Spring 2014

CPR

vol. xiv no. 1

columbia political review

License to Spill

Why Keystone XL Threatens Our Future

PLUS INSIDE: Columbia Students Debate Boycotting Israel (p 18) Maren Killackey Looks at Terminator Seeds in Brazil (p 22)

read more at cpreview.org

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cpr Volume XIV, no. 1

masthead: Editor-in-Chief Publisher Managing Editors

Web Editor Senior Editors

Associate Web Editor

Arts Editor Copy Chief

Greg Barber Omeed Maghzian Joshua Fattal Tommaso Verderame Stewart Shoemaker Asha Banerjee David Blackman Jamie Boothe Daniel Brovman Julian NoiseCat Brina Seidel Sophie Wilkowske Jason Zhu Zubair Akrama Anais Carell Andre Paiva Anushua Bhattacharya Sofi Sinozich

Assistant Copy Editors

Zubair Akrama Angela Chen Michael Greenberg Yeye Kysar

Design Editors

David Blackman Alejandra Oliva

Artists: Anushua Bhattacharya (page 10)

Editor’s Note

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rma virumque cano Troiae qui primus ab oris, Italiam, fato profugus, Laviniaque venit litora, multum ille et terris iactatus et alto, vi superum saevae memorem Iunonis ob iram; multa quoque et bello passus, dum conderet urbem, interferretque deos Latio, genus unde Latinum, Albianique patres, atque altae moenia Romae, Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine laeso, quidve dolens, regina deum tot volvere casus, insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores, impulerit. Tantaene animis caelestibus irae?

Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuere coloni, Karthago, Italiam contra Tiberinaque longe, ostia, dives opum studiisque asperrima bellum; quam Juno fertur terris magis omnibus unam, posthabita coluisse Samo; hic illius arma, hic currus fuit; hoc regnum dea gentibus esse, si qua fata sinant, iam tum tenditque fovetque. Progeniem sed enim Troiano a sanguine duci audierat, Tyrias olim quae verteret arces; hinc populum late regem belloque superbum venturum excidio Libyae: sic volvere Parcas. Id metuens, veterisque memor Saturnia belli, prima quod ad Troiam pro caris gesserat Argis— necdum etiam causae irarum saevique dolores exciderant animo: manet alta mente repostum iudicium Paridis spretaeque iniuria formae, et genus invisum, et rapti Ganymedis honores.

His accensa super, iactatos aequore toto Troas, reliquias Danaum atque immitis Achilli, arcebat longe Latio, multosque per annos errabant, acti fatis, maria omnia circum. errabant, acti fatis, maria omnia circum. Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem!

Vix e conspectu Siculae telluris in altum vela dabant laeti, et spumas salis aere ruebant, cum Iuno, aeternum servans sub pectore volnus, haec secum: ‘Mene incepto desistere victam, nec posse Italia Teucrorum avertere regem? Quippe vetor fatis. Pallasne exurere classem Argivom atque ipsos potuit submergere ponto, unius ob noxam et furias Aiacis Oilei? Ipsa, Iovis rapidum iaculata e nubibus ignem, disiecitque rates evertitque aequora ventis, illum expirantem transfixo pectore flammas turbine corripuit scopuloque infixit acuto. Ast ego, quae divom incedo regina, Iovisqueet soror et coniunx, una cum gente tot annos bella gero! Et quisquam numen Iunonis adoret praeterea, aut supplex aris imponet honorem?’

Julie Chen (pages 13, 14, 25, 27) Gemma Gene (pages 28, 29) Claire Huang (cover, pages 5, 6, 9) Josiana Lacrete (pages 23, 24) Cibel Quinteros (pages 16, 17)

Greg Barber Editor-in-Chief Channeling Vergil

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this magazine belong to their authors and do not necessarily

reflect those of the Columbia Political Review, Columbia Political Union, or Columbia University.

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A publication of the Columbia Political Union

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SPRING.2014 table of contents Features 4

A Fresh Order of Domino Theory

Russian Foreign Policy Re-examined

By Frank Pellegrino

Cover Story 8 License to Spill

Why Keystone XL

Threatens Our Future

By Elana Sulakshana

12 The War of Alawite Agression?

Rethinking Religion’s Role

in the Syrian Civil War

By Bradley Williams 15 Paki-standing Alone Are Sino-Pakistan Relations Cooling?

By Zan Gilani 22

Need for Seed Are Terminator Seeds in Brazil a Threat?

By Maren Killackey 25

Naval-Gazing Examining the Buildup of Southeast Asian Militaries

By Greg Graff 28

By The Numbers: 70,000: Number of people who have

pledged to engage in civil disobedience if the keystone xl pipeline is approved

12%: Portion of syrian population that is ethnically alawite

$0.00:

Amount of monsanto’s $800m worth of annual seed sales that is made up of terminator seeds

$12,000,000,000: The threshold sino-pakistani bilateral trade crossed

Diamonds Aren’t Forever last year for the first time De Beers’ Uncertain Future in Botswana

By Ankeet Ball

Student Stump 18 Columbia Students Discuss Boycotting Israel

Feride Eralp, Daniella Greenbaum

Isabel Peñaranda, Julia Salazar

80%:

Portion of global diamond sales controlled by De Beers in the 1990s

$134,000,000,000: fense budget this year

Chinese

de-

60,000:

Number of russians attending a moscow rally to support crimea’s split from the ukraine 3

columbia political review :: spring 2014

features

A Fresh Order of Domino Theory Russian Foreign Policy Re-examined

By Frank Pellegrino One for All and All for Russia

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s a US foreign policy, domino theory argued that the fall of a nation to communism would trigger and fuel the spread of communism to neighboring nations. The Soviet Empire wished death upon American principles, liberties, and ideals, with a communist backbone rivaling that of Hitler’s fascism. If left unchecked, the Soviet Union could spread across the globe—a string of “falling dominos”— until it isolated its final opposition and unleashed its nuclear might upon them.

Ultimately, this result would politically and ideologically isolate the United States. Domino theory became used as an illustrative tool of US foreign policy and helped to justify US intervention in Korea and Vietnam through a policy of containment. In the West, the premise of domino theory was never proven and its consequences were never felt.

However, I argue that the premise and consequences of domino theory were in fact realized, not in the West, but in the East.

This article aims to better analyze the symmetrical affects of domino theory as they correspond to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, its foreign policy objectives, and national security strategy.

This article also aims to address the historical significance and consequences of policy misinterpretations within Western-Russian relations. Recent events have amplified international focus on Russian influence in the “near abroad”—the group of non-Russian states formed out of the former Soviet Union. However, overly critical analyses of Russia, in the name of domestic or global security, will almost always generate exaggerated, heavy-handed results. To remain unbiased and objective, this analysis will rely on historical events, patterns, and trends.

Domino Theory – Obsolete or Obscured?

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To take a page from Adam Przeworski’s Democracy and the Market, “Henry Kissinger’s domino theory triumphed; all he missed was the direction in which the dominoes would fall.”

While factual, Przeworski’s observation is significantly understated. The direction that the dominos fall only reverses national security concerns from one party to the other. Domino theory was not annulled because communism failed: It was deemed obsolete because the West had overcome the fear of communism. In other words, if

“After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the same concerns of international isolation that had plagued the United States since the 1950s.” the United States found political and ideological isolation to be a dire concern, why should Russia not hold the same fears? Is the threat of international isolation only a viable concern for Western powers? Is domino theory still viable despite not being part of the Western foreign policy discourse for some time now? The inherent symmetrical applications of domino theory are largely unconsidered in modern day relations between the West and Russia.

In preparing to analyze the symmetrical effects of domino theory, it is important to distinguish several control elements. First, the simplicity of the theory holds three main outcomes: 1. Containment—Halting the falling process, 2. Success/Completion—All dominos down (global unification) 3. Reversal—The falling process is inverted.

Success and reversal outcomes will

always yield two results: global unification in one direction and global isolation in the other direction. The containment outcome yields a stalemate.

Second, I also incorporate the final value of “duration” and “pace” of the “falling process.” Duration and pace focus on the length of time and speed at which nations align themselves with other nations. This value will help contextualize the actions and reactions of Soviet and post-Soviet Russia over time. Once overlaid with historical events and conflicts, these control elements of domino theory symmetry will depict a contemporary Russian foreign policy almost identical to US policies of Cold War containment.

The Vietnam False Positive and Afghanistan False Negative In the 1960s, the communist uprising in Vietnam prompted US-led military intervention, and shortly after, Soviet weaponry and financial aid was provided to the North Vietnamese communist regime. Subsequently, the 1980s saw a stark role reversal, as the Soviet military began combating a threat to communist rule in Afghanistan. The communist opposition in Afghanistan was then met with US weaponry and financial aid. When looked through the domino theory prism, these events can be seen as paradigmatic episodes of “containment.”

The United States viewed Vietnam as another threat enabling the spread of communism. Equivalently, the Soviet Union viewed the Afghan rebellion as a threat to communist integrity in the region. Both attempts to contain the uprisings failed and both resulted in regime change within Vietnam and Afghanistan.

However, long-term results of the Vietnam War did not substantiate the proposed consequences of domino theory. Even though the United States did not succeed in Vietnam, communist expansion did not spread exponentially.

columbia political review :: spring 2014 Conversely, within three years of Russian defeat in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Communism began to crumble throughout the Eastern Bloc, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was already picking up the pieces.

Russian defeat in Afghanistan was not, necessarily, the sole cause for Soviet dissolution; however, it was a manifestation of domino theory that influenced Russian containment policy. Often referred to as “The Soviet Union’s Vietnam,” the Soviet failure in Afghanistan amounted to far more than just a military and ideological loss. It lends great credibility (especially in the Russian perspective) to the realism of domino theory. Thus, the West escaped the Cold War relatively unscathed by the isolating consequences of domino theory. No lessons were learned and no repercussions were felt. As it was no longer a relevant (or authenticated) foreign policy, domino theory disapeared from the Western policy dialogue. However, unbeknownst to the West, domino theory endured.

I consider the Soviet-Afghan war to be the initial transition of domino theory, from a US foreign policy to a Russian one. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited the same concerns of international isolation that had plagued the United States since the 1950s. If Russia was to retain its superpower status, it could not afford to be isolated. Domino theory had now become more applicable to Russia than it ever had been to the United States. To restore its former grandeur, Russian foreign policy needed to regain its regional relevance and international clout. However, Russian attempts to do so have only reinforced a Russian domino theory mindset via its misinterpretations of Western initiatives.

Generally, Western misinterpretations of Russian foreign policy view Putin’s Russia as attempting to “re-Sovietize” Central Asia. Russia’s coercive tactics in Ukraine, Moldova, and other neighboring countries continue to suggest a Russian lust for power. However, when domino theory symmetry is applied, Russian foreign policy is a

modified strategy of containment. Its actions towards re-Sovietization are actually reactions against Western encroachment. Its decisions and actions are highly reflective of and dependent on Western initiatives. That being said, domino theory symmetry could prove to be an efficient tool in predicting Rus-

sian foreign policy. Its future use could also help to reduce Western-Russian tensions in the near abroad.

“Expansionism” or “aggression” must not be conflated with “sustainment.” The 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary exemplifies this point. Tasked with ousting a rising revolution, the Soviet military committed numerous atrocities against the Hungarian population. Western communities largely condemned this act as Soviet expansionism, analogous with that of Nazi Germany. Conversely, Russian aggression “was aggression to maintain a position previously achieved and in an area that the Kremlin considers its

features most important core of interest.” If the Soviet invasion of Hungary is to be labeled as aggression or expansionism, then Western involvement in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Afghan Wars must also be labeled as such. Furthermore, whereas the Warsaw Pact substantiated a Soviet response, the West had no such concrete legal justification for its interventions.

To be clear, I am not defending the atrocities that occurred in Hungary. I am identifying factors contributing to a Russian foreign policy, guided by historically justified paranoia of the West and by past lessons learned. Whether through extending EU/NATO membership or providing financial/military aid to Central Asia, good-natured intent by the West has sustained domino theory concerns in Russia for decades.

These misinterpretations of intent are found in both the West and Russia and further complicate international cooperation.

Western-Russian relations have long been plagued with critical misinterpretations of each other’s policies. The most general of these misinterpretations is the ill-defined “intent” of Western or Russian actions. Highlighted in the above case of Hungary, American perception of Russian ‘intent’ was concentrated on Soviet expansionism. Conversely, actual Russian ‘intent’ was more focused on preservation of the Warsaw Pact. Such misinterpretations of international intent continue to confuse Western-Russian relations and increase paranoia. Like the past Western misinterpretation of Soviet “expansionism” in Hungry, there are present-day Russian misinterpretations of Western “expansionism” in the Eastern Bloc. To identify the significance of these misinterpretations, I use the aforementioned “control element of duration.”

