In order to explore these relationships we chose three projects of differing scales and complexities each with some common elements but for the most part with different problems that needed solving, in order to have a wide range of data to compare and contrast. Through these we took a close look at the entities involved in this collaboration, as well as their responsibilities, interactions, and roles. Through this lens we can then begin to look at the process of completing these projects, through
I. IntroductIon What we chose to research for this case
research and analysis. The projects we chose to concentrate on were; the Big Dig in Boston, the Seattle Sculpture
study was the interdisciplinary collaboration between
Park in Seattle, and the TF Green Interlink in
parties in the process of working on projects that
Providence. The Big Dig represents our “large scale”
interact on some level with existing infrastructural
intervention, at the civic scale by burying the highway
elements. In today’s built environment cities are
and creating a new urban environment. The Seattle
becoming more and more dense and from an
Sculpture park is our “medium scale” intervention
architectural standpoint the challenge becomes
at the building level by creating a new building, as
how to integrate new and exciting buildings into
well as a link that changes the relation of existing
this dense fabric. On the other hand, from an
urbanism. Finally the TF Green Interlink is our
infrastructural standpoint. There is the dilemma of
“small scale” intervention at the public amenity level,
what to do with massive and often degraded and
connecting existing urbanism and changing their
obsolete infrastructural elements, as planning and
interpretations.
technology ever changes with modern advancements.
While these projects each address different
In order to deal with these related issues architecture
issues at different scales, they all share the
and architects have integrated projects that deal with
commonality of infrastructure and the complex
these two issues, and in so enter into a complex web
work flows and interdisciplinary collaboration in
of involved parties and processes to achieve the final
order to get them built and make them a successful
goal.
intervention in our ever changing urban fabric.
Section i: introduction
1
II. BIg dIg, Boston MA The first example, the Big Dig, is the burying of the
a single firm or agency accepting complete design
Central Artery of I-93 between Boston’s Financial
responsibility and lead to the creation of the Artery
District and the historical North End dealt with a
Business Commission.
project that not only created marginalized under
The Artery Business Commission was
approximately multiple miles of overpasses of traffic
made up of businessmen and real estate moguls
off the surface, but separated and marginalized an
who both operated businesses within Downtown
entire neighborhood by making its approach dark,
Boston and owned property close to the proposed
loud, and dirty forcing pedestrians to cross under
submerged route. The ABC was founded initially
eight lanes of raised highways. Within a project of
in 1988 by Norman Leventhal and Edwin Sidman,
this magnitude, where the design and implementation
the chairman and president, respectively, of the
have such significant repercussions on not only the
Beacon Companies, who owned and operated the
highway system, but the surrounding neighborhoods
new Rowes Warf Building. Leventhal and Edwin also
in both social and economic attributes. The massive
brought in Robert Beal, whose firm owned property in
scale (within scope and timetable) also precluded
the artery corridor; Lawrence DiCara a local attorney
2
Section ii: the Big dig
and ex-city councilor; and Catherine Donaher, a planner who had done Leventhal and Sidman in the past.1 A project of the scope of the Big Dig inherently had massive risks and rewards for the revitalization of down town Boston, yet as a project, it was under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation and was funded through a mixture of state and Federal funds from the Interstate Highway Program.2 The ABC was primarily concerned that since the primary drivers of the projects were Federal and State Transportation Agencies, the project would be focused, logically on the problem of moving automobile traffic on the interstate while sacrificing the urban connections and context within Boston. The four major concerns, according to Luberoff were that downtown Boston would remain accessible during the construction process, that the project would serve Downtown Boston and that the number of access and exit points would adequately serve the city (rather than just allowing I-90 to run through the city) that political and legal controversies wouldn’t hamper the project later in the construction process, when time and traffic had removed the optimism that the project first had, and finally what would become of the twenty seven new acres of land created by burying the interstate.
