Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia: A U.S. Experts Workshop

Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia: A U.S. Experts Workshop Samuel R. Berger Richard K. Betts Dennis Blair Stephen W. Bosworth Anla Cheng Gerald L. Curtis Karl W. Eikenberry Takeo Hoshi Merit E. Janow Robert Jervis Charles Lake Winston Lord Xiaobo L端 Andrew J. Nathan Marcus Noland Hugh T. Patrick Ezra F. Vogel Donald S. Zagoria

Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia: A U.S. Experts Workshop

On June 27, 2014 eighteen of America’s leading East Asian experts met at Columbia University for a daylong discussion of Northeast Asia, focusing on the increasingly tense relations between China and Japan and the Republic of Korea and Japan and the threat posed by a nuclear armed North Korea. The objective of the workshop was twofold: to exchange views on the root causes of these tensions and to take a kind of first cut at considering policy recommendations for how the United States government can help reduce them and strengthen its relationships with our allies Japan and South Korea and with China. We were gratified to see the enthusiastic response to our invitation; there were several additional experts who were unable to attend because of other long standing commitments and whom we expect to participate in future meetings. What follows is a brief summary of the discussion.

We believe that the dramatic changes that are ongoing in Northeast Asia, both politically and in economic relations, call for a new look at United States policy in a region of the world that is of central importance to America’s security and well-being. We proceed from the conviction that the appropriate role for a group such as this one is not to lecture others about what their governments’ policies should be but to provide policy advice to our own government. As scholars and practitioners, we look forward to continuing this conversation and aim to produce analyses and policy recommendations that will inform public debate about American foreign policy and contribute to America’s ability to play a leading role in managing change through a period of extraordinary dynamism in Northeast Asia.

Gerald L. Curtis Burgess Professor of Political Science

Merit E. Janow

Dean, School of International and Public Affairs Professor of Professional Practice, International Economic Law & International Affairs

Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia:

A U.S. Experts Workshop

Merit E. Janow opened the workshop by welcoming participants and discussing the rationale for the gathering. She noted that this workshop was convening because tensions in Northeast Asia are mounting and pose serious threats to peace and stability in the region and to American interests. A US expert group such as this could potentially make an important contribution by putting forth ideas and recommendations for US policy in East Asia. While the US-China economic relationship continues to deepen and now includes substantial two-way investment along with trade, and while people-to-people interaction is expanding, there is a significant increase in “strategic distrust” between the United States and China. Japan is making important changes in its foreign policy, which is being met with suspicion and criticism in China and Korea. The importance of the region and the changing security and economic landscape in East Asia is of such importance that we believe it merits calling together a group of our country’s leading Asian experts.

Janow encouraged participants to consider both economic and security issues in the discussion as well as the interaction between these elements. She also noted that in her recent travels to China and Japan she came away with the impression that both Japan and China, for their own separate reasons, saw regional trade agreements, including with the United States, as being extremely important in facilitating the implementation of a domestic economic reform agenda. There appears to be domestic opposition in both Japan and in China to a number of the structural reforms that have been identified by the country’s leaders as important to support ongoing economic growth and prosperity.

In Japan, for example, opposition to agricultural liberalization remains acute and immigration reform is politically sensitive. In China, while a very ambitious economic reform agenda has been announced, the phasing and implementation of that agenda faces many obstacles. This domestic interest in the value of international trade agreements creates opportunities for the US to play a leadership role in advancing its trade agenda, but uncertainty remains in both Japan and China as to whether the US will get domestic authority to conclude trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and for China, whether the US is willing to include China in the process even in the future. She also noted that in China, the view prevails that Japan is purposely seeking to increase bilateral tensions in order to justify policy changes to make Japan the kind of “normal” country that Prime Minister Shinzō Abe desires. Japanese officials, for their part, often express concern that China’s actions are increasingly aggressive and unpredictable and demand a firm response. She observed that these are a few of the current strains in the region and the interaction between security and economic factors that warrant attention by this distinguished group of experts.

SESSION 1

China-Japan Relations Moderator: Donald S. Zagoria Introductions: Winston Lord, Gerald L. Curtis

Donald Zagoria opened the session with four introductory points. He suggested first that the China-Japan situation has reached a particularly dangerous juncture, primarily due to the Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict and the hostility generated by arguments about history. Second, he noted that recent close encounters of Chinese and Japanese aircraft in the East China Sea remind us we could be one mistake away from a serious accident that could escalate into military conflict. Third, he noted that the United States has a vital stake in trying to insure that China and Japan avoid conflict which would invariably involve the United States because of its treaty commitments to Japan.

Fourth, he suggested that President Xi Jinping’s May 21, 2014 speech in Shanghai was very important in signaling a new Chinese effort to weaken the US alliance system in Asia.

Distinguished guests gathered at SIPA

Winston Lord began his introductory remarks by noting that there appears to be a significant change in China in the longstanding belief that the US-Japan alliance benefits Beijing. Although Mao Zedong and Chou En-Lai accepted the view that the US-Japan alliance makes a positive contribution to regional stability, China’s leaders now talk of the alliance as being destabilizing and providing cover for Japan’s remilitarization. Lord stated that he believed that both Japan and China want to avoid a military clash, but he noted that the parties were no more than an accident away from conflict.

He also said that if there were to be a military clash it would be because of Chinese policy towards Japan and not the other way round. Lord argued that President Xi is China’s most powerful leader since Deng Xiaoping and is taking the most muscular policy stance on China’s territorial disputes since 1972, pushing aggressively in both the East China Sea and South China Sea. This policy, he averred, serves as a convenient distraction from domestic issues.

Lord noted that Japan remains the only country in East Asia that can challenge China, and that the longstanding historical wounds between the two countries only encourage present-day tensions. He also stated that he sensed a significant debate was taking place within the Chinese leadership: should they stick to Deng’s “hide and bide” strategy or rally behind a more muscular foreign policy.

