Th e Schlachtschiff VII

dation for new, broader slipways. Within a year and at a great expense, new workshops and two 265 m long and 35 m wide slipways of reinforced concrete (Battleship slipway No I and No II) were constructed. Th e territory of the shipyard reached 127,000 square meters in 1912, including the new embankments. It was evident too, that the capacity of Danubius’s machine shop in Budapest263 was not suffi cient for such a great order. In 1911, the Hitelbank initiated the fusion of the Danubius and the Ganz és Tsa Gépgyár (Ganz and Co. Machine Factory) under the name of Ganz és Tsa. Danubius Hajó-, Waggon- és Gépgyár (Ganz and Co. Danubius Shipyard, Railway Wagon and Machine Factory). Th is fusion created Hungary’s largest industrial complex.

After the fusion the so-called Naval Machinery Department in Budapest switched over to autonomous machinery design instead of merely copying the plans of the Navy. To help that, the shipyard bought some licenses from Great Britain and Germany.264 Th e most important of them, the license of German AEG turbines was bought in October 1909.265 Beside these the Danubius had for a long time possessed the license to manufacture Babcock-Wilcox boilers.

On 13 December 1910, the MTK inspected the Danubius yard. Th e report of the MTK stated that the great slipways for battleships would be completed only in the spring of 1912. Considering that and the unprepared state of the Danubius, they stated that the building time of the battleship would be 42 months rather than 30 months prescribed by the Navy.266 In fact, the total building time of the battleship Szent István from signing the contract to the commissioning reached 55 months.

Beside the one battleship the Navy ordered from the Ganz and Co. Danubius two of the three 3,500 ton scout cruisers of the 1911 program, the H and the I which were later named Helgoland and Novara. According to the agreement of January 1911 all the six 800 ton destroyers (Tátra class) were ordered from the Danubius. Th ese were the fi rst ships not only built, but designed by the Hungarian shipyard. Originally all the 250 ton torpedo boats were to be ordered from the Austrian industry. Th e Navy increased the number of the boats from twelve to twenty-seven in February 1913. In the same year the Navy ordered sixteen torpedo boats from the Danubius, partly as a compensation for the Hungarian industry because the submarines intended for Hungary were ordered in Germany. Th e total worth of these orders excluding the battleship was 41.1 million Kronen. Th is sum alone was more than twice the total worth of the Navy’s orders given to Danubius between 1906 and 1910 (18.1 million Kronen).267 After the fusion of the Danubius with the Ganz and Co. in 1911, the annual reports of the Ganz stated that the shipbuilding branch was loss-making while the published production data were false. Most probably this served to conceal the huge profi t of the warship building.268

Th e Schlachtschiff VII When Korvettenkapitän Alfred von Koudelka, the secretary of the Marinekommandant, Admiral Montecuccoli, negotiated in November 1906 with members of the Hungarian government on the future dreadnoughts in Budapest, Commerce minister Ferenc Kossuth made clear that Hungary would assent to future dreadnought construction only if one third of the costs would be spent in Hungary and one of the battleships would be built by the Danubius Shipyard. Hearing this news Montecuccoli allegedly cried out in his hotel room: “Th at ship will be never completed!”269 Th e prophecy of Montecuccoli almost came true, but at last she was completed well past the deadline.

To come to terms with Hungarian politics was a long process. Th e Navy had certain worries in connection with the quality of the Hungarian built ships, but the Hungarian dreadnought was a question of politics: she was the sine qua non of Hungary’s vote for the whole class. Th e negotiations between the Navy, the Hungarian government and the Danubius Shipyard started in 1909 and lasted until the end of 1910. Th e Navy in July 1909 agreed with the Hungarian government on the principles: in exchange of voting the dreadnoughts and developing the Danubius at public expense, 50 percent of the orders for new vessels including one of the four battleships would go to Danubius.270

Once the Hungarian political crisis was past the Austrian and Hungarian delegations voted the 312 million Kronen extraordinary credit for the Navy in February and March 1911. After the vote of the delegations, the Navy fi nally could legally

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36 Th e Ganz and Co. Danubius design for Schlachtschiff VII from 1912

and offi cially sign the contract with the STT and the Danubius on the four battleships and on the other ships of the 1911 program.

