MIXED SIGNS FOR COAL IMPORTS INTO ASIA

TRADE & COMMODITIES Mixed signs for coal imports into Asia

Transshipment plays an important role in Asia’s coal market (photo: Shi.E.L.D. Services).

Richard Scott, Bulk Shipping Analysis

Imports into countries in Asia comprise the biggest part of world seaborne coal trade, over four-fifths of the total. Consequently the Asian trend is closely watched and, as expected, a partial recovery was seen last year, after the previous year’s large reduction when the coronavirus pandemic severely weakened energy consumption. Amid reviving energy use in 2021 coal demand strengthened, but prospects for further growth during 2022 seem unclear.

Asia’s role as an importer is often the main focus of attention, although the regional contribution as an export supplier is also a prominent feature of the global coal market. Import demand reflects economic and commercial influences, but political pressures in many countries have become increasingly visible. Typically these are less predictable, in both timing and magnitude, resulting in forecasts with a greater speculative element.

Nevertheless, underlying determinants of coal movements into Asia are broadly clear. Among energy sources, coal consumption — frequently dependent wholly or partly on imports — remains a preferred option, assisting economic progress and enabling rising energy use. This emphasis supports purchases of coal, especially when competitiveness is improved by high prices for alternatives such as natural gas. Conversely in several larger economies, reducing coal consumption is a government environ mental policy aim. Such policies impose a shift towards cleaner energy supplies, restraining coal imports.

Over three-quarters of Asia’s import volume consists of steam coal, with the remainder comprising coking coal. The largest individual importing countries are China, India and Japan, while South Korea and Taiwan are also major buyers. In recent years a group of smaller importers has become more prominent, including Vietnam’s notable robust trend.

SUPPORTING ENERGY USE Energy consumption in Asia revived last year after the downturn caused by the pandemic’s adverse impact on economic activity. Changes in the trend were reflected in coal usage, which fell and then recovered. Previously there had been solid support for energy and coal demand, accompanying increased volumes needed by power stations, steel mills and other industries amid economic progress in many countries.

Some positive signs for the remainder of 2022 and beyond are still evident. The damaging effects of the pandemic are receding in many economies although, as events in China have emphasized in recent weeks, there remains potential for further setbacks. But prospects for the world and individual countries in Asia have been overshadowed since the end of February

China

2016 2017 2018

2019 2020 2021* % change**

200 217 237 258 238 281 +18

Japan

184 186 183 180 168 177 +5 India 199 203 231 250 222 209 -6 South Korea 125 141 141 135 117 119 +2 Taiwan 65 69 69 71 67 73 +9 Other importers 110 126 149 170 184 181 -2

Total 883 942 1,010 1,064 996 1,040

% change 3.2 6.7 7.2 5.3 -6.4 4.4

* estimate ** 2021 compared with previous year source: Clarksons Research, Bulk Shipping Analysis

by the war in Ukraine. In an update on the world economy published last month the OECD organization commented that “beyond the ongoing humanitarian disaster, the economic damage is already being felt worldwide and risks becoming increasingly severe”.

The OECD further suggested that the conflict in Ukraine is “throwing the strong global economic recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic into doubt”. Before the war began growth in global economic activity and in some individual Asian countries was widely expected to decelerate during 2022 after the initial rebound from the pandemic. This expectation implied continued, but probably slower, increases in energy use with coal demand and imports potentially reflecting the general trend

In 2021 gross domestic product in Asia rebounded. Within the emerging and developing Asia group — which includes China and India — GDP growth surged to an estimated 7.2% (after a –0.9% decrease in the previous twelve months), and was estimated to grow at 5.9% by the IMF in its January report this year. Among advanced Asian economies, Japan achieved a 1.6% GDP increase last year after a –4.5% reduction previously, and was predicted to see a 3.3% rise in 2022. Progress at such forecast rates now looks more difficult to attain as the effects of the Ukraine war spread around the world.

Assuming that many Asian countries will achieve a sustained, albeit slower than earlier forecast continuation of recovery from the pandemic, energy demand could strengthen this year, with some advantages for coal. Another more specific influence is energy supply shortages directly resulting from the war in Ukraine. The conflict and its consequences has led to much greater uncertainty about Russian oil and gas supplies. An already tight global market for natural gas and the higher international prices resulting was tightened further by these events. Coal’s competitiveness could be enhanced.

