CPR Spring 2017

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW

“There’s nothing republican about the Republican Party.”

—Emil Mella, p. 14 Volume XVII, No. 1

1

Masthead & Editor’s Note

Editor-in-Chief Publisher Design Editor Marketing Director Art Editors Lead Web Editor Managing Editors

Copy Chief Senior Editors

Copy Editors

Matthew Zipf

Dear reader,

Anamaria Lopez

This past winter, Anamaria Lopez—CPR’s publisher— and I recruited a new editorial board for the magazine, selecting writers, artists, and designers from across Columbia’s four undergraduate schools. The present issue is the first by our new team, produced in collaboration with four excellent writers from outside the board: Sebastian Gerschman, Mi Yeon Kim, Emil Mella, and Giovanni Pagán Vélez.

Theresa Yang Huhe Yan Michelle Huang Charly Voelkel Poorvi Bellur Amanda Kam Dimitrius Keeler Shambhavi Tiwari Karen Yuan Maggie Toner Vivian Casillas Audrey DeGuerrera Brian Gao Belle Harris Melissa Ho Jahan Nanji Sheena Qiao Bani Sapra Nina Zweig

Accompanying the new magazine are several updates to our web presence. Owing to the near-Herculean efforts of Theresa Yang, our design editor, and Poorvi Bellur, our lead web editor, we have a new website and a growing staff of web columnists. If you like the articles in this issue, especially Emil Mella’s cover story and Bani Sapra’s report on Chinese–American relations, then please visit cpreview.org, where Emil and Bani are now columnists, among others.

In addition to recognizing the many hours put in by the editorial board and our writers, I would like to thank our parent organization, CIRCA, which continues to support CPR’s work in publishing articles critical to understanding politics, on and off campus.

That’s all from me. Enjoy the magazine.

—Matthew Zipf, Editor in Chief

Sahana Narayanan Song Rhee

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this magazine belong to their authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Columbia Political Review, of CIRCA, or of Columbia University.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW 4: The United States’ pivot to isolationism What abandoning the TPP means for US foreign policy.

Published by CIRCA

Spring 2017 Volume XVII, No. 1

19: Hijabs in Europe From head-covering to symbol.

by Mi Yeon Kim

by Giovanni E. Pagán Vélez 9: Sino–US relations A brash president challenges traditional diplomacy.

by Bani Sapra 14: What’s republican about the Republican Party?

Watching a political party lose its roots.

by Emil Mella

23: Iranians & Iraqis in the new Sweden Nordic immigraiton.

by Sebastian Gerschman

04 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW

PIVOT TO ISOLATION: ON LEAVING THE TPP Giovanni E. Pagán Vélez With the stroke of a pen, President Donald Trump officially reneged on the United States’ commitment to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), undoing a decade-long diplomatic effort to consolidate US leadership in the Pacific region. By discarding the agreement without any consideration for the long-term repercussions, the president signaled that the skepticism and vitriol manifested towards international agreements throughout his campaign are indeed

part of his policy agenda – even if this means disappointing traditional allies and disregarding pre-existing international commitments. In eschewing the agreement, Trump not only repudiated the Obama administration’s commitment to multilateralism but also broke a long-standing bipartisan consensus around the benefits of free trade.

Given the strong sentiments manifested against the trade deal from populists on both the left and the right during the 2016 presidential campaign, defending the TPP has been a political non-starter for

any elected official hoping for reelection. Even Republican legislators, who were expected to cooperate with President Obama to pass the deal during the lame-duck session, have since distanced themselves from it. Moreover, the consolidation of public opinion against the TPP has made any discussion of the issue an intellectual minefield.

As a result, little consideration has been given to the costs that the United States will incur by abandoning the deal. Similarly, while a fair amount has been said about the economic impact of the deal, discus-

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 05 sion of its geopolitical consequences has not constituted any significant portion of the conversation. Yet when both aspects of the deal are taken into consideration, revoking the United States’ commitment to the TPP may be a move that President Trump will come to regret.

The Basics of TPP The TPP is a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA), designed to institutionalize a set of common economic guidelines and liberalize trade between 12 Pacific-Rim economies, the most substantial of which are the United States and Japan. If ratified, the TPP would create a single market in the Pacific Region similar to the EU. In order for the treaty to go into effect, it requires ratification by at least six countries, the combined GDP of which represents 85 percent of the total GDP of all nations in the agreement – making it impossible for the deal to survive without US and Japanese support.

Many expected the treaty to be a boon for US exporters because it would cut more than 18,000 individual taxes and tariffs - uniformly reducing trade barriers across the region.

From the perspective of the average producer, international trade agreements diminish monopolistic power in domestic markets, generate savings that can be later used for investment, and promote the shift of factor endowments to more productive ventures.

The TPP would also provide greater economies of scale for US companies, given their new access to a broader

pool of consumers in Asia. The lower unitary cost of production would allow US companies to better compete in export markets, sell more products and also lower domestic prices for locally produced and consumed goods. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the president’s signing the TPP would result in a 9.1 percent increase in US exports by 2030. This would add more than $244 billion to the nation’s GDP over that time period.

The agreement would also have harmonized labor and environmental standards across the region and promoted a common set of guidelines to regulate competition, investment, and intellectual property rights.

Property rights are of particular interest to the United States in regards to its economic contest with China.

Despite the fact that China will overcome the United States as the world’s largest economy by the end of the decade, the US maintains a significant advantage when it comes to per capita purchasing power (PPP) and technology and innovation. Maintaining this advantageous status quo relies, in part, on enforcing intellectual property rights both domestically

“race to the bottom” for American labor standards, the deal would actually provide more developed countries with the leverage to promote higher labor standards across the board. For example, countries like Brunei, Vietnam, and Malaysia were required to improve their labor laws before they would be allowed to join the agreement. Moreover, the agreement’s mechanism for the settlement of disputes establishes similar enforcement capabilities as those used by the World Trade Organization to ensure a strict level of compliance with the stipulations of the agreement.

President Obama’s Path to the 21st Century

Significantly, the TPP was meant to outline the path forward for US global leadership in the 21st century. In addition to pushing a strong commitment to international cooperation, the Obama administration saw a shift in focus areas as central to maintaining the United States’ standing in the world. In the eyes of President Obama, developing regions like East Asia and Latin America merited more attention than traditional hotspots in Europe and the Middle East.

With this in mind, the TPP was designed with three strategic objectives: first, to develop a common international trade and regulations regime to ensure that the gains from globaland abroad; the TPP would have en- ization continue; second, to increase sured the enforcement of American US influence in the rapidly growproperty rights in China’s backyard. ing region of East Asia; and third, Although critics on the left have to use the bargaining power of the argued that the TPP would lead to a TPP bloc to set the global econom-

In the eyes of President Obama, developing regions like East Asia and Latin America merited more attention than traditional hotspots in Europe and the Middle East.

06 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW ic agenda and prevent China from usurping leadership from the US. In the context of an interconnected and globalized world, the only way to ensure positive outcomes is by embracing a multilateral approach to international relations. This is particularly true in international economic relations, as economies are no longer local but instead increasingly interdependent. According to statistics from the World Bank, the trade of goods and services today accounts for 57.9 percent of global GDP, up from only 24.9 percent in 1960.

During this same period, global GDP per capita has risen from $449 in 1960 to $9,995 in 2015, while US GDP per capita has risen from $3,007 in 1960 to $55,836 in 2015.

Although correlation does not always imply causation, 90 percent of economists agree that free trade is beneficial for general economic welfare. This is more than just theoretical accord, but a consensus supported by a vast range of robust empirical studies. As national and regional economies have become increasingly specialized based on the abundance of their factor endowments, the production of goods and services has increased, global prices have fallen, and the surplus received by consumers has grown. In sum, trade allows countries to achieve higher real incomes than they otherwise would in a closed economy.

The positive effects of economic openness are best evidenced by the “catch-up effect” seen in developing countries, which have experienced an average GDP per capita growth rate above 3 percent since 1990.

Trade also generates positive externalities at the international level beyond simply the economic gains generated through comparative ad-

vantage. Exposure to other economies allows for the greater exchange of ideas through communication and travel. For example, one of the least discussed but perhaps most important externalities of NAFTA was the democratization of Mexico as a result of increased economic and political linkages with the US economy.

The strategic provision of material incentives – income, in the case of trade – can go a long way in promoting normative objectives like democracy, demilitarization, and environmental regulations.

From a diplomatic perspective, with the passage of the TPP, the United States, Canada, and Japan would have much stronger ways to pressure other TPP countries into improving their democratic institutions, such as threatening to limit trade if authoritarian governments emerged.

