International: Gimme, Gimme More By Sarina Bhandari
Domestic: Rigging the System
By Lucas Rehaut
Briefing: Immigration Reform vol. XII, no. 2
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A Magazine of the Columbia Political Union
Bribe and Punishment By Bruno Rigonatti Mendes
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cpr
VOLUME XII, NO.
Editor-in-Chief Publisher
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CONSTANCE BOOZER MALINI NAMBIAR
Editor’s Note Letting  go  is  hard  to  do.  So  hard,  in  fact,  that  I  called  up  Hillary  earlier  this  week  to  give  her  the  once-Âin-Âa-Âlifetime  opportunity  to  serve  as  Columbia  Political  Review’s  next  editor-Âin-Âchief  once  she  ends  her  State  Department  gig.  I  hate  to  say  it,  but  she  politely  declined. Â
Managing Editors
TOM CARUSO GEETIKA RUDRA
Web Editor
CHRIS BRENNAN
Last  term,  our  editorial  board,  including  me,  voted  to  amend  our  Constitution,  changing  the  editorial  board’s  schedule  from  an  academic  to  a  calendar  year  and  precluding  second  semester  seniors  from  sitting  on  the  board.  As  a  result,  this  is  my  last  issue  of  CPR  as  an  editor.  Despite  being  a  “one-Âsemesterâ€?  EIC,  I  consider  myself  extremely  fortunate  to  have  had  the  opportunity  to  serve  the  publication  in  this  capacity  these  past  few  months. Â
MICHAEL ARD GREGORY J. BARBER JOSHUA FATTAL MELISSA FICH JORDAN KALMS LUCAS REHAUT TAYLOR THOMPSON TOMMASO VERDERAME
In  this  issue,  our  writers  tackle  the  question  of  how  government  should  best  serve  the  public.  Sarina  Bhandari  takes  us  to  East  Africa,  pointing  to  the  lack  of  accountability  in  the  process  of  “land  grabbingâ€?  –  transactions  involving  the  purchase  of  land  on  a  massive  scale  for  its  natural  resources,  usually  by  foreign  investors.  The  practice,  Bhandari  reports,  has  displaced  millions  in  the  region  (17).  Lucas  Rehaut  writes  that  our  need  for  another  precious  resource,  oil,  has  allowed  corporations  to  rig  the  system.  Nevertheless,  he  argues  that  President  Obama’s  re-Âelection  is  evidence  that  the  net  effect  of  individual  actions  can  lead  to  results  –  ones  that  Rehaut  hopes  will  one  day  include  the  promotion  of  more  sustainable  practices  from  the  fossil-Âfuel  industry  (27). Â
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COVER ART BY MARISSA TJARTJALIS & ALEJANDRA OLIVA
Companies,  it  seems,  are  not  the  only  ones  that  should  be  concerned  with  ef- forts  to  sustain  the  world  around  them.  The  same  can  be  said  for  countries.  In  its  preparations  for  momentous  international  events,  like  the  2014  World  Cup  and  the  2016  Olympics,  and  its  recent  demonstration  of  due  process  for  those  accused  of  corruption,  Brazil  has  demonstrated  a  willingness  to  spur  and  sustain  long-Âterm  development,  as  Bruno  Rigonatti  Mendes  demonstrates  in  our  cover  story  (13). As  2012  draws  to  a  close,  my  hope  for  2013  and  the  distant  future  is  that  law- PDNHUV LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV WU\ WR GR WKH VDPH E\ Âż[LQJ RXU EURNHQ LPPLJUDWLRQ V\VWHP ,Q WKLV LVVXHÂśV EULHÂżQJ ZH RXWOLQH D QXPEHU RI WKH SURSRVDOV WRZDUG tough  but  fair  immigration  reform.  At  the  end  of  the  day,  however,  although  a  possible  framework  exists  to  reform  immigration,  it  is  ultimately  up  to  our  HOHFWHG RIÂżFLDOV WR DJUHH WR LPSOHPHQW WKRVH LGHDV WRJHWKHU As  I  move  one  step  closer  to  graduation,  I  am  happy  to  announce  that  current  managing  Geetika  Rudra  will  be  taking  the  reigns  of  the  Political  Review  as  LWV QH[W HGLWRU LQ FKLHI , KDYH WKH IXOOHVW IDLWK DQG FRQÂżGHQFH WKDW VKH DQG KHU board  will  continue  to  spur  and  sustain  the  development  of  this  publication  –  far  better  than  I  have.  Godspeed.  Constance  Boozer  Editor-Âin-ÂChief Â
The  views  and  opinions  expressed  in  this  magazine  belong  to  their  authors  and  do  not  nessacar- LO\ UHÀHFW WKRVH RI WKH &ROXPELD 3ROLWLFDO 5HYLHZ &ROXPELD 3ROLWLFDO 8QLRQ RU &ROXPELD 8QLYHUVLW\
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WINTER.2012 table of contents
cover story
features | international
13
Bribe and Punishment Legal Strides and Policy Development in Brazil
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…Bibi One More Time? A Look Into the Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu Coalition
By Bruno Rigonatti Mendes
By Bryan Schonfeld
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Sanctioning Progress The Consequnces of Misguided International Pressure on Iran
By Joshua Fattal
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Gimme, Gimme More Shedding Light on African Land Grab Deals
By Sarina Bhandari
Egypt’s Party Scene With an Eye to the Future, a Push for Pluralism
By Nadine Mansour
briefing 20
Crossing the Border for Immigration Reform By Columbia Political Review
features | domestic 7
Over Defense Taking Another Look at American Counterterrorism Spending
By Toby Pegors
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27
Rigging the System Why Multinational Oil Companies Keep Getting Away With It
By Lucas Rehaut
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features :: international
columbia political review :: winter 2012
‌Bibi One More Time? A Look Into the Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu Coalition by Bryan Schonfeld
S
ix  months  ago,  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Benjamin  “Bibiâ€?  Netanyahu’s  right-Âwing  Li- kud  party  joined  the  centrist  party  Kadima  to  make  a  broad  super-Âcoali- tion  that  comprised  96  out  of  the  120  seats  in  Israel’s  legislative  body,  the  Knesset.  The  center-Âright  coalition  fell  through  within  seventy  days.  On  October  25,  Likud  joined  forces  with  the  hyper-Ânationalist  Yisrael  Beiteinu  (Israel  is  Our  Home)  party  in  prepa- ration  for  upcoming  elections  on  January  22.  Together,  they  current- ly  have  42  seats  in  the  Knesset.  N e t a n - yahu  ex- p l a i n e d  t h e  m e r g e r  by  say- ing  “we  [ m e m - bers  of  the  two  parties]  are  asking  the  pub- lic  for  a  mandate  to  deal  with  the  se- curity  threats,  at  the  top  of  which  is  stopping  Iran  from  obtaining  nuclear  ZHDSRQV DQG ÂżJKWLQJ WHUURULVP ´ Given  the  public’s  fears  about  the  danger  of  a  nuclear  Iran,  it  appears  increasingly  likely  that  Netanyahu  will  be  re-Âelected.  But  what  would  this  Likud-ÂYisrael  Beiteinu  govern- ment  do  with  its  mandate?  It  is  pos- sible  to  analyze  the  speeches  and  previous  legislative  actions  of  both  parties,  taking  into  account  the  nu- anced  positions  of  Prime  Minister  Netanyahu  and  Deputy  Minister Â
Avigdor  Lieberman,  to  anticipate  what  policies  this  government  would  promote.  A  Likud-ÂYisrael  Beiteinu  coalition  will  likely  lead  to  a  contin- ued  impasse  with  Palestinian  lead- ers  and  a  more  hawkish  military  strategy.  The  potential  consequenc- es  include  further  friction  with  the  Obama  administration  and  policies  that  may  make  Israel  more  isolated  in  the  international  community  than  ever  before. Likud  and  Yisrael  Beiteinu  have  fundamentally  different  stances  on Â
Palestinians  claim  as  their  capital)  and  a  resolution  of  the  Palestinian  demand  for  a  right  of  return  for  the  DSSUR[LPDWHO\ ÂżYH PLOOLRQ GHVFHQ- dants  of  Palestinian  refugees  who  ÀHG GXULQJ WKH RXWEUHDN RI ZDU IRO- lowing  Israel’s  founding.  The  parties  have  different  stances  on  how  to  approach  the  peace  process.  Yisrael  Beiteinu  is  a  hyper-Ânationalist  party  made  up  largely  of  Russian  im- migrants.  The  party  supports  Jewish  settlement  of  the  West  Bank,  vows  of  allegiance  from  all  citizens  to  the  state,  and  n a t i o n a l  military  or  civil  ser- vice.  One  somewhat  radical  po- sition  of  the  party  p l a t f o r m  is  its  call  for  land  s w a p s  based  on  ethnicity.  This  would  mean  transferring  certain  Arab-Âmajority  areas  to  Palestinian  sovereignty  and  annexing  Jewish  settlements  in  the  West  Bank  to  Israel.  Some  have  called  this  plan  racist;Íž  others  have  called  it  innovative  and  pragmatic.  Yisrael  Beiteinu’s  founder,  Deputy  Minister  Avigdor  Lieberman,  believes  the  cre- ation  of  two  ethnically  pure  states  is  the  best  way  to  bring  about  a  lasting  peace  and  minimize  each  nation’s  internal  strife.  This  position  is  based  on  Lieberman’s  belief  that  Israeli  Ar- abs  identify  mostly  with  Palestinian  nationalism.  As  a  result,  he  has  ad-Â
A Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu coalition will likely lead to a continued impasse with Palestinian leaders and a more hawkish military strategy.
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WKH ,VUDHOL 3DOHVWLQLDQ FRQĂ€LFW 0XFK of  modern  Israeli  political  discourse  regarding  the  issue  focuses  on  the  idea  of  a  two-Âstate  solution  where  a  Palestinian  state  is  established  in  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  alongside  Israel.  Palestinians  have  called  for  Israel  to  cede  all  of  the  territory  it  conquered  in  the  1967  war,  but  Israel  has  been  hesitant  to  give  up  this  land  because  of  Israeli  settlement  activity,  an- nexed  territory,  and  concerns  about  the  ability  to  defend  its  borders.  Ul- timately,  the  main  issues  hindering  a  two-Âstate  solution  are  the  status  of  Jerusalem  (which  both  Israelis  and Â
columbia political review :: winter 2012 vocated that Israeli Arabs take loyalty oaths or lose their right to vote and has suggested that Israel prosecute Israeli-Arab congressmen that have met with the terrorist organization Hamas. The Likud platform also supports settlement of the West Bank, which the party considers to be a realization of Zionist values through the repopulation of historically Jewish lands. Likud consid- ers Jerusalem to be the eternal and undivided capital of Israel, making a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem very unlikely. Its platform is against the cre- ation of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River. However, Netanyahu has broken from the platform by supporting a two-state solu- tion, saying in June 2009 that he would support the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state. Earlier this year, Netan- \DKX VHQW DQ RI¿FLDO GLSORPDWLF letter to the Palestinian Au- thority (PA) President Mah- moud Abbas, expressing hope for a negotiated settlement. Nothing came of it. Lieberman has a strong distaste for Abbas, repeat- edly calling for his removal or resignation. His stance would make a peace agreement with the PA even more unlikely. Given that Abbas is a relatively moderate Palestinian leader (compared with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh), this is very problematic;; Lieberman’s stance may destroy any chance of progress toward a two-state solution. On the other hand, one aspect of a Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu government is its originality and dissimilarity to previous Israeli governments, as Lieberman’s opinions are innovative and somewhat dis- tinct from mainstream Israeli political discourse. Ultimately, the impasse in peace negotia- tions with the Palestinians can only be settled by innovative
art by Daniela Brunner
features :: international compromise, which Yisrael Be- iteinu may be able to provide. Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu will have to make compromises on settlement expansion if a vi- able two-state solution is to be reached. A pressing issue of the con- ÀLFW LV ,VUDHO¶V UHVSRQVH WR 3DO- estine’s successful pursuit of non-member observer status at the United Nations. In re- sponse to the UN bid, which Lieberman called a “diplomatic terror,” Netanyahu announced an expansion of settlements in the E1 development region, which would effectively sepa- rate Ramallah and Bethlehem from East Jerusalem and make any kind of contiguous state virtually impossible. This is a potentially severe blow to the two-state solution. The Obama administration condemned the move as counterproduc- tive to the peace process, and it is unclear whether Netan- yahu intends to use this build- ing plan merely as a threat or if the settlement will actually be developed. It remains to be seen whether the Netanyahu- Lieberman government will take such a drastic step away from a peace agreement. Ulti- mately, for a two-state solution to come into effect, E1 must not be settled. Another important foreign policy issue for Israelis, if not the most important, is Iran. At the moment, Lieberman be- OLHYHV LQ WKH HI¿FDF\ RI VDQF- tions to prevent Iran’s attain- ment of nuclear arms. He has said, “Based on my conversa- tions with people who visit Iran, if you held a referendum - the nuclear program or quality of life - 70 to 80 percent would choose the second option. It’s not that they’re opposed to the nuclear program, but they are not willing to pay these crazy prices.” In addition to suggesting that the Iranian re- gime may crumble under dip- lomatic pressure, Lieberman
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features :: international believes  that  if  protests  break  out  in  Iran  again,  (as  they  did  in  2009),  the  West  must  support  the  protest- ers  and  encourage  the  government’s  overthrow.  While  some  portray  Lieberman  as  a  warmonger  and  hawk,  he  believes  war  with  Iran  could  prove  cata- strophic.  Earlier  this  year,  he  said  war  would  “be  a  nightmare,â€?  leaving  “no  one...unscathed.â€?  He  added  that,  “the  right  way  to  prevent  war  is  to  present  a  solid  uni- ¿HG IURQW of  the  i n t e r n a - t i o n a l  c o m - munity,â€?  and  ex- p r e s s e d  s u p p o r t  for  sanc- tions  in  an  interview  with  Yediot  Aharonot,  a  Tel  Aviv  newspaper.  In  some  ways,  this  represents  a  more  apprehensive  attitude  toward  war  with  Iran  than  that  of  others  in  Netanyahu’s  ad- ministration.  Retiring  defense  min- ister  Ehud  Barak  has  said,  “there’s  no  chance‌for  500,000  killed,  not  5,000  or  even  500  killed,â€?  minimiz- ing  the  negative  consequences  of  a  war.  The  Likud-ÂYisrael  Beiteinu  joint-Âgovernment  appears  more  hesitant  about  striking  Iran,  making  unilateral  Israeli  military  action  less  likely. Regardless  of  his  defense  min- ister’s  position,  Netanyahu  seems  to  agree  with  Lieberman  that  war  with  Iran  is  a  potentially  disastrous Â
columbia political review :: winter 2012 option.  Despite  his  reputation  as  a  war  hawk,  Netanyahu’s  response  to  Iran  has  in  reality  been  measured  and  cautious.  He  has  been  sensitive  to  the  necessity  of  getting  American  support  for  a  strike  on  Iran  and  using  non-Âmilitary  options,  like  sanctions,  to  persuade  Iran  to  cease  its  nuclear  program.  This  diplomatic  approach  has  had  some  success:  Several  Euro- pean  nations  have  agreed  to  put  sanc- tions  on  Iran,  causing  Iran’s  econ-Â
hawkish  on  Iran,  their  statements  and  actions  imply  a  more  measured  approach.  Netanyahu,  nonetheless,  would  likely  act  more  aggressively  towards  Iran  in  his  second  term  be- cause  Iran  is  closer  to  nuclear  capac- ity  than  ever  before.  Still,  Netanyahu  and  Lieberman  both  recognize  Is- rael’s  dependency  on  American  sup- port,  which  makes  a  unilateral  strike  unlikely.  Regarding  the  Israeli-ÂPal- HVWLQLDQ FRQĂ€LFW SURJUHVV WRZDUG D two-Âstate  s o l u t i o n  a p p e a r s  unlikely.  For  prog- ress  to  be  made,  Li- e b e r m a n  must  get  over  his  d i s t a s t e  for  Ab- bas,  who  is  Israel’s  best  chance  for  a  peace  partner,  and  continue  to  craft  un- precedented  proposals.  Ultimately,  Prime  Minister  Netanyahu  must  show  a  willingness  to  negotiate  on  West  Bank  settlements  if  he  desires  a  comprehensive  peace. Â
“           Â
Ultimately, the main issues hindering a two-state solution are the status of Jerusalem and a resolution of the Palestinian demand for a right of return for the approximately five million descendants of Palestinian refugees who fled during the outbreak of war following Israel’s founding. omy  serious  harm.   Netanyahu  was  DEOH WR ELGH KLV WLPH GXULQJ KLV ÂżUVW term,  but  as  Iran  nears  bomb  capa- bility,  he  will  be  more  pressed  for  ac- tion.  He  established  a  literal  red  line  in  his  speech  at  the  United  Nations,  taking  out  a  red  marker  and  drawing  a  line  on  an  image  of  a  bomb.  This  represented  Iran’s  completion  of  the  second  step  of  nuclear  enrichment,  the  point  of  no  return.  Clearly,  for  Netanyahu,  a  worse  option  than  war  with  Iran  is  a  nuclear  Iran.  Indeed,  he  warned  that,  “given  this  record  of  Iranian  aggression  without  nuclear  weapons,  just  imagine  Iranian  ag- gression  with  nuclear  weapons.â€?  Despite  the  widespread  view  that  Netanyahu  and  Lieberman  are Â
�
Bryan  Schonfeld,  CC  ’16,  is  leaning  towards  majoring  in  economics.  He  is  involved  in  restarting  J  Street  on  campus,  a  Pro-ÂIsrael  group  devoted  to  furthering  a  two  state  solution.  In  addition,  he  is  a  proud  member  of  the  Undergraduate  Recruiting  Committee  and  the  Alpha  Epsilon  Pi  fraternity.  He  can  be  reached  at  bjs2200@columbia.edu.