COAL IMPORTS TRENDS Last year’s upturn in Asia’s seaborne coal imports reversed almost two-thirds of the preceding year’s fall. As shown in the table, the period of four years from 2016 to 2019 saw the regional volume increasing by an average 5.6% annually to reach 1,064mt (million tonnes). This robust trend was followed by a 68mt or 6% reduction in

2020, to 996mt and, based on Clarksons Research calculations, a 44mt (4%) increase to 1,040mt in 2021.

Changes seen last year, compared with the previous twelve months, varied among individual importing countries. India was the only country among the five largest importers to see a continued decline, of 6%. China recorded strong 18% expansion, while Japan, South Korea and Taiwan saw growth within a 2–9% range. The other importers group comprising about onesixth of the Asian total experienced a further slight 2% weakening.

Trends and patterns revealed in the table show that imports into Japan and Taiwan have been relatively stable over recent years. In China an upwards trend has evolved, while in India and South Korea annual volumes have decreased in the past two years after previously expanding. The smaller importers category — including Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam — grew strongly up to 2020 before slackening last year.

Asia’s imports are predominantly, approximately 80%, steam (also known as thermal) coal grades used mainly for electricity generation. Other significant consumers are cement producers and various manufacturing industries. The balance of 20% is coking (or metallurgical) coal, used in the steel industry by mills employing blast furnace technology to make pig iron as the intermediate product for conversion into steel.

Both coal types are needed by many Asian buyers, in varying proportions reflecting features of individual domestic markets. Foreign purchases result from a lack of domestic supplies, or domestic mines’ inability to supply sufficient quantities of the required grades.

Changes in import volumes may reflect changing prices for domestic supplies. In India and China domestic coal production is extensive, satisfying a large part of the national market, while Japan, Korea and Taiwan rely solely or mostly on imported supplies.

Changing coal imports flows into Asia are affected by variations in electricity generation and steel production in particular, as well as the fluctuating output of other energy consuming industries.

Port of Visakhapatnam in India.

Large increases or decreases in domestic coal production and supplies, and domestic coal price fluctuations, are sometimes prominent influences. Another variable increasingly visible is alternative energy supplies — hydro-power, natural gas, renewable energy from wind or solar sources, and nuclear — affecting power generation markets in many countries.

IMPORTS CHANGES IN 2021 A closer look at last year’s changes in Asia highlights China’s import demand rebounding, amid coal shortages accompanying the country’s economic recovery. Seaborne imports (the total excludes overland movements, mostly from Mongolia) are estimated at 281mt, a 43mt or 18% increase compared with the previous year, as shown by the table. The elevated total exceeded the previous peak, attained after an upwards trend over a period of four years.

Overall energy consumption in China reportedly rose by 5.2% in 2021, assisted by a rapidly improving economy, and power generation increased by 8.1%. Coal consumption for all purposes was 4.6% higher, the strongest rate of growth in a decade. Another major influence, coal production from domestic mines, saw a 5% rise to reach 4.070mt. Despite enlarged domestic output, shortages were apparent and, consequently, despite government policy measures designed to limit foreign purchases, a resurgence in coal imports occurred.

By contrast in India a 13mt (6%) coal imports decline to 209mt was seen last year according to the Clarksons Research estimates shown in the table. However, alternative estimates suggest that there may have been an increase, which would be more consistent with robust economic recovery and an 18% rise in steel production, heavily dependent on imported coking coal. Major coal users are the electricity generation, steel and cement industries. The government’s policy aims to increase reliance on domestic coal mines, the dominant steam coal supplier.

The third largest Asian coal buyer, Japan, registered a 9mt (5%) rise in imports to 177mt last year after the previous year’s reduction. Energy consumption was boosted by the country’s economic recovery. Since the Fukushima nuclear power station disaster more than a decade ago, which resulted in most plants of this type being closed, reliance on coal as well as other power station fuels has continued. Nuclear plant reopenings have been limited, because of safety checks and political opposition.

South Korea’s coal imports were 2mt (2%) higher in 2021 at 119mt. Volumes in the past two years have been lower than in the preceding period. The government is continuing to prioritize environmental improvements, especially air pollution reduction, and is aiming to cut the country’s dependence on coal, shifting towards the cleaner alternatives of natural gas and nuclear power generation. In Taiwan coal imports recovered last year by 6mt (9%) to 73mt, despite a policy of moving towards using more gas and renewables for power generation.

