ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Volume 3 - Issue 2, February 2013
NATO Interoperability and New Capabilities NATO’s strategic objectives over the past several years have been to enhance and better coordinate its operational capabilities to address emerging threats while adhering to the growing fiscal constraints of its members and the need to downsize military budgets. The key goals have been to acquire new capabilities that can maintain NATO’s strategic edge while increasing interoperability amongst its members in order to maximize cooperation and efficiency. Essential to achieving these goals is coordinating military and technical specializations between member states that seek to capitalize on each
F35 Joint Strike Fighter (Photo - A-A Military Aviation News and Media)
Contents:
members area of expertise within the Alli-
Implications of Broken Promises on NATO’s 2% Rule
ance.
Quint Hoekstra examines the consequences of the ongoing inequality between the financial
The rapidly changing international securi-
commitments of NATO members and the impact this will have on future operations. He
ty environment brings added emphasis to
analyzes how NATO’s goals of attaining greater interoperability and new capabilities are ef-
NATO’s need to ensure that its goals are not
fected by ongoing budget constraints and that these goals can be jeopardized if defense spend-
jeopardized in the face of emerging threats
ing between European nations and the US is not rebalanced.
and financial crisis. Accomplishing these ob-
Engaging Young Thinkers on the Euro-Atlantic Security Debate
jectives rests heavily on effectively coordinat-
The ATA hosted a one-day workshop with Master’s Students in Political Science and Interna-
ing future NATO campaigns and facilitating
tional Relations on Euro-Atlantic foreign policy and its implications for the Alliance. A group
better cooperation in acquiring new capabili-
of selected students were engaged in a meaningful debate on the future of Euro-Atlantic secu-
ties that are critical, sustainable, and rapidly
rity. Together with ATA experts, they outlined a new vision and set of priorities for the
deployable.- Jason Wiseman
Transatlantic community to ensure that NATO remains prepared for future challenges.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
1
Implications of Broken Promises on NATO’s 2% Rule NATO utilizes peer-pressure by reporting annually on member
by Quint Hoekstra
F
states´ military spending. Using NATO´s own definition and or decades, NATO member states have pledged to
report, in 2011 only three members – Greece, the United King-
commit at least two percent of their gross domestic
dom, and the United States – spent more than two percent of
product (GDP) to their armed forces. Unfortunately,
their GDP on their armed forces.3 Nearly three quarters of
this promise has often been broken. In fact, in 2011, only
NATO member states spent between one and two percent.
three out of 27 members complied.1 This article investigates
There are two outliers: At the low end is Iceland, which has no
the implications of non-compliance with these self-determined
armed forces; at the high end is the United States, contributing
rules and opens the debate on whether the old rule should be
nearly five percent. As will be explained later, this discrepancy
modified. It consists of five parts: observations on the current
has caused friction between member states.
size of member states’ budgets; a theoretical approach to explaining member states’ behaviour; a short overview of historical developments around this issue; implications for the growing gap between US and European defence spending; and finally, conclusions on how to proceed. This article argues that interoperability programmes should be limited to areas where all parties benefit; that it is in the interest of NATO and its members to lower the
Scholars of international relations have a long history of explaining the difficulty of international cooperation. There are three relevant theories to the NATO case: The prisoner’s dilem-
In 2011, only three members— Greece, the UK, and the US—spent more than two percent of their GDP on their armed forces.