state’s design committee while, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, a private, for-profit company, hired as project managers to oversee construction of the project.4 The twenty seven acres of new space, and how the ABC chose to represent the strategic long term thinking that the group approached this project with. While the ABC had among its members real estate developers, who by conventional wisdom would want to develop this 27 acres into lots to maximize future square footage and profits, it remained open to outside opinion and willing to work with groups that may have had contradictory opinions on how to treat the new land. While the Boston Society of Architects and to an extent BRA wanted the newly created land to be civic open space while the ABC wanted to develop the land, how agencies can work together on a project of such massive scale as the Big Dig, and how in some cases, these
3
During this stage of the early design process Michael P. Lewis served was the head of the Section ii: the Big dig
opposing views can lead to alterations to plans that are eventually mutually beneficial: “ABC also established committees to 3
review public planning for the corridor’s various
it called for designing and permitting the artery in
sections and, in some cases, to develop their own
ways that did not “unduly constrain future decisions”
plans and guidelines for those areas as well. In
about what could be built on the new land.”6 This
some cases—notably the artery’s northern section
clause to “unduly constrain future decisions, and
these committees included representatives of other
the groups ability to get it included in the policy of
community groups...”5
development of the Artery shows how the group was
By incorporating and encouraging other
able to win concessions through inter-agency and
groups participation in the process, rather than using
group cooperation and indeed, a letter from Salvucci
their considerably political capital to just further
he praised the ABC for, “helping resolve disputes
their agenda the ABC was able to gain concessions
between the city and the state, communicating
in the future zoning and development of the new
information to both the business community and
land’ “Though ABC’s leaders generally favored the
other public officials, and providing valuable volunteer
plans that allowed more construction in the corridor,
technical expertise.7
the group did not take an official stand. Instead,
4
While the Artery Business Committee
Section ii: the Big dig
served as a mediator during the design phases of the process, the group was most successful within the political realm. In 1990 the Artery Business Committee sent members to Washington as lobbyists for continued funding under the Federal Highways budget. Because of the social and political relationships of the group, they were able to read the political climate and initiate measures that were able to ensure the continuation of funding. As noted within Luberoff’s study Leventhal recalls ABC’s focused their efforts on Thomas Foley, the Democratic Speaker of the House. The group managed to collect over a hundred thousand dollars in campaign contributions for him, and in turn he continued to lobby for the project when annual funding was granted.8 This political lobbying was also carried out at the state level where the ABC took on an unconventional approach to keep the public opinion from derailing the Central Artery Project. They managed this by approaching the gubernatorial candidates in the Massachusetts State Governor race by approaching all five candidates, to, “educate [the] candidates … about the economic and transportation benefits of the Artery” and to “outline ABC’s role as project assessor and monitor and its potential as the sole source of continuity outside of state government.” Given the poll results, she added, the meetings, should particularly focus on the artery’s fiscal benefits..”9 They also managed to Section ii: the Big dig
use connections to emphasize, “Anyone who runs for governor and makes this an issue is never going to be able to get out of it. Your whole campaign is going to be tied to aspects of that issue. And we’re going to go to all of your Democratic opponents and make the same pitch.” We did … and we got a commitment from all of them that unless something blew up in their face they were not going to initiate anything [against the project].10 This type of interaction between the business and political aspects of large infrastructural projects is common, but can lead to public backlash later in the project, and even post completion. This was the made with the Big Dig, as later on in the project, and post-completion, the public began to recognize the true costs of the project. While those who focus on business and design committee are quick to praise the actions of the ABC and their pairing with the state and Bechtel/ Parsons Brinckerhoff the public thought differently. During construction in 1994, public outcry was so great the State government was forced to convene 5
a oversight committee to deal with ballooning cost
government found negligence not only on the PM’s
of the project. Primarily caused by lax regulation and
part but on the part of the oversight committee
oversight by the Bechtel/ Parsons Brinckerhoff, by
themselves. The Committee on Cost Recovery
1997 the project was 1.7 billion dollars over budget.11
was headed by Michael P. Lewis, the former head
The original committee was so ineffective, a second
of design and, “Lewis’s very involvement in the
committee was formed in 2000 to decide whether
committee raises questions. As the state’s Big
the PM would be responsible for fines paying back
Dig design director, Lewis had overseen Bechtel’s
the taxpayers for their negligence. The Committee
management of the design phase. To review
decided that Bechtel/ Parsons Brinckerhoff should
Bechtel’s work meant passing judgment on his own
not be responsible for repaying the ballooning project
supervision of Bechtel. Lewis now served as the
cost.
state’s Big Dig project director. Bechtel, too, had a A subsequent Boston Globe investigation
6
conflict of interest in cost recovery, the Globe found.
Section ii: the Big dig
State procedures called for Bechtel “to identify issues of potential cost recovery,” which meant the state relied on Bechtel to point out flaws in its own designs and management.”12 This aspect of the project was not mentioned in the Artery Business Committee’s website when mentioning project facilitation. While self regulated interest groups such as the Artery Business Committee can facilitate continued political and financial support for projects, the construction delay and budget overruns that plagued the process cast a dubious light in the role they can play in oversight. Positive attributes such as early integration into the design process and the economic and political capital allowed the ABC to continue supporting the project while both changes occurred in the both the construction team and the state government. Also while the Massachusetts Department of Transportation saw the Big Dig as a tunneling and transpirational infrastructure project, the BRA and BSA were more focused on the land created the BRA was able to communicate and move between the two groups. Unfortunately groups like these can start to allow lax oversight in the projects with such long construction process such as these.