Contextualizing the Asia Pivot The importance of Asia as a whole in contemporary international affairs cannot be stressed enough.

Current geopolitical issues, such as the conflicts over military establishments in the South China Sea and the growing threat of North Korean aggression, are a mere preview of what lies ahead. By 2030, Asia is expected to “have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of global power, based upon GDP, population size, military spending, and technological investment.” Moreover, according to estimates by the consultancy firm KPMG, between 54 and 66 percent of the global “middle-class” – more than 3.2 billion people – will be concentrated in the region in the coming years, due to its large share of popu-

lation and economic growth. Soon, China will be the most populous and largest economy in the globe, posing a significant challenge to the United States’ status as sole superpower.

With these realities in mind, it becomes evident why President Obama’s Pivot to Asia was so crucial and why the TPP was hailed as its central pillar. Additionally, from a national perspective, the United States has clear economic interests in the agreement. With nearly 45 percent of current US exports going to TPP countries, there is a clear need for improved market access, trade facilitation, and guidelines for trade with these countries. On the other hand, due to the fast-paced change that is expected to occur in Asia during the next two decades and the tensions that will emerge with China, US presence as a balancing force to ensure regional stability is essential.

Although President Trump and his advisors have apparently not yet come to terms with this reality, the only way to achieve a much-needed balance is by prioritizing economic power over military might.

When combined, the GDP of the 12 countries of the TPP bloc account for 40 percent of global GDP, substantially more than China’s 16 percent. Similarly, in terms of trade volume, TPP countries account for $9.6 trillion in trade, more than twice as much as China’s $4.3 trillion. Uniting this much economic activity under a common set of standards would provide the TPP bloc with an advantage over China by defining world markets through standards dictated by the United States.

The institutionalization of certain trade practices under the TPP would preserve the liberal international order – led by the United

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 07

States and its allies – that has dictated global affairs since the end of the Second World War. As David Lake explains in British and American Hegemony Compared, international institutions rather than sheer power buttress the current international regime. International organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank provide a legal liability framework, reduce transaction costs, and provide information and transparency throughout the globe. These organizations strengthen the norms of reciprocity and multilateralism, which not only

make cooperative equilibriums durable but also make them less costly to maintain. The TPP would be another institution in this mold, focused on promoting economic openness and stability in the Pacific region.

As the central economy of the TPP, the United States would continue to enjoy the power of setting the agenda in the global economy.

Additionally, the TPP has the potential to revive broader trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization, which stalled after the collapse of the Doha round. With TPP members representing such a large share of global GDP, the lux-

ury of not abiding by TPP standards will eventually come at too high a price for other countries to continue, forcing them to either join the TPP, create other overlapping agreements, or revive the Doha round.

“We Don’t Win Anymore” Throughout his campaign and during his first month in office, Donald Trump has railed against Chinese economic practices as a threat to the United States’ wellbeing, promising to impose heavier tariffs on imports.

Although Trump’s flippant attitude towards China certainly raises con-

08 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW cerns about possible conflicts down the road, from a policy perspective, Trump’s isolationism hands China a golden opportunity to augment its international influence. Immediately after Trump’s victory, China moved to rekindle the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – a deal that would rival the TPP. The RCEP includes seven TPP members and would have the same objectives of trade integration and common regulation. Nevertheless, the RCEP would also include China and India while excluding the United States, Mexico, Canada, Chile, and Peru. If the RCEP is ratified by member countries, it would be China, not the United States, dictating the economic regulations and standards of the Pacific region. This would not only diminish US leadership in the region but also divert trade from the United States to China.

The RCEP would also lack the environmental and labor regulations included in the TPP and would not have a common intellectual property right regime with the United States.

Moreover, Chinese exporters would have more favorable access to Asian markets than would US exporters – significantly jeopardizing American exporting industries. According to estimates by the Council of Economic Advisors, nearly $225 billion in exports would go to RCEP, rather than TPP, members. Additionally, nearly five million jobs and 162,000 export businesses would be put at risk for trade diversion to China.

The consequences of withdrawing from the TPP have grander geopolitical consequences as well.

Because China is vying with the United States for the role of leading world power, forging strategic alliances with China’s neighbors would

hold in check any possible revisionist tendencies. Greater economic integration between the United States and countries in the Pacific region would mean an implicit US security commitment in the region and so would serve as a deterrent if China overstepped any boundaries.

Although security and economic concerns are often viewed separately from one another, they frequently overlap. Being at the helm of as large an economic trade bloc as the TPP would generate spillover benefits for the United States in terms of both setting international norms and ensuring international security.

Although only a little over a month has elapsed since the president’s inauguration, the abandonment of the TPP offers particular insight into the central tenets of the fledgling administration’s foreign policy. The first of these is a clear disregard for the “Foreign–Policy Establishment” – the group of intellectuals, bureaucrats, and practitioners concentrated in academic institutions and think tanks – that has for decades been at the heart of American foreign policymaking. Instead, a small group of ideological advisors continue to push “America First” as the only guiding principle of the administration’s foreign policy agenda. There is also a clear commitment to fulfilling far-fetched campaign promises, even if it means effectively reducing US international influence. Finally, we see that unilateralism and preferential treatment have replaced the multilateralism that has been the core of American diplomacy for decades. This is best reflected in Trump’s promises to create bilateral agreements with Japan and the UK, in lieu of regional pacts.

During his time in office, Pres-

ident Barack Obama made it clear that American power and prosperity result from American leadership in the international community and the durable partnerships that the country makes with its allies; the TPP was central to the Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia. Nonetheless, President Trump has made it clear that he intends to be the diametrical opposition of his predecessor.

From an economic perspective, the reduction of trade is expected to increase consumer costs, limit market access in the Pacific region for exporters, and increase the risk of trade diversion from the United States to China. From a geopolitical perspective, US influence in the region will be significantly reduced. China will now have an advantage over the United States by pushing for the establishment of the RCEP as a means of dictating regional trade policy. It may still be too early to fully understand the consequences of President Trump’s abandonment of the TPP. However, if President Trump continues to implement his firebrand style of isolationism, the United States may soon find itself with limited influence in a global and political axis that is gradually tilting towards Asia.

Giovanni E. Pagán Vélez is a junior at Columbia College studying political science with a focus on international relations and Latin America. He was born in San Juan, Puerto Rico and is a strong advocate for Puerto Rican Sovereignty. In addition to writing for the Columbia Political Review, Giovanni is an editor for the Columbia Undergraduate Law Review, a project leader for the Columbia Consulting Club, and a board member of CIRCA. He can be reached at giovanni.pagan@ columbia.edu.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 09

SINO-US RELATIONS: AN EXTENDED CROSSROADS Bani Sapra Both Russia and China paid particular attention to the foreign policy changes that the 2016 US presidential election foreshadowed.

While Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton had already demonstrated her views on China when she served as Secretary of State, Republican candidate Donald Trump’s proposed foreign policies were more ambiguous.

Although Trump’s campaign did its fair share of villainizing China, his promise to remove the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would actually decrease US influence in the region. Despite threatening to impose a high tariff on Chinese imports, President Trump has put forward policies which would diminish the United States’ role in international affairs, allowing China to take on greater leadership in the region. His election has left the future of Sino-US relations unclear.

A fundamental principle in international politics is that no power must rest secure; in an international order with no legal enforcement, only a consistent effort to maintain the global balance of power prevents the situation from falling into anarchy. In the aftermath of World War II, multiple institutions were established to maintain this balance: the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World

Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the G-20. These organizations depended largely on direct state action to ensure that all nations would accept principles such as non-aggression, regulation of nuclear weaponry, and a codified standard of universal human rights. After WWII stripped countries like the United Kingdom of their world power status and after the Soviet Union collapsed in the late 20th century, the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower, capable of dictating the behavior of other nations.

Yet the new international order has often come under fire from states that have risen to power in recent decades. China, in particular, has criticized the US-dominated system for imposing strict conditions on any participating country and for menacing its regime with the promotion of democracy. China’s rapid economic ascension and its incorporation into international institutions such as those mentioned above has given rise to the debate over the country’s intentions as a global power. Will it become a part of the status quo, or will it establish itself as a revisionist power? Is it likely to preserve the existing international order or create a new one? While proponents of the latter stance look to China’s criticism of the international system as evidence of drastic changes to come, advocates of the former claim that

China’s participation in the institutions that form the current international order makes a total upheaval of international relations unlikely.

Questioning One China The debate over the One China policy has recently received greater attention among American policymakers, after a phone conversation between newly elected President Trump and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. Since the ratification of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, the United States has adhered to China’s demand for a “One China policy,” in which Beijing is recognized as the sole seat of the legitimate Chinese government. Trump’s conversation acknowledged the Taiwanese head of state and thus called the future of this treaty into question.