I find that Western-Russian relations degrade in tandem with an increase in Western interventions abroad.

Russian Foreign Policy – Western Oversight or Eastern Overthrow?

A synopsis of Western-Russian re-

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features lations over the past decade depicts a steady turn from Western-Russian international consensus and cooperation to increasing Russian isolation and containment of Western influence. Beginning with the Bosnian War in 199295 and notwithstanding a few minor glitches in diplomacy, a relatively weak Russia in transition was able to sustain its international significance. The Bosnian War arguably saw Western-Russian consensus at its highest since the Second World War. However, six years later, the Kosovo War would sour relations. To put it simply, “When NATO began its 1999 air campaign in Kosovo without UN Security Council approval, Russians perceived this as part of NATO’s drive for unilateral security in Europe.” NATO’s circumvention of Security Council and Russian approval before beginning its campaign in Kosovo had detrimental consequences.

Kosovo was the last straw since it united many of the most feared military and political threat. NATO intervention completely revamped Russian paranoia of the West. Russian Defense Ministry spokesmen even admitted that the

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columbia political review :: spring 2014 Kosovo War directly led to revisions of Russian national security and defense strategy.

Once again, the intent of NATO to end conflict in Kosovo was severely misinterpreted by Russia. Where NATO saw the promotion of peace, Russia saw promotion of Western influence and expansionism. Russia found itself cornered in an unstable region. It was surrounded by a slew of nations who were eager for democracy and prosperity but were too weak to transition on their own. With economic and political instability bubbling, the main question in the Kremlin was (and likely still is), why is NATO still a functioning body and what do they seek to accomplish?

NATO – To Be or Not To Be? When the Soviet Union fell, so did the raison d’etre of NATO. Founded largely in response to concerns of Soviet expansionism, NATO’s continued existence and involvement abroad drives Russian consternation. Political and economic ideology aside, what differentiates NATO from the former

USSR? As NYU law professor Stephen Holmes explains, “Important schools, at least, within Soviet studies, were purveyors or victims of the same fallacy that afflicts much contemporary social science: They confused analogy with causality. Their thesis was, put crudely, that the world is the way it is because it reminds us of the way it used to be.”

Just as past American interpretations viewed the Soviet Union as another Third Reich, present-day Russian misinterpretation of Western expansionism is widely viewed as Cold War resurgence. Putin sees no route other than bellicosity to preserve the international relevance and regional significance of Russia. If Central Asian states will not side with him willingly, he must coerce them.

As mentioned above, during the Cold War, US foreign policy generally assessed Russian intent to be expansionism, which held severe national security consequences. Therefore, the cause of NATO’s formation was to militarily protect and unite Western society. In the present day, Russian foreign policy has assessed Western intent to

columbia political review :: spring 2014 be expansionism into the Eastern Bloc, with the intent of isolating Russia. If we consider Western-Russian military capabilities as a stalemate, then removing any regional influence of Russia is a castration of Russia’s legitimacy as a superpower. This loss of its superpower status underpins the final consequence of domino theory: isolation.

Russia simply cannot afford any more dominos to fall. The causality behind this Russian perception is the Russian understanding that their economic, political, and sovereign status rest in their “national interests.” These “national interests,” as defined by “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020,” extend into former Soviet Republics and other areas with Russian citizenry. So far, the degree to which Russia has pursued these national interests has been highly reflective of Western involvement in the region. In response, Russia has shown many attempts, via soft power, to contain Western influence.

However, Russia is also attempting to curtail Western influence in key dominos like Ukraine and Moldova. With a Russian military presence in both countries, Putin has shown hard power determination in disallowing their Western unification.

Cold War Defrost While NATO and EU membership expansion has temporarily subsided, the paranoia of the Kremlin has not.

Moscow remains locked in an unending bidding war for nations of the near abroad to join Russia-led coalitions.

Russia now faces a foreign policy of containment far more complex than that of Cold War containment. It must rely on economic appeal to a host of nations it has repressed for decades.

Through Russian eyes, Western intent continues to knock down dominos within the Eastern Bloc. If Russia continues to lose nations to which it is most culturally and historically connected, international isolation seems inevitable. Ironically, the use of hard power to contain falling dominos may only lead to further Western involvement in the Eastern Bloc in a sort of positive feedback loop.

North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria are a few examples of nations that defied international consensus on various topics, and were all met with equal international condemnation. Via

features

increasing levels of hostility, self-induced ideological isolation, and lack of regional support, these nations had no choice but to succumb to international sanctions and defamation of their national legitimacy. If the West continues to think and act without considering the concept of domino theory symme-

“To take a page from Adam Przeworski’s Democracy and the Market, ‘Henry Kissinger’s domino theory triumphed; all he missed was the direction in which the dominoes would fall’.” try, the consequences could be grave. If Russia perceives the loss of its regional authority to mean international isolation, it may pursue a more destructive means to reach a unified end.

The reasons, causation, and underlying motives of Russia’s provocative posturing are numerous. With ethnic conflict, territorial disputes, and economic concerns, Putin’s Russia has become ripe with paranoia. The most important concept to grasp is not what Putin’s Russia is most concerned with, but why Putin’s Russia has these concerns. As simplistic as the concept of symmetry is, it should not be completely overlooked. The haunting resemblance of containment in Russian foreign policy must be acknowledged in future Western initiatives before the Central Asian house of dominos falls.

Ukraine as Domino The unfolding of recent events in Ukraine has the world—and academia— buzzing. Political scientists, economists, and others continue to peddle their theories advocating adequate international reprimanding and fiscal consequences for Russian actions in Crimea. While the conflict in to Ukraine is severe, their explanation would detract from the overarching issue of Russian paranoia and its expanding inferiority complex. This central issue is not that Ukraine requires stabilization; it is from whom that sta-

bilization should come.

Putin’s Russia has not been presented with such a prime opportunity to center-stage its “national security interest” since the Georgian War in 2008. By asserting that “the defense of Russian citizens abroad” is key to Russian “national security” their profits are twofold. First, Russia can depict the expansiveness of its ethnic empire.

With so many people claiming to be ethnic Russians (for which there is yet to be a hard definition), Russia may assert its role as the only logical caretaker for certain Central Asian states.

Secondly, by labeling its citizens and certain institutions abroad as “national security interests”, Russia can better homogenize Central Asia as a Russian responsibility and priority. It is no coincidence that a Russian occupation of Crimea comes on the heels of increased Ukrainian discourse with the West.

Destabilization and conflict in Ukraine only provided the legal foothold Russia needed to gain a physical presence in Ukraine and attain an international spotlight to better express its regional relevance.

As mentioned earlier, significant use of Russian hard power would be met with further Western intervention in Ukraine. Thus negating Putin’s drive to secure a, reinvigorated, regional responsibility for Russia. Ukraine holds a close historical and cultural relationship to Russia, and preserving the Ukrainian domino ranks above all others in Central Asia. This allows us to better understand the Russian reaction to Western involvement and the paranoid Russian misinterpretation of Western intent. Above all, Russia’s reaction helps substantiate my above-mentioned claim that, “If Russia perceives the loss of its regional authority to mean international isolation, it may pursue a more destructive means to reach a unified end”. cpr

Frank Pellegrino GS `15, is working towards a B.A. in Political Science, specializing in International Relations. He was born and raised in Miami, Florida before serving as an intelligence analyst in the United States Marine Corps.

When he is not attempting to diagnose the onset of Vladimir Putin’s apparent vestiphobia, he enjoys billiards, paintball, and classic car restoration projects. He can be reached at: fjp2119@columbia.edu

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cover story

columbia political review :: spring 2014

License to Spill

An XL Dissent Protester on the Keystone Pipeline’s Threat to our Future

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n February 17, 2013, nearly 50,000 people gathered in Washington D.C., including a contingent from Columbia University, to participate in “Forward on Climate,” the largest climate rally in US history. These thousands convened from all over the country in order to urge President Obama both to say no to the Keystone XL pipeline, a proposed extension to the Keystone pipeline that has become a rallying point in the fight against climate change, and to take swifter action to combat climate change more generally.

The XL extension, a seven billion dollar pipeline, would stretch 875 miles from Canada, crossing Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma, before ending in Texas. It would transport 830,000 barrels of diluted or crude oil per day to refineries on the Gulf of Mexico. The oil in the pipeline would be extracted from the Alberta tar sands in northern Canada, which contain a vast quantity of bitumen, a solid state of petroleum, mixed with water, sand, and clay. Tar sands oil (diluted bitumen) is known as an unconventional fossil fuel because of its particularly energy-intensive extraction process; according to the State Department, it emits 17 percent more CO2 than conventional oil, since it requires a large quantity of heat to separate the oil and sand.

The president now faces a difficult decision. Since the pipeline would pass international borders, it requires a permit from the State Department, and so Obama and his administration have the final say on whether or not the project is approved. On the left, he faces intense pressure from environmentalists—many of whom were key supporters, and donors, in 2008 and 2012. On the other side are those advocating for jobs and a secure source of energy, including many moderates and conservatives, as well as the labor movement.

According to leading environmen-

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By Elana Sulakshana talist Bill McKibben, the pipeline’s construction would be “the fuse to the biggest carbon bomb on the planet.” In addition, refining the oil, which is slated for facilities in Texas, is even more destructive than refining conventional oil, emitting nitrous oxides and sulfur oxides, chemicals that contribute to acid rain, smog, and asthma. Oil spills are an issue as well, considering that the Keystone I pipeline has leaked 12 times in the past year, threatening wildlife and exposing communities to toxic materials. The pipeline is an environmental disaster, threatening local ecosystems and communities, and

“According to leading environmentalist Bill McKibben, the pipeline’s construction would be ‘the fuse to the biggest carbon bomb on the planet.’” extracting tar sands oil is a grave mistake for our climate.

Though he was out golfing with oil executives as the protestors surrounded his home last February, the president has heard their message over and over since the first major protest in August 2011. More than 1,000 people were arrested there, making it the largest collective act of civil disobedience in the history of the climate movement. Led by leading international climate organizations such as 350.org and the Sierra Club, opponents to the pipeline have sent more than a million

messages and letters to the State Department’s public comment system, consistently impeded construction of the southern portion of the pipeline in Texas by chaining themselves to trees and machinery, and bringing the question of the pipeline’s permit into mainstream American political discourse.

In August 2011, it was assumed that the pipeline would be approved easily, but the surge of protest has continued to delay a decision—until recently.

Many have predicted that the president will make a decision within 90 days of the State Department issuing its last report on the pipeline—the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (or Final Supplemental EIS). This report is an evaluation of the environmental impact that the pipeline would have and responds to the millions of comments that the State Department has received.

The publication of the report marks the end of the environmental review process and ushers in the Presidential Permit review. This period of deliberation will, according to a statement from the State Department, consider “whether the proposed Project serves the national interest, which involves consideration of many factors: including, energy security; environmental, cultural, and economic impacts; foreign policy; and compliance with relevant federal regulations and issues.”

The government has opened up another round of commenting, slated to end on March 7, after which the president will presumably make a final decision.

The Final Supplemental EIS was not promising for environmentalists.

Nor did they expect it to be, after uncovering ties between the report’s contractors and TransCanada, the Calgary based energy infrastructure company responsible for the Keystone project.

The main player responsible for the research and report is Environmental Resources Management (ERM), a company with very close ties to the

columbia political review :: spring 2014 fossil fuel industry. ERM is one of a few energy industry groups that are publicly in support of approving Keystone, and even had a lobbying contract from a group that included TransCanada. Additionally, ERM worked with TransCanada on the Alaska Pipe-

line Project. Jacobs Consultancy, the company that analyzed the effects on climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, is also owned by a tar sands developer and was hired by the Alberta government. Despite recent claims by environmental lawyers that these

cover story are significant conflicts of interest, the State Department has not made any concessions, ensuring the apparent objectivity of the report.

The EIS analyzed eight key areas, coming to similar conclusions as they had in past reports in all sections except climate impacts. In the climate section, the report came to the conclusion that building Keystone XL would not significantly affect greenhouse gas emissions. This statement has created a political pathway by which the president can approve the pipeline and not go back on previous promises. In a climate speech at Georgetown University last June, he stated that he would approve pipeline only if it would not “significantly exacerbate” greenhouse gas emissions—this statement has now been corroborated by the State Department.