Lord noted some recent “mixed signals” on China’s policy towards Japan: Beijing has reduced its patrol activity around the Senkaku

islands, and the two countries are exchanging envoys, yet China recently buzzed Japanese aircraft in a dangerous maneuver. On balance, he maintained, historical issues seem to be overriding the potential for deeper cooperation, and recent Chinese moves have major implications for American interests. China may be seeking to change the status quo unilaterally, whether through its interpretation of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its position on international arbitration, or its incremental grabs in the South China Sea. According to Lord, these are Chinese efforts to erode US credibility in the region. Beijing realizes that it cannot drive the United States out but seeks to erode its influence gradually. This raises the broader question of Chinese intentions in how to manage the world order. Are they seeking adjustments that would reflect China’s increase in global power, or is the intention to overhaul the international order in a fundamental way? The answer remains to be seen, Lord argued, but he maintained that President Xi is a potentially dangerous leader and that the years ahead look rocky for China-Japan relations.

Gerald Curtis began his remarks by noting that experts have long predicted a “sea-change” in Japanese security policy. This time, they are likely to be right, he argued. This inflection point is not occurring simply because Abe is prime minister. What he is doing builds incrementally on policies adopted by previous governments. But over time incremental changes can accumulate to a point where they create a foreign policy that is qualitatively new and

different. Japan under Prime Minister Abe is reaching that point. Since the end of the Second World War Japanese have been opposed to Japan becoming a major military power, preferring to rely on alliance with the United States. Anti-militarism remains an important constraint on Japanese policy, as evidenced by Prime Minister Abe having to accept a restrictive definition of what is permissible under collective self-defense, but it is weaker than ever before. And this change in the domestic political environment comes at a time of a growing sense of insecurity spawned by the collapse of the bipolar system that underwrote Japanese security policy during the Cold War. In this new era, Japan will do more for the alliance and more for itself.

Curtis noted some important developments in China-Japan-US relations that suggest the possibility for improvement in bilateral relations. First, he said that Prime Minister Abe has signaled that he probably will not visit the Yasukuni shrine this year though he will not make a public declaration to that effect.

Chances are better than not that he will not go to Yasukuni again as prime minister if there is some improvement in relations with China – since a Yasukuni visit would destroy whatever progress had been made – and if he understands how adverse a visit would be not only for relations with China and Korea but with the United States. It is important for the US to do a better job of getting this point across without appearing to be making demands or lecturing the Japanese prime minister as to how he should behave. What was seen in Tokyo as heavy-handed American attempts to forestall a Yasukuni visit last December clearly backfired. Second, he underscored the importance of President Barak Obama’s reiterating in Tokyo the United States’ public position that the Senkaku Islands, as territory under the administrative control of Japan, are covered by the US-Japan security treaty. That has been the official US position for years, but it is important that the president stated it in Tokyo. However, President Obama needs to go further to make it clear that Chinese efforts to drive a wedge between the US and Japan, America’s most im-

portant ally in East Asia, will fail and that Chinese actions that worsen relations with Japan will have an adverse impact on Sino-American relations as well. Third, Curtis noted that China has to be concerned about declining Japanese private sector investment in China, a decline driven by rising labor costs in China but also by a concern about political risk.

Curtis argued that there are hopeful signs that both Japan and China, even if for tactical rather than strategic reasons, are looking for ways to reduce tensions and to hold a bilateral summit on the sidelines of November’s AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in Beijing. Both sides seem to be edging toward accepting a formula for dealing with the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute by which each would continue to insist on the legitimacy of its claim to sovereignty but agree that the Senkaku issue is a serious bilateral “foreign policy problem” that the leaders of the two countries need to discuss face to face. This is the way for Japan to continue to insist that it recognizes no legal “dispute” over sovereignty and for China to claim that Japan has agreed to discuss the Senkaku issue. In other words, it is the way to put the Senkaku issue back on the shelf and enable President Xi and Prime Minister Abe to shift their focus to areas where cooperation is possible.

Chinese patrols in Senkaku’s contiguous waters have declined in recent months and are being met by reciprocal reductions in Japanese patrols.

Curtis noted that Prime Minister Abe has been cautious in his Senkaku management: he has respected the long standing informal understanding that Japan would not put people on the islands or build any infrastructure on them, and he has quietly indicated his willingness to have the Senkaku issue put on the agenda of a bilateral summit. For progress to continue, China must realize that Prime Minister Abe probably will be in office for several years more, and that Chinese interests will not be served by policies that only increase Japanese public support for a strong response to Beijing’s actions. Diminished economic ties are bad for both countries, and China’s muscular policy towards Japan will only push the US and

tion Army (PLA) budget skyrocketed, internal Chinese opposition to the PLA was destroyed and we are now living with the consequences.

Likewise, a Senkaku/Diaoyu incident would have a major effect over long-term dynamics.

The Japanese are very proud that they have not lost a service member since WWII, noted Blair.

We would likely see much stronger support for rearmament and a more muscular security policy following a serious clash.

Andrew J. Nathan and Ezra F. Vogel

Japan closer, and encourage unilateral Japanese pushback. If rationality prevails, Curtis argued, China and Japan will take steps to de-escalate the East China Sea crisis, and he expressed cautious optimism that there would be some improvement in relations toward the latter part of this year. Over the long-term, however, SinoJapanese rivalry will be a prominent feature of the international politics of East Asia. The United States needs to consider what it can do to mitigate and respond to it.

Donald Zagoria summarized some issues for further discussion, including Gerald Curtis’ short-run hopefulness and the structural changes that have occurred in the region as the Cold War world has given way to a multipolar one. He also raised the question of what the future security architecture in the region should look like and if changes were needed to the longstanding US system of alliances. He then opened up the floor for discussion.

Dennis Blair maintained that he was not terribly concerned about a Senkaku incident, even if it involved military casualties. Chinese activity in the East China Sea is less imaginative than in the South China Sea, he stated. Furthermore, accidents and the disappearance of vessels or aircraft happen frequently in the Western Pacific. As evinced by the EP-3 incident, there is a formula for managing these incidents. The long-term political effects of these incidents are more important, however. In the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, for example, the US scored a short-term victory, but the People’s Libera-

In response to queries from Andrew Nathan, Blair discussed what might occur if a Senkaku/ Diaoyu clash did take place. He noted that the Japanese Coast Guard and Navy are more competent than their Chinese counterparts but that both countries have problems communicating with their capitals. Both China and Japan likely have contingency plans to put people ashore on the islands, Blair stated, but they are unlikely to go this far. A clash would probably include shows of force, perhaps declarations of exclusion zones. But the nature of maritime clashes is that they cannot be sustained forever.

