industries and
position, language, value systems, and traditions of the two peo-
the allies. The second spectrum of challenges could be more
ples are close. It should be noted that the political relations with
difficult for the allies. In accordance with the values they militar-
Tunisia remain excellent. It is the only country that Libya has no
ily defended, western allies will push for starting a “democratic” political reform and for signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. On the other hand,
visa requirements with. The Cyrenaica
Political relations with Egypt have always been complex but important and “manageable”.
region is contiguous with Egypt, and here, too, the border is not naturally defined. Illegal as well as legal crossings
Libya could be a very profitable market
are frequent. Political relations with
for their security/military industries.
Egypt have always been complex but
Too aggressive an attitude could push the Libyan leaders to seek
important and “manageable”. As the Muslim Brotherhood came
new providers of modern technologies (nuclear power stations,
to power in Egypt, relations with Libya could become easier
sophisticated weapons); a more “understanding” behavior which
than expected. By contrast, Fezzan's borders with Algeria, Ni-
would take local characteristics into consideration might allow
ger, and Chad are rarely crossed because of the almost total
them to compete for major contracts (oil, arms, civilian tech-
emptiness of the desert countryside. The control of the border
nologies).
was de facto delegated to the Tuareg in the southwest and the
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
3
Tubu in the southeast. Border control and keeping the traditional
inhabitants. As far as the Libyan situation is concerned, there are
forms of land tenure were part of the deal with the previous
two opposing views whose posture depends on the nature of the
regime in the 1980s to achieve a fully unified Libya. After the
threat. On the one hand, to physically monitor the country’s
military operation and the collapse of Col. Qaddafi’s regime, the
borders as a whole in order to counter threats from outside, an
control over the borders is more important because of the com-
oversized army is required. First estimates would lead to the
bination of several factors. First, the disappearance of thousands
recruitment and training of 100,000 military personnel. First of
of small arms and light weapons – caches in the south were dis-
all, this would mean absorbing as many fighters as possible from
covered by the transitional authorities. Moreover, there is the
the militia forces, at the risk of creating an ineffective military
political-diplomatic aspect, mainly regarding the attitude of Al-
and endangering the stability of the government authorities. The
geria during the operation and its reluctance to recognize the
second scenario takes into consideration an environment where
NTC as representative of the Libyan people. The Algerian au-
Libya is not facing any outside danger and is unable to keep effec-
thorities were opposed to the intervention close to their terri-
tive control over its around 4,500 km land borders and the
tory and are suspected to still host Qaddafi’s family members. In
1,770 km coastline. In this context, some would argue in favor
the south, Mali and Niger periodically face Tuareg rebellions.
of maintaining small but well trained armed forces (25,000 to
The question of border control is, however, directly linked
50,000 men). Moreover, close cooperation with local internal
to the state of the security sector in the aftermath of the civil
security forces would also allow to fulfill the law and order mis-
war.
sions and to protect the oil fields and the strategic facilities and infrastructures.
The (re)-construction of the security sector
But the Libyan army of tomorrow is far from being created
Since the army no longer exists, there is a risk that the new Lib-
in the current élite offices in Tripoli and in western capitals. The
yan authorities will limit their security activities to law and or-
new elected government of the post-Qaddafi Libya will have no
der, the control of the coastal area, the cities and the oil fields.
choice but to build an entirely new military force. Rather than
Even if the transitional leaders seem determined to fight AQIM
simply merging rebel and regime forces, a third way should be
and the “foreign” incursions, the lack of security instruments
explored. A Demobilization-Disarmament-Reintegration (DDR)
would in practice mean abandoning a part of the deep South to
program takes several months or years to be negotiated and to be
the Tuareg and AQIM.
implemented, and decades to achieve its
The former Libyan rebels – lately renamed the ‘National Liberation Army’ by the NTC (May 2011) – consisted of roughly 17,000 troops. They used to
goal. Demobilization alone without assis-
Post-conflict security is invariably a much more complex undertaking than security reform in relative peace.
consist of two groups: defectors from the
tance in financial or educational terms and without the creation of alternatives on the labor market has proven to be a recipe for disaster.
Libyan armed forces and volunteers with no military experience. It is hard to know exactly how many of these groups have spontaneously disbanded after the conflict and returned home.
NATO and European nations as “hammer” to fix the security “nail”?