Th e fourth member of the class of 20,000 ton battleships, Schlachtschiff VII, was intended to be built in the Hungarian shipyard. On 6March 1911, the Navy asked the Danubius if they could build a battleship on the plans of the STT but with diff erent machinery. A few weeks later, on 20 April 1911 the Navy and the Danubius signed the contract on the Schlachtschiff VII. Th e contract price of the hull was 14.5 million Kronen and of the machinery was 6.6 million Kronen. Th e time limit of the delivery was 10 July 1914.271 Th e price of the complete battleship including armor, guns and ammunition was 60.6 million Kronen.

Originally the Schlachtschiff VII would have differed from her sisters in machinery only. Th e Danubius built the ship with Babcock-Wilcox boilers instead of Yarrow boilers and with AEG-turbines instead of Parsons-turbines. Th e Hungarian ship had only two screws, while the Austrian built ones had four. Th e Danubius argued that the twin screw arrangement would make the ship more maneuverable.272 Otherwise each of the four ships had two sets of two-stage (high pressure and low pressure) turbines, on the Austrian ships each stage worked on its own shaft, while on the Hungarian ship the two stages of each set were coupled together in line and worked on one shaft. Th e Babcock-Wilcox boilers of the Schlachtschiff VII were heavier, but superior and had greater effi ciency than the Yarrow ones in that they could produce enough steam (200,000 kg per hour) for eight hours unlike the STT built Yarrow ones.273 Th e Babcock-Wilcox boilers were fi tted also with superheaters, which the Yarrow boilers of the STT-built dreadnoughts lacked. Th e dynamos, the generators and the coolant pumps were manufactured by the Ganz Villamossági Rt. (Ganz Electric Ltd).274

Th e visible diff erences, which rendered it easy to distinguish the Hungarian dreadnought from her sisters, were ordered by the Navy after her launch. Th e ship was fi tted a modifi ed and enlarged searchlight platform over the bridge and around the funnels. Th is platform was copied from the 24,500 ton battleship design and the change order was given to the shipyard in February 1914. To clear this new platform, the two funnels had to be heightened by 1.5 meters. Th e armored fi re control towers for the 15 cm batteries on the Oberdeck were traversed by 90 degree respective to the other ships’ control towers, so they became more spacious and less exposed to enemy fi re. Th is modifi cation was proposed by Linienschiff sleutnant von Schwarz in early 1915.275

In the Plansammlung of the Kriegsarchiv Vienna there is a series of plans made by the Ganz and Co. Danubius in 1912. Th is version of the Schlachtschiff VII had some unique features which were not implemented on the ship as actually built. On the mast tops there were large fi re control po-

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37 Th e Schlachtschiff VII under construction

sitions with a searchlight on the top of each one. Not visible from the outside, but a much more important diff erence was the lack of the bulkheads between the two magazines of the 30.5 cm turret groups compared to the Navy’s/STT’s plans. Obviously, the Navy considered the lack of these bulkheads to be a serious fl aw and ordered the Ganz and Co. Danubius to build Schlachtschiff VII with these bulkheads. Th e drawings of the fl ooding calculations of battleship Szent István show the ship with these bulkheads.276

Due to the diff erent shaft line arrangement the stern of the ship had to be redesigned and the propeller shaft bearings had to be reinforced. Th e Navy considered the shipyard’s sizing calculations of the propeller shafts and bearings inadequate and the same applied to the calculations of these items for the cruisers and destroyers being built by Danubius. Th e Navy advised to use the Stodola method.277 Th is was the most important in the case of the Schlachtschiff VII because her propeller shafts were longer by 20 meters and heavier by 13 tons compared to the shafts for the STT built ships. Th e Navy ordered to increase the shaft diameter from 380 mm to 410 mm and to strengthen the frames of the stern.278 Th e Danubius introduced a new, innovative method of lubricating the shafts: the closed system was comprised of a pump, a tank and a water cooling section. Th is system eliminated the danger of external contamination. Th is innovation impressed the Navy so much that they ordered this system to be fi tted to the Tegetthoff and the Prinz Eugen.

279

Unlike the other three units of the class, for the Schlachtschiff VII only the 30.5 cm guns were originally ordered from the Škoda in 1911. Th is was due to the intention of the Hungarian government to establish a Hungarian gun factory. In March 1911, the Hungarian Finance Minister László Lukács informed the common Ministry of War that the Hungarian government would establish a gun factory in Diósgyőr.280 Montecuccoli, contrary to the common War Minister Moritz von Auff enberg, was enthusiastic because he hoped that the Hungarian factory would break down the high prices of the Škoda. At the end of April, Linienschiff ska-

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38 Th e turbine rooms and the aft boiler room of the Schlachtschiff VII

pitän Emil Fath, the head of the artillery department of the MTK, travelled to Budapest and negotiated with the directorial board of the Diósgyőr Ironworks and with Lukács. During these negotiations Fath was informed that the Hungarian government was planning to involve the British Vickers-Maxim in the establishing of the gun factory. On 18 May 1911, the Navy offi cially promised that the 15 cm and 7 cm guns for the Schlachtschiff VII would be ordered from the new factory if it could guarantee a delivery deadline of 1 April 1914.281 Th anks to the strong opposition of the Heir of the Th rone and the new common War minister, Alexander von Krobatin, the establishing of the gun factory in Diósgyőr with the participation of the Vickers-Maxim failed. Th e Hungarian government then started negotiations with Krupp in 1912. Th e Navy waited until 31 May 1912, but when on this date the agreement between the Hungarian government and Krupp still was not concluded, on 1 June 1912 the Navy ordered the 15 cm and 7 cm guns for the Schlachtschiff VII from the Škoda for 2,260,163 Kronen.282 A little later the Krupp terminated the negotiations with the Hungarian government and declared the bargain off . Th e new Hungarian Finance Minister, János Teleszky, realized that he could not act against Krobatin who was vehemently lobbying for Škoda. Teleszky, despite his strong reservations against Škoda, agreed with the Czech fi rm on establishing a joint gun factory in 1913. Th e Magyar Ágyúgyár Rt. (Hungarian Gun Factory Ltd) was established in Győr, near Vienna in April 1913. Th e Hungarian government had controlling interests with shares of 7 million Kronen and Škoda had shares of 6 million Kronen. Although no guns were actually delivered to the Navy, gun production for the Army was started in July 1916 and until the end of the war the Hungarian Gun Factory manufactured 711 fi eld guns and howitzers for the Army.283

From the fi rst moment it was dubious that the Danubius could keep the delivery deadline for the battleship. In April 1911, when the contract on the Schlachtschiff VII was signed, the great slipway was only 10 percent complete and even in January 1912 it was still incomplete. Th e keel of Schlachtschiff VII was laid down on 29 January 1912. In consequence of the unsatisfactory working-stock of the yard, the lack of experience of the workers and the delays of the subcontractors, the building process was much slower than in the STT. An article in the Austrian newspaper “Neue Freie Presse” in January 1911 blamed the Navy for giving a battleship order to the Danubius and stated that the ship would never be completed. Th is article also accused the Danubius to allot the two thirds of the orders to Prussian fi rms.284 Th e Heir of the Th rone reading this article pressed the Navy to restrict the material orders of the Danubius from abroad to special materials not available in Austria.285 In October 1912 Franz Ferdinand (who was notorious for his hatred of Hungarians) questioned the ability of the Danu-

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