6 timeline by Alejandra Oliva
columbia political review :: winter 2012
features :: domestic
Over Defense Taking Another Look at American Counterterrorism Spending by Toby Pegors
F
our  months  prior  to  the  Sep- tember  11  attacks,  Harvard  University  Professor  Richard  Falkenrath  published  an  article  in  WKH -RXUQDO RI 6WXGLHV LQ &RQĂ€LFW Terrorism  that  argued  for  a  drastic  reduction  of  government  spending  on  counterterrorism.  He  suggested  that  there  was  little  evidence  of  any  real  threat  to  Americans’  safety  and  that  spending  on  counterterrorism  was  a  waste  of  resources  that  could  be  better  spent  on  other  domestic  SURJUDPV )ROORZLQJ WKH KRUULÂżF DW- tacks  in  2001,  however,  Americans  GHYHORSHG D UDOO\ URXQG WKH Ă€DJ mentality  and  President  George  W.  %XVKÂśV DSSURYDO UDWLQJ EULHĂ€\ URVH WR 90  percent  in  the  weeks  subsequent  to  the  attack.  The  United  States  com- pletely  revamped  its  operations,  put- ting  a  core  focus  toward  increasing  its  counterterrorism  capabilities.  The  FBI  doubled  its  number  of  coun- terterrorist  agents  and  set  its  num- ber  one  priority  to  “protecting  the  United  States  from  terrorist  attack.â€?  The  total  dollar  amount  spent  on  do- mestic  counterterrorism  has  contin- XHG WR FOLPE HYHU VLQFH DQG IRU ÂżVFDO year  2013,  the  Congressional  Budget  2IÂżFH H[SHFWV WKH 'HSDUWPHQW RI Homeland  Security  (DHS)  budget  to  be  $68.9  billion,  or  roughly  $526  per  household.  Thousands  of  politicians  and  cor- SRUDWLRQV KDYH SURÂżWHG IURP WKLV UH- cent  expansion  of  counterterrorism  efforts.  In  the  last  decade,  the  gov- ernment  spent  over  $570  billion  on  the  DHS  in  2002  –  not  to  mention  the  additional  allocations  to  agencies  like  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA)  and  National  Security  Agency  16$ ZKRVH EXGJHWV DUH FODVVLÂżHG The  $570  billion  allocation  alone  is  more  money  than  the  nation  spent Â
on  groceries  last  year,  according  to  the  USDA  Economic  Research  Ser- vice.  This  is  a  big  industry,  and  its  growth  has  been  astonishing.  With  the  horrifying  attacks  of  9/11  still  prominent  in  the  public  conscious- ness,  the  United  States  spent  $22  billion  on  DHS  in  2002.  However,  after  more  than  a  decade  with  no Â
major  terrorist  attacks,  the  funding  has  ballooned  to  over  three  times  that  amount.  US  citizens  have  sacri- ¿FHG PDQ\ UHVRXUFHV WR ÂżJKW WKH ZDU on  terror,  including  their  tax  dollars  and  civil  liberties.   Some  experts,  like  The  Ohio  State  University  professor  John  Mueller,  try  to  assure  us  that  there  is  no  real Â
ECONOMIC VIEWPOINT
As  with  almost  every  capital  investment,  the  outlays  on  counterterrorism  have  diminishing  marginal  returns.  That  is,  after  a  certain  point,  each  additional  dol- lar  invested  in  counterterrorism  does  not  produce  an  equally  large  increase  in  our  citizens’  safety.  If  terrorist  attacks  were  the  only  threat  facing  our  nation,  one  could  easily  argue  that  we  choose  a  point  of  spending  where  we  come  close  to  minimizing  all  US  casualties.  But  if  spending  becomes  too  large,  it  could  be  more  devastating  than  the  terrorist  attacks  that  it  prevents.  We  choose  not  to  VSHQG DQ H[RUELWDQW DPRXQW RQ SROLFH DQG ¿UH¿JKWHUV UDWKHU ZH UDWLRQDOL]H RXU approach  and  have  come  to  accept  a  certain  amount  of  crime  and  death. graph and art by Mikhael Klimentov
7
features :: domestic
threat to America. He argues that the JUHDWHVW KDUP LQÀLFWHG E\ WHUURULVP is the ill-considered overreaction and fear it creates in the wake of an attack. Others, like retired U.S. Army Colonel David Hunt, counter that the next big attack is right around the corner and that we have done far
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columbia political review :: winter 2012
too little to combat it. Both of these experts rely on their analysis of cur- rent global events and overall trends in terrorist activities. The problem, however, is that terrorist threats are organic in nature and extremely unpredictable. If the threat were calculable in the same way as a dice
roll, we could simply determine an appro- priate risk manage- ment level and adjust our counterterrorism efforts accordingly. However, in the ran- domness and chaos of today’s world, it is not that simple. There needs to be a differ- ent approach to strik- ing the proper balance between economic burdens and national security. If terrorist attacks were the only threat facing our nation, one could easily argue that we choose a point of spending where we come close to mini- mizing all US casual- ties. Unfortunately, this is not the world in which we live. We must take into account the burden that the spending on counter- terrorism imposes on society. If it becomes too large, it could be more devastating than the terrorist attacks it prevents. We choose not to spend an exor- bitant amount on po- OLFH DQG ¿UH¿JKWHUV rather, we rational- ize our approach and have come to accept a certain amount of crime and death. In the same way, how- ever, we also become angered and reactive when the level rises above what we deem a reasonable threshold. Moreover, we, as a so- ciety, try to determine the level at which we optimize our economic investments through taxes DQG WKH RXWFRPHV RI FULPH ¿JKWLQJ When crime skyrockets, we rally in the streets and demand more pro- tection even if it requires an increase in government revenue. In contrast, when crime is low, we complain
features :: domestic
columbia political review :: winter 2012 about the tax level and are as a whole willing to cut public safety invest- ments in return for lower taxes and a reallocation of the resources. Although many experts attempt to manipulate our fears of another at- tack or our anger about government over-spending, the answer is not as c o m p l e x as they make it a p p e a r . We sim- ply need WR ¿QG WKH point at which our spending has the g r e a t e s t a m o u n t RI HI¿FD- cy, and, if the num- ber of potential fatalities is reason- ably low, set our spending accord- ingly. According to the FBI, there have been 318 terrorist attacks in the United States from 1980-2005, re- sulting in a total of 3,178 deaths. If, however, we take out the 2,996 deaths from the 9/11 attacks, which were counted as a single event, we have an average of less than one death per attack. Furthermore, the average number of attacks per year from 1980 through 2000 was 13.4, while from 2001 through 2005 it was only 7.6. Although the frequency of attacks during the 1980s and 1990s was al- most double that of 21st century, why were we so content at the time with an almost nonexistent counter- terrorism policy? There were more attacks each year, although none of them mounted to the level of trag- edy as that of 9/11, the potential was there. Just because the terror- ists executed fewer attacks does not mean that they were not trying. Was the horror of 9/11 just a freak occur- rence? Predicting organic events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 is not a VFLHQWL¿F HQGHDYRU $OWKRXJK VWXG\-
ing terrorist events may lend some insight, Oxford University Professor Nassim Taleb refers to their suppo- sitions as “epistemic arrogance,” or, arrogance despite our own limited knowledge. Furthermore, he ques- tions, “Why on earth do we predict so much? Worse, even, and more in-
ZH DUH ZLOOLQJ WR VDFUL¿FH VR PXFK They show that not only do we feel that more could be done to prevent terrorism, but also that we feel that what we have done so far does not make us feel safe. However, we al- ready spend $526 per household per year on domestic counterterror- ism. So is it irrational to spend even more on pro- t e c t i n g the lives U.S. citi- zens from such an unpredict- able and u n l i k e l y event? If we are truly concerned with pro- tecting the lives of U.S. citizens, then we must reallo- cate our resources to areas that have a greater impact on a larger number of people. For example, 2,996 lives were lost on the day of the 9/11 at- tacks. In comparison, in that same year 559,354 died from cancer, 42,196 lives died in car accidents, and 700,142 died from heart disease. It boils down to a betting game: the likelihood of dying from any one of these more likely scenarios is far higher than from a terrorist attack. Although we should never forget 9/11, it is time, as hard is it may be, to move on and to use our money to more effectively to protect America. Since a major consideration of our elected leaders is re-election, we must be the voice of reason that pro- pels them to change our current poli- cies.
“
Although many experts attempt to manipulate our fears of another attack or our anger about government over-spending, the answer is not as complex as they make it appear. We simply need to find the point at which our spending has the greatest amount of efficacy, and, if the number of potential fatalities is reasonably low, set our spending accordingly. terestingly: Why don’t we talk about our record in predicting? Why don’t we see how we (almost) always miss the big events?” So why, then, if our abilities are so limited, do we put such vast resources into trying to prevent an attack we can never pre- dict? Columbia professors Brigitte Na- cos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro conducted a study that illu- minates some of the underlying sen- timent responsible for this mentality. Through an analysis of public polls from September 2001 through De- cember 2005, the professors found WKDW SXEOLF FRQ¿GHQFH LQ WKH JRYHUQ- ment’s ability to protect citizens from terror attacks spiked immediately af- ter the attacks, but waned thereafter. By the summer of 2005, they found that “a majority of the public (56%) ZDV QRW WRR FRQ¿GHQW RU QRW DW DOO FRQ¿GHQW LQ WKHLU JRYHUQPHQW¶V DELO- ity to prevent terrorism in their own communities.” Additionally, they found that “a majority of Americans (54%) felt that more could be done in terms of prevention, while only 43% believed that the United States was doing all it reasonably could.” These two results help us understand why
”
Toby J. Pegors, GS ’13, is a political science major from Minneapolis, MN. He enjoys gasoline-powered outdoor adventures and is a huge motorcycle fan. He can be reached at tjp2131@columbia.edu.
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features :: international
columbia political review :: winter 2012
Sanctioning Progress The Consequences of Misguided International Pressure on Iran by Joshua Fattal
A Â
s  democracy  becomes  a  life- less  dream  for  Iranians  and  the  *UHHQ 0RYHPHQW EHFRPHV D Ă€HHWLQJ memory  of  a  brave  but  futile  attempt  for  change,  there  seems  to  be  reason,  backed  up  by  the  recent  behavior  of  the  international  community,  to  look  at  Iran  as  a  monolithic  nuclear  threat.  It  is  one  thing,  though,  for  the  Iranian  nuclear  threat  to  dominate  the  world’s  headlines;Íž  it  is  quite  an- other  for  this  threat  to  eradicate  or  render  obsolete  the  world’s  efforts  to  help  the  Iranian  people  transform  their  political  system.   Forgetting  the  Iranian  people’s  ¿JKW IRU UHIRUP LV DV PRUDOO\ HUURQH- ous  as  it  is  strategically  shortsighted.  The  best  hope  for  preventing  a  nu- clear  Iran  is  promoting  the  develop- ment  of  an  Iranian  government  that  attains  its  authority  through  the  people,  not  through  nuclear  power.   As  Tom  Malinowski,  Director  of  the  Human  Rights  Watch  in  Washing- ton,  D.C.,  explains,  “So  long  as  an  authoritarian  government  rules  Iran  against  the  wishes  of  much  of  its  people,  it  will  have  an  incentive  to  provoke  confrontations  with  the  out- side  world,  in  hopes  of  distracting  its  people  from  domestic  problems,  and  to  justify  domestic  repression.â€?   For  the  United  States  and  the  international  community  to  play  a  critical  part  in  fostering  the  rise  of  a  democratic  Iran,  it  must  promote  Iranian  human  rights  and  the  growth  of  Iranian  civil  society.  To  do  this,  the  world  must  turn  its  focus  to  the  oppressive  nature  of  this  Iranian  re- gime,  stop  sanctioning  the  Iranian  middle  class,  and  foster  an  environ- ment  that  promotes  human  rights.  In  advocating  for  the  rise  of  a  civil  society  capable  of  promoting  demo- cratic  reform  in  Iran,  it  is  important Â
10
to  look  at  the  reasons  for  the  2009  uprising  and  the  response  of  the  Ira- nian  regime  that  led  to  its  deteriora- tion  In  the  immediate  wake  of  the  fraudulent  2009  Iranian  elections,  Mahmoud  Ahmadinejad  was  falsely  reported  to  have  won  in  a  landslide,  and  Iranians  took  to  the  streets  in  protest.  The  opposition  quickly  as- sumed  the  title  of  the  Green  Move- ment,  named  after  the  Islamist  campaign  colors  of  the  revolution- ary-Âturned-Âreformist  candidate  Mir  Hossein  Mousavi.  Protestors  formed  a  human  chain  around  Tehran’s  cen- WHU VTXDUH VHW ÂżUHV RXWVLGH RI WKH ,Q- terior  Ministry  building,  and  chanted  “Down  with  the  Dictator.â€?  Hope  for  a  changed  Iran  seemed  tangible  for  the  ¿UVW WLPH LQ WKLUW\ \HDUV Such  hope,  though,  did  not  last  for  long  once  the  Iranian  government  responded.  Backed  by  the  resilient  Revolutionary  Guard,  the  Ahmadine- jad-Âled  Iranian  regime  killed  171  in- nocent  protestors  and  arrested  and  tortured  thousands  more.  In  all,  312  people  were  executed  in  2010  alone.  In  2011,  emboldened  by  the  suc- cesses  of  the  Arab  Spring  around  the  Middle  East,  the  Green  Movement  began  to  plan  a  new  protest.  This  time,  the  Iranian  government  sought  to  end  the  protest  before  it  could  even  begin,  and  the  Green  Move- ment’s  leaders,  Mousavi  and  Mehdi  Karroubi,  were  placed  under  house  arrest,  where  they  remain  today.  For  WKH ÂżUVW WLPH VLQFH WKH SURWHVW PRYH- ment  began  in  2009,  members  of  the  Iranian  parliament  publically  called  for  the  execution  of  Mousavi.  In  the  Iranian  parliamentary  elections  on  March  2,  2012,  the  Green  Movement  was  nowhere  to  be  seen.  It  was  as  if  2009  had  never  occurred. Â
 The  intense  military  response  to  the  protests  has  been  coupled  by  human  rights  violations  for  a  huge  QXPEHU RI ,UDQLDQ FLWL]HQV VSHFL¿- cally  minorities  and  those  who  speak  out  against  the  government.  Ever  since  the  government’s  crackdown  in  2009,  repressing  civilian  dissenters  became  the  regime’s  primary  means  of  retaining  power.  As  the  climactic  Arab  Spring  raged  across  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa,  Iranian  au- thorities  refused  to  allow  critics  of  its  government  to  engage  in  peace- ful  demonstrations.  In  Iran’s  Arab- majority  Khuzestan  province,  secu- rity  forces  allegedly  shot  and  killed  dozens  of  protestors.  Around  the  country,  the  regime  increased  its  use  of  the  death  penalty.  Since  then,  the  regime  has  continually  targeted  civil  activists,  lawyers,  students,  and  jour- nalists.  Human  Rights  Watch  reports  that  Iranian  prison  authorities  have  exe- cuted  over  600  people  since  January  2012,  many  of  them  children.  When  a  demonstration  demanding  gov- ernmental  accountability,  reform,  and  an  end  to  discrimination  against  ethnic  minorities  hit  the  streets,  thousands  were  killed,  beaten,  and  arrested  by  security  forces.  Iran  has  imprisoned  the  greatest  number  of  journalists  in  the  world  –  42.   It  con- tinues  to  be  one  of  the  world’s  most  repressive  and  brutal  regimes.  Hu- man  rights  researchers  are  not  even  allowed  into  the  country. This  is  the  environment  where  a  protest  movement  must  struggle  to  form.  If  any  opposition  movement  is  to  rise  up,  then,  it  will  require  both  international  assistance  and  strong  internal  support  to  gain  a  footing  ca- SDEOH RI LQÀXHQFLQJ FKDQJH %XW LQ
columbia political review :: winter 2012 recent  months  the  opposition  move- ment  has  faced  a  new  hardship:  the  economic  side  effects  of  the  interna- tional  community’s  actions  to  thwart  Iran’s  nuclear  program.  Before  the  international  community  can  begin  to  take  smart,  strategic,  and  concert- ed  action  to  force  the  Iranian  regime  to  rectify  its  record  on  human  rights,  LW ÂżUVW PXVW VWRS LWV XVH RI VDQFWLRQV that  are  harming  the  very  middle  class  that  should  be  encouraged  to  lead  the  next  wave  of  the  protest  movement.  Recent  reports  have  emphasized  that  the  sanctions  are  primarily  hurting  an  innocent  Iranian  popula- WLRQ VSHFLÂżFDOO\ WKH UHIRUP RULHQWHG middle  class.  “Sanctions  are  affect- ing  the  entire  country,  but  it  is  the  people  that  bear  the  brunt  and  have  the  least  ability  to  protect  themselves  from  this  pressure,â€?  as  Trita  Parsi,  the  president  of  the  National  Iranian  American  Council,  told  The  Guard- ian  this  summer.  Those  middle  class  women  who  historically  are  the  voice  for  change  within  Iran  are  increas- ingly  unemployed  and  forced  to  re- treat  from  volunteer  work.  The  sanc- tions,  which  are  precipitating  the  demise  of  public  enterprise,  will  in- evitably  force  people  to  depend  more  on  the  state,  spelling  the  end  of  civil  activism.  Not  only  are  these  sanctions Â
art by Justin Walker
harming  the  opposition,  but  they  also  have  minimal  effect  on  their  intend- ed  targets:  autocratic  countries.  In- deed,  ultimately,  the  Iranian  regime  will  not  comply  with  international  demands  even  if  its  people  are  suffer- ing.  The  only  sanctions  that  are  nec- essary  are  those  that  apply  pressure  directly  on  the  Iranian  government.  By  sanctioning  over  forty  Iranian  ter- rorist  and  nuclear-Âmaterial  related  entities  as  well  as  state-Âowned  banks  since  2006,  the  US  Department  of  the  Treasury  has  begun  to  do  this,  but  these  types  of  sanctions  need  to  be  broadened  and  strengthened.  There  is  also  a  stronger  course  of  action  that  the  international  commu- nity  can  and  should  take  to  better  the  chances  for  a  renewed  democratic  movement.  In  the  late  20th  century,  the  American  and  Western  European  community  adopted  the  Helsinki  Ac- cords,  effectuating  an  international  environment  that  valued  respect  for  human  rights  to  the  extent  that  the  Eastern  Bloc  found  itself  forced  to  reform  its  policies.  Today,  an  inter- national  consensus  stands  opposed  to  the  Iranian  nuclear  program,  and  it  stands  to  reason  that  this  interna- tional  consensus  should  be  further  utilized  to  demand  the  end  of  the  Khomenei  government’s  oppression.  As  Malinowski  points  out,  “Iran’s Â