Section ii: the Big dig
7
The Big Dig
Federal Government
Massachusetts State Government
Mass. Highway Department.
Mass. Turnpike Association
Boston Redeveloment Authority
Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff
Artery Building Committee
KEY:
8
Design
Oversight
Section ii: the Big dig
1991
1990
1988
1987
1986
1982
1985
13
Section ii: the Big dig
Collaboration
2007
1997
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991 Approval
Advocacy
Funding
9
III. seAttle sculpture pArk, seAttle WA In Seattle, the city was looking for a way to
on urban environments. The contextual approach
reinvigorate a part of the city divided by outdated
of the Olympic Sculpture Park project show both
infrastructure creating a barrier for pedestrians. At
continuity and a divergence from former discussions
a site where the old form of architecture was so
of contextualism. The design strategies of the project
prevalent, but outdated and decimated by age and
contain the knowledge of other fields. As a result
damage from an earthquake, the city and the client
of this, landscape is dealt as a ‘performative thick
looked for an approach to address the new changing
surface’, built fabric is considered as a ‘topological
pace of urbanism.14 This thinking is what brought
stratum’ and the obsolete infrastructure is handled
them to choosing the Design by Weiss Manfredi
as a ‘reconstructive organizational principle’ in the
which accomplished this, critic Eric Kömez discusses
design process. These contextual strategies lead
this stating; “The architects of Olympic Sculpture
to the hybridization of the morphology. To conclude,
Park for the Seattle Art Museum are among the ones
emerging practices of architecture are shaped by
searching for new spatial configurations to overcome
hybrid morphologies where buildings and urban fabric
the impacts of globalization and deindustrialization
integrate, fluid spatial continuum develops and figure-
10
Section iii: Seattle Sculpture park
ground distinction dissolves.”15 The Seattle Art Museum, acting as the
that appealed to the principles of their firm. In their book Site Specific, Weiss Manfredi speaks
client for this project, led an international design
of their attitudes when seeking out a potential
competition to find and appropriate design to
project. They go on to say “For us, the allure of
implement for the Seattle Sculpture Park. Weiss
this new public territory lies in the range of scales
Manfredi went on to win this competition. The Seattle
and blurred perceptions it affords. We began to
Art Museum then worked with the lead architects of
look at the elements of infrastructure, and the
Weiss Manfredi to develop the guiding principles for
often marginalized sited they occupy, as potential
the overall design, as well as to help assemble the
contributions to the public realm. We focused our
design and contracting.16
attention on the interstitial spaces that transform
This project was the perfect opportunity for Weiss Manfredi to actively engage with a site
Section iii: Seattle Sculpture park
and reconnect disparate enclaves across the metropolis.”17 This agenda speaks to how well of
11
a fit the Seattle Sculpture Park project was for
which champions the exploitation of marginalized
Weiss Manfredi. Beyond this, Weiss Manfredi has
spaces within the urban fabric. A understanding of
constructed a portfolio of works both built and
this design theory is integral to understanding the
unbuild that exemplify their willingness to stay true
beginnings of a design project such as the Seattle
to their design principles no matter the circumstance.
Sculpture Park.
Such unwavering support for their ideals speaks to
There were many parties involved in
the ability through which they are able to accomplish
getting the Seattle Sculpture Park off the ground.
works that integrate all parties involved such as the
As previously noted, the main player that got the
contractor and structural engineer. As it will be seen,
design moving was the project architect Weiss
Weiss Manfredi’s efficient and all encompassing
Manfredi. Design partners Marion Weiss and Michael
interdisciplinary work drives the success of their
A. Manfredi worked with the client to develop the
projects. What the parties involved took away
guiding principles for the overall design, and to
from this project was the successful integration of
assemble the design and construction team. As
infrastructure and new public space. This attitude is
the design process went on, Weiss Manfredi hired
indicative of Weiss Manfredi’s overall design theory
experts to help carry out their multidisciplinary
12
Section iii: Seattle Sculpture park
design, particularly a landscape architect who was
Magnusson Klemencic Associates ended
familiar with local species and civil engineers.18
up becoming the suitable firm to fill this role. Their
The landscape architect that was eventually hired
engineers worked with Weiss Manfredi to help
was Charles Anderson of Atelier ps. With all of the
realize the architects’ design concept. They offered
essential elements assembled, the multiple parties
technical support and executed innovative yet
then proceeded to collaborate throughout the design
simple approaches to be easily constructed and
and development process with artists, client, project
economical.20 In one instance, Magnusson Klemencic
managers, donors, contractors, city officials, and
was able to propose a cost cutting measure by
natural resource agencies.