spending rule to one-and-a-half percent of GDP; that Europe is likely to focus on security in the greater European area only; and that the US might find itself without its European allies should it get into a conflict in the Far East. Comparing Military Budgets The initial goal of NATO, founded in reaction to the Warsaw Pact, was to contain Soviet aggression and to deter the USSR from invading Europe. In order for the deterrence strategy to be credible, European states had to maintain large standing armies ready to be deployed at a moment’s notice. The two percent rule functioned as a means to ensure states pulled their weight. European member states meanwhile saw the rule as a way to make sure the US would not abandon them. Contrary to security integration in the EU, NATO´s intergovernmental nature prohibits the secretariat from developing an autonomous mechanism to ensure state compliance.2 Furthermore, divergence between member states´ expenditure calculations have complicated transparency. Therefore, using what little power the NATO secretariat does have, Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
Theory
ma, which expects no cooperation; Olson’s theory, which expects small states to benefit the most; and the hegemonic stability theory, which expects great powers to gain most from cooperation. Each theory will
first be examined and then tested in an analysis of the development of military budgets. The first theory is the prisoner’s dilemma4 (PD) and is the one most commonly used. In this scenario, each member state is portrayed as a player seeking to maximize relative gains over all others. The situation shows how individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. All states pursue the same strategy: they want all others to cooperate with the regime whilst defecting themselves. Applied to the NATO case, this means that all states want the others to stick to the two percent benchmark whilst spending a lot less themselves. The Pareto-optimum would be if all states chose to cooperate, as this way they would form the best deterrence. PD theorists expect states not to end here but with a more likely scenario called the Pareto-deficient Nash equilibrium. This is the situation where no player has the incentive to defect. In the NATO case, this equilibrium means all states choose to defect and ignore the benchmark. The second relevant theory comes from the late Ameri2
can
social
scientist
Mancur
Using EU membership to
Olson5, who illustrated how the
incorporate former communist
small powers try to exploit the
states in Eastern Europe into their
great. A way to do this would be
sphere
for small European states to defect
materialist Western Europe had
whilst hoping the US will keep up
managed to rule out war altogeth-
its own forces for other unrelated
er. They weren’t keen on getting
strategic interests. Smaller states
involved militarily either within
can also seek to free ride or band-
Europe or abroad. However, the
wagon with stronger states. After
rest of the world didn’t share that
all, defence spending by the small-
vision. The end of hostilities be-
est states has no significant effect
tween great powers unfortunately
on the total NATO military force,
did not mean the end of hostilities
although it does have an effect on their budgets.
U.S. Naval Ship (Photo: US Department of Defense)
of
influence,
post-
altogether. The Cold War had long
overshadowed
interstate
A third and final theory is the hegemonic stability theory.6
disputes and regional tensions, and kept the lid on many lin-
It explains the benefit of having a powerful and dominant state to
gering conflicts. These now flared up, with the war in the
lead the cooperation. The hegemon, in this case the US, can incur
former Yugoslavia serving as a prime example. The US was
transaction costs associated with the defence regime in return for
subsequently charged with a new role: that of global police-
the privileged position of laying down the rules for all others. It
man. This required the US to maintain a large and readily de-
can then use its power advantage to coerce unwilling states to
ployable military force which had the side benefit of discour-
comply.
aging new powers to challenge it. The result was that Europe,
Historical development
dipping its average under the two percent rule for the first
During the Cold War, the US had similar strategic interests to its European counterparts as the hegemon in the NATO
time11, cut its military budgets much more than the US, marking the beginning of a US-European divide.
alliance. The alliance was united against the Soviet threat, seeking
The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan
to contain communism and prevent a war on European soil.
and Iraq temporarily illustrated to some NATO members the
Smaller European states were safe under the nuclear umbrella of
necessity of military spending. Yet the terrorist attacks had
the US, Britain and France. Some, such as the Netherlands, also
complex effects on military spending. NATO data shows that
had (and still have) nuclear weapons stored on their territory.
7
US spending went up from an average of 3.3% of GDP during
This functioned as an insurance policy of American assistance.
the second half of the 1990’s to 5.4% at its peak in 2010.12 In
Military spending was largely similar between members, hovering
Spain, after the Madrid bombings, the opposite happened. The
around three percent of GDP.8 This all changed dramatically after
Spanish cut their spending by a quarter from 1.2% to 0.9% in
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the USSR as the US
2011. Interestingly, the London bombings caused no signifi-
took up a new role: that of the sole global superpower. With the
cant change in the United Kingdom’s spending. Overall, the
main threat now gone, military budgets were slashed around the
European average dropped from 2.5% in the early nineties to
world. For example, the UK’s portion of military spending as a
1.6% in 2011.13 From this data it can be said that, generally
percent of GDP halved between the early 1980’s and 2000.9 For
speaking, the longer ago the terrorist attack, the less pressured
the first time in over a century, Western European NATO mem-
European states feel to keep up military spending. This rule
ber states no longer had to live under the looming threat of a land
does not apply to the US, thus increasing the US-European
invasion from the East. Some states abolished conscription10 and
divide.