Weather can interfere. And because you don’t have civilians involved or press helicopters hovering, governments actually do control information. In this case, both governments would have to maintain face but should eventually be able to solve a standoff. In this scenario, Blair continued, the US role would be limited to intelligence, rear area support, and the like. The Japanese are pretty clear that they have primary responsibility for the Senkaku islands, and the United States has agreed to a support role. The US would fly aircraft close to the scene, but not nearly as close as Japan’s Air Self Defense Force, for example. This would remain in an indirect support role.

Ezra Vogel noted that the region at present was far more complex than it had been in the Cold War, with far more channels for communication. He suggested that for the Chinese, antiJapanese sentiment would remain a convenient distraction from domestic issues, but that Beijing would have to try to keep this sentiment under control so that it does not explode. A key question is whether they can manage this balance. If there is a major inflection point, Vogel

asked, can we expect a rapid change in Japanese military spending?

in US-China relations will be resolved over decades with tests of strength and will.

Gerald Curtis replied that a Senkaku incident that resulted in death or injury to Japanese coast guard personnel would have a galvanizing effect on Japanese public opinion and in all likelihood would dramatically increase Japanese public support for major strengthening of Japan’s military capabilities. At present, it is difficult for Japan to make large increases in its defense budget given its fiscal constraints but if there were a serious incident that transformed Japanese apprehension about a “China threat” into concrete reality there probably would be strong public support for making the sacrifices necessary to substantially augment Japan’s military power. Even in the absence of such a clash, we are seeing an accelerated removal of constraints on what the Japanese military is able to do. Japan is coming into the international arms market, Article Nine has been stretched to permit collective defense, and debate about security policy options that had long been considered taboo is becoming possible now.

Participants debated how economic interdependence colored this picture, noting strong bilateral economic ties between Japan and China. This includes foreign director investment, trade, and tourism, which some maintained should place some constraints on conflict. How should we think about the relationship between the regional economic and security architectures? Participants noted that there remains ample opportunity for economic cooperation between the US and China and Japan and China. Beijing must prioritize environmental protection, clean technology, and food safety.

Both the US and Japan are obvious partners in these endeavors. Despite differing views on the prospects for success of Abenomics, participants agreed that the Japanese economy could do much better than it has in recent years. Several members underscored the importance of the TPP and raised the question of how China could be brought in, in part if not in whole.

Another noted the importance of demographic trends in all three countries, arguing that Japan would have trouble sustaining 2 percent growth amidst population decline. One participant wondered if economic interdependence mattered if the PLA took initiative in escalating conflict. Blair responded that the PLA tended to have autonomy around lower-stakes issues or events but has historically been under tight control when actual incidents occur.

In response to Winston Lord’s argument that the US must maintain the credibility of its East Asian alliances while also encouraging newer, stable, regional institutions, Andrew Nathan argued that from Beijing’s vantage point, the current security architecture is unacceptable.

China’s leaders can acknowledge that the US presence served the region well for decades, but that is no longer the case in as much as it involves deployments near China’s territorial waters. From Beijing’s perspective, Nathan argued, problems involving Korea, Japan, and the South China Sea are all US-induced. Beijing sees the US, Japan, Philippines, and others as having fundamental weaknesses that will grow over time. Chinese see this as a long game. Strategists consider the will to fight in addition to military capabilities. Nathan mentioned James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon’s recent book, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S. China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, noting that their seeminglypragmatic proposals for improving Sino-US relations are unrealistic because they are not acceptable to China. Nathan argued that issues

Donald S. Zagoria

Richard K. Betts

Blair noted that China’s need for continued growth and development has historically been a stabilizing force when crises occurred and wondered whether this remained as such. Winston Lord replied that the overarching goal of the government is to maintain party control, but there is certainly continued interest in improving the lot of the Chinese people. He argued, however, that this stabilizing force is probably not as strong as it once was and called for more serious strategic dialogue between Washington and Beijing. Lord argued for a return to frank discussions without talking points, as had previously been possible between the countries.

Winston Lord and Stephen Bosworth both urged caution and modesty concerning predictions and power transitions. A rise in Chinese power does not inexorably spell US decline, nor is there any certainty about the future of the Chinese economy. We should remember earlier predictions about Japanese long-term growth. Nathan, however, cautioned against taking comfort in Chinese domestic weakness or interdependence with the West. He argued that China’s leaders do not want to take over the world, but do consider the current status quo unacceptable and intend to improve it in their favor inch by inch.

Returning to each country’s motivations, Gerald Curtis stressed that we should not exaggerate the Abe factor in explaining recent developments in Japanese foreign policy, that foreign policy trends are being driven by structural factors and would not be notably different if someone else were

prime minister. Prime Minister Abe has been able to accelerate the pace of change because his party has control of both houses of the Diet, making it possible to get legislation passed that was stymied for the past several years by the opposition’s control of the Upper House. In terms of policy there is continuity, even with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government he replaced. Prime Minister Abe’s national defense guidelines for example build directly on the guidelines adopted by the DPJ government in 2010. Prime Minister Abe’s chief liability is not just that he takes a revisionist view of history but that he has raised suspicions that those views of the past color his vision of Japan’s international role in the future.

Prime Minister Abe needs to articulate a broad vision that emphasizes regional cooperation and not just play up potential threats to justify his aim to make Japan a “normal” country.

On China, Ezra Vogel maintained that Beijing remains preoccupied with corruption, growth rates, and the public’s access to outside information.

He pushed back against Lord’s contention that President Xi was “dangerous” and suggested that the Chinese were selectively using anti-Japanese propaganda. Prime Minister Abe should make it more difficult for them to score propaganda victories, he advised.

Robert Jervis raised four broad points. First, he wondered if it would be useful to try to rewrite the Appendix to the Steinberg/O’Hanlon book from a Chinese standpoint. Second, he noted that unlike many persistent rivalries (e.g. Israel-Palestine), we have trouble envisioning how the ChinaJapan rivalry will end. Third, he noted that whether or not the Chinese have actually changed their view of the US-Japan alliance is important: most in the US consider the alliance to be stabilizing, but is there a moral hazard problem occurring?