suggesting the Weiss Manfredi replace the costly
Charles Anderson advocated the use of
precast concrete retaining wall with a much cheaper
native plant species to improve habitat richness
and more simple mechanically stabilized earth walls
and reduced maintenance throughout the site. He
that became clad in precast sandstone panels.21
also worked with the architect on topography within
These panels served the dual purpose of being able
the site, and the “valley� he created helped reduce
to shift in place if any seismic activity were to occur
the amount of fill soil.19 All of this work required a
in the area. Integration and cooperation between the
specialized team of engineers, specifically structural
architect and engineer were paramount in creating
and civil.
a successful and fiscally responsible project such
Section iii: Seattle Sculpture park
13
as the Seattle Sculpture Park. With an active and
was to execute the construction of complex systems
engaging structural engineering firm on board, the
in both art and technology, including marine work,
final piece of the puzzle for this project became an
the large bridges that crossed existing infrastructure,
open-minded project management team who could
extensive earthwork components, landscaping, street
synthesize the work of these parties and transition it
work, the pavilion and the assembly and placement
into the final constructed piece of urban architecture
of the art, etc. They coordinated the construction
that thousands enjoy today.
with city infrastructure, while working safely and
The project management firm responsible for all of this was Barrientos, LLC. Project managers
efficiently.23 Then came the final contributor, who was
from this firm developed the detailed project
not part of the design team but arguably just as
execution plan; including budget, procedure (permits),
important, the artists. For new artworks developed
constructional material and labor resource, and
specifically for Seattle Sculpture Park, artists worked
conducted risk control.22 They handed construction
closely with the park designers to create works that
responsibilities off to the General Contracting firm of
embodied the spirit of the design and worked within
Sellen Construction. The role of Sellen Construction
the framework for their architectural vision of the
14
Section iii: Seattle Sculpture park
project. For existing ones, artists helped by selecting
further intrigue is the fact that the project almost did
the location of their sculptures to be installed,
not happen due to the city considering taking the
redesigning the surroundings, and supervising the
land by eminent domain to put a flyway and tunnel
installation.24 In one such instance, Richard Serra’s
on the site to increase the capacity of the highway.26
“Wake” installation had to receive special attention
However, this never happened and the project did
because of it’s sheer size. In total, the piece weighed
come to fruition, and it became indicative of Weiss
300 tons and required the structural engineer to pay
Manfredi’s overall design theory which as noted
extra attention to the location of installation to ensure
champions the exploitation of marginalized spaces
that the site was capable of holding a permanent
within the urban fabric. A understanding of this
piece of such weight. Richard Serra was also on site
design theory is integral to understanding the journey
for the installation of his work, ensuring that another
from idea to final construction of a design project
layer of close collaboration was involved in the
such as the Seattle Sculpture Park. What is also of
project.25
note throughout this process is Weiss Manfredi’s
What the parties involved took away from
openness to integration and design suggestions from
this project was the successful integration of
the other components and agencies involved with the
infrastructure and new public space. What adds
Seattle Sculpture Park.
Section iii: Seattle Sculpture park
15
Seattle Art Museum Weiss/Manfredi Atelier (Charles Anderson) Magnusson Klemencic Associates Sellen Construction Barrientos LLC Mayor Edward B. Murray City Council Seattle DOT FHA/FRA DNR/EPA KEY:
16
Design
Oversight
Section iii: Seattle Sculpture park
2002
2001
2000
27
1999
Seattle Sculpture Park
Collaboration
Section iii: Seattle Sculpture park
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003 Approval
Advocacy
17
IV. tF green InterlInk, proVIdence rI Finally, we have chosen to study the Interlink
development by expanding public transportation,
project at T.F. Green Airport located in Warwick, RI
increasing economic recovery for the state of Rhode
and designed by Northeast Collaborative Architects
Island, offering future development opportunities
in conjunction with Jacobs Engineering Group.
for the state, and offering future development
Although, Northeast Collaborative was responsible
opportunities for both the airport and the train station.
