Violence and drug trafficking: influence on society and state reactions Fifty thousand dead: that's the human toll of drug trafficking in Mexico since Felipe Calderón came into power in 2006. This figure, to which must be added those of many other countries in the region, is revelatory in linking violence and drug trafficking in South America. How, then, might we set about explaining the sort of difficulties faced by authorities in the fight against drug trafficking? This question in turn leads to another: how might we understand the intensity of the violence surrounding the drug trade? The latter seems to take root in societies that provide fertile breeding ground for a sort of ‘narco culture’. An analysis of the societal issues raised by drug trafficking requires a look of the history of cartels. In addition to this, it is worth noting that drug-‐related violence is closely related to a number of factors specific to the region. History and typology of cartels The term ‘cartel’ surfaced in the 1980s. Created by the American judiciary as a blanket term to describe activities related to drug trafficking in South America, it carries no precise definition1. Elie Tenenbaum distinguishes three generations of drug traffickers2. The first was born in Colombia, Medellin (hence its name ‘Medellin Cartel’) in the mid-‐1970s. The head (or capo) of the Medellin cartel, Pablo Escobar, is probably the most famous drug trafficker of that period. Born into an underprivileged milieu and poorly educated, his desire was to make drug trafficking an ‘open and participatory’ enterprise3. Cultivating a paternalistic image through the financing of housing and community facilities (such as the zoo at Hacienda Nápoles), he would recruit youth from disadvantaged backgrounds, acquiring for himself a sort of ‘Robin Hood’ image. He even attempted to enter politics in order to set in motion the ‘Medellin without Slums’ movement. However, Escobar is also characterized by extremely violent measures that resulted in the murder 1
Adolfo Leon Atehortua Cruz, « Les organisations du trafic de drogue en Colombie », in Culture et Conflits, Articles inédits, 2008, p.3. 2 Elie Tenenbaum, « Mexique : Narco-‐insurrection au pays du serpent en plumes », DSI, 5 May 2011. 3 Adolfo Leon Atehortua Cruz, « Les organisations du trafic de drogue en Colombie », art. Cit. p.4.
of many politicians and journalists eventually, and these eventually caught up with him. His assassination by a paramilitary group in 1993 marked the end of the Medellin cartel. Also born in the 1970s, the second generation of drug traffickers is collected in the ‘Cali Cartel’. Even before the death of Escobar, it opted for a different approach to the violence of the Medellin cartel. If the Cali cartel ‘is not inherently less violent than Medellin [...], its strategy of insertion and development reserved violence for specific, targeted goals rather than employing it as the principal means for situating and maintaining its power’4. The druglords of the Cali Cartel confirmed this strategy after the death of Escobar. In order not to suffer the same fate, they decided to abandon violence and preferred a strategy of widespread corruption. The cartel thus ‘informally’ formed alliances with regional elites, by attending social gatherings as well as legally securing economic investments. In the 1980s, the arrival of guerrillas altered the existing balance. In 1981 the guerrilla M-‐19 kidnapped Marta Nieves Ochoa, one of the daughters of the Ochoa clan, a family of the Medellin Cartel, leading the capos of different cartels to join forces to defend their interests. They created MAS (Muerte A Secuestradores or ‘Death to Kidnappers’) that quickly attracted the favour of government: both the state and drug traffickers united in a common interest in the fight against the guerrillas5. Such cooperation emphasizes the porosity of borders between legal and illegal, government and cartels, which reinforces endemic corruption. In addition to the fight between traffickers and the Colombian state against the guerrillas, there was a war between cartels in 1988, and a clash between the cartels and the FARC guerrillas6 between 1987 and 19897. The fight against cartels, and their decommissioning in the early 1990s, worked mostly to the advantage of the FARC. The FARC engaged in cocaine trafficking in the 1980s, working hand in hand with the cartels: the drug traffickers would produce cocaine on territories under FARC control in exchange for a share in the profits. However from the 1990s, the guerrillas got directly involved in drug trafficking8. 4