many reduced the size of their standing armies. Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
3
A contributing factor to the growth of the divide may have
The NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 to oust Colonel
been the recent global financial crisis (GFC).14 With govern-
Gaddafi served as a wake-up call to NATO members for two
ments seeking to remedy large deficits incurred by bank bailouts
reasons. First, it showed that European budget cuts have weak-
and a shrinking economy, military budgets have come under
ened their operational capabilities. The Asia-oriented US felt
pressure once more. Worryingly, Brookings Institution research
that it should only ‘lead from behind’ in missions with more
fellow Clara Marina O’Donnell remarks that this happens with-
European than American relevance, leaving Europe to do the
out consultation with allies.15 NATO has responded with ‘smart
job.20 However, military chiefs of staff soon realized Europe
defence strategies’ where member states seek to cooperate to
was unable to carry out this relatively small mission without
boost efficiency in an attempt to maintain operational capabilities
US assistance. Not wanting to see the mission fail, eventually
with reduced budgets. However, results are likely to be modest
the US reluctantly agreed to take up a larger role. What this
due to states’ unwillingness to relinquish sovereignty in the field
shows is that by 2011, the US-European divide had grown so
of security for economic gains.16 The GFC also announced the
large that this inhibited their willingness to cooperate.
rise of China as a global player in the security sphere. In 2009,
The second wake-up call is that the divide has severe
US President Barack Obama responded on this by proclaiming
consequences for NATO´s much emphasized interoperability
himself the first ‘Pacific President’.17 European states have fewer
goals. The idea of interoperability is that making national mili-
strategic interests in that region, again causing an increase in the
taries more compatible with each other can yield significant
US-European divide.
benefits in the battlefield. For example, interoperability in-
Implications of the US-European Divide
volves synchronizing communication systems or installing the
The US and Europe have long disagreed on whether NATO should stick to the protection of their member states or if it should operate globally.
same air-to-air refueling systems. In
In an era with increased threats and shrinking budgets the goal is to be able to do more with less.
an era with increased threats and shrinking budgets the goal is to be able to do more with less. Not only can NATO use this to improve its
The US, which favours a global NATO, has kept up their mili-
operations, but it can also reduce costs by collective bargain-
tary budgets and now accounts for 41% of the world’s military
ing. A crucial way to improve interoperability is to freely ex-
spending. It rightfully views itself as a global actor, able to in-
change information relevant to other allies, allowing them to
tervene anywhere in the world. Europe, taking on a more re-
streamline their adaptation to new systems. In Libya however,
gional focus, favours a more modest role for the military alli-
the US, leader in military technology, was unwilling to share
ance. European countries have much smaller budgets, constrain-
some of its new cyber capacities with its European counter-
ing the scope and breadth of their intervention options. It has no
parts out of fear that Europe would free-ride on its technologi-
interest in pursuing large scale missions in faraway places. Ra-
cal achievements. Indeed, the US considered mounting a cyber
ther, it seeks to undertake limited missions in the greater Euro-
attack on Libya, but the problem with deploying cyber weap-
pean area, such as the current mission in Turkey. The deploy-
ons is that they can only be used once.21 As soon as cyber
ment of Patriot missiles to the Syrian border shows that, contra-
weapons are exposed, other states have relatively easy access
ry to Western European public opinion, security in Europe still
to knowledge on how these systems work and how to build
is not a given and remains a top priority for European states.
their own protection systems for them. The US chose not to
With limited aspirations, European member states are reluctant
deploy the system out of fear that their unique capabilities
to maintain forces to the two percent rule, despite public prom-
would end up in European states for free. Coming back to
ises. The American economist and Research Fellow at the U.S.
interoperability, NATO should not overestimate the willing-
Business and Industry Council Alan Tonelson even goes as far to
ness of its members to exchange information if they feel other
say that Europe has been breaking these promises for over 50
militaries gain an unfair advantage out of it. Rather than boost-
years.
ing the overall level of knowledge and capabilities, interopera-
18
19
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
4
bility programmes can lead to states seeking to free-ride on each
secretariat is attempting to resolve the issue, with Secre-
other, as the cyber example shows.
tary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen repeatedly urging
The Libyan intervention and the European military con-
member states to comply with the two percent rule and
straints have furthered the Pentagon’s doubts on European
increase military budgets.25 Europe however, hasn’t been
capabilities and intentions further from home. This is particu-
receptive to such calls and insists on making its own strate-
larly important considering the rise of China. China’s leaders
gic decisions.