features :: international human  rights  activists‌want  us  to  speak  out  on  their  behalf,  to  expose  and  condemn  the  government’s  hu- man  rights  abuses,  and  to  sponsor  resolutions  in  U.N.  bodies  challeng- ing  their  government  to  stop  its  re- pression.  â€?  The  history  of  the  Hel- sinki  accord  should  serve  as  a  guide  for  policymakers  seeking  to  do  more  to  hasten  the  day  when  Iran  begins  to  respect  its  people.  As  much  as  the  Gorbachev-Âled  Soviet  Union  was  in  a  perhaps  more  open  position  toward  accepting  change  than  Khomenei-Âled  Iran  is  today,  the  Helsinki  model  does  of- fer  some  striking  and  useful  paral- lels.  Daniel  Thomas  explains  in  The  Helsinki  Effect  that  the  economic  pressures  on  the  Soviets  in  the  mid- 1980s  were  not  enough  to  democrati- cally  reform  the  regime  as  Gorbachev  eventually  did,  rightly  pointing  to  China’s  Tiananmen  Square  Massa- cre  as  an  example  where  economic  reform  did  not  entail  political  liber- alization.  The  international  adoption  and  promotion  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  in  1975  created  an  international  environment  in  which  normalizing  relations  with  the  West  depended  on  the  strength  of  a  country’s  human  rights  record.  Quite  like  Khomenei,  Gorbachev Â
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features :: international was  well  aware  that  his  country  faced  international  isolation,  and  sought  to  rectify  this  environment,  leaving  him  little  choice  but  to  accept  the  need  to  improve  his  country’s  human  rights  record.  The  international  commu- nity  issued  widespread  criticism  of  the  regime  in  the  international  press.  $PHULFDQ RIÂżFLDOV OHG E\ QRQH RWKHU than  the  former  Secretary  of  State  G e o r g e  S h u l t z ,  s t r e s s e d  the  pre- eminence  of  human  rights  in  America’s  d e a l i n g s  with  the  w o r l d .  D u r i n g  r o u t i n e  meetings  with  senior  Soviet  foreign  policy  ad- visors,  the  co-Âchair  of  Congress’  Hel- sinki  Commission  listed  the  names  of  VSHFLÂżF 6RYLHW SROLWLFDO SULVRQHUV WR be  released.   The  constant  push  by  Western  governments  to  the  Soviets  to  release  political  pressures  convinced  the  So- viets  to  release  dissidents  who  quick- ly  resumed  their  political  activities  against  the  state.  The  social  mobiliza- tion  that  can  result  from  such  oppor- tunities  erodes  a  repressive  regime’s  control  of  information  and  public  discourse.  Such  constant  and  relent- less  focus  on  human  rights  abuses  ultimately  left  the  government  with  little  choice  but  to  reform.  If  Iranian  political  prisoners  were  to  be  freed,  a  re-Âenergized  dissident  movement  could  continue  to  do  what  the  inter- national  community  might  not  have  WKH LQĂ€XHQFH WR DFKLHYH RQ LWV RZQ “The  Iranian  government  can- not  survive  with  tanks  and  prisons  alone  –  it  needs  at  least  some  de- gree  of  political  legitimacy  at  home  and  abroad,â€?  said  Malinowski.   “We  should  do  everything  we  can  to  deny  it  that  legitimacy.â€?  The  key  to  the  success  of  this  kind  of  international  action  is  the  formation  of  an  environ- ment  where  there  are  no  other  op- tions  –  a  process  the  United  States  must  lead  today.  States  that  iden- tify  weakly  with  international  society Â
columbia political review :: winter 2012 will  calculate  the  instrumental  value  of  compliance  with  international  norms.  If  the  international  community  FDQ UHGHÂżQH ,UDQÂśV LQWHUHVWV VR WKDW losing  power  at  home  is  deemed  pref- erable  to  massive  repression,  as  was  achieved  with  the  Soviet  Union,  the  calculus  of  the  Iranian  regime  can  and  will  change. Â
weakened,  surrounded  position  and  offer  it  a  way  out.  By  ceasing  to  point- lessly  sanction  the  Iranian  people  and  offering  to  stop  all  economic  censures  on  the  Iranian  regime  in  return  for  a  new  respect  for  human  rights,  the  United  States  and  the  international  community  can  provide  a  democratic  movement  the  chance  to  reform  Iran  from  the  inside  and  offer  the  Islamic  Republic  the  road  to  le- g i t i m a c y  that  it  so  craves.      The  short  term  goal  of  halt- ing  Iran’s  n u c l e a r  p r o g r a m      can  and  should  be  coupled  with  the  long-Âterm  goal  of  fostering  a  more  democratic,  open  Iran,  if  only  because  the  sanctions  that  target  those  worth  targeting  and  a  diplomacy  that  offers  Iran  a  path  to  legitimacy  are  ultimately  the  solu- tions  to  both  these  issues.  “An  action  that  extends  Iran’s  nuclear  clock  by  a  couple  of  years,  but  its  democracy  clock  by  ten  years,  will  undermine  the  long  term  goal  of  denying  Iran  nuclear  weapons,â€?  said  Malinowski.  America  cannot  turn  a  blind  eye  to  the  best  solution  to  the  Iran  problem,  which  requires  the  rise  of  a  newly  energized  protest  movement.  The  nuclear  centrifuges  are  continuing  to  spin,  faster  than  ever,  in  Tehran  to- day.  The  long-Âterm  analysis  dictates  a  radical  revision  of  today’s  current  international  strategy.  If  Iran’s  fu- ture  is  to  change,  the  international  community’s  approach  must  change  ¿UVW
“            �
When a demonstration demanding governmental acountability, reform, and an end to discrimination against ethnic minorities hit the streets, thousands were killed, beaten, and arrested by security forces.
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In  Hidden  Iran,  Ray  Takeyh  pro- vides  historical  background  to  the  success  of  diplomatic  pressure  and  economic  incentives.  He  discusses  how  long-Âstanding  militant  Iranian  practices,  such  as  the  assassination  of  dissidents  living  abroad,  were  cur- tailed  following  the  European  Union’s  threat  to  cut  off  diplomatic  relations  and  German  threats  to  impose  trade  restrictions  in  1997.  In  2011,  when  Iran  announced  that  it  was  apply- ing  for  a  seat  on  the  United  Nations  Human  Rights  Council,  the  interna- tional  outcry  that  ensued,  with  hu- man  rights  organizations  loudly  op- posing  its  candidacy,  led  the  regime  to  withdraw  its  bid.  Indeed,  the  cre- ation  of  this  normative  environment  has  already  begun,  perhaps  most  no- ticeably  through  Senator  Mark  Kirk’s  Iranian  Dissident  Awareness  Pro- gram,  which  aims  to  turn  courageous  dissidents  into  household  names.  The  imposition  of  such  a  norma- tive  framework  can  also  offer  pro- test  movements  an  internationally  legitimate  model  to  construct  trans- national  networks  for  mobilization.  Even  partial  compliance  expands  op- portunities  for  domestic  mobilization  and  increases  the  likelihood  that  the  regime  will  be  persuaded  to  reform.  It  is  evidently  time  for  a  new  Helsin- ki  process  today.  The  international  community  should  use  Iran’s  current Â
Joshua  Fattal,  CC  ’15,  is  studying  intellectual  history  and  philosophy.  He  is  interested  in  politics,  foreign  policy,  and  human  rights.  He  is  a  Contributing  Editor  of  The  Current,  Assistant  Executive  Editor  of  the  Co- lumbia  Undergraduate  Law  Review,  and  a  Senior  Editor  and  Columnist  for  the  Columbia  Political  Review.  He  can  be  reached  at  jrf2126@co- lumbia.edu.
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Bribe and Punishment Legal Strides and Policy Development in Brazil by Bruno Rigonatti Mendes
“T
he  problem  is  that  in  Brazil  you  don’t  convict.  I’ve  been  in  court  for  seven  years,  yet  this  is  the  second  time  we  attempt  to  reach  conviction.  This  course  of  ac- tion  is  still  very  novel  to  me  and  to  other  judges.â€?  Judge  Joaquim  Bar- bosa  is  unhappy  with  his  court’s  con- viction  rate.  He  is  closer  to  the  rule  than  to  the  exception  in  a  region  that  has  suffered  from  a  tainted  judicial  system  since  the  establishment  of  LWV ÂżUVW LQVWLWXWLRQV %DUERVD KRZ- ever,  isn’t  merely  a  small-Âtown  pub- OLF RIÂżFLDO GUDZQ LQWR WKH LQHYLWDEOH patrimonial  political  relations  that  plague  Latin  America.  In  reality,  he  is  a  justice  and  rapporteur  at  the  Su- premo  Tribunal  Federal,  the  Brazil- ian  equivalent  of  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court.  Colloquially  ab- breviated  as  STF,  the  country’s  highest  court  is  currently  conduct- ing  its  most  important  trial  in  its  two  hundred  years  of  existence,  a  process  whose  novelty,  unprecedented  size,  and  potential  impact  have  intrigued  justices  and  common  citizens  alike. Justice  Barbosa  is  referring  to  a  gargantuan  trial  where  37  people  have  been  indicted  with  up  to  sev- en  different  constitutional  types  of  criminal  offenses.  All  of  the  indicted  were  involved  in  a  political  bribery  scheme  at  the  federal  level  organized  between  2003  and  2004  by  the  Par- tido  dos  Trabalhadores  (Workers’  Party)  to  maintain  congressional  support  for  their  incumbent  govern- ment.  The  scheme  became  popularly  known  as  “mensalĂŁo,â€?  a  word  that Â
generally  refers  to  a  large  monthly  stipend.  Its  executors  were  only  brought  to  trial  after  several  years  of  press  investigations  and  peripheral  scandals  that  progressively  uncov- ered  their  complex  political  arrange- ments. After  the  scandal  gained  atten- tion  at  the  national  level  and  more  evidence  became  available,  an  ava- lanche  of  accusations  between  in- volved  parties  began  to  shed  more  light  on  the  individuals  behind  the  VFKHPH %UD]LOÂśV 2IÂżFH RI WKH $WWRU- ney  General  has  been  able  to  iden- tify  the  recipients  of  $16  million  in  bribes,  but  many  remain  unclear  –  LWV RIÂżFLDO UHSRUW FRQFOXGHG WKH WRWDO amount  of  transferred  money  adds  up  to  over  $70  million.  Those  indict-Â
ments  in  2007.  Designed  to  analyze  all  individual  cases  together,  the  trial  began  in  August  and  led  to  the  con- viction  of  25  of  the  defendants  in  late  October.  However,  the  trial  is  ongo- ing,  and  the  STF’s  justices  have  yet  WR GHFLGH RQ WKH VSHFLÂżF VHQWHQFHV RI each  convict.  Nevertheless,  the  trial’s  repercus- sions  have  transcended  the  capital,  BrasĂlia,  and  have  struck  a  chord  with  the  Brazilian  public,  popping  up  in  day-Âto-Âday  conversations.  Born  and  raised  in  poverty,  Justice  %DUERVD WKH ÂżUVW $IULFDQ %UD]LOLDQ to  become  a  STF  justice,  has  found  clamorous  popular  support  –  from  trending  hashtags  on  Twitter  to  dop- pelgänger  masks  worn  during  street  protests  and  currently  being  mass  produced  for  the  Febru- ary’s  Carnival  festivities. To  many  Brazilians,  the  mensalĂŁo  trial  rep- resents  a  shift  in  the  im- punity  paradigm  that  has  GHÂżQHG DQG VXSSRUWHG                                                 political  abuse  in  Brazil  throughout  its  history.  Denise  Moura,  a  historian  at  SĂŁo  Paulo  State  Uni- versity,  traces  corruption  in  the  country  back  to  the  ed  range  from  business  and  banking  16th  century,  when  the  Portuguese  moguls  to  high-Âlevel  government  of- Royal  Court  encouraged  government  ¿FLDOV $PRQJ WKH ODWWHU JURXS DUH bureaucrats  to  settle  and  work  in  JosĂŠ  Dirceu,  a  founding  member  of  Brazil  by  turning  a  blind  eye  to  any  the  Workers’  Party  and  former  gov- instances  of  power  abuse  or  graft.  ernment  minister,  and  JosĂŠ  Genoi- The  Court  was  particularly  permis- no,  who  was  president  of  the  party  sive  in  Brazil’s  rural  frontier  terri- when  the  bribes  took  place.  tories,  which  had  little  contact  with  The  judicial  process  examining  the  government  outposts  and  were  left  mensalĂŁo  began  only  after  a  compre- largely  to  the  iron  hand  of  local  land- hensive  series  of  investigations  called  holding  bureaucrats.  This  practice  of  on  by  the  Brazilian  Chamber  of  Dep- localized  despotism  was  accentuated  uties  that  led  the  STF  to  issue  indict- by  the  continuous  isolation  of  large Â
“   Â
The mensalĂŁo scandal is just another instance of this form of corruption that reaches into the BrasĂlia’s highest circles, yet it is the first major scheme at the federal level to result in thorough investigation and punishment.
â€? Â
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swaths  of  the  country  and  eventually  evolved  into  various  forms  of  clien- telism.  The  mensalĂŁo  scandal  is  just  an- other  instance  of  this  form  of  cor- ruption  that  reaches  into  the  BrasĂ- OLDÂśV KLJKHVW FLUFOHV \HW LW LV WKH ÂżUVW major  scheme  at  the  federal  level  to  result  in  thorough  investigation  and  punishment.  Previous  attempts  were  not  as  successful:  One  of  the  latest  was  the  trial  of  Fernando  Collor  de  Melo,  Brazil’s  ¿UVW GHPRFUDWL- cally  elected  –  and  impeached  –  president  after  a  twenty-Âyear  pe- riod  of  military  dictatorship  that  ended  in  1984.  Publicly  accused  by  his  own  broth- er  of  sanctioning  D PLOOLRQ GROODU LQĂ€XHQFH SHGGOLQJ scheme  run  by  his  campaign  trea- surer,  Collor  was  absolved  by  the  Supremo  Tribunal  Federal  for  lack  of  evidence  of  his  involvement.  The  verdict  was  met  at  the  time  with  unanimous  outrage  by  the  public  and  has  remained  a  constant  refer- ence  for  the  STF’s  previous  failings  throughout  the  mensalĂŁo  trial,  ex- erting  pressure  on  the  court  to  meet  popular  expectations  this  time. Indeed,  the  thorough  and  fair  con- YLFWLRQ RI FRUUXSW RIÂżFLDOV DOOLHG WR the  government  is  an  unprecedented  and  welcome  fact  in  a  country  that  in  2011  scored  3.8  on  Transparency  In- ternational’s  Corruption  Perception  Index  on  a  scale  that  ranges  from  0  (highly  corrupt)  to  10  (highly  un- corrupt).  The  convictions  have  also  attracted  international  attention.  While  foreign  analysts  differ  in  their  assessments  of  the  trial’s  practical  impact  on  Brazilian  law,  it  has  gen- erally  been  interpreted  as  a  signal  of  change  in  a  continent  where  many  countries  still  struggle  to  bring  cor- rupt  politicians  and  corporate  lead- ers  of  the  past  and  present  to  court. $OWKRXJK ÂżQDO VHQWHQFHV KDYH QRW yet  been  delivered,  Brazil’s  STF  has  proven  its  ability  to  tackle  corrup- tion,  setting  a  strong  deterrent  to  any  future  attempts  by  government Â
RIÂżFLDOV WR SXUVXH JUDIW $FFRUGLQJO\ there  is  widespread  expectation  that  the  STF  will  continue  to  indict  and  FRQYLFW SRZHUIXO RIÂżFLDOV LQYROYHG in  future  corruption  schemes.  As  Cy- nara  Menezes  describes  in  Brazil’s  Carta  Capital  magazine,  any  future  demonstration  of  leniency  or  lack  of  rigor  in  Brazil’s  highest  court  will  risk  perpetuating  the  mensalĂŁo  case  as  an  exception  rather  than  a  game Â
“   Â
where  clientelism  is  at  its  strongest.  Moreover,  the  trial  does  not  di- rectly  address  the  incentives  that  engender  the  politics  of  patronage  DQG LQĂ€XHQFH SHGGOLQJ DW ERWK WKH local  and  the  federal  levels.  Indeed,  just  punishment  does  not  necessar- ily  impede  these  forms  of  corruption  from  reappearing  in  Brazilian  poli- tics.  Paulo  Uebel,  Columbia  SIPA’13,  who  is  currently  writing  his  thesis  on  Brazilian  cor- ruption,  points  to  the  source  of  the  problem:  “The  Brazilian  govern- ment  has  a  series  of  legal,  adminis-            WUDWLYH ÂżVFDO DQG ÂżQDQFLDO LQVWUX- ments  at  its  dis- posal  to  pick  win- ners  and  losers,  all  of  which  gen- erate  incentives  IRU LQĂ€XHQFH SHGGOLQJ ´ 6LQFH JRY- ernments  at  the  federal,  state,  and  municipal  levels  in  Brazil  often  lack  restraint  in  choosing  the  recipients  RI VXFK EHQHÂżWV IUHH PDUNHW FRPSH- tition  gives  way  to  bribery,  lobbying,  and  personal  connections.  Rather  than  addressing  these  incentives  di- rectly,  the  mensalĂŁo  trial  merely  ex- HPSOLÂżHV D SDOOLDWLRQ RI WKHLU FRQVH- quences. Nevertheless,  the  international  community  has  been  primarily  op- timistic  while  observing  the  trial’s  development.  The  results  were  par- ticularly  praised  in  neighboring  countries  like  Argentina  and  Ecua- dor,  where  increasingly  authoritar- ian  governments  seem  to  be  headed  in  an  opposite  direction,  cracking  down  on  free  press  and  showing  little  sign  of  tackling  internal  corruption  and  impunity.  ClarĂn,  Argentina’s  largest  newspaper,  said  that  the  con- victions  harmonize  with  a  series  of  measures  undertaken  by  Brazilian  President  Dilma  Rousseff  to  increase  government  transparency  and  to  dis- courage  graft,  such  as  publishing  the  salaries  of  all  federal  employees  on- line.  La  NaciĂłn,  another  major  Ar- gentine  newspaper,  highlighted  for- mer  Brazilian  President  Luiz  InĂĄcio  Lula  da  Silva’s  positive  outlook  on  the  process,  seeing  it  as  a  sign  of  in-Â
While foreign analysts differ in their assessments of the trial’s practical impact on Brazilian law, it has generally been interpreted as a signal                          of change in a continent where many countries still struggle to bring corrupt politicians and corporate leaders of the past and present to court.
