ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Volume 4- Issue 1 January 2014
Afghanistan Post 2014 Lessons Learned and What to Expect In this edition of the Atlantic Voices, we focus on the dilemmas and opportunities forcing the Allied partners after their withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and we also present, an overview of the ATA, NATO Post 2014 Conference held in Brussels, December 11-13, 2013. The harmonization of the regions bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan is and will remain a major dilemma for the future stability of the region. Pakistan’s involvement will remain detrimental but in order to avoid a backfire of its historical strategy towards Afghanistan, the government is currently negotiating with different factions operating in its territory. These initiatives portray the significant
The flags of Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Photo: The Express Tribune)
role of states neighbouring Afghanistan and their
Contents:
future collaboration, when the Allied forces will exit
Lessons Learned in NATO – A Way Towards Smart Defence
the region.
Philip Chr. Ulrich discusses the importance of Lessons Learned from the mis-
At the same time the Alliance focuses on the
sion in Afghanistan on future NATO operations.
adoption of a holistic approach, to better facilitative
Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Depth’ Towards Afghanistan: Shifting or Not?
lessons learned initiatives after the end of the mis-
Areva Paronjana offers her analysis regarding the role of Pakistan to Afghanistan’s internal stability after the official withdrawal of NATO troops from the area.
sion. Gathering lessons learned from the ISAF mission is on the top of NATO’s agenda and constitutes a valuable tool for the implementation of Smart
Report from the General Rapporteur, NATO Post 2014, December 11 -13, 2013
Defence initiatives.
Andreas Stradis presents an overview of what was discussed during the ATA’s
-
Klaudia Tani Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
NATO Post 2014 Conference. 1
Lessons Learned in NATO – A Way Towards Smart Defence bilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts bet-
By Philip Chr. Ulrich
T
ter.” he member nations of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) are currently going through a drawdown period, in more
A way of achieving this desired cooperation and sharing of capabilities is to focus on lessons learned. Lessons Learned
than one sense.
The Alliance is withdrawing after more than ten years of operations in Afghanistan. This significant event marks the end of the most demanding operation ever
Each organization, either military or civilian, analyzes its experiences and tries to learn from them. A lesson learned is the result of a thorough analy-
conducted by the Alliance and its
sis of observations made
partners. At the same time, aus-
during various stages of
terity also portrays a significant
engagement. In the mili-
challenge.
budgets
tary, observations can be
across the alliance are being cut,
collected from training,
and new strategies are been de-
exercises and operations.
veloped to fulfill the needs of the
These observations are then
member states, while at the same
analyzed within the national
time satisfying national demands.
systems, and results in a
Defence
For this purpose, the Alliance and its individual members need
NATO naval exercise (Photo: NATO)
to think smart. The member states of the Alliance have agreed on
remedial action, which either changes procedures in
case the procedure is found wanting, or to institutionalize a so called “Best Practice”.
the concept of Smart Defence at the May 2012 Chicago
In the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for the Con-
Summit. NATO defines Smart Defence as a: “new way
duct of Operations, the purpose and relevance of Les-
of thinking about generating the modern defence capa-
sons Learned is explained as follows: “The purpose of a
bilities the Alliance needs for the coming decade and
lessons learned procedure is to learn efficiently from
beyond. It is a renewed culture of cooperation that en-
experience and to provide validated justifications for
courages Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring
amending the existing way of doing things, in order to
and maintaining military capabilities to undertake the
improve performance, both during the course of an op-
Alliance’s essential core tasks agreed in the new NATO
eration and for subsequent operations. This requires
strategic concept. That means pooling and sharing capa-
lessons to be meaningful and for them to be brought to
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
2
the attention of the appropriate authority able and responsi-
In order for lessons learned to be drawn from the
ble for dealing with them. It also requires the chain of com-
ISAF mission and those to remain relevant, the outcomes
mand to have a clear understanding of how to prioritize les-
need to be inclusive of different aspects of theater opera-
sons and how to staff them.”
