Attack on Pearl Harbor by Casemate Publishers Ltd

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR STRATEGY, COMBAT, MYTHS, DECEPTIONS ALAN D. ZIMM Graphics by

MATT BAUGHMAN

Philadelphia & Newbury

Published in the United States of America and Great Britain in 2011 by CASEMATE PUBLISHERS 908 Darby Road, Havertown, PA 19083 and 17 Cheap Street, Newbury RG14 5DD Copyright 2011 ÂŠ Alan D. Zimm ISBN 978-1-61200-010-7 Digital Edition: ISBN 978-1-61200-021-3 Cataloging-in-publication data is available from the Library of Congress and the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed and bound in the United States of America. For a complete list of Casemate titles please contact: CASEMATE PUBLISHERS (US) Telephone (610) 853-9131, Fax (610) 853-9146 E-mail: casemate@casematepublishing.com CASEMATE PUBLISHERS (UK) Telephone (01635) 231091, Fax (01635) 41619 E-mail: casemate-uk@casematepublishing.co.uk

CONTENTS Introduction Folklore, Viewed with a Critical Eye

CHAPTER

Strategic and Operational Setting

CHAPTER

Targets, Weapons and Weapon-Target Pairings

CHAPTER

Wargames

CHAPTER

Planning the Attack

CHAPTER

Pre-Attack: Training, Rehearsals, Briefings and Contingency Planning

139

CHAPTER

Execution of the Attack

151

CHAPTER

Assessment of the Attack

173

CHAPTER

Battle Damage Assessment

225

CHAPTER

What Might Have Been: Alerted Pearl Harbor Defenses

267

CHAPTER

Assessing the Folklore

289

CHAPTER

The Fifth Midget Submarine: A Cautionary Tale

327

CHAPTER

Reassessing the Participants

355

CHAPTER

Summary and Conclusions

371

APPENDIX

Tabulation of Second-Wave Dive-Bomber Attacks 387

APPENDIX

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Japanese Terms

391

APPENDIX

Ships in Pearl Harbor and Vicinity

394

APPENDIX

The Perfect Attack

401

APPENDIX

Acknowledgments

413

Bibliography

415

Endnotes

425

Index

454

C HART S AN D D I AG R AM S 1.

Chart of Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

World Distribution of Battleships, 6 December 1941

World Distribution of Battleships, 1 January 1942

US Technical Mission to Japan Ordnance Data Page, 800-kg AP bomb

US Technical Mission to Japan Ordnance Data Page, 250-kg GP bomb

5. 6.

Torpedo Bomber Planned Attack Routes

121

AP Bombing Anticipated Results

127

Number of Inboard Battleships Crippled or Sunk

128

Japanese Aircraft Approach Routes

135

10. Timeline of Planned Torpedo Attacks on Carriers and Battleship Row

188

11. Actual Development of Torpedo Attacks on Carriers and Battleship Row

189

12. AP Bombing Under Actual and Expected Conditions

197

13. Distribution of Number of Inboard Battleships Sunk or Crippled

197

14. Submarine Patrol Areas

223

15. Torpedo Hits: Claimed and Actual

230

16. AP Bomb Hits: Claimed and Actual

233

17. GP Bombs: Hits Claimed and Attacks Claimed

239

18. GP Bombs: Hits Claimed and Actual Hits

241

19. GP Bombs: Hits Claimed and US Records of Attacks

245

20. The Fifth Midget Submarine: Event Flow Chart

339

C HAP T E R T HR E E

WARGAMES

First Estimates Early in April 1940 Yamamoto’s staff officer for air discussed the attack with his opposite number on the Second Carrier Division’s staff, Lieutenant Commander Suzuki Eijiro. Suzuki believed that, with surprise, the attack could succeed. However, he believed that it would cost the Japanese three of the four carriers used in the attack, perhaps all four. Suzuki calculated that if the Americans sent up 100 bombers, that Kido Butai’s defenses could eliminate only about 40, leaving 60 to bomb the fragile carriers.1 Wargames The first test of the attack’s operational concept was in a series of wargames conducted in September of 1941. While other staff members in the main facility gamed the Southern Advance, 30 selected personnel— a group of the most senior commanders—withdrew to a separate room. The specific rules used in the wargame have not surfaced, but from some of the surviving commentary it is possible to understand the basic structure the Japanese used. First, some background. There were three styles of wargames prevalent among the navies of the period: 71