Observatoire Géopolitique des drogues, « Colombie : la stratégie du cartel de Cali », 1994. Adolfo Leon Atehortua Cruz, « Les organisations du trafic de drogue en Colombie », art. Cit., p.7. See also: Daniel Pécaut « Trafic de drogue et violence en Colombie », 1991, in Culture et Conflit, p.7. 6 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Revolutionnary Armed Forces of Colombia. 7 Adolfo Leon Atehortua Cruz, « Les organisations du trafic de drogue en Colombie », art. Cit., p.10. 8 Jean-‐Michel de Marchi, « L'histoire des Farc, de la révolution au trafic de drogue », Rue89, 3 July 2008. 5
There no longer exist cartels in Colombia as important as those that were around in the 1980s. There are many small producers, and ‘drug dealers are more cautious, less exhibitionist, and more removed from politics and the social elite’9. Drug trafficking has ‘democratized’ itself, with a division of its production process: in Colombia, there is a split between production, conception, etc. The most dangerous activities such as transportation of the product to the United States today are granted mainly by Mexican organizations. Mexican cartels emerged as soon as those in Colombia disappeared as a result of repression. These are a third generation of drug traffickers, who combine ‘the coercive force of the first and the underground funding of the second, the entirety of the operation based on an exceptional adaptation to the opportunities presented by globalization’10. These cartels are characterized firstly by an extreme recourse to violence, founded, unlike with the first generation, on principles of militarization and professionalism. The latest generation of drug traffickers is comprised largely of former soldiers who have deserted their ranks due to negligible earnings. They are often former members of the Fuerzas Especiales of Grupos Aeromóviles (GAFES), elite units to combat terrorists (that is to say, suppress the insurrections of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, in the mid-‐1990s). These former military men and other corrupt police were grouped under the name ‘Zetas’ in the early 2000s. Initially under the control of the Gulf cartel, they quickly became independent. Then a phenomenon Tenenbaum refers to as zétanisation occurred: the employment of military techniques in gang warfare, forcing all the other cartels to adapt their approaches in rising to the challenge. The arrival of the Zetas on the cartel scene initiated an escalation in violence, strengthened by the acquisition of heavy weapons (anti-‐tank weapons, explosives, etc.), helicopters and even submarines with the profits from drug trafficking and kidnapping. This professionalization and militarization of criminal activity is the reason behind the increase of extreme violence characteristic to the third generation cartels. The second characteristic of these organizations is that their modus operandi is not confined to ‘the production and marketing of illegal goods and services’11. They function like the Italian mafia, involving themselves at all levels of social life and using their influence to manipulate 9
Adolfo Leon Atehortua Cruz, « Les organisations du trafic de drogue en Colombie », art. Cit., p.16. Elie Tenenbaum, « Mexique : Narco-‐-‐-‐insurrection au pays du serpent en plumes », art. Cit. 11 Adolfo Leon Atehortua Cruz, « Les organisations du trafic de drogue en Colombie », art. Cit., p.1. 10
the economy (e.g. racketeering traders) as well as direct education and career prospects12. This ‘exceptional adaptation to the opportunities presented by globalization’ is directly visible in the diversification of the activities of cartels, branching out into activities such as the kidnapping of Latin American illegal immigrants in the process of being deported by the United States. The emergence of such phenomena can be explained by the desire of cartels to diversify their sources of income, in this case demanding ransoms from the families of these deported illegal immigrants. Mexican President Calderon clamped down on drug trafficking, and the narcos simply adapted and reacted thus. The Mexican National Commission on Human Rights estimated that about 10,000 of them were kidnapped over the course of 6 months13. The influence of drug trafficking on society: the emergence of a ‘narco culture’ The appearance of a ‘narco culture’ is unique to the third generation cartels. Originating with drug traffickers, this culture spread to a large part of Mexican youth and those living in the border towns of Mexico. It seems to have imbued youth culture; most young men are drug dealers. Narco culture can be defined as a sort of criminal subculture, which is expressed in many areas: music, film, architecture and even religion. In the arts, music, film and video games14, the growing influence of narcos in Mexican culture is visibly reflected. An example of this would be the appearance in Mexico of narcocorridos, songs in praise of the drug traffickers. Corridos have existed since the 1910s (at the time of the Mexican Revolution). Guillermo Benares, a researcher at the Centre for Advanced Studies in Education of Monterrey states: ‘These are songs that tell everyday stories in the tradition of the troubadours. They draw on people's lives. First, the revolutionaries, then, from 1925, the “tequileros” cowboys who led the herds in the United States and became bootleggers during Prohibition. Areas that appreciated the corridos were those that trafficked. Inevitably then, the two were eventually married. After the tequila came marijuana in the 60s and, from 1970, cocaine. Since the late 90s and the advent of drug cartels, the narcocorridos exploded and now accounts for 80% of the musical production.’15 12