Islamist fighters, while present to a very small extent (and
Threats and risks are commonly perceived according to a na-
needed for their military skills), did not play a significant role.
tion’s background. As Abraham Maslow stated: “If you only have
Current transitional authorities face substantial challenges in
a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.” For multilat-
trying to provide a secured environment necessary for recon-
eral institutions such as NATO, combating global security
struction and political reform. A quick look at the previous cases
threats will continue to be the rationale behind their actions. The
in Africa or elsewhere teaches us that post-conflict security is
lessons learned from previous interventions have suggested that
invariably a much more complex undertaking than security re-
building a comprehensive security system is vital. NATO’s assis-
form in relative peace. It depends on many factors like the to-
tance in creating sound armed forces seems to be appropriate
pography, geography and the size of the population. The agreed
given the organization purpose and the onward challenges. Nev-
upon ration for security provisions is around 13 troops per 1,000
ertheless, a positive outcome will depend on close cooperation
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
4
with the next legitimate Libyan representatives.
tent, with partners in Africa in general. European countries could also mobilize two additional secu-
Short term objective: Set up new Libyan security forces
rity tools: the Civilian Response Team (CRT) and the European
The newly elected representatives should initially be the sole
Gendarmerie Force (EGF). The CRT concept has been devel-
decision-makers for setting up security forces. This implies to
oped under the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 in order to enhance
disbanding militias and an effective DDR process. The recruit-
the EU’s rapidly deployable capability for civilian crisis manage-
ment should in-
ment.2 The idea of
clude all factions
a CRT refers to
including the for-
the readiness for
mer
Qaddafi-
deployment
supporters as part
within five days
of the reconcilia-
on request of the
tion process. As a
Secretary
series of gradual
eral/High Repre-
changes, the mili-
sentative,
tary
se r v i ce s
Political and Secu-
should be the first
rity Committee or
to go through this
the Council and to
process ultimately
the
a stay in the field
which could
Gen-
Revolutionary soldiers
for up to three
be a stepping stone in achieving peace among civilians later on.
months. Acting as a bridging mechanism in the first phase of a
Efforts may be reinforced through the assistance of NATO mem-
mission, its objectives include: assessment and fact-finding mis-
ber states which could provide technical services. NATO mem-
sions; the rapid establishment of an initial presence in the field
bers have gained experience in military training drawn from the
after a Joint Action and support of the deployment of a civilian
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the prospective
crisis management operation; reinforcement of existing EU
Operational Mentor and Liaison Team-Libya, a NATO initiative,
mechanisms for crisis management, notably in assistance of an
could respond timely to the local needs after careful appreciation
EU Special Representative; and finally, logistical support. Fol-
of Libya’s own set of security issues and cultural differences.
lowing the approval of the CRT concept document by the Coun-
Such a group of instructors could consist of experienced person-
cil on 18 July 2005, further work was undertaken in order for
nel, not only from NATO Allies but also from the partner coun-
the recommendations to materialize. Such a civilian crisis man-
tries which could be selected on cultural and reputation basis. In
agement rapid reaction capability consists of troops flexible in
reference to Libyan needs and aspirations, some Arab nations
terms of both size and structure, made-up of national experts pre
participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue (Algeria, Egypt,
-selected through national timetables in accordance with agreed criteria and procedures. Completed by
Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates) could join the multinational effort by providing instruc-
NATO members have gained experience in military training drawn from the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
tors. The newly trained armed forces
2007, the pool of 100 European experts brings an added value through the CRTs’ potential to offer reliable, trained expertise that can be mobilized at very short notice. Although such a new tool should
would be responsible not only for the protection of Libya from
not be seen as an end or ‘definitive solution’ to the EU’s capaci-
internal and external threats but also of its people. From a re-
ties gap in civilian crisis management, civilian response teams
gional point of view, the allies’ participation could be directed
aim to increase the rapid reaction capacity, and they also contrib-
toward reaching a consensus on a more global strategy with re-
ute to the adequacy and effectiveness of the EU’s crisis response,
gard to relations with neighboring countries, and, to some ex-
as well as to its coherence with other actors. The objectives of
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
5
the CRT capacity include a wide range of missions. They should
some specific and local characteristics. Defined as a “force organ-
allow the EU to perform assessment and fact-finding missions in
ized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and
a crisis or impending crisis situation and, when appropriate,
safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment”, the American concept of “constabulary forces” would be
provide input for the development of a crisis management concept before the adoption of an EU Council Joint Action and facilitate action in the framework of
Protecting the energy-related facilities appears to be crucial for success in the reconstruction of the country.