The situation was exacerbated when Trump later floated the idea of using Taiwan and the One China policy as leverage to gain greater concessions from China. “We’re being hurt very badly by China with devaluation; with taxing us heavy at the borders when we don’t tax them; with building a massive fortress in the middle of the South China Sea,” he said, “and, frankly, with not helping us at all with North Korea.”

Failing to honor this policy after 44 years, as Trump seemed keen to do when he called the One China policy into question, would change

10 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW the course of Sino-US relations. But, while rash, Trump’s threat fits into a larger pattern of recent change in political discourse. Playing on the fear of China’s rise in global power, Trump’s presidential campaign promised to protect Americans from currency manipulation, job loss, and diversion of incomes by containing China.

However, as East Asia experts, such as Paul Haenle, have warned, the One China policy is non-negotiable. In fact, China has compiled a list of punitive measures that they would take should Washington push the issue. In the event of a trade war, China could reduce imports of American agricultural products, Not only could they turn to Europe, Australia, and Canada to fill the gap, but they could also rely on the agricultural lobbies in 20 to 30 US states to put pressure on Congress to preserve One China.

The rapid reversal of this carrot-and-stick approach to Chinese relations invites some investigation into US perceptions of China. In addition to a phone call between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping reasserting America’s commitment to the One China policy, former national security advisor Michael Flynn hand-delivered a letter to the Chinese ambassador to the United States, wishing the Chinese people a prosperous Year of the Rooster. A video of Trump’s granddaughter singing Happy New Year in Mandarin was even unofficially circulated on social media.

While the Trump administration quickly performed damage control for the phone call to Ing-wen, one still wonders: what are the implications of threatening the One China policy? Why would recognizing Taiwan threaten the global standing of the People’s Republic of China?

For many, Taiwan is the great

spite the fact that the United States never formally contested China’s claim to Taiwan. America’s early recognition of the Taiwanese state in 1949—a product of their support for Chiang Kai-shek—was never fully withdrawn. Historically, Sino-US diplomacy has been based on tacit acknowledgments of spheres of power. In the Normalization Communique of 1979, China agreed to the maintenance of cultural, commercial, and other unofficial ties between the United States and Taiwan. Moreover, the Second Shanghai Communique of 1982 served as a significant compromise for China, in which ambiguous language stated that a reduction of US arms sales to Taiwan would be contingent on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In effect, though the US withdrew troops and military advisors, China agreed to the continuation of American arms sales to Taiwan.

Military annexation of Taiwan was thus never considered, due to persistent US involvement in the region.

While Chinese annexation of Taiwan would be unlikely to transform the political framework of the smaller state—a assumption supported by the lack of political transformation in Hong Kong following the reinstallation of Chinese authority—the historical claim laid to it has made annexation integral to China’s own conception of its global power.

Unlike Western countries, for whom the concepts of state and nation are interwoven, China’s existence predates its consolidation into a nation in the early 20th century. Chinese

Failing to honor this policy after 44 years, as Trump seemed keen to do when he called the One China policy into question, would change the course of Sino-US relations.

Taiwan: A Core Part of Chinese Identity

“lost territory” of China. Not only is the territory itself regarded as a historical part of China, but the flight of Chiang Kai-shek and his forces after the Chinese Civil War represented a perennial challenge to the People’s Republic of China. Striking down Chiang Kai-shek’s claim that Taipei was the new seat of the Republic of China became an important objective on the Chinese Communist Party’s agenda for the civil war, an objective that is still unfulfilled today.

Many in China view Chinese identity as immutable, timeless, and fixed in history. The legitimacy of the Chinese claim to Taiwan, therefore, is viewed through the lens of historical right, rather than as an appeal to popular sovereignty. Thus, although they maintain that the claim to Taiwan is non-negotiable, the Chinese seem to be content to sideline the issue and think of reunification as a future inevitability—so long as their claim to Taiwan remains uncontested.

Tensions already exist between the United States and China, de-

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 11 history, customs and traditions, roles of government, and ways of thinking are all intrinsically linked to its identity as a civilization. Thus, the reclamation of Taiwanese territory matters more as a symbolic reaffirmation of Chinese civilization than as a geopolitical expansion of power.

tures are not high enough to justify the suspicion that the Chinese economy is militarized and mobilized to balance against US power. No attempt has been made to construct anti-American alliances, and China is not trying to actively disrupt US alliances with Japan or South Korea.

In fact, it is only in Taiwan that ChiGlobal Power na’s goals lay in direct conflict with those of the United States, as China Yet another question rises from seeks to minimize the United States’ this explanation: what exactly does ability to defend Taiwan global power mean for the Chinese? against Chinese In the traditional definition linking military power to wealth, China is a major global player. It is the world’s largest exporter and even has a manned space program. It receives the second-largest amount of foreign direct investment, has the world’s largest population, the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, and ranks as the largest or best in many traditional measures of economic power.

But as Harvard professor Joseph Nye argues, resources do not necessarily translate into power. Militarily, China advocates non-interference in global affairs, and, economically, it appears to act solely in its own interests. China’s isolation from international affairs has kept the country from living up to its full potential as a political superpower.

For instance, China’s coermodernization program, in cion. Chiplace since the mid-20th na’s preparations century, has largely been for countering US military aimed at deterring US military pow- power in a hypothetical Taiwanese er and other foreign forces in the re- conflict should thus not be intergion. However, its military expendi- preted as a larger desire to counter-

balance the United States in terms of regional distributions of power.

China’s policy of non-interference has drawn criticism in the past, and is often considered to be a factor in the country’s lower global standing, as other states are less receptive to the influence of a country that stands isolated from international affairs. In a 2005 address to the National Committee of US-China relations, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called for China to “strengthen the international system that has enabled its success,” as a “stakeholder that shares responsibility on international economic issues.”

Interestingly, the Chinese government has become an unusually strong proponent of the United Nations. Its commitment to the international liberal order has caused China to advocate a “new type” of regional organization, based not on alliances but on comprehensive, cooperative security, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and confidence-building measures. China’s departure from the traditional, Western concept of international compet i t i o n has enhanced the nation’s commitment to the global order and so reaffirmed its position as a status quo power.

By initiating several agreements, China has strengthened its

12 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW own soft power. For instance, by taking the lead in the establishment of a Chinese-ASEAN free trade area on January 1st, 2010, China reassured East Asian countries that it will be mindful of the consequences of pursuing economic development. The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) now lies at the core of a new web of East Asian arrangements. Notably, the United States has been effectively excluded from economic diplomacy in the region.

In fact, China’s commitment to international cooperation has alarmed US foreign policy officials in the past. In 2013, China launched an initiative to establish a new multilateral development institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This fulfilled Zoellick’s aforementioned plea for greater global involvement, as it helped fulfill a multi-trillion dollar gap in financing for railways, roads, power plants, and other infrastructure in the world’s fastest-growing region. Nevertheless, the United States treated this as a challenge to the existing regional and global development institutions that it had helped to establish in the decades after World War II. By mid2016, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, South Korea, and the UK had all defied Washington and signed up. The only exception was Japan, which has yet to sign on as a contributory to China’s alternative multilateral financial institution.

Another attempt by the United States to reinstate its presence in East Asia—and contain China’s influence —was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a proposed free trade area between 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the election of Donald Trump brought an end to US participation in the treaty when

President Trump reneged on the deal in his first month in office. Ironically, this has opened the door for Beijing’s own proposed treaty, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which proposes a similar agreement but with China at its helm rather than the United States.

China may criticize Western institutions, but its commitment to international treaties suggests that it would push reform for the international order, rather than upheaval. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, this January, Chinese President Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to globalization and even suggested that China was prepared to step up as the champion of free trade while the United States threatens to retreat into isolationism. As it invests heavily in developing regions and enhances its own economic influence via trade agreements across the Asia-Pacific region, China appears to have taken Zoellick’s advice in an attempt to expand its own global power.

While Trump’s phone call to the Taiwanese president may seem unrelated to China’s pursuit of global power—which, after all, does seek to exclude the United States from the Asia-Pacific region—it should be understood as an attack on China’s symbolic stature. Rather than imitate the previous attempt to undermine China’s global power by discouraging countries from joining the AIIB, Trump chose to use this phone call as a gesture to hit China at the heart of its own conception of power: its identity as a civilization.

Similarly, any attempt by the new administration to pursue relations with Japan, China’s great rival, would directly compromise US recognition of the Chinese sphere of influence.

A Conflict of Actions: Symbolic or Pragmatic?