Mark Stevenson, « Les cartels mexicains s'inspirent de la mafia italienne », Cyber Presse, 2009. S.A., « Enlèvements : le nouveau business des narcotrafiquants en Amérique latine », RFI, 2010. 14 Aude Lasjaunias, « Un jeu vidéo sur le trafic de drogue fait polémique au Mexique », Le Monde, 11 March 2011. 15 Jerôme Pierrat, « La ‘narcoculture’ est arrivée », Le Point, 8 November 2007. 13
The most famous of these narcocorridos groups are Los Tigres del Norte and Los Tucanes de Tijuana. Their music can be compared to gangsta rap in the United States insofar as these two musical currents condone criminals. Moreover, given that these narcocorridos reach audiences in Mexican-‐US border towns, it is unsurprising that their popularity has stretched to other Latin American countries (Guatemala, Honduras, etc.). Their success is reviled by Mexican authorities, which accuse these narcocorridos of glamourising a lifestyle based on extreme violence and ostentatious displays of wealth16. Traffickers promote and enjoy these songs largely to taunt the police. PAN (Partido Acción Nacional, the National Action Party, to the right of the political spectrum and currently in power) has decided to ban these songs and put their singers jail. In May 2011 a decree banning the playing of these narcocorridos in public places was signed17. It is a well-‐ known fact that there is a tight connection between singers of these narcocorridos and the drug traffickers, who often invite them to play for their private parties18. For the less fortunate who are unable to afford a group to play for them live, narcocorridos are prolific in nightclubs on both sides of the US-‐Mexico border. Narcocorridos singers are not the only ones with links with the criminal underworld. The film stars who play these narcos often maintain ambiguous relationship with their ‘models’, sometimes to the point even of becoming victims of gang warfare. As with each genre, ‘narco-‐ cinema’ has its own classics (which includes La Camioneta gris, made in 1990), its own stars and its own codes (extreme violence, corrupt police). It is estimated that the revenue of this trade is used to bribe police officers19. Shaul Schwarz, a photographer who worked on Israeli narco culture, points out that the filming of these movies sometimes even takes place in the villas of traffickers. In his eyes the narcos are proud to open the doors of their homes to these production companies, so as to be able to watch the movie with their friends and say “See, such-‐and-‐such was filmed at mine!”’20. The existence of a narco culture is also reflected in the field of architecture and fashion. If the houses of these narcos (purchased with money from the drugs) do not reveal anything very iconoclastic an architectural point of view, they are nevertheless symptomatic of the willingness of dealers to exhibit their success, manifested by the use of ‘kitsch’ and glitz. Then there are the specific trends in fashion associated with and dictated by narco culture. 16
S.A., « Le Mexique veut interdire les Narcocorridos », Drogues News, 1 February 2010. Emmanuelle Steels, « La guerre aux ‘narcocorridos’ », La Presse, 26 May 2011. 18 Ibid. 19 Louis Lepron, « Mexique : Dans le narcocinéma, ‘la pute est une pute, le flic un flic’ », Rue89, 29 January 2012. 20 Priscille Lafitte, « Shaul Schwarz : La Californie et le Mexique qui s’habillent en narco », France 24, 5 September 2011. 17
