Journal of the Company of Military Historians
35
Testing Underwater Ordnance in the Patuxent During World War II Merle T. Cole This article is extracted from the author’s monograph, “Solomons Mines”—A History of the U.S. Naval Mine Warfare Test Station, Solomons, Maryland, 1942–1947, published in 1987 by the Calvert Marine Museum, Solomons, Maryland.
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rom 1942 to 1947, the U.S. Navy operated a research, development, and proof testing facility for mine warfare, countermine warfare, and torpedo warfare including related hardware and methods on a reservation at Point Patience, near Solomons Island, Maryland.
America and Mine Warfare The United States has been engaged by one aspect or another of mine warfare since before it became a nation.1 Historians generally agree mines in their recognizably modern form first appeared during the American Revolution when David Bushnell tried to break the British blockade of Philadelphia by floating mines in the Delaware River. The so-called “Battle of the Kegs” (1778) was unsuccessful but clearly established a precedent. American inventors such as Colt and Fulton later experimented with mine designs. The Russians used electrically fired, i.e., command detonated, mines for harbor defense during the Crimean War (1853–1856). Mine warfare came to the fore during the American Civil War, during which period the terms “torpedo” and “mine” were often used interchangeably. When Admiral Farragut ordered, “Damn the torpedoes!,” he was really damning the Confederate minefield in Mobile Bay. Lacking a sizeable navy, the Confederate States were forced to rely on “infernal machines” to fight the Federal naval blockade. More Federal ships fell victim to “torpedo warfare” than to any other form of combat. By the end of the Civil War, the mine had become a firmly established component of naval warfare. Mines were employed during several European wars of the late nineteenth century and in the Spanish-American War (1898). They reemerged with a vengeance during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Two of the czar’s capital ships were lost to mines and six of the emperor’s. Mines served both sides well during World War I. GermanTurkish minefields blunted initial Allied attempts to force the Dardanelles, leading to the disastrous Gallipoli Campaign. Later, the North Sea mine barrage greatly reduced the effectiveness of Germany’s U-boat operations in the Atlantic. The U.S. Navy played a key role in laying and maintaining this extensive minefield. Mine warfare took a quantum leap during World War II. Aerial delivery of the weapons over long distances enabled their truly offensive use. When in possession of air superiority, mines could be deployed by aircraft
deep into enemy controlled waters and existing mine belts thickened without the danger of running into one’s own weapons. The U.S. Army Air Force’s aerial mining campaign against Japan during the closing days of the war is the prime example of this technique. Bomber Command committed only about 5.7 percent of total bombload to “mining in” Japanese harbors and the Inland Sea. But the enemy credited Operation STARVATION with throttling seaborne commerce and generating economic impact equivalent to Bomber Command’s bombing and incendiary raids. Along with more effective delivery techniques came the development of sophisticated activating mechanisms. Earlier mine technology relied on actual contact between the mine and the ship’s hull for detonation. “Influence” mechanisms now appeared. These reacted to changes in magnetic fields generated by a ship’s metal mass, or the noise created by ship’s propellers or machinery (acoustics), or by the reduction of water pressure caused by a ship’s passage. Such devices were often employed together in the form of pressure-acoustic, magnetic-acoustic, and similar multiple triggers. This defeated or reduced the effectiveness of countermeasures, particularly when combined with such “fiendishly clever” devices as ship counters. These waited until a preset number of activations (ship passages) had occurred before detonating the mine. Thus did minefields believed to be “cleared” offer some nasty surprises to mariners. Although United Nations forces quickly established air and naval dominance during the Korean War, they could not overcome Communist mine warfare. Sovietdirected mining of coastal waters presented a major and unexpected challenge. In fact, all five American Naval vessels lost during the war were destroyed by mines. At Wonsan Harbor, a field of over three thousand mines delayed a planned amphibious interdiction of retreating North Korean forces. Pursuing U.N. forces overran the harbor area before the Marines landed. So effective were Soviet magnetic and contact mines, some American naval officers concluded the U.S. Navy had “lost command of the sea” in mined areas. Although the Navy renewed its emphasis on countermining measures, deteriorated since World War II, its overall approach to mine warfare as a whole has been characterized as ambivalent. Mine warfare was mainly of nuisance value during the Vietnam War until the very end. In May 1972, the Navy sowed mines in the inland rivers, coastal waters, and harbors of North Vietnam. Seaborne traffic, including several Soviet freighters, was “mined in” at Haiphong Harbor, and vessel movement ceased. This pressure facilitated conclusion of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho