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

• Rule-based games, where all movement and combat was regulated and adjudicated strictly in accordance with specific, predetermined rules. Combat results were determined by deterministic rules, or alternately a throw of the dice or random number tables provided variability; • Umpire-controlled games, where combat results were decided by the judgment of subject matter experts or specificallytrained officers; • Hybrid games, a combination of rule-based and umpire-controlled games, where rule-based or randomly generated combat results can be overruled or modified by the umpire. The leading practitioner of naval wargaming was the United States Navy. The Naval War College (NWC) held academic and analytic wargames using rules first introduced in the early 1920s and constantly updated. Wargames at the tactical and operational level constituted the majority of the time spent in instruction in the senior officer’s course, lasting nine months to a year. By 1941 the rules and data filled hundreds of legal-sized pages. In contrast, the British naval wargaming rules ran to 43 pages.2 The USN also had a simplified system used during fleet exercises. Rules were strictly followed. An umpire had the authority to adjust results in the course of the game for those cases not handled thoroughly in the rules (which were few). When testing operational plans, the atmosphere was very interactive, with all ranks providing input and criticism. Calculations of logistic requirements were an integral part of the games. At the NWC, strategic map wargames and tactical wargames were used for training, to test out and explore options in war planning, and to compare the capabilities of potential ship designs, test out tactics, and formulate fighting doctrine. Operationally, commanders used games to test plans for weaknesses, practice responses to enemy countermoves, and explore logistics concerns. For American naval officers, the games were intense—in the schoolhouse, reputations were made and broken; underway, admirals who blundered in fleet exercises were known to be passed over for promotion or gracefully retired from active service. The Japanese ran hybrid games, primarily to test operational plans to see how they stood up to enemy countermoves. The Japanese wargames could also be an intensely political process.

Wargames

In the case of the games testing the Pearl Harbor plans, Yamamoto used gaming as an opportunity to socialize the plan with his senior commanders and the Naval General Staff. The game introduced the plan’s concept, showed its potential, and corrected conceptual and operational errors. It allowed Yamamoto to muster his supporters and, more significantly, to flush out the opposition, drawing them into making their positions public. This prevented situations where officers could work against the plan behind the scenes—the game forced them to make their positions open and public, so Yamamoto could identify them and deal with their objections. The plan could be changed on the spot to address some officers’ issues. In other cases, with the opposition identified, Yamamoto could employ his considerable charm, and appeal to them directly for their support. Several key opponents identified during the games were convinced to withdraw their opposition. This socialization process was of considerable significance, considering the sometimes volatile nature of Japanese decision making. For example, When Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon, the commander of the Second Carrier Division [Hiryu and Soryu], became aware that planners were considering not including his command in the strike force bound for Pearl Harbor, he became highly intoxicated and physically seized Nagumo and, watched by a collection of officers who made no attempt to intervene, beat his commander until the latter agreed that Yamaguchi’s formation would be included in the task force. In another confrontation, Yamaguchi threatened to kill Nagumo.3 Surprisingly (by Western standards) Yamaguchi retained his command. His desires were accommodated, not as a result of his conduct but because his conduct aligned with Yamamoto’s desires. His behavior could be interpreted as the kind of “fighting spirit” the Japanese valued. The wargaming environment also conferred a certain amount of control to the host, in this case, Yamamoto. A few words with the umpires might influence results to favor those options Yamamoto desired, and show undesired options in a bad light. With control of the assumptions and combat results, a good umpire could govern the outcome, both of the game and of the political process.

