ISSN 2294-1274
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Volume 3 - Issue 8, August 2013
NATO and the New Partnership Paradigm Dating back to the early 1990’s NATO has sought to pursue formal working relationships with states and regional organizations around the world to bolster its ability to address global threats with global partners. Designed to prepare the Alliance for dangers originating beyond the borders of the Euro-Atlantic, NATO has increasingly emphasized the importance of working closer with regional actors and international organizations to ensure that the security concerns of different regions are met.
Secretary General Rasmussen at the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in April 2013 (Photo: NATO)
Contents:
Two areas of high concern for NATO are Africa and the Asia-Pacific. Resulting from the global concern of these conflict rife regions, NATO has initiated a
The Path Ahead for NATO Partners in the Asia-Pacific Miha Hribernik analyzes the progress and obstacles of NATO’s emerging partnerships
series of partnership agreements with key
throughout the Asia-Pacific region. He describes the current problems facing NATO and the
regional actors in order to prepare itself for
Asia-Pacific while highlighting key areas of cooperation and concludes that a continued step
the security threats of the next century.
by step approach that capitalizes on areas of existing cooperation is critical for the Alliance.
This month’s edition of Atlantic Voices
NATO and Africa: Future Prospects of a Nascent Partnership
analyzes the discussion in depth and presents recommendations for the future of
Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga analyzes the role of NATO’s missions and partnerships in Africa and
NATO’s partnerships in Africa and the Asia
the importance of strengthening cooperation between NATO and the African Union. She
-Pacific.
explores the different areas where cooperation can improve and the current obstacles facing
-Jason Wiseman
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
formal partnership while explaining why NATO’s role in the region is likely to increase. 1
The Path Ahead for NATO Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific By: Miha Hribernik
T
he April 2013 visit of NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) under-
scored the growing visibility of the Asia-Pacific on the Alliance’s
is an increase in security tensions. Alongside the rise of non-traditional and transnational security threats – such as terrorism, organized crime, maritime piracy and cyber-attacks – the Asia-Pacific is also plagued by
radar
screen. Although
pro-
grammes, and reignited maritime ter-
bilateral ties with
ritorial disputes are
the Alliance, the
just two examples
visit was all the
of recurring security
more significant as time of renewed
concerns.
missile
their
it came during a
security
nuclear and ballistic
Asian
partner countries reaffirmed
traditional
The North Korean
the six-day tour of Northeast
more
Meeting between Secretary General Rasmussen and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in April 2013 (Photo: NATO)
tension on the Korean Peninsula and served to signal NATO’s determination to tighten relations with the Asia-Pacific.
concerns that could have global reper-
cussions. The North Korean threat or the unpredictable Sino-Japanese stand-off over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands could even entangle NATO directly. In the event of escalation and US involvement, Washington
Japan and South Korea are two of NATO’s
could possibly invoke Article 4 – or even Article 5 –
‘Partners Across the Globe’, alongside Afghanistan,
of the North Atlantic Treaty and involve the other 27
Australia, Iraq, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan.
allied countries. For all intents and purposes, NATO
These geographically distant countries, which are not
has one foot in the Pacific at any given time, although
part of any other NATO partnership initiative, coop-
until very recently the Alliance’s ambitions in the re-
erate with the Alliance in a number of areas. As the
gion did not always reflect this.
concept of NATO’s global partners can only be traced back to the early 1990s, the fact that five of the eight partners are located in the Asia-Pacific is testament to the region’s meteoric rise in geopolitical significance. Accompanying the Asia-Pacific’s surge in economic and political clout in the post-Cold War period Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
Even though NATO will continue to remain a transatlantic alliance first and foremost, the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific and the proliferation of security threats will ensure that the Alliance will devote increasing resources to maintaining a presence in the region in the ‘post-Afghanistan’ period. 2
This will present NATO with a range of chal-
even leading some analysts to call for the expansion of
lenges. First, dwindling member state defence spend-
NATO into an alliance with global membership. During
ing will limit its capabilities and necessarily curb its
the first post-9/11 years, cooperation with contact
regional ambitions. Major initiatives will be very rare
countries, including those from the Asia-Pacific, primar-
as NATO members face the reality of tight budgets and
ily revolved around their participation in the Interna-
limited interest for intervention in places as far re-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
moved as the Pacific Ocean.
Contact countries were first
Second, any NATO policy towards the Asia-Pacific region will need to be limited to non-
Cooperation with NATO’s global partners . . . will likely lead to a significant expansion of the Alliance’s partner network in the Asia-Pacific.
traditional threats that can be ad-
invited to participate in activities available to members of NATO’s structured partnerships, but this was later expanded at the Riga and
dressed with a modest investment of resources and
Bucharest Summits in 2006 and 2008 respectively. The
through cooperation with partner countries – this in-
latter brought about particularly significant changes; it
cludes cyber security,
counter-terrorism, non-
renamed ‘contact countries’ into ‘Partners Across the
proliferation and efforts to combat transnational crime.