In the group of countries shown in the table as ‘other importers’ a limited 3mt (2%) decrease to 181mt is estimated to have occurred last year. This reduction followed a strong upwards trend in recent years reflecting several smaller importing countries, which became a rapidly expanding part of the Asian region’s coal trade. Rising imports were seen in the subcategory comprised of Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. But in 2021 Vietnam’s volume abruptly diminished, falling by 13mt (24%) to 39mt.

PROSPECTS FOR IMPORTS Intensified uncertainty about how geopolitical events will unfold over the next twelve months has arisen. The economic impact of the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia’s economy and trade is hard to evaluate. But it seems likely that the global economy’s recovery, including progress in many Asian countries after the coronavirus pandemic will decelerate more than expected earlier.

Although some indications still point to further growth in Asia’s coal imports during

2022, after last year’s upturn, confidence in predictions has receded. Economic recovery and accompanying stronger energy use may be greatly restrained by recent events. Higher prices for, and possibly shortages of, energy supplies including coal are actual or potential outcomes which could have adverse effects on coal trade over the year ahead.

Despite a possibility that imports into Asia could continue to rise this year, albeit slowly, an upwards longer-term trend extending into later years seems much less likely, because of the restrictive pressures clearly visible. Many governments across Asia are prioritizing steps to tackle environmental problems and are shaping energy policies accordingly, which typically results in an emphasis on cutting coal consumption. Consequently purely commercial influences determining coal use and imports are not always at the forefront.

Reducing air pollution to acceptable levels and cutting greenhouse gas emissions in the longer term, are central issues considered by policymakers. This aspect complicates analysis of the outlook for Asia’s coal markets. While changes in policy affecting coal consumption and imports are foreseeable as broad possibilities, the extent and timing of changes and what effects these may have on volumes are not so easily predictable. Moreover, some energy policy modifications may be unforeseen.

In recent years both China and India have been a particular focus of attention amid political decisions with a major actual or potential impact on coal. These two buyers imported 490mt last year, almost half of the Asia total. Growth prospects are uncertain and restraining influences have become prominent.

A target of greatly reducing or eliminating coal imports into India, announced several years ago, has been confirmed as a medium-term aim. Although apparently difficult to achieve, gradual progress could substantially weaken seaborne coal movements. In China an unofficial ceiling on annual coal imports appears to exist, but whether it is applicable under all circumstances is not clear. Many government policy measures affect Chinese coal consumption, domestic production and market performance, complicating predictions.

AN UNCLEAR FORECAST Moderately positive views of Asia’s coal imports in 2022 are adopted by some forecasters. Amid reviving energy demand as the pandemic’s effects recede, this outlook seems plausible although the future pace is unclear. While economic influences indicate the direction of the trade trend, the impact of political decisions in several countries is hazy. As a result, forecasts are speculative.

A flat (approximately unchanged) regional volume of imports or a marginal increase this year, compared with the previous twelve months, can be envisaged. Additional imports into India, Japan and the ‘other importers’ group could contribute to maintaining or raising the Asian total. In South Korea and Taiwan potential for higher volumes seems limited, and in China a reduction after last year’s large expansion is seen as more likely.

Several smaller importers may see growing volumes in the current year. Higher steam coal purchases by Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam are foreseen. Some of these countries may be sustaining a longer-term upwards trend. In several, coal is still the most economical and convenient source of energy used in power generation, an essential element of aiming to achieve economic progress.

Activity at numerous ports in Asia where coal is discharged could experience firm support in the year ahead, reflecting maintained or perhaps increased throughput volumes. Ports in exporting countries within the Asian region — mainly in Indonesia and Russia (Pacific coast) — could benefit.

However, as a consequence of international reaction to the war in Ukraine, there is greater uncertainty about Russia’s large exports. If these are substantially restricted, more Asian supplies may be sourced elsewhere around the world.

Russian war on Ukraine fuels food price surge

Eastern European crisis increases demand for Indian surplus agribulk

The port of Mykolaiv is one of several closed in Ukraine while the war with Russia rages.