14
changer  in  Brazil’s  justice  system.      While  the  novelty,  size,  and  ex- ecution  of  the  trial  are  all  laudable,  it  is  also  important  to  note  its  short- comings  and  the  extent  of  its  imme- diate  impact.  The  meticulousness  of  the  investigation  process  might  have  been  crucial  to  providing  enough  in- formation  for  the  conviction  of  sev- HUDO JXLOW\ RIÂżFLDOV +RZHYHU WKH VHYHQ \HDU JDS EHWZHHQ WKH ÂżUVW news  of  the  scandal  and  the  sentenc- ing  of  involved  parties  is  nothing  new  IRU WKH 67) 7KH JDS UHĂ€HFWV DQ RS- HUDWLRQDO GLIÂżFXOW\ LQ %UD]LOÂśV MXVWLFH system  that  was  not  addressed  by  the  trial.  Moreover,  it  stands  alongside  other  shortcomings  that  delayed  the  process  and  continuously  enabled  those  who  are  guilty  to  game  the  system  to  their  favor.  The  outcomes  of  the  mensalĂŁo  trial  ultimately  re- sulted  in  many  convictions  in  spite  RI VXFK GLIÂżFXOWLHV ZKLFK ZRXOG RQO\ be  resolved  by  structural  reforms  reducing  the  judicial  privileges  en- MR\HG E\ JRYHUQPHQW RIÂżFLDOV 7KHVH reforms  include  the  foro  privile- giado,  a  constitutional  arrangement  that  overloads  higher  courts  with  all  indictments  of  corruption  in  the  public  sector,  as  well  as  undermin- ing  attempts  to  corrupt  or  maneuver  the  judicial  system,  particularly  in  the  least  developed  areas  of  Brazil, Â
�
columbia political review :: winter 2012 creased  institutional  strength  rather  than  a  threat  to  his  party  and  politi- cal  legacy.  An  op-Âed  from  Ecuador’s  La  RepĂşblica  similarly  praises  the  STF’s  “enviableâ€?  neutrality  and  in- tegrity.  News  of  the  convictions  reso- nated  all  the  way  north  to  Mexico,  the  region’s  second  largest  economy,  where  El  PaĂs  stressed  the  trial’s  un- usually  severe  sentences  and  praised  the  STF’s  decision  to  prevent  inter- QDWLRQDO Ă€LJKW E\ ZLWKKROGLQJ WKH passport  of  every  defendant,  albeit  criticizing  the  STF’s  slow  pace  in  set- ting  up  the  trial.  The  mensalĂŁo  trial  might  be  the  most  remarkable  event  in  Brazil- ian  legal  affairs  today,  but  it  is  not  the  only  contemporary  government  stride  toward  a  more  developed  so- ciety  in  Brazil.  As  it  embarks  on  its  third  decade  of  democracy,  Brazil  KDV ÂżQDOO\ DFKLHYHG WKH SROLWLFDO DQG economic  stability  it  needs  to  ad- dress  latent  institutional  problems  that  have  hindered  its  development  for  decades,  or  even  centuries.  In- deed,  Brazil  strives  to  become  a  leading  world  presence  worthy  of  its  immense  area,  population,  and  resources.  Begun  during  Presi- dent  Fernando  Henrique  Cardoso’s Â
term  in  the  1990s  and  furthered  by  Workers’  Party  President  Lula  and  incumbent  Dilma  Rousseff,  major  advances  have  been  made  in  three  particular  areas  in  which  Brazil  has  struggled  in  the  past:  infrastructure,  education,  and  inequality. Notorious  for  their  large-Âscale,  poorly  planned  projects,  Brazil’s  main  transport  and  energy  net- works  have  historically  been  built  and  maintained  by  federal  and  state  governments,  often  costing  too  much  to  compensate  for  embezzled  money  and  taking  too  long  to  be  completed.  Brazil’s  latest  leaders  have  begun  to  privatize  parts  of  both  networks,  which  have  often  led  to  safer,  even  environmentally  friendly,  projects,  such  as  SĂŁo  Paulo  state’s  Rodoanel  and  scenic  Imigrantes  highways.  Hoping  to  attract  greater  invest- ments  to  interior  areas,  President  Rousseff  has  also  recently  an- nounced  a  series  of  measures  to  sig- QLÂżFDQWO\ GHFUHDVH SURGXFWLRQ FRVWV among  them  an  up  to  28  percent  cut  in  electricity  bills.  The  increasing  in- ÀRZ RI IRUHLJQ PRQH\ LV DOVR XQOLNHO\ to  halt  within  the  next  few  years.  The  PLOLWDU\ RIÂżFHUV ZKR SODQQHG WKH Rodovia  TransamazĂ´nica  highway, Â
cover story which  connects  large  empty  areas  to  each  other  throughout  the  Amazon  rainforest,  hardly  knew  their  coun- try  would  win  bids  to  host  both  the  2014  World  Cup  and  2016  Olympics.  Brazil  is  also  a  pioneer  in  offshore  oil  drilling,  and  the  recent  discovery  of  massive  deep-Âwater  reserves  along  its  coast  has  sparked  the  interest  of  investors  and  politicians  alike. The  government  has  also  spe- FLÂżFDOO\ IRFXVHG RQ LPSURYLQJ WKH technical  experience  of  science  and  engineering  students  by  implement- ing  the  “CiĂŞncia  sem  Fronteirasâ€?  (Science  without  Borders)  fellow- ship,  which  covers  tuition  and  living  costs  for  a  semester  or  year  abroad  at  top  universities  across  the  world.  The  program  avoids  brain  drain  by  guaranteeing  that  students  return  to  Brazil  for  the  last  year  of  their  stud- ies.  At  the  same  time,  it  provides  stu- dents  with  the  top-Ânotch  education  DQG QHWZRUNLQJ UHTXLUHG WR IXOÂżOO D growing  national  demand  for  high  skilled  labor.  There  have  also  been  advance- PHQWV LQ WKH DUHD RI DIÂżUPDWLYH DF- tion.  The  STF  ruled  in  April  of  this  year  that  racial  quotas  in  universi- ties  are  constitutionally  valid.  In  Au-Â
art by Marissa Tjartjalis
15
cover story
columbia political review :: winter 2012
gust,  President  Rousseff  sanctioned  a  law  that  reserves  50  percent  of  all  spots  in  federal  universities  to  public  high  school  students,  who  are  often  at  a  disadvantage  when  competing  against  wealthier  private  school  stu- dents  in  taking  standardized  tests  for  admissions  to  the  country’s  best  public  institutions,  which  also  hap- pen  to  be  free  of  charge. Educational  reform  further  caused  an  uproar  among  the  white  upper-Âmiddle  class,  whose  privately  educated  younger  generations  will  face  tougher  competition  because  RI WKH QHZ DIÂżUPDWLYH DFWLRQ SROL- cies  in  public  universities.  Criticism  abounds,  ranging  from  veiled  rac- ism  and  classism  to  more  construc- tive  arguments  questioning  the  generality  of  the  50  percent  public  high  school  quo- ta,  which  might  lead  to  imbalanc- es  in  regions  where  most  students  are  privately  educated.  Some  also  question  the  functionality  of  racial  quotas  in  a  country  where  over  40  SHUFHQW RI WKH SRSXODWLRQ LGHQWLÂżHV as  a  mix  of  European,  African,  and  indigenous  ancestry.  One  of  the  most  acute  problems  endured  by  Brazil  is  its  high  degree  of  income  inequality.  The  World  Bank’s  latest  measure  in  2009  re- vealed  Brazil  has  the  12th  highest  *LQL FRHIÂżFLHQW WKH SULQFLSDO PHD- sure  of  a  state’s  economic  inequal- ity)  in  the  world,  surpassed  only  by  smaller  economies  in  Latin  America  and  Sub-ÂSaharan  Africa.  Fortunate- ly,  it  is  an  active  topic  of  discussion  in  the  government’s  agenda,  and  there  have  been  signs  of  steady  im- provement.  A  comprehensive  World  Bank  study  published  in  2004  point- ed  to  inequitable  access  to  educa- tion,  regressive  public  transfers  in  the  pensions  system,  and  high  wage  differentials  as  the  main  source  of  Brazil’s  unusually  high  economic  LQHTXDOLW\ EXW DOVR UHYHDOHG VLJQLÂż- cant  attempts  by  the  governments  of  Presidents  Fernando  Cardoso  and  Lula  to  counter  these  problems.  The  aforementioned  education  policies Â
ensure  a  fairer  educational  access  and  skill-Âbuilding  experiences.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  progress  has  not  occurred  at  an  optimal  pace,  and  that  many  govern- ment  initiatives  have  faltered  or  out- right  failed  because  of  weak  political  support,  implementation  problems,  social  resistance,  and  corruption.  In  WKH ÂżHOG RI HQHUJ\ DQG LQIUDVWUXF- ture,  local  governments  are  strug- gling  to  complete  the  infrastructure  projects  necessary  to  accommodate  the  World  Cup  and  the  Olympics  on  time,  in  a  paradoxical  scenario  where  delayed  bureaucratic  checks  have  fostered  urgency  contracts  that  are Â
“   Â
program,  but  long-Âoverdue  reform  of  Brazil’s  pensions  system  has  been  pushed  back  on  the  senate’s  agenda  several  times  and  there  is  no  short- term  implementation  in  sight,  partly  because  of  the  political  cost  of  reduc- LQJ JRYHUQPHQW EHQHÂżWV WR ZHOO RII senior  citizens. The  mensalĂŁo  trial  is  not  an  isolat- ed  phenomenon,  but  part  of  a  mul- tidimensional  struggle  to  overcome  developmental  problems,  which  for  a  long  time  have  characterized  Brazil’s  political,  economic,  and  social  or- ganization.  Many  of  these  attempts  WR Âż[ WKH V\VWHP DLP DW WKH URRWV of  the  problems,  and  the  successful  implementation  of  a  few  is  laud- able  not  only  at  the  national  level,  but  also  in  Lat- in  America  as  a             whole,  where  oth- er  countries  still  languish  without  much  hope  for  transformation.   However,  as  skeptics  of  the  trial’s  outcome  have  correctly  highlighted,  reform  will  only  come  from  the  con- tinuous  generation  of  progressive  results,  and  any  faltering  can  be  in- terpreted  as  a  step  backwards  in  the  VWUXJJOH DJDLQVW FRUUXSWLRQ LQHIÂż- ciency,  educational  imbalances,  and  inequality  of  opportunity.  It  is,  then,  necessary  for  both  the  government  and  civil  society  to  actively  monitor  and  evaluate  the  results  of  structural  reform  and  developmental  policies  –  recognizing  progress  and  scruti- nizing  failure  in  order  to  spur  and  sustain  long-Âterm  development  in  Brazil. Â
The outcomes of the mensalão trial ultimately resulted in many convictions in spite of such difficulties, which would only be resolved by                          structural reforms reducing the judicial privileges enjoyed by government officials.
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more  vulnerable  to  embezzlement.  The  federal  government  is  also  strug- gling  to  receive  competitive  bids  for  the  completion  of  a  high-Âspeed  rail  system  between  SĂŁo  Paulo  and  Rio  de  Janeiro,  and  there  has  been  sig- QLÂżFDQW SUHVVXUH IURP HQYLURQPHQ- tal  groups  to  halt  the  construction  of  large-Âscale  hydroelectric  projects  in  the  Amazon  rainforest.  Large-Âscale  SXEOLF SURMHFWV KDYH DOVR EHHQ GLIÂż- cult  to  implement.  The  transposition  of  the  SĂŁo  Francisco  River  in  Bra- zil’s  northeast,  for  example,  aimed  at  combatting  regular  droughts,  has  been  delayed  for  more  than  a  decade  among  complaints  of  embezzlement,  environmental  disregard,  and  ques- tionable  functionality.  Environmen- tal  concerns  have  also  arisen  after  a  minor  oil  leak  in  one  of  Brazil’s  newer  offshore  oil  drilling  platforms,  and  fears  of  a  “resource  curseâ€?  have  increased  since  the  Brazilian  Depu- ties  Chamber  failed  to  pass  a  bill  pipelining  all  future  federal  royalties  to  educational  funding  from  the  ex- ploration  of  deep  water  oil  reserves. Concerning  inequality,  there  has  been  remarkable  progress  with  con- ditional  cash  transfers  such  as  Bolsa  FamĂlia,  a  titanic  poverty-Âreduction Â
�
Bruno  Rigonatti  Mendes,  CC  ‘14,  is  an  economics  and  political  science  major  born  and  raised  in  SĂŁo  Pau- lo,  Brazil.  He  has  an  avid  interest  in  development  economics  in  Latin  America  and  Sub-ÂSaharan  Africa,  and  strives  to  climb  the  interna- tional  development  ladder  to  World  Bank  presidency  one  unpaid  intern- ship  at  a  time.  Bruno  can  be  reached  at  brm2126@columbia.edu.