Beyond the artistic aspect, narco culture even extends to the religious domain. Present on the screen, on the radio, narco culture has penetrated into some of the most intimate spheres. They lead a cult to Santa Muerte, the protector from death, as well as to Santa Jesus, father of the narcos (a highwayman hanged in 1909). For Shaul Schwarz, ‘even the most feared narcos are really afraid of Santa Muerte’21. How to explain such a cult? If Mexicans are a people steeped in Christianity, syncretism occurs amongst certain indigenous cults. Narco religiosity is part of a global process of hybridization of religions22, the ‘saints narcos’ being also recognized by either the Catholic Church or by the Mexican government, both of which seek instead to prevent proliferation of shrines dedicated to them23. Their worship and protection they offer are not necessarily reserved to narcos. One of the followers of Santa Muerte is none other than the Mexican Minister of Public Safety, who asks him for protection against drug traffickers. This ‘personification of death for people who risk losing their lives on a daily basis answers to their troubles of negotiating constantly with the end’24 and corresponds to the phenomenon of a ‘religion of crisis’ observed anthropology. For drug traffickers, the figure of Santa Muerte does not embody so much the fragility of life but rather the entirety of life. Prisoners appeal to her for a reduced sentence. It does not appear that this culture can be likened to a soft power (in the terminology of Joseph Nye, meaning a tool of cultural influence) consciously implemented by traffickers. It is rather a crucial element of the ‘Narco Way of Life’ (analogous the American Way of Life), which has spread to both sides of the US-‐Mexico border25. If the extension of this is culture so intimately linked to drug trafficking, does it amount to a crime in itself? While it is clear that the proliferation of a culture glorifying narcotics may influence youths to join gangs, it is safe to assume the majority of those who live along the US-‐Mexico border adopt aspects of this narco culture without themselves being traffickers. This discussion points, at least where narco cinema and music are concerned, to the two conflicting theories of catharsis and mimesis. For proponents of the first theory, the distribution of movies and songs in praise of the narcos allows the viewer (or listener) to get rid of his impulses, anxieties and fantasies by living through the hero or situations represented. In other words, living these adventures in the imaginary realm stops the viewer (or listener) from replicating them in reality. 21
Ibid. Alma Guillermoprieto, « Mexican Saints », in National Geographic, May 2010. 23 Raphaël Morán, « Santa Muerte, vierge des narcotrafiquants », Le Monde des religions, 17 January 2011. 24 Marion Du Bron, « Santa Muerte : A Mexico, un culte grandissant face à la catastrophe écologique », lepetitjournal.com, 30 November 2010. 25 Priscille Lafitte, « Shaul Schwarz : La Californie et le Mexique qui s’habillent en narco », art. Cit. 22
Conversely, for supporters of the theory of mimesis, watching these movies and listening to these songs inevitably lead the viewer (consciously or not) to reproduce these behaviors in reality (e.g. by joining a gang). In all cases, there is no denying that the spread of this culture has the effect of trivializing the violence of narcos, which surely has some part to play in its expansion. Explaining the level of violence in drug trafficking Beyond the use of extreme violence for psychological ends, in order to create a climate of fear and intimidation, it is worth examining the more profound causes of the relationship between drug trafficking and violence. Gabriel Kessler notes that violence is not a self-‐evident upshot of trafficking. In fact, one of the objectives of criminal organizations is actually to reduce the violence. Thus one must search for factors that may explain its undesired escalation and maintenance at destructive levels26. The catalytic role of the economic situation is the first explanatory factor. Poverty, informality of jobs and social exclusion are all conducive to this phenomenon27. For Elena Azoala, Advisor to the Attorney General of the Republic of Mexico, ‘the root causes of this violence are associated with the enormous inequalities of society’28. The weakness of state institutions also prevents the establishment of genuine behavioural control29. Features of a functional, law-‐abiding state, that is to say a state where each citizen – in government or governed – is subject to the rule of law, are absent. This is evidenced by the daily behaviour of individuals (traffic rules rarely observed, bribes etc.). Added to this configuration is the impotence of the judiciary. A study conducted by Cidac concludes that 96% of violent crimes committed between 1996 and 2003 have not been brought to justice30. In Colombia, the weakness of the state is linked to geographical features, such forests or mountains disrupting communication. There is little confidence in institutions and low civic solidarity31. Finally, some argue that the assumption of cultural violence finds its roots in the brutality of Mexican history, which has seen three centuries of Spanish colonisation, a century of 26