tions. It is not enough to focus on tactical lessons, taken
Such processes are important in order to facilitate change or institutionalization of Best Practices within organizations. However, the process of potentially analyzing one’s own mistakes and thereby drawing attention to them, is very difficult, both in civilian and military settings.
from combat operations. Although such lessons are important, the Alliance needs to focus on the full-spectrum of operations conducted as part of the ISAF mission, as well as from all levels of operations, from tactical to strategic. Such lessons can be both a national but also from the Alliance’s point of view. According to the afore-
In many NATO countries this is changing. Lessons Learned is receiving increased attention, reflecting an increased appreciation of the
It is clear that the contribution of lessons learned from individual states portrays a significant step towards cooperation and information sharing.
mentioned, the lessons gathered from the ISAF mission will become a necessary a tool for future NATO operations.
value of, for example, operational experiences in Afghanistan.
It is clear that the contribution of lessons learned from individual states portrays a significant step towards
Afghanistan – A Major Lessons Learned Challenge
cooperation and information sharing. If a nation such as Great Britain or Denmark collect observations from their
Following more than a decade of operations in Afghanistan, the Alliance has gained many valuable lessons. It can learn from stability operations, combat operations, international headquarters, and civil-military cooperation, just to name a few. The mission in Afghanistan has required massive resources from the participating nations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As an alliance therefore, NATO has to focus intensely on securing lessons learned from the mission in Afghanistan. The mission in Afghanistan can secure valuable lessons for NATO and its future operations, within the framework of this large multinational coalition. Such lessons will be of outmost importance to both NATO as an alliance, as well as the individual member states. The reason for this is that with budgetary cut downs being experienced at the moment across all member states, what is ensured without question is that future missions have to be conducted within a cooperative framework. This will be discussed in more detail, later in this article.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
operations in Afghanistan, and keep the results of subsequent analysis to themselves, this will be of little value to the Alliance. Therefore, lessons learned efforts must not be limited to national tactical observations, but expanded to include observations relevant to the Alliance from all levels of operation. Therefore, analysis of observations must be related to the functioning of the Alliance during the ISAF mission. It is also important that the individual nations focus their lessons learned efforts on how themselves functioned as part of the Alliance, rather than focus primarily on observations with immediate tactical relevance to them. If NATO is to remain relevant in the future, the member states need to ensure that lessons about operating in a multinational context are secured. Just as it is relevant for the Alliance to secure observations on how to conduct its operations in Afghanistan. Consequently, relevance of such lessons is not limited to the ISAF mission; the mission to Libya with Operation Unified Protector, as well as the involvement of the Alliance in the Gulf of Aden with Opera3
For this reason, it is important that the increasing focus on Lessons Learned in the individual member states continue to secure such important tools which can help secure the relevance and development of the
ance, the Alliance in itself may maintain full-spectrum capabilities making it possible for each member nation to conduct budgetary cuts while still being able to operate internationally. Such a shift in thinking may be a long way off;
Alliance. Furthermore, as many of the observations, relevant to the NATO Alliance are unlikely to have the same immediate effect on a member state, for
however, the process must be initiated in order for NATO to remain a valued actor for international missions.
Counter-
Therefore, if
Improvised Explosive De-
NATO can draw val-
vice (C-IED) related obser-
uable lessons from
vations. The C-IED
was
the mission in Af-
created with the aim of
ghanistan, which will
protecting troops, from
assist in incorporat-
different explosive devices
ing procedures or
when conducting opera-
capabilities which can
tions. The use of this tool
increase the effec-
example the
has nowadays expanded its
Afghan boy giving water to soldier (Photo: NATO)
tiveness
and
rele-
vance of the Alliance,
scope. Therefore, the focus must be expanded towards how the member states
it will be a major success. This does, however, depend on
act in the context of an international alliance and how
the member states cooperating and committing resources
they use lessons learned.
to such efforts.