columbia political review :: winter 2012
features :: international
Gimme, Gimme More Shedding Light on African Land Grab Deals by Sarina Bhandari
B
y  2013,  more  than  1.5  million  Ethiopians  will  be  displaced  from  their  homes  by  the  or- ders  of  their  own  government.  Some  will  have  to  relocate  to  areas  that  lack  stable  access  to  food  and  water,  and  VWLOO PRUH PD\ ÂżQG WKH\ FDQ QR ORQJHU VXSSRUW WKHPVHOYHV ÂżQDQFLDOO\ 7KH land  of  these  local  residents  no  longer  belongs  to  them  because  the  Ethio- pian  government  has  sold  much  of  it  without  their  consent.  Between  2008  and  2011,  Ethiopia  leased  3.6  million  hectares  of  land  to  foreign  investors,  and  more  than  two  million  hectares  remain  avail- able  for  lease  or  purchase.  What  is  h a p p e n - ing  to  these  1.5  million  Ethiopians  is  not  an  a n o m a l y  within  Af- rica.  In  fact,  it  is  an  increasingly  common  occur- rence,  given  the  quantity  of  land  that  foreign  investors  have  purchased  on  the  continent  following  a  spike  in  food  prices  in  2008.  As  governments  and  ¿QDQFLDO RUJDQL]DWLRQV VHDUFKHG IRU solutions  to  rising  food  prices,  inves- tors  also  knew  to  act  quickly.  The  ag- ricultural  crisis  was  a  telltale  sign  of  a  new  era  in  which  demand  for  staple  crops  and  natural  resources  would  soar  as  supply  decreased.  Acknowl- edging  the  unsustainability  of  global  FRQVXPSWLRQ KDELWV PDMRU ÂżQDQFLDO SOD\HUV LGHQWLÂżHG WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ then  swiftly  secured  food  and  other  resources.  To  be  prepared  for  the  next  major  resource  shortage,  investors  be- gan  acquiring  large  tracts  of  land  that Â
could  be  used  for  the  production  and  extraction  of  resources.  The  practice  of  acquiring  land  on  a  massive  scale  in  the  name  of  resource  security  has  a  name:  land  grabbing.  :KLOH QR VHW UXOHV GHÂżQH ZKDW LV DQG what  is  not  land  grabbing,  the  process  typically  involves  the  sale  of  a  plot  of  land  that  is  larger  than  10,000  hect- ares.  Today’s  land  grab  deals  often  in- volve  even  larger  plots  of  land  —  many  are  larger  than  200,000  hectares,  and  some  purchases  exceed  one  mil- lion  hectares.  The  buyers  are  usually  wealthy  governments  and  private  in-Â
usually  call  for  environmentally  un- friendly  practices  and  the  forcible  re- location  of  its  residents.  The  displaced  PXVW WKHQ ÂżQG QHZ MREV DQG KRPHV all  while  dealing  with  increasingly  limited  access  to  food  and  water.  Current  guidelines  for  foreign  land  purchases  do  not  effectively  ensure  that  investors  handle  the  land  and  the  people  living  on  it  fairly  and  respon- sibly.  Financial  institutions  have  the  power  to  regulate  the  terms  of  trade,  but  they  enable,  rather  than  restrict,  the  rampant  deals. Land  grabbing  was  an  established  p r a c t i c e  even  be- fore  the  2008  food  c r i s i s .  Droughts  and  a  hike  in  oil  pric- es  in  2006  led  to  dra- matic  in-   creases  in  the  price  of  food  in  developing  nations,  but  within  the  past  few  years,  the  number  of  foreign  land  acquisition  deals  has  exploded.  Research  by  Columbia  so- ciology  professor  Saskia  Sassen  shows  that  land  grab  deals  between  2006  and  2011  exceeded  a  total  of  200  million  hectares.  According  to  public  reports,  134  million  hectares  of  land  in  Africa  now  belong  to  foreign  investors.  This  PHDQV DSSUR[LPDWHO\ ÂżYH SHUFHQW RI the  African  continent  is  entangled  in  a  land  grab.  Additionally,  the  prolif- eration  of  legal-Âyet-Âclandestine  land  acquisition  deals  means  that  the  true  quantity  of  foreign-Âowned  land  in  Af- rica  is  likely  even  greater.  While  the  sheer  size  of  African  land  acquisition  can  be  shocking,  the Â
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After a deal has taken place, investors’ plans for the land usually call for environmentally unfriendly practices and the forcible relocation of its residents. vestors  purchasing  tracts  of  land  from  developing  nations.  Most  of  the  land  sold  to  foreign  investors  in  this  way  is  in  eastern  Sub-ÂSaharan  Africa.  The  GHDOV DUH FRQFHQWUDWHG LQ ÂżYH FRXQ- tries:  Ethiopia,  Tanzania,  Sudan,  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo,  and  Madagascar,  according  to  a  2012  re- port  from  Oxfam  International.  The  intended  uses  of  the  acquired  land  are  diverse,  but  biofuel  extraction  and  food  crop  production  are  usually  the  primary  objectives. /DQG JUDEELQJ \LHOGV EHQHÂżWV IRU both  buyers  and  sellers,  but  the  prac- tice  comes  with  consequences  for  which  no  one  is  currently  taking  re- sponsibility.  After  a  deal  has  taken  place,  investors’  plans  for  the  land Â
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treatment  of  the  land  is  even  more  origins  of  the  issue.  In  the  1980s,  the  frightening.  Twenty  years  of  sustained  World  Bank  and  the  International  heavy  mining  or  industrial  planta- Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  supported  re- tion  procedures  will  strip  land  of  its  structuring  programs  that  introduced  resources.  As  Sassen  notes,  a  twenty- African  land  to  the  global  market.  In- year  land  grab  lease  can  leave  land  vestors  who  had  previously  consid- barren.  Speculators  have  realized  that  ered  African  property  law  too  compli- foreign  investors’  use  of  land-Âgrabbed  cated  to  purchase  now  reconsidered,  territories  is  unsustainable  and  could  NQRZLQJ WKDW UHSXWDEOH ÂżQDQFLDO LQ- cause  massive  food  and  water  crises  stitutions  would  support  their  deci- in  Africa.  Some,  including  Henk  Hob- sion  to  invest  in  African  territory.  In  belink,  a  coordinator  of  GRAIN,  an  or- fact,  within  the  past  decade,  the  World  ganization  supporting  small  farmers,  Bank  has  loaned  over  $8  billion  to  in- have  even  called  the  problem  of  wa- vestors  for  land  grab  deals.  Before  Western  institutions  could  ter  abuse  in  land-Âgrabbed  territories  “hydrological  suicideâ€?  for  the  African  complete  the  process  of  integrat- continent.  If  foreign  investors  were  ing  Africa  into  the  global  market,  the  to  use  green  procedures,  sustainable  problem  of  political  instability  needed  farming  techniques,  or  other  methods  WR ÂżUVW EH DGGUHVVHG $IWHU DOO LQ VRPH to  protect  the  longevity  of  the  land,  SDUWV RI WKH FRQWLQHQW LW LV GLIÂżFXOW IRU perhaps  the  land  could  be  returned  Africans  –  let  alone  foreign  investors  to  Africans  in  a  manageable  state.  But  –  to  determine  who  is  in  charge  of  the  when  investors  are  only  looking  out  land.  For  foreign  investors  looking  to  for  their  own  interests  and  lack  exter- purchase  hundreds  of  thousands  of  nal  pressure  from  national  and  international  regulators,  they  will  not  question  the  ethics  of  their  practices.  'XH WR Ă€LPV\ RU QRQ H[LV- tent  property  rights,  most  Af- ricans  in  heavily  land-Âgrabbed  territories  do  not  have  any  le- gal  claim  to  their  land.  Another  concern  is  that,  despite  playing  QR UROH LQ WKH RIÂżFLDO ODQG JUDE agreements,  local  residents  face  forcible  displacement  and  ¿QDQFLDO SUREOHPV ZKHQ WKH land  is  transferred  to  foreign  investors.  The  deals  incite  re- sistance  among  some  affected  Africans,  but  most  are  at  a  loss  as  to  how,  exactly,  to  resist  the  deals.  When  a  Saudi  investor  purchased  700,000  hectares  for  the  rice  production,  lo- cal  farmers  in  Mali  responded  with  court  action.  Unfortu- nately,  locals  who  protest  land  JUDEV ZLOO ÂżQG OLWWOH VXSSRUW IRU their  grievances  within  the  very  governments  that  sold  the  land  LQ WKH ÂżUVW SODFH :LWK QRZKHUH to  appeal,  locals  often  suffer  the  consequences  of  land  grabs  art by Desislava Petkova without  any  attention  or  help  hectares,  it  is  impractical  to  communi- from  their  own  governments. When  looking  for  solutions  to  the  cate  with  individuals  or  local  leaders.  problems  associated  with  land  grab  To  make  their  deals  secure,  investors  GHDOV LW KHOSV WR ÂżUVW XQGHUVWDQG WKH instead  negotiate  with  national-Âlevel Â
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political  leaders  endorsed  by  interna- tional  organizations  like  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank,  even  if  these  leaders  do  not  have  the  support  of  local  resi- dents.  Unfortunately  for  the  displaced  and  their  land,  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  generally  back  leaders  who  show  promise  to  prioritize  their  countries’  ¿QDQFLDO FRQFHUQV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH related  to  international  debt.  A  lead- HU EDFNHG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ÂżQDQFLQJ organizations  would  be  predisposed  to  accept  lucrative  land-Âgrab  agree- ments,  especially  considering  that  large  foreign  investors  are  relatively  reliable  with  payments.  However,  these  leaders  are  often  unmoved  by  the  fact  that  the  terms  of  most  deals  threaten  the  rights  of  Africans  and  the  long-Âterm  health  of  the  land.  Given  that  the  power  to  accept  or  reject  the  sale  of  land  lies  with  these  leaders,  those  who  would  oppose  the  deals  are  usually  powerless  to  stop  them.  African  leaders  agree  to  land  grab  deals  because  they  EHQHÂżW IURP WKH SD\PHQW UH- ceived  from  foreign  investors.  However,  the  leaders  ignore  the  negative  (and  often  per- manent)  impacts  of  the  deal,  such  as  displacement,  unem- ployment,  and  environmental  degradation.  Investors  seem  to  understand  that  the  local  and  long-Âterm  problems  caused  by  their  land-Âuse  practices  will  be  issues  they  can  ignore  –  it  is  only  the  people  on  the  land  that  will  have  to  face  the  conse- quences.  The  deals  are  rapidly  taking  place,  despite  the  fact  that  the  consequences  devas- tate  vast  amounts  of  land  and  millions  of  people,  especially  small  farmers.  As  the  deals  take  place  today,  neither  the  buyers  nor  the  sellers  are  watching  out  for  the  consequences,  especial- ly  the  long-Âterm  ones,  that  East  Africa  will  have  to  endure.       No  single  organization,  government,  or  other  group  of  individuals  is  entirely  respon- sible  for  ensuring  that  human  rights  and  long-Âterm  environ- mental  concerns  are  taken  into  con- sideration  when  these  deals  are  made.  Current  organizations  can  offer  guide- lines  that  the  deals  should  follow,  but Â
columbia political review :: winter 2012 these  bodies  lack  the  power  to  enforce  any  of  their  suggested  rules.  On  an  in- ternational  level,  the  United  Nations  has  developed  global  guidelines  that  call  for  transparency  in  land  grab  deals  and  consultations  with  locals,  but  these  guide- lines  are  not  enforceable.  Afri- can-Âled  programs  currently  in  place  for  small  farmers,  such  as  the  Comprehensive  Africa  Agri- culture  Development  Program  (CAADP),  outline  basic  protec- tions  that  all  African  countries  should  honor,  but  when  land  grab  deals  deny  these  basic  pro- tections,  they  lack  the  regula- tory  and  enforcement  power  to  insist  that  small  farmers’  rights  be  respected  by  the  terms  of  the  trade.  If  buyers  or  sellers  do  not  want  to  follow  international  or  national  guidelines,  no  one  says  they  have  to.  Dangerous  deals  continue  to  happen  because  the  current  po- litical  institutions  are  too  weak  to  intervene.  Because  buyers  and  sellers  do  not  pay  enough  attention  to  long-Âterm  environ- mental  or  human  rights  con- cerns  in  their  agreements,  land  grab  deals  need  to  be  checked  by  an  external  party  that  en- sures  important  interests  are  not  neglected.  Given  that  cur- rent  policy-Âbased  organizations  lack  the  power  to  enforce  healthier  terms  of  trade,  it  is  up  to  organizations  with  real  power  over  land  grab  deals  to  de- mand  better  terms.  Land  grab  deals  require  the  sup- SRUW RI ÂżQDQFLDO ORDQLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV because  foreign  investors  usually  need  to  withdraw  major  loans  to  purchase  extensive  tracts  of  land.  By  contrast,  land  grab  deals  do  not  require  the  sup- port  of  policymaking  organizations,  such  as  the  UN  or  CAADP.  Because  in- VWLWXWLRQV WKDW ÂżQDQFLDOO\ VXSSRUW ODQG grabs  ultimately  determine  whether  or  not  a  deal  can  take  place,  they  have  the  most  leverage  to  demand  that  land  grab  take  environmental  interests,  human  rights,  and  other  long-Âterm  concerns  into  consideration.  By  com- parison,  policy  institutions,  which  do  not  determine  whether  the  deals  will  take  place,  do  not  have  leverage  over  the  deals.  Â
Historically,  governments  and  in- ternational  policymaking  institutions  have  been  expected  to  regulate  inter- national  terms  of  trade.  They  still  do, Â
but  deregulation  has  allowed  for  high- VSHHG KLJK YROXPH ÂżQDQFLDO WUDQVDF- tions  to  take  place  with  less  oversight  than  in  the  past.  The  power  of  regu- lation  has  shifted  from  the  hands  of  governments  and  political  institutions  WR ÂżQDQFLDO RUJDQL]DWLRQV WKHPVHOYHV Whether  a  transaction  will  occur  de- SHQGV PRUH RQ ÂżQDQFLDO QHHGV WKDQ on  any  given  set  of  policy  aims.  This  PHDQV WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV WKDW ÂżQDQFH land  grab  deals  serve  as  the  last  and  sometimes  only  checkpoints  before  a  deal  can  go  through  –  but  most  are  not  exercising  their  power  responsibly. (YHQ WKRXJK ÂżQDQFLDO OHQGLQJ RU regulating  institutions  have  the  most  power  to  enforce  social  responsibility  in  investments,  they  often  lack  incen- tives  to  do  so.  Socially  responsible  in- vesting  often  correlates  with  weaker  returns  on  investment.  For  example,  if  land  grab  investors  were  required  to  provide  housing  and  work  for  the Â
features :: international displaced,  use  sustainable  farming  or  extraction  methods  instead  of  cheaper  but  more  harmful  ones,  and  leave  the  land  arable  at  the  end  of  their  lease,  they  would  have  to  spend  more  money.  Simply  put,  when  in- vestors  opt  for  expensive,  al- beit  socially  responsible  plans  in  place  of  cheaper  yet  damag- ing  ones,  they  do  not  receive  as  PXFK SURÂżW +RZHYHU LI ÂżQDQFLDO LQVWL- tutions  look  at  the  long  term,  they  should  understand  the  need  to  demand  fair  and  sus- tainable  land  grab  deals  –  even  if  it  means  taking  a  short-Âterm  hit.  The  resource  crisis  that  inspired  land  grabbing  will  only  worsen  in  twenty  years  if  abusive  farming  and  resource- extraction  dry  out  over  200  million  hectares  of  land.  Sus- tainable  practices  need  to  be  enforced,  but  buyers  and  sell- ers  without  regulation  are  agreeing  to  non-Âsustainable  terms  of  trade.  Land  grab  deals  cannot  be  halted,  but  they  can  be  handled  responsibly.  Many  continue  to  believe  that  governments  and  policy  institutions  should  be  in  charge  of  enforcing  social  responsibility  in  investments,  but  these  organizations  are  too  weak  to  intervene  in  the  deregulated,  IDVW SDFHG ZRUOG RI PRGHUQ ÂżQDQFH 7KH VWURQJHVW FKHFN RQ ÂżQDQFLDO WUDGH FRPHV IURP ZLWKLQ WKH ÂżQDQFLDO VHF- tor.  The  protection  of  human  rights  and  the  environment  is  possible  if  de- manded  by  the  World  Bank  and  other  ¿QDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV 'RLQJ VR LV RI the  utmost  importance  for  the  future  of  the  African  continent  and  its  peo- ple. Sarina  Bhandari,  CC  ’14,  is  major- ing  in  sociology  and  concentrat- ing  in  business.  She  has  worked  in  cartoons  at  The  New  Yorker  and  communications  at  Doctors  With- out  Borders.  Currently,  she  is  the  outreach  director  and  an  editor  for  Columbia’s  undergraduate  literary  magazine,  Quarto.  Her  interests  in- clude  new  age  philosophy,  human  biology,  and  humor.  Sarina  can  be  reached  at  sb2122@columbia.edu
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briefing
columbia political review :: winter 2012
Crossing the Border for Immigration Reform A Future Framework for Fixing a Fractured Immigration System ,Q WKH HOHFWLRQ DQ RYHUZKHOPLQJ PDMRULW\ RI ÂżUVW generation  Americans  voted  in  favor  of  Democratic  candidates  over  Republican  ones,  bringing  the  issue  of  immigration  re- form  to  the  forefront  of  governance.  With  71  percent  of  Latinos  voting  for  President  Barack  Obama,  many  Republican  politi- cians,  including  Marco  Rubio  and  Jeb  Bush,  both  from  Flor- ida,  have  voiced  concerns  that  their  party  needs  to  change  its  stance  on  immigration  policy  to  account  for  a  rapidly  changing  American  demographic.  In  1986,  the  Immigration  Reform  and  Control  Act  legal- ized  the  status  of  many  undocumented  residents  in  the  United  States,  but  the  hiring  of  workers  without  proper  work  authori- zations  remained  illegal.  While  a  subsequent  Immigration  Act  that  passed  four  years  later  increased  and  established  a  more  ÀH[LEOH FDS RQ WKH QXPEHU RI OHJDO LPPLJUDQWV DOORZHG LQWR WKH United  States,  the  Illegal  Immigration  Reform  and  Immigrant  Responsibility  Act  of  1996  led  to  massive  federally-Âimposed  deportations  by  requiring  those  who  had  unlawfully  immigrat- ed  to  the  United  States  to  leave  the  country  until  they  could  acquire  a  pardon.  In  2001,  senators  Dick  Durbin  (D-ÂIL)  and  Orrin  Hatch  (R- UT)  introduced  the  Development,  Relief,  and  Education  for  Alien  Minors  (DREAM)  Act,  which  provides  for  conditional  SHUPDQHQW UHVLGHQF\ DQG IHGHUDOO\ VXEVLGL]HG ÂżQDQFLDO DLG WR
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allow  the  children  of  undocumented  residents  to  pursue  post- secondary  education.  Despite  subsequent  attempts  to  pass  the  DREAM  Act  in  Congress,  most  recently  by  Harry  Reid  (D-ÂNV),  the  bill  has  never  become  law.  President  Barack  Obama’s  exec- utive  order  in  2012,  nonetheless,  directed  his  U.S.  Department  of  Justice  to  stop  the  deportation  of  immigrants  who  fall  under  the  provisions  originally  proposed  in  the  DREAM  Act.  Apart  from  the  DREAM  Act,  other  Congressional  attempts  toward  immigration  reform  have  included  the  bipartisan  pro- posals  of  senators  Charles  E.  Schumer  (D-ÂNY)  and  Lindsay  Graham  (R-ÂSC).  In  2010,  they  introduced  a  legislative  blue- SULQW UHTXLULQJ WKH XVH RI ELRPHWULF LGHQWLÂżFDWLRQ WR HQVXUH WKDW only  documented  citizens  are  hired  for  jobs.  They  also  brought  forward  a  proposal  to  improve  border  security  to  prevent  un- lawful  crossing  of  the  American-ÂMexican  border  while  simul- taneously  constructing  a  means  to  admit  temporary  workers  into  the  United  States  and  give  those  already  in  the  country  an  opportunity  to  become  citizens.  Despite  the  fact  that  their  UHVROXWLRQV IDLOHG WR UHDFK WKH 6HQDWH Ă€RRU DQG WKDW WKH PLG- term  elections  placed  immigration  reform  on  the  backburner,  Schumer  and  Graham  announced  after  the  2012  elections  that  they  are  planning  to  revive  their  proposals.  In  December  2012,  it  became  evident  that  the  Obama  ad- ministration  had  already  begun  gearing  up  to  launch  a  com-Â
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columbia political review :: winter 2012
The Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act of 2009 Current immigration law has capped the number of immigrants who can come to the United States based on country of origin. This bill, introduced by Representative Jason Chaffetz of Utah, which has passed in the House of Representatives but is stalled in the Senate. It would eliminate these quotas for immigrants who come to the United States with an employment visa, that is visas that have been sponsored by an American employer. This bill would also increase the country quotas for family-based immigrants, meaning immigrants who already have family in the United States. munications strategy to promote immigration reform after its QHJRWLDWLRQV RQ WKH ¿VFDO FOLII GUDZ WR D FORVH $V RI¿FLDOV LQ WKH Obama administration told the Los Angeles Times, President Obama intends to start working with Congress on a compre- hensive bill that would not only create a path to citizenship for the large number of undocumented workers already residing in the United States, but would also create disincentives for future unlawful immigration by improving border security, punishing employers for hiring illegal immigrants, and encouraging the immigration of high-skilled workers through legal means. It is uncertain at this moment whether the Obama administration will work closely with Senators Schumer and Graham to ad- vance their proposed measures that includes a tough but fair approach toward amnesty, or will instead focus predominantly on provisions that are more popular with conservatives, such as visas to assist entrepreneurs and high-tech workers. In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold some of the provisions in Arizona’s SB 1070, it is inevitable that the path toward immigration reform will involve a deli- cate dance between local and federal government. What can be changed, however, is whether members of both political par- ties work to creating substantive immigration reform.
briefing
The Startup Visa Act of 2011 Introduced by Senators John Kerry (D-MA), Richard Lugar (R-IN), and Tom Udall (D-NM), this bi-partisan initiative creates a new provision in current immigration law that would create a new type of visa for foreigner entrepreneurs who want to move to the United States. This new visa can be given to three types of foreign entrepreneurs: 1.
Entrepreneurs who have an American investor who has agreed to invest $100,000 in the venture. In two years the venture must have created five new American jobs and generated at least $500,000 in financing or early income.
2.
Foreigners already living in the United States and who have graduated from an American university with a degree in the sciences, including math or engineering. They must have an income of at least $30,000 and a US investor who can commit $20,000 to their venture. After two years, the startup must have created three new American jobs and generated at least $300,000 in financing or yearly income.
3.
Foreign entrepreneurs who already have businesses that generate at least $100,000 in sales from the United States. After two years, the startup must have created three new American jobs and generated at least $100,000 in financing or yearly income.
The Startup Visa is only a temporary visa, but people who initially move with the visa can later apply for a green card that would give them permanent residency.
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briefing
Rodolfo de la Garza Professor of Political Science SIPA
As  part  of  his  presidential  campaign,  on  June  15,  2012,  President  Obama  issued  a  directive  to  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS)  that  it  use  “prosecutorial  discre- tionâ€?  to  allow  unauthorized  immigrants  between  the  ages  of  15  and  30  who  entered  the  United  States  before  the  age  of  16;Íž  who  continuously  resided  in  the  United  States  since  June  15,  2007;Íž  and  who  are  currently  in  school,  graduated  from  high  school,  obtained  a  GED/in  the  process  of  getting  a  GED,  graduated  with  an  associates  or  bachelor’s  degree;Íž  or  are  honorably  discharged  from  the  Coast  Guard  or  Armed  Forces  to  remain  in  the  country  for  two  years.  Although  the  directive  includes  many  of  the  policies  contained  in  the  DREAM  Act,  it  does  not  create  a  path  to  permanent  legal  residency  or  citizenship.  Moreover,  unlike  the  DREAM  Act  that  promises  permanent  reforms,  the  directive  will  remain  in  effect  only  through  2016  or  until  Congress  enacts  new  im- migration  policy  prior  to  the  end  of  that  year.  The  directive  offers  temporary  relief  to  the  most  innocent  and  deserving  of  the  undocumented,  that  is,  those  who  were  brought  to  the  United  States  as  children  and  who  have  either  DOUHDG\ PDGH VLJQLÂżFDQW FRQWULEXWLRQV WR $PHULFDQ VRFLHW\ or  have  prepared  themselves  to  make  such  contributions. As  the  National  Hispanic  Leadership  Agenda  demands,  permanent  reforms  require  two  components.  First,  they  must  institutionalize  the  rights  of  these  groups  and  extend  them  to  all  undocumented  immigrants  who  demonstrate  that  through  their  labor  and  behavior  they  too  are  contrib- uting  to  the  nation’s  wellbeing.  Second,  the  Department  of  Justice  must  develop  policies  designed  to  curtail  anti-Âimmi- grant  policies  at  state  and  local  levels.  But  even  such  major  changes  will  not  provide  a  viable  long-Âterm  solution  to  the  immigration  dilemma.
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columbia political review :: winter 2012
Scott Minkoff
Assistant Professor of Political Science Barnard The  root  of  the  problem  is  in  the  continuous  reproduc- tion  of  households  that  include  undocumented  immigrant  children.  This  pattern  means  that  the  current  problem  re- garding  how  to  deal  with  large  numbers  of  relatively  young  XQGRFXPHQWHG LPPLJUDQWV ZKR KDYH DOUHDG\ EHQHÂżWWHG WKH nation,  or  who  are  poised  to  do  so  in  the  future,  will  continu- ously  recur  and  create  demands  for  new  DREAM  Acts. There  are  three  obvious  humane  responses  to  this  conun- GUXP 7KH ÂżUVW LV WR RSHQ WKH ERUGHU DQG OHDYH LPPLJUD- tion  unrestricted;Íž  this  is  politically  untenable.  The  second  is  to  mandate  the  use  of  reliable  and  enforceable  employer  sanction  regime.  This  is  increasingly  technically  feasible.  Employers  who  hire  immigrants  and  activists  who  defend  all  immigrants,  strongly  oppose  such  a  regime  because  of  doubts  regarding  its  reliability.  Such  opposition,  given  the  FXUUHQW TXDOLW\ RI YHULÂżFDWLRQ V\VWHPV ULVNV PDNLQJ WKH EHVW the  enemy  of  the  good.  Third  is  to  enact  legislation  countermanding  Plyler  v.  Doe  that  would  greatly  reduce  the  educational  rights  of  undocu- mented  children.  Absent  Plyler,  foreign  nationals  would  be  much  more  likely  to  demand  improved  educational  oppor- tunities  for  their  children  in  their  countries  of  origin.  This  legislation,  thus,  is  not  intended  and  should  not  deprive  children  of  education.  Rather,  it  would  create  strong  incen- tives  for  parents  to  demand  that  their  home  governments  provide  the  services  that  citizens  demand.  Unless  the  Obama  administration  commits  itself  to  ad- dressing  the  roots  of  our  nation’s  immigration  problem  by  GHVLJQLQJ SROLFLHV WKDW LQFRUSRUDWH D YHULÂżFDWLRQ V\VWHP DQG E\ GLVLQFHQWLYL]LQJ DJDLQVW IXWXUH IDPLO\ UHXQLÂżFDWLRQ GH- PDQGV DQ\ UHIRUPV LW HQDFWV ZLOO EH XQOLNHO\ WR VLJQLÂżFDQWO\ improve  the  immigration  problems  we  now  confront. Â
columbia political review :: winter 2012 While  the  Supreme  Court  has  made  it  clear  that  the  na- tional  government  is  the  enforcer  of  US  citizenship,  public  policies  in  our  federal  system  suggest  murkier  waters.  One  example  of  this  is  the  federal  278(g)  program  that  allows  state  and  local  police  to  partner  with  federal  authorities  in  order  to  collectively  enforce  immigration  laws  (including  raids  on  businesses  employing  illegal  immigrants).  But  the  fact  remains  that  without  the  help  of  the  federal  government,  there  is  little  that  sub-Ânational  governments  can  do  to  actu- ally  remove  people  from  the  state  or  country.     6WDWH DQG ORFDO JRYHUQPHQWV GR PDLQWDLQ VRPH Ă€H[LELO- ity  to  independently  engage  with  policies  that  impact  non- citizens.  The  fallout  from  Arizona’s  “Support  Our  Law  En- forcement  and  Safe  Neighborhoods  Actâ€?  is  a  good  example.  In  U.S.  v.  Arizona  (2012),  the  Court  pre-Âempted  the  most  of  the  enforcement-Âoriented  aspects  of  Arizona’s  tough  immi- gration  law  but  left  intact  the  law’s  requirement  that  police  check  the  immigration  status  of  anybody  who  has  been  ar- rested  if  there  is  suspicion  that  the  person  is  in  the  country  illegally.  What  remains  of  these  state  level  efforts  is  not  only  consistent  with  historical  Constitutional  standards  but  also  UHĂ€HFWLYH RI WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ SROLWLFV RI LPPLJUDWLRQ IHG- eralism.  Indeed,  the  immigration  policies  being  formulated  and  enacted  by  state  and  local  governments  are  not  trivial  but  they  are  also  –  by  rule  and  intention  –  fundamentally  different  than  uniformly  federal  efforts.  Whereas  federal  im- PLJUDWLRQ SROLF\ LV DERXW GHÂżQLQJ DQG HQIRUFLQJ OHJDO VWDWXV VXE QDWLRQDO SROLF\ HIIRUWV DUH DERXW GHÂżQLQJ WKH HFRQRPLF and  social  bounds  of  community.    These  social  and  economic  bounds  can  be  contracted  with  exclusionary  policies  or  expanded  with  inclusionary  policies.  Large-Âscale  exclusionary  policy  efforts  (like  Arizona’s)  have  received  the  majority  of  attention  but  narrower  exclusionary  H[DPSOHV DERXQG (OHFWURQLF YHULÂżFDWLRQ ( 9HULI\ LV D WRRO administered  by  the  Social  Security  Administration  and  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  that  allows  sub-Ânational  governments  and  private  businesses  to  check  the  immigra- tion  status  of  their  employees  (within  a  non-Âtrivial  margin  RI HUURU ,W ZDV HYHQ WRXWHG DV DQ LPSRUWDQW WRRO IRU ÂżJKWLQJ illegal  immigration  by  Mitt  Romney  during  the  campaign.  Throughout  his  2010  Florida  gubernatorial  campaign,  Rick  Scott  strongly  supported  an  E-ÂVerify  mandate  for  public  and  SULYDWH HPSOR\HUV EXW XSRQ WDNLQJ RIÂżFH KH IRXQG WKDW WKH
briefing politics  of  immigration  reform  were  more  complicated  than  he  anticipated.  The  Florida  citrus  industry  pushed  back  and  6FRWW PRGLÂżHG KLV SRVLWLRQ WR VXSSRUW ( 9HULI\ RQO\ IRU SXE- lic  contractors  and  subcontractors.  Whether  or  not  E-ÂVerify  is  an  effective  tool  for  reducing  the  desirability  of  places  as  destinations  for  illegal  immigrants  remains  an  open  ques- tion.   What  is  clear  is  that  E-ÂVerify  is  a  way  for  communities  to  say:  “You  are  not  welcome  here‌  even  if  we  cannot  force  you  to  leave.â€?  Local  governments  have  implemented  exclusionary  poli- cies,  too.  Illegal  Immigration  Relief  Acts  (IIRAs)  are  local  ordinances  that  seek  to  regulate  employment  and  housing.  These  measures  have  been  considered  in  cities  in  over  30  states.  A  2006  IIRA  passed  in  Hazleton,  Pennsylvania  made  it  illegal  for  landlords  to  rent  to  illegal  immigrants  and  for  employers  to  hire  them.  The  Act  was  pre-Âempted  by  a  U.S.  District  Court,  but  still  sent  a  clear  signal  to  the  illegal  im- migrants  in  the  community.  Prince  William  County,  Virginia  passed  a  similarly  restrictive  ordinance  that  prevents  immi- grants  access  to  certain  social  services  and  creates  a  partner- ship  between  local  law  enforcement  and  U.S.  Immigrations  and  Customs  Enforcement  (ICE).  Other  ordinances  estab- OLVK (QJOLVK DV WKH RIÂżFLDO ODQJXDJH Not  all  policy  efforts  are  exclusionary.  State-Âlevel  DREAM  Acts  are  an  example  of  inclusive  efforts  by  states  to  broaden  the  economic  and  social  community.  These  laws,  which  have  been  enacted  by  California,  Texas,  Illinois,  New  Mexico,  and  Maryland,  allow  undocumented  students  to  pay  the  in-Âstate  tuition  rates  at  public  colleges  and  universities  and  in  many  FDVHV WR DFFHVV VWDWH ÂżQDQFLDO DLG DQG VFKRODUVKLSV ,QGHHG inclusionary  policies  are  just  as  much  about  shaping  the  bounds  of  community  as  exclusionary  policies.  But  just  as  exclusionary  policies  are  not  enforcement  policies,  inclu- sionary  policies  –  like  state  DREAM  Act  programs  –  are  not  paths  to  citizenship.  Nevertheless,  it  is  worth  remembering  that  whatever  action  governments  have  to  deal  with  the  il- legal  immigration  problem  is  not  being  uniformly  used  to  make  the  community  more  hostile  to  illegal  immigrants.    It  remains  to  be  seen  if  federal  action  will  change  the  dy- namics  of  state  and  local  immigration  policy.  Our  suspicion  is  that  because  these  policies  appear  to  be  driven  by  expecta- tions  of  community,  anything  short  of  a  draconian  national  law  is  unlikely  to  curb  local  exclusionary  policies.