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

Japanese wargames tended to push logistic matters to the background. Logisticians could attend and observe the games to see what support would be required of them, but clearly they were subordinate to the combat commanders. Logistics did not drive the scenarios, as in the NWC games. The Japanese Pearl Harbor games did not totally neglect logistics, but did assume that the logistics problems would be overcome. The Japanese staff system valued accord and promoted unanimity. Agreement with the group was a guiding principle. Dissenters had strong social and professional pressures to concur with the group. As a result, after agreement it was very difficult to later challenge assumptions or judgments. Anyone attempting such impudence would at best firmly be put in his place, at worst publicly reprimanded. Commanders might be required to execute a plan that they felt was seriously flawed. Prange’s Misinterpretation Japanese wargaming during World War II has been given a bad reputation by Prange, who criticized the wargames that preceded Pearl Harbor and especially those held before the Battle of Midway. In the workup to the Midway operation, Prange highlighted a game where the Japanese force was attacked and two carriers were lost. Rear Admiral Ugaki Matome, the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet, intervened and restored the two carriers.4 In Prange’s words, “With a sunny lack of realism . . . He did not scruple to override unfavorable rulings of other umpires.”5 Prange contends such actions were the result of overconfidence and a refusal to credit the Americans with a reasonable level of combat effectiveness. Concentrating on personalities rather than process, Prange characterizes the wargame as a contest of one-upmanship. He scolds what he sees as “war games rigged to make the enemy look incompetent, just as in the planning for Pearl Harbor.”6 Prange did not understand operational wargaming. His interpretation is seriously flawed. One purpose of an operational wargame is to understand what could possibly go wrong and to gather insights on how a plan might progress in the face of enemy countermeasures. Umpires’ decisions are revised to take into account modifications of the plan, lessons learned, to prevent the game from departing too far from what is considered the most probable course of events, or to allow different elements of the plan to be exercised.

Wargames

“Game” is an unfortunate label, as it connotes an activity with winners and losers. “Chart exercise” is a better title, with less baggage. Consider a chart exercise where a carrier force is approaching an island for a surprise attack. During the approach the Carrier Force Commander believes he has not been spotted, so, after his strike is launched he retains his CAP (combat air patrol) fighters on deck. Unbeknownst to him, an enemy submarine spotted his force and the enemy launched their own air strike. With no fighter protection aloft, nine hits sink two of the carriers. The lesson is, “Keep CAP aloft at all times.” Notes are made to change the operational order to that effect, and the results recalculated assuming the fighters were properly on station. The exercise proceeds. Compare this with Prange’s description of the wargame held prior to the Battle of Midway: . . . during the table maneuvers, the theoretical American forces broke through and bombed Nagumo’s carriers while their aircraft were away from their mother ships attacking Midway—the very situation which had concerned Ugaki. Lieutenant Commander Masatake Okumiya, the umpire, ruled that the enemy had scored nine hits, sinking both Akagi and Kaga. But Ugaki would not suffer such lese majeste, and immediately overruled Okumiya, allowing only three hits, with Kaga sunk and Akagi slightly damaged. And later, when conducting the second phase practice, he blandly resurrected Kaga from her watery grave to participate in the New Caledonia and Fiji invasions.7 A wargame has many potential paths. Many could result in cancelled operations or major readjustments to a plan, since “no plan survives contact with the enemy.” To prevent wasting time exploring possible (but improbable) rabbit-trails, combat results often have to be readjusted to allow the entire plan to be exercised. What Prange interprets as hubris, as “lese majeste,” and depicts as an inability to stare unpleasant reality in the face, is actually a common and necessary practice in operational planning wargames. With two carriers sunk, the operation would likely be broken off, so continuing down that path would not have been fruitful. The objective of the wargame is not for one side or the other to “win,” but rather to see how to best execute the operation and to ferret out unanticipated factors.

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

Prange failed to mention that the nine hits were generated by a die roll, not by a pre-calculated deterministic ruling.8 The die roll may have given an extremely improbable result, a statistical outlier, a result entirely appropriate for Ugaki to overrule. On the other hand, Okumiya is said to have been surprised by the move, indicating either that it was unusual to intervene in this manner, or that the change was questionable. Japanese wargaming was hostage to the judgment of flag officers. Consider another gaming situation. A force takes a route through shallow water and runs into a minefield. Two carriers are lost. There is an alternate route available in waters that cannot be mined. The two carriers are restored to the game, and a note made to change the operational plan to avoid the shallow water. This is not lese majeste, simply the accepted practice of adjusting the course of the action to account for lessons learned. Prange accepted uncritically comments made by Fuchida that, “If any notable difficulties arose, Ugaki arbitrarily juggled them in favor of the Japanese team.”9 Without a clear understanding of operational wargaming, he did not know to ask questions that might have resulted in a more balanced assessment and a better understanding of what might require Ugaki to make adjustments to the game’s combat results. Much of this testimony comes from Fuchida. Here, as in many other places, he relates the story in a manner that places others in a bad light and intimates that Fuchida knew better all along. Fuchida was not the impartial witness needed to pass judgments on Ugaki’s decisions. As the exercise proceeded, Ugaki and his staff should have been noting lessons from the individual encounters and tabulating them to discuss after the game. Japanese culture and manners limited on-the-spot criticism. The results were likely adjusted so the exercise could continue to test the plan. Prange stated that “cheating occurred during the war games for Pearl Harbor,”10 as if it was a schoolyard game with winners and losers. He was oblivious to Ugaki’s responsibility to monitor the proceedings, and, while ensuring they did not stray far from the objective, that of exercising the entire plan. Similarly, Ugaki “resurrected” Kaga to allow the officers in command of the New Caledonia and Fiji operations to undergo the crucible of simulated battle with carrier support included in their plan. In the real world, Kaga was lost and the New Caledonia and Fiji operations were cancelled. There was nothing to be gained in the wargame by “practicing” can-