might insist on a ‘peaceful rise’, but the security dilemma of
Conclusions
the growing Chinese armed forces puts this optimistic vision
From this study, there are two discernible conclu-
in doubt. An inherent problem with growing armies is that
sions. The first concerns the three theories, while the sec-
for outsiders it is unclear if they serve a defensive or offensive
ond concerns NATO’s options to resolve the US-European
purpose. Faced with uncertainty, militaries work based on
divide and enhance greater interoperability. Regarding the
worst-case scenarios. The US would therefore be tempted to
theories, the prisoner’s dilemma does not apply well to the
increase its presence in the South China Sea, threatening Chi-
Cold War scenario, in which the Soviet threat was para-
na’s dominance there. Making matters worse, NATO mem-
mount and was deemed more significant than another state
bers are deeply divided on policy towards China. The US has
getting a relative gain over an ally. States largely followed
the capacity to engage China while European members are
the two percent rule. However, with the disappearance of
much more hesitant to engage in such an adventure, leading
this existential threat, European states started their race to
one to the aforementioned O’Donnell to conclude that Eu-
the bottom, per the theory’s provisions.
rope´s military strength might become irrelevant.22
Therefore, the prisoner’s dilemma theory is applicable
The US-European divide on China, as well as on mili-
only in situations where there is no existential threat. The
tary missions and budgets in general, threatens NATO unity.
second theory, that of Olson that the small exploit the great,
It comes then as no sur-
seems plausible. Indeed, the US has
prise that the US has long
incurred the vast majority of defence
tried to convince Europe
costs; however, because the US spends at a rate far above two percent, it seems
to broaden its horizon and
increase
they may have alternative motives for
military
this. Thus, US defence spending is likely
spending. In 2011, then
more of the US’s own volition rather
US Secretary of Defence Robert
Gates
than exploitation by smaller members.
even
Finally, hegemonic stability theory ex-
warned NATO that it
plains how the US has been successful in
would have a “dim if not
leading and shaping NATO, despite
dismal future” if defence spending
didn’t
failing to coerce European members to
in-
spend more. Further investigation is
crease.23 At last year’s
necessary to see whether this was be-
Chicago
the
cause European states were unable to
decline of military budg-
spend more or were simply unwilling to
ets was mentioned as one
do so. Moreover, there is a growing rift
of the most important
due to the inability of the US to prevent
summit,
challenges to NATO.
24
Meanwhile, the NATO
the US-European divide from overlapUS Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (Photo: US Department of Deping into different military strategies. fense
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
5
There are two considerations for NATO as it determines a
military operations in the area will be conducted without its
course of action to resolve this divide. First, the imbalance of
European allies.
military spending in the Alliance can harm interoperability goals, as states are tempted to free-ride on others. It is there-
About the author
fore recommended to only pursue it in those areas where all parties benefit, rather than a select few. Second, the disagreement concerning the appropriate size of the national armed forces currently undermines
Quint Hoekstra is Political Science Major with a specialization in International Relations at Leiden University (the Netherlands) and writes about global security issues.