for the architectural design, there were major
In addition, Northeast Collaborative implemented
engineering design requirements that Jacobs
sun shades, energy-efficient lighting, lighting-control
Engineering oversaw. The Interlink is a thirty-five feet
systems, and recycled construction materials. The
high, quarter of a mile long pedestrian bridge that
Interlink was awarded the 2012 AIA Rhode Island
links travelers to major transportation infrastructures
Merit Award for Commercial Design and the 2013
including a train station, rental car facility, and parking
AIA Connecticut Award for Commercial Design.29
garage via a series of moving walkways.28 The project
The types of data that our group was able
took place from 1998 to 2010. The Interlink increases sustainable 18
to collect in order to develop the study varied immensely. Because one of our group members Section iV: tF green interlink
has interacted with the former project manager for the Interlink from Northeast Collaborative, we were able to establish contact with Glenn Gardiner, who was the architect of record for the Interlink project. Mr. Gardiner has been our most pertinent source of information and we have been able to communicate with him both via email and through meeting with him in person. He gave us an overview of the project and answered questions relating to collaboration with other entities and what the various phases of the project entailed. We have also been able to travel to T.F. Green via both car and train to experience the project ourselves and witness how pedestrians interact with the space. We have also gathered additional information from online journal articles that discuss the Interlink. Our main interest in this particular project was to discover who the many entities involved with this project were and how they collaborated and coordinated together in order to complete such a large scale infrastructure related project. We began our research by studying the main architecture firm involved in the design of the project, which was Northeast Collaborative Architects. When the Interlink was constructed, Northeast Collaborative still worked under the name of Newport Collaborative Architects. They were the largest firm in Rhode Island who then merged with Bianco Giolitto Weston Architects in 2011 to form Northeast Collaborative Architects. They now have three different offices in the New Section iV: tF green interlink
England area including Newport, RI (the main office involved in the Interlink), Middletown, CT, and Providence, RI.30 Before the merge, each firm had over thirty years of experience and because of this, have been able to establish strong relationships with experts throughout the industry, allowing them to develop structural and environmental strategies to help deliver the best possible solutions for projects.31 Because of this prior experience with large structural and environmental projects, along with the size and expertise of their firm, they were the most qualified designer to undertake the great infrastructure requirements that went into the planning and execution of the Interlink. Northeast Collaborative worked closely with other entities to design the project to its full potential. The main entities involved were the Rhode Island Airport Corporation, the Rhode Island Department of Transportation, Northeast Collaborative Architects, Jacobs Engineering Group, PB Americas, and Gilbane Building Company.32 Also, Robinson Green Beretta Architects, CDR Maguire, the Mayor/City Council of Warwick, and other government entities like the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Amtrak, and the Federal Highway Administration. Eighty other 19
subcontractors were also involved in the project.33 The Rhode Island Airport Corporation and the
with the project. “Northeast Collaborative Architects is a highly
Rhode Island Department of Transportation acted as
motivated team of architects who work in a boutique
the clients in the project. The Rhode Island Airport
studio environment. [They have] built a reputation
Corporation “undertakes the planning, development,
for delivering quality, innovative, and award-winning
management, acquisition, ownership, operation, repair,
projects.”37 They were the lead skywalk architecture
construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, renovation,
designer with Glenn Gardiner being the lead project
improvement, maintenance development, sale, lease,
architect involved with the design. They were
or other disposition of any airport facility as defined
responsible for the design of the Interlink and worked
in Rhode Island General Law relative to RI’s six
with the Rhode Island Airport Corporation and the
state airports”.34 “The Rhode Island Department of
Rhode Island Department of Transportation to create
Transportation designs, constructs, and maintains
a design that was approved by both the two major
the state’s surface transportation system.”35 Together,
clients and the public. They were responsible for
they initiated a master planning process for the
completing multiple design solutions at various levels
T.F. Green Airport. The approved concept included
of completion. Northeast Collaborative also worked
terminal end improvement and a pedestrian walkway,
closely under Jacobs Engineering to complete the
customer service operations building, and parking
design of the Interlink.38
garage.36 They directed the program and oversaw construction, coordinating with all entities involved 20
Jacobs Engineering Group “is one of the world’s largest and most diverse providers of Section iV: tF green interlink
technical, professional and construction services”.39
charge of constructing a corridor that services more
They were the designer of record and worked closely
than forty trains per day, managed construction
with the Rhode Island Airport Corporation/Rhode
activities above and around existing infrastructures
Island Department of Transportation, Amtrak, and
such as Amtrak railways and state and municipal
Gilbane Building Company (construction manager)
roads, coordinated around the airport parking lot
to address a multitude of design and construction
and pedestrian traffic, challenged trade coordination
tasks for this facility. They included Federal Highway
due to the fast-track schedule, and coordinated with
Administration value engineering workshops,
the numerous transportation entities involved in the
preparation of Guaranteed Maximum Price
project. In addition, they chose to work at night to
documents for use in developing the construction
avoid conflicts with ongoing operations while the
manager at risk agreement, and development of
airport stayed open 24/7 during the construction.43
early procurement documents for long-lead items.40
They also worked closely with the project manager,
Significant portions of the work included innovative
PB Americas.