Unfortunately, it is incorrect.

The State Department argues that Canada will extract and sell the oil no matter what since the pipeline is not the only way to transport the oil. They claim, therefore, that the issue of increased greenhouse gas emissions and climate change is irrelevant. Yet if we examine the alternatives—the State Department points to three: rail and pipeline, rail and tanker, and rail direct to the Gulf Coast—it is clear that Keystone is the only viable option. The State Department has failed to recognize the limited feasibility of these other options.

In the rail and pipeline scenario, crude oil would almost certainly be sent via rail from Lloydminster, Saskatchewan to Stroud, Oklahoma. It would be stored in Oklahoma and then enter existing and expanded pipelines to refineries in Cushing, Oklahoma. Similarly, with rails and tankers, the oil would first be sent out via rail. It would then travel to

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cover story Western Canada, where it would be loaded onto tankers and shipped to the Gulf Coast. Finally, they propose that oil be directly sent to the Gulf Coast by rail. The report stated, “rail will likely be able to accommodate new production if new pipelines are delayed or not constructed.” But this ignores all of the issues with rail.

The major flaw with rail and tanker, which the State Department overlooks, is that the costs are currently prohibitive. There are huge expenses in building new infrastructure as well as a significant increase in cost to transport each barrel, compared with transport by pipeline. Each of these situations requires the construction of multiple new rail facilities and would involve 12-14 unit rails—trains in which all cars travel from one point to another, usually transporting a singular good in bulk—per day. The construction of these terminals and many new cars would be expensive. This is in addition to the extra costs of shipping via rail as opposed to pipeline. Estimates say that a barrel will cost $15.50 by rail, but in current practice the cheapest

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columbia political review :: spring 2014 non-pipeline method is rail and barge, costing $30 a barrel. In comparison, the State Department says that the Keystone pipeline will be eight to ten dollars per barrel. Additionally, Reuters reporter Patrick Rucker investigated the costs and came to the conclusion that to get the oil to the Gulf Coast, railway rates would cost more than two times what pipeline tariffs would be. While economic conditions change with time, it is clear that at this time the State Department’s claim— that rail is ready to fill a gap left by scuttling the Keystone XL extension— is untenable.

Rail was traditionally seen as just a short-term alternative because of such high costs. It may not even be possible to build all of the facilities needed.

Construction to expand rail capacity is currently in process in Alberta, but it has been much more difficult than expected, facing unfavorable weather conditions, increased labor costs, and logistical challenges. Canexus Corp. in Alberta is in the process of building Canada’s first unit train terminal—a station that would have a much larger capacity than any existing ones and would solely send out unit trains carrying tar sands oil. Since it started the process of construction, costs have risen 40 percent, and the process is many months behind schedule. Rail is also a highly dangerous way of transporting oil. Two recent accidents—one in Quebec last July, and one in Alabama last November—resulted in more than 50 deaths, and have led lawmakers to draft new standards for transporting oil via rail. These new regulations are

likely to reduce efficiencies and further drive up the price of rail.

Other sectors of the government are raising objections to the State Department report. The Environmental Protection Agency stated that the State Department report “is not based on an updated energy-economic modeling effort...This analysis should include further investigation of rail capacity and costs, recognizing the potential for much higher per barrel rail shipment costs.” The State Department has been overly optimistic about rail in the past. In a 2011 report, it wrote that “shipment of conventional or oil sands crude in Canada is arguably just now reaching a takeoff point…the implication is that we could see a growing scale of shipment of crude by rail in the next one to two years.” This prediction has not been fulfilled. In 2011, refineries in the Gulf Coast processed 150,000 barrels per day of Canadian crude, and that number decreased to less than 100,000 in 2012 (most of the oil was transported via rail from Alberta to the southern United States).

It has been more than two years, and we can see that transport by rail from Canada has stalled, despite increased investments in rail infrastructure.

Even if rail and barge systems were set up successfully, it is undeniable that the amount of oil processed and transported would be less than by pipeline due to the cost and practical advantages of pipeline over rail. The Royal Bank of Canada’s brokerage services, under the title RBC Dominion Securities Inc., referred to Keystone XL as “a key supply chain link” for tar sands oil in a recent market analysis.

Various projections corroborate the claim that Keystone would expand tar sands exploitation in comparison to rail options.

The same RBC report predicted that a rejection of Keystone would reduce tar sands extraction by 450,000 barrels per day from now until 2017. Just in the processes of mining and turning bitumen into synthetic crude oil, each barrel produces about 116 kg of greenhouse gas emissions, according to oil industry consultants IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates. That means rejecting the pipeline would save 52,200,000 kg of greenhouse gases per day, or 19,053,000,000 kg per year, an amount equal to the annual emissions of 145,544 cars. By these

columbia political review :: spring 2014

numbers, the State Department’s assertion that Keystone would have no climate impact is preposterous.

Despite the setback, the environmental movement is not giving up the fight. Many recognize that the pipeline will be a threat to our climate, despite the proposed alternatives, and are taking a stand to stop it. Even in the very unlikely case that the State Department report is correct and the construction of the pipeline will not affect the rate of tar sands extraction, the message that the United States sends to the world with this decision is still important.

Rejecting the pipeline would affirm Obama’s commitment to renewable energy and a future that shifts away from fossil fuels.

On March 2, more than 300 college-age students were arrested protesting the pipeline outside the White House, including 13 from Columbia University. The action, named XL Dissent, was the largest single-day act of civil disobedience in the District of Columbia. Concern with the pipeline and passion to protect the future of our planet inspired over one thousand people to put themselves on the line—physically, as they staged a mock oil spill and chained themselves to the gates of the White House.

Thousands of American citizens—at

least 76,000—have signed the Keystone XL Pledge of Resistance, organized by Rainforest Action Network and CREDO. The pledge, started in

“As a nation and as a world, we must start thinking about the longterm impacts of our actions, rather than the short-term economic and energy benefits.” April 2013, will organize protests across the country at strategic locations such as embassies and TransCanada’a offices, if the State Department’s National Interest Determination finds that Keystone XL would indeed be in the national interest, thereby approving the pipeline.

The Keystone Pipeline would cause “game over” for the planet, according to James Hansen, Columbia University Professor and NASA’s former head climate scientist. By allowing Canada to export 830,000 barrels of tar sands oil through the United States per day, we would be spelling out the destruction of our planet. This issue is larger

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than the pipeline. Fossil fuels cause climate change: It is indisputable that Keystone XL will have an effect on our climate. Even if we interpret it like the administration did—looking at the alternatives, assuming that the oil will be used no matter what—it is clear that the rejection of Keystone will still reduce emissions from tar sands extraction because of logistical and monetary constraints.

As a nation and as a world, we must start thinking about the longterm impacts of our actions, rather than the short-term economic and energy benefits. Sustainable growth today will be more profitable in the future. Rejecting Keystone XL this spring is the right choice both for the nation and for the planet. cpr

Elana Sulakshana, CC `17, is thinking about pursuing a double major in Sustainable Development and Economics. She is particularly concerned about climate change and its intersection with human rights issues. She has engaged in local activism opposing the Keystone XL pipeline and promoting renewable energy for the past few years in Boston and took part in the XL Dissent protest on March 2nd in Washington DC. She can be reached at: ess2211@columbia.edu

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columbia political review :: spring 2014

The War of Alawite Aggression?

Rethinking Religion’s Role in the Syrian Civil War

By Bradley Williams

“W

e don’t want bread or tahina, we want freedom for our prisoners.

Butheina Sha’aban, the Syrian people aren’t hungry… The people want the fall of the regime!”

These were chants from initial protests in Dera’a from the parents of incarcerated child prisoners in March 2011 after Butheina Sha’aban, President Bashar al-Assad’s adviser, told him to increase food subsidies instead.

In March 2011, the citizens of Dera’a in the south of Syria launched their first protest. Three years later, it is easy to forget what the original causes of the protests and the subsequent conflict were. Both sides have often exploited a single justification for the protracted fight: religion. But this common religious narrative is not just abused; it is also inconsistent with history. While the origins of the conflict are multi-faceted, the media’s claim that this conflict is an extension of the age-old “Sunni-Shi’ite” divide is essentially fabricated. Alternative explanations for the conflict in Syria have been ignored in an effort to obscure the geopolitical interests of regional and global stakeholders, an effort that continues to prove detrimental to all attempts to end the violence today.

The Sunni-Shi’a explanation for Middle Eastern conflict presents an all-tooeasy schema through which interests of regional powers can be understood.

Reporters and diplomats alike explain the Assad regime’s actions in terms of the interests of its powerful Shi’a allies Iran and Hezbollah. But, in reality, this alliance has little to do with religion:

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Syria’s religious role in Shi’a Islam is extremely limited. The main Shi’ite presence is confined to Damascus, the home of two holy Shi’ite shrines. The first, the Sayyida Zainab Mosque, where Prophet Mohammad’s granddaughter is buried, is located in a southern suburb of Damascus. The second shrine, Sayyida Ruqaya, is located in the northwest corner of Old Damascus and is an important site of pilgrimage during the holy Day of Ashura. In the past two decades, Damascus has become a popular site of pilgrimage for working-class Iranian, Pakistani, and Lebanese Shi’ite tourists, many of whom visit the two shrines as well as the Ummayyid Mosque, one of the oldest mosques in the world and holy to all Muslims. Other than the two shrines, there are a few Shi’ite religious schools located in old Damascus. However, none of this is enough to motivate a Shi’a religious alliance that would fuel a civil war.

The international community’s interest in the role of Shi’a Islam in Syria stems from an excessive focus on the religious implications of President Bashar Al-Assad’s Alawite heritage. Much verbiage has recently been spewed about Assad’s Alawite background, but a glimpse into history demonstrates that the Alawites are more than just a religious group. The Alawite faith is an offshoot of Twelver Shi’ite Islam. This position has left Alawites isolated from more mainstream Shi’a and Sunni alike throughout history because of their heterodox beliefs that incorporate pre-Islamic practices, as well as naturalist beliefs that the majority of Muslims reject.

With time, they found themselves located mostly in and along the northeastern coast of the Mediterranean which spans north to south from Adana (in modern-day Turkey) along the mountains of Antakya to Tripoli (in modern-day Lebanon). Like some other religious minorities throughout the world, they settled in mountainous regions in order to remain out of sight and thus out of mind for the majority of the population.

During the late Ottoman Empire, France began strengthening its ties with Syria by doing business with favored minorities like the Maronite Christian community in Mount Lebanon. But even as these non-Muslim religious minorities experienced an economic renaissance at the hands of the imperial powers, Alawite Muslims remained in abject poverty. With the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the entirety of the Eastern Mediterranean fell into the control of the French and the British. During this time, the French adopted a divide-and-conquer approach to occupying Syria. They devised a framework for partitioning Syria into six future independent states defined by religious affiliation, including a separate state for the Alawites along the Syrian coast. The main task of the French was to get the Alawites out of their mountain villages and into the port cities of Latakia and Tartus so that they could facilitate French control of Syrian trade and thus Syria as a whole. As this move proceeded, the Alawite population finally found social mobility in the form of service in the French army.

The increased role of Alawites in the

columbia political review :: spring 2014 army gave them an unprecedented role in Syrian society when Syria became independent from France in 1946. No longer isolated in the mountains, Alawite communities appeared for the first time in the industrial city of Homs and in the capital city of Damascus. The 1950s marked the least stable period in post-independence Syria. A series of coups culminated in the 1963 seizure of power by the Ba’ath Party. The leader of the air force, the strongest branch of the Syrian armed forces, seized control of the state in 1970 after three more coups.

That leader was Hafez al-Assad, the first Ba’athist president of Syria, and the father of Bashar.

The Assad clan comes from the village of Qardaha in the mountains of the eastern Mediterranean. Like many nearby villages, it faced crippling poverty and underdevelopment for centuries.

With the Assad family’s rise to power, Qardaha and select other Alawite villages in Syria, notably al-Sheikh Badr and Duraykish, benefited from the government development subsidies provided by the Assad regime. This development of certain Alawite villages, as well as the rise of the Alawite presence in Latakia, Homs, and Damascus, is often pointed to by those who favor the sectarian narrative as proof that the Assad regime is an Alawite regime. However, this assertion misses the big picture. Hafez al-Assad put personal friends into positions of power throughout the government and army, but Alawites who were not connected to the regime remained stuck in the poverty they had experienced for centuries. It was not Alawites as a whole, but rather Assad’s specific allies who rose to levels of striking wealth in Syria.