Wargames

celling the operation. To exercise its part of the operation Kaga was needed, so Kaga was “resurrected.” Certainly the games can be criticized. The process of converting game lessons to planning changes appears to be less effective than it ought to have been—it may not have been formalized at all. The usual American practice was to include note-takers capturing all such issues in preparation for discussions afterward; we do not know if the Japanese had a similar formal practice. Their practice was likely more informal, with individual officers installing changes to their parts of the operational order based on their personal observations and discussions with their counterparts. A trap of wargaming is the assumption of godlike powers by umpires and admirals. Games proceed under conditions that they deem realistic, even if they are based on judgments that others might question. In the Japanese games there were disagreements over some decisions, but the purpose of a chart exercise is to bring such disagreements out into the open for consideration. The game’s Japanese critics should not be ignored. There were flaws in the game and gaming process, and judgment calls by the umpires and admirals that were questionable. However, the Japanese wargaming effort was more robust, less arbitrary, and more productive than Prange’s interpretation would suggest. Certainly it was not perfect; in the Midway game there were elements of the “Victory Disease” that infiltrated Japanese attitudes and thinking, along with a sense they would win regardless of what the Americans threw in their path. Victory Disease had yet to taint the environment when Yamamoto held the first of several wargames to examine the Pearl Harbor attack— more the opposite, as most Japanese naval officers were in awe of the magnitude of what they were about to attempt. These wargames seemed genuine, with perhaps some staging by Yamamoto to help socialize acceptance of his plan with other senior officers. They were games to explore operational alternatives, and not merely to put an existing plan to the test. As such there appears to be fewer interventions by senior officers, although there were some rather improbable judgments that, as will be seen, reflected the role the gods were assigned to play. The First Games The first of the wargames were played on 16–17 September 1941. The

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

Japanese allocated all four of their active fleet carriers to the striking force. The carriers were spotted before they launched their attack, alerting Pearl Harbor’s defenses. The Japanese strike met heavy resistance from interceptors and AA. Half the strike aircraft were shot down,11 losses on the order of 106 to 127 aircraft (depending on the composition of the strike). Only “minor” damage was inflicted. Counterattacks by US aircraft sank two carriers and damaged the other two. The attack was a disaster. The next day the game was re-run with some modifications. The plan was modified so that the carriers made a high-speed overnight approach to arrive at the launch point before the American scouts were in the air for their morning search. Surprise was achieved. The strike was judged to have sunk four battleships and severely damage one, sunk two carriers and severely damaged one, and sunk three cruisers, with three cruisers heavily damaged. One hundred and thirty US aircraft were destroyed,12 50 in the air and 80 on the ground. US counterattacks sank one carrier and severely damaged another. While withdrawing, a fortuitous (probably umpire-generated) rain squall screened the Japanese fleet from further damage.13 The attack was deemed feasible, but heavy Japanese losses were expected.14 Details of the game rules and damage assessment formulae, along with details of the composition of the strike, are not known, along with details such as how many B5N Kate bombers carried torpedoes, and what proportion of the D3A Val dive bombers were allocated to hit ships and what proportion were allocated to airfield targets. The D3A Val dive bomber had at this time demonstrated (in training) a 50 to 60 percent hit rate, but B5N Kate torpedo bombers had yet to solve the shallow water problem. Rigorous training in April of 1941 had increased the B5N Kate level bombing hit rate from 10% to 33%.15 But, with the uncertainties in how the Japanese composed their strikes, there is insufficient information to reproduce the calculations for each weapon, and how the stated result was achieved. The wargame serves as a benchmark to what the Japanese believed an attack with four carriers might accomplish. If the enemy was alerted and had their air defenses ready, the Japanese felt that there would only be “minor” damage inflicted. If surprise was attained, the damage inflicted by the four carriers would be enough to immobilize the main body