Along what course, then, lies the future of Sino-US relations, and how will it affect China’s global power?

From a practical perspective, President Trump has cleared the way for China to increase its soft power. By enacting a series of policies designed to isolate the United States and alienate its allies, China is now able to present itself as the new champion of the international liberal order.

From a symbolic perspective, however, Trump has presented an ambiguous series of actions from which China must derive its response. Unlike his approach in conversations with other heads of state, Trump’s moderation of his bullish tone when confirming American commitment to the One China policy falls in line with the respectful exchange that Chinese leaders demand when negotiating with other heads of state.

However, accepting the phone call from the Taiwanese president in the first place and inviting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to visit the United States are both gestures that allow the United States to question Chinese authority in the Asia-Pacific region, a move that could antagonize Beijing. China’s future as a global power is promising, but the future of Sino-US relations remains less clear.

Bani Sapra is a sophomore in Columbia College, hoping to major in Economics and History. As a consequence of a childhood between India, the UAE and Qatar, she has always been interested in the international balance of power and its potential to shift, which is Sad! She can be reached at bss2136@columbia.edu.

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FEATURE: THERE’S NOTHING REPUBLICAN ABOUT THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 15 Emil Mella In 1854, at a schoolhouse in Ripon, Wisconsin, former members of the defunct Whig Party met, seeking to create a new party based on the principles of the old Democratic-Republican Party of Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The new Republican Party that they created stood firmly against the expansion of slavery and thus began to rapidly draw support in the Northern states. Two years later, its first presidential candidate, John C. Frémont, won 11 out of 16 Northern states.

Four years later, its second presidential candidate, Abraham Lincoln, won the presidency and went on to become one of the most renowned presidents in American history.

From its very beginning, the Republican Party has endorsed principles of civic responsibility, predicated on the conviction that liberty demands freedom from undue governmental burden and relies on a democratic and representative government of a free people.

Rallying cries of the party’s first election included “Free men, free soil, free press, free labor, free Kansas, free speech, Frémont!” In Gettysburg, Lincoln championed a “government of the people, by the people, for the people,” and succeeded in his fight that it should “not perish from this earth.” Even the women’s suffrage movement aligned itself with the Republican Party.

Essentially, the opposition of the Republican Party to any encroachment of government power upon individual liberties, whether at the establishment or grassroots level, has defined its progression across time.

True to its values of protecting

personal freedom, the Republican Party as a movement has been consistently allied with the concept of “small-r” republicanism, despite the fact that its name derived more simply from the Democratic-Republican Party, whose principles the new party sought to emulate.

It is this same Democratic-Republican Party whose luminaries were often cited as instrumental supporters of republicanism as a governing philosophy. Per the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the concept of republicanism fundamentally centers on freedom from “large” and invasive governance by an arbitrary power. Republicanism emphasizes that the rule of law should define the structure of society and often recognizes the few ways in which government can facilitate the rule of law.

It must be noted that (small r!) republicanism diverts such powers of government, to the largest extent possible, away from the designs of a single executive head of government. Instead, republicanism directs the greatest powers of governance towards elected, representative legislators, who work as a group to protect the public from gross government overreach—a particularly fitting undertone for a political philosophy that notably originated in opposition to a monarchy. This contextualizes the jeers that refer to presidents as monarchs, exemplified most recently in caricatures of former President Barack Obama as “King Obama” in right-wing media.

This serves as proof of the clear and present fear of executive overreach that appears in both a republican form of government and in the Republican Party’s political philosophy.

It is therefore also clear that the connection between the Re-

publican Party, henceforth referred to as the GOP to avoid confusion, and republicanism reaches far beyond the coincidental nature of their names. The principles of liberty and rule of law form some of the strongest threads of governing philosophy that run throughout the Republican Party’s history.

But this strong tradition finds itself betrayed by the behavior of the new Trump administration.

President Trump, throughout his short time in office, his candidacy, and even in his career before entering politics, has displayed a marked lean towards authoritarianism, a lean reinforced by the actions of his staff and, now, his government.

Vox’s political writer Amanda Taub defines authoritarianism well: it is “a term political scientists use for a worldview that values order and authority and distrusts outsiders and social change.” Taub goes on to describe (italics are my own, for emphasis) authoritarians as people who seek out “strongmen leaders who are punitive, who target out groups and have a simple, forceful leadership style that makes them feel strong. And if you were going to grow that candidate in a lab, he would look a lot like Donald Trump.”

Anticipating that readers who support President Trump’s policies might find such a description unflattering, I will seek to elaborate on this definition with no commentary on its merits or drawbacks.

There is inherent validity in being authoritarian and in supporting authoritarian candidates and viewpoints, just as there is validity in supporting republican viewpoints, libertarian viewpoints, capitalist viewpoints, or socialist viewpoints.

The term itself is often avoided

16 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW in the Trump administration’s public comments and actions, presumably due to its negative association with many dictatorships or other anti-democratic governments that American leaders of both parties have opposed since the inception of the American republic. But President Trump, on the campaign trail and in office, has shown no hesitation in praising many of these same leaders and their governing styles. The president’s seemingly cozy relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin is the most publicized example, given that Trump recently compared the legacy of President Putin’s regime to that of the United States by asking Fox News’ Bill O’Reilly, “You think our country’s so innocent?” Trump has also praised former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein for his capacity in fighting terrorist insurgencies, Kim Jong Un for his “pretty amazing [...] takeover” of the North Korean government, and Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad for “getting an A in terms of leadership”—even as news swirled around President Al-Assad’s violent actions against civilians as part of the Syrian Civil War, actions that Human Rights Watch has since deemed genocidal.

President Trump has also sought to employ wide-ranging executive power as a solution for many of the ills of American government.

One particularly prominent example is the President’s oft-expressed wish that the American military had “taken the oil”during the Iraq War by seizing control of Iraqi oil fields. This wish also features heavily into his publicly stated proposals

for the fight against ISIS, though it has been classified by many as a war crime. In response, President Trump was quoted by CNN as say-

Coretta Scott King for actively denying civil rights in his role as Alabama’s Attorney General), President Trump ensures that authoritarian tendencies will find their way into the bastions of American policymaking.

In his sparse Oval Office, which does not even feature family photos, President Trump has hung a lone portrait of President Andrew Jackson, the founder of the Democratic Party, whose authoritarian, populist policies—which led, in part, to the destruction of the Second National Bank and the Trail of Tears—are said to be an inspiration to Mr. Trump.

And these leanings are not new. President Trump’s first-ever mention in the New York Times in 1973 was the result of a lawsuit brought against his company by the Department of Justice, on account of its discriminatory policies against non-white tenants.

But just as the republican philosophy has a long history in the GOP, so does this authoritarian bend.

Frequently recounted in American History classes is the “witch-hunt” of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy and the largely Republican “House Un-American Activities Committee.” Their now-decried investigations, which sought to weed out communists from within the American government, have found a high-profile supporter in former House Speaker and Trump advocate, Newt Gingrich. Gingrich appeared on several news programs after the 2016 election, calling for the restoration of the Committee in order to find supporters of “radical Islamic terrorism” in government circles.

Prominent GOP presidents

But this strong tradition finds itself betrayed by the behavior of the new Trump administration. ing, “Can you believe that? Who are the critics that say that? Fools. I don’t call them critics. I call them fools.”

In office, President Trump has not been shy to display these strongman tendencies to foreign leaders.

German chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly had to inform the president about the ramifications of the Geneva Convention, a substantial treaty that defines international law for war crimes and other ethical violations perpetrated against both foreign governments and one’s own people. President Trump also reportedly threatened to send American armed forces into Mexico to help deal with “bad hombres” causing civil unrest, though both the American and Mexican governments have denied that he made such a threat during a conversation with Mexico’s president.

In hiring brazen authoritarians for important positions, such as Steve Bannon as Chief Strategist (who derided the media as “the opposition party,” managed to land a permanent seat in the White House situation room, and contributed extensively to an executive order banning people from several Muslim-majority nations from entering the United States) and Jeff Sessions as Attorney General (who was denied a federal judgeship in 1984 due to accusations of racism and was condemned by

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 17 Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt—patriots featured on the face of Mount Rushmore—are also credited with some of the largest expansions in executive power in American history. Lincoln carried out the Emancipation Proclamation by executive order and refused to comply with a Supreme Court decision overturning his suspension of the right

to habeas corpus for those believed to be supporters of the Confederate insurgency. Likewise, in pursuit of construction for the Panama Canal, President Roosevelt supported a coup d’etat against the Colombian government that resulted in independence for Panama. He also took brazen, unilateral action to ensure the formation of the National Park Sys-

tem and to “bust” trusts in the largest industries of the American economy.