No sooner had the world started recovering from the profound negative impact of Covid-19 pandemic than the Russian president Vladimir Putin decided to send his army across the border to Ukraine to install a government in Kyiv of his choosing and also to make sure that the country does not join NATO.

As Russia steps up its assault of Ukraine, which was once part of the Soviet Union, in the face of brave resistance by the Ukrainians, the world is paying for the sins of Putin by buying wheat at prices that are already at their highest since the 2008 global food crisis. This is because the war leading to closure of Ukrainian seaports such as Odesa, Pivdennyi and Mykolaiv has come in the way of wheat shipments to foreign destinations. Moreover, intense shelling by Russian army and air force has destroyed transport logistics of the aggressed. Not only this. The increasingly comprehensive sanctions by the Western powers and Japan, including disbanding of SWIFT facility to Russian banks have made it too very challenging to conduct trade, including agricultural produce with Putin’s country.

War is spine chilling. This is specially so when this is sponsored by a country with the largest nuclear arsenal. And the world is getting a very bitter taste of it. For days on end, rates at Chicago Futures Exchange were found hitting the daily limit, the most in records going back more than six decades. The United Nations has told the world that food prices of wheat and the rest are already at their all-time peak. But as the war situation on the ground worsens and passage from crop growing fields to food processing plants and onto ports is destroyed, food prices are destined to rise further stoking inflation. Go to any store, you will find everything made from wheat be it bread or biscuit or pasta or noodles, prices are going up and up. This cannot be otherwise since wheat is a hugely globally traded commodity. Between Ukraine and Russia, the world’s two breadbaskets, they have a share of over 25% of the global trade in wheat. If barley along with wheat

Kunal Bose

is considered, then the two warring nations account for over one-third of global trade. Ukraine and Russia also have a major profile in corn and sunflower oil, both as producers and suppliers to the world market.

Since the breakout of the war coincided with plantation of new spring crops in Ukraine, supplies from the traditionally major point will remain choked for quite some time. Moreover, many Ukrainians have abandoned working in farms to join the battle voluntarily. Because of what is happening in Eastern Europe, the world is witnessing a domino effect in prices of agricultural commodities. From edible oils to soybean to corn, prices are sizzling to the discomfort of consumers. In an OECD-FAO report on global agricultural outlook published well ahead of the RussiaUkraine war concern was expressed that the available “agri-food systems fail to keep about 10% of the world population free from hunger.” This is said in the context that in the visualized ideal world, agri-food systems will be “resilient, inclusive and sustainable, producing safe and nutritious food for all” and at the same time generating “livelihoods that guarantee people’s economic access to that food.” Not only has the war made refugees of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who tragically are greatly short of food in a country that has always boasted of surpluses, but it has caused many food surplus countries to become careful in exporting farm products. As governments of a growing number of countries are increasing their oversight on their extent of participation in global trade in cereals in particular to provide relief to their own citizens, China, which is the world’s largest importer of corn and soybean and also a significant user of foreign-origin wheat, is sparing no efforts to secure supplies from all possible sources, including the US. Export restrictions and soaring demand, particularly from China are sending food prices up and up.

When supplies from Russia and Ukraine dry up, importers turn to India, the world’s second-largest producer of wheat, which always has considerable surplus for export unlike China. According to India’s food secretary Sudhansu Pandey, “our wheat exports have picked up in the wake of spike in global prices caused by the war. Even ahead of the conflict, Indian wheat met with good export sales. Wheat exports in the first 11 months till February of 2021/22 financial year were a record 6.6mt (million tonnes) bettering 6.5mt for the whole of 2012/13. As a war fallout, wheat prices are up in a range of Rs24,000 ($316) to Rs25,000 tonne and that’s an incentive to send out as much as possible. I think our March exports will be good. You can expect our wheat exports for 2021/22 will be 7mt plus.”

What will sustain Indian exports at high levels for the coming months is Indian wheat supply will remain comfortable with harvest to start in March and going up to June. In contrast, the wheat crop of Russia and Ukraine will mature in August and September. Moreover, the two countries may not have overcome their logistical disruptions by then. This will work to the advantage of Indian exporters.