Gabriel Kessler, « Crime organisé et violences en Amérique latine et dans les Caraïbes », Diploweb, 4 June 2010. Manuela Mesa, « Violence « Maras », « féminicide » et violence sociale en Amérique latine », Centre de formation pour le développement et la solidarité internationale, 2008. 28 Ibid. 29 S.A., « Approche géographique et stratégique du Narcotrafic en Amérique du Sud et de ses acteurs comme facteur de violence dans le continent », Irenees.net, 2008. 30 Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo, Asociación Civil, Mexican think-‐tank. 31 S.A., « Approche géographique et stratégique du Narcotrafic en Amérique du Sud et de ses acteurs comme facteur de violence dans le continent », art. Cit. 27
dictatorship after independence, revolution and 71 years of authoritarian rule. Catherine Heau, a history professor at the École Nationale d’Anthropologie (National School of Anthropology) emphasizes that there has never been in Mexico a ‘distinction between police, justice and thugs’32. This porosity is a sign that, as in Colombia, there is no ‘monopoly of legitimate physical violence’ that would be exercised by a sovereign state, which is a significant contributor to the diffusion of violence in a society33. What answers, state or otherwise, regional or international, have been given in response to this phenomenon? The fight against drug trafficking A radicalization of national struggles against drug trafficking Nationally, this struggle is carried out on two levels: first, there is the focus on agricultural production and the farmers directly concerned with the manufacture of the drugs. Second, there is the targeting of traffickers in Latin America. Radical methods are used in the fight against peasant agricultural production such as the destruction of plantations by the forced shutdown of production or by the aerial spraying of chemicals, making them unsuitable for production use. Special anti-‐drug forces, particularly in Bolivia, may also operate in the jungle, where they destroy laboratories that manipulate coca to produce cocaine34. Peru has invested heavily in the fight against trafficking and has implemented several programs to develop alternative crops to coca. These aim to diversify the country's agricultural production as well as to ensure employment and a living wage to agricultural producers. Peru has also created public programs to prevent drug use amongst civilians. In addition to such measures, a manhunt was launched to track down drug traffickers. Several countries have promoted not only repressive policies but also preventive ones. States severely affected by drug trafficking such as El Salvador and Guatemala have radicalized their legal system with the launch of a repressive policy against the narcos, as was the case in 2011 with the Mano Dura policy (literally translated as ‘Hard Hand’) launched by Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina and his counterpart in El Salvador. Salvadoran law thus stipulates that anyone 32
Manuela Mesa, « Violence « Maras », « féminicide » et violence sociale en Amérique latine », art. Cit. Max Weber, Le savant et le politique, Paris, Plon, 1959 (1919). 34 Vincent Prado, « Bolivie, le nouvel eldorado des trafiquants de cocaïne», Reportage Enquête Exclusive (M6), Ligne de Front, 6 November 2011. 33
suspected of belonging to a gang because of tattoos or because they are spotted with known gang members, even without any evidence, faces up to twelve years imprisonment. Along with this severe law criticized by the Salvadoran population, a Mano Amiga policy (‘Friendly Hand’) was established to facilitate the social reintegration of former gang members35. Both phenomena suggest that the fight against the narcos underwent significant radicalisation. Serious abuses arose from the fight against the drug cartels such as torture, disappearances and extrajudicial executions. In November 2011, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released its report, Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexico's “War on Drugs” which concluded that instead of ‘reducing violence, war against drug traffickers in Mexico has caused a dramatic increase in the amount of murder, torture and other abuses by the security forces’36. Since the war on drugs declared by President Felipe Calderon, HRW believes it has sufficient evidence to inculpate the Mexican police, accusing them of nearly 170 cases of torture, 39 disappearances and 24 extrajudicial executions. The Mexican Ministry of Justice furthermore considers that of the nearly 45 000 homicides since 2006, only 22 would have been convicted by the police37. The fight against drug cartels has also led to the emergence of extremely violent paramilitary groups in Mexico responsible for the killings of gang members, such as the Matazetas (killers of the Zetas). Even if the fight against these drug cartels is the main objective of these central and Latin American states, the war against the narcos had only had a limited impact and has essentially given rise to an escalation violence38. Towards exit from this international imbroglio The situation is complicated at international level. The ineffectiveness of the fight against drug trafficking can be explained in part by the decline in North American interventionism, the progressive methods of traffickers, and the legal framework. Drug traffickers adapt quickly to certain measures taken against them. For example, since the narcos realised that their tattoos could lead to more or less arbitrary arrests, some simply ceased to be tattooed or had their tattoos removed. 35