Even President Ronald Reagan, a prominent proponent of Republican small-government philosophy and, by many polling standards, the most popular modern President, did not shy away from using of executive power. He invaded Grenada without congressional approval, or even

18 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW awareness, he was sued repeatedly for undemocratic measures taken as a part of the “War on Drugs,” and he prevented large-scale treatment measures for the HIV/AIDS epidemic due to its mistaken association with homosexual Americans. Note that resistance to societal change is a tenet of authoritarianism in my aforementioned definition. The prominence of figures such as Pat Buchanan and Strom Thurmond at some of the highest levels of modern Republican Party politics also speaks to the historical trend of social conservatism.

The strains of republicanism and authoritarianism have warred constantly for control of the Republican Party, and one might argue that these tendencies play into what many call “political decay.” This concept—popularized by political scientist Francis Fukuyama—suggests a trend in the development of liberal democracies and republics: such governments can crumble from the deterioration of their own internal institutions rather than through intentional sabotage by external sources. Fukuyama considers Trump’s election to have actually vindicated republicanism in an important sense: the peaceful transfer of power, one of the most central republican practices, functioned smoothly in allowing President Trump to assume office. In weaker democracies, such a transition might have been hindered, given that those in power before him largely opposed his win.

However, in an interview on the “Ezra Klein Show” podcast, Fukuyama bluntly categorized Trump’s rise as “one of the most severe political crises [he has] experienced in [his] lifetime,” and described the president’s disregard for many of America’s most revered republican institutions as a cause for worry. During

his short time in office, the president has expressed anger and disdain at “so-called judges” and has shown little patience for many of America’s limits upon presidential power, such as confidentiality law—President Trump was found to have a partially opened lock-bag on full display at an IBM event in the Oval Office, as well as to have discussed policy towards North Korea publicly with advisors at his Mar-a-Lago resort—and conflict-of-interest restrictions—implicitly condoning Counselor Kellyanne Conway’s promotion of his daughter Ivanka’s clothing line from the White House press room and refusing to place his assets in a blind trust.

It must be emphasized, however, that the issues surrounding republican decay are not localized merely to the GOP, but have taken hold across parties and throughout American governmental systems. The Democratic and Republican parties have switched positions over the course of their heavily-intertwined histories.

For example, the first Democratic president was the aforementioned Andrew Jackson and President Trump’s judicial disdain finds a historical precedent in the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was of the most prominent figures in the modern Democratic Party. The same Franklin D. Roosevelt infamously interned thousands of Japanese-Americans during World War II, largely due to racist fears, and less-famously sought to unilaterally change the date of Thanksgiving and add three new justices to the Supreme Court to help enforce his own agenda.

Presidential impeachment, the ever-important limitation upon executive power, has never been executed by the Senate. When Democratic presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill

Clinton were drawn up by the House on articles of impeachment, partisan support for the presidents at the Senate level stalled any further action.

Increased party polarization suggests that any future impeachment of President Trump would be doubtful.

As a result of many of the developments described above, the American executive has acquired immense powers through which to pursue strongly anti-republican actions. From drone strikes to surveillance powers to data calculation by the various Cabinet departments, the powers of the American president are largely restricted by norms, not laws, and could be very easily twisted to create the kind of autocratic state Mr. Trump has praised in the past.

The question, therefore, that lies before us is whether or not President Trump will follow through on his many autocratic-leaning statements and employ the power and force of the American government in a manner reckless enough to violate the norms currently holding the American republic together, thereby driving it further toward decay.

If he does, then we must all look to Congress, to the judiciary, to the American media, and to the American public to see whether they will step forward and safeguard the traditions of the American republic from those who would see them crumble.

Emil Mella is a Columbia College sophomore majoring in Economics-Political Science, with a concentration in Sustainable Development. He enjoys volunteering at Music Matters, and keeping a healthy media diet of econ white papers and hate tweets. His Twitter is @EmilMella, and he particularly loves it when he’s told exactly what was wrong with his last article.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 19

HIJAB CONTROVERSY: FRANCE & GERMANY Mi Yeon Kim The hijab has become an increasingly divisive symbol in Europe; other traditional Muslim women’s garments like the burqa, niqab, and perhaps most infamously, the “Burkini,” are not exempt from the confusion and hysteria either. Despite the fact that only a minority of Muslim women in Europe are fully veiled, the hijab and similar garments are hypervisible and hypersexualized in Western society. In response to perceptions of the hijab as an ideological threat, countries have taken steps to rearticulate core national values, tighten definitions of citizenship, and even ban the hijab altogether. However, not all debates around Europe have led to the same policy outcomes.

France and Germany are particularly useful illustrations for this phenomenon. One might assume that the two nations would have similar policy responses to the headscarf, as both are members of the European Union and share similar Western, liberal values. They also share histories of Muslim immigration and currently accommodate the largest and second-largest Muslim populations in Europe, respectively. However, while France passed a law in 2011 banning the full-face veil in public spaces, Germany has adopted a more lenient stance, despite a growing movement for such legislation.

Instead, such instances are handled on a case by case and state by state basis, with decisions ranging from complete bans to absolute freedom.

What is being regulated, and whom do these regulations most affect? On paper, France has prohibited the “full-face veil” in “all public spaces,” citing security concerns and the need for religious neutrality; this legislation precludes women from wearing the veil in the workplace, schools, hospitals, roads, streets— essentially, anywhere outside of the home. The full-face veil, however, is rarely worn by Muslim women in Europe; instead, most women elect to wear scarves that cover only their hair and ears. As a result, indiscriminate social and political exclusion of Muslim women, wearing any type of clothing that resembles the full-face veil, runs rampant.

In Germany, there is no national policy restricting the wearing of headscarves. In fact, in 2003, the German Constitutional Court ruled in favor of a teacher who wanted to wear an Islamic scarf to school. Tracing the discrepancies between France’s and Germany’s legislative approaches to the hijab is no easy task, but there can be seen an underlying difference in the attitudes of these two states.

This difference emerges in large part as a result of Germany’s status as a federal state and France’s as a unitary republic. Consequently, Germany does not have any universal regula-

tion of the headscarf in place. Federal states have chosen to confront the political quagmire of the hijab in various ways, which may be organized into four main policy models.

The liberal model, which tends to allow for greater freedom of dress in public areas, is favored by states like Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and Rhineland-Palatinate. The flexible regulation model, practiced in Bremen and Lower Saxony, deals with the headscarf issue on a case by case basis. The Christian model, implemented in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Saarland, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Hesse, only permits Judeo-Christian religious symbols, as these are viewed as an integral part of Germany’s cultural tradition. Finally, the secular model, followed in Berlin, makes no exceptions, proscribing all religious symbols for all civil servants.

Curiously, no other religious clothing is as contested, scrutinized, and regulated as the Muslim veil. In the name of secularism and religious neutrality, the hijab and those who wear it are systematically excluded from the public eye, even as the issue falls under greater public scrutiny.

The debate surrounding the hijab is grossly skewed in terms of gender, as it mostly disregards any consideration of Muslim men’s religious clothing.

And, it should be noted, the hijab’s presence in the political sphere is decidedly separate from other, similar garments—neither the nun’s habit

20 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW nor the Jewish kippah face the same level of legislative control. This is perhaps due to the reductionist, Islamophobic sentiments expressed by many members of the political establishment.

Just last year, a French minister compared veil wearers to “Negroes who accept slavery,” and, although his statement does not encompass the entire nation’s views about the hijab, it reflects the insidious nature of Islamophobia. Indeed, by likening hijabis to “slaves,” one makes the orientalist assumption that Muslim women are passive victims of identity principles, who need to be saved by Western legislation.

In order to make sense of these discrepancies, it is important to remember that policies do not exist in a vacuum. Policy decisions are informed by a constellation of beliefs and assumptions shared by members of a given community, which inform the legislators of what society deems acceptable. In this case, distinct rep-

ertoires of “French values” and “German values” demarcate characteristics of ideal citizens. These values are used as a metric for deciding to what

degree a particular society will accept the hijab, if it chooses to do so at all.

The history of French and German interactions with Muslim populations can provide an explanation as to why France’s attitude towards

the hijab is far harsher than that of Germany. France’s colonization of Algeria, which persisted until the Algerian War for independence in the mid-20th century, continues to haunt the French Republic. In fact, the Algerian occupation was a topic considered, for many years, to be too traumatic to publicly discuss.

Despite the fact that the war caused one million deaths, French officials took 37 years to admit that the Algerian “conflict” was actually a war.