It is worth noting that Alawites do not only live in Syria, but also in Lebanon and Turkey (where they go by the Turkified name “Alevi”). The Alevi community in Turkey has always had a limited relationship with the Syrian community and, given their lack of contact and interaction with the Syrian Alawites, differing views of the Assad regime.

Likewise, the community of 120 thousand Alawites in Lebanon is split: While some in the Alawite areas of Tripoli are taking up arms to defend the regime due to their longstanding ties with it, others, such as those in the southern Lebanese village of Ghajjar, are simply ambivalent. Therefore, there is no justification for the prevailing narrative in which it is

the Assad regime’s Alawite identity that has fueled a religious conflict. Many Alawites within Syria remain unaided by the regime, and many Alawites outside Syria see no reason to lend Assad their support.

Instead, it is crucial to examine the impact of the Assad regime on the Syrian economy. The late 1970s and entirety of the 1980s saw extreme economic turmoil for Syria. Syrian agriculture suffered when the 1973 October War against Israel failed to recapture the country’s lost access to the Sea of Galilee. Moreover, Syrian industry suffered when an Islamist-led popular uprising in the industrial cities of Hama and Aleppo led to massacre and destruction.

Through much of the 1980s, Syria was in a state of military lockdown and its economy was crippled as a result. Most Syrians subsisted only on government handouts and subsidies. The 1990s showed some growth, but the collapse of Assad’s strongest ally, the Soviet Union, made it clear that significant changes were necessary.

At the time of Hafez al-Assad’s death in 2000, Syria was far removed from the globalized, liberal market. As many Syrians are quick to point out, during Hafez’s rule, there were few fax machines and no mobile phones. Civilians were unable to access internet connections, satellite dishes, or foreign brands within the country. But when Bashar came into power in 2000, promises of political and economic liberalization came too. The political reforms and freedoms never materialized, but economic liberalization did. New industries were created, multi¬national firms penetrated the Syrian market, and the number of banks in Syria tripled from two to six. This period of transition, from a

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centralized, state-run economy towards a free market based on globalized trade, introduced an unprecedented amount of capital into Syria. As a result, a drastically expanded business-class bourgeoisie has emerged in Damascus and Aleppo, populated by Syrians of many Muslim denominations. Religion does not unite the members of this bourgeois class—the only thing they have in common is political connections.

To begin to understand the cronyism that characterizes the Assad regime, one need look no farther than Rami Makhlouf. Makhlouf is Assad’s maternal cousin, carrying the title of the “Richest Man in Syria” with around $5 billion US net worth in assets. He oversees both the licensing of the two telecom companies in Syria (MTN and Syriatel) and all foreign banks operating in Syria. For the vast majority of Syrians, Makhlouf represents the corruption and cronyism of the Assad regime.

Liberalization did not just grow the wealthy business class—it increased the size of the poorest class as well. As staterun sectors shrunk, government revenues fell and the state subsidies supporting the majority of Syrians were cut.

This liberalization had a profound effect on the lives of rural Syrians, particularly in the southern Hauran region and the countryside surrounding Damascus and Aleppo.

Even with internet, mobile devices, and investment from Gulf banks, the Syrian economy stagnated in the 2000s. The eastern Mediterranean suffered from an unprecedented drought in 2008 that left the agricultural industries in the Hauran and Jazira regions in ruins. When the Syrian state did not address these challenges, Syrians left their towns and villages for the urban

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features metropolises of Damascus and Aleppo, already overcrowded with refugees from Iraq. Syria came to rely more and more on imported goods, and the price of fuel, water, food, and rent rose significantly.

The biggest boon to the economy was the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.

Cheap labor and plentiful capital from one million Iraqi refugees kept the Syrian economy afloat. Meanwhile, Iraq transformed into a woebegone political vacuum with de facto partitions along religious and ethnic lines.

Almost all appraisals of the conflict in Syria fail to address or even recall the non-sectarian elements that led to the situation in Syria today. While the country is proceeding steadily towards de facto religious and ethnic partitions, just as Iraq did a decade prior, religion did not start this conflict. It is simply being used as a cover for other elements at work. Yes, the Assad regime presents itself as a defender of religious minorities in Syria, and, yes, political Islam was an early goal of the ideologically tumultuous opposition forces. However, this is mainly rhetoric, and the realities of the

columbia political review :: spring 2014 situation have little to do with religion.

As the conflict draws on as a stalemate, the religious narrative is being exploited to hide the kleptocracy of both the regime and the opposition as the collective suffering of the Syrian people only increases. If the religious narrative is the only one being told, then radicalization becomes inevitable.

A brief look at Syria’s neighbors can help clarify what’s at stake when this religious story goes too far. The “Sunni-Shi’a” and “Islamist-Secular” narratives appear as founding myths for Arab nations that were truly born from modern state conflict. Iraq, home to a diverse makeup of Muslim denominations, Christians, Kurds and Armenians, saw the de facto partition and radicalization of its society come to life out of the power vacuum caused by the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Lebanon faced a similar fate at the close of its fifteen years of civil war: The state disintegrated into armed factions based on constructed ethno-religious narratives, with each faction backed by international geopolitical stakeholders. The

Syrian case is running a similar course.

The entire Middle East has spent centuries chained to religious narratives that belie geopolitical forces at work between regional powers. This conflict is no exception. There are clear incentives for stakeholders to advance the religious narrative in pursuit of their political and economic goals inside Syria. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, have funded hardline fringe jihadist armed groups while snubbing secular or moderate Islamist opposition. They defended this decision by arguing that the Assad regime contributes to an extremist Shi’a alliance that threatens all Muslims.

Similar arguments were used to exclude Iran from the Geneva II conference, which is currently dragging on with no results. In the run-up to the talks in Geneva, the Gulf Cooperation Council member states vowed Iran could not take part due to its alliance with Assad and, particularly, its support for Hezbollah. However, excluding the Assad regime’s sole ally from the conversation has only led to the failure of the talks.

The regime finds itself under diplomatic attack without an ally to defend it.

If history is any guide, the continued use of a religious narrative as explanation for the conflcit will only lead Syria further into inter-ethnic and religious rupture. If Syria is to have any hope of avoiding complete destruction, foreign stakeholders must forswear the religious façade and tackle the political and economic challenges at hand. The Syrian conflict did not begin as an altercation between fundamentally incompatible religious groups, but the more that story gets told, the more powerful it becomes. The religious narrative must be contextualized and not distorted in order to find a way to end this brutal civil war. cpr

Born in Chicago, Bradley Williams, GS `15, is majoring in MESAAS and Linguistics. He arrived at Columbia this January after beginning his university education at the University of Damascus and the American University in Beirut. He previously worked for the Iraqi Student Project in Damascus and is hoping to start a scholarship fund for Syrian students who have been unable to finish their university education due to the conflict. He can be reached at: bw2441@columbia.edu

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columbia political review :: spring 2014

features

Paki-standing Alone

Are Sino-Pakistani Relations Cooling?

By Zan Gilani

O

ver the last half-century, one of the few constants in both Pakistan and China’s ever-shifting political landscapes has been their intimate and unwavering relationship. In early 2011, Pakistan’s ambassador in Beijing, Masood Khan, vividly described the two countries’ alliance as “higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight, and sweeter than honey.” Indeed, China has consistently championed Pakistan’s causes, whether by supporting its position on Kashmir or supplying engineers and aid to develop its economy. But why has China, a nation with a multivalent agenda and myriad of other investment opportunities, time and again poured its foreign reserves into sponsoring low-security and low-returns deals with Pakistan, an unstable economy that lacks a clear program for growth?

And will Beijing continue its heavy political and economic engagement with Pakistan?

Some arguments point to increasing the distance between Beijing and Islamabad. Mutually rewarding trade partnerships between India and China have thawed the two countries’ historically frigid relations, so there is a decreasing need for Islamabad to help Beijing balance New Delhi. On the domestic level, recent violence and unrest in Xinjiang, a northwestern Chinese province, is traced back to Taliban-run camps in Pakistan where Uighur separatists are said to have trained. Moreover, the last few decades have seen China increasingly constrained by nationalistic sentiment, and less inclined to continue its famous no-strings-attached developmental aid.

Despite these new considerations, China will continue its close relationship with Pakistan as part of its security strategy. Today, a close relationship with Pakistan is valuable to China with regards to three geostrategic considerations. First, Pakistan is necessary for balancing India as it becomes more

economically, politically, and militarily powerful. Second, Pakistan may play a

critical part in preserving China’s energy security interests in its western

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features territories and Central Asia. Third, Pakistani cooperation is critical in combating domestic unrest and Islamic terrorism in Xinjiang.

Without strong ideological or cultural affinities, Pakistan and China’s closeness has been largely governed by geostrategic security considerations alone.

The Sino-Indian War in 1962 made New Delhi and Beijing hyperaware of each other’s proximity and ambitions for strategic dominance in Asia. Shared enmity towards India, their common neighbor, led Pakistan and China to form a ready-made alliance, beginning a multi-pronged policy of containment.

First, the threat of defending two long borders in the event of a war (as opposed to one) constrained Indian military ambitions: China has been Pakistan’s largest defense supplier, and, in the words of arms-control advocate Gary Milhollin, “If you subtract China’s help from Pakistan’s nuclear program, there is no nuclear program.” Second, China’s political support of Pakistan on issues such as Kashmir prolonged the South Asian conflict, thereby slowing New Delhi down in its pursuit to become a major international player.

“The Chinese government and people firmly support the righteous stand of the Pakistani government and the just struggle of the Kashmiri people for their right of self-determination,” said President Liu Shaoqi during a visit to Pakistan in 1966.

As time wore on, however, China’s notoriously elastic foreign policy did not leave Pakistan unscathed. Sino-Pakistan relations cooled in the wake of the Cold War as Beijing sought rapprochement with New Delhi. China’s Kashmir rhetoric seemed more diluted

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columbia political review :: spring 2014 - in 1996, when then-President Jiang Zemin advised Islamabad to “put the thorny issues aside and develop cooperative relations with India in less contentious sectors like trade an economic cooperation.” In 1999, the Kargil War saw Pakistan and India skirmish in Kashmir. Rather than maintain its usual support for Pakistan, China was critical of Islamabad’s violation of the Line of Control and adopted a deliberately neutral position on the conflict. It seemed as if Sino-Pakistani relations were losing their durability.

Other considerations have also tempered Beijing and Islamabad’s allegiance. Pakistan plays a significant role in the domestic unrest and instability

“Pakistan’s strategic importance to China does not guarantee harmonious relations— Beijing has the power to waggle the carrot or wield the stick.” of western China. Xinjiang, China’s largest and most energy-rich province, is home to a majority Uighur population, a predominantly Turkic Muslim people. Ethnic assimilation by migrating Han Chinese, diminishing political autonomy, and socioeconomic marginalization led to major discontent in the 1990s as Uighurs violently protested. After the opening of the Karakoram Highway, which links Kashgar, the historical and cultural center of Xinjiang, and Pakistan’s capital Islamabad, many U i g h u r s travelled to Pakistan for religious instruction.

Actually, some of these U i g h u r s trained at Taliban-run camps, and

returned back to Xinjiang with plans to fight the perceived Chinese oppression with terrorist tactics, targeting civilians and detonating suicide bombs. Consequently, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a militant separatist organization with strong links to Al-Qaeda, was founded, though the CCP has ruthlessly tried to squash it.

Suspicious that Pakistan has been sympathetic towards such Uighur quasi-Islamic separatist movements, Beijing has punished Islamabad accordingly.

In 1992, after a failed Islamist uprising in a town near Kashgar that saw 22 people killed, China closed its road links with Pakistan for several months and tapered the aid it had been sending.

Beijing’s direct development also may no longer be so forthcoming due to emerging constraints on Beijing’s foreign policy. Domestic nationalist pressures forced the Chinese government to launch a large-scale evacuation of tens of thousands of Chinese citizens from Libya in 2011. Chinese nationals in Pakistan have also come under heavy attack in recent years. In 2004, a bombing in Baluchistan killed three engineers, and more recently Chinese workers have also been kidnapped increasing frequency. Pakistan has high hopes for China to back the construction of rail and road links from Kashgar down to Gwadar, a port by the Arabian Sea, but it is difficult to see whether China will take on the heavy risks of construction in Baluchistan, Pakistan’s most unstable and ungoverned province. Similarly, in September 2011, China Kingho Group, a mining behemoth, pulled out of a $19 billion deal that would have been Pakistan’s largest ever direct foreign investment.