Sophie Dubreil, Marine Verna, Joseph Brew, Albert Kimbembe, « Les nouvelles formes de violence sociale en Amérique Latine : les gangs comme facteurs de conflits et comme acteurs de violence », 2008. 36 Human Rights Watch, “Neither rights nor security”, 9 November 2011. 37 Catherine Gouëset, « Mexique : la sale guerre contre les narcos », L’Express, 16 November 2011. 38 Global Study on Homicide Report, p.25, figure 1.11 subregional trends in homicide suicide, the Americas 1995-‐2010.
The decline of U.S. interventionism in the fight against drug trafficking in Central America dealt a major blow to these countries. Since the 1980s and the war launched by the United States on drug trafficking, drug trafficking was considered the number one enemy of the national security of the country mainly because of its proximity to Mexico, and so a U.S. federal police force was established. The majority of drug users are located in the United States and the fight launched against drug trafficking particularly concerns them. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the three Mexican cartels of Sinaloa-‐Juarez, Gulf and Tijuana control nearly three-‐quarters of the drug market in the United States39. DEA operates on almost the entire South American continent, where it is responsible for ensuring the effective implementation of the fight against drug trafficking, especially against the American Mafia and the laundering drug money in banks or tax havens40. Bolivia no longer falls under its responsibility, as President Morales expelled DEA agents in 2008, accusing them of political espionage. This decision immediately benefited narcos (especially coca growers), who now had free rein of the country. This case has had a significant impact on the anti-‐drug budget: the withdrawal of U.S. funds reduced it to a third. The failure of some U.S. operations earned them considerable criticism, as illustrated by ‘Operation Fast and Furious’ conducted in July 2010. Initiated by the ATF, the federal agency on alcohol, tobacco and weapons, this programme’s intention was to pass two thousand contraband weapons to Mexican drug traffickers, in order to trap them by following the traces of these weapons. However, these quickly disappeared and two hundred of them were found or used on crime scenes41. The international legal framework comes no closer to halting the spread of drug trafficking, despite the signing of three international conventions ratified by the Central America states forcing them to meet their commitments and translate them into domestic laws. The first of these conventions dates from 1961 and was ratified by 179 states on 1 November 2002: it established a list of drugs (the main ones are opium, morphine, heroin, methadone, codeine, cocaine, and cannabis). The second, dating from 1971 and ratified by nearly 172 countries, establishes a list of psychotropic substances (ecstasy, LSD, amphetamines). Finally, the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, ratified by 166 States, complements this legal arsenal by providing increased international cooperation as well as control of twenty-‐three 39
Markus Schultze-‐Kraft, « Tout un continent sous l’emprise des narcos », Courrier International, 30 April 2009. S.A., « La Drug Enforcement administration », Le Monde diplomatique, 2000. 41 Darrell E. Issa, Charles E. Grassley, 26 juin 2011, « The Department of Justice’s Operation Fast and furious: fueling Cartel Violence », p.8. 40
chemicals needed to manufacture illegal drugs, referred to as ‘chemical precursors’42. States that have ratified these conventions must establish national drug control institutions, and a national classification of drugs in order to better target them. They remain free however to decide how they wish to relevantly penalise criminal offenses relating to the possession and trafficking of drugs as well as the implementation of devices to reduce risk and lower demand. They must however cooperate with United Nations agencies, in particular with the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which oversees the implementation by states of these international conventions and delivers reports assessing the progress made by signatory states. In its 2010 report, the Board has welcomed the continuation