Ever since France became a colonial power in North Africa, women’s clothing has served as a nexus for debates concerning female sexual morality, oppression, and cultural backwardness; attempts to alter and westernize the clothing of colonized women fit into a larger mission to “civilize” them. During the Algerian War, a “de-veiling” event was held on a podium in Government Square at the center of Algiers: a group of generals who were

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 21 determined to keep Algeria as a part of France choreographed a ceremony where Algerian women were publicly “de-veiled” as a sign of emancipation and as a rejection of Algerian revolutionaries seeking to liberate the colony from French control.

The debate over the control of women served as a key dialectical encounter between Western and Muslim societies during colonization, fueled by Orientalist fantasies of veiled women in harems, of female subjugation to a culture perceived as anachronistic, and of the oppression of wives by their polygamous husbands. In fact, the French Governor-General of Algeria at the time, Thomas Bugeaud, remarked, “Les Arabes nous échappent parce qu’ils dissimulent leurs femmes à nos regards” (“We cannot control the Arabs because they hide their women from our sight”). Traditionally, women have constituted symbolic boundaries of ethnic and national groups, demarcating who can belong to a community and who cannot.

Women have been fetishized as the primary caregivers, given the task of socializing children and thus molding archetypal citizens. As a result, women are often seen as carriers of a community’s “honor” and culture.

If the Muslim woman’s body is seen as a politically significant, cultural marker, then bodily performances manifested in styles of dress can demonstrate allegiance to particular values. In this case, when a Muslim woman chooses to wear a hijab, her garment constitutes a metonymic statement of her loyalty to a religion that has, in the Western consciousness, long been framed as violent

and averse to modernity. As we will examine later, one of France’s key republican values has long been an allegiance to the state. Wearing the headscarf thus becomes the ultimate test of French citizenship.

left at home; the hijab was decried as a rejection of French values and a refusal to assimilate to French society.

With the rise of France’s far-right party, the Front National (FN), the issue of Muslim immigrants became highly politicized. The FN capitalized on anti-immigrant sentiments and drew on colonial stereotypes that portrayed Arabs as untrustworthy vagrants who sought to live on handouts, who would fuel crime, and who would undermine France’s sacred national identity.

In Germany, the state did not create an integration policy, as it was widely believed that, after the expiration of their labor contracts, guest-workers would return to their place of origin. Even as the total foreign population grew to nine percent in the 1990s, successive Christian Democratic Union (CDU)-led governments continued to proclaim that Germany was “not a country of immigration.” Hence, rather than making an effort to assimilate Muslim guest-workers, the laissez-faire policy of Multikulti allowed immigrants to retain their cultural identity while living alongside German citizens. In the 2000s, however, it became apparent that Germany had indeed become a country of immigrants and thus needed to create a new idea of citizenship to accommodate its new population. This policy, known as Leitkultur, shifted the idea of citizenship away from the traditional ethno-cultural sense of nationhood to a more multicultural and integrationist model. The implementation of Leitkultur explains why Germany has, in some instances, allowed for greater leeway

The hijab was decried as a rejection of French values and a refusal to assimilate to French society.

In contrast to France, Germany has not been burdened by the same colonial legacy. Instead, Germany has maintained a working relationship with its Muslim population through foreign labor contracts. In the 1950s and 1960s, Germany implemented a guest-worker (Gastarbeiter) model, in which foreigners were given incentives to immigrate due to the high demand for cheap, industrial labor fueled by postwar reconstruction efforts. Although anti-immigration sentiments flared up when recession hit in 1973, there was no particular fixation on Muslim women’s attire at the time. Furthermore, the traumatic memory of the Holocaust has produced an aversion towards alienating groups on the basis of race or religion.

With the increase of immigrants in France and guest-workers in Germany after the Second World War, both societies felt a pressing need to accommodate foreign populations that were perceived to hold values incompatible with European culture.

France dealt with this issue by developing a policy of assimilationism, which promoted the construction of a common, national culture as opposed to a more pluralistic society.

One’s original language or culture, including religious beliefs, were to be

22 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW in expressing cultural distinctiveness.

While the differences between strict and lenient citizenship models can explain the degree to which the hijab is accepted in different societies, they only tell part of the story. In modern French discourse, the Muslim veil is often cited as the antithesis of core national values.

This argument is particularly interesting because “core values,” such as “freedom” or “equality,” are not monolithic, static terms and are not nearly as easy to define as they may seem. In order to unpack the core values referenced in modern French discourse, we must turn to France’s founding principle of republicanism.

When the French state proclaims that its core national values are a, b, and c and its citizens are characterized by x, y, and z, the state is declaring itself the final arbiter for deciding fundamental French values.

In France, this particular relationship between the individual, state, and society strongly shapes public discourse and policy decisions, via a mechanism called republicanism. In the Republican way of thinking, living together—vivre ensemble—promotes shared civic values and rejects public expressions of certain identities. As a result, belonging to the nation and functioning in the public sphere requires that distinct cultures and ideas be restricted to the private realm. As a result, when the headscarf, an emblem of Islamic identity, dares to intrude into the public space, its wearer is seen as rejecting the French belief in “living together.” The French state thus plays a positive and active role in “correcting” the hijabi’s failure to assimilate into French society.

This tradition of the centrally designed, state-society-religion nexus has roots in France’s strict separation

of the church and the state, institutionalized by a 1905 law after a centuries-long conflict between the state and the Catholic church. Part of this anticlerical legacy is France’s core value of laïcité. Notoriously difficult to define, laïcité is often conflated with secularism. However, it is crucial to understand the difference between these two principles, as the former emerges regularly in the headscarf debate. According to French political scientist Olivier Roy, secularism is a social phenomenon whereby society emancipates itself from a sense of the sacred, even if the society does not explicitly deny the sacred. For instance, a state may be secular but not laïque, as in the case of the United Kingdom, because it has an official religion; it may even be laïque, in the form of strict separation of church and state, while still recognizing the role of religion in the public sphere, as in the United States. Laïcité, on the other hand, is anti-clerical: it is an explicit decree by the state which actively rejects religion and makes the public space a decidedly neutral arena.

Like France, Germany’s justification for its anti-hijab stance has been rooted in secularism. However, unlike France’s strict principle of laïcité, Germany’s secularism should be defined more as open neutrality.

The essence of open neutrality lies in the state’s concern for assuring that individuals have the freedom to practice religion in both the private and public spheres. The roots of open neutrality may be traced to Germany’s never having experienced the same level of anticlerical conflict and strict separation of church and state as emerged in France. Moreover, after the Holocaust, Jewish traditions were integrated into German culture, requiring the state to accom-

modate different religions. Hence, open neutrality is grounded in the idea that the state should not be “identifying with any one religion” but guaranteeing that “all religions in society are treated by the state in an even-handed and impartial way.”

Here, Germany differs significantly from France in that it guarantees the freedom to practice religion in both the private and public spheres, whereas France guarantees the freedom from religion in public spheres.

Ultimately, what might seem to be an innocuous piece of cloth has become a hyperbolized threat to the stability and foundational values of the nation-state. National ideologies are culturally distinct narratives that demarcate who belongs in society and who does not, and each culture holds certain values in higher esteem than others. The future of European hijabis hangs by a thread amongst acrimonious debate, as both Marine Le-Pen and Angela Merkel promise to banish the hijab. The policies that emerge from this discourse will surely play an integral role in the future of the ever-evolving idea of citizenship in an increasingly globalized world.

Mi Yeon Kim is a junior in the dual program between SciencesPo Paris and Columbia University. She is majoring in Political Science with a minor in East Asian studies, and is a board member of the Pre-Law society. She also enjoys traveling, cooking and practicing martial arts. She can be contacted at mk3689@columbia.edu

Find more coverage of French and German politics online, at our new website, cpreview.org.

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 23 of life for migrants: the current reality in Sweden is that of a large, struggling refugee population and a country overwhelmed and divided by its attempt to help. But these problems are not insurmountable. If Sweden is willing to learn from the cultural and economic battles fought by the migrants who have spent decades within Every day, thousands of migrants its borders, it can make meaningful from nations such as Syria, Yemen, strides towards harmony and serve Iraq, and Afghanistan move through as an example to the rest of Europe.

Europe in an attempt to find a better life for themselves and their famiSweden’s Immigration History lies. Many nations have thus far refused to take in even a fraction of the To understand the evolving stomasses currently making their way ry of Iraqi and Iranian refugees in through the European mainland, Sweden, it is vital that one first unciting concerns of crime, national derstand the history of refugee popusecurity, cultural division, and the lations in the country more generalenormous cost of such an undertak- ly. Sweden maintained an open-door ing. In spite of these worries, Swe- policy towards refugees for decades, den, a country of around 10 million but the overwhelming number of people, has accepted over 400,000 people seeking aid in recent years applications for asylum since 2010. has led the country to tighten its Sweden now has the second largest borders. In 2015 alone, Sweden renumber of refugees per capita of any ceived over 160,000 applications for nation, and immigrants make up asylum. Once granted entry, refugees nearly 15 percent of the population; are given all the benefits that citizens approximately 65 percent of these receive, even if their application for immigrants are born outside the EU. asylum is still being processed. BenThough the current levels of efits include government-subsidized immigration are unprecedented healthcare, dental care, and educain Sweden’s history, the country is tion through the end of high school. no stranger to refugees. In the late Once they arrive, refugees are 1970s and early 1980s, Sweden took responsible for finding their own in many refugees from both Iran housing. For those who are unable and Iraq who were fleeing conflict in to do so, the state has traditionalthat region. Since then, immigration ly helped in the search for a home. from both countries has continued, In 2015, however, the government and both groups have developed a announced that it had no further complicated relationship with their housing available for refugees. This new home. Though Sweden’s govern- resulted in longer waits for those ment assistance policies and accep- migrants living in camps and repurtance of refugees have been touted as posed buildings, like gymnasiums. nearly utopian by left-leaning think- In the mid-1980s, Swedish policy on ers across the globe, such a portrayal refugee housing had been the assigndoes not present a complete picture ment of refugees to housing across

IRANIANS AND IRAQIS IN SWEDEN Sebastian Gerschman In 2015, a reporter from the Guardian accompanied Hashem Alsouki, a Syrian refugee, on his journey to find a new home for his family in Europe. On a train from Paris, Alsouki, who had no documents and little money, picked up a copy of Charlie Hebdo to blend in.

The cover featured a cartoon of Kate Winslet in a boat full of refugees, the title reading, “A Titanic every week.”

Though he did not understand the cover, Alsouki smiled, recognizing that it was “about refugees like him.”

Less than two weeks earlier, Alsouki had been one of hundreds of individuals on a boat smuggling refugees from Egypt to Italy. He had tried to make the same voyage with his family eight months earlier, but they were detained before reaching the beach.

The boat that they had missed sank, killing all 500 passengers on board.

Alsouki would later make the voyage to Italy without his family, eventually traversing thousands of miles of railroad, police checkpoints, and foreign soil in order to make it to what he hoped would be his new home: Sweden. In that year alone, he would become one of over 160,000 people to seek asylum in the country.

The refugee crisis in Europe has become one of the most widely discussed and contentious issues in contemporary international affairs.

24 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW the country, in order to ensure reasonable living conditions, help migrants find work, avoid the creation of ghettos, and aid integration. This policy was later abandoned, though, when critics argued that not allowing migrants to choose where they would live was inhumane. Many refugees also simply moved towards areas where their countrymen were located, regardless of their assignment.

Migrants are also entitled to language and culture courses provided by the state if they are registered by the Swedish Migration Board, but the Swedish government has recently been unable to provide these resources to everyone who needs them, as is also true with much-needed employment assistance. The absence of these resources has proven to be a major obstacle to integration and has contributed to the disillusionment of many migrants who feel that the state does not care about their needs.

Iraqis and Iranians in Sweden The first major wave of Iranian refugees to Sweden was a result of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. After taking power, the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini quickly initiated a sustained effort to remove any opposition against the new Islamic Republic. Many citizens who had once held positions of economic comfort and political influence began to fear for their safety and decided to seek refuge in Sweden, particularly because of its open-door policies.

After the situation in the Islamic Republic cooled and the new regime solidified its position, emigration remained minimal until the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War in late 1980. Young Iranian males who sought to avoid compulsory military

service during the war already knew of Sweden’s reputation as a haven for those fleeing the state, and many had family in the country already.

Like the one preceding it, this second wave of Iranian migrants was primarily composed of young, educated males whose bright futures had been upended by political upheaval. Immigration to Sweden ebbed again for several years but increased exponentially after 1984, when the number of migrants began to exceed 500 people annually. Between 1985 and 1990, the number of Iranian citizens in Sweden swelled from about 7,300 people to over 30,000.

Though migration rates have once again fallen, the fact of a firmly established Iranian community within Sweden has contributed to a steady flow of migrants since the 1990s.

Iraqi migration to Sweden, by contrast, first began with the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 and continued through the war’s entirety. Later, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the American-led response in the Gulf War caused a second wave of emigration. As a result of these conflicts, the number of Iraqis living in Sweden grew from 500 in 1980 to over 20,000 by 1994. The 2003 American invasion of Iraq, coupled with the rise of the Islamic State and the existence of established Iraqi communities in Sweden, has caused thousands to flee to the small country in recent years. In 2009, half of all Iraqi refugees in Europe came to Sweden.

Though their cultural presence in Sweden spans decades, both groups have faced economic and cultural challenges. These challenges are becoming more acute as Swedes— weary of increases in crime and believing that the many thousands of foreign refugees are incapable of

adapting to their way of life—reconsider their open-armed welcome of immigrants to the country. These circumstances have left many Iranian and Iraqi immigrants isolated, angry, and economically restricted.

Economic Marginalization One major barrier to integration is the challenge migrants face when seeking work. In the early years of Iraqi and Iranian immigration to Sweden, waves of newcomers from both countries consisted largely of young, highly-educated men. These doctors, engineers, academics, and businessmen entered Sweden confident that they would have promising careers in their new home. Unfortunately for both groups, this was not the case. In many instances, due to cultural and linguistic barriers, these individuals were forced to take jobs for which they were grossly overqualified.

Nowadays, Iraqi immigrants to Sweden are generally less educated than their Iranian counterparts and face higher unemployment as a result.

And even highly-educated Iraqis have been relegated to low-wage jobs or unemployment. One study by Hofstra University’s Sarah Skiold-Hanlin on the Iraqi population in Sweden offers an interesting anecdote: Sait, an Iraqi man who held a PhD in civil engineering was told that he had been passed over for a position because his insufficient knowledge of the Swedish language rendered him incapable of communicating with coworkers and carrying out the job’s functions.

Unemployment is high even among migrants who are educated locally. Many immigrants in Sweden experience discrimination and poverty, as employers are often more concerned with their national origin

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 25 than their level of education. Another Iraqi man featured in the Hofstra study came to Sweden and earned a Master of Science degree in cognitive science from Lund University, one of the two most selective universities in Sweden, without the aid of a translator. In spite of his success and his mastery of the Swedish language, he remained unable to find any work for which he was not clearly overqualified.

This same phenomenon of underemployment has proven especially frustrating to Iranian migrants, who have historically viewed education as the primary means to personal improvement and in whose culture one’s career is heavily tied to his social standing. As one Iranian man said: “I am educated in this country. Yet, after several years, I am still unemployed. I have no role in this society and I feel absurd. In Iran at least I can teach high school. After eleven years of being in Sweden, I have nothing left to lose if I leave this country.”

Cultural Division and Diaspora Both groups’ struggles within Sweden are as driven by cultural strife as they are by poverty. In each population’s case, a diaspora consciousness has formed as the result of physical, economic, and cultural isolation from the Swedish people and an enduring belief among many immigrants that they do not belong.

Dr. William Safran of Columbia University has put forth a comprehensive list of criteria for groups in a state of diaspora. It includes a state of physical isolation, as well as more intangible characteristics, like longing for a homeland and a feeling of separation from one’s host culture. Safran further asserts that diasporic communities often feel as though they

can never truly be a part of their host culture and in many cases remain committed to the idea of their people returning home someday. As the decades have passed and both the Iraqi and Iranian communities have grown in Sweden, so too has the diaspora consciousness within each.

In keeping with this phenomenon, a defining aspect of the Iranian experience in Sweden has been the political, racial, and cultural divides that have existed within Swedish society since their arrival. Many of those in the first wave of Iranian migrants carried with them the weight of their exile even in the new country.

Both Swedes and Iranians were affected by lingering opposition to the Islamic Republic: to accept Sweden as a permanent home was to accept the permanence of the Ayatollah and his new regime. When visitation to Iran was later permitted, Iranians in Sweden also viewed visiting as a form of concession. Many feared that they would face punishment or be forced to stay should they return. This left thousands of individuals unwilling to either return to their country of origin or to recognize the Swedish state as a source of authority in their lives.

Though the majority of Iranians began integrating in Sweden immediately, some sought to preserve their culture through political activism and social isolation. Perhaps the most extreme example of this was the Mujahedin-e Khaleqh-e Iran, an organization whose members lived collectively and concerned themselves only with the reestablishment of what they considered legitimate rule in Iran. The group proclaimed publicly that attempting to integrate into Swedish society was a “distraction” from this goal. Most Iranians eventually accepted that their stay in Swe-

den would not be a short one, but many still maintained the idea that they would someday return to Iran.