design and construction solutions to maintain
PB Americas (Parsons Brinkerhoff) “is a
operations of T.F. Green Airport, Amtrak service on
global consulting firm assisting public and private
the Northeast Corridor and daily traffic on adjacent
clients to plan, develop, design, construct, operate,
highways.41
and maintain critical infrastructure”.44 They were
Gilbane Building Company “is one of the
the project manager assigned to the Interlink and
largest privately held family-owned real estate
provided program management and construction
development and construction firms in the industry”.42
management. They closely collaborated with the
They were the construction manager and were in
construction manager, Gilbane Building Company
Section iV: tF green interlink
21
throughout construction. They represented the Rhode
construction manager for the project and formed
Island Airport Corporation’s interests and served as
a value engineering team including CDR Maguire
a liaison with the construction manager, the design
to evaluate the design. They then determined that
team, the Rhode Island Department of Transportation,
the project was over budget, thus eliminating major
the Federal Highway Administration, the U.S.
design features in the skywalk, including the high
Department of Transportation Infrastructure Finance
tech structural glazing system and the canted wall
and Innovation Act Office, Amtrak, multiple rental car
design. These were only a few of many changes
agencies, and other state and federal agencies.45
that the engineering team proposed.50 From 2007
Although Northeast Collaborative is the
to 2008, Jacobs Engineering Group and Northeast
architect on record, they were not the original firm
Collaborative “went back to the drawing board”
intended to design the project. In the words of
and redesigned the skywalk and connector and bid
Glenn Gardiner, “We were brought in after they
documents were completed during 2008.51
shelved the design.”46 From 1998 to 2004, the
Following the completion of the bid
original design connected the airport to the parking
documents, the project was bid, bids were reviewed,
garage via a monorail train. This was designed by
and construction commenced by the end of 2008.
Jacobs Engineering Group (the primary design and
The bids came in thirty million dollars under budget.52
engineering contractor) and assisted by Robinson
From 2008 to 2010, Gilbane Building Company
Green Berreta Architects.47 From 2004 to 2005, the
constructed the project in about twenty months.
Rhode Island Department of Transportation decided that the monorail was too expensive to maintain on a yearly basis and potentially a problem when broken down. They then shelved that design and hired Northeast Collaborative Architects to design a new elevated walkway under Jacobs with moving walkways a quarter of a mile long and 35 feet in the air.48 From 2005 to 2006, the project was designed from schematic design through the design development phase.49 In 2006 to 2007, Gilbane Building Company was hired as the 22
Section iV: tF green interlink
insurance program. This meant that rather than each contractor involved with the project providing its own worker compensation and liability insurance, Gilbane Building Company acted as the “gatekeeper� and included everything into one big policy for anyone working in the site. This resulted in less than $200,000 in claims and only six lost-time incidents which is a major accomplishment for a project of this size.56 Jacobs Engineering Group ran the on site project
The most substantial issues for completing
coordination and administered the design contract.
the project were the large amount of paperwork and
Northeast Collaborative was in charge of the on
temporary paths of travel that had to be created for
site review of the architectural design work for
travelers using the airport while construction was
the skywalk portion of the Interlink and in October
taking place.57 Because of the immense amount
of 2010, the project was completed.53 Northeast
of stakeholders, there was a significant amount of
Collaborative’s main collaboration took place
paperwork that had to be completed and signed
under the direction of Jacobs Engineering and in
regularly, so a system was created that could
conjunction with Robinson Green Beretta Architects.
prevent the schedule from slowing down. In addition,
All final approvals and decisions were made by the
there were passengers that had to access the rail
Rhode Island Airport Corporation and the Rhode
platform from the terminal and buses and there
Island Department of Transportation.54
were also people coming in to access rental cars.
Because of the complexity and large scope
Because of this, a large amount time was spent
of the project, the overall cost was $267 million,
making modifications in order to create a constant
primarily funded by Federal Highway Administration
seamless path of travel.58 It is because of the
grants, a Transportation Finance and Innovation
constant collaboration between partners, designers,
loan, special facility revenue bonds, state grants and
engineers, and contractors that made this large
customer facility charges collected by the rental
infrastructural project possible to complete within a
car companies.55 A large reason the project did not
tight construction timeline and overall under budget.