Globe’, unveiled the concept of Tailored Cooperation
As a result, cooperation with NATO’s global partners
Programmes (TCPs) and introduced a set of objectives
will only increase in the future, and will likely lead to a
for each partnership. Furthermore, the Bucharest Sum-
significant expansion of the Alliance’s partner network
mit also expanded the possibilities for enhanced cooper-
in the Asia-Pacific.
ation, including high-level bilateral talks, as well as
The Evolution of NATO’s Partnership Policy
meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
and Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific
and ministers of partner countries and their ambassa-
The beginning of NATO’s cooperation with
dors.
countries outside of its structured partnership frame-
The Lisbon Summit of 2010 represented another
works (such as the Partnership for Peace or the Medi-
major step forward and saw the adoption of the new
terranean Dialogue) can be traced to a series of ad hoc
Strategic Concept, which alongside NATO’s 2011 Effi-
dialogues initiated during the 1990s. Such cooperation
cient and Flexible Partnership Policy now forms the
was formalized in 1998 with the adoption of a set of
framework for increasingly sophisticated cooperation
general guidelines that detailed avenues for coopera-
with ‘Partners Across the Globe’. This includes partners
tion with so-called ‘contact countries’. These guide-
in the Asia-Pacific, even though the region is not singled
lines arguably marked the beginning of a shift in
out as one of specific interest to the Alliance. Both docu-
NATO’s strategic outlook, as it began actively cooper-
ments are very broad and emphasize the importance of
ating with select partner countries across the planet.
strengthened cooperation and continued dialogue –
The September 11 terror attacks three years later, and
within the framework of ‘cooperative security’ – with
the subsequent waging of the Global War on Terror,
partner countries, but without outlining concrete initia-
brought about an increased interest in cooperation
tives.
with partner countries in countering global terrorism, Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
The loose nature of these two strategic documents 3
allows NATO a substantial degree of flexibility in tai-
one of NATO’s most significant partner countries. As
loring Individual Partnership and Cooperation Pro-
part of its on-going Operation SLIPPER, Canberra has
grammes (IPCP’s), which have replaced the earlier
contributed an ISAF contingent of 1,039 troops,
TCP’s, to suit areas of mutual interest. Even so, both
along with a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
documents emphasize several security threats that are
and a Special Operations Task Group in Afghanistan’s
high on the agenda in NATO’s relations with all of its
southern Uruzgan Province. Australia has also donat-
partners: maritime and cyber security, counter-
ed some €150 million to the Afghan National Army
terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation.
Trust Fund. In the Gulf of
Australia Australia
Aden, the Australi-
main-
an frigate HMAS
tained a degree of con-
Newcastle is cooper-
tact with NATO during
ating with NATO
the Cold War primarily through
assets
cooperation
piracy against ships
with the US. It is both a
off the Horn of Af-
‘major non-NATO ally’
rica as part of Op-
of Washington and part
eration
of the ANZUS alliance together with the US
combating
Australian troops in Afghanistan (Photo: Australian Defence Force)
and New Zealand.
Ocean
Shield.
Japan
During the 1990s, Canberra contributed a con-
Japan was one of the first NATO partner states
tingent of troops to the NATO-led Stabilisation Force
in the Asia-Pacific. Visits by Japanese defence minis-
(SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but interaction
ters to NATO Headquarters date back to 1979, alt-
remained limited until Australia dispatched troops to
hough these contacts did not begin to resemble con-
Afghanistan in 2001. Regular dialogue has been pur-
crete cooperation until the July 1990 visit by Foreign
sued since 2005, and Australian foreign and prime
Minister Taro Nakayama in Brussels. This occasion
ministers have been addressing the NAC on an almost
paved the way for emerging cooperation during the
annual basis since 2004. Australian prime ministers
decade; as an example, Japan became a major donor
were also present at two NATO Summits; Prime
in the Western Balkans following the 1995 NATO
Minister Kevin Rudd attended the 2008 Bucharest
intervention during the war in Former Yugoslavia.
Summit, while Prime Minister Julia Gillard and De-
Although Japan has not contributed troops to
fence Minister Stephen Smith participated at the 2010
ISAF, it has taken on a supporting role, with its Mari-
and 2012 summits in Lisbon and Chicago respective-
time Self Defence Force (MSDF) ensuring refueling
ly. Most recently, Australia and NATO signed an
capabilities for Operation Enduring Freedom from
IPCP in February 2013.
2001 to 2009. Tokyo has also devoted significant
On an operational level, Australia is currently Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
funding to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan 4
National Police; for the reintegration of insurgents
erability, addressing global security issues, developing
under the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Pro-
mechanisms for crisis prevention and management, as
gramme; and for the construction of hospitals and
well as capacity building.
schools in the country. Most recently, the July 2012
Although the signing of the IPCP formalizes the
Tokyo Conference helped attract foreign investment
bilateral relationship, regular contacts between Mon-
and donations to Afghanistan.
golia and NATO can be traced back to 2005, when
During the past decade the bilateral relationship
Ulan Bator first contributed soldiers to the NATO-led
has reached several important political milestones.
Kosovo Force (KFOR). Since then, cooperation has
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visited To-
slowly expanded. Mongolia has hosted high-level
kyo in 2005, and Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro Aso
NATO delegations, and President Tsakhia Elbegdorj
addressed the NAC in 2006. The address was fol-
attended the 2010 Lisbon Summit. The country first
lowed in 2007 by the first ever visit of a Japanese
dispatched an infantry platoon to ISAF in March 2010,
prime minister to NATO Headquarters, during Prime
and at the time of writing contributes 46 troops.