of the Central American Integration System (SICA) as an engine of regional integration and cooperation dealing with the threats of drug trafficking on security, renewing its commitment to 953 million dollars in the organisation. It has also been noted in the action plan resulting from the summit of heads of state of the member countries of SICA in San Salvador in July 2010, the need to examine the role of the police chiefs in the national struggle, to curb corruption43. Despite these advances in international and regional cooperation, concrete results remain elusive. The Global Commission on Drug Policy has nevertheless attempted to revive the process in June 2011. Composed of personalities from all over the world (Kofi Annan, Mario Vargas Llosa, Paul Volcker, four former presidents -‐ Fernando Cardoso of Brazil, Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, César Gaviria of Colombia and Ruth Dreifuss of Switzerland), the organization started from the premise that ‘the global war against drugs is a failure’44. It therefore advocates the decriminalization of drugs – a decriminalization of recreational use and possession of drugs, and a ban on sale and production – and the legalization of cannabis, that is to say, an authorization of its sale and consumption via a state control on production and distribution. In addition to this proposal, the Commission wants to refocus their strategy to be implemented by revising the current policy of zero tolerance launched nearly forty years ago by U.S. President Richard Nixon. To this end, it proposes to revise the UN conventions on drugs, with the aim of encourage a dialogue between producing and consuming countries. For former Brazilian President Henrique Cardoso, legalization would enable ‘huge amounts of money used today for repressive policies to be used in preventive policies and rehabilitation’45. 42
« Les conventions sur les stupéfiants », 1961, 1971 et 1988. « Rapport Organe International de Contrôle des Stupéfiants 2010 sur l’avancée de la coopération », 2010. 44 Rapport de la Commission mondiale sur la politique des drogues, juin 2011, p. 12, recommandation n°2. 45 Adeline Journet, « Mario Vargas Llosa pour la légalisation des drogues en Amérique latine », L’Express, 4 March 43
A losing battle? Despite the hopes the World Drug report gave rise to, for many observers the fight against drug trafficking appears doomed to failure. Drug trafficking seems to have outstripped national and international governmental efforts at intervention, for several reasons. First, in response to the ‘war’ waged against them, drug traffickers move their production to other countries (including to the countries of Central America, as in the case of Mexico). This phenomenon is termed the ‘duster effect’ (or the ‘cockroach effect’) and appears to prevent any sustainable disruption of production. The answer to this permanent displacement might lie in cooperation and full coordination between the states of South and Central America in the face of their common enemy, but so far this remains lacking. The other two factors explaining this failure must be sought in the socio-‐economic context of these states on the one hand, and the extension of political and economic power of drug traffickers on the other. The complexity of the fight against drug production and drug trafficking in Latin America stems from several characteristics key to Latin American countries. In the absence of other equally lucrative production avenues, the cultivation of coca is the first single stable source of income for farmers. In Bolivia, coca growers (cocalejos) receive income ranging from about 200 to 400 euros per month46, while the Bolivian minimum wage is 50 euros per month. This discrepancy is explained by the strong demand for coke from the narcos. The removal of this particular sort of agricultural production greatly diminishes the standard of living of these people. On the other hand some crops are an integral part of culture and tradition. In these countries, as Bolivian President Evo Morales states, ‘coca is not poisonous to humans’47. Instead, it is a plant carrying a sacred and mystical value, and is used as an offering to the goddess Pachamama. Furthermore, the cocalejos consume coca everyday because it serves as an appetite suppressant and fights certain ailments such as altitude sickness in the Andes Mountains. The sustainability of drug trafficking can be explained by the economic and political power of the traffickers. There exist palpable links between political power and the narcos48. For example, General Salabria, one of the senior members of the Bolivian anti-‐drug effort, was
2011. 46 Vincent Prado, « Bolivie, le nouvel eldorado des trafiquants de cocaïne», op. cit. 47 Ibid. 48 Thierry Garcin, entretien avec Alain Musset, 21 November 2011.