exceed the budget and was completed within a tight time frame is because of an owner-controlled Section iV: tF green interlink
23
T.F. Green Interlink
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
59
Rhode Island Airport Corporation
Rhode Island Department of Transportation
Northeast Collaborative Architects
Robinson Green Beretta Architects
Jacobs Engineering Group
PB Americas
Gilbane Building Company
CDR Maguire
KEY:
24
Design
Oversight
Section iV: tF green interlink
Section iV: tF green interlink
Collaboration
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003 Approval
Advocacy
25
V. conclusIon In analyzing these three similar yet unique projects, we feel we have displayed a wide array
future. While each of these projects have very
of issues and methods for dealing with projects of
different intentions and architectural expression
a certain scale that deal with the complex issue of
and merit, a commonality of them is how they get
our ever changing and ever evolving ideologic of
accomplished. Each project has a clear agenda and
infrastructure. Infrastructure is something that is
the way teams are organized. In all cases there is
not going away any time soon, but it is constantly
an interrelationship and interdependency between
adapting. Through projects like these architects and
all the agents involved from both the design,
designers alike not only react to the issues of the
consultation, governmental and regulatory sides of
present but in a way also help shape the way we
the process. It is clear that all these projects and
deal with problems in the future. The projects are
their interrelationships show three different methods
great examples of this process as they are not only
for approaching the problem of mixing infrastructure
successful and inventive but can help inform the way
and architecture. Although we as architects tend
infrastructural related projects are addressed in the
to look at these for their architectural merits and
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Section V: concluSion
urban implication, what is often glossed over is the intense team and process involved in getting them completed. When you look at the process of these projects they seem more similar than one may get at first impression. As these three projects show, coordination between different agencies and parties involved on a specific project is integral to the creation of what most would consider a positive outcome, not only in a functional project but one that can synthesize multiple interests into one cohesive idea and implementation of that idea into the built environment.
Section V: concluSion
27
Client
Architect
Government
Dept. of Trans.
Advocacy
Project Manager
Structural
Construction
Weiss/Manfredi Architects Northeast Collaborative Architects
Federal Government FHA/FRA/DNR
Mass DOT Seattle DOT RI DOT
Artery Building Committee Mayor Edward B. Murray
Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff Barrientos LLC PB Americas
Magnusson Klemencic Associates Jacobs Engineering Group
Sellen Construction Gilbane Building Company
Design
Oversight
Section V: concluSion
Year 7
Year 6
Year 5
Year 4
Massachusetts State Government Seattle Art Museum Rhode Island Airport Corporation
KEY:
28
Year 3
Year 2
Year 1
Composite Big Dig, Seattle, TF Green
Approval
Section V: concluSion
Collaboration
Advocacy
Funding
29
Year 25
Year 15
Year 14
Year 13
Year 12
Year 11
Year 10
Year 9
Year 8
Works cIted 1. Luberoff, David, Civic Leadership and Major Transportation Projects: Lessons from Boston’s Artery Business Committee and the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, 2005, 3. 2. Ibid, 4. 3. Ibid, 5. 4. Murphy, State’s Cost-Recovery Efforts Have Been Nearly a Lost Cause. Boston Globe, 2/10/03, http:// www. boston.com/globe/metro/packages/bechtel/021003.shtml 5. Luberoff, David, Civic Leadership and Major Transportation Projects: Lessons from Boston’s Artery Business Committee and the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, 2005, 29. 6. John Bok and Thomas Nally, “Joint Development Subcommittee Update,” in ABC, “Board of Directors’ Briefing Book,” September 26, 1990. For an overview of the various plans see Boston Redevelopment Authority, “Central Artery: Framework for Discussion,” 1989. 7. Edwin Sidman, author’s interview, July 19, 2002 and Frederick Salvucci, Letter to Edwin Sidman, February 16, 1990 in “Board of Directors Briefing Book,” March 14, 1990. 8. Luberoff, David, Civic Leadership and Major Transportation Projects: Lessons from Boston’s Artery Business Committee and the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, 2005, 12. 9. Idib, 11 10. Harold Hestnes, author’s interview, May 20, 2002., Luberoff, David, Civic Leadership and Major Transportation Projects: Lessons from Boston’s Artery Business Committee and the Central Artery/Tunnel Project, 2005, 12. 11. Murphy, State’s Cost-Recovery Efforts Have Been Nearly a Lost Cause. Boston Globe, 2/10/03, http:// www. boston.com/globe/metro/packages/bechtel/021003.shtml 12. Ibid. 13. Schedule is not produced by any firm or entity involved, it has been produced for this case study based on excerpts from research as well as our own expertise and experience. 14. Bahamón, Alejandro, and Maria Camila Sanjinés. Rematerial: From Waste to Architecture. New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2010. 15. Esin Kömez. Architectural Contextualism and Emerging Hybrid Morphologies: The Case of Olympic Sculpture Park for the Seattle Art Museum 16. Chris Rogers, “Risky site inspired creative thinking,” Seattle Art Museum. 17. Weiss, Marion, and Michael A. Manfredi. Site Specific: The Work of Weiss/Manfredi Architects. New York: Princeton Architectural, 2000. Print. 18. John Schwartz, “Complicated project packs a few surprises,” Barrientos. 19. Charles Anderson, “Landscape grounded in Northwest natural history,” Charles Anderson Landscape Architecture. 20. Drew A. Gangnes, “Engineering the path took a lot of twists and turns,” Magnusson Klemencic Associates. 21. Weiss, Marion, and Michael Manfredi. “Evolutionary Infrastructures.” Evolutionary Infrastructures Lecture. GSD, Cambridge. 5 Oct. 2014. Lecture. 22. John Schwartz, “Complicated project packs a few surprises,” Barrientos.