Minister Abe’s first term in office. That same year, the
finalization
of
a
NATO-Japan framework
New Zealand
NATO-Japan cooperation is most prominent in the Gulf of Aden.
for cooperation in Afghanistan opened the doors for a Japanese provision of humanitarian assistance in support of NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), while 2010 saw the signing of a bilateral security agreement, followed by a Joint Political Declaration in April 2013.
New Zealand’s relationship with NATO somewhat mirrors that of its larger neighbour. Like Australia, New Zealand is party to the
ANZUS Treaty and has been conferred the status of a ‘major non-NATO ally’ by the US. Its close military ties with the US gave the country some familiarity with NATO standards and practices prior to Wellington’s first cooperation with the 28-nation bloc on an
Outside of Afghanistan, NATO-Japan coopera-
operational level. This took place within SFOR, when
tion is most prominent in the Gulf of Aden. Two
the country dispatched several officers to the NATO-
MSDF destroyers and two P-3C patrol aircraft oper-
led peacekeeping operation.
ate out of a Japanese base in Djibouti. The force works together with NATO assets countering maritime piracy in the region as part of Operation Ocean Shield. Mongolia
As was the case with Australia, participation in ISAF also marked a milestone in New Zealand’s relationship with NATO. The majority of the country’s ISAF personnel were deployed as part of a PRT in Bamyam. Although most have already left the coun-
Mongolia is NATO’s latest Asia-Pacific partner
try, 13 members of the New Zealand National Sup-
country, only becoming one in March 2012 after the
port Element remain in Afghanistan and provide logis-
signing of an IPCP. The Programme envisions oppor-
tical support at Bagram Air Force Base.
tunities for greater cooperation in enhancing interop-
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
On a political level, contacts with NATO in5
tensified in the immediate post-9/11 period. During her
sonnel still remain in the country, mostly in Bagram.
time in office, Prime Minister Helen Clark visited
South Korea also remains invested in Afghanistan
NATO Headquarters on a regular basis, and attended
through financial contributions: Seoul has earmarked
the
Bucharest
some $500 million for the Afghan security forces and
Summit. Frequent bi-
the country’s develop-
lateral talks and visits
ment between 2011
continue, and Foreign
and 2014, and has al-
Minister
Murray
ready donated $75 mil-
McCully attended the
lion between 2011 and
NATO Summit in Lis-
2012.
bon in 2010 and Chica-
Along with many other
go in 2012. Both sides
partner countries in the
signed an ICPC in June
region, South Korea has
2012, which emphasiz-
also dispatched naval
2008
es cooperation in areas such as arms control,
Bilateral discussion between Secretary General Rasmussen and the Minister of Defence of New Zealand, Jonathan Coleman, in February 2013 (Photo: NATO)
disaster relief and crisis management, non-proliferation, education and training. Republic of Korea
vessels to help counter the threat of piracy in
the Gulf of Aden. 2013 & Beyond: Old Challenges, New Momentum
An address to the NAC by then-Foreign Minister
Secretary General Rasmussen’s April tour of
Ban Ki-Moon in 2005 marked the beginning of South
Northeast Asia brought renewed momentum to
Korea’s political dialogue with NATO. Cooperation was
NATO’s role in the Asia-Pacific. The visit followed in
formalized in September 2012 with the signing of an
the wake of a January letter from Japan’s Prime Min-
IPCP, which identifies the following priority areas: ter-
ister Abe where he openly invited the Alliance to play
rorism response, enhancing of interoperability, working
a greater role in the region and to become more ac-
together in multinational peace-support operations and
tive in the security, stability and prosperity of East
cooperating under the NATO Science for Peace and Se-
Asia. The letter also warned of China’s increasing
curity Programme.
maritime power and North Korea’s behaviour, adding
Even though South Korea’s (ROK) relations with NATO are arguably less developed than most other Asia
that both have intensified the security concerns in East Asia.
-Pacific partners, the country is a long-standing contrib-
Although it is unclear whether the appeal di-
utor to ISAF. Seoul first deployed a contingent of medi-
rectly prompted Rasmussen’s visit to the region, the
cal personnel in 2002, followed by a unit of military
letter highlights a challenge to increasing NATO in-
engineers in 2003. Between 2010 and 2013, the ROK
volvement in the Pacific. While the strategic interests
also fielded a 470-person strong civilian-military PRT in
of NATO and its partners overlap substantially, a cer-
Parwan Province. After the PRT’s dissolution, 350 per-
tain mismatch in expectations persists. For example,
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
6
the 28-nation bloc and Japan do not entirely see eye-to-
By the Secretary General’s own admission, in the
eye on China. Secretary General Rasmussen strongly
event of a North Korean attack against the US, NATO
emphasizes that NATO does not perceive China as a
would have to discuss the situation and make a deci-
threat, but rather wishes to see a structured dialogue
sion based on specific circumstances, leaving the door
with the rising power. For the foreseeable future, nei-
open for various interpretations. Contingency plan-
ther NATO nor many of its member states – some of
ning for such an eventuality is something that NATO
them still reeling from the global economic crisis – will
will have to do over the coming years, despite the
have any desire to antagonize a
relatively low likelihood of
major trading partner, let
such an event.
alone to perceive it as a strategic competitor. Even so, the text of the NATO-Japan Joint
NATO does not perceive China as a threat, but rather wishes to see a structured dialogue with the rising power.