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columbia political review :: winter 2012
features :: international
Egypt’s Party Scene With an Eye to the Future, A Push for Pluralism by Nadine Mansour
“T
he  success  of  our  efforts  to  devise  a  thoroughly  Egyp- tian  model  for  reform  will  depend  to  a  large  extent  on  the  abil- ity  of  our  political  parties  to  mould  themselves  into  dynamic  grassroots  forces,  thereby  stimulating  broader  public  participation  in  the  political  SURFHVV ´ ZURWH $EUDKLP 1DÂżH D columnist  for  the  Al-ÂAhram  weekly  QHZVSDSHU UHIHUULQJ WR (J\SWÂśV ÂżUVW multi-Âcandidate  elections  in  2005.  But  this  comment  could  not  be  more  relevant  to  Egypt’s  political  climate  today.  Now  that  Hosni  Mubarak  has  been  removed  from  power  and  Mohamed  Morsi  has  been  elected  through  a  fair  and  free  election,  Egypt  seems  to  be  on  its  way  to  democracy.       In  the  United  States,  the  two-Âparty  system  has  emerged  as  the  accepted  paradigm.  As  a  result  of  this  model, Â
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however,  many  citizens  are  under  the  false  impression  that  they  must  choose  between  only  two  candidates.  This  system  traps  us  in  the  mindset  that  there  can  only  be  two  possible  winners.  When  presidential  elections  began  in  Egypt,  14  candidates  ran,  UHĂ€HFWLQJ D GLYHUVH VRFLHW\ %XW WKH candidates  were  functionally  whittled  down  to  two  by  the  High  Commission  for  Elections’  decision  to  establish  a  ¿UVW SDVW WKH SRVW V\VWHP ZKHUH WKH candidate  with  the  most  votes  in  the  election  wins,  even  without  a  major- ity  of  votes.  The  system  left  two  vi- able  candidates:  Mohamed  Morsi  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood’s  Freedom  and  Justice  Party  (FJP)  and  Ahmed  6KDÂżT IRUPHU 0LQLVWHU RI $YLDWLRQ running  as  an  independent.  7KLV ÂżUVW SDVW WKH SRVW V\VWHP will  ensure  a  two-Âparty  system  in Â
all art by Nadine Mansour and Chloe Blanchard
Egypt.  Egyptians  should  eliminate  WKH ÂżUVW SDVW WKH SRVW V\VWHP WR move  away  from  an  era  of  thinking  between  Mubarak  cronies  and  the  long-Âbanned  Muslim  Brotherhood,  and  to  make  way  for  cooperation  that  transcends  this  binary. *LYHQ WKH RULJLQDO FDQGLGDWHV D Âż- QDO FKRLFH EHWZHHQ 6KDÂżT DQG 0RUVL –  while  not  as  polar  as  a  choice  be- WZHHQ SRWHQWLDO 6DODÂż FDQGLGDWH $EX Ismail  and  Mubarak’s  Vice  President  Omar  Suleiman,  would  have  left  Egyptians  with  a  bittersweet  taste  of  democracy.  It  is  only  hoped  that  Egypt  will  not  go  down  a  road  where  citizens’  interests  are  seen  as  binary.  It  is  ironic  that  as  much  as  this  system  seems  to  pit  two  extremes  against  HDFK RWKHU Âą ÂżJPHQWV RI WKH ROG Mubarak  regime  versus  the  Brother- hood  –  the  parties  are  actually  iden- tical  in  their  ability  to  address  Egypt’s  employ- ment,  education,  and  healthcare  crises.  An  expansion  of  the  politi- cal  space  through  an  in- stitutional  change  in  the  electoral  system  would  move  the  country  for- ward.  To  begin  this,  the  most  important  change  is  a  reform  of  the  politi- cal  attitude  into  one  that  does  not  lead  into  this  political  polarization.       In  the  current  Egyp- tian  political  climate,  citizens  think  in  either  a  pro-ÂMorsi  or  anti-ÂMorsi  mindset.  Violent  clashes  occur  on  the  ground  be- tween  those  who  deem  Morsi  democratically  elected  and  thus  worthy  of  obeisance,  and  those Â
columbia political review :: winter 2012 DJDLQVW KLV SRZHU JUDE 7KLV LV UHĂ€HF- tive  of  the  political  climate  during  the  HOHFWLRQV EHWZHHQ 0RUVL DQG 6KDÂżT where  voting  for  Morsi  was  consid- ered  tantamount  to  voting  for  a  pup- pet  of  the  Brotherhood,  and  those  VXSSRUWLQJ 6KDÂżT ZHUH FDWHJRUL]HG as  felool,  or  Mubarak  supporters.  Perhaps  it  is  because  Egyptians  have  never  had  a  free  election  between  multiple  par- ties  under  Mubarak,  Sa- dat,  and  Nass- er,  that  they  are  currently  s t r u g g l i n g  with  the  con- cept  of  politi- cal  difference  and  plural- ism.       The  Egyp- tian  Republic  under  Gamal  Abdul  Nasser  started  with  a  one-Âparty  system.  In  1978,  Anwar  Sadat  formed  the  National  D e m o c r a t i c  Party  (NDP)  and  ended  the  one-Âparty  ide- ology.  Despite  this  reform,  the  electoral  system  con- tinued  to  be  d o m i n a t e d  by  the  NDP,  which  would  “winâ€?  each  election  with  a  sweeping  majority.  Per  the  1971  constitution,  the  president  would  be  re-Âelected  every  six  years,  functionally  serving  for  life  in  a  one- SDUW\ V\VWHP ,Q WKH ÂżUVW PXOWL party  elections  occurred,  but  they  proved  to  be  a  farce.  Ayman  Nour  of  the  al-ÂGhad  (Tomorrow)  Party  won  only  8.8  percent  of  the  vote,  and  was  immediately  accused  of  signature  rigging.  As  a  result,  Mubarak  held  the  presidency,  and  Nour  was  impris- oned.  It  is  this  with-Âus-Âor-Âagainst-Âus Â
mindset  that  has  placed  Egyptians  into  a  hole  that  can  only  be  escaped  through  gradual  trust  in  elected  poli- ticians.       This  polarized  mindset  was  pres- ent  even  before  Egyptians  had  the  FKDQFH WR HQJDJH LQ WKH ÂżUVW IUHH DQG fair  elections  in  May  2012.  In  discus- sion  with  Western  allies,  Mubarak  would  strengthen  his  autocratic  po-Â
sition  by  presenting  his  Islamist  op- ponents  as  destabilizing.  If  anything,  there  are  more  similarities  than  dif- ferences  between  rule  under  the  NDP’s  Mubarak  and  the  FJP’s  Morsi  in  terms  of  power  consolidation,  use  of  emergency  laws,  and  calling  oppo- VLWLRQ ÂżJXUHV WKUHDWV WR WKH QDWLRQÂśV interests.  This  Mubarak-Âversus- Brotherhood  mindset  continues  to  divide  the  country,  as  Morsi  focuses  KLV HIIRUWV RQ VXVSHQGLQJ WKH ÂżQDQ-Â
features :: international FLDO DVVHWV RI $KPHG 6KDÂżT DQG FDOO- ing  for  a  retrial  of  Mubarak,  two  acts  that,  unfortunately,  have  gained  him  popular  support.      The  defeat  of  this  with-Âor-Âagainst- me  notion  will  not  only  take  time,  but  will  require  continuous  efforts  toward  establishing  a  new  discourse.  For  decades,  the  Muslim  Brother- hood  was  banned  from  political  ac- tivity;Íž  only  in  March  2011  did  it  estab- lish  its  own  party,  the  Freedom  and  Justice  Party.  Over  the  sev- enty  years  of  their  politi- cal  exclusion,  the  Islamists  had  stepped  in  to  help  the  poor  when  the  g o v e r n m e n t  was  unable  to  provide  services,  and  thus  with  a  broad  appeal,  it  was  able  to  more  easily  mobilize  sup- port  during  the  elections.  While  liberal  and  secular  parties  would  not  as  easily  appeal  to  the  u n e d u c a t e d  masses,  they  PXVW ÂżQG DQ alternative  to  boycotting  so  as  to  include  themselves  in  the  political  process,  even  with  its  FXUUHQW Ă€DZV Currently,  there  is  evidence  of  progress.  But  the  impasse  in  approv- LQJ D FRQVWLWXWLRQ WKDW UHĂ€HFWV PRUH than  just  the  Islamist  interests  of  the  populace,  the  struggle  for  Morsi  to  ef- fect  change  without  feeling  the  need  to  reopen  unhealed  wounds,  and  Morsi’s  expansion  of  his  unchecked  use  of  political  powers,  will  pass  as  soon  as  the  country’s  institutions  are Â
25
features :: international put  in  place.  Overcoming  the  two- party  system  mindset,  however,  is  not  a  change  that  will  come  with  the  new  institutions.  Rather,  a  new  sys- tem  must  be  put  in  place  that  can  al- low  for  a  wider  variety  of  opinions  in  future  elections.  While  no  electoral  system  can  completely  avoid  political  polariza- tion,  there  is  still  a  way  to  have  a  two- party  system  whereby  voters  rank  their  candidates  in  a  preferential  voting  system.  Had  candidates  been  UDQNHG LQ WKH ÂżUVW (J\SWLDQ HOHFWLRQ either  Abol  Fotoh  or  Hamdeen  Sa- EDKL ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ RQH RI WKH ÂżQDO contenders,  as  they  were  the  most  commonly  favored  candidates  across  a  large  span  of  voters  according  to  polls  from  the  Egypt  Independent.  Australia,  for  example,  has  preferen- tial  voting,  a  ranking  system  in  which  candidates  favorable  to  a  large  base  are  successful.  As  voters  pick  their  second  and  third  choice  candidates,  a  common  consensus  can  be  reached,  and  a  shift  from  the  duopoly  can  be  achieved.  This  electoral  system  al- lows  for  more  space  for  third  parties  in  that  the  winner  does  not  need  a  majority  of  the  vote  in  order  to  win.  In  this  way,  third  parties  have  a  bet- ter  chance,  and  voters  will  learn  to  think  in  terms  of  their  personal  pref- HUHQFHV IRU VSHFLÂżF LGHDV RI HDFK LQ- dividual  candidate. Keeping  Egypt’s  plurality  system  provides  a  low-Ârisk  model  for  future  political  movement,  but  the  revolu- tion  was  not  started  to  achieve  low- risk  results.  In  order  for  Egypt  to  avoid  establishing  this  problematic  precedent,  an  institutional  change  accompanied  by  a  more  important  societal  shift  from  the  two-Âparty  paradigm  is  necessary.  This  means  efforts  should  be  made  to  effect  in- stitutional  change.  Given  the  frustra- tion  and  impatience  surrounding  the  unchecked  powers  of  the  “democrati- callyâ€?  elected  president,  this  may  not  be  easy.  Since  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Armed  Forces-Âappointed  High  Commission  of  Elections,  not  the  president,  put  this  electoral  system  into  place,  there  remains  room  for  innovation.  Unlike  prior  presidents,  Morsi’s  mandate  is  derived  from  his  legiti- mate  election.  With  time,  the  genu-Â
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columbia political review :: winter 2012
inely  democratic  election  of  presi- dents  will  become  the  norm  in  Egypt.  To  maintain  legitimacy,  they  will  need  to  prove  they  are  abiding  by  their  party’s  platform.  As  the  Free- dom  and  Justice  Party’s  platform  states,  “We  also  stress  the  need  that  the  Egyptian  people  should  be  the  ones  who  draft  the  Egyptian  Con- VWLWXWLRQ LQ D ZD\ WKDW UHĂ€HFWV WKH identity  and  will  of  the  nation.â€?  The  current  climate,  however,  in  which  liberals  and  secularists  withdrew  from  the  constitutional  committee,  left  the  constitution  to  be  drafted  in  a  way  that  does  not  respect  plural- ism.  As  Morsi  claims,  his  power  grab  is  temporary  until  Egyptians  approve  the  new  constitution. At  present,  the  Egyptian  political  scene  sees  the  negotiations  over  its  constitution  as  its  primary  struggle  for  the  future.  The  political  climate,  nonetheless,  that  will  emerge  is  not  bound  by  new  laws:  It  is  an  ethos  that  will  characterize  how  the  coun- try  expresses  its  pluralistic  interests  for  years  to  come.  If  the  choices  in Â
Egyptian  elections  are  seen  as  be- ing  between  corruption  and  sup- posed  purity,  or  between  religion  and  pragmatism,  the  emerging  debates  will  only  drive  the  nation  backward  to  the  choice  that  Mubarak  had  al- ways  evoked  between  an  authoritar- ian  leader  or  chaos.  A  new  system  is  needed  to  elect  a  new,  truly  repre- VHQWDWLYH OHDGHU 7KH FXUUHQW Ă€DZV in  the  democratic  system  are  paving  the  way  for  a  tyranny  of  the  major- ity  rather  than  exhibiting  the  kind  of  pluralism  that  the  Freedom  and  Justice  Party  platform  is  supposed  to  ensure. Nadine  Mansour,  BC  ‘14,  is  a  politi- cal  science  major  with  an  interest  in  international  relations  and  a  love  for  languages.  An  Egyptian-ÂAmerican,  her  research  focus  is  to  examine  the  changing  socio-Âpolitical  dynamic  of  the  Middle  East  within  the  greater  context  of  a  universal  human  strug- gle  for  justice.  She  can  be  reached  at  nmm2150@barnard.edu.
columbia political review :: winter 2012
features :: domestic
Rigging the System Why Multinational Oil Companies Keep Getting Away With It by Lucas Rehaut
T
he  numbers  alone  are  striking.  In  2011,  the  World  Bank  esti- mated  the  gross  domestic  prod- uct  (GDP)  of  the  state  of  Ecuador  at  approximately  $67  billion.  Chevron  Corporation,  by  contrast,  reported  sales  of  $236.3  billion  for  2011,  with  QHDUO\ ELOOLRQ LQ SURÂżWV DORQH In  the  same  year,  a  local  Ecuador- ian  court  ruling  against  Chevron  in  an  $18  billion  case  over  the  company’s  widespread  pollution  in  the  Ecua- dorian  rainforest  marked  an  unprec- HGHQWHG YLFWRU\ LQ WKH JOREDO ÂżJKW WR hold  multinational  corporations  re- sponsible  for  their  actions.  Between  1964  and  1990,  Chevron  illegally  dumped  tons  of  contaminated  waste- water  directly  into  the  forest,  causing  the  land  and  water  supply  to  become  dangerously  toxic.  In  the  case,  which  started  in  1993,  thousands  of  poor  Ecuadorians  sued  Chevron  in  New  York  federal  court  for  the  damage  to  their  local  environment,  demanding  the  company  pay  for  a  proper  clean- up  as  well  as  for  the  health  care  of  those  affected  by  illnesses  caused  by  the  pollution.  After  Chevron  man- aged  to  have  the  case  moved  to  Ecua- dor  in  2003,  the  company  continued  to  stall  the  court’s  progress  with  brute  force  and  dubious  legal  maneuvers  –  threatening  laboratories  that  released  unfavorable  environmental  assess- ments  and  harassing  the  resident’s  lawyers  with  unfounded  racketeering  charges.  The  judgment  in  2011,  how- HYHU VHHPHG WR ÂżQDOO\ LQGLFDWH WKDW the  underdog  Ecuadorians  had  over- come  the  goliath  Chevron.  As  of  December  2012,  Chevron  has  still  not  paid.  The  company  has  ap- pealed  the  court’s  decision,  insisting  that  interference  by  the  Ecuadorian  government  invalidates  the  judg- ment.  To  be  fair,  there  may  be  legiti-Â
mate  reasons  to  question  the  govern- ment’s  objectivity  –  some  evidence  suggests  it  turned  a  blind  eye  to  Chev- ron’s  activities  and  is  hoping  to  let  the  company  take  all  the  blame  –  but  the  broader  implication  is  clear  nonethe- less:  Despite  overwhelming  evidence  that  Chevron  is  at  fault  for  the  harm  done  to  the  local  environment  and  its  residents,  Chevron  is  getting  away  with  it.  The  unfortunate  reality  of  the  situ- ation,  moreover,  is  that  it  makes  per- fect  economic  sense  for  Chevron  to  carry  on  with  the  tactic  it  has  been  using  successfully  for  the  past  two  de- cades  –  avoiding  formally  acknowl- edging  any  wrongdoing  by  spending  millions  of  dollars  to  stall  court  pro- ceedings  into  oblivion  and  disabling  opponents  from  continuing  their  cas- es.  Whereas  admitting  defeat  would  set  an  important  precedent  and  could  inspire  innumerable  other  groups  with  grievances  against  Big  Oil  to  launch  similar  cases,  Chevron’s  opt- ing  instead  to  invest  a  couple  million  dollars  a  year  to  pay  legal  fees  and  keep  the  case  from  closing  is  rational;Íž  the  company  makes  billions  in  prof- its  every  year  and,  ultimately,  is  con- FHUQHG ZLWK EHQHÂżWWLQJ LWV VKDUHKROG- ers.  For  the  people  of  Ecuador  and  their  independent  legal  team,  how- HYHU PDLQWDLQLQJ DGHTXDWH ÂżQDQFLDO support  for  the  continuing  court  pro- ceedings  has  become  an  all-Âconsum- ing  struggle,  a  weakness  Chevron  is  actively  exploiting  by  drawing  them  out  as  long  as  possible.  But  even  if  Chevron’s  strategy  is  logical  and  tech- QLFDOO\ OHJDO LW LV GHÂżQLWLYHO\ XQHWKL- cal.  Indeed,  the  Ecuador  case  illus- trates  the  fact  that  Chevron  can  often  avoid  the  constraints  of  justice  and  international  law  simply  by  mobiliz- LQJ LWV YDVW ÂżQDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV
     To  this  point,  those  who  follow  in- ternational  affairs  might  object  that  such  abuses  of  human  rights  and  in- ternational  law  are  typical  of  power- ful  states:  Consider  the  United  States’  reliance  on  torture  of  captives  at  Guantanamo  Bay  or  on  drone  strikes  in  unstable  countries.  “Might  makes  right,â€?  the  saying  goes,  and  that’s  just  the  way  it  goes.  Such  objections  would  be  valid,  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  Chevron  is  not  a  state.  Rather,  it  is  a  multina- tional  oil  corporation  and  acts  in  a  fundamentally  different  way.  Inso- far  as  today’s  multinational  oil  cor- porations  play  a  key  role  in  shaping  American  energy  policy  both  at  home  and  abroad,  it  is  important  to  take  these  distinct  characteristics  into  ac- count  when  analyzing  and  attempt- ing  to  regulate  their  behavior,  rather  WKDQ ULVN RYHUVLPSOLÂżFDWLRQ E\ WUHDW- ing  them  like  other  political  actors.  Moreover,  unless  the  United  States  HQDFWV VSHFLÂżF SROLFLHV GHVLJQHG WR change  the  incentive  structure  of  how  multinational  oil  companies  operate,  it  risks  allowing  critical  aspects  of  the  country’s  energy  policy  to  be  dictated  E\ WKH ÂżQDQFLDO LQWHUHVWV RI FRUSRUD- tions  that  cannot  be  effectively  held  accountable  by  the  American  people. The  primary  difference  between  the  behavior  of  multinational  corpo- rations  and  states  relates  to  this  idea  of  democratic  accountability.  Sim- ply  put,  modern  democratic  states  provide  concrete  mechanisms  –  like  elections  –  by  which  citizens  can  hold  state  governments  accountable  IRU WKHLU DFWLRQV :KLOH RIWHQ Ă€DZHG or  weak,  they  force  policymakers  to  “self-Âregulateâ€?  and  take  public  opin- ion  into  account  when  determining  state  policy.  Corporations  gener- ally  lack  such  direct  mechanisms,  as Â