In 2008, Pakistan was even forced to turn to the International Monetary Fund when China did not deliver the comprehensive bailout package it had attempted to solicit.

Despite this apparently growing schism, Hu Jintao still described Pakistan as an “indispensable partner” during his presidential visit to the country in November 2006. In December 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao remarked that Beijing would “never give up” Islamabad. What drives such exclamations of solidarity and loyalty? Since the turn of the 21st century, Pakistan, in exchange for diplomatic and economic support, has performed

columbia political review :: spring 2014 three functions that are crucial to preserving China’s national security.

Pakistan’s role as a balancer has gained new vigor since 9/11. Previously, Pakistan and China had simply drawn mutual benefits from a military balancing maneuver against India, but after 2001 Pakistan became crucial in balancing both the United States and India’s strengthening relationship with them. In retaliation for the US-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in 2004 and the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement that soon followed, the China National Nuclear Corporation signed an agreement with Pakistan for two new nuclear reactors, in addition to the two it is already working on.

This move was in clear violation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines involving NPT non-signatories, but China justified its action on the basis of “compelling political reasons concerning the stability of South Asia.” Moreover, from a Chinese perspective, US intervention in Afghanistan post-9/11 was a preliminary step in its long-term strategy in Central Asia. This may not be far from the truth: The Pentagon’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review identified Central Asia as a “new strategic crossroad,” and the US already has a military base in Kyrgyzstan and is pushing development efforts there as well. For China, Pakistan may be crucial to halting further US advances into the region as a bridge between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Persian Gulf countries. If Sino-US interests clash more directly in the region, a future military base in Pakistan will match proposed US military bases in India.

Maintaining energy security is a core feature of China’s larger security endeavors. China is the world’s largest energy consumer and producer in the world, and Pakistan serves its larger ally’s energy objectives in two ways.

First, Pakistan’s coast lies close to the Strait of Hormuz, and could be the location of a future naval base to protect China’s energy supplies, especially given the presence of US Navy patrol ships in the region. Second, Pakistan could function as an alternative energy corridor channeling oil and gas from the Middle East to western China.

This second role is most apparent in China’s heavy investment in Gwadar, a constructed port city at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Gwadar’s strategic

importance is so considerable that the US reportedly “tried to outprice the Chinese to take over the entire facility.”

Pan Zhiping, Director of the Central Asian Studies Institute at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, describes Gwadar Port as “China’s important energy transfer station” and “China’s new energy channel.” A Pakistan-based oil and gas passage to western China would be a quicker and safer route than the passageway through the South China Sea, where China has recently sparred with the United States, the Philippines, Vietnam, and India over territorial disputes. As the Karakoram Highway is expanded and Qinghai-Tibet railway is constructed, an energy corridor starting from Gwadar seems more and more likely.

The advancement of an energy corridor through Pakistan would also serve another of Beijing’s goals: the development and restraint of Xinjiang as part of the larger effort to control western China. Although Pakistan’s inability, if not reluctance, in fighting ETIM contributed to the instability in Xinjiang, Pakistan’s cooperation in combating this real and potent threat to stability in economically important western China is critical. ETIM members are both trained in Pakistan and funded by sympathetic groups, and China has pushed for the Pakistan government to crack down hard. In 1997, 14 Uighur students were deported and in 2001, then-President Musharraf told thenVice President Hu Jintao, “Pakistan will wholeheartedly support China’s battle to strike against the East Turkestan terrorist forces.” These efforts have gained results: In May 2002, the Pakistani military was reported to have detained Ismail Kader, a major Uighur separatist leader, and Hasan Mahsum, founder and leader of ETIM, was also killed in a Pakistani military sting operation in December 2003.

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China’s calculus in Pakistan may be continually evolving, but long-term geostrategic security remains the objective on which China cannot and will not compromise. Rather than reacting to a weakening, unpredictable Pakistani state by severing ties, Beijing will probably scale up its efforts and institute “tough love” policies to meet its needs. Of course, China is still extremely cautious in its efforts to balance US-Indian relations as it does not want to overtly aggravate either party— previously, Pakistan suggested China could use Gwadar as a naval military base, a proposition that Beijing immediately rejected.

Pakistan’s strategic importance to China does not guarantee harmonious relations—Beijing has the power to waggle the carrot or wield the stick.

In early March, eight men and women attacked the central train station of Kunming, the capital of the southwestern province Yunnan. Armed with knives, these people slaughtered 28 civilians and left 130 injured in what the Chinese media have dubbed “China’s 9/11.” As pressure mounts on Beijing to react swiftly, Islamabad must do all it can to ensure that Beijing, its most powerful ally, does not lose faith but remains, in the words of former President Pervez Musharraf, a “time-tested and all-weather friend.” cpr

Zan Gilani, CC `15, is from Karachi, Pakistan and double majoring in Political Science and East Asian Studies.

He is also the president of the Growth and Development Project at Columbia University. He can be reached at: shg2113@columbia.edu

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columbia political review :: spring 2014

Israel/Palestine Debates

Students Speak Out About the ASA Boycotts

PROMPT:

What is the academic boycott of Israel and why is it so important?

PANELISTS:

DANIELLA GREENBAUM Daniella Greenbaum, BC ’17, is an English student with a deep interest in Middle Eastern politics. She is a graduate of the Write On For Israel fellowship, an advocacy through journalism program. While spending a year abroad in Jerusalem, she became a fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. Daniella is active in LionPAC, Columbia’s Pro Israel, Pro Peace, non-partisan student group.

She can be reached at djg2158@barnard.edu

In

Julia Salazar, CC ’14, is a History student, focusing on the modern Middle East with a concentration in Jewish Studies. While staying in the Palestinian Territories last year, Julia became devoted to a community development project for Palestinian youth in the West Bank village of Beit Sahour.

She will continue to work in Beit Sahour and Jerusalem after graduating from Columbia in May. She can be reached atjcs2194@ columbia.edu

JULIA SALAZAR

FERIDE ERALP Feride Eralp, CC ’14, is a student of Anthropology, focusing on the repressive, colonial and genocidal politics of the Turkish state. She is an activist from Turkey who grew up in Istanbul with a Muslim and Jewish background. She has been actively involved in feminist and Kurdish movements, and is looking forward to being back home.

She can be reached at fe2146@columbia.edu

Isabel Peñaranda, CC ’14, is studying Anthropology, and uses it to draw connections between the dispossession of poor communities of color in Harlem due to Columbia’s Manhattanville expansion, the people of Palestine by the Israeli state, and peasants by state and paramilitary violence in Colombia, where she is from. She hopes to return to Colombia to support social movements fighting this dispossession.

She can be reached at ip2230@columbia.edu

ISABEL PENARANDA

December 2013, the American Studies Association (ASA) voted to boycott Israeli universities and academic institutions through a resolution that attracted 1,252 participants—the largest in organization history—and passed with over 66 percent endorsement. Sticking to his guns, Columbia University President Lee C. Bollinger joined many other American universities in condemning the ASA boycott on the grounds that it violated the constitutional right to free speech. Devoutly multi-partisan, CPR solicited input from passionate and authoritative student voices on the subject to better understand the considerations and rationale underlying their positions.

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columbia political review :: spring 2013

student stump

The American Studies Association’s political maneuver to boycott Israeli academic institutions was almost instantaneously met with reactions of surprise, dismay, and shock by students and presidents across many of the campuses ostensibly represented by the ASA. President Bollinger issued a statement condemning the ASA’s vote to boycott as being contrary to political and academic freedoms. The boycott was significant in that it reminded peace activists around the world of the unfortunate consequences of actions that are allegedly taken to promote peace and equality. One of the problems with this boycott movement is that it specifically targets Israel, a country with clear flaws like any other, but not a country whose real In response to the 2002 Palestinian call for a comprehensive economic, cultural, and academic boycott of Israel, the academic boycott is a tactic that tries to attain three goals: 1. Ending the colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall.

2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality.

3. Respecting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes as stipulated in UN resolution 194.

It is important to know that the academic boycott of Israel is a call to boycott institutions, not individuals; in this sense I see it as a form of exposing and struggling against the complicity of institutions in a system of oppression, rather than a curtailment of individual freedoms. This is why I value it as a means of protest. Yes, Israeli academic institutions are part of the occupation and complicit in Israel’s discriminatory policies. First of all, the Israeli government denies Palestinians freedom of education by bombing schools in Gaza and restricting the freedoms of students in the Occupied Territories to the extent that the army can

or alleged human rights violations reach the level of countries like Iran or Syria—just to give two examples of countries in Israel’s immediate vicinity. Once we acknowledge this odd singling-out of Israel, it is important to discern why this injustice is happening. Is it anti-Semitism? Pure misguidedness? It is certainly an advancement of a hidden agenda, which warrants further inquiry and explanation. Additionally, academic boycotts in general, but certainly this one in particular, run completely antithetical to the ideas of academic freedom and open forums for the exchange of all philosophies, viewpoints and beliefs.

veto them when they apply to Israeli universities, even if they meet all required criteria. Moreover, academic institutes like the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), associated with Tel Aviv University, help formulate military strategy targeting civilians—including the “Dahiya Doctrine,” which entails the usage of disproportionate force in heavily populated areas as a “deterrent.” This is a war crime! Universities also collaborate on the development of weapons used by the Israeli army against Palestinians and others. The Israel Institute of Technology, the Technion, conducts research in military technology on which Israel relies to sustain its occupation of Palestinian land.

These developments include the unmanned D-9 bulldozer, which the Israeli military used during Operation Cast Lead, a war that resulted in the death of around 1400 Palestinians, mostly civilians. It is important to understand that these are the institutions that the academic boycott seeks to target. As a student, I believe in an academia that does not collaborate in endangering people’s lives, perpetrating and perpetuating injustice.

The ASA’s recent resolution to boycott Israeli academic institutions is consistent with BDS, the international movement of Palestinian civil society calling for a boycott of products, services, and institutions which financially or otherwise benefit the State of Israel, or which support Israel’s military occupation of the West Bank. In the ASA’s press release regarding the academic boycott, the voting members cited several reasons motivating their decision, collectively saying that the Israeli government’s policies actively inhibit Palestinians’ academic freedom.

This resolution is important for largely the same reasons as similar divestment resolutions recently passed by American and international institutions: It indicates an unprecedented negative shift in public opinion about Israeli

state policies. The call for an academic boycott (rather than an exclusively economic boycott) has unique implications because it provokes the question of how academic freedom is upheld. Many American academics (including our own President Bollinger and President Spar) have condemned the academic boycott on the grounds that, ironically, it further impedes on academic freedom. However, the boycott may effectively draw attention to the reality of the State of Israel’s systematic control over Palestinians’ lives. Above all else, the ASA boycott reveals that our academic commons is profoundly interconnected: A threat to Palestinian and Israeli academic freedoms is a threat to academic freedom at large.

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columbia political review :: spring 2014

student stump In 1985, the African National Congress was still considered by many governments a terrorist organization, and many Western governments insisted on keeping their relations with the Apartheid regime. But, many universities worldwide, including our own Columbia University, decided to stand up for justice and divest.

Then, like now, many voices accused the divestment movement of undermining freedom of expression on campus. But today we recognize the movement to divest from South African Apartheid as one of the most valuable displays of academic freedom and integrity.

Furthermore, preventing boycott itself is an inhibition of freedom, since the right to engage in human rights boycotts, which were used to oppose segregation in the southern United States,

the Apartheid regime in South Africa, and are now aimed at achieving equal rights for Palestinians, are protected by the First Amendment.

Many voices inside Israel have indeed endorsed the boycott as well. This is again reminiscent of the South African struggle in which boycott and divestment provided everyone with a peaceful means for the struggle for freedom and justice.

Today, just as we make the moral choice to stand against our university’s investments in the private prison industry, and thus its profits from the increased incarceration of people worldwide, some of us also think universities and academic institutions should not collaborate with, or allow for the justification of, taking away people’s lives and lands.

REBUTTALS The idea that the boycott draws attention to Israeli control is one that I fundamentally disagree with. The boycott ostensibly is in some way related to academic freedom—when Israel is in fact the only country in the Middle East where genuine, complete freedom of the press is allowed— and one of the only countries where colleges and institutions, including Palestinian institutions, can freely question and critique the government.

This kind of freedom, for Jews and Arabs alike, exists only in Israel.