Another challenge that the Alliance faces is the unwillingness of the United States to commit to major military operations, as it has been seen with operations in, for example, Libya and Mali. In this new situation, the relevance of NATO has increased. As the United States is unlikely to lead another “coalition of the willing� in the immediate future, and no European nation is able to carry such a burden alone, NATO is a very likely arena for future cooperation with the aim of conducting international operations. For this reason, the concept of Smart Defence is important. It will be difficult for each member to maintain a full-spectrum capabilities in an age of austerity. However, if the individual states begin to think
Effective Lessons Learned Can Contribute To An Effective Way Ahead The ISAF mission in Afghanistan has been a demanding mission for the Alliance. As the number of troops of members and partners shrinks, it is important that NATO draws lessons from theater operations. The challenge with Lessons Learned from Afghanistan is the importance of not only limiting the scope of analysis to observations that are immediately relevant to individual member nations, but also include observations relevant to the Alliance as a whole. The major ongoing budgetary cuts that made within the member states, on both sides of the Atlantic, mean that the Alliance is as relevant as ever.
more in terms of being an integral part of the Alli-
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
4
In order to increase the relevance and durability of NATO, member states must begin to think not only as individual
About the author
nations, but also as being integral parts of the Alliance. For this
Philip Chr. Ulrich holds an M.A. in American Studies
purpose, Smart Defence is a very relevant concept.
from the University of Southern Denmark graduating in May
Many focus on the procurement aspect of the concept of
2012. He analyzes American foreign and defence policy for
Smart Defence. The relevance of Smart Defence is not, however,
the Danish website Kongressen.com. He has previously
limited to procurement. The mindset that is behind Smart De-
worked as head of section at
fence is equally relevant in regards
the Royal Danish Defence Col-
to lessons learned. Each nation must
lege, where he published sev-
begin to think in a more interna-
eral briefs on US defence and
tional context and not limit the col-
foreign policy. He has also had
lection of observations and subse-
an internship at the Lessons
quent dissemination of valuable les-
Learned / Development Sec-
sons learned to its own national mil-
tion at the Civil-Military Co-
itary system. By ensuring a wider
operation Centre of Excellence
dissemination of Lessons Learned among allies and partners, the Alli-
in Enschede, the Netherlands. Member nations discussing amongst themselves at NATO HQ. (Photo:
ance can better prepare for future
NATO)
challenges. If NATO has to reestablish valuable lessons for each new
Bibliography 1.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Smart Defence, URL: http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/78125.htm
2.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Agency: “Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations“ (AJP-3(B)), March 2011, 4-19.
mission, this means a reduced efficiency, compared to a more thorough dissemination of lessons learned; before, during and after training, exercises and missions. Each member nation has valuable insights and gains Lessons Learned, relevant to allies and partners. However, as these insights and lessons learned are currently kept behind closed curtains, they do not become known to relevant parties that will be involved in future missions. If a wider dissemination of lessons learned is pursued, allies and partners can learn from each other. Efficiency is ensured and the response time needed to take action shrinks Therefore, more focus on lessons learned and wider dissemination of such important insights, can help the Alliance in its efforts towards Smart Defence. It can save resources in preparing and conducting missions, in which the Alliance will participate in the future.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
5
Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Depth’ Towards Afghanistan: Shifting Or Not? By Areva Paronjana
its arguably most important neighbour - Pakistan, and
T
its implications for Afghanistan’s peace process.