Fourth, Jervis raised the question of the relationship between the future and the past. Can China and Japan get the future straight without getting the past straight, or is that a trap? Jervis noted that many future conflicts come from analyses of the past, which is odd, distorting, and important for policy. How much political and intellectual capital should we invest in trying to secure agreements about the past?

Gerald Curtis closed by saying that he was skeptical that Japan would come to grips with its history problems and that a failure to do so will continue to vex its relations with its closest neighbors and be a constraint on its foreign policy. Winston Lord urged that the United States must work on building more of a community with China and noted that there was both a floor and a ceiling on US-China relations. The two have no major bilateral conflicts and good economic relations, but the two also have fundamentally different values and interests.

Hugh T. Patrick

SESSION 2

The Korean Peninsula and Korea-Japan Relations Moderator: Andrew J. Nathan Introductions: Stephen W. Bosworth, Dennis Blair, Marcus Noland

Stephen Bosworth opened the session by describing the recent deterioration of relations between Korea and Japan over Dokdo/ Takeshima and history issues. He noted that the bilateral alliances with Japan and Korea are the cornerstones of the US position in East Asia, making their enmity a serious problem without a clear solution. In his discussion of North Korea, Bosworth stated that he did not have new ideas on how to approach the problem, nor did he detect an appetite in the US State Department to reengage with North Korea. He noted that the North’s missile and nuclear programs continue to develop, and argued that at some point, Washington as well as its allies will become deeply alarmed by this technological progress, but that we are presently doing nothing to stop it. Bosworth argued that Pyongyang has constantly surprised the world with its ability to overcome its lack of resources and maintained that another North Korean nuclear crisis would occur. He also argued that while the Chinese were displeased about North Korean nuclear development, the possibility of state collapse and a unified peninsula remains even more problematic for Beijing.

Dennis Blair began his remarks by acknowledging that the United States has tried almost everything in its toolkit with respect to engaging Pyongyang.

He spoke of changes to South Korean military doctrine after sinking of the Cheonon and shelling of Yeonpyeong (the so-called “CounterProvocation Plan”), to allow Seoul to take more forceful actions in response to provocations. Blair also noted the lingering threat of a fourth North Korean nuclear test, and statements from Seoul that an additional demonstration would amount to crossing the Rubicon. Blair also argued that the United States has little understanding of the motivations and goals of Kim Jong Un, as evinced by the execution of Jang Song-thaek. Although China has reduced its support to Pyongyang recently, aid has only been reduced by about 10 percent. And while the bonds forged by the Korean War are no longer salient to younger generations, the Chinese do not trust that major political change in North Korea will be a net positive for Beijing. Blair also argued that the United States tends to overestimate China’s coercive leverage over its ally. He noted that Washington has been predicting North Korean collapse for decades but argued that the regime could last a good long time. Blair urged, however, that we not overstate the damage that Pyongyang could do with nuclear weapons, given the threat of overwhelming US retaliation. He argued that the greater threat is nuclear proliferation, and that the North would

surely sell nuclear materials if they thought they could get away with it. Time is not on our side on this particular issue. As a result, conversations with the Republic of Korea and China should focus on proliferation.

Marcus Noland began his introduction by observing that he has never seen relations as bad as they currently are between Japan and South Korea, primarily due to the comfort women issue.

He also noted the possibility that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could diminish Japan’s faith in extended deterrence while at the same time making Tokyo unwilling to intervene in a contingency on the Peninsula lest they become a target. Noland then turned to the North Korean economy.

The Bank of Korea released its 2013 numbers on North Korean growth, which it estimated at 1.1 percent, but Noland cautioned that we should not believe any North Korea-related number that comes with a decimal point! The North Korean economy is characterized by bloated government expenditures on the military and the absence of effective tax collection, which results in a resort to the printing press and serious inflation. The North Korean economy is also characterized by increasing inequality, food insecurity, and high levels of corruption. Pyongyang is interested in ameliorating this state of affairs, but not in real reform.

China accounts for 90 percent of North Korean trade. The North Korean economy is basically a hunter-gatherer economy and involves a heavy reliance on mining exports. North Korea’s primary vulnerabilities are therefore the slowdown of the Chinese economy or seriously reduced commodity prices. Noland closed by noting that the North Anla Cheng and Xiaobo Lü

Korean economy is run on the whims of Kim Jong Un and argued that its long-run trajectory may look like certain states in Central Asia (an economy based on resource extraction that works well for the leader and his close associates but not for the general population). He also noted that North Korea is remarkably insensitive to sanctions and inducements. We should not overestimate the influence of external inducements on regime behavior.

Participants then discussed the Chinese view that the US threat to North Korea is the sources of Pyongyang’s security problem. Several participants noted that the United States has promised the North fairly substantial security guarantees.

They also then discussed whether it might be possible to revive Four Party Talks (minus Japan and Russia) and expand the Leap Day deal, as well as the possibility that Washington may be overestimating North Korean nuclear weapons capabilities or underestimating its enrichment capacity. One participant noted that it was unlikely that the United States would be able to put in place an agreement that freezes the program and reorients towards nonproliferation prior to 2017.

Another noted that the Chinese were beginning to talk quietly with South Korea about the possibility of North Korean collapse, although they are not eager to have the US at the table for these discussions.

Participants went on to discuss whether the United States would keep troops in Korea after unification, with Dennis Blair arguing that Washington’s desire to support allies and regional interests would prevent their complete removal.

Several speakers agreed that the desirability of a continued troop presence had to be determined

by US regional goals. Without harboring any Macarthur-like aims or desiring to contain China, the US may have ample reason to keep a military presence in a reunified Korea.

Winston Lord argued that the United States should take steps to freeze the North Korean nuclear program, with the ultimate goal of future dismantlement. Washington cannot, however, formally announce a decision to live with the program. Lord also argued, however, that the

North Koreans have no intention of either giving up their nuclear weapons or ceasing to abuse their own people. The human rights situation in the country is the worst the world has seen since Hitler. In light of this fact, regime change or collapse is preferable to the status quo. The United States must continue its attempts to talk to China about the collapse scenario to coordinate possible responses so that US military actions are not threatening to Beijing. Conversations about refugees are also vital.