what comes close to the concept. From a European perspective, such forces are seen as “militarized police forces”. In-
EU Commission instruments. The CRT
deed,
besides
the
basic
training
concept document also seeks the setting-
(involving law enforcement and investi-
up of an early operational presence on the ground to support EU
gation techniques), they also receive military training with a
political structures in defining a concrete process in order to
focus on non-lethal use of force to enable them to respond to
turn a fuzzy political concept into a measurable and tangible
potential violence through negotiations and conflict manage-
mission. At this stage, CRTs play a key role not only in the op-
ment. On the request of Libyan leaders, the EGF co-operation
erationalization of civilian crisis management in the planning
programs could provide an appropriate training in international
phase, but also in providing timely reinforcement of existing EU
rule of law to forces to promote better governance. The local
mechanisms in charge of conflict prevention, mediation, stabili-
forces’ mandate could include conducting criminal investigation
zation and confidence-building measures including monitoring,
tasks, performing security and public order missions, conducting
and early identification of needs on the ground. In this way, a
public surveillance, traffic regulations, border policing and
timely deployment of crisis response tools can directly affect
criminal intelligence, covering detection of offences, tracing of
trust and confidence among stakeholders inside the country and
offenders, and their transfer to the appropriate judicial authori-
thus facilitate the imple-
ties. Some of the identi-
mentation
fied internal threats in
of
civilian in
Libya entail attacks on
cooperation with other
the infrastructure used
actors, both local and
for the exploitation of its
multinational, both mili-
crude oil to undermine
tary and civilian.
its economy. Protecting
crisis
management
The EGF initiative
the energy-related facili-
gathers five full members
ties appears to be crucial
(France, Italy, The Neth-
for success in the recon-
erlands, Portugal, and
struction of the country.
Spain), two partner states
The lessons learned from
(Poland, Lithuania) and
the NATO Training Mis-
one observer (Turkey).
sion-Iraq (NTM-I) could
These nations aim to put
lead the Libyan authori-
at the disposal a convincing and operational in-
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton visiting Benghazi in 2011 (Photo: European Commission)
ties to be interested in the
specific
program
strument for crisis management, first and foremost under EU
dedicated to train oil police forces. Indeed, among the various
command, but also other security organizations, such as NATO,
offers of police training, NATO or EU using the EGF assets
UN, OSCE, or ad hoc coalitions. Their “gendarmerie” assets
could instruct local forces in oil-policing which consists in pre-
seek to contribute to the crisis management capability in sensi-
venting attacks from land and sea terrorists and smugglers on the
3
tive post-conflict areas. This concept is globally known under its
main critical refineries and the coverage of some 21,000 km of
French version as “gendarmerie” but it has been nationally
oil and gas pipelines.4
adapted in several European states taking into consideration Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
From a technical aspect, NATO or EU members should 6
continue to supply Libyan authorities with ground surveillance
possible to achieve this goal in an acceptable atmosphere.
intelligence while aiming to have the national coastguards and the border police forces fully operational in the interim. On the
In the long term: reintegrate Libya into the regional politi-
other hand, the OSCE and the EU could provide civilian person-
cal landscape
nel for technical assistance in the development and implementa-
Geographically, Libya is located at the crossroads between the
tion of national strategies and action plans, based on the vision of
Maghreb and the Mashrek regions and is considered, together
the Libyan authorities and their commitments. Such assistance
with Morocco and Egypt, as a strategic location. In the long run,
could be composed of inter alia: training plans and programs
and if the Libyan authorities wish so, the participation in regional
through the sharing of good practices including new technologies
political forums could improve its security situation. Certainly,
and national know-how, confidence-building by promoting and
the security issues and their implications are different for each
facilitating interagency, bilateral and multilateral cooperation in
country. In parallel to the basic post-conflict efforts, newly
the Mediterranean neighborhood in the field of border security
elected Libyan leaders should anticipate the re-appearance of the
and management, drafting of national border strategies, specific
country in several Euro-Mediterranean arenas. These could help
theoretical and practical training of border personnel (including
or accelerate the improvement of its security. In several cases
border guards and customs), or on the spot monitoring, patrol-
Libyan leaders would only have to renew the previously negoti-
ling and mentoring exercises. Moreover, the OSCE and the UN,
ated commitments. In others, they would have to formally apply
thanks to their long-standing and concrete experience, could
for membership of targeted programs because these could meet
cooperate to make some assets available for a DDR process. DDR programs should be demand-driven, and the national authorities should demonstrate leadership and commitment to the proc-
their expectations.
In the long run, Libya’s participation in regional political forums could improve its security situation.
ess. The more precise and concrete the
Since the beginning of the Helsinki process and the conclusion of the Final Act in 1975, the security in the Mediterranean area has been considered directly connected to the security of the
programs are, the clearer the measures to be taken will be. Con-
European continent and vice versa. Libya as well as Lebanon and
sequently, it would be easier to implement them. The frame-
Syria have taken part in the OSCE meetings. However, they
work offered by both the UN and the OSCE has already demon-
never took a step further, beyond the informal discussions,
strated that dialogue and inclusiveness are crucial to building
unlike countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco
capacity of local and national institutions. The OSCE Office for
or Tunisia. In addition, Libya has been excluded from this proc-
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), upon
ess or had excluded itself from such discussions for most of the
request of the Libyan transitional leadership, could provide ex-
time due to Muammar Qaddafi’s support for international crimi-
pertise and advice on drafting an electoral code thus ensuring
nal groups. A bilateral agreement could be signed with the
that the elections process complies with international standards.
OSCE which would provide a wide spectrum of political and
The first step would consist of a meeting between a team of in-
security tools to its partner as mentioned in the decision 571
ternational and local experts, representatives of the informal
adopted by the Permanent Council. The issues discussed are
groups as well as representatives of all official political parties.
mainly related to human security, e.g. tolerance and nondis-
The coordination of actions and trust not only among na-
crimination, migration and migrants’ human rights, including in
tional actors but also between national and international/
countries of destination, water management, desertification, and
regional partners is critical for success. According to western
anti-terrorism measures. The long-term and comprehensive
standards, the result of a DDR process should give priority to
approach adopted by the OSCE implies that the discussions and
demilitarizing above all the mindsets which dominate the Libyan
the activities in these areas aim to instill into the partner states a
population since a large number of small arms-light weapons
more democratic vision of their political development. How-
have overflowed the country during the previous months of con-
ever, the implementation of the moral commitments is on a
flict. But the traditional and strongly family-based structures,
voluntary basis; therefore, the OSCE should review its modus
together with an ancestral culture of negotiation, should make it
operandi and first ask the newly elected government how the
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
7
Civil Defense agency thanks to a close cooperation with the Euro
organization could provide support. This is all the more the case as this organization has largely
-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC)
lost its relevance since the EU and NATO developed their own
and the International Civil Defense Organization; confidence-
approaches to this critical region. Indeed, in 1994, NATO under
building and strategic-level training of Libyan high-ranking mili-
the influence of the US and its allies from the southern region, have come to focus much more on the Mediterranean area. The assessment of the risks and threats
tary and civilians through the so-called
Libya is implicitly offered the same basis for cooperation with NATO as others.
“NATO Regional Cooperation Course” at the NATO Defense College (NDC). With regard to the European
resulting from the socio-economic prob-
initiatives, the Libyan leaders have the
lems of the Southern Mediterranean and
opportunity to tap into these forums. In
Middle East were quite accurate. The Alliance with its own
terms of socio-economic development, the EU, under the lead-
Mediterranean initiative seeks to develop a security dialogue
ership of the Commission and the Council, has defined specific
with non‐member riparian states. However, sensitive political
strategies towards each Southern Mediterranean partner. From
issues have tended to be excluded from this dialogue. On the
the very beginning, the European Communities, and then the
other hand, NATO has defined a precise role in the area in order
European Union have recognized that certain interests are shared
to avoid duplication with parallel initiatives undertaken by the
by both rims of the mare nostrum. Political stability and economic
former WEU, the EU and some Allies’ national policies (namely
development were the main goals to be achieved by both the
France). To date, seven countries of the Mediterranean region
European institutions and the national political leaders. Under
are involved through bilateral agreements: Algeria, Egypt, Israel,
the influence of the southern European members, a process was
Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. According to the non-
launched in the early 1990s towards fourteen countries of the
discrimination principle, Libya is implicitly offered the same
Mediterranean area including Libya. As common policy of the
basis for cooperation with NATO as others. Upon request of the
EU under the direction of both the European Commission and
Libyan leadership, the Allies would adopt a tailored approach to
the Council of the EU, the “Barcelona Process”, later called
meet its specific needs. As for the framework of a negotiated
“European Neighborhood Policy” (ENP), covers three major
Individual Cooperation Program (ICP), the Alliance would es-
aspects of regional security that also convey the European con-
sentially provide “military service” which consists of collabora-
cerns and beliefs. The first dimension called “Political and Secu-
tive activities such as military education, training and doctrine,
rity Dialogue” was set up to create a peaceful and stable area
defense policy and strategy, defense investment, civil emergency
through the implementation of principles of rule of law, democ-
planning, public diplomacy, crisis management, armaments, and
racy and human rights. The second one, the “Economic and Fi-
intelligence activities. Over fifteen years, a wide range of mecha-
nancial Partnership”, consists of progressively establishing a free-
nisms have been used and tailored which could definitely be
trade zone characterized by shared economic opportunities
useful for the region in the wake of security challenges: a tailored
through sustainable and balanced socio-economic development.
Operational
Capabilities
Finally, the “Social, Cultural and Human
Concept
(OCC) which aims to improve the ability to contribute effectively to NATOled crisis response operations through achieving interoperability; the access to
The uneven EU initiatives were not always fully supported by the major European players.
a trust fund mechanism that currently
Partnership” should contribute to promoting “understanding and intercultural dialogue between cultures, religions and people, and facilitating exchanges between civil society and ordinary citizens,
includes ongoing substantial projects; the enhancement of its
particularly women and young people”. The results were not
civil preparedness through a Civil Emergency Planning (CEP)
necessarily those expected and quite uneven because of several
action plan in order to prevent damages and to protect the popu-
major factors: a lack of coordination between the European insti-
lation and the critical infrastructures following either natural
tutions, the overlapping with national initiatives and the misjudg-
disasters or high-level criminal attacks; the creation of a Libyan
ment of the diversity of expectations and perceptions among the
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
8
southern partners. Despite the detailed action plan for each
leaders of the five members of the Union du Maghreb Arabe and
country drafted by the European Commission and the newly
from the Mediterranean countries (France, Italy, Portugal,
established European External Action Service, North African
Spain, and Malta). At a ministerial level, the 5+5 Mediterranean
countries were still perceived as threats (e.g. migration, terror-
group deals with several topics, namely within the ‘Barcelona
ism, drug- and arms-trafficking) than as real partners. As a re-
Process’: defense, energy security, immigration, education,
sult, the European partners tended to give priority to the hard
transportation, etc. The newly elected Libyan authorities will
security dimension (joint border control, national initiatives for
have to decide whether they want to renew their commitment to
heavy arms supply to security services) turning a blind eye to the
this informal process or not. Despite the participants repeatedly
use of financial aid (misappropriation of European funds, corrup-
stating that this process does not duplicate other initiatives, it is
tion,
quite difficult to
predatory
behavior of the
maintain.
It
local élite, etc.).
seems to be a
International
result that restate
flects a balance
that some of the
of power be-
leading European
tween
countries yielded
European coun-
to the “migration
tries, and the
threat”
and
to
unsatisfying
some
leaders’
cooperation as
blackmailing. The
well as the con-
observers
tinuous rivalry
latest Joint Communication by the
some
Writings on a wall in Tripoli
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Secu-
between
the
Southern Mediterranean countries.
rity Policy and the European Commission (November 2011) confirms the latter. It does not change the mindset according to which the European bureaucratic apparatus as a “philanthropic
Conclusion
entity” could not act without analyzing the current events in
The first general elections in Libya led the designation of the
Libya and in its neighborhood in terms of “aid”. Likewise, the
General National Congress (GNC) which will not have as duties
latest initiative – the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – has
to draft a new constitution as initially announced. The 200 mem-
become a hollow shell because of the “unified” vision that it im-
bers will soon appoint a panel of 60 personalities to that pur-
plies. Neither the initial qualification of “Mediterranean Union”
pose. Certainly, the way of conducting relations with the “new
nor the approved final version under German pressure do match
Libya” as with other countries should be reviewed. After centu-
the reality.
ries of influencing international affairs, the members of the At-
The uneven EU initiatives were not always fully supported
lantic Alliance have lost their hegemony to a certain degree.
by the major European players either. Indeed, even if they were
They still have the ability to persuade but the preventive inter-
officially designed to be complementary, the EU hard security
vention in order to protect the Libyan people against Qaddafi’s
actions towards the Southern Mediterranean rim were chal-
violent repression, namely in Benghazi, has shown that it re-
lenged by the French program named “5+5” process (dialogue
quires specific circumstances. This display of influence remains
5+5). Originally proposed by the French President François
exceptional and is not an end in itself. NATO officials’ self-
Mitterrand in the early 1980s, but only endorsed in 1990 by the
proclaimed success is only justifiable from a military standpoint.
Italian President Bettino Craxi, and the Spanish Prime Minister
The political aspect is not to be underestimated since Libya has
Felipe González, these informal meetings bring together political
historically succumbed to instability. The Euro-Atlantic powers
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
9
have a clear vision of what the new Libya should look like: de-
questions among the Allies about burden-sharing and the Alli-
mocratized, a liberalized economy, an effective protection of
ance’s cohesion and the risk of a de facto two-tier Alliance, the
human rights, etc. But there are challenging powers (e.g.
consensus rule within the North Atlantic Council, the coordina-
Qatar’s financial support of religious movements, ancestral tribal
tion between the Alliance and the EU, the development of ap-
composition of the population) affecting the Libyan society and
propriate capabilities, and the coordination between NATO
the emerging leaders. According to the reactions of western
activities and those of other international organizations. The
leaders, the newly elected GNC seems to satisfy those wishes. 80
short term mission in Libya is now over but the Allies, acting in
seats were allocated only to political parties: 39 seats won by the
coordination with other multilateral institutions, should be ready
Alliance of National Forces (NFA) led by Mahmoud Jibril; 17 for
to respond to a potential Libyan request, if necessary.
Justice and Reconstruction (PJR) associated to the Muslim Brotherhood movement; finally, a multitude of small groups The first move into this direction is the change operated in June
share the remaining 24 seats; 120 seats were reserved for inde-
1
pendent candidates. But, again, the ideological spectrum is quite
2012 when following tensions within the NTC, its members
narrow, religion is entirely part of Libyan life and culture. More-
decided to adjust the mandate of the General National Congress.
over, like in all parliamentarian regimes, the next step is to agree
2
on shaping alliances and coalitions between independents and
Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management Resources in an
political parties. In order to gain influence, allies should act very
Integrated Format - Civilian Response Team”, General Secre-
carefully; they should not repeat some mistakes which could be
tariat Document, DG IX, 10462/05 OA-SB/BL, Brussels, 2005.
used as justification for authoritative outcomes, e.g. sultanistic
3
centralized regimes. As this short paper has shown, the allies
the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of The Netherlands and the
have many means to help the Libyan central government. These
Portuguese Republic, establishing the European Gendarmerie
means cover a large part of the security spectrum. But a new
Force (EUROGENDFOR), 2006.
mindset would consist of recognizing that it is up to the legiti-
4
mate Libyan government to request joining the different pro-
Mission-Iraq”, NATO Defense College Research Paper, n 67, April
grams or to renew/to decline previous commitments. Mean-
2011.
Council of the European Union: “Civilian Headline Goal 2008 -
Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic,
Gaub, Florence: “Building a New Military? The NATO Training o
while, even if NATO is capable of deploying powerful forces in large numbers, and of using them to enable entry where necessary, it is not its role to commit to nation-building missions.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the
NATO itself fully depends on the contribution of its members
author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic
and other international organizations. It has no real capabilities
Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.
for civil implementation and/or low-end peace enforcement missions. As demonstrated, several initiatives are in competition to perform the myriad of non-military functions essential for the
About the author
success of any nation-building operation. However, unlike the 1990s’ events in Central and Eastern Europe, the events of 2011
Samir Battiss
in the Middle East/Northern Africa region take place in a funda-
Dr Samir Battiss is currently lecturer at the Department of
mentally different historical, cultural area with specific strategic
Political Science of the Quebec University in Montreal
factors at play. To date, it has been sufficient to focus diplomacy
(Canada) and associate researcher at the Research Center
on the top governmental leadership; from now on, the western
for International Relations of the National School of Public
countries’ – common or national – strategy should also focus on
Administration (Montreal, Canada).
a broader cultural, sectarian, ethnic and tribal civil society, far from their traditional mindset. The experience in Afghanistan as well as the Libyan case raise Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
10
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 7
11
ATA Programs From 8 to 14 July 2012, the first ever Model NATO simulation took place in Brussels, at the Free University of Brussels. The socalled “Model NATO Youth Summit” (MoNYS) attracted more
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
than 250 students from 37 countries representing 70 universities in 5 continents. ATA supported the event through the organization of the opening ceremony, a high-level panel discussion on NATO-EU relations in the European Parliament and a gala reception at the Club Prince Albert.
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international nongovernmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom, Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37 countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include to the successor generation in our work. Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch. We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your work please see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below.
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
◊
the establishment of new and competitive programs on international security issues.
◊
the development of research initiatives and security-related events for its members.
◊
the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia. The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy
Editor: Florian Bauernfeind
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activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.