Th e Bombardment of Ancona

commander in chief of the Anglo-French forces in the Mediterranean was Lapeyrère, in the Adriatic Sea all the French and British commanders were subordinated to the Italian commander in chief. Th e commander in chief of the Italian Navy between 1914 and 1917 was Prince Luigi Amedeo Duca degli Abruzzi, a polar explorer and the cousin of King Vittorio Emanuele III.

Oddly enough, the three parties had not any specifi c operational plan when Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. Th is, and other factors, as the far from cordial Franco-Italian relationship or the low opinion of the British on the Italian Navy at least questioned the effi ciency of the future naval cooperation between the three powers. In May 1915 the Italian Navy had fi ve completed dreadnoughts (Dante Alighieri, Giulio Cesare, Leonardo da Vinci, Conte di Cavour and Caio Duilio) and one still under construction, completed in March 1916 (Andrea Doria). Th is was an equal, or slightly superior force compared to the three Radetzkys and the three completed Tegetthoffs, while in older battleships, armored cruisers, cruisers and smaller units the First Allied Fleet had at least a twofold superiority over the Austro-Hungarian fl eet. Th e Italian dreadnoughts were based at Taranto, while the four Regina Elena class and the two Regina Margherita class standard battleships, the newest Italian ships of this type were deployed at Brindisi. Abruzzi planned to keep his dreadnoughts outside the Adriatic in the fi rst phase of the war. Nevertheless, he as many others in the Italian fl eet dreamed of the revenge for Lissa, but Abruzzi together with Th aon di Revel was cautious enough. Only after the southern Adriatic was cleaned of Austro-Hungarian light surface units and submarines would leave the Italian battle fl eet Taranto for the Southern Adriatic in hope that Haus and the Austro-Hungarian fl eet could be lured out from Pola. But the advantageous moment never came and the Italian dreadnoughts did not enter into the Adriatic until October 1918.

Political and military leaders of the AustroHungarian Monarchy were well aware of the diplomatic activity between the Triple Entente and Italy. On 27 April, the AOK warned Haus that Italy might launch an attack without declaring war. But Haus was well aware of the situation even without this warning as he regularly read the reports of the naval intelligence service as well as the Italian press. In accordance with the Treaty of London, on 4 May Italy offi cially left the Triple Alliance, so it became evident that the hostilities would soon begin between the Monarchy and Italy. Korvettenkapitän Albrecht Freiherr von Freyberg, the German naval attaché in Vienna and a great enemy of Haus since August 1914, urged the Austro-Hungarian Navy to strike fi rst, even before a formal declaration of war. Th e Marinesektion told him that no attack could be launched without the authorization of the Emperor.451

Haus had plans from August 1914 for a strike against Ancona and the eastern coastline of Italy to be executed immediately after the Italian declaration of war. From 19 May the cruisers Helgoland and Admiral Spaun and several destroyers patrolled the routes between Gargano, Lagosta and Pelagosa, watching the lower Adriatic to prevent any unpleasant surprise from the south. Th e waters before Ancona were searched twice by torpedo boats and submarines to make sure that the Italians had not laid mines there. When word of the Italian mobilization ordered on 22 May reached Pola, the fl eet was ready for an action against Ancona. It seemed probable that Italy would declare war on Austria-Hungary on the next day, so on 23 May the fl eet in Pola stood ready to put to sea after darkness fell.452

Th e Bombardment of Ancona

At 4:15 a.m. on 24 May Peter von Moritz, the Austro-Hungarian Consul General in Ancona was tipped out of bed by two violent detonations which were followed by thundering of guns. At 5 a.m. an Italian police offi cer angrily told him: “Your nation is bombarding an open city!” Later he learned from another police offi cer that seventeen Austro-Hungarian warships had appeared before the city and had bombarded it.453

Th e Bombardment of Ancona on 24 May was the largest action of the Austro-Hungarian Navy during the war. Th is was also the only successful large fl eet action against the enemy, and the only occasion – not counting the failed rendezvous with the Goeben in August 1914 – when the units of the Tegetthoff and the Radetzky classes put to sea together against the enemy. Th e detailed orders for the strike against Ancona and the Italian coastline were issued on 9 May.454 Haus as Flottenkomman-

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dant wanted to lead his fl eet personally against Italy. As fl agship he chose the oldest battleship which was to participate in the action, the Habsburg. Th e reason behind this decision was that Haus did not intend to risk a dreadnought if he would run on a mine leading his fl eet. Th e First Battleship Squadron was commanded by Vizeadmiral Maximilian Njegovan.

Th e word of the Italian declaration of war reached Pola at 4 p.m. Th e news of the declaration of war was allegedly welcomed by a spontaneous cheering of the sailors. Th e fl eet raised steam, and the fi rst reconnaissance groups left Pola at 7 p.m. At 7:30 p.m. Haus went on the board of the Habsburg. Th e battleships left the harbor between 8 and 8:30 p.m. En route to Ancona the Radetzky was detached from the fl eet at 1:07 a.m. on 24 May and the Zrínyi at 1:45 a.m. Th e target of the Radetzky was the mouth of the Potenza River, while the Zrínyi sailed to Senigallia. After 3 a.m. the fl eet led by Haus arrived near Ancona. Between 3:12 and 3:47 the torpedo boat groups which searched the waters before the city reported one after another that the southern and the northern route were free of mines. At 4:06 a.m. the Second Battleship Squadron composed of the three units of the Habsburg and the three units of the Erzherzog Karl classes heading towards Ancona at a speed of 6 knots on the southern route opened fi re. At 4:10 a.m. Haus sent a radio telegram to every ship in which he ordered not to fi re on churches.455