NATO unity. Decisions must be made in funding and opera1. Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence (Brussels: NATO, 2012). 2. Jolyon Howorth, “Decision-making in members to adhere to the two persecurity and defense policy: Towards supranational inter-governmentalism?” Coopcent rule. This generates the money eration and Conflict 2012 : 433-453. NATO can show its strength by ac3. NATO, Data, 2012. for European states to independently 4. Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory knowledging and managing the differ- and Cooperation.” World Politics 1988 (3): execute operations in the European 317-319 ence of US and European interests. 5. John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, “The neighbourhood, leaving the US to Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests,” focus on containing China. This outPolitical Research Quarterly 1994 (2): 373396 come is unlikely to occur considering popular European re6. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 7. “Kernwapens Tijdlijn [Nuclear weapons timeline],” NOS, sistance to large military spending, especially in an age of April 22, 2010, http://nos.nl/artikel/152354-kernwapenstijdlijn.html. austerity. The second option is to maintain the current spend8. Ibid 9. Ibid ing structure. The US will keep spending more than other 10. Christopher Jehn and Zachary Selden. “The End of Conscription in Europe?” (paper presented at the Western Economic members but in return Europe has to support the US in the Association International Annual Meeting, July 5-8, 2002). NATO, Data, 2012. Far East with what little capacity they have. The difficulty 11. Ibid 12. Ibid here is that sovereign states are unlikely to operate outside of 13. Clara Marina O’Donnell, “The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members.” Brookings Centheir strategic interest. The third and best option is to lower tre on the United States and Europe (2012), 3. 14. Ibid the currently ignored benchmark to one-and-a-half percent of 15. Jakob Henius and Jacopo Leone McDonald, “Smart Defence: A Critical Appraisal” (paper presented at the NATO DeGDP. Each member is free and encouraged to stay above it, fence College Forum, Rome, March 2012). 16. “Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall,” The but this would at least stem the decline of military budgets. White House, last modified November 14, 2009, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentHaving attainable goals makes states considerably more likely barack-obama-suntory-hall. 17. “Recent trends in military expenditure,” SIPRI, accessed to pursue them. This way, NATO can remain relevant, seFebruary, 20 2013, http://www.sipri.org/research/ armaments/milex/resultoutput/trends. cure peace in the greater European area, and engage in small18. Alan Tonelson, “NATO Burden-sharing: Promises, promises,” Journal of Strategic Studies 2000 (3): 29-58, 52. scale missions globally. 19. Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Tactics in Libya May Be a Model for Other Efforts,” The New York Times, August 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/world/ With the end of two ground wars in the Middle East africa/29diplo.html?pagewanted=all. 20. Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker, “U.S. Debated Cyberwarfare and a new focus on cyber and drone technology, NATO has in Attack Plan on Libya,” New York Times, October 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/world/africa/cyberalready begun to reduce its footprint. Adapting to a change in warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html?_r=0. 21. O’Donnell, Spending Cuts, 2012, 6. military budgets, NATO can show its strength by acknowl22. Thom Shanker, “Defense Secretary Warns NATO of ‘Dim’ Future,” New York Times, June 10, 2011, http:// edging and managing the difference of US and European inwww.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11gates.html? _r=0. terests. Europe can be expected to focus primarily on bring23. Lisa Aronsson and Molly O’Donnell, “Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the ing security to the greater European area, while the US is Twenty-First Century?” (paper presented at the NATO Chicago Conference, March 28-30, 2012). likely to continue its Asian focus under the pretext that any 24. “Why we need to invest in defence,” NATO, last modified November 13, 2012, http://nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/ news_91256.htm.
tions. In terms of funding, the first option is to encourage all
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
6
Engaging Young Thinkers on the Euro-Atlantic Security Debate
T
he ATA hosted a one day workshop with Mas-
ternational Organization and military alliance, should en-
ter’s Students in Political Science and Interna-
courage Member and Partner states to reduce their energy
tional Relations on Euro-Atlantic foreign policy
demands; aspire for renewable supplies; and, most im-
and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance. A group of
portantly, constrain the energy consumption in their mili-
selected students were engaged in a meaningful debate on
taries. This shall be done by adopting educational and R&D
the future of Euro-Atlantic security. Their proposals and
programs that aim to develop new energy-efficient solu-
priorities for a renewed transatlantic partnership have been
tions in their militaries. Investment in ‘green’ military
discussed with ATA experts and are being presented to
solutions will not only serve Members and Partner states, but the international community as
NATO officials. These are the students’ own ideas, developed on the basis of materials (NATO Manuals + NATO history videos) provided beforehand by
NATO members are among some of the most advanced countries when it comes to green technology
the ATA.
a whole. NATO members are among some of the most advanced countries when it comes to green technology. This
This workshop represents an active contribution by the
puts NATO at a prime position to work with its Science
Post-Cold War Generation to the strategic thinking cur-
and Technology Organization (STO) to invest in furthering
rently in place amongst Allied countries over the future of
green technology research.
NATO.