The loss of civilian life in Gaza is certainly not a straightforward or a simple subject, but it is imperative to remember that the Israel Defense Forces expend time, energy, and money, and in fact endangers its own soldiers’ lives, to ensure that civilians are warned of impending attacks and given time to find safe haven. It is Hamas and the other terrorist groups budding in this region that use Palestinian innocents as human shields.

I happen to also believe that this tragedy is completely irrelevant to the discussion at hand, as the Above all else, the ASA boycott reveals that our international academic commons is profoundly interconnected: a threat to Palestinian and Israeli academic freedoms is a threat to academic freedom at large. The security checkpoints and unjustified restrictions, which prevent Palestinian and Israeli students from moving freely in the Occupied Territories, go beyond violating Palestinian civil rights. They prevent Israeli and Palestinian students from even interacting with one another, let alone learning

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interaction between Israeli institutions and the army in its role in Gaza is minimal.

I resent and fervently deny any inherent comparison with South African Apartheid, as well as the private prison industry with Israel and Israeli policy. Israel is not an Apartheid state. It does not discriminate based on a thinking of one race being superior to another. The separation that takes place in the West Bank is based on citizenship, not race. There is no single country in the Arab world where there are more freedoms (including for Arabs) than in Israel. The BDS movement, and by extension academic boycotts, attempt to achieve by subterfuge what has not been achieved by force of arms: the de-legitimization and destruction of the state of Israel. As illustrated by the song some of our very own students will chant during Apartheid Week, if “Palestine will be free from the river to the sea,” where exactly will the state of Israel be? Wiped off the map, as is the true goal of BDS.

from each other. Many West Bank Palestinians often find themselves trapped by the restrictions imposed on them by Ha-Minhal ha-Ezrahi—the Israeli Civil Administration. Conversely, Israeli and American students are legally able to travel freely to and from Israel. But, the violation of Palestinian students’ civil rights inevitably encroaches on the academic freedom of those beyond the West Bank because we are deprived of these students’ valuable contributions to the academic commons.

student stump

columbia political review :: spring 2014 Boycott is only one of the tools or tactics used within resistance and solidarity movements. It is a means and not an end; the goal is to dismantle an oppressive regime and boycott is only one way of increasing international pressure. It is not necessarily more valuable than any other form of resistance, but what is important about academic boycott is that it refuses to cooperate in strategies of justification and whitewashing that support oppressive regimes. It draws attention to the fact that academia and the knowledge it produces are not separate from, but are rather deeply entangled in, the workings of power over populations that are subjugated.

Furthermore, criticizing Israel’s denial of the Palestinians’ right to exist freely upon their own land is interconnected to exposing global forms of injustice ― from systems of mass incarceration destroying communities of color in the United States to the elimination of indigenous peoples by the settler state in North America and other places. Israel, like the United States, is not exceptional; both are part of a global system of domination.

It is in this sense that Israel must be resisted. Yet it is Israel itself that claims a form of exceptionalism by arguing that it is possible to legally discriminate against people based on their ethno-re-

ligious identity and to still treat everyone equally.

The impossibility of this claim is demonstrated as occupied Palestinians are made to live under Israeli military law while Israelis live under civil law. Yes, four million Palestinians in the Occupied Territories cannot vote for the government controlling their borders, air space, water, and tax revenues because of a military occupation.

It is impossible to speak of equality when Palestinian citizens of Israel, who can vote, also face around 50 discriminatory laws that have been documented by the human rights organization, Adalah. These laws include those that control who a Palestinian can marry and still remain home.

Palestinians who have been forced into exile have no right to return to their homes, in complete disregard to UN Resolution 194, while any Jewish person anywhere in the world may claim “birthright.” Because I have a Jewish grandmother, I have the right to live anywhere within the borders of the State of Israel even though I have never had any relationship to the place, while Palestinians forced to leave their homes cannot go back. Does this look like freedom in any way? Rather, it is this injustice and lack of freedom that boycotts, as tactics within movements, seek to expose and put international pressure upon.

In thinking about what the academic boycott of Israel aims to help dismantle, it is important to keep in mind the facts of the situation, since they do speak for themselves, rather than get bogged down in rhetoric. The academic boycott is not a restriction of academic freedom; on the contrary, it is an exercise of the freedom to make a choice not to participate in the oppression and dispossession of the Palestinian people. Individuals and institutions may make the choice not to boycott Israeli academic institutions. They may decide to collaborate with a system that produces the weapons and policies that cause the death and displacement of Palestinians. That choice— to participate in the dispossession of a people or not—is one everyone is free to make. But, it is important to lay bare that this is the choice before us. It is not a choice between remaining neutral and taking a position: Collaborating with an Israeli academic system directly linked to the oppression of Palestinians is not remaining neutral. Making the choice to boycott is a manifestation of the freedom of expression, and so it is

within the scope of the First Amendment. The Israeli academic system, on the other hand, allows the army not only to veto Palestinian applicants, but also to prevent certain research projects and thesis topics. This is what restricting academic freedom really means.

We should also remember that the connection between the South African, anti-Apartheid movement and global solidarity with the Palestinian people is one made by South Africans themselves. The ruling party, the African National Congress, endorsed both the BDS campaign and Israeli Apartheid Week. Many unions support the boycott including the South African Municipal Workers Union that promoted an “Israeli Apartheid Free Zone” to ensure their municipalities have no commercial, academic, cultural, or sporting linkages with the Israeli regime. Let me end, then, by recalling the words of the celebrated Nelson Mandela: “We know too well that our freedom is incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinians.”

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columbia political review :: spring 2014

features

Need For Seed

Are Terminator Seeds in Brazil a Threat ?

D

uring the monsoon months of 1998, unrest swept the agricultural communities of several developing nations, and watchdog organizations mobilized a legion of experts to warn of imminent danger. The concern: biotech giant Monsanto’s acquisition of a patent on genetic use restriction technology (GURT), otherwise known as the “terminator seed.”

The ingenuity of terminator technology lies in making the seed incapable of producing fertile offspring, and therefore making the farmer incapable of saving seed from one year’s harvest to plant in the next. This development was expected to bring record profits for massive agro multinationals like Monsanto, Syngenta, and Dupont, but seemed to spell ruin for the nearly 1.4 billion people who rely on saving seed because they can’t afford not to. A global uproar followed.

In the year after the approval of Monsanto’s patent, advocacy groups around the world put up calls to action on websites and blogs, urging readers to sign their petitions or write letters to the US Department of Agriculture.

The controversy inspired grassroots protests, such as those in India, where farmers in Karnataka banded together to destroy alleged terminator test fields, and others in Andhra Pradesh marched through the streets bearing signs that read, “Monsanto Quit India.” In the United States, environmental groups even threatened the USDA with litigation. These efforts were matched by those of thousands worldwide caught up in the fervor over this potentially disastrous new piece of biotechnology.

While proponents claimed GURT had legitimate uses, including increased yields and incentives to produce more efficient seeds in countries with weak patent laws, opponents levied a wave of compelling economic and environmental accusations against major seed and chemical companies—

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By Maren Killackey especially Monsanto. The result was a public relations obstacle that the companies could not surmount. By the end of the 1990s, all of the companies that had patents on GURT issued statements articulating a commitment to never commercialize it.

Then, in 2000, at the fifth meeting of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), 193 nations unanimously agreed to a de facto moratorium on the sale of terminator seeds. In 2006, at the eighth meet-

“The ingenuity of terminator technology lies in making the seed incapable of producing fertile offspring, and therefore making the farmer incapable of saving seed from one year’s harvest to plant in the next.” ing of the UNCBD, another vote was taken on the moratorium, which was not only reaffirmed, but strengthened, especially with respect to terminator seed research; the new language explicitly bans field testing, whereas before it was simply implied. The new language also included a recommendation for states to “respect traditional knowledge and Farmers’ Rights to the preservation of seeds under traditional cultivation” and “[disseminate] in appropriate language and simplified form” information on issues relating to GURTs. With the second unanimous affirmation of the moratorium, it seemed that the discussion on GURTs was over—until today.

In December 2013, a bill that would

legalize the commercial use of GURT was proposed in the Brazilian Congress. Landowning groups had been putting pressure on Brazil’s legislators to draft a bill allowing for certain, non-food uses of terminator technology since 2007, but were stymied by environmental groups. Now, however, in the nation that hosted the eighth UNCBD, such a bill threatens to violate the thirteen-year-old moratorium.

As the world’s third-largest agricultural exporter—and the B in the BRIC economies—Brazil’s actions could set a crucial precedent for the rest of the world. A Guardian article from late last year quotes a Brazilian NGO staffer: “Brazil is the frontline.

If the agro-industry breaks the moratorium here, they’ll break it everywhere.” If Brazil, then maybe India, and then maybe countries in sub-Saharan Africa: One country after another until global agricultural safety is undermined, and those 1.4 billion subsistence farmers languish in total penury.

That Brazil’s violation of the GURT moratorium would result in the collapse of the world’s agricultural security is extreme, but the precedent set by it would still present frightening implications. Yes, the precedent might motivate other states to violate the UNCBD moratorium, but it could also motivate states to violate other treaties as well, leading to a new trend of non-compliance.

Arguably, the strength of an international treaty lies in how well its violation can be prevented, and if unpreventable, that one can at least know when violations occur. In the example of the GURT moratorium, both of these roles—which I’m loosely defining as enforcement and monitoring—are undertaken by the very same groups that whipped up frenzy in the late 1990s: NGOs and human rights groups.

Though the causal link between the efforts of international advocacy

columbia political review :: spring 2014 groups and the establishment of the 2000 UN moratorium is not proven, without backlash on the issue, international leaders would have been less inclined to even draft such a declaration. Luckily, the influence that advocacy groups wield over governments on the terminator technology issue is made clear by the groups’ activities in 2006.

At the time, the moratorium was being challenged by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, who were insisting on a “case-by-case risk assessment” of GURT, as opposed to the blanket ban championed by advocacy groups. This

challenge was met by counter efforts from farmers, indigenous peoples, and a broad swath of civil society organizations, which pressed governments meeting in Brazil to reject the “threatening” new language. A press release from the time describes the following situation: “On Tuesday morning, as delegates arrived at the conference venue, they faced more than 100 peasant and indigenous rights activists at the main gates staging a demonstration in support of a complete ban on the sale and use of Terminator seeds, officially known as Genetic Use Restriction

features Technology. ‘Terminate the Terminator,’ the activists chanted in unison, while demanding tough laws against field testing and sale of so-called ‘Terminator’ technology...”

When the CBD announced the new and improved ban language, advocacy groups were quick to claim victory.

This series of events allows us to see how the concerted efforts of traditionally marginalized groups can effect large-scale change by pressuring governments. This phenomenon is well-described in political science literature and represents a glimmer of hope for the world’s most vulnerable populations: an individual does not need access to government, which is very limited, to ensure one’s interests are represented. One simply needs access to advocates, who are much more abundant.

However, now, eight years after the successful defeat of government interests by the interests of the people, advocacy is working to reinforce government interests over popular ones. Moreover the oppositional group, large landowners, has substantially more resources than the involved populist groups, which almost by definition have few assets.

If the Brazilian Congress were to oblige large landowners over groups representing the socio-politically disadvantaged, would this create a slippery slope wherein nations blatantly ignore the substantial pleas of the most vulnerable in favor of the demands of its bankrollers? (Many of them do, but rarely when it comes to an unanimous, international agreement.) Or are the precedent and subsequent actions of other nations unrelated?

Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory theory to explain which specific characteristics of an advocacy network—or any campaigns undertaken by NGOs—affect success.

Furthermore, scholars are silent on what happens at the desired policy level (domestic and/or international) when the advocacy network is opposed by an equally or perhaps even more capable network.

One could probably guess what the answers might be to the questions I have posed, but guesswork is not the mark of a field that deigns to call itself a “science.” There is a disappointing paucity of work—es-

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pecially recent work and especially recent, rigorous work—on the relationship between precedent-setting and subsequent international response, as well as advocacy groups’ roles in norms propagation/agenda setting, treaty compliance, and domestic policy outcomes.

The new millennium seems to have ushered in an age of trickle down norms; issues are agreed upon (often unanimously) at the international level, with states then expected to go home and to start implementing and propagating them. The Millennium Development Goals would be one instance of this phenomenon; norms of equality, empowerment, and

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columbia political review :: spring 2014

increased social participation were agreed upon at the highest level, then delegations returned and states—hypothetically—went to work. But as the Brazil example shows, what’s agreed upon internationally can be attacked domestically, leading to a revocation of commitment in such a way that could inspire other states to revoke.

Just like GURT itself, a pattern of revocation, here defined as non-compliance, would spell disaster for exactly the populations these norms seek to support.

The slippery slope could really be a harmless bunny hill. That the international community currently has no way of telling what will happen and

why is detrimental to future efforts of norms adoption. This in turn is detrimental to the “unanimous” world vision that’s started to emerge over the last two decades.

Advocacy literature reports that the Brazilian Judicial Commission has delayed voting on the bill until the end of February, which will have come and gone by the time this article goes to print. Within Brazil’s legislature, positions on the bill are fractionalized: it was approved by the agricultural commission, rejected by the environmental commission, and finally sent to the Judicial Commission, which has not yet issued a statement.

While journalists predict the bill will go to a full congressional vote, they are silent on what the outcome will likely be. A protest letter signed by 34,000 people was presented to Congress, but in light of the opposition protesters face, its impact remains unclear.

Regardless of what happens, the conditions of this situation allow us to ask important intellectual and practical questions about how NGOs and other civil society organizations enforce or undermine international norms at the domestic level. The second theme unifying these questions is what the precedent set by that enforcement or undermining predict for other countries at least nominally committed to the same international agreement.

Unfortunately, there too little literature answers these questions, so it is not that the jury is still out, but that there is no trial to begin with. Understanding the mechanisms by which the people who benefit most from international norms can ensure their propagation will be a crucial question as the world progresses into an age where institutions are formed not just for security, but for the creation of holistic well-being for a global citizenry.

cpr

Maren, CC `15, is majoring in Political Science and Sustainable Development. She’s interested in economic development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, as well as international relations. Maren is a member of the Growth and Development Project at Columbia (DeltaGDP) and the Columbia Economics Review. She can be reached at: msh2187@columbai.edu

columbia political review :: spring 2014

features

Naval-Gazing

Examining the Buildup of Southeast Asian Militaries

By Greg Graff

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rms procurements are a great barometer for determining a state’s threat perceptions and the “pressure” of its environment.

A weapons system provides discrete capabilities and is itself a response or counter to specific threats. In Southeast and East Asia, commentators have focused heavily on a perceived naval arms race. Regional states have started procuring weapon systems with a strong naval focus, with surface ships, submarines, and fighter aircraft as the big-ticket items.

This has led many to suggest that growing Chinese power, as well as doubt in US military commitments, has led states to bolster their own navies.

The nervousness surrounding China’s growing power has had the unintended effect of making many look at the region’s naval procurement through that prism alone. The fear is that the region is entering a multilateral arms race – one that could increase instability and tensions leading to clashes and even war. Yet this conclusion oversimplifies a region filled with varied states, each with its own complicated strategic calculus. According to the US Energy Information Administration, more than half of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through regional straits, and the majority continues into the South China Sea. A third of global crude oil and half of global liquid natural gas also pass through the sea. Intra-regional rivalries, economic dependence, and threats other than China continue to influence defense planning in the region. The simple but sensationalized explanation that China’s rise is triggering other nations to beef up their navies simply does not go far enough to explain the nuances of what is going on in the region.

China has certainly expended a lot of time and effort modernizing its navy.

As a rapidly rising power, it has focused on counterbalancing US naval dominance through a strategy that seeks to make US naval operations impossible or prohibitively costly in its immediate periphery, through what US planners call anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD).

It has invested in both conventional naval assets, namely surface ships, and asymmetrical naval assets such as submarines and anti-ship missiles. Conventional naval warfare involves two surface fleets being sent out against each other. Hasbro’s Battleship® game, however, does not seem to have been a very popular game among China’s naval strategists. Their strategy is to use relatively cheap assets such as missiles and submarines, which are difficult to defend against, to threaten expensive assets like American carriers. Because of their limited range, those weapons do not allow for much power projection; they merely prevent American surface ships from operating close to Chinese shores.

At the same time, Beijing has also invested in conventional naval assets as part of its own desires to project power regionally by procuring new ships and even an aircraft carrier, with plans to build more. Beijing’s intentions for its surface fleet are likely more modest and regional than the massive 11-carrier American navy, which has made ensuring the security of the global sea lines of communication one of its main goals.

China has territorial disputes with Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Brunei over various islands in the South China Sea, with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, and with Taiwan over the island of Taiwan. Building a credible surface fleet allows Beijing to back up those territorial claims, and with a little brinksmanship, potentially force smaller states to back down.

What must a largely coastal state with a territorial dispute with China procure to ensure that Beijing thinks twice about pushing those claims? Surface ships are expensive assets.

When they are equipped with modern anti-ship missiles and facing off against other surface ships, it can become a naval knife fight very quickly—and the first rule of any knife fight is that both fighters will get cut. The solution is very good anti-surface warfare (ASuW) weapons that provide an asymmetric advantage against enemy ships.

The classic example of these weapons is a diesel-electric submarine.

Diesel-electric submarines use a diesel motor to generate an onboard battery that is activated when the boat is submerged to power the propellers.

Detecting a submarine often relies on passive sonar, which involves listening very closely to the water to pick up distinctive submarine sounds. As a result,

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features submarines have to be quiet in order to survive, and because they are running on a battery, diesel-electric powered subs are the quietest out there. In effect, a diesel submarine is the perfect weapon to prevent an enemy fleet from operating in your coastal waters, but not much else. The other popular option is anti-ship missiles, which can be launched from aircraft, land, ships, and even submarines.

Aside from China, several other nations in Southeast and East Asia are procuring submarines, suggesting a counter-China arms race. Vietnam has just received the first of its six submarines ordered from Russia, prompting some to question whether the country’s defense industry and military even have the technical experience to operate and maintain such advanced subs.

Meanwhile, Japan is quietly increasing its own submarine force from 16 to 22.

South Korea, currently operating 12, plans to produce another 6 to have a total fleet of 18 by 2018. Singapore has two new subs in the pipeline to be delivered around 2020. Malaysia’s two submarines, ordered in 2002, arrived in 2009-2010, though it has no real plans to procure more.

If all of the above countries were to achieve their procurement goals, roughly 30 new submarines would enter the fleets of China’s neighbors. Is this an arms race? The numbers alone are not actually all that interesting, since for most nations they do not constitute a major defense priority. Both Japan and South Korea operate relatively large and capable surface fleets, and any increased procurement of submarines has not affected their surface fleet modernization programs, which are ongoing. These large surface fleets are emblematic of the high level of capital investment required to balance against China’s conventional war capabilities.

Rather than challenging China’s navy asymmetrically, the two countries are arguably seeking to respond to China’s own asymmetric challenge, but China is not the only threat to which Seoul and Tokyo are responding.

Critically, surface ships are flexible enough to respond to a variety of regional threats. In a region where most states have coastlines and economies dependent on maritime trade, the best way to protect vital sea lines of communication is through surface ships. This versatility needs to be taken into ac-

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columbia political review :: spring 2014 count when speaking about naval arms proliferation and what threats might be driving it. Large surface ships like destroyers can shoot down ballistic missiles, like those possessed by North Korea, which has threatened South Korea and Japan. Indeed, the sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean surface ship, by a North Korean midget submarine exemplifies the vulnerability of surface ships to even outdated attackers under the right circumstances. The South Korean navy’s interest in procuring better anti-submarine warfare capabilities, such as another helicopter carrier, is as much directed against the North Korean submarine threat as it is against the Chinese. Helicopters, because they can drop sonar buoys and torpedoes, are great sub hunters. They are also great for humanitarian operations, and Japanese helicopter carriers proved their worth responding to the destruction

“In this arms race, some participants are sprinting, some are walking, and some are spectating.” caused by the 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami, as well as the 2013 Philippines typhoon.

In the South China Sea, the situation is also more nuanced. One of the claimants to the Spratly Islands dispute, the Philippines, has not made many advances toward purchasing new naval weapons. Because of inadequate funding, the Philippine navy has had to operate some of the oldest warships in the world, including a 70-year-old frigate.

In fact, The US Coast Guard recently donated two 45-year-old decommissioned cutters to the navy, which were viewed as a significant increase in capability. It still has no surface to air missiles, no surface-to-surface missiles, and no real anti-submarine warfare capability. In addition, the military must also contend with the localized threat of Islamic separatist groups in the south of the country. If there is an arms race in Asia, Manila is still at the starting line.

Vietnam, on the other hand, has gone full steam ahead with a counter-China procurement strategy, bolstered by

rapidly expanding energy assets. In addition to its six submarines, it has placed orders for modern surface ships, offshore patrol aircraft, land-based anti-ship missiles, and new Russian fighter jets. Most of these new systems have been ordered or procured since 2009, contrasting sharply with the incremental modernization that took place in the decade before. Modernization is almost exclusively naval and air-oriented, as the Vietnamese military is not progressing with any land-based procurement programs, except updating their stock of Soviet-era tanks. Importantly, the Vietnamese and Chinese navies fought several small-scale skirmishes with each other in the 1970s and 1980s, one of which, in 1988, saw Vietnam lose some 70 sailors and two warships. Having been a historical victim of Chinese aggression, Hanoi perceives an expanding Chinese surface fleet as a significant threat, and is balancing against it.

Nevertheless, Vietnam seems to be the exception in the South China Sea. Malaysia’s new submarine capability is significant, but it has no plans to procure more, and two subs do not constitute a credible undersea deterrent. In addition, its other procurement programs are moving in fits and starts. For example, plans for new frigates remain on hold while a batch of six smaller corvettes will begin delivery in 2017.

Malaysia’s haphazard procurement has led IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly to suggest the “government [is] placing more priority on political considerations and economic expediency in regard to fleet development and procurement.”

Recently, under pressure of budget cuts, the government has decided that instead of buying new fighter jets, it would lease them.

Ironically, the smallest Southeast Asian country, Singapore, has the most advanced navy. For such a large budget, it has relatively few dedicated asymmetric weapon systems like submarines. Like Japan and South Korea, it has leveraged its large defense budget into building a well-rounded military that can respond to many threats. This means that while it has some advanced surface ships, including six stealth frigates, it also has spent significant time and money building a highly capable air force and army, the latter of which is of little use to stop a Chinese fleet.

Singapore has a difficult history with Malaysia, from which it seceded, and

columbia political review :: spring 2014

those tensions play an important role in both of the countries defense planning. Its defense spending is directed as much toward balancing against regional rivals, against whom it seeks to maintain a clear technological edge, as it is toward China.

Nevertheless, Singapore cooperates with its regional rivals Malaysia and Indonesia to protect the vital Straits of Malacca, through which much of the region’s trade passes, from piracy. With globalized economies, it is unsurprising that East and Southeast Asian nations want robust navies to protect sea-lanes.

Each coastal state is dependent on the sea, and guarding these trade and energy routes requires strong navies. The simple fact that they are modernizing their navies is not itself evidence of regional arms race, nor is it evidence of a changing regional power dynamic.

Military hardware is not inherently useful; it is the capabilities, which hardware provides, that create power.

Too often measurements of military power become exercises of arithmetic: how many ships does China have? How many does Singapore have? But these numbers do not tell us much. A useful

measure of military power must describe what a military force can do, and how successfully. Going further, simple tabulations of what arms a country is buying will not reveal much about its defense policy; rather, the capabilities of those arms will. The better question to ask is whether a country’s procurement program has given it new capabilities. When we look at procurement in the Asia-Pacific region, we realize that the modernization of many countries’ apart from China has not brought with it any game-changing capabilities.

Those types of procurements, such as Vietnam’s submarine purchase, do happen, but not frequently enough to suggest the entire region’s balance of power is in the serious flux expected of a multilateral arms race.

Further, the regional trend of modernizing navies is not convincing evidence that China’s military is threatening all countries equally. Indeed, of the Spratly Islands claimants, Vietnam and the Philippines have had tense confrontations with China while Singapore and Malaysia have tended to avoid confrontations. Analyses of China’s military capabilities and strategies are

features

often clouded by a certain alarmism, and the regional arms narrative is part of this. While China’s military growth is undeniable, it is important to avoid overreaction and sensationalism. Attributing naval weapons proliferation in the region to only China also makes the mistake of hastily discounting other rivalries and threats. The greater takeaway from looking at the shopping lists of Asia-Pacific countries is that different militaries are indeed different. In this arms race, some participants are sprinting, some are walking, and some are spectating. Wide, sweeping claims of a regional arms race in response to China, are not only exaggerated, they minimize the important idiosyncratic motivations that sub-regional states militaries have to procure different weapons. cpr

Greg Graff, CC ‘15, is currently majoring in political science with a specialization in international relations.