India heading for its largest wheat production of 111.32mt on record in the current 2021/22 agricultural year (July to June) will allow it to make the best of brightened export prospects. The record wheat production is fuelled by farmers bringing in an additional 1m hectares making a total of 34.5m hectares under the crop, says the agriculture ministry. What also has aided the bumper harvest is the plentiful availability of irrigation water helped by an excellent monsoon, improved soil moisture and occasional showers and low temperatures coinciding with crop growth. To incentivize farmers, New Delhi announces minimum support price (MSP), based on cost analysis and adequacy of return to growers, for as many as 25 major agricultural commodities, including wheat every year and ahead of start of plantation. Many agencies, including the US Department of Agriculture say New Delhi’s timely announcement of MSP “encouraged farmers to increase wheat planting.”

Like China, India pays top priority to food security. The resilience of the world’s two most populous countries to reach free food to vulnerable sections of society was put to test during the Covid-19 pandemic. Both could come out trumps because over the years they have gone on replenishing buffer stocks of wheat and rice, mainly. According to Food Corporation of India, the country had stocks of 30mt of rice plus unmilled paddy of 44.1mt and 23.4mt of wheat at March beginning. A food ministry

official says: “We generally have stocks in silos that are much higher than the prescribed buffer minimum. The challenge is to rotate the stocks in a way as not to let grains become unfit for human consumption. Now this year we are having record foodgrain production. Therefore, the country is well placed to step up exports of wheat and rice and also sugar without in any way compromising national food security.”

Indian agricultural expert Om Prakash Dhanuka says: “The curse of acute food shortages causing mass malnutrition will accompany any war and internal conflict as we are seeing in many places in the Middle East and Latin America, besides more recently in Ukraine. Wars come to an end when reason prevails. But what is of great concern is the harm the weather change is causing to the farm sector across the world. Thanks to the unacceptable level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions leading to rise in temperature, the warming atmosphere will hold bigger volumes of moisture. That will be the reason for the world to experience storms and floods more often. The inter-governmental panel on climate change has given the warning that things could become worse as the earth warms. This is really bad for agriculture.” Inflation in food prices, says Dhanuka, began ahead of outbreak of Ukrainian war when every country started stockpiling on essential food items panicked by Covid-19 pandemic. But what must also be considered is the fact that before all the pandemic and war related developments, agricultural prices had been relatively weak. Isn’t there also a link between easy monetary policy and food inflation?

The two-year long Covid that claimed thousands of human lives and left millions sick without sparing any country also hurt the agricultural sector alongside industry and trade. Dhanuka says: “The farm sector came under unprecedented stress. Strictly enforced lockdown caused disruptions in movement of farm labour. Supply of inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides became irregular upsetting plantation of crops and their tending. At the same time, the authorities in major producing regions from China to India to the European Union to the US took steps to ensure quick return to normalcy of the sector. The global challenge is to make sure that the farm sector remains resilient and its growth sustainable in all circumstances.” Many emerging nations including China and India not to speak of underdeveloped countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam have to take note of farmers flagging concerns about rising production and transportation costs and also decline in input quality. They are also becoming increasingly vocal about the returns they get for their efforts.

FARMER PROTEST Hadn’t the world witnessed the year-long mass farmer sit-in protest in various parts of India but particularly around Delhi to express strong reservations about three laws that “loosened rules around sale, pricing and storage of farm produce. These rules gave farmers protection from the free market for decades”? The protests on occasions turned violent and nothing that the government did — persuasion and strong arm tactics — would make farmers to abandon the agitation. For the first time the Modi government, which always looked

Indian agricultural expert Om Prakash Dhanuka.

The year-long farmer protests around India meant that the Modi government had to roll back controversial farm laws.

invincible had to back down and roll back the vexed farm laws. There is a lesson here for all democratically elected governments. They must not enact any farm related laws with bearing on crop prices without deep consultation with growers. Indian farmers have served notice that they may be on the road again unless the MSP is made mandatory by law. As the practice now, New Delhi buys different crops but mainly wheat and rice at MSP. But this is done voluntarily and private traders are under no obligation to do transaction on MSP basis. Farmers want sanction of law for MSP, which the government dithers to do. The world had earlier seen how the forced collectivization of farming under Mao Zedong proved disastrous both in terms of impoverishment of growers and crop productivity. Under pressure, Beijing went for gradual de-collectivization through progressive disbanding of communes. As the system in China now obtains, households are required to sell a fixed percentage of farm output to the state procurement agency at predetermined fixed prices and also pay a tax, often in kind to the state. In return, however, the farmers get a fixed quantity of inputs, principally chemical fertilizers, from state agencies at predetermined prices. This dual-track approach has been found good in bringing about substantial improvement in land productivity and making Chinese farm products globally competitive.

