Opinions on the Szent István

Th e gunnery trials were conducted on 18 and 19 November and took place in the Fasana Channel. Th e trial of the main battery was conducted at a speed of 14-16 knots. Th e fi rst salvo was fi red at a range of 15,200 m then the range was gradually decreased to 10,000 m. Th e full salvos with the guns in each turret coupled together put extreme stress on the gun turrets and hull structure and resulted in the decalibration of the turret rangefi nders. At a speed of 16 knots the fi re control system failed to follow the rapidly changing range rate. Th ere was a special problem in turret No III as the temperature rose to 45 degrees C because the ventilation duct was near a heat source.313 Th e cost of repairing the damages caused by the 30.5 cm guns was 1,460 Kronen. On her sisters the costs of the repairs after the gunnery trials were similar.314 Th e fi nal trial of the gun turrets was conducted on 15 January 1916.315

When the Szent István was docked after the trials there were found much greater distortions in the underwater hull structure than on her sisters. A committee established that the Danubius had made some structural parts from lower quality material than the prescribed in the contract.316 Th e delivery record of 11 December listed the following issues: there were problems with some ventilators and with the refrigeration plants of the ammunition magazines, some spare parts were missing and the caulking of the teak deck was defective.317 On a summer maneuver in 1916 the whole electric system of the ship broke down, its manufacturer, the Ganz Villamossági Rt. repaired it under guarantee.318 Th e aft capstan also had to be replaced because when it was fi tted sand and gravel got into its mechanism due to the negligence of shipyard workers.319

Th e total sum which the Navy paid to the Danubius for the hull and the machinery was 22,589,800 Kronen. In 1916, the Navy claimed a penalty of 475,000 Kronen from the Danubius for the delay. Th e Danubius asked the deduction of 398,466 Kronen as a compensation for the additional charges of the works in the Arsenal.320 Th e Navy counting the strikes and wartime circumstances fi nally reduced the penalty to 312,500 Kronen.321 Th en the Danubius asked to cancel the penalty but the Navy refused it. Finally, the Navy and the shipyard agreed to postpone the negotiations on the penalty until the end of the war.322

Szent István was an unlucky ship: on her very fi rst mission, during “Operation Korfu” on 10 June 1918, she was torpedoed and sunk by an Italian motor torpedo boat (MAS). In the “little war” on the Adriatic the heavy units of both the Austro-Hungarian and the Italian navies rested in their bases at Pola and respectively at Taranto. On 8 and 9 June Flottenkommandant Kontreadmiral Miklós Horthy sail to sea with all four dreadnoughts in two separate groups in an attempt to attack the Otranto Barrage and smash the inferior Allied forces. Th e second group was led by the Szent István followed by the Tegetthoff left Pola on the evening of 9 June. On 10 June, at 3:20 a.m. they accidentally met two Italian motor torpedo boats led by the famous Italian MAS commander capitano di corvetta Luigi Rizzo. Th e MAS-21 attacked the Tegetthoff without success. MAS-15 however succeeded in hitting the Szent István with two torpedoes. Th e torpedo protection system designed by Siegfried Popper failed to protect the ship. After three hours at 6:07 a.m. she capsized and at 6:12 a.m. sank with 89 hands.

Opinions on the Szent István On 8 April 1916, the Navy asked the commanders of the battleships of the Tegetthoff class to write a report on their ships. While the other commanders wrote useful reports, Grassberger’s fi rst version was rather a pamphlet against the shipyard so the Navy rejected it. Grassberger was notorious in the Navy for his manner and from his reports it is clearly visible that he disliked his new ship. Grassberger was the commander of the fl eet’s fl agship Viribus Unitis before his appointment to the Szent István and may he have felt this change of command as a reduction in prestige. His second version of the report was accepted but some of his proposals received criticism.

Grassberger had previously criticized his new ship in his 3 December 1915 report on the list observed at large rudder angles during the full force trial. After presenting his theory on the causes of the list, he criticized the ammunition hoists of the 15 cm guns and questioned the watertightness of the manholes. Th en he wrote a lengthy pamphlet on the (by his opinion) wrong construction of the waste pipes, backed with quotes from German and

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43 Szent István fi res her main battery during a gunnery practice

British shipbuilding establishments and blamed the Danubius. He lamented that these waste pipes lacked fl ap valves and when the ship listed heavily during her trials, water fl ooded into the seamen’s toilets.323 In its answer of 18 January 1916 the Arsenal politely told Grassberger to go to hell and refuted his statements. Th ey informed him that the lack of the fl ap valves was not the fault of the shipyard but was done per the Navy’s order. Th e Navy had found that these fl ap valves were prone to sticking due to rust, rendering it impossible to fl ush the toilet. Th ey added that new technologies had to be based upon practical experience and not exclusively on theoretical textbooks.324

Th e second version of Grassberger’s report on his ship was written in September or October 1916. He started his report with the bow. In his opinion, the bow was too heavy and low and it had a bad and antiquated shape. At full load the draught at the bow was 20 cm greater than at the stern. Beside this line there is a handwritten note in the report “Maybe the ship was not correctly trimmed?” During the gunnery trial at 16 knots the foredeck was almost constantly wet and the spray reached the upper gun turret. For the future battleships he proposed a bow similar to the Japanese battleships combined with a raised forecastle deck.325

In his opinion the ships of this class were overloaded with the upper triple turrets, and recommended that the use of twin turrets as superimposed turrets would lessen the stability problems. He also blamed the construction of the fore conning tower for the high center of gravity of the ship. He eventually repeated the statements of the commander of the Viribus Unitis on the conning tower adding that an unlucky hit on the lower part could cause the fall of the heavy upper part of the conning tower. He wrote that at a speed of 14 knots or more the conning tower had been vibrating during the gunnery trial so that it had hindered the fi re control. For this phenomenon he blamed the weak understructure of the fore conning tower.326 Th e searchlight platform over the bridge which was a unique feature of the Szent István hindered searching the air for enemy aircrafts. He proposed to create weatherproof anti-submarine lookout posts. He criticized the small and cramped bridge and the arrangement of the navigational equipment.327

Th e chapter on the armament of Grassberger’s report started with the mention of the dangerous unprotected slot between the barbette and the gunhouse. While he did not make such serious claims about the turret ventilation as the commander of the Viribus Unitis, he proposed relocating the air inlets and the ventilators of the turret ventilation. For the future battleships he proposed diesel generators placed near the trunks of the gun turrets instead of remote, steam turbine driven generators.328

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