His interests include security and defense issues, especially ones involving obnoxiously long and complicated acronyms. He can be reached at: ggg2118@columbia.edu.

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columbia political review :: spring 2014

Diamonds Aren’t Forever

De Beers’ Uncertain Future in Botswana

W

hen we recall the most influential figures in the history of Africa, we could consider state leaders such as Anwar Sadat and Nelson Mandela, or seminal figures like the king of the Zulus and Kofi Annan.

We might not, however, think of Cecil Rhodes, the man who gave his name to the Rhodes scholarship, Rhodes University, and even the nation of Rhodesia before it split into Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Cecil Rhodes left his own contribution to the history of Africa by leaving what many white men before him have left to Africa—a vehicle to imperialize the continent, a vehicle enshrined in exploitation of the world’s most precious stone. Cecil Rhodes founded De Beers.

De Beers, the world’s most powerful diamond mining company, has held a monopoly on the diamond market since the trade evolved into an international market, acting more as a cartel than an actual company. As a company with a fantastically successful practice, De Beers seeks to meet the incredibly high demand for diamonds at all costs. The De Beers empire is far-reaching, with interests in Siberia, Brazil, and, most notably,

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By Ankeet Ball in southern Africa, namely Botswana.

The reach of the empire has its hands in regional authoritative bodies, special interest groups, and even governments, especially in the case of Botswana.

This tiny African nation has transformed itself from a destitute post-British colonial state into a nation with one of the most robust economies and stabel governments in the continent. This transformation can be largely attributed to its partnership with De Beers in diamond mining operations through Debswana, a joint venture diamond mining company with profits and dividends split evenly between the lone shareholders, Botswana and De Beers. The revenues from Debswana provide 50 percent of all government revenues in Botswana. The case study of the relationship between De Beers and Botswana represents the intermingling of a firm and the state, the combination of economic and political interests, and serves as a modern study of political economy. It also provides an intriguing glimpse into modern imperialism.

The present economic and political atmosphere is extremely promising for Botswana, but the future could be bleak.

Diamonds, as precious as they are, cannot possibly last forever, and concerns are growing about the future of Botswana’s economy after the supply of diamonds runs dry. What will Botswana do when De Beers leaves? While Botswana can continue to reap the benefits of its relationship with De Beers for the present, it must identify and come to terms with the ecological, economic, and human rights problems posed by the company, and work towards economic independence. For its future prosperity, Botswana must become independent of the influence of De Beers in order to sustain hope for the existence of an economically independent and stable African state.

A diamond gemstone has been a symbolic object of gentility throughout the course of human history. Before the 19th century, diamonds were almost solely in the hands of high-class aristocrats or royalty. They were usually stumbled upon by accident in Brazil and India, and organized attempts of wide-scale diamond mining generally went unnoticed on the world stage. However, in the late 19th century, as European nations scrambled to colonize Africa after initial exploration of the “dark continent,” a diamond rush began in South Africa that marked the dawn of diamonds as the root of a commercial enterprise. The discovery of this precious mineral in southern African lands flooded the world diamond market. In simple economic vernacular, a rush of supply drives down price, and the sudden spike in the diamond market weakened the comparative utility of owning a diamond.

Cecil Rhodes saw opportunity in this newfound market, and started buying up deeds to diamond mines, including one owned by the two de Beer brothers.

Rhodes merged his fledgling company with that of his rival Barney Barnato, forming the De Beers Mining Company. By 1900, De Beers consolidated a monopoly on all production and distribution of diamonds coming out of colonial southern Africa. As time passed, more and more diamond claim holders and distributors merged with De

columbia political review :: spring 2014 Beers because of a compelling mutual interest: to create a shortage of diamonds and profit off of the high prices.

When the Great Depression hit, the price of diamonds fell, like nearly all other goods. To keep the demand for diamonds high, De Beers conducted one of the most successful advertising campaigns in the history of marketing, equating love with the size of a diamond and generating their famous company slogan in 1947, “a diamond is forever.”

Men started buying diamonds left and right, and movie stars showed off their new diamonds in the golden age of Hollywood. This sudden spike in the demand for diamonds drove prices up exponentially and financed further expansion. De Beers, having conquered the US market, created new international markets using its same advertising model in promising markets like Japan, Germany, and Brazil.

The history and success of De Beers is intrinsically linked with the history of the Republic of Botswana. Modern-day Botswana was known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate of the United Kingdom.

Established in 1885 as a method of protection for Setswana-speaking peoples from aggressive Dutch Boer expansion in southern Africa, the Protectorate sought independent and democratic self-governance in 1964. After prolonged talks with European-African advisory councils and other regional bodies, a constitution for the Republic of Botswana was penned in 1965, leading to general elections and eventual independence on September 30, 1966. Seretse Khama, a highly public figure on the road to independence for Botswana, and also a descendent of the principal Mangwato tribe, became the first president of Botswana after election in 1966. In 1967, a team of De Beers geologists found abundant quantities of ilmenite and garnet, the two chief indicators of diamondiferous presence, between the villages of Letlhakane and Mopipi Pan. In April 1967, the volcanic pipe at Orapa was found, initiating the excavation of the world’s most valuable diamond mine. De Beers saw the vast potential for diamond mining in Botswana and, previously denied access by the commonwealth for land grants, now came knocking on the door of newly-independent Botswana.

The joint venture between Botswana and De Beers, originally named the De Beers Botswana Mining Company, was formed in June of 1968. The diamonds produced by Botswana were of such exceptional quality that the government

of Botswana was allowed an initial 15 percent stake in the company, which grew to a 50 percent share over the next five years. The company changed its name to Debswana Diamond Company in 1991. Today, Debswana operates four diamond mines (including the aforementioned Orapa mine) in a monopoly of diamond mining in Botswana, producing nearly one out of every four diamonds by carat. The high value by weight of diamonds mined

by Debswana has cemented the company’s status as the leading producer of diamonds by value in the entire world.

Debswana has become a symbol of identity for Botswana. It serves as the largest non-government employer in Botswana, employing over 6,000 people. Politicians in Botswana are swayed by the government’s biggest lobbyists—De Beers representatives. The consistency of Botswana’s ability to produce market goods has prompted major investment services to deem Botswana as the safest credit risk in Africa. Debswana production accounts for nearly one-third of the gross domestic product of Botswana, deeming the nation one of the foremost producers of diamonds in the entire world.

Even though De Beers has brought on an age of prosperity for Botswana, the business practices of De Beers create negative externalities for the African nation. In the quest to establish diamond mines central to Debswana practices, De Beers has monopolized crucial supplies of water for business purposes.

Botswana is an extremely arid nation often plagued by drought. Environmental projections from the UNEP conclude that the temperature of Botswana will in-

features

crease by as much as 1.6 degrees Celsius by 2050, leading to an even lower rate of precipitation. Because of its drought problems, the people and government of Botswana rely on groundwater supplies to provide water for the nation. De Beers lobbyists have forced government officials of Botswana to supply Debswana with a guaranteed percentage of water reserves for business purposes, decreasing the supply for the general population. Diamond mining has also degraded land potentially useful for herd grazing; in an effort to secure lands for diamond mining, Debswana has forced owners of large herds of cattle westwards, causing overgrazing problems in western Botswana in the pursuit of diamonds.

Botswana might face a few environmental problems regarding De Beers, but the country must cope with the largest pending issue concerning De Beers: the overall diamond supply. The

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features government of Botswana announced in 2009 that it would attempt to shift its economic focus and dependence on diamonds due to serious projections of diamonds drying out in Botswana over the next twenty years. At this time, Botswana would be devastated by a sudden exit of De Beers from its economy—diamonds, again, account for 50 percent of government revenues and nearly a third of the national GDP. Debswana employs 6,300 specially trained Batswana who would then be unemployed, affecting thousands of families. Foreign investment, capital markets, and trade flow would become heavily distorted due to the exit of Botswana’s largest contributor of capital flow. The economic effects will be devastating if Botswana fails to prepare for a future without diamonds.

This precious stone cannot be a sustainable good for the future of Botswana because of its rapidly decreasing supply.

The most transparent and public problem that De Beers has faced in Botswana has been the abuse of human rights of the indigenous Bushmen, or San, tribes living in the country. Spurred by De Beers lobbyists, the government has used harassment tactics to drive them out of their native lands to give way for mining operations. After finding evidence of diamonds within the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (created to protect the native territory of the Bushmen), government officials forced the Bushmen out of the territory in three big clearances, the most recent one being in 2005. Remaining Bushmen were forbidden to bore holes to search for groundwater, forcing them to relocate in order to find water for survival. After De Beers decided not to mine expansively in the reserve, Botswana allowed some populations to start returning, but the damage had been done.

Native Bushmen, once culturally and economically independent, are now dependent on government handouts, rarely able to hunt to sustain their cultural lifestyle, and many have succumbed to the rampant HIV/AIDS epidemic. This trend has caused an uproar from human rights watchdog groups, specifically by the international indigenous rights organization, Survival International, who seek to remove De Beers from Botswana because of its infringement of basic human rights.

For all the good that De Beers has done for Botswana, the presence of the diamond cartel in the core identity of Botswana will pose a problem in the long term. The relationship between De

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columbia political review :: spring 2014 Beers and Botswana can be described as a sort of economic colonialism; while there is some sort of mutualism within the relationship, the freedom of the country to function as an independent nation is hindered by De Beers due to the firm’s massive influence on Botswana’s political and economic policies.

Botswana will, one day, within our lifetimes, cease to serve De Beers as the center of its diamond empire, and, if Botswana does not prepare for that day, the consequences will be devastating.

First and foremost, the government of Botswana must take measures to reduce the influence of De Beers lobbyists on government operations. Noting the impending limit of diamonds in Botswana, the government cannot allow such influence from a foreign actor on policy decisions. Botswana must gradually reduce its stake in Debswana, either converting it to tradable capital stock or by selling it altogether in installments. Bo-

“The government of Botswana must take measures to reduce the influence of De Beers lobbbyists on government operations” tswana will then benefit from cashing out a very valuable investment over time, instead of keeping a share of a company that will become worthless once the diamond supply runs dry in the nation.

By drawing back its economic investment in Debswana, De Beers’ influence will have decreasing economic implications for policy decisions by the Botswana government, carving a path towards total political autonomy, free from tyrannically strong foreign interests.

While reducing this political influence, the Botswana government must also reinstate the land rights of the remaining Bushman population. The Bushman/San people are critical to the ancestral and cultural identity of Botswana, and measures must be taken by the government in order to preserve the land domain of those populations. Groundwater and boring rights must also be granted to these populations so that a self-sustaining civilization can once again emerge, free from government entitlements.

In the long term, Botswana’s reconciliation with its indigenous peoples will

positively impact the history of Botswana, much more than its relatively shortterm economic benefits from diamonds.

Lastly, and most critically, Botswana must make preparations for a post-diamond economy. In 2007, significant quantities of uranium were discovered, prompting the initiative of uranium mining from the Botswana government. Uranium can serve as an eventual replacement for diamonds as a crucial export good. Botswana’s financial institutions rank as some of the most sophisticated in all of Africa; the financial sector provides plenty of access to credit for entrepreneurs. Botswana can transform itself from a goods-based economy to a service-based economy with further efforts to establish itself as a global financial center. New portfolio investment options have caused the Botswana Stock Exchange to grow. Botswana must continue its traditions of prudent fiscal policymaking, conservative and cautious foreign policy, and technical assistance on the international level. Botswana can also enlarge its market for tourism, which currently accounts for 12 percent of GDP. However, Botswana’s timeline is much shorter compared to other nations who have made similar economic transitions.

The De Beers-Botswana relationship simply is not sustainable despite the massive role of De Beers in the transformation of Botswana. In order to continue developing into a strong economy, a consciously protected environment, and civilian reconciliation, Botswana must eventually sever its ties with the De Beers cartel. Botswana represents an international hope that has been sought after for much of the 20th century: a robust African economy coupled with a politically stable state. Free from violence and tribal warfare, free from widespread corruption and government inefficiency, free from the failure of financial markets and rampant inflation, Botswana itself is Africa’s own diamond—and in order for it to shine brightest, it must one day shine without the help of De Beers. cpr

Hailing from a New Jersey suburb of Philadelphia, Ankeet Ball, CC `16, is majoring in Economics-Political Science with a concentration in American Studies. He is an aspiring appellant lawyer and wishes to eventually enter a life of politics and public service. He can be reached at: ab3755@columbia.edu.

CPR is always looking for new contributors for our website.

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MORTON ADD HERE

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