he end of 2014 will be significant, both to the International
Security
Assistance
Force
(ISAF) and Afghanistan with the end of com-
Looming Post-2014 Afghanistan: A Backgrounder
bat operations and the phased
There is still no clarity on
withdrawal of NATO forces. A
whether the ISAF mission in Af-
force level estimated between
ghanistan has been a success or a
6000-20000 will remain on the
failure. NATO would argue that
ground in the form of the Resolute
despite setbacks and initial strate-
Support Mission, the main purpose
gic miscalculations, the mission has
of which will be to train, advise
largely been a success. They would
and assist Afghan National Securi-
support their argument with facts
ty Forces (ANSF). At the time of
that the Taliban have been re-
writing, the Bilateral Security
moved from power in Afghanistan,
Agreement (BSA), which would authorise a U.S. military presence
Afghanistan Pakistan borders (Photo: The Economist)
after the 2014 transition and specify the exact number of troops, has not yet been signed. The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan is still being debated and will be in the months to come, likewise the nature of these debates will be largely influenced by developments in Afghanistan. The path of Afghanistan’s future development depends on many variables, of which the most important are: the outcome of the 2014 presidential election, the readiness of ANSF to completely overtake security from ISAF, and the international community’s ability to assist ANSF when and where needed. This article will address another important aspect of the future of Afghanistan – changing attitude and behaviour of
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
ANSF is building up in numbers as well as capacity and women's
rights have improved dramatically, with women having gained constitutional guarantees, institutional equality and protection, and rights for education. They would be right - hand over of military facilities from coalition forces to ANSF began already in 2011 and as of the first quarter of 2013, ANSF is in charge of the majority of military facilities. The Taliban, although retaining influence in territory to the south and east, have not been able to seize political control of a province or city, furthermore the casualty rates among coalition forces have dropped steadily after reaching its peak in the Summer 2010 from 711 to 144 casualties at the time of writing.
6
No doubt also, women's rights have improved tre-
Pakistan to create and maintain a regional military power bal-
mendously and cannot be even compared to Taliban rule
ance in favour of Pakistan and against its principal rival India,
with the current constitution guaranteeing 64 women
by gaining strategic influence over Afghanistan. What
seats in the Lower House of the National Assembly. How-
‘strategic depth’ policy has created, however, is increased ex-
ever, all this should not come as a surprise considering
tremism and instability in the region that has spiraled out of
financial and human resources that the international com-
Pakistan’s control.
munity has pumped into Afghanistan. Interestingly enough, all of these arguments work the same way for ones claiming there has been little success in improving and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan: the Taliban is still present
Pakistan’s military started implementing ‘strategic depth’ over Afghanistan, as a result of its defeat in the 1971
‘Strategic depth’ is a series of military reforms adopted by Pakistan to create and maintain a regional military power balance in favour of Pakistan and against its principal rival India, by gaining strategic influence over Afghanistan.
Indo-Pakistan war after which India emerged as a regional power and Pakistan was forced to search for the ways to regain its influence in the region. Pakistan’s ‘strategic
in Afghanistan. Instead of fully eradicating the Taliban
depth’ can be described through its willingness to get control
from Afghanistan, there are now talks of inclusive political
over trading routes to Central Asia, which would mean a fa-
settlement with the Taliban.
vourable strategic position in comparison with India. In order
During the last three decades, Pakistan has been a spoiler to Afghanistan’s development and stability. In order to defend its perceived national interests in the context of complicated and ever changing regional power balance and instability, Pakistan has systematically weakened Afghanistan to gain power in the region and get an upper hand in its relations with India – Pakistan’s longtime rival. It is because of Pakistan’s historically intrusive role in Afghanistan that Pakistan’s role is of a great significance to a post-2014 Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Historic Role In Afghanistan Afghanistan and Pakistan share a very sensitive and disputed border, the Durand line, which divides the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is exactly because of the fluid nature of the Durand line and cross border insurgency, that Pakistan is one of the most important actors in
to achieve this, Pakistan intended “to turn Afghanistan into a vassal country by playing on the Pashtun ethnic group and on fundamentalism”. It found the way to exercise its ‘strategic depth’ via the use of proxy groups, heavily increasing the role of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) which provided assistance for Afghan mujahedeen’s in their fight against Soviet forces. This process led to the accommodation of fundamentalists within Pakistan’s borders. Two years after Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, the various mujahedeen groups were driven by infighting, this provided the perfect conditions for the Taliban and other Islamic fundamentalist groups to cross the Af/Pak border and seize the country by force. In the beginning, Pakistan was the country that supported the Taliban both diplomatically and financially as a stabilizing force, in addition to harbouring Osama bin Laden himself.