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23. Bill Badger, “Sculpting an oasis from a blighted landscape,” Sellen Construction 24. Brian Alexander, “Artist’s glass creation will make stroll on bridge a walk in the clouds,” Seattle Times 25. Weiss, Marion, and Michael Manfredi. “Inhabiting Topography.” Utzon Lecture Series. UNSW Built Environment. 5 Oct. 2014. Lecture. 26. Ibid 27. Schedule is not produced by any firm or entity involved, it has been produced for this case study based on excerpts from research as well as our own expertise and experience. 28. “Northeast Collaborative Architects.” Northeast Collaborative Architects. Web. 24 Oct. 2014. <http://www. ncarchitects.com> 29 Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Richards, Jodi. “New Intermodal Connection Expected to Lure Passengers, Airlines to T.F. Green Int’l.” Airport Improvement Magazine. Airport Improvement Magazine, Nov. 2010. Web. 25 Oct. 2014. <http:// www. airportimprovement.com/content/story.php?article=00228>. 33. Ibid. 34. The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations. Web. 22 Nov. 2014. <http://sos.ri.gov/govdirectory/ index.php?page=DetailDeptAgency&eid=283>. 35. “About Us.” - Rhode Island Rhode Island Department of Transportation. Web. 22 Nov. 2014. <http://www.dot. ri.gov/about/index.php>. 36. United States. City of Warwick. City Council. Warwick Station Development District Master Plan. Warwick: Goody Clancy, 2012. Web. 25 Oct. 2014. <http://www.warwickri.gov/pdfs/planning/WSDD %20Master%20 Plan%20Final%20Approved.pdf> 37. “Northeast Collaborative Architects.” Northeast Collaborative Architects. Web. 24 Oct. 2014. <http:// www. ncarchitects.com> 38. Gardiner, Glenn. “T.F. Green Interlink.” E-mail interview. 13 Nov. 2014. 39. “Jacobs Engineering Group.” Jacobs Engineering Group. Web. 22 Nov. 2014. <http://jacobs.com/>. 40. “New Transit Hub in Rhode Island Connects Commuters to All Modes of Transportation.” - BSCES. Web. 22 Nov. 2014. <http://www.bsces.org/index.cfm/page/New-Transit-Hub-in-Rhode-Island-ConnectsCommuters-to-All-Modes-of-Transportation/cdid/10985/pid/10371>. 41. Ibid. 42. “About Gilbane Inc.” Commercial Real Estate Development and Construction by Gilbane Inc. N.p., n.d.Web. 22 Nov. 2014. <http://www.gilbaneco.com/AboutGilbane.aspx>. 43. “Interlink T.F. Green Airport.” Gilbane Building Company, T.F. Green Airport. Web. 22 Nov. 2014. <http://www. gilbaneco.com/featuredProject.aspx?id=2147484579>. 44. “Parsons Brinckerhoff.” Parsons Brinckerhoff. Web. 22 Nov. 2014. <http://www.pbworld.com/>. 45. “Transportation.” Parsons Brinckerhoff: Airports. Web. 22 Nov. 2014. <https://www.pbworld.com/ capabilities_ projects/transportation/airports.aspx>.
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46. Gardiner, Glenn. “T.F. Green Interlink.” E-mail interview. 13 Nov. 2014. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Richards, Jodi. “New Intermodal Connection Expected to Lure Passengers, Airlines to T.F. Green Int’l.” Airport Improvement Magazine. Airport Improvement Magazine, Nov. 2010. Web. 25 Oct. 2014. <http:// www. airportimprovement.com/content/story.php?article=00228>. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Schedule is not produced by any firm or entity involved, it has been produced for this case study based on excerpts from research as well as our own expertise and experience.
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