Wargames

of the US Pacific Fleet for the needed six months. But only 130 of the estimated 550 American aircraft on the island would be destroyed, leaving sufficient air power for strong counterattacks. Consequently, the risk was deemed high. “At the September war games, even with the umpires bending over backwards in favor of the home team, all had agreed that they must anticipate the sinking of several carriers.”16 Part of the “bending over backwards” perhaps involved the anticipated hit percentages against the fleet. In this wargame, four Japanese carriers accomplished more damage against warships than was accomplished in the actual attack with six carriers. It may have been that the Japanese saw that the level of effort used in this wargame achieved sufficient damage against the fleet targets, but there were shortfalls in the damage inflicted on American air power. So, when Shokaku and Zuikaku became available, they were pulled into the attack plan, and the bulk of their aircraft was directed to the offensive counter-air (OCA) role. Another alternate possibility is that the aircraft in the actual strike did not achieve the hit rates and fire distribution expected of them, so the six carriers, in reality, caused less damage then was predicted for the four carriers in the wargame. Another optimistic assumption was that one A6M Zero was the equivalent of three enemy fighters—when one officer tried to challenge “such stupidity” he received a “sharp admonition.”17 Another Round of Games Beginning 13 October 1941 another wargame was held on the flagship Nagato, with Yamamoto as host. This time the striking force had only three fleet carriers—Akagi was pulled out at the insistence of the Naval General Staff to support the attack on the Philippines.18 In this game surprise was achieved, but only “moderate damage” was inflicted. How the damage was assessed is again unknown, as is the threshold between “major,” “moderate,” and “minor” damage. The Japanese warships took no damage, but the operation was seen as “less than satisfactory.”19 One might suspect that Yamamoto welcomed the verdict of “moderate damage” inflicted by the three carriers—that is, if he hadn’t set up that outcome—since that usefully established the need for more carriers in the minds of the attending Naval General Staff officers. In addition,

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

the Japanese force escaped without damage, another result that Yamamoto would welcome in his campaign to obtain approval for the attack.20 A few weeks later Yamamoto asked for and got all six fleet carriers. Not all the discussion was on the expected offensive results of the operation. Many of the planners emphasized bringing the precariously vulnerable carriers back to home waters quickly and safely. The need for repeated attacks against Pearl Harbor did not come up during the wargames, although two of Yamamoto’s planners—Genda and Commander Sasaki Akira, Yamamoto’s Air Staff Officer—talked about the possibilities before and after the exercises. Nevertheless, in front of the flag officers the exercise concentrated on what could be accomplished against the American fleet units in a single strike of two waves, and the costs in terms of aircraft and carriers damaged and sunk.21 Summary The wargame results established mental models of expected outcomes (cause and effect) in the minds of the attending officers. These models can be summarized as follows: # of IJN CV 4

Surprise?

Unit Type

BB: CV: CA/CL: Aircraft:

Yes

BB: CV: CA/CL: Aircraft:

Yes

BB: CV: CA/CL: Aircraft:

US Losses Sunk Damaged

IJN Losses Sunk Damaged 2

“Minor” 4 2 3

~127 (50%) 4 1 3

130 “Moderate”

No Damage

The possible Japanese losses were daunting—they were losses on a strategic level, losses that could influence the course and outcome of the war as a whole. And yes, there were opportunities for the umpires to inject bias—Admiral Kusaka thought “the results depended too much on the various personalities of the umpires.”22