assuring security and stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan is
Madrasas have had an important role in the evolution of
known for implementing the ‘strategic depth’ concept in
Afghan Taliban by recruiting, educating and training the Tali-
relation to Afghanistan for the last three decades.
ban. Historically, madrasas have mainly been situated on the
‘Strategic depth’ is a series of military reforms adopted by
Pakistan side of the Durand Line, recruiting mostly refugees
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
7
escaping to Pakistan from post-Soviet Pashtun areas of
Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ And Its Implications
Afghanistan. Madrasas provided a special curriculum of
For Afghanistan
ideological indoctrination meant to create a mindset of jihad in the refugees from Afghanistan. Currently madrasas in Pakistan produce around 250 000 students and potential recruits for the Taliban annually. It is also argued that Pakistan not only helped in recruiting madrasa students into the Taliban, but as well was active in providing support.
In spite of the long established and deep-rooted ‘strategic depth’ approach towards Afghanistan, there are signs of a ‘strategic shift’ taking place. In his Independence Day’s speech on August 14, 2012, Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani stressed that domestic extremism and terrorism are now posing threats to Pakistan, and that the war against extremism
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan
and terrorism is not only the army’s war, but that of the
under the pressure of the U.S. officially withdrew its
whole nation. In the immediate aftermath of the state-
diplomatic recognition of
ment, a number of other Paki-
the Taliban. Islamabad allied
stani officials have supported
with the U.S., receiving
the argument, claiming that its
billions in aid. Its decade’s
interests lay within a stable,
long mentality of ‘strategic
peaceful, sovereign and inde-
depth’, however, proved
pendent Afghanistan.
not to be so easy to over-
Other important signs
come. In reality, Pakistan
indicating a shift in Pakistan’s
retained ties with the Taliban insurgency. Pakistani
policy Former Taliban Fighter (Photo: The Voice of America)
President Musharraf’s compliance with the U.S. demands came as a surprise to certain levels of Pakistan’s Army and the ISI that although accepting an official country’s stance, kept supporting Taliban.
towards
Afghanistan
have more to do with actions
rather than rhetoric. At the beginning of the idea of Afghanistan’s reconciliation with the Taliban, Pakistan offered its Afghan Islamist ally Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hizb-e-Islami, to consider joining Karzai’s government. This move itself represents a shift in policy
Hence, while Pakistan was indecisive upon its
from setting Afghan Taliban against Karzai’s government
further course, Islamic fundamentalist groups in Paki-
to try achieving reconciliation. On the other hand, there
stan were transforming and regrouping. Continued in-
has recently been a release of some mid-level Taliban
decisiveness led to the situation where upon the agree-
prisoners to participate in Afghanistan reconciliation
ment that Islamist insurgence in Afghanistan would not
talks and calls for them to sincerely negotiate.
harm Pakistan’s national interests, their activities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Eastern regions were being tolerated and that allowed Islamic militancy to blossom, despite Pakistan’s official decision to fight it.