Training and Education in the Balkans
Green Military (by Alon Gilboa)
(by Enitsa Gabrovska)
In light of the global need to adopt sustainable policies
A local qualified workforce is an integral part of the
and reduce the use of fossil fuels, NATO, as a leading In-
sustainable civilian-military structure necessary for NATO accession. While NATO puts emphasis on military capabilities, a civilian workforce is indispensable for the comprehensive approach towards capacity building that the Alliance strives for. Therefore, NATO should partner with the European Union on this
civilian
component,
which includes strengthening of police structures; the rule of law and law enforcement; civilian administration; and Two US Marines discussing energy (Photo: PEW Charitable Trusts: Environmental Initiatives) Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
7
The two organizations
health risks, and transnational threats to security. NATO
should invest in local capacity, in particular, by developing
identified climate change as a challenge to the security of
educational programmes for students to receive higher
NATO members in 2010; however, it has not taken practi-
education in NATO/EU Member countries (for example,
cal measures to prevent the advancement of climate
American and European universities and academies) on
change, due to a lack of political will. With the past decade
these specific topics. This way, NATO can ensure continu-
being the hottest on record, it is now time for NATO to
ity in the development process, while re-focusing on a
establish substantive steps to stabilize this increasingly
much-overlooked gap in its partnership programmes,
problematic issue. By doing so, it will galvanize other na-
namely the civilian component.
tions around the world to follow NATO’s lead in reducing
overall monitoring capabilities.
Energy Security/Article 4 (by Alon Gilboa) The temporary cut-offs of Russian gas supply to Europe in 2006 and 2009 illustrated that
the damage to the environment.
NATO should begin the process of planning for instability in key regions caused by climate change
the unstable flow of energy is a
In addition, NATO should begin the process of planning for instability in key regions caused by climate change. The rising of the Arab Spring was in part a result of food
strategic weapon that can affect the lives of millions of citi-
scarcity from the year before. Many have attributed this
zens in Europe. Therefore, NATO should not only assist in
food scarcity to the droughts in the U.S. and Russia. A lack
diversifying its members’ gas supplies and aspire for alter-
of resources culminating into instability in regions around
native energies, but also to establish clear security mecha-
the globe will become the new normal. It is imperative
nisms that will prevent such incidents from occurring in
that NATO members begin discussions on potential mili-
the future. These mechanisms should firstly emphasize
tary and political strategies that will lead to an institutional
strategic cooperation and open dialogue between NATO
framework to prepare for these events.
and the supplying states. And secondly, threats on energy security, which go under the threshold of violence, should invoke Article 4 of the NATO founding treaty that calls for consultation when the security of the Parties is threatened. Global Warming (by Fouzia Bencheikh) In a 2011 editorial piece in the Huffington Post, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen declared that taking the appropriate steps to combat climate change is “…not a choice. It is an urgent necessity.” However, since 2011, NATO has not taken the practical measures to combat this devastating problem. Blizzards in Northern Europe, drought in the American Midwest, torrential rains in Central Europe and disruptive storms along the eastern coast of the U.S are examples of events that are becoming increasingly intense and are results of climate change. It affects all NATO nations differently and in complex ways; including food shortages, Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) rehearses in Croatia 2007 (Photo: NATO) 8
Capacity Building in the Balkans (by Enitsa Gabrovska) In the process of preparing for NATO membership, it is crucial for the countries of the Western Balkans to develop and modernize their military capabilities to conform to NATO’s requirements. In achieving this, Member and Partner (MAP) countries might benefit substantially by establishing topic-specific programmes not only with NATO headquarters but within institutionalized channels for cooperation. Indi-
Flags bearers from 19 nations rehearse their march (Photo: US Department of Defense)
vidual NATO Members and their respective military struc-
Program (APRP). These countries have shown a dedication
tures can be a valuable source of soft power in the process
to the NATO mission in Afghanistan; however, NATO has
of developing military capabilities in the West Balkan
not taken the steps to formalize bilateral partnerships after
countries. This can best be achieved through information-
the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. NATO should
sharing platforms, joint capacity-building projects, best-
begin discussions to invite nations outside of the Western
practice learning, and assistance on a bilateral level. These
Hemisphere into the Partnerships for Peace program. This
partnerships allow for a more bottom-up approach in ca-
regional forum would have political consultations on sig-
pacity development within the individual aspirant states.
nificant security threats in that region and would put forth
Partnerships Across the Globe (by Fouzia Bencheikh) The days of clearly identifying your enemy are long gone. NATO members now face threats from terrorist groups and cells from around the world. It is of strategic
practical steps to combat such threats. Therefore, as NATO evolves in the 21st century, it should diversity its partnerships for the sake of maintaining global security. NATO/EU Common Security Strategy (by Dario Sabbioni)
importance to institutionalize bilateral relations between
European Union foreign policy has always determined
NATO and countries that have contributed to missions and
divisions among Member States when they were dealing
exemplify NATO’s core values. The idea of formalizing
with thorny issues. Since the very beginning of the Europe-
bilateral relationships between NATO and non-member
an Political Community (1970) the force of the main trans-
countries is not a new one; however, NATO has not put
atlantic ally was an excuse for most of the countries to
forth measures to diversify its partnership programs or
refuse to have a common strategy and common policies.
provided partners with the tailor made partnership they
The early forums in which foreign policy was debated were
wish.
not very structured ones and suffered from a weak focus
Countries like Australia and New Zealand have contributed a significant amount of troops and resources to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Additionally, Japan has donated more then 50 million dollars in 2012 to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
on how the discussed relevant issues should evolve. When the EU began to have a stronger voice in international affairs (i.e. after Maastricht and the establishment of the second pillar, CFSP) it became clear that the previous status quo would be reformed. 9
Today, there is a new starting point for reflection on
tania, Morocco and Tunisia in order to promote coopera-
EU issues and transatlantic security integration. The roles
tion and ensure regional security and stability. Its tools
of NATO and the EU have been colliding over the last
include information sharing; funding through the Trust
several years, as the cases of the Former Yugoslav Republic
Fund mechanism; and joint responses to terrorism (PAP-
of Macedonia (FYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina
T) at the governmental and civil level. This initiative was
demonstrate when the EU took over a previously estab-
followed in 2004 by the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
lished NATO mission. In the most important strategic the-
(ICI) which extended a similar type of dialogue to the Gulf
atres for military and civilian operations of the last ten
region, namely to Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United
years (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan) cooperation between the
Arab Emirates.
two actors has been a key factor in fostering future partnerships. On the institutional level, an EU cell has been established in the NATO SHAPE HQ in Brussels in March 2006 and on the other hand, a NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been working side by side with EU officials in the EU Military Staff. A truly new security environment can be created with a simple move that nevertheless requires a very high political consensus. The creation of a common NATO-EU strategy upon which to create a shared view of what security means in terms of capabilities and knowledge is necessary. This Joint Strategy between NATO and the EU would make it possible to tackle the same problems that plague both institutions more effectively, namely: instability of the MENA region, post-conflict resolution and democracy building measures in Afghanistan, improving global energy security and creating an international cyber security strategy. The review of the European Security Strategy which is expected this year, and the always higher number of Strategies by NATO, could be combined in a joint paper aimed at speaking with the same voice in the international arena.
However, while improving joint training operations and raising contributions by some MENA partners to NATO operations (e.g. Qatar and the UAE provision of air assets in NATO’s intervention in Libya), the main objective of better mutual understanding – a problem which the EU’s Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is also facing has not been achieved. This is to a large extent owed to the ongoing ArabIsraeli conflict and accusations of double-standards in Western democracy promotion after having prominently supported North African and Middle Eastern authoritarian leaders in repressing their populations over the past decades. It is therefore seen as crucial by the workshop participants to work around political restrictions at the governmental levels which have oftentimes led to the calling off of joint discussions or summits. Instead it is seen as necessary to encourage dialogue among the civil society and especially the youth to ensure that the negative rhetoric towards NATO and its Member States is met by a realistic perspective on NATO missions and objectives. We therefore suggest setting up a comprehensive forum for dialogue
Establishing a high-level panel whose task should be
including young people from NATO and MENA countries
dealing with the reflection of common security policies
who will then be able to further promote a realistic image
will increase the responsibility of ambassadors and repre-
of NATO into its respective national communities. Fur-
sentatives, with the focus being on cooperation rather than
thermore, the outcome of these workshops – which may
allocating scarce goods amongst themselves.
be conducted to some extent via online communications –
Mediterranean and Middle East Partnerships/ Youth Inclusion (by Tobey Metzger)
could be generating suggestions on improving the partner-
In 1994 NATO initiated the Mediterranean Dialogue
Collective Cyber Defense (by Tobias Metzger)
(MD) comprised of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, MauriAtlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
ship from the eyes of the youth.
Since the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia and the use of 10
cyber attacks in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, cyber
Legislation and the question of attribution: NATO should
threats have emerged as a new potential domain of warfare
encourage the political and judiciary processes
next to land, sea, air and space. Since then, multiple ac-
necessary to shape a future legislation going be-
tors, including online activists or “hacktivists”, have used
yond the Tallinn Manual on Cyber Warfare
the internet for means of disturbance, propaganda, espio-
which is intended as a mere expression of opin-
nage as well as acts of destruction as seen in the 2010 Stux-
ions. The difficulty will be to create a frame-
net attack destroying centrifuges in Iranian nuclear facili-
work of rules which are flexible enough to cope
ties. According to internet security provider Symantec,
with the quickly evolving and somewhat unpre-
more than 5 billion cyber attacks were blocked in 2011
dictable technology. This process will also have
alone. The main difficulties in countering any of these in-
to define whether technical changes are going to
trusions are on the one hand the difficulty of definite at-
be necessary in order to ensure future attribu-
tribution (although news reports have been suggested that
tion to clearly identify perpetrators – with all of
some of the recent acts of cyber espionage have been con-
the implications for issues of loss of anonymity
ducted from Chinese computers) and the unclear legality
and privacy.
of the cyber domain. Whereas the Geneva Convention clearly outlines the “jus in bello” – the techniques allowed to be used in warfare – a similar “cyber Geneva Convention” is far from existent.
Pooling and sharing: The current budgetary situation has led, within NATO as well as within the EU, to new strategies of smart defense (NATO) or pooling and sharing (EDA). All stages of cyber
Media and political attention has increased and cyber
defense from R&D to cyber investigations need
security and defense have been on the agenda of all NATO
to be clearly aligned across the institutions over-
Summits since 2004 in Istanbul. In addition, the European
coming the jealousy and competition occasional-
Union has recently presented its own European Cyber
ly visible in previous high level discussions.
Security Strategy highlighting the need for enhanced cooperation with the civil society and the private sector.
About the author
During the workshop discussions three areas of activity in cyber defense have emerged:
Fouzia Bencheikh is an LLM candidate at the University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies in Brussels, Belgium.
Information sharing: NATO needs to work closely
Alon Gilboa is a graduate student of Political Science and International Relations at Leiden University, The Netherlands.
with the EU, the Member States and the private sector to ensure an effective division of labor each focusing on its core competencies. This means that NATO and the EU should develop joint approaches for intelligence sharing in order to create a truly comprehensive approach across the private and public sectors. The difficulties lie in generating enough political will to ensure
Tobias Metzger is a graduate student of “International Conflict and Security” at the University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies (BSIS) in Brussels, Belgium. Enitsa Gabrovska is currently pursuing an MSc degree in Political Science with specialization in International Relations at Leiden University, The Netherlands. Dario Sabbioni is currently a Political Strategy and Communication Master’s student at the Brussels School of International Studies of the University of Kent.
sufficient transparency in every Member State since the overall security of the internet is determined by its weakest link.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 2
11
ATA Programs From 14-15 March, the Armenian Atlantic Association together with its youth branch Armenian Youth Atlantic Association will
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
host a youth conference “The Black Sea Region: Bringing Future Decision Makers Together in the Changing World.”
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international nongovernmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and
From 4-6 April, the Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association
security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with
(EATA) will host a NATO-EU Roundtable in Tallinn to discuss
academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes
various topics related to the
the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,
work and cooperation of
Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37
NATO and the EU. This
countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,
event will bring together 60
the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially
students in order to in-
include to the successor generation in our work.
crease the knowledge of
Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and
young people in foreign and security policy to discuss the working
understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security
principles of NATO.
through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
Visit www.globsec.org/globsec2013/ to learn more about the
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
Slovak Atlantic Commission’s upcoming Globsec Conference on
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
18-20 April. Don’t miss the opportunity to apply for the Young
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Leaders Forum and join one of the leading security and foreign policy forums in the world. Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch. We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your work please see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below. Editor: Jason Wiseman Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.
the establishment of new and competitive programs on international security issues.
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the development of research initiatives and security-related events for its members.
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the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia. The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy
activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.