Wargames

The Japanese were never ones to allow calculations of material forces (or a roll of the dice) to take precedence over their deeply held belief in the primacy of fighting spirit and the unquantifiable superiority of Japanese crews and equipment. These games were “mere mathematical exercises.” They ignored the factors of luck and divine guidance, factors that the proponents were sure favored the Japanese.23 In spite of the gods’ expected bias, the word that filtered down to the aviators was that they faced a fifty-fifty chance of dying for their Emperor.24 To Yamamoto, whatever the circumstances, whatever the potential for losses, the effort had to be made. He was adamant. The issue went beyond logical argumentation. In an exchange with one of his most intransigent opponents, Yamamoto “put a hand on Kusaka’s shoulder and said with an air of utter sincerity, ‘Kusaka—I understand just how you feel, but the Pearl Harbor raid has become an article of faith for me. How about cutting down in the vocal opposition and trying to help me put that article of faith into practice?’ ”25 Western readers, grounded in theories of total war based on calculations of material superiority and firepower, might dismiss this approach as something akin to superstition, an outmoded, backward belief system. If so, they have eluded understanding. In war, there are only three ways to win: by annihilating the enemy, totally incapacitating him, or by eliminating the enemy’s will to fight. The first two are more in line with Western theories of war, but occur in a tiny number of cases historically. Few wars or battles have been won by annihilation or total incapacitation of the enemy. The overwhelming majority conclude when one side decides to quit. The Western way of war strives for annihilation but accepts the enemy’s surrender well before annihilation. Changing the enemy’s will to fight is a by-product of material losses. Instead, the Japanese recognized the primacy of the will to fight from the outset, striving for means to convince the enemy to quit without requiring overwhelming incapacitating losses to settle the issue. If this could be accomplished, as in the Russo-Japanese War or the Sino-Japanese War, their relatively small country could successfully win against opponents many times their size. Just because their approach did not work in World War II does not invalidate it—it simply demonstrates that the course to winning a war based on the psychological defeat of the enemy must be carefully charted.

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

Yamamoto sought to induce despair in the volatile American voting public by destroying an inviolate symbol of naval supremacy, the battleship. He was convinced he had taken the measure of a population that was vocally pacifistic. He did not understand that the loudest voices in the American polity may not be the most representative. Several times after the wargames he reasserted his determination to make the attack, in one instance announcing, â&#x20AC;&#x153;As Commander-in-Chief I have resolved to carry out the Pearl Harbor attack no matter what the cost.â&#x20AC;?26

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR STRATEGY, COMBAT, MYTHS, DECEPTIONS

The December 7th, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor has been portrayed by historians as a dazzling success, “brilliantly conceived and meticulously planned.” With most American historians concentrating on command errors and the story of participants’ experiences, the Japanese attack operation has never been subjected to a comprehensive critical analysis of the military side of the operation. This book presents a detailed evaluation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on the operational and tactical level. It examines such questions as: Was the strategy underlying the attack sound? Were there flaws in planning or execution? How did Japanese military culture influence the planning? How risky was the attack? What did the Japanese expect to achieve, balanced against what they did achieve? Were there Japanese blunders? What were their consequences? What might have been the results if the attack had not benefited from the mistakes of the American commanders? “Zimm's conclusions will remain definitive for the foreseeable future… So, by all means, reread Gordon Prange's At Dawn We Slept, but definitely read Alan Zimm's Attack on Pearl Harbor for a fuller and more up-to-date understanding of an event that changed history and continues to fascinate.” Michigan War Studies Review “It is not often that one can say that an outstanding book transforms our knowledge of a well – known event but this can be said of Alan Zimm’s Attack on Pearl Harbor….groundbreaking… sets straight the record of a key historical event…essential reading…” Dr. Eric Grove, Navy News “…nothing previously published has offered such a close examination of Japanese strategy…an in depth study of the Japanese planning, preparation and execution of the attack with particular focus on factors not thoroughly considered by other historians, if at all…full of revelations that counter common perceptions…detailed analyses that lead to a much better understanding of what the Japanese did, why they did it and especially how the attack was very nearly an abject failure instead of a stunning success.” Proceedings “Readers will be left with a great deal to think about and consider new aspects of the attack that are illuminated in Zimm’s book. This excellent analysis is a definitive critique of the Japanese planning and execution of the attack. For any serious student of the Pacific War, the volume makes for fascinating, “must” reading and should be included among the very best books on the Pearl Harbor attack.” Naval Historical Foundation Attack on Pearl Harbor is available in print & eBook from all booksellers.