It seems that what should have been Pakistan’s official stance on Afghanistan right after 9/11 when allying with the U.S., could only now start becoming real and genuine. With the 2014 withdrawal Pakistan seems to be realizing that its ‘strategic depth’ policies towards Afghanistan have the potential to erupt. Accommodat-
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
8
ing, training and funding Afghan Islamic fundamentalists
Another argument suggesting that Pakistan is in-
have, as a result, radicalized certain Pakistani factions.
sincere about its strategic shift is Pakistan’s reluctance in
With the uncertainty of post-2014 on the way, Pakistan
fighting Afghan Taliban sanctuaries along the Durand
fears its national interests to be under threat by its own
line that have caused so much violence and instability.
fundamentalist groups coupled with possible chaos and a
Both of these arguments contradict Pakistan’s ‘strategic
probable intrastate conflict. An increasing number of
shift’, and can only be explained as deliberate rather
Taliban attacks that are resulting in army and civilian
than sporadic policy choices that are part of an inten-
casualties are forcing Pakistan to rethink its ties with the
tional and well planned strategy. Pakistan is reluctant to
Taliban. For the Pakistani government, Pakistan’s semi-
accept a U.S. central role in Afghanistan. There are also discrepancies between Paki-
autonomous Federally Administered
Tribal
Areas
(FATA) and their bordering provinces, being a safe ha-
Pakistan is and will remain one of Afghanistan’s most influential neighbours, regardless whether the ‘strategic shift’ is real and sincere or not.
stan’s and the U.S.’s view on the future of reconciliation. Pakistan supports an equal role
ven for the Taliban, have
of the Taliban in the peace
become a threat to security of the country.
talks while the U.S. accepts merely giving the Taliban a voice, but refusing them the
There is a fear that Afghanistan may break down and descend into chaos where Pakistan will experience more negative consequences. For the current government, unrest and instability along the Durand line and
unconditional and equal support over other stakeholders in the negotiations. In addition to all that, there is also a deep-rooted mistrust between Pakistan and the U.S. despite them being allies in the War on Terror.
its bordering provinces might lead to an ideological unification of the Pakistani Taliban’s with the Afghan Taliban where the Pakistani Taliban take advantage of their ability to hide-out in Afghan border areas.
Protecting Afghan Taliban sanctuaries is also a calculated policy choice stemming from their linkage to Pakistan’s domestic militancy that threatens Pakistan’s government. There is a widespread approach across Pa-
While there are signs of Pakistan’s strategic shift towards Afghanistan, there has been voiced scepticism
kistan’s government and army that unless Afghan Taliban is provoked they wouldn’t harm the Pakistani state.
and speculation that this shift is not being sincere and real, that “we have seen this before” and that in reality,
Pakistan is and will remain one of Afghanistan’s
although with slight changes in rhetoric, Pakistan is still
most influential neighbours, regardless whether the
implementing ‘strategic depth’, towards Afghanistan.
‘strategic shift’ is real and sincere or not. If the former is
The main argument for this is that, despite supporting
true, it means misery and despair for both Afghanistan
the idea of an inclusive reconciliation process and free-
and Pakistan - to Afghanistan, because after the with-
ing Taliban prisoners, for them to be able to take part in
drawal of ISAF, having only fragile ANSF to trust in it
peace talks, Pakistan overall seems to be reluctant to
would find the outcomes of Pakistan’s destructive poli-
proactively support such inclusive talks. Quite on the
cies ever harder to fight, and to Pakistan, because by
contrary – there have been reports of Pakistan trying to
continuing its ‘strategic depth’ policies, it would further
undermine other stakeholders’ than Taliban to establish
threaten the stability of its own government and push
contact with them.
Pakistan into deeper fundamentalism and fragmentation.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
9
If the latter proves to be true and Pakistan is indeed sincere in its shifting strategy towards Afghanistan, it is a win -win situation. By dealing with numerous problems and challenges after post-2014, it would be an invaluable relief for Afghanistan to worry less about the destabilizing effect of its neighbor’s actions. Pakistan on its part would gain more control over the security situation in its country by actually working on it. In the long run it might also mean a stable and trustworthy neighbor at its border – that is only if the ‘strategic shift’ is sincere.