Participants then discussed the comfort women issue between Japan and South Korea. Gerald Curtis explained that the Japanese government’s investigation into the background of the Kono Statement was an effort to appease the far right, but that it actually confirmed that the statement was based on evidence and not only on the testimony of the comfort women who had been interviewed. Although the report undercut the arguments of right wing critics of the Kono Statement, they continue to denounce it.. Moreover, by recounting the extensive discussions with the Korean government in the process of drafting the statement, Japan embarrassed Korea and made improving relations all the more difficult.

They also discussed the abductee issue in North Korea-Japan relations, with Curtis arguing that the North Korean agreement to conduct a new investigation into the issue suggests that they are ready to produce new evidence and possibly “discover” that there are abductees still living in the North. If this leads to Prime Minister Abe visiting Pyongyang this fall, as is being widely speculated in Tokyo, and his return to Japan with abductees and Japanese women who emigrated to North Korea in the late 1950s with their Korean-Japanese husbands and have been unable to return, his popularity will skyrocket. The North Korean government will do that only if it is guaranteed large amounts of Japanese aid and the removal of sanctions.

This in turn could cause a rift in Japan’s relations with the United States. Secretary of State John Kerry’s alleged warning to Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida that Prime Minister Abe should not visit Pyongyang or cut a deal with North Korea over the abductees without full consultation in advance with the United States has generated a lot

Winston Lord

of criticism in Liberal Democratic Party circles.

But Curtis argued that expectations about a JapanNorth Korea deal that would bring closure to the abductee issue are likely to be disappointed. North Korea must be aware that if this issue were to be resolved that Prime Minister Abe would then be free to shift back to a hard line policy and repair whatever damage had been done to relations with the United States. North Korea is likely to try to draw out the negotiations for as long as possible, providing information and people piecemeal in exchange for economic aid and a lifting of some sanctions, an approach that is likely to end up generating frustration in Tokyo.

The session then concluded with statements by the initial speakers. Stephen Bosworth agreed that there could be a marked improvement in Japan-North Korea relations if abductees are returned. Bosworth also agreed that the best way forward on the nuclear question was a return to the Leap Day agreement. The important conditions of such a deal remain the “Three Nos”: no more nuclear weapons, no better nuclear weapons, no nuclear exports. If we can get a deal that implements this verifiably, this would be a serious improvement over the status quo. If North Korea was willing to show American nuclear scientist Sig Hecker one uranium facility this implies that there are more of them, and US policy has not absorbed this fact. From a technical perspective, a uranium program makes it much more difficult to verifiably monitor fissile material production. Dennis Blair noted that the largest area for potential military cooperation is a Japan-ROK-US missile defense system.

Takeo Hoshi

He stated that there are no US impediments to this prospect. The major Japanese impediment is Article 9 and the interpretation of collective self-defense, which prevents data sharing.

On the ROK side, Seoul has generally been more concerned about artillery but is growing increasingly concerned about the missile threat. This system should not alarm China, as it would not be able to shoot down Chinese missiles, and the Chinese are more “receptive to facts” than the Russians when it comes to ballistic missile defense. Marcus Noland closed by noting that North Korea takes pleasure in publicly abusing foreign leaders. Prime Minister Abe appears to be a newfound friend for Pyongyang, but only time will tell how tenable a working relationship will actually be.

SESSION 3

The United States in Northeast Asia Moderator: Merit E. Janow Introductions: Samuel R. Berger, Karl W. Eikenberry

Samuel Berger opened by noting that the United States faces a dual challenge in East Asia, which is to assure allies without emboldening them and to deter China without provoking it.

The second is the fact that the US-China relationship is “too big to fail.” Berger noted that at the outset, China was suspicious of the US “rebalance” to East Asia but willing to live with

it. There were also significant US resources devoted to the Pivot. In the second Obama term, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, etc., have contributed to the perception that the US is losing its Asia focus and is having trouble actually rebalancing. Berger discussed the maritime disputes as indicative of other issues in China. He noted that President Xi has inherited the greatest economic story of modern times but also a country with deep problems. The Chinese narrative on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands blames the Japanese government for nationalizing the islands. Much more than his predecessor Hu Jintao, President Xi wants China to act like a major power. Part of this may be posturing, but this is also consistent with a vision for a new security order. President Xi may indeed hope to displace the US alliance system in Asia and replace it with an Asia for Asians approach. It is not, however, clear how China’s actions, such as its recent oil rig dispute with Vietnam, further this goal. The United States has consistently taken the position that there is a fundamental tension between China’s moderately revisionist foreign policy and its desire to have good relations with its neighbors. The United States should rearticulate and reassert the specifics of its vision for its relationship with China. Shifting to Japan, US policy has consistently relied on energetic assurance efforts. TPP would also be a transformative step if it can be approved this year. Berger also noted the serious risk of an accident in the East China Sea and the lack of adequate mechanisms for dealing with one.

Karl Eikenberry raised three central themes.

First he commented on the rising power/status quo power paradigm; next he discussed some important assumptions about power trajectory; third, he touched on US strategic options. Eikenberry noted the prevailing paradigm that a rising power is discontented with the status quo. To revise an undesirable status quo, rising powers can acquire new territory, attempt to acquire new spheres of influence, or overthrow norms and institutions that the status quo power had put in place. For a status quo power, there are also several choices. Status quo powers may define their interests more

narrowly, may accommodate the rising power (President Xi’s “New Great Power Relationship”), or may shift responsibilities to partners and allies. The rebalance to Asia makes the latter strategy central, and the Obama Administration has clearly sought to focus on the domestic sources of power. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidelines place heavy emphasis on domestic politics to a degree unprecedented since President Eisenhower.

Eikenberry then moved on to discuss some basic assumptions about power trajectories.

When we speak about the decline of the United States, are we speaking about persistent decline? About temporary retrenchment?

Eikenberry noted that the Chinese seem to think that the United States is in persistent decline but remarked that we have seen periods of retrenchment before. The nature of decline has important consequences for strategy. Persistent decline requires a re-tooling of strategy (e.g. the British and their East of Suez policy). A declining power who fails to admit its constraints will wind up surprised and embarrassed. A realistic picture is also important for credibility, as Asian partners wonder if the United States will be able to maintain its place in the world. For China’s part, it has the option to overthrow the prevailing order, integrate into it fully, or free-ride on the system in part and erode it selectively. The latter appears to be China’s tack. China’s weaknesses are also considerable, however, and the Chinese model is not a particularly appealing one. Economic restructuring, serious problems in the banking sector, and endemic corruption are persistent problems.