Despite the mismatch in interests noted above, the Alliance and its five part-
Political Declaration signed
ners in the region agree on
during the visit appears to have at least partially taken
the need to pick some of the security arrangement’s
into account Mr. Abe’s January appeal, as it emphasizes
‘low hanging fruit’ in areas where obtaining consensus
common strategic interests and the shared values be-
for cooperation is fairly unproblematic and which will
tween NATO and Japan, although it avoids mentioning
not be seen as contentious by other states or existing
China.
security structures in the region. These are the need
Another hindrance to the Alliance’s foray into the
to address the safety of sea lines of communication
Pacific comes in the form of overlapping security ar-
(SLOC); to combat international terrorism and orga-
rangements in the region. The US is part of ANZUS, and
nized crime; to enhance non-proliferation efforts; and
has bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea. Rela-
to boost cyber defence capabilities. Furthermore,
tions between these two US allies and NATO partners
there is consensus on the need to manage the North
are, however, burdened with historical baggage, and
Korean ballistic and nuclear missile threat, which was
compounded by an on-going territorial dispute over the
emphasized several times during Rasmussen’s April
Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. Although an escalation of this
visit at the height of the most recent crisis on the Ko-
dispute is unlikely, it illustrates the extent of tensions
rean Peninsula. Although ballistic missile defence
that exist in the region even between NATO-partner
(BMD) cooperation features mainly on the bilateral
democracies and US allies. The US forward military pos-
level between the US, Japan and South Korea,
ture in the Asia-Pacific carries with it additional implica-
NATO’s own substantial BMD expertise provides a
tions. If the country finds itself embroiled in a war on
promising venue for cooperation that could be placed
the Korean Peninsula, or on the side of Japan in a hypo-
higher on the agenda between NATO and its part-
thetical war over the disputed islands with China, Wash-
ners.
ington may choose to invoke Article 4 (consultation) or
Over the coming years NATO and its five Pa-
even Article 5 (collective defence) of the North Atlantic
cific partners will need to work closely to further op-
Treaty. By extension, this scenario could entangle
erationalize the various areas of mutual interest out-
NATO in a conflict far outside of the Euro-Atlantic area.
lined in the IPCPs. For the time being, cooperation in
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
7
many areas – such as cyber security – is still in an em-
towards Western military alliances. For this reason, a
bryonic phase. To this end, talks such as the ones held
formal partnership with India remains an unlikely pro-
between NATO and Japan on the side-lines of the Shan-
spect, although there remains substantial room for
gri-La Dialogue in May, and the November 2012 NATO
raising awareness of NATO’s work through public
-ROK policy consultations, will help translate the IPCPs
diplomacy, which would lead to more regular politi-
into concrete initiatives.
cal contacts and possible practical cooperation in areas
Cooperation With Non-Partners in the Region Despite the aforementioned obstacles, NATO’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific is undeniably growing. As its strategy evolves, the Alliance will likely seek to structure and formalize its cooperation and dialogue in the region. This will include both dialogue with nonpartner countries such as China and India, and the expansion of its partnership network to new countries. In line with its ambition of establishing a struc-
such as counter-terrorism, maritime and cyber security. Even though a formal partnership with China and India is a distant prospect, NATO’s network of partnerships in the Asia-Pacific will continue to expand. Its growth could follow the accession pattern established with existing partners, when practical cooperation – primarily in multilateral operations such as SFOR, KFOR and ISAF – paved the way for regular political dialogue, and eventually culminated in an
tured dialogue with
IPCP.
Beijing, NATO will
Malaysia is perhaps the
seek to engage China
most probable future NATO
further over the com-
partner, as both sides have a
ing years. This is un-
history of working together,
likely to culminate in
ranging from the deployment
a formal partnership,
of a Malaysian contingent as
but could potentially
part of the Implementation
lead to the creation of a
formal
structure
akin to the NATO-
Force (IFOR) and SFOR in Lt. General Rhys Jones (Chief of Defence, New Zealand) with Captain Khir Junaidi Idris (Military Representative, Malaysia) (Photo: NATO)
Russia Council. In the more immediate term, frequent bilateral talks across different levels will continue. Examples include the seven rounds of NATO-China staff talks held to date, and meetings such as the one centered around enhancing military-to-military cooperation during this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue.
Bosnia during the 1990s, to its on-going participation in ISAF.
Singapore is another potential candidate: Its troops joined ISAF in 2007 and concluded their mission in Uruzgan Province in June this year. Another recent and noteworthy contributor is Tonga, which dispatched a 55-strong contingent to Afghanistan in 2010. Relative to the size of Tonga’s population –
Relations with India remain limited for the time
numbering just over 100,000 people – its force is the
being, largely stemming from the disinterest in NATO
largest in ISAF. Most recently, the kingdom’s De-
within India’s strategic community, the country’s tradi-
fence Minister, Lord Tu’ivakano, met with NATO
tional policy of non-alignment and general skepticism
Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow in
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
8
Brussels during the June 2013 meeting of NATO De-
policy of Japan, and maritime security in East Asia –
fence Ministers. This was one of only two bilateral meet-
with an emphasis on the role of coast guards in terri-
ings with non-NATO states during the two-day event.
torial disputes and on counter-piracy information sharing networks such as ReCAAP. Miha holds an
Conclusion
MSc in International Security from the University of
As NATO’s increasing engagement with its partners in the Asia-Pacific shows, a shift from an alliance
Bristol and a BA in International Relations from the University of Ljubljana.
purely focused on both sides of the Atlantic to one with a global outlook is unfolding with renewed momentum. The 28-nation bloc is increasingly working together
Bibliography
A shift from an alliance purely focused on both sides of the Atlantic to one with a global outlook is unfolding with renewed momentum.
with regional partners on issues of common concern. In the post-Afghanistan period, future practical cooperation will likely focus on areas such as nuclear non-proliferation (principally due to the threat from North Korea), maritime security (as maritime piracy and robbery continue to threaten SLOCs in the Gulf of Aden and in Southeast Asia), counterterrorism and cyber security.
1
Benitez, Jorge (2011, May 25). Time for a NATO-China Council? http://www.acus.org/ new_atlanticist/time-nato-chinacouncil.
2
Helbig, Robert. “NATO-India: Prospects of a Partnership”. Research Paper 73, February 2012. Rome: NATO Defense College. 3
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4 Magyarics, Tamás. “NATO: From Great Expectations Through Hard Times To Bleak House?” Panorama of global security environment 2012. Bratislava: CENAA. 5 Mei, Jingya (2013, January 14). Abe appeals to NATO while toughening stance against China. http://english.sina.com/ world/2013/0113/548383.html. 6
These arguably present ‘low-hanging fruit’ that will ensure NATO’s growing involvement in the AsiaPacific does not put regional powers on edge. This approach is very much in line with an increasingly global NATO that will, however, remain a Euro-Atlantic alliance at its core. As the Secretary General emphasized in his speech at the Japan National Press Club in April, even a global
NATO (2013, June 3). NATO, Asian countries together at the Shangri -La Dialogue. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ news_100984.htm.
7 NATO (2012, October 30). NATO’s relations with partners across the globe. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49188.htm. 8
NATO (2013, February 21). NATO cooperation with Australia. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-8F77F7B8-310EB9F7/natolive/ topics_48899.htm.
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NATO (2013, April 22). NATO cooperation with Japan. http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50336.htm.
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NATO (2012, March 23). NATO’s cooperation with Mongolia. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-538A5E39-BF562807/natolive/ topics_85297.htm?selectedLocale=en.
11
NATO will not seek a presence in the Asia-Pacific, but
NATO (2012, July 26). NATO cooperation with New Zealand. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52347.htm.
will instead endeavour to work with the Asia-Pacific.
12
About the author Miha Hribernik is Research Coordinator at the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels and an analyst at the geopolitical consultancy Wikistrat. His research and analysis focus on the foreign and security Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
NATO (2013, April 22). NATO’s cooperation with the Republic of Korea. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50098.htm.
13 Nishihara, Masashi. “Can Japan be a Global Partner for NATO?” RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 2, December 2006. Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security. 14 Schreer, Benjamin. “Beyond Afghanistan: NATO’s Global Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific”. Research Paper 75, April 2012. Rome: NATO Defense College. 15 Weinrod, W. Bruce. “NATO and Asia’s Changing Relationship”. Global Asia, Fall 2008, vol. 3 no. 3.
9
NATO and Africa: Future Prospects of a Nascent Partnership maintains partnership relations with 41 countries and
By: Ioanna Nikoletta Zyga
N
ATO’s current Strategic Concept,
a range of international organizations. The breadth of
adopted by Allied leaders at the Lisbon
NATO’s partnerships are such that the Alliance has
Summit in November 2010, identifies
been forging a series of frameworks for cooperation
cooperative security as a core task of the Alliance,
with external actors, namely the Partnership for
alongside collective defense and crisis management. It
Peace (PfP), that brings together NATO and Euro-
underlines the necessity for NATO to work with part-
Atlantic partners, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)
ners to address transnational threats at a time when
that involves North African countries, the Istanbul
instability and conflict originating beyond Allied terri-
Cooperation Initiative (ICI) that brings together
tory can directly threaten Allied security:
NATO and four Gulf Cooperation Countries, and the so-called Partners Across the Globe.
The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations;
This article aims to discuss NATO’s engagement in Africa, principally its cooperation with the African Union (AU) - the primary institution currently involved in addressing peace and security in Africa -
The Strategic Doctrine
which has not attracted much
also states that “the promotion
scholarly attention if com-
of Euro-Atlantic security is
pared to other NATO part-
best assured through a wide
nerships.
network of partnerships with
This paper is organized
countries and organizations
as follows: It first discusses
across the globe.” NATO’s
why Africa matters to Allies.
new partnership policy aims to prepare the Alliance for an ever changing security envi-
(Photo: NATO)
ronment, in which NATO needs to cooperate with states and international organizations that NATO has not traditionally engaged with in order to address transnational security challenges that can affect the security of its members. Partnership has been key to the Alliance’s evolution, strategy and operations. At present, NATO Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
It then goes on to provide an
Visit to NATO by Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan
overview of NATO’s engage-
ment with the AU. Finally, it examines the challenges in enhancing cooperation between NATO and the AU and offers suggestions for the way ahead. Conclusions are presented in the last section. Why Africa Matters Africa hosts many transnational security risks that currently threaten the Alliance. To begin with, Africa is the world’s most conflict-prone continent 10
and is burdened by underdevelopment, poor governance
have direct security implications for the Alliance’s se-
and fragile state structures. These aspects make Africa a
curity interests; Allies who share the Mediterranean
potential safe haven and breeding ground for terrorists
border with North African states are particularly vul-
and other criminal movements. Particularly alarming are
nerable to spillovers from the region. That said,
the developments in North Africa’s Sahel Region, which
NATO should continue improving its partnership with
has emerged as an ungoverned haven for militant groups.
Africa, given that the underlying vulnerabilities of the
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the principal
region listed above can directly impact NATO’s secu-
terrorist threat coming from the region. As one observer
rity interests. This is also in line with NATO’s Strate-
notes, “the recruitment of fresh fighters from surround-
gic Concept which stresses the necessity for Allies to work with partners in order to deal
ing countries (Libya, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia) and attempts to move closer to other more local ex-
Allies who share the Mediterranean border with North African states are particularly vulnerable.
with disruptive challenges, especially in the field of what it labels as
tremist groups, in particular, Boko
“emerging security challenges,”
Haram operating in northern Nigeria, leaves open the
which include weapons of mass de-
risk of creation of a terrorist arch across Africa from
struction proliferation and counter- piracy. In other
Mauritania as far as Somalia.”
words, NATO does not intend to become a ‘gendarme
The recent crisis in Mali demonstrated that failing
du monde’ yet the Alliance must be engaged in regions
states are a much desired safe haven for radical Islamic
where Allied security is at risk. Further, with NATO
groups and transnational terrorist organizations. Recog-
members sharply reducing their military spending,
nizing the threat from terrorism in the region, NATO
NATO should better leverage its partnerships in order
Heads of State and Government agreed to intensify coop-
to share the costs of providing security. Besides, a pro-
eration on terrorism-related issues as an integral part of
active approach on NATO’s part is required to prepare
NATO’s engagement with the countries of the Mediter-
for the many risks ahead. For example, the participa-
ranean Dialogue during NATO’s 2002 Prague Summit.
tion of Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in
In addition to the terrorist threat and its potential spillo-
NATO’s campaign over Libya greatly demonstrates the
ver to NATO territory, Allies are concerned about the
importance of forging consistent security partnerships,
security risks posed by immigration, civil conflict and
as well as the value of NATO’s outreach to the MD
new interstate wars, piracy and weapons trafficking.
and ICI countries. These countries, building on the
What is more, the crisis in Libya in 2011 exacerbated
foundations laid by these two partnership frameworks
two of the already existing and interconnected problems
contributed not only logistical support and resources
of the region: the illicit trafficking of weapons from the
to the NATO-led intervention in Libya, but more im-
country increased dramatically as large amounts of so-
portantly, their political support.
phisticated weapons such as SA-24 missiles, heavy mor-
NATO’s Involvement in Africa So Far: Is there
tars, heavy artillery and thousands of anti-tank mines fell
Room for Improvement?
into the hands of terrorist groups.
As far as the institutional aspect of the NATO-
The problems facing Africa are regional security
AU relationship is concerned, no formal mechanism
challenges that not only affect African populations but
exists for the two institutions to interact. What is
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
11
more, AU-NATO strategic level contacts and po-
Provider (OAP), NATO’s first ever counter piracy
litical dialogue have been periodic at best. The two
mission. OAP ran until December 2008, when it was
principles guiding NATO’s engagement in Africa
handed over to the European Union. NATO returned
are “African Solutions to African Problems” and
to the region in March 2009 when it launched Opera-
“minimal NATO footprint.”
tion Allied Protector, whose mandate ran until Au-
Although NATO maintains partnership rela-
gust 2009. Following that, NATO launched Opera-
tions with some North African countries since the
tion Ocean Shield (OOS) whose mandate runs until
establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue in
the end of 2014. At present, OOS is contributing to
1994, the organization’s involvement in the conti-
counter piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden and off
nent is relatively new. Security cooperation be-
the Horn of Africa. What is more, under counter-
tween NATO and AU only started in 2005 when
terrorism Operation Active Endeavour (OAE),
following an African Union request, NATO start-
NATO vessels are patrolling the Mediterranean and
ed assisting the African Union Mission in Sudan
monitoring shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt
(AMIS) by providing critical logistic support and
and protect against terrorist activities in the Mediter-
conducting strategic airlift for AMIS peacekeepers
ranean, including off the coast of North African
engaged in Africa. NATO continued providing
Countries. NATO has been cooperating with several
support to the hybrid United Nations and African
North African countries within the framework of
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which suc-
OAE.
ceeded AMIS on 31 December 2007.
NATO undertook its first ever operation in an
Since then, NATO’s relations with the AU
Arab country in March 2011 when it launched Opera-
have been expanded. Since 2007, NATO has been
tion Unified Protector (OUP) to implement United
supporting the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973
In particular, NATO has been providing AMISOM
to enforce the arms embargo against Libya and the
with strategic airlift and sealift support. NATO has
UN-mandated no-fly zone over the country. The op-
also been providing subject matter experts for the
eration was concluded on 31 October 2011.
Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the
In the field of education and training, the
AU that supports AMISOM. To date, and follow-
NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, has been
ing renewed requests by the African Union, the
hosting African Union staff officers since 2009.