Unlike in a democracy, Beijing on all issues, farming or otherwise remains the final arbitrator. So starting 2007, on realization that farmers with average land holdings of 0.5 hectares stand to be more productive, allocate resources optimally and gain greater access to the market if they work together under co-operatives, Beijing is providing sops to the sector by way of preferential taxation and finance. In

SMARTER PORT LOGISTICS SOLUTIONS

Through our new port logistics services, we help our customers improve efficiencies in their supply chain, save on freight costs and reduce carbon emissions. All in line with our purpose of enabling smarter global trade. Visit us on norden.com

fact, some such co-operatives have received technical and financial support from the World Bank. The result: improvement in income of farmer members and jobs for women, returned migrant workers and older people.

The point of concern of Indian agriculture is that average land holding is now down to 1.08 hectares and small landholders cultivate 42% of operated land of 155m hectares. Indian small land owners stand to gain if they have the benefit of mechanization. But that is possible if they voluntarily form co-operatives to be able to use tractors, harvesters and other machinery. Here the government unlike in China could only be a facilitator by educating farmers about the good that cooperativeness will bring about and extend financial and marketing incentives. But being a democracy, state diktat is not an option. Despite all inadequacies in their agriculture system, both China and India have raised foodgrain production in 2021.

FOOD SECURITY CONCERN China’s National Bureau of Statistics informs that overcoming natural disasters wreaking havoc on farm operations, particularly during plantation, the country’s grain production was up 2% to 682.9mt from 650mt a year earlier. There was some improvement in productivity in not so favourable weather since land under cultivation was marginally up close to 170m hectares. Commercial savvy of Chinese farmers was much in evidence as they assigned more land under corn and wheat, which were fetching higher prices. In parallel, seeing prices of soybean and rice falling, land under these crops shrank. Both China and India have started benefiting from their investment in developing better seeds varieties and at the same time bring about continuous improvement in agricultural practices through farmer education.

Even while China continues to achieve new milestones in agriculture development, the concern for food security is pushing Beijing to seek greater global cooperation to facilitate import of some critical items such as corn, soybean, sugar and cotton. Play of geopolitics at times makes Beijing wary of procuring enough supplies of critical items from countries such as the US, Canada and Australia. In soybeans in particular, China remains heavily import dependent. In 2021, its soybeans imports were once again a massive 96.52mt, though down from 100.33mt in 2020 on falling hog margins and higher wheat feeding curbed the oilseed demand.

Brazil and the US make up almost total supplies of soybeans to China. Not comfortable with this high level of import dependence, the country has a threefold strategy to progressively raise domestic production of this oilseed: Bring more land under the crop; expand the operating soybean-corn rotation programme; and bring about improvement in crop yield. At 147mt for rice and 134.3mt for wheat, China is well placed to take care of domestic requirement. But in its search for food security, the country imported 2.94mt of rice and 8.38mt of wheat last year. China’s People’s Daily, which defers to the Communist party line recently wrote: “Safeguarding grain security is an eternal task that can’t be relaxed at any time... We must ensure domestic supplies to counter external uncertainties.”

In the meantime, India with a modest improvement of 1.71% in harvesting attained a record foodgrains production of 316.06mt in 2021/22, including 127.93mt of rice and 111.32mt of wheat. All these are according to second advance estimates by agriculture ministry to come for review twice in the next few months. India, which continues to be very largely dependent on imports of edible oils and oilseeds, could lift production of nine major oilseeds, including groundnut, sunflower, soybeans and rapeseed by 3.34% to 359.46mt. This comes as some relief for the government in the face of recent sharp inflation in prices of edible oils.

In its aggressive pursuit of self-reliance in pulses, a common man’s staple, New Delhi has a programme to bring more land under the crop, make available quality seeds to farmers and ensure farm gate procurement by processors to eliminate wastage. The country is at least 10% import dependent on pulses import, which would be around 2mt during 2021/22. Pulses production this season is likely to be up 5.87% to 26.96mt from 25.46mt a year earlier.

DCi