arrested because of his membership in a cartel. Mexican investigative journalist Anabel Hernández49 pointed to the existence of a collusion between the police and the powerful Sinaloa cartel50, led by Joaquin Guzman. Incidentally, the latter was ranked one of the most influential people in the world by Forbes in 2009. This collusion is even stronger at local level: nearly 70% of Mexican municipalities were infiltrated by narcos. Their goal is not officially take power but to keep the elbowing there way about through intimidation by violence, and if necessary by targeted displays of it to affect morale. The son of Honduran President Ricardo Maduro was kidnapped and then murdered in 1997. Similarly, the Mexican Minister of the Interior Francisco Blak, specializing in the fight against drug trafficking, died in a helicopter crash in November 2011. The same accident had occurred two years earlier with his predecessor Juan Camilo51. Beyond policy makers, enforcers of law often have relationships with cartels. The difficulties inherent in their profession is summarized by the unequivocal formula ‘lead or silver?’ (that is to say, ‘bullet or gold?’) that explains how corruption, massacres and money laundering are commonplace. One of the latest examples is the dismissal of 284 senior officials acting in league with drug traffickers in the blitz that took place on the outskirts of Tijuana in 2007, during which nearly 400,000 members of the police at all hierarchical levels were placed under surveillance. Within the framework of a concerted fight against corrupt officials, other operations of the same magnitude will certainly be executed in the future52. If the fight against drug trafficking is a failure at both national and international levels, the solution might lie with non-‐governmental actors in the case of Mexico. Pressure from civil society could bring to power the current opposition, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI) in the forthcoming presidential elections scheduled for July 2012. Hector Moreno, a political scientist at the Technological Institute of Monterrey, said that unlike the discredited PAN, the PRI retains ‘the image of a strong structure, guaranteeing public order and an ability to govern firmly’53. Action on the part of civil society was seen in June 2011, with the crossing of Mexico by a ‘Caravan of Peace’54. The second initiative likely to change the situation is that of ‘hacktivists’, in this case the Anonymous. The latter, one of whose members was kidnapped by the narcos, managed to blackmail traffickers and secure the release of their 49
Annabel Hernandez ,“Los senores del narco”, Grijalbo Mondadori Sa, November 2010. Delphine Saubaber et Léonore Mahieux, « Mexique : la fausse guerre anti-‐-‐-‐narcos », L’Express, 24 December 2010. 51 S.A., « Les mystérieux assassinats des ministres de l’intérieur mexicains », Le Monde, 3 November 2011. 52 Babette Stern, « Le Mexique tente une opération mains propres dans la police », Libération, 28 July 2007. 53 Frédéric Saliba, « Mexique : le possible retour de l’ancien parti hégémonique », Le Monde, 2 January 2012. 54 Léonore Mahieux, « Le Mexique traversé par la caravane de la paix », L’Express, 16 June 2011. 50
comrade by threatening to reveal links between the Zetas cartel and the government. Their decentralized nature, without hierarchy, is an asset for this group of hackers from threats of retaliation by the narcos. It remains to be seen whether this movement will develop with time to become a real player in the fight against drug trafficking55. There is a spectrum of responses to narcos from grassroots to nationwide, on regional and international stages. Answers are to be found in the formation of a new sustainable economic model, ensuring everyone a decent standard of living and a decent income through greater involvement of the civic power and the implementation of a real agricultural policy diversification of crops produced. States should finally solve the governance problems that undermine efforts from inside by removing corruption and promoting greater institutional transparency. Club du Millénaire: Antoine Jeanneau, Louis Rossignol, Hugo Verger-‐Garnacho Editorial board: Louis-‐Marie Bureau, Sarah Laffon Translation: Rosalind Tan
55
S.A., « Anonymous, pirates du net aux multiples visages », Le Monde, 31 January 2012.