Finally, Eikenberry moved on to discuss US options. He stated that Washington should be more explicit about the role of China in its rebalance strategy. Washington has overemphasized the military elements of this policy, and must remember that China is not yet a global power. There exists an asymmetry of interest between the US and China. The United States would like Chinese help on many different global issues, but China does not see itself as a leader in this way, which in turn causes frustra-

tion on both sides. Further, the Chinese simply refuse to engage in certain discussions, such as those over democracy and human rights. The United States should be using forward-looking agreements (like TPP) to stay ahead and relying heavily on allies to help balance China. The United States must get its own house in order if it is to remain competitive. There is no defense for a country that allows itself to go bust.

Merit E. Janow and Gerald L. Curtis welcomed a group of experts

Ezra Vogel commented on the delicate balance between reassuring US allies and maintaining a stable US-China relationship. How does Washington explain to Tokyo that it is a trustworthy partner when its most visible contact is with Beijing? Winston Lord noted that President Obama’s West Point speech had said almost nothing about the rebalance. He also took issue with the idea that China is not yet a major power, stating that Beijing has enough global power to be considered a “responsible stakeholder.”

The conversation shifted to TPP. Merit Janow commented that the feeling prevails among many Chinese that they are being purposefully excluded from TPP as part of a systematic US strategy. At the same time, it is far from clear whether a specific ambitious trade agenda could be implemented that Beijing would find positive. Thus, an important question for the future is whether the US can articulate a positive vision for economic integration in the region that includes China and serves to stimulate a more productive exchange about that future.

Karl W. Eikenberry

One participant noted the disconnect between the economic and security elements of this debate. In China, the narrative on TPP was previously that it was a US containment tool, but it is now viewed as something that China can use to its advantage. One speaker noted that the Chinese are unlikely to comply with all of TPP’s exacting standards. Participants agreed that TPP has widespread international support and that the United States itself may be the biggest stumbling block.

The United States cannot conclude negotiations without trade promotion authority and partner countries have good reason to be skeptical about the US Congress approving an agreement. There is little incentive for partners to make concessions knowing that the Senate might change hands. Ironically, a Republican controlled Senate may be better able to conclude the deal. One participant noted that a heads of state meeting at APEC following the mid-term elections could be used to conclude a deal. Where including China in TPP is concerned, one speaker suggested that negotiations should be concluded with the current group of participants, after which further negotiations with additional countries could take place. Participants also agreed that TPP has taken on great symbolic value, in addition to its intrinsic value.

Gerald Curtis raised the question of whether there are roles for the United States to play in ameliorating current tensions in northeast Asia that it is not currently playing. Samuel Berger noted that the fundamental US goals in East Asia have not shifted, but that they have gotten harder to achieve. The conversation shifted back to history issues, with Dennis Blair noting that the Koreans and Japanese had been very close to putting the comfort women issue behind them. He suggested that we try to rehabilitate these discussions. Blair also argued that the United States should stop emphasizing “bedside manner,” and simply argue facts with China as well as allies. By emphasizing the military dimensions of the pivot when there is little behind it, or being too gentle about raising uncomfortable topics, Washington hurts the whole. Ezra Vogel commented that getting these countries to agree on history would be nearly impossible.

Participants then discussed the reasons behind the growing amity between China and South Korea. Stephen Bosworth stated that President Park Geun-Hye’s inclination to cooperate with Beijing stems from colonial-era animosity towards Japan. These age-old tensions scuttled an intelligencesharing agreement between Seoul and Tokyo and are very deeply rooted. Many Koreans and Japanese appear to get along well, but Korean animosity toward Japan is palpable. In Japan there is a strong tone of condescension towards Koreans once you scratch the surface. The United States must be concerned with how its two allies move beyond these issues that feed on prejudices. Koreans have suspicions and resentments of China too and spent two centuries “ping-ponged” between China and Japan. Gerald Curtis noted that in Japan there has been a loss of wartime memory as schools do not teach it, people who experienced it do not want to talk about it, and children are not exposed to it. By con-

trast, in both China and Korea there has been an intensification of historical memory where Japan’s wartime actions are concerned. States may also cite memory issues selectively, and moving past them not only requires apologies but the willingness to accept those apologies. Participants noted that we should draw distinctions between Prime Minister Abe wanting to revise history and the notion of Japan becoming militaristic. The United States should use the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II to mark the fact that we can remember without letting history stand in the way of the future.

Samuel Berger closed by noting that Japan, China, and the United States all have very different views of what international engagement should look like. But most of the forces that are moving against the United States have at least some domestic component. Washington must rebuild itself at home while remaining engaged internationally. Karl Eikenberry closed by remarking on the persistent asymmetry of interest between the United States and China, using military-to-military engagements as an example. He raised the possibility of issue linkage, wondering if perhaps TPP could be linked to China’s 2012 reform program.

SESSION 4

Where from Here?

Moderators: Merit E. Janow, Gerald L. Curtis

Gerald Curtis and Merit Janow opened the final session by asking what the group might suggest as a next step, and inquiring whether participants thought that sufficient engagement mechanisms on these issues already existed. Participants agreed that regional issues were serious and warranted more engagement; further, they would like to be useful to policymakers, but that the group needed to clarify its focus and be clear about its comparative advantages.

Robert Jervis

Participants were in general agreement that the area most in need of attention by a group such as this one is US strategy and intentions. Stephen Bosworth stated that he thought there was an intellectual lacuna around how the US defined its regional interests in North East Asia and what it should be doing to pursue them.

Others commented that there was a general lack of understanding throughout East Asia about US strategy, intentions, and will. There also were comments to the effect that there are clear advantages in bringing together specialists on security and economics and also that the group should engage Southeast Asia if it aims to address China’s rise as a whole..

It was noted that there are a number of existing dialogues and groups looking at issues of US-East Asia relations and that this group might consider a dual focus on the domestic economy and foreign engagement and the intersection between economic power and foreign policy Participants agreed that the most important role of a group such as this would not be to give advise to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean policy makers but to come up with useful recommendations for our own government on how to manage US policy during a time of dramatic change in Northeast Asia.

Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia: A U.S. Experts Workshop

Samuel R. Berger is Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group, with a strong focus on Asia, Russia and the Middle East. Drawing on experiences as National Security Advisor to President Clinton and in the private sector, Mr. Berger helps clients successfully navigate emerging economies and beyond.

Mr. Berger is an active participant in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s “U.S.-China CEO and Former Senior Officials’ Dialogue,” Aspen Strategy Group and the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue and serves on the International Advisory Council of the Brookings Doha Center.

He is also a member of the International Crisis Group Board of Trustees, Chairman of Advisory Board of National Security Network, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Co-Chair Senior Working Group on Middle East, USIP. Richard K. Betts is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor and Director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. He has taught at Harvard and Johns Hopkins’ Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, and was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He has been Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and served long ago on the staffs of the original Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the National Security Council, and the Mondale Presidential Campaign.

For six years in the 1990s he was a member of the National Security Advisory Panel of the Director of Central Intelligence and in 19992000, a member of the National Commission on Terrorism. He currently serves as a member of the External Advisory Board for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Betts has published numerous articles on U.S. foreign policy, military strategy, intelligence operations, security issues in Asia and Europe, terrorism, and other subjects, and is author six books – Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises; Surprise Attack; Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance; Military Readiness; Enemies of Intelligence; and American Force.

Dennis Blair is the Chairman and CEO of Sasakawa Peace Foundation, USA, a think-tank devoted to US-Japan relations. He serves as a member of the Energy Security Leadership Council; on the boards of Freedom House, the National Bureau of Asian Research and the National Committee on US-China relations. He is a member of the Aspen Homeland Security Group. A career Navy officer, Blair was the Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command from 1999 to 2002. From January 2009 to May 2010, as Director of National Intelligence, Blair led sixteen national intelligence agencies, providing integrated intelligence support to the President, Congress and operations in the field. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Admiral Blair earned a master’s degree in history and languages from Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar.

Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia: A U.S. Experts Workshop

Stephen W. Bosworth is a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

He is also Chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins’ Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Amb. Bosworth had an extensive career in the United States Foreign Service, including service as Ambassador to Tunisia (1979-1981), to the Philippines (1984-1987), and to the Republic of Korea (1997-2001). He served in a number of senior positions in the Department of State, including Director of Policy Planning and U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy for the Obama Administration (2009-2011). Amb. Bosworth was the Executive Director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization from 1995-1997 and the President of the United States Japan Foundation from 1987-1995.

Anla Cheng joined Sino-Century, a China PE firm in 2007 as Senior Partner with prior investment experience as the founder of Centenium Capital, an Asian Hedge and PE Fund of Funds. Prior to Centenium, she was Sr. Vice-President of Robert Fleming for Asian investment; was Institutional Head of the Asia Desk for Prudential Bache; was an Analyst and Portfolio Manager at Citibank Asia Asset Management and started her career at the GNMA Bond Desk at Goldman Sachs. Ms. Cheng received her MBA from the Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania and her Bachelors (Magna cum laude) from Pratt Institute. Ms. Cheng is currently a Trustee at the China Institute, the Museum of Chinese America, Committee of 100, The Nature Conservancy, and Facing History and Ourselves. She is former Trustee at Riverdale Country School,NY Community Trust, The Browning School and ThinkQuest.

Gerald L. Curtis is Burgess Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and former Director of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute. He is the author of numerous books and articles published in both English and Japanese. He divides his time between Columbia University and Tokyo where he is active as a columnist, speaker and writer. In addition to his academic work, he has served as Director of the U.S.-Japan Parliamentary Exchange Program, Special Advisor to Newsweek for Newsweek Japan, columnist for theTokyo/Chunichi Shimbun, and member of the International Advisory Board of the Asahi Shimbun and the Advisory Council for the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership. His articles and commentaries appear frequently in newspapers and magazines in Europe, Japan and the United States. Professor Curtis is the recipient of numerous prizes and honors including the Japan Foundation Award, and the Marshal Green Award of the Japan-America Society of Washington, DC. He is a recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Star, one of the highest honors awarded by the Japanese government.

Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia: A U.S. Experts Workshop

Karl W. Eikenberry is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and is a Distinguished Fellow with the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

He served as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2009 until July 2011 and had a 35-year career in the United States Army, retiring with the rank of lieutenant general. His military assignments included postings with mechanized, light, airborne, and ranger infantry units in the continental United States, Hawaii, Korea, Italy, and Afghanistan as the Commander of the American-led Coalition forces from 2005–2007. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, has earned master’s degrees from Harvard University in East Asian Studies and Stanford University in Political Science, was awarded an Interpreter’s Certificate in Mandarin Chinese from the British Foreign Commonwealth Office, and earned an advanced degree in Chinese History from Nanjing University. He is also the recipient of the George F. Kennan Award for Distinguished Public Service and Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Centennial Medal. Ambassador Eikenberry serves as a Trustee for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Asia Foundation, and the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Takeo Hoshi is Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), Professor of Finance (by courtesy) at the Graduate School of Business, and Director of the Japan Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (S-APARC), all at Stanford University. Hoshi is also Visiting Scholar at Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and at the Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER), and Senior Fellow at the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER). His main research interest includes corporate finance, banking, monetary policy and the Japanese economy. He received 2006 Enjoji Jiro Memorial Prize of Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha, and 2005 Japan Economic Association Nakahara Prize. His book Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future co-authored with Anil Kashyap received the Nikkei Award for the Best Economics Books in 2002. B.A., University of Tokyo (1983). Ph.D. (Economics), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1988).

Merit E. Janow is an internationally recognized expert in international trade and investment, with experience in academia, government, international organizations, and business. As of July, 2013, she was appointed Dean of the faculty of Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). Professor Janow has written several books, numerous articles.

Professor Janow was elected in 2003 to serve for a four-year term as one of the seven Members of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body, and from 1997 to 2000 served as the Executive Director of the first international antitrust advisory committee of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Prior to joining Columbia’s faculty, Professor Janow was Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan and China (1989-93). She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission and serves on the board of several technology and financial services companies and the advisory council of the Chinese sovereign wealth fund, CIC.

Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia: A U.S. Experts Workshop

Robert Jervis is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University. Specializing in international politics in general and security policy, decision making, and theories of conflict and cooperation in particular, his Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War was published

by Cornell University Press in April 2010. Jervis also is a coeditor of the Security Studies Series published by Cornell University Press. He serves on the board of nine scholarly journals, and has authored over 100 publications. Dr. Jervis is a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and the American Philosophical Society. He has also served as the president of the American Political Science Association. In 1990 he received the Grawemeyer Award for his book The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution.

Charles Lake received a bachelor’s degree in Asian studies and political science from the University of Hawaii at Manoa in 1985 and juris doctor degree from the George Washington University School of Law in 1990. He joined Aflac International in February 1999 and Aflac Japan in June 1999. He became deputy president in 2001, president in 2003, vice chairman in 2005, and chairman in 2008. In 2014, he also assumed the position of president, Aflac International. Before joining Aflac, he practiced law in Washington, D.C. He also served as director of Japan affairs and special counsel at the office of the U.S. Trade Representative in the Executive Office of the President. He currently serves as a director on the board of the Japan Exchange Group, Inc.; the Peterson Institute for International Economics; the Coalition of Service Industries; and the U.S.-Japan Business Council. He is also president emeritus of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan.

Winston Lord is Chairman Emeritus of the International Rescue Committee’s Overseers. He has had a distinguished career in the U.S. government, having served as U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Clinton administration; U.S. ambassador to the People’s Republic of China in the Reagan and Bush administrations; director of the policy planning staff at the department of state in the Ford administration; and special assistant to the National Security Adviser in the Nixon administration. r. Lord has also headed and served in many non- governmental organizations, including as President of the Council on Foreign Relations and Co- Chair of the IRC. He received numerous honorary degrees and awards, including the Outstanding Performance Award from the U.S. Department of Defense and the Distinguished Honor Award from the U.S. Department of State. Ambassador Lord has appeared frequently on most major television and radio networks and published articles in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Time, Newsweek, and Foreign Affairs.

Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia: A U.S. Experts Workshop

Xiaobo Lü is Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University and former director of Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University. He was a Fulbright vising professor at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin in Spring 2014. Professor Lu teaches courses on Chinese politics, post-communist political economy, comparative political corruption and it control, and comparative politics. His research interests include Chinese politics, corruption and good governance, regulatory reforms, and government-business relations. He has published widely on these subjects and consults for business firms, civic groups, and government agencies. He is the author of several books including Cadres and Corruption and Taxation without Representation in Contemporary Rural China. His new book manuscripts, From Player to Referee: Politics of the Rise of the Regulatory State in China is forthcoming.

He is a member of Council on Foreign Relations and the National Committee of US-China Relations. Xiaobo Lu received his PhD degree in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.

Andrew J. Nathan is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. His books include Chinese Democracy (Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); The Tiananmen Papers, coedited with Perry Link (Public Affairs, 2001); How East Asians View Democracy, coedited with Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin (Columbia University Press, 2008); and China’s Search for Security, coauthored with Andrew Scobell (Columbia University Press, 2012). He is working on a coedited volume called Ambivalent Democrats, which analyzes data from the Asian Barometer Surveys. Nathan is chair of the Steering Committee of Columbia’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights.

Marcus Noland, executive vice president and director of studies at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, has been associated with the Institute since 1985. He is also senior fellow at the East-West Center. He was previously a senior economist at the Council of Economic Advisers in the Executive Office of the President of the United States. He has held research or teaching positions at Yale University, Johns Hopkins University, the University of Southern California, Tokyo University, Saitama University (now the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies), University of Ghana, and Korea Development Institute. His books include Korea after Kim Jong-il (2004), Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (2000). He is the coauthor of Confronting the Curse: The Economics and Geopolitics of Natural Resource Governance (2014).

Tension Reduction in Northeast Asia: A U.S. Experts Workshop

Hugh T. Patrick is the Robert D. Calkins Professor of International Business Emeritus and Director, Center on Japanese Economy and Business. He joined the Columbia faculty in 1984 after serving as director of the Economic Growth Center and a professor of economics at Yale University. He has been a visiting professor at Hitotsubashi University, the University of Tokyo, and the University of Bombay and has authored 18 books and some 60 articles and essays, including How Finance Is Shaping the Economies of China, Japan, and Korea (co-edited with Yung Chul Park, Columbia University Press, 2013).

From 1979 to 1981, Professor Patrick served as one of four American members of the Japan–United States Economic Relations Group appointed by President Carter and Prime Minister Ohira. He was a member of the board of directors of the Japan Society for seven three-year terms. The recipient of an honorary doctorate from Lingnan University in Hong Kong, Guggenheim and Fulbright fellowships, and the Ohira Prize, Professor Patrick received the Eagle on the World award from the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry of New York in 2010 and the imperial decoration, the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold and Silver Star, from the Japanese government in 1994.

Ezra F. Vogel is the Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard. After graduating from Ohio Wesleyan in 1950, he studied sociology at Harvard, receiving his Ph.D. in 1958. He went to Japan for two years to study the Japanese language and conduct research on middle-class families. He returned to Harvard in 1964 and became a professor in 1967. Vogel retired from teaching on June 30, 2000. Vogel was the Director (1972-1977) of Harvard’s East Asian Research Center and Chairman of the Council for East Asian Studies (1977-1980), Director of the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at the Center for International Affairs (1980-1987), and the first Director of the Asia Center (1997-1999).

He has authored numerous books on China and Japan. The Japanese edition of his book Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (1979) is the all-time best-seller in Japan of non-fiction by a Western author.

Donald S. Zagoria is Senior Vice President at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. Prior to joining the NCAFP, Professor Zagoria was a consultant during the Carter Administration to both the National Security Council and the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the State Department. He has also worked for the RAND Corporation and taught courses on United States foreign policy and the international relations of East Asia at Hunter College for many years. Professor Zagoria is the author of four books and over 300 articles on Asian security issues. His book on the Sino-Soviet Conflict, published in 1962, is generally recognized as the seminal work on one of the key turning points in the Cold War–the split between Moscow and Beijing. Professor Zagoria earned his B.A. at Rutgers University and his M.A. and Ph.D. at Columbia University.