At 4:05 a.m. Haus ordered Njegovan to come closer. Njegovan with his four battleships, the three dreadnoughts and the Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand made a turn and followed the Second Battleship Squadron. At 4:34 a.m. Njegovan’s fl agship, the Teget thoff opened fi re from a distance of 6,400 m. In the next few minutes the other three battleships joined her. Th e last of them, the Erzherzog Franz Fer dinand, opened fi re at 4:48 a.m. Njegovan’s ships ceased fi re between 4:55 and 5 a.m. Anyone imagining that during this 20-25 minutes period the heavy guns of the four battleships were thundering continuously, fi ring broadside after broadside is seriously mistaken. In fact, the ammunition was used economically and the commanders protected well the interests of the Treasury, expending only a few of the expensive,456 heavy shells. Th e Tegetthoff fi red twelve, the Prinz Eugen fi ve and Viribus Unitis an unknown number of 30.5 cm HE projectiles, while the Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand did not fi re a single one and only three 24 cm shots. At 5:06 a.m. on Haus’s order, Njegovan’s battleships left the scene and accelerating to full speed joined the Second Battleship Squadron. At this time appeared in the air the Italian airship M.2 Città di Ferrara457 at which the Tegetthoff fi red six rounds from her 7 cm AA guns without any eff ect.458 It is interesting to note that the Italian airships were nicknamed in the Austro-Hungarian Navy as “Staniolhund” (tin foil dog).459

After she was detached from the fl eet, the Radetzky escorted by two torpedo boats sailed to a point eight nautical miles off the mouth of the Potenza River. Th e battleship stopped there and the torpedo boats searched her intended course for mines. During this operation the contact sweep broke, so it had to be replaced which caused some delay. At 4:20 a.m. the Radetzky reached the point where she turned on the course which led to the fi ring position. At 4:37 a.m. from a distance of 3,000 m she opened fi re on the stone bridge over the Potenza River. Th e large dust clouds caused by the hits covered the whole mouth of the river, so it had to cease the fi re for a while. When the dust cloud dissipated the Radetzky opened fi re again, this time on the railway bridge. Th e battleship ceased fi re at 4:50 a.m. and left the mouth of the Potenza River. During this action she fi red fi ve 30.5 cm, fi ve 24 cm and seventeen 10 cm HE projectiles. One of the 30.5 cm projectiles exploded in the air 600 m from the ship.460 Th e Radetzky united with the fl eet after 5:15 a.m.461

Th e Zrínyi arrived near Senigallia sometimes before 3:30 a.m. Between 3:35 and 4:00 a.m. the two escorting torpedo boats searched the waters before the city. At 4:03 a.m. the battleship opened fi re from a distance of 3,400 m. Due to the shallow water a torpedo boat sailed slowly ahead of the battleship constantly sounding the depth. Zrínyi’s guns fi red on the port, the water tower, the railway bridge and the railway station. When they fi red on the station, a train coming from the north was spotted, so it was also destroyed with the 24 cm and 10 cm guns. At 4:38 a.m. the Zrínyi ceased fi re and turned on the course leading to the meeting point with the fl eet. Linienschiff skapitän Daublebsky did not mention in his report the number of the projectiles fi red. At 4:45 a.m. they spotted the Italian airship Città di Ferrara coming from the direction of

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58 Th e Bombardment of Ancona on 24 May 1915

Fano. From the poop deck of the Zrínyi a few dozen sailors commanded by two offi cers opened fi re on the airship with machine guns and rifl es, and the commander of the ship, Linienschiff skapitän Maximilian Daublebsky ordered an increase in speed and to zigzag. Th e Città di Ferrara dropped fi ve bombs, all of which missed the battleship by 50-100 meters. Th e airship had started a new attack on the Zrínyi when two Austro-Hungarian fl ying boats appeared. Th e Italians fl ed, increasing their altitude. As it was mentioned, fi fteen minutes later the airship encountered Njegovan’s squadron. Th e Zrínyi united with the fl eet at 5:25 a.m.462

Other Austro-Hungarian units bombarded different locations near Ancona on the eastern coastline of Italy. Th e armored cruiser Sankt Georg bombarded Rimini. Th e scout cruiser Admiral Spaun bombarded the signal station at Cretaccio Island, while the destroyer Streiter attacked the signal station at Torre di Mileto. Th e scout cruiser Novara, commanded by Linienschiff skapitän Miklós Horthy, the later Flottenkommandant, escorted by three light crafts entered the Corsini Channel and bombarded Porto Corsini. Th e Novara was the only ship which suff ered damages and causalities during the operation, when she was hit by an Italian shore battery. Six men were killed and ten wounded from her crew of 325.463 A squadron composed of the scout cruiser Helgoland and four destroyers ran into the Italian destroyer Turbine and sank her. Th e destroyers Tátra and Csepel shelled Manfredonia. Th e fl eet arrived back to Pola after an uneventful voyage around 11 a.m.

In Ancona heavy damage was infl icted by the guns of the battleships. Th e port facilities, the railway station, the old barracks which served as military hospital at that time and several private houses were damaged. Despite the defi nite order of Haus, the Ancona Cathedral, the Duomo San Ciriaco, was damaged. Diff erent sources put the number of the deaths between 63 and 70 in Ancona alone. Th e majority of the victims lost their lives when the military hospital was hit. In contrast to the fi rst Austro-Hungarian reports and despite their hopes the Italian railway line which ran along the eastern coastline was only lightly damaged. It is worth noting that it was always a very hard task to evaluate the damage done in land targets from the board of a ship. Citterich, the Austro-Hungarian Vice-consul in Brindisi on the day of the bombardment with his wife travelled incognito along the railway line from Brindisi to Jesi through Ancona and Rimini. Th e train could cross all the railway bridges which were shelled a few hours before and

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