Alliance’s assistance has been extended several
NATO’s Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples has also
times. Furthermore, at the request of the UN Sec-
organized certification/evaluation training programs
retary-General, NATO is also escorting UN char-
for AU staff. NATO has also participated and sup-
tered vessels in support of the African Union Mis-
ported various African Standby Force (ASF) prepara-
sion in Somalia.
tory workshops designed to develop ASF-related con-
NATO has also sought to address the
cepts. Moreover, in June 2006, NATO exercised its
scourge of piracy in the region. Since 2008, the
NATO Response Force (NRF) in Africa during its
Alliance has been actively involved in counter-
first out-of-area exercise (Operation Steadfast Jaguar)
piracy efforts when it launched Operation Allied
in Cape Verde.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
12
Finally, since 2005 NATO is providing capacity
concerned - with the exception of risks posed by pira-
-building support to the African Union and the ASF
cy and terrorism - and as such, the political will
with the aim of strengthening the AU’s peace- keeping capabilities. The
Alliance
also
maintains a Military Liaison
among Allies for NATO to deepen
Cooperation between NATO and the African Union is limited, especially in comparison with the Alliance’s other partnership programs.
Officer Team in Addis Ab-
its engagement with its partners in the region is limited. Second, the cornerstone of NATO’s approach vis-à-vis Africa is “African Solutions to African
aba which has facilitated cooperation between NATO
Problems.” Subsequently, NATO provides assistance
and the AU in the military-technical sphere.
only at the request of the African Union, which means
Overall, the aforementioned discussion of
that cooperation between the two institutions has
NATO’s involvement in Africa shows that NATO has
developed on an ad-hoc basis. The problem with this
been making valuable contributions to peace and se-
approach is that although it can address goals on a one
curity primarily by providing operational support,
-off, short term basis, it gives little consideration to
and through military and technical assistance and sup-
long -term goals.
port in the area of education and training as well. Yet,
Another factor that needs to be taken into con-
the level of cooperation between NATO and the Afri-
sideration is the African Union’s inherent limitations,
can Union is limited, especially in comparison with
namely the fact that “the AU’s institutions and execu-
the Alliance’s other partnership programs. NATO’s
tive bodies are still weak. Many of them have not re-
partnership with the African Union is nascent, and
ally advanced beyond the stage of a “work in pro-
indeed there is room for improvement, however a
gress.” In general, the AU is understaffed, critically
series of factors have been obstructing the deepening
lacking in coordination with the actions and decisions
of NATO’s partnership with African states.
of its member states.”
Hindrances to Furthering NATO’s Partnership With Africa
Then there is the issue of NATO’s image among African states. In general, “a history of coloni-
The following obstacles remain in the way of
zation and bilateral interventionism has created with
strengthening cooperation between NATO and Afri-
the wider public an ambiance of distrust, which af-
ca.
fects NATO as well.” The Alliance’s image in the reFirst, there is a sense of fatigue among some
gion suffered badly following the Libya campaign in
NATO members due to NATO’s operation in Af-
2011. More specifically, NATO was accused of going
ghanistan, the Organization’s most demanding opera-
beyond the mandate of the United Nations Security
tion. This, coupled with sweeping austerity cuts, sub-
Council and pursuing regime change, while some re-
sequent shrinking defense budgets and ever-declining
gional states expressed their reservations toward
European defense capabilities, has a negative impact
NATO. The fact that NATO suffers from a negative
on the willingness of Allies to engage in African secu-
image in the region is a major obstacle in furthering
rity affairs. Furthermore, Africa is not seen as a prior-
cooperation between NATO and the AU, as some
ity region as far as its relevance to Allied security is
African partners are reluctant to work with NATO.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
13
tion of its image among certain African states.
The Way Ahead Before deciding its future involvement in
Moreover, NATO should take advantage of the
the continent, NATO should decide its level of
partnership structures it already has in place, such as
ambition regarding its engagement in Africa. In
the Mediterranean Dialogue, to further develop its
any case, there is no political will among Allies to
partnership with North African countries which are
address the conditions of instability in the region
members of the MD. The potential for establishing
which are rooted in a social, economic, and cultur-
new cooperative arrangements that would bring to-
al context. If NATO wants to improve its partner-
gether NATO allies and key countries of the region in
ship with the region, several steps can be taken:
an effort to engage in policy dialogue should also be
Although the military dimension of the part-
examined. NATO’s numerous operations make NATO a
nership is progressing, the political aspect of the partnership must be
repository for operational
improved. Strengthen-
lessons learned in the
ing the political dia-
fields of peacekeeping, as
logue between NATO
well as in the fields of
and African states is a
maritime
much needed require-
counterterrorism. NATO
ment to move the part-
should continue sharing its
nership forward. Regu-
experience with the AU
lar meetings between
Visit to NATO HQ by Mauritanian Parliamentarians and Senators
NATO Allies and Afri-
(Photo: NATO)
security
and
and assist it in building up its capabilities and train its
can Union members within the framework of a
forces. Given the prevalence of porous borders in the
forum similar to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
region, training in the fields of border control with
Forum would be a step toward this direction. In
the aim of tackling the illicit trafficking of weapons
this way, Allies and key countries of the region
and terrorism is very much needed.
confronted by shared security threats could discuss
NATO could also examine the possibility of
topics of mutual concern to enhance mutual un-
providing capacity building assistance to other region-
derstanding. Additionally, strengthening the ca-
al organizations, such as the Economic Community of
pacity of NATO’s liaison team in Addis Ababa to
West African States (ECOWAS), whose efforts in
coordinate cooperation between the two sides and
Mali “have been impeded by limited crisis response
facilitate the exchange of information would also
planning capabilities, accompanied by the insufficient
be beneficial.
military readiness of several troop-contributing na-
NATO should also capitalize on a more
tions.”
structured dialogue to improve its image and cor-
Needless to say, an area where there is great
rect misperceptions about its intentions among the
potential for cooperation is maritime security, where
countries of the region in light of its recent en-
NATO has gained unparalleled expertise. NATO
gagement in Libya, and the consequent deteriora-
should put emphasis on the maritime security capacity
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
14
building of its partners so that they can tackle the
eration with partners to meet today’s many complex
scourge of piracy on their own over the long term.
challenges. Undoubtedly, partnerships are key in tur-
The fact that African navies “have taken first steps to
bulent times, and strengthened cooperation between
develop a naval component to the African Standby
NATO and the African Union can only be a win-win
Force” is a step toward the right direction while
situation.
NATO and its African partners should step up these efforts. In parallel, the Organization should examine
About the author
the possibility of renewing the mandate of Operation
Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga currently works at the
Ocean Shield and expanding its geographical scope.
European Parliament. She holds a Master’s degree
Finally, it has to be highlighted that it is imper-
from Stanford University’s Center for Russian, East
ative for NATO to cooperate with other actors cur-
European and Eurasian Studies. She has worked at the
rently involved in Africa, particularly the European
Cooperation and Regional Security Division of
Union (EU). In an era of strained defense budgets and
NATO’s International Military Staff.
complex security threats, a concerted effort is required to tackle security challenges more efficiently while avoiding duplication. Conclusions NATO has been cultivating its relations with African states for some time and has been making considerable contributions to peace and security on the continent. Security threats stemming from Africa will continue to threaten the security of NATO members and as such, the need for NATO’s involvement in the region will persist. As it was already discussed, the likelihood that Allies will opt for a more ambitious approach toward Africa is minimal; they will
Bibliography 1 NATO, Strategic Concept, 2010, http://www.nato.int/strategic concept/ pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf. Nicole Ameline, “A Crescent of crisis on Europe’ s doorstep: A new North/ South Strategic Partnership for the Sahel,” NATO PA draft special report, 10 April 2013,http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=3168, 3. 2 NATO, Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002, http:// www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm, 09 April 2013, http:// www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-libya-arms-unidUSBRE93814Y20130409. 3 Michelle Nichols, “Libya arms fueling conflicts in Syria, Mali, and beyond: U.N. experts,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-libyaarms-un-idUSBRE93814Y20130409. 4 Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, “Building an AU-NATO partnership for the 21st Century” in AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, ed. Brooke A. Smith-Windsor (Rome:NATO Defense College,2013) http:// www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=491, 24. 5 NATO, NATO assistance to the African Union, http://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natolive/topics_8191.htm. 6 NATO, Chicago Summit Declaration, 20 May 2012, http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm. 7. NATO, NATO assistance to the African Union, http://www.nato.int/ cps/en/natolive/topics_8191.htm.
rather continue pursuing a low-key, and above all,
8. NATO, Of bagpipes and capacity-building in Africa, 25 March 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-24A5D1AD-90ACD073/natolive/ news_71790.htm?selectedLocale=en.
pragmatic approach informed by political considera-
9. Smith-Windsor, “Building an AU-NATO partnership for the 21st Century,” 20.
tions and resource restrictions. By focusing on capaci-
10. Adesoji Adeniyi, “Paternalism or Partnership?The AU-NATO relationship and the Libyan Crisis:Implications for Security Governance in Africa” in AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, ed. Brooke A. SmithWindsor (Rome:NATO Defense College,2013) http:// www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php?icode=491, 125.
ty building of its African partners, the Alliance empowers African states to manage and address their security challenges and contribute to regional security. Definitely, enabling the African states to take ownership of their challenges and strengthening their defense capabilities to tackle them also advances NATO security interests. This approach is in line with NATO’s doctrinal foundations that dictate coopAtlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 8
11. Kumbirai Hodzi, “Forging and Charting a Judicious and Realistic Partnership: Rethinking the Interfaces,” in AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, ed. Brooke A. Smith-Windsor (Rome:NATO Defense College,2013) http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/current_news.php? icode=491, 94. 12. Florence Gaub, “Against all odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA region,” Strategic Studies Institute, 2012, http:// www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1112.pdf, ix. 13. Lesley Anne Warner, “Advancing Peace and Security in Africa” in Top five reasons why Africa should be a priority for the United States, ed. John Banks et al., Brookings, March 2013,http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ Research/Files/Reports/2013/04/africa%20priority%20united% 20states/04_africa_priority_united_states.pdf, 4. 14. Eva Strickmann, “EU and NATO Efforts to counter piracy off Somalia: A drop in the Ocean?,” ISIS Europe, 2009, http://www.esdpmap.org/ pdf/2009_artrel_332_esr46-eu-nato-counterpiracy.pdf, 4.
15
ATA Programs From 1-8 August, the Portuguese Atlantic Committee held the 18th Annual Portuguese Atlantic Youth Seminar in Lisbon,
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
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professionals from across the Alliance to participate in a range of
governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global
lectures, workshops and debates about the future of the Alliance.
networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with
From 6-7 September, the Latvian Transatlantic Organiza-
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tion (LATO) is hosting
the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,
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Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37
tional renowned “Riga
countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,
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include to the successor generation in our work.
will
feature
statesmen and interna-
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From 5-11 July, the Danish Atlantic Treaty Association (DATA) hosted the 28th annual Danish Atlantic Youth Seminar
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