About the author Areva Paronjana currently works for the Security & Defence Agenda, Brussels-based think tank. She has previously been a Head of Research Department at Model NATO Youth Summit. Paronjana holds an MSc in Development and International Relations from Aalborg University in Denmark and dedicated her dissertation to the analysis of the causes of the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan after 2001. Bibliography
General Rapporteur Report—NATO Post 2014 Conference By Andreas Stradis
I
t falls to me to give some closing remarks after such a wide-ranging and rich programme over the past three days here in Brussels. This is my first General Assem-
bly, and I have been very impressed, as doubtless you have been, by the quality of the speeches and subsequent debate. Monday saw the parallel running of the ATA and YATA Council meetings, before turning to current issues such as Counter Terrorism after the elections. Yesterday, the ATA and YATA assemblies merged, so as to bring young voices into the fold as debate ranged across topics such as NATO and EU cooperation, the future of NATO, and the consideration of operations after ISAF. Today, we
Loyn David, “Afghan National Army counts cost of war.” http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22886263, BBC News, 14 June 2013
have broached the Transatlantic Bond in its broadest sense,
Roy Olivier, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?”, In Maley, William (ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. New York: New York University Press, 1998. p. 210.
trade and investment potential, as well as the possibilities
3.
Akhtar, Nasreen, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban.” International Journal on the World Peace, Vol. 25., Nr. 4., 2008, p. 49.
What the shape of the programme and the paths of
4.
Markey S. Daniel, “A Pakistani Strategic Shift?” Council on Foreign Relations, 13 March 2013
5.
Yusuf Moeed, “Decoding Pakistan’s ‘strategic shift’ in Afghanistan.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013
1.
2.
6.
Khan Raza, “Shift in Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan.” Global Politician, 5 June 2010
7.
Ahmad Javid and Daniel Twinning, “Has Pakistan’s Afghan policy really shifted?” http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2012/12/21/has_pakistan_s_afghan_policy_really_shifted_0, Foreign Policy, 21 December 2012
8.
9. 10.
Siddique Quandeel, “Pakistan’s future policy towards Afghanistan: a look at strategic depth, militant movements and the role of India and the U.S.” Danish Institute of International Studies, Report 2011:08 Gross Eva, “Afghanistan: enter 2014.” European Union Institute for Security Studies, Issue alert, July 2013 Ul Haque Raheem, “Strategic depth: does it promote Pakistan’s strategic interests?”http://www.academia.edu/978181/ _Strategic_Depth_Does_It_Promote_Pakistans_Strategic_Interests, Academia.edu.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
going beyond mere defence capabilities and exploring for enhancing the bond in the future.
discussion over the past three days seem to me to reflect is a gradual yet fundamental change in emphasis in the NATO alliance. In the absence of the Cold War that defined the alliance up to 1989 and as we approach the close of NATO’s definitional war in Afghanistan next year, this new emphasis will be more political. Over 150 years ago, Carl von Clausewitz told us that war is the extension of politics by other means; therefore as the prospect of war – or at least major conventional war – recedes for NATO post-2014, we can expect to be faced with challenges that involve the political dimension more heavily than before. Furthermore, in an era not only of economic austerity but also of reduced political will for kinetic solutions, NATO will have to look further forward and evolve more preventative strategies to implement ‘up-stream’, ahead of time
10
and trouble in order to meet its security obligations. In this sense, Françis Fukuyama could not have been more wrong when he heralded the ‘End of History’ along with the end of the Cold War. Far from facing an existential crisis, NATO’s history is still very much being written, and will continue to be so over the coming years. The increasingly multipolar geopolitical landscape, with the rise of China, India and South America, to name but three states hitherto not counted amongst
General Sir Rupert Smith has said, ‘among the people’, and NATO must be wary of becoming apathetic to actively anticipating and countering these risks, or ‘potential threats’, in the post-Afghanistan environment. As we have heard consistently, we must work to improve interoperability and military cooperation. We must strengthen and expand our capabilities, especially in non-conventional areas, yet retain breadth across the
the world’s ‘great powers’, will put renewed emphasis on the
Alliance by pooling or clustering our resources along
importance of the Transatlantic Bond. Whilst conventional inter
the lines of Smart Defence. Finally, our partnerships
-state war may not be on the horizon, conventional inter-state politics with these rising powers is. As the relative power of the US and Europe declines on this crowded new world stage, our
will become increasingly important in a world where NATO can no longer afford – in more than one sense – to go it alone.