Another unique aspect of Iranian diaspora consciousness is the fact that, for many refugees, the consciousness began to development even before they fled Iran. The Shah’s attempt to modernize the country led urban, upper- and middle-class members of society to adopt secular views that were at odds with an increasingly religious and conservative Iran. As one Iranian businessman recalls: “My exile did not begin when I crossed the border into Pakistan on foot on a cool night in March 1987, but long before that night. My exile had begun in my own country when I did not recognize Iran under Islamic rules.” Because the home country became “unrecognizable” after the revolution, the Swedish-Iranian homeland mythos had to be modified to represent a land that no longer existed.

One study found that without a homeland to which to return, the Iranian homeland mythos combined several different places into one vision, a vision that “encompasses all of [the places] but is not reducible to anyone of them.” The homeland mythos of the pre-revolutionary Iran became a combination of countries and cultures, with Sweden serving as inspiration for the center of education and the Iranian-dense segments of Los Angeles serving as a model for the cultural center and land of economic opportunity.

Today, Iranians maintain a political, cultural, and economic middle ground within Swedish society.

Though levels of unemployment among Iranians remain higher than that of native Swedes, their unemployment rates are some of the low-

26 // SPRING 2017 // COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW est among all immigrant groups from predominantly Muslim nations. While Iranians are also more likely to have relatively few Swedish friends and to live in areas with a larger-than-average Iranian population, they are much less isolated than other migrant groups in Swedish society and are now more likely to view Sweden as a permanent home than they were in the past.

Liberal laws toward women’s rights have also influenced the Iranian experience in the country, as over onethird of marriages ended in divorce in 2012 and many studies cited greater decision-making amongst women as a determining factor. Ultimately, most metrics show a positive trend in quality of life for Iranians living in Sweden, with many families moving from a dependence on welfare to receiving higher education and financial independence within a generation. Many have pointed to the combination of a strong cultural emphasis on education and subsidized universities as key to their upward mobility.

Though both groups share a historic struggle over the issue of race, the diaspora consciousness of the Iraqi population has been fueled less by political strife and more by poverty and the psychological wounds caused by direct exposure to conflict and flight to an unfamiliar place. The issue of poverty has become inseparable from the way Iraqis are perceived in the country and has fed their rejection of Sweden as a host culture.

Despite the huge gap between their average level of education and that required for the jobs available, Iranians had still been able to take advantage of the need for lowskilled jobs upon arrival in Swe-

den. As a result, Iranians and other groups who arrived during the early 1980s were able to integrate and establish themselves relatively quickly. By contrast, Iraqis who came to Sweden often did so during times of comparatively weaker economic activity. In the 1990s, for example, the housing bubble burst, plunging Sweden into its worst recession since the 1930s. Unemployment, coupled with the arrival of over 100,000 refugees from former Yugoslavia, created a huge strain on government resources and taxpayers. These circumstances adversely affected Iraqis who had fled the First Gulf War, making it much more difficult for them to establish themselves economically, just as the group as a whole was seeking to do so.

Factors such as these have contributed to the differing directions of experience for Iraqis and Iranians in the country. Even today, the individual historic context of each group has caused them to occupy different spaces in Swedish society and the Swedish psyche. While each culture has long been associated with certain stereotypes, such as the poor treatment of women and strong religious conservatism, Iranians are also associated with more “positive” stereotypes, likely due to their presence in medicine and education in the country. Some Swedes also believe that the ethnic and religious minorities within the Iranian population are more “grateful” for available work, whereas Iraqis are perceived as being simply unwilling to join the workforce.

Stereotypes such as these feed the latter group’s feelings of rejection and the perception of integration as futile. While most Iranians report an optimism for the future and a

relatively high feeling of belonging, Iraqis and other migrant groups are less likely to share this outlook.

The Iraqi situation in Sweden is further complicated by the group’s physical separation from Swedish society. Though Iranians are statistically somewhat isolated, they are generally not as cut off from society as other many other groups, including Iraqis. One study found extreme isolation of Iraqi migrants to be very common, especially in the southern region of Skåne. Many apartments inhabited by these individuals are overcrowded, with as many as 15 people living in units designed for five or six, a result of migrants electing to live with family or simply with those from a familiar culture. Irene Molina, professor of cultural geography at Sweden’s Uppsala University claims that, “Sweden has the most ethnically segregated cities of all the groups of countries in the OECD.” Investigation into the impoverished and immigrant-dense neighborhood of Rosengård found that many immigrants could go years without encountering a native Swede. Many also felt a strong sense of resentment towards the Swedish public and government, which they believed were unwilling to help them and discriminated against migrants trying to find work. In 2009, a young boy interviewed in Rosengård expressed his hatred for the Swedish government and people, a hatred caused by his father’s inability to find a job and his belief that Swedes are only willing to help themselves. Stories such as these show how a combination of isolation, lack of opportunity, and inability to access overburdened integration programs has led many to believe there is no point in learning

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2017 // 27 the Swedish language or familiarizing themselves with the nation’s culture.

The same study mentioned above also found numerous cases of psychological trauma by observing the interactions between parents and children in Rosengård. Symptoms of post-traumatic stress and behavioral issues among children were some of the most common points of conversation in interviews with community members, with many attesting to signs of serious and debilitating afflictions. Without a safe homeland to which to return or a sense of belonging in Sweden, the Iraqi diaspora here continues to evolve and will likely be influenced by political and military developments in Iraq as much as by efforts by the Swedish government.

Looking Forward Though they share a common historical point of entry into Swedish culture, Iraqi and Iranian migrants experience diaspora and marginalization in similar and different ways. Sweden today faces an immense challenge and must ask some hard questions about its own culture and its capability as a nation to tackle this crisis. No matter how noble its intentions, it has become clear that the country is unable to support the masses arriving every day. It is possible, however, to learn from the experience of immigrants already in the country in order to improve the lives of incoming migrants and lessen the burden on the state.

Migrants from both groups have continued to become important and productive members of Swedish society. Sweden must make a sustained effort to match hard-working and educated migrant workers with jobs and to help prevent discrimination

by potential employers. The Iranian experience in Sweden has proven that the majority of migrants are not helpless or unable to contribute to the Swedish system, so long as they are given the tools to do so and supported in the belief that their education will be worth something in the future. The country can help alleviate the massive tax burden on municipalities by empowering migrant communities to achieve financial independence and a sense of belonging in Swedish society.

The Iraqi presence in Sweden has also demonstrated the importance of aggressive, sustained efforts to expose migrants to Swedish culture as much as possible. The presence of ghettos that completely isolate migrants from Swedish language, culture, and institutions is unsustainable and will only exacerbate poverty and dependence on the state. Sweden must do what it can to disperse incoming migrants and those in existing ghettos and perhaps even revisit its decision to repeal laws which dispersed migrants upon entry. It should focus as much as possible on using labor incentives to encourage movement to Sweden’s more rural areas, as opposed to relying entirely on assigned placement. Though concerns about the morality of Sweden’s dispersal system were not without merit, they must be weighed against the fact that the absence of such policies has contributed to greater isolation and dangerous living conditions amongst vulnerable groups like children. To be effective, such programs must work in tandem with efforts to match migrants to areas with suitable jobs.

Sweden has already implemented programs that disperse refugee children across different schools in order to ease the integration process.

If the government lacks the resources to provide language and culture courses to migrants, it should build on this policy and maximize immigrant exposure to Swedish culture wherever possible. This, coupled with targeted outreach efforts to isolated neighborhoods, could make a significant difference in the efforts of hundreds of families hoping to become a part of Swedish society in one generation instead of in many.

It is tempting to paint the issue of immigration with a broad brush, but such an approach fails to ground itself in the diverse array of people entering the country.

For Swedes themselves, the narrative of immigration has shifted from one of pity and acceptance to one of successful defense of native culture and traditions at all costs.

Whichever side one takes on this issue, it has become painfully clear that treating the hundreds of thousands of unfamiliar faces as a single “other” and isolating them from society has failed to deliver progress in any group’s preferred direction. By examining the many different stories of arrival present in Swedish culture, it becomes clear that, for both natives and migrants, progress will hinge less on Sweden’s ability to find new definitions of success and more on the country’s ability to recognize its failures.

Sebastian Gerschman is a junior at the School of General Studies pursuing his undergraduate degree in political science. He is interested in international relations and security issues, particularly those relating to Europe, the Middle East, and the intersection of those regions. He can be contacted via email at sebastian.gerschman@ columbia.edu.

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