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features :: domestic they  are  only  directly  accountable  to  their  shareholders,  though  to  some  extent  consumers  can  hold  corpora- tions  accountable  by  “voting  with  their  wallets,â€?  choosing  to  selectively  buy  products  from  companies  whose  policies  they  support.  If  a  particular  clothing  manufacturer  mistreats  its  foreign  workers,  consumers  can  ex- press  their  disapproval  by  buying  from  a  different  company.  Second,  breaches  of  international  law  and  abuses  of  human  rights  by  powerful  states  are  often  publicly  perceived  as  more  acceptable  than  those  of  multinational  corporations  because  of  differences  in  the  way  each  organization  explains  its  actions.  For  example,  when  the  United  States  launches  drone  strikes  against  ter- rorist  operatives  in  the  Middle  East,  LW MXVWLÂżHV LWV DFWLRQV RQ WKH EDVLV RI national  security,  something  even  the  most  human  rights-Âconscious  Americans  tend  to  support.  Goals  like  national  security  or  promoting  de- mocracy,  which  are  associated  with  ethicality  in  the  collective  American Â
art by Wehui Lu
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columbia political review :: winter 2012 consciousness,  are  seen  as  “goodâ€?  ends  that  can  justify  occasional  “badâ€?  means,  such  as  drone  strikes  or  tor- ture.  When  a  corporation  commits  some  major  impropriety,  however,  their  purpose  is  inherently  tied  to  LQFUHDVLQJ SURÂżWV $PHULFDQ SXE- lic  opinion  can  excuse  drone  strikes  when  they  promote  national  security,  but  few  Americans  consider  it  accept- able  for  multinational  corporations  to  abuse  human  rights  in  order  to  fur- ther  enrich  their  shareholders.  But  why,  then,  has  Chevron  man- aged  to  get  away  with  just  that  for  so  long?  The  answer  has  to  do  with  the  unique  features  of  the  oil  industry  and  of  oil  (and  other  hydrocarbons)  as  products.  Oil  is  a  resource  of  nearly  unpar- alleled  economic  and  political  value.  States  around  the  world  desperately  compete  for  access  to  oil  reserves  in  those  countries  that  have  them,  and  a  secure  oil  supply  is  essential  to  the  healthy  functioning  of  nearly  all  modern  industrialized  economies.  For  that  reason,  politicians  and  con-Â
sumers  are  much  less  likely  to  seek  intervention  in  the  operations  of  the  companies  that  provide  their  state  with  oil.  In  addition,  because  oil  prices  tend  to  have  a  direct  effect  on  the  prices  of  many  goods  throughout  the  economy,  many  people  fear  that  heavy-Âhanded  government  attempts  to  regulate  oil  companies  may  impose  substantial  personal  costs  and  pre- fer  to  conveniently  ignore  the  messy  world  of  oil  production  altogether. Still,  even  after  wrongdoings  as  serious  as  Chevron’s  abuses  in  Ecua- dor  have  come  to  light,  how  is  it  that  virtually  all  Americans  remain  con- sumers  of  products  that  can  be  linked  to  Chevron  oil?  If  it  were  true  that  self-Âinterested  concern  about  higher  prices  always  trumps  ethical  convic- WLRQ LW ZRXOG EH GLIÂżFXOW WR H[SODLQ the  popularity  of  “sweatshop-Âfreeâ€?  or  “fair  tradeâ€?  products.  Rather,  when  it  comes  to  oil  products,  the  structure  of  the  industry  is  such  that  consumers  simply  have  no  choice  but  to  continue  supporting  companies  whose  policies  they  condemn. Â
columbia political review :: winter 2012 Since  the  beginnings  of  the  inter- national  oil  industry,  the  number  of  major  production  companies  has  al- ways  been  small,  but  if  there  was  a  tendency  toward  cartel-Âlike  behav- ior  in  the  early  years,  today’s  multi- national  oil  corporations  compose  a  model  oligopoly.  As  oil-Âproducing  states  around  the  world  began  na- tionalizing  their  own  oil  industries,  the  multinational  oil  corporations  were  forced  to  turn  to  a  smaller  num- EHU RI LQFUHDVLQJO\ GLIÂżFXOW WR DFFHVV oil  reserves,  and  the  greater  risks  and  costs  associated  with  tapping  these  reserves  led  to  a  need  for  larger  econ- omies  of  scale  and  expanded  access  to  capital.  As  a  result,  today  we  have  the  so-Âcalled  “supermajorsâ€?  which  emerged  in  the  late  1990s:  Exxon- Mobil  (originally  Exxon  and  Mobil),  Chevron  (which  absorbed  Texaco),  ConocoPhillips,  BP,  and  Royal  Dutch  Shell.  7KHVH ÂżYH FRPSDQLHV WRJHWKHU SUR- vide  around  one-Âthird  of  all  US  oil,  so  each  has  such  a  large  market  share  that  consumer  efforts  to  avoid  prod- ucts  connected  to  any  of  these  compa- nies’  oil  are  largely  unrealistic.  Since  LQGLYLGXDOV RQO\ SXUFKDVH UHÂżQHG RLO products,  like  gasoline,  and  consumer  goods  produced  with  energy  from  oil,  rather  than  raw  crude  oil  itself,  their  attempts  to  refrain  from  supporting  a  particular  company  are  frustrated  by  complex  domestic  networks  of  oil  SRZHU SODQWV DQG UHÂżQHULHV ZKLFK may  process  crude  originally  pumped  by  any  number  of  companies.  Fur- thermore,  because  the  incestuous  co- operation  of  the  supermajors  ensures  that  each  can  enjoy  stable  access  to  the  US  market,  none  have  a  meaning- ful  incentive  to  consider  public  opin- ion  or  government  policies  in  their  own  policymaking.  In  this  sense,  they  can  all  be  understood  as  having  a  role  in  collectively  protecting  each  other  from  the  pressures  of  democratic  ac- countability. In  sum,  the  United  States  has  ef- fectively  ceded  control  over  a  major  portion  of  its  energy  resources  to  a  JURXS RI XOWUD SURÂżWDEOH PXOWLQDWLRQ- DO FRUSRUDWLRQV WKDW VHHN SURÂżW ZLWK- out  regard  for  ethical  norms  or  public  opinion  and  that  both  politicians  and  consumers  are  unwilling  or  unable  to  regulate.  This  recognition  should  be Â
uncomfortable  for  Americans  who  like  to  believe  that  the  United  States  and  its  corporate  representatives  abroad  act  in  accordance  with  the  inspired  ideals  of  democracy,  justice,  and  the  rule  of  law.  Furthermore,  while  we  expect  that  the  government,  which  is  elected  by  the  people,  should  deter- mine  the  path  of  the  country’s  foreign  energy  policy  and  that  American  mul- tinational  corporations  should  follow  behind,  historical  instances  of  corpo- rate  direction  of  government  policy  illustrate  that  it  sometimes  works  the  other  way  around. In  2001,  for  example,  when  sepa- ratist  violence  encroached  on  Exx- onMobil’s  facilities  in  the  Arun  gas  ¿HOGV LQ WKH FKURQLFDOO\ XQVWDEOH state  of  Aceh,  Indonesia,  the  com- pany  threatened  to  suspend  opera- tions  unless  the  Indonesian  govern- ment  could  create  conditions  under  which  its  employees  felt  safe.  Robert  Gelbard,  the  US  ambassador  to  Indo- nesia,  reported  concern  that  the  loss  of  federal  tax  revenues  from  such  a  suspension  could  further  weaken  the  already  struggling  new  Indone- sian  government.  Gelbard  used  that  argument  to  help  push  the  United  States  into  an  arrangement  with  the  Indonesian  government  where  the  Indonesian  military,  which  had  an  DFNQRZOHGJHG KLVWRU\ RI Ă€DJUDQW KX- man  rights  abuses,  would  protect  ExxonMobil’s  property  and  person- nel  in  Aceh.  In  addition,  he  made  it  clear  to  the  leaders  of  the  GAM,  the  militant  separatist  group,  that  the  United  States  would  designate  the  GAM  as  a  terrorist  organization  un- less  the  attacks  against  ExxonMobil  were  stopped  immediately.  Gelbard  claimed  later  that  his  de- cisions  at  the  time  had  nothing  to  do  with  preserving  ExxonMobil’s  busi- ness  interests  in  the  region,  yet  the  extent  to  which  ExxonMobil  was  in- volved  in  diplomatic  negotiations  about  the  US  response  to  the  Aceh  cri- sis  suggests  that  these  business  inter- ests  likely  did  play  an  important  role.  Regardless  of  Gelbard’s  true  inten- tions,  moreover,  this  case  illustrates  the  tendency  of  the  US  government  to  DOPRVW UHĂ€H[LYHO\ VXSSRUW WKH PXOWL- national  oil  corporations  in  their  op- erations  abroad  without  considering  the  consequences.  Since  supporting Â
features :: domestic a  famously  brutal  military  and  con- doning  the  violent  suppression  of  an  Acehnese  nationalist  movement  does  not  seem  to  be  in  line  with  the  broad- er  American  foreign  policy  agenda,  it  is  clear  that  ExxonMobil’s  risky  com- mitment  to  gas  production  in  Aceh,  rather  than  any  well-Âreasoned  analy- sis  by  policymakers,  ultimately  deter- mined  the  direction  and  tenor  of  US  policy  in  the  region. Similarly,  over  the  past  two  years,  both  ExxonMobil  and  Chevron  have  made  oil  exploration  deals  with  the  autonomous  government  of  Kurd- istan  in  northern  Iraq,  a  move  that  KDV RXWUDJHG ,UDTL JRYHUQPHQW RIÂż- cials  in  Baghdad,  who  maintain  that  the  companies  are  legally  obligated  to  get  their  approval  for  any  deal  in- volving  territory  in  the  region.  Both  companies  have  actively  ignored  Iraq’s  claims,  implicitly  contribut- ing  a  great  deal  to  the  credibility  and  authority  of  the  beleaguered  Kurdish  government.  Furthermore,  without  legal  control  over  Kurdistan’s  oil  in- dustry,  Iraq  can  no  longer  exert  the  VDPH NLQG RI LQĂ€XHQFH RYHU .XUGLV- tan  as  before,  and  the  multinational  oil  corporations  are  largely  to  blame.  Indeed,  Steve  LeVine,  a  commentator  on  energy  and  geopolitics  for  Foreign  Policy,  suggests  that  the  companies  QRZ UHSUHVHQW ÂłDQ XQLQWHQWLRQDO ÂżIWK column  in  Kurdistan’s  march  toward  economic  autonomy.â€? Of  course,  opinions  diverge  on  whether  this  enhancement  of  Kurd- ish  authority  is  a  good  thing,  but  the  most  notable  aspect  of  the  situation  is  the  conspicuous  absence  of  any  other  state  actors,  especially  that  of  the  United  States.  Just  a  year  after  pulling  its  troops  from  the  country,  and  despite  impassioned  requests  by  Iraqi  leaders  for  President  Obama  to  pressure  ExxonMobil  and  Chev- ron  into  stopping  their  exploratory  efforts,  the  United  States  has  not  played  an  active  role  in  negotiating  WKH GHYHORSLQJ FRQĂ€LFW ,QVWHDG E\ its  inaction,  the  United  States  is  en- abling  the  multinational  oil  corpora- tions  to  shape  the  future  path  of  the  Kurdish  and  Iraqi  nations.  Whereas  US  foreign  policymakers  might  have  VLJQLÂżFDQW LGHRORJLFDO VHFXULW\ RU geostrategic  reasons  for  supporting  one  side  or  the  other,  the  companies’ Â
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features :: domestic support  of  Kurdistan  is  based  purely  on  economic  interests.  Frustrated  with  the  greater  regulatory  demands  of  the  Iraqi  government,  the  compa- nies  decided  to  throw  their  weight  behind  the  Kurdish  government,  which  promised  them  more  generous  ¿QDQFLDO WHUPV IRU WKH RLO H[SORUDWLRQ deals.       While  the  cases  of  Aceh  and  Kurd- LVWDQ LOOXVWUDWH WKH FRQWLQXHG LQĂ€X- ence  multi- national  oil  corporations  have  over  US  foreign  policy  in  re- gions  where  fossil  fuels  are  involved,  their  foreign  policy  in- v o l v e m e n t  has  steadily  decreased  over  the  past  few  decades  as  the  world’s  oil  reserves  have  been  nationalized.  In  contrast  to  the  mid- dle  of  the  twentieth  century,  when  the  multinational  oil  corporations  were  the  sole  producers  extracting  from  RLO ÂżHOGV DURXQG WKH JOREH WRGD\ DS- proximately  80  percent  of  the  world’s  proven  oil  reserves  are  controlled  by  companies  that  are  either  wholly  or  partially  owned  by  the  states  in  which  they  operate.  This  trend  has  forced  multinational  oil  corporations  to  op- erate  on  a  more  contractual  basis,  RIWHQ KHOSLQJ GHYHORS RLO ÂżHOGV WKDW new  state-Âowned  companies  lack  the  technical  capabilities  to  exploit,  but  it  has  also,  to  some  extent,  pushed  them  out  of  international  affairs.  However,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  suggest  that  their  era  has  ended.  Multinational  oil  corporations  are  in  fact  continuing  to  direct  US  policy  on  what  may  be  the  most  pressing  global  issue  of  this  gen- eration:  climate  change.      In  a  Rolling  Stone  piece  published  earlier  this  year,  famed  environmen- talist-Âjournalist  Bill  McKibben  makes  the  case  that  the  fossil-Âfuel  industry  should  be  considered  “Public  Enemy  Number  Oneâ€?  and  that  we  should  re- gard  it  as  “a  rogue  industry,  reckless  like  no  other  force  on  Earth.â€?  McK- ibben  notes  the  fact  that  the  amount  of  carbon  contained  in  the  proven  DQG WKXV ÂżQDQFLDOO\ DFFRXQWHG IRU
columbia political review :: winter 2012 reserves  of  fossil-Âfuel  companies  around  the  world,  if  released,  would  far  exceed  the  upper  limit  of  the  range  of  emissions  designated  by  main- VWUHDP FOLPDWH PRGHOV DV VDIH 7KH Âż- nancial  health  of  these  companies,  he  argues,  has  therefore  become  directly  dependent  on  energy  policies  that  will  eventually  wreck  the  planet.  The  companies  then  have  powerful  incen- tives  to  use  their  resources  to  prevent Â
Responsibility,  standards  that  should  apply  even  to  corporate  activity  out- side  of  the  United  States.  In  terms  of  FOLPDWH FKDQJH PRUH VSHFLÂżFDOO\ WKH American  government  should  em- brace  the  widely-Âendorsed  concept  of  a  tax  on  carbon,  which  would  allow  market  forces  to  help  promote  more  sustainable  behavior  throughout  the  economy  by  forcing  fossil-Âfuel  com- panies  to  revalue  their  assets  in  a  way  that  ac- counts  for  the  costs  of  climate  change.       Lastly,  but  per- haps  most  i m p o r - t a n t l y ,  campaign           f i n a n c e  laws  must  be  reformed  to  limit  the  ability  of  corporations  to  determine  the  direc- tion  of  American  politics.  In  October,  Chevron  proudly  made  a  $2.5  mil- lion  donation  to  a  Republican  Super  PAC,  and  the  Center  for  Responsive  Politics  estimates  that  Mitt  Romney  received  nearly  $5  million  in  dona- tions  from  the  oil  and  gas  industry.  It  is  unacceptable  that  corporations,  as  McKibben  puts  it,  “have  far  more  free  will  than  the  rest  of  us,â€?  and  campaign  ¿QDQFH UHIRUP VKRXOG SXW DQ HQG WR this  dangerous  inequality.  However,  despite  the  efforts  of  the  fossil-Âfuel  companies  and  other  major  corpo- rations,  Barack  Obama’s  successful  reelection  once  again  demonstrated  the  irrepressible  power  of  collective  action  by  motivated  individuals.  Cor- porations  may  be  rigging  the  system,  but  they  will  never  be  invincible. Â
“          Â
Unless the United States enacts specific policies designed to change the incentive structure of how multinational oil companies operate, it risks allowing critical aspects of the country’s energy policy to be dictated by the financial interests of corporations that cannot be effectively held accountable by the American people.
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adoption  of  stricter  climate  change  policies  by  lobbying  and  support- ing  political  candidates  who  eschew  such  policies.  Though  McKibben  is  excessive  in  his  blanket  characteriza- tion  of  fossil-Âfuel  companies  as  “en- emiesâ€?  of  the  planet,  he  is  insightful  in  his  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  restructuring  these  companies’  cor- porate  incentives  such  that  they  are  more  consistent  with  efforts  to  limit  climate  change.       So  we  are  left  with  a  vivid  under- standing:  Multinational  oil  corpo- rations  cannot  be  properly  held  ac- countable,  and,  if  left  unchecked,  they  DUH FDSDEOH RI VWURQJO\ LQĂ€XHQFLQJ United  States  foreign  policy  and  poli- cies  on  energy  and  climate  change  in  ways  that  are  inconsistent  with  gov- ernment’s  ultimate  goal  of  promot- ing  the  well-Âbeing  of  the  American  SHRSOH 7KH VSHFLÂżF SROLF\ PHDVXUHV necessary  for  fostering  more  account- able  multinational  oil  corporations  are  less  obvious,  but  the  basic  con- tours  are  clear.  In  general,  increased  government  regulation  and  oversight  of  corporate  activities  is  crucial,  es- pecially  for  industries  (like  the  oil  in- dustry)  whose  products  are  integral  to  the  country’s  economic  health.  Ad- ditionally,  the  United  States  should  codify  and  legally  mandate  corporate  adherence  to  basic  ethical  standards  along  the  lines  of  Corporate  Social Â
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Lucas  Rehaut,  CC  ‘14,  is  studying  political  science  and  business.   He  is  interested  in  the  ways  both  states  and  businesses  are  responding  to  the  threats  and  opportunities  asso- ciated  with  global  climate  change.   Despite  occasional  cynicism,  he  has  faith  in  human  ingenuity  and  be- lieves  that  progress  has  momentum.   He  also  really  likes  dogs,  traveling,  and  photography.   Lucas  can  be  reached  at  lnr2115@columbia.edu.
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