alliance to some extent mitigates against our decline, and pro-
Sun Tzu wrote that the most successful battles
vides us with a solid platform from which to set the tone in
are the ones that are never even fought. So in NATO’s
world affairs. Should NATO fail to assert itself in a cohesive
new anticipatory phase, this is the gold standard that the
manner post-2014, it risks allowing others to set the tone on its
Alliance should aim for. It is also the standard of excel-
behalf.
lence that our publics will expect of NATO, given the We heard yesterday that 2014 is a ‘strategic inflection
reduced appeal of kinetic responses like Afghanistan that
point’. This is because we are now moving into the next ‘phase’
have cost so much blood and treasure in the last twelve
of the NATO alliance after 65 years.
years. Yet in shying away from a heavy military foot-
The first phase was one of Collective Defence, centered on the deterrence of the Soviet bloc. Since 1994, NATO entered its second operational’ phase, beginning with the Banja Luka incident in the Bosnian War. The third phase is now upon us, one that I call the ‘anticipatory’ phase. Why anticipatory? Ulrich
print, NATO must be careful to keep its members and its publics abreast of the new evolutions of security challenges in the post-2014 era. It must identify and meet these challenges early, before they degenerate into widespread violence.
Beck observed that we live in a risk society, one in which anxie-
Looking around the room today, it is of course
ties over terrorism, failed-states or economic decline affect wide
fora such as these which form that first crucial step in
swathes of the population. ‘Our sense of ‘security’ today con-
bridging the gap between NATO and the wider public,
cerns the mitigation of these risks as much as it does the countering of conventional (and these days quite theoretical) ‘threats’. Thus in this anticipatory phase, it will increasingly fall to NATO to concern itself with risk. Thus the security issues of the future will be characterized by their hybridity. They will combine military and political ele-
between the leaders of today and the aspirations of tomorrow’s generation. Let me finish by thanking Giuseppe, Jason, and the rest of the conference team for all their efforts in putting together such a thorough, seamless and engaging three days, and please join me in thanking them along with all those who participated.
ments, whether by coincidence or by design, as globalization continues to interweave and complicate the relationships between individuals, communities and governments, across continents and at lightening speed. The ‘wars’ of the future will be, as
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 1
11
ATA Programs On December 20, 2013, the Atlantic Council of Albania organized its 16th Annual International Conference entitled
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
"For a greater role of the
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-
Balkan countries in interna-
governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global
tional security”, at Hotel
networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and
Mondial, Tirana. The aim
security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with
of the Conference is to raise
academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes
awareness regarding differ-
the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,
ent aspects concerning the Balkan countries and fuel debate
Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37
amongst it members.
countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,
From 3-4 February, Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite (Norwegian Atlantic Committee) will be hosting the Leagkollen
the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially include to the successor generation in our work.
Conference. This years 49th annual security conference will be
Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and
focusing on “The Rise of East Asia: Implications for Great Pow-
understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security
er Relations and the Transatlantic Relationship”.
through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern
The Atlantic Treaty Association secretariat will be host-
European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.
ing the annual reception organized by the Inter-institutional
In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
Liaison sub-Committee of the European Commission (EC),
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
which will be held 18th February at the Club Prince Albert.
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This networking event has the aim to bring together the EC’s stagiaires and representatives from international organizations. Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch. We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your work please see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below. Editor: Klaudia Tani Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.
the establishment of new and competitive programs on international security issues.
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the development of research initiatives and security-related events for its members.
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the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia. The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy
activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.
This publication is co co--sponsored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization