Taking into account what can or does go wrong

An important aspect of preparing for a crisis is to see what can go wrong, either through a simulation exercise or on the basis of an actual event. The case studies that were conducted as part of the PACTESUR project showed two examples of how a lack of coordination among the various security forces tasked with protecting public spaces can lead to a serious near-miss or worse, a catastrophic situation.

Madrid: when lack of cooperation between police forces leads to a near-miss

The first case was a contribution of the City of Madrid. It happened in 2018 when a passenger boarded a high-speed train at Barcelona’s main station, en route to Madrid, with an object resembling a fragmentation grenade in their luggage.

The private security guards at Barcelona’s station did not detect the object and it was only when the train had left the station and was on its way that security services in Madrid were alerted. The case was handed to the National Police who ordered the closure and evacuation of the Madrid Atocha train station, where the train was due to arrive, and nearby Carlos V square. As the incident happened at around 8 a.m. during rush hour, and knowing that Atocha is one of Spain’s busiest stations for high-speed and commuter trains, as well as a major subway hub, the impact on the city’s morning traffic was significant.

Once National Police teams were able to board the train and check the passenger’s luggage, they identified that the suspicious object was actually a belt buckle in the form of a grenade. The alert was lifted and things went back to normal.

The incident highlighted a number of flaws: in Barcelona, a lack of due diligence by the private security officers checking luggage before boarding the train and a lack of communication between that private security company and the Regional Police of Catalonia; in Madrid, a lack of communication between the National Police force and the municipal emergency and police services, especially the Madrid Municipal Police force.

The main takeaway from this case is that the incident was due to poor coordination between the different law enforcement agencies, which was due in part to Spain’s administrative organisation where responsibilities are not always clearly defined between the state, regional and local levels of governance and corresponding levels of policing.

> The lesson learnt is that it is essential to identify and establish clear communication channels between all the relevant actors, in particular law enforcement, when planning for an emergency in a public space. The difficulty though is to identify which authority is responsible for coordinating these different actors, and as far as we know at the time of writing, neither the Barcelona/Catalonia authorities nor the Madrid or national, Spanish ones took any specific, structural measure to correct the failings identified through this case.

Turin: when a crowd panic escalates into tragedy

The incident happened in Turin in 2017 during the projection of the Champions League’s final on a big outdoor screen in the centre of the city. The area was sealed with security barriers and all the 40,000 attendees had to undergo a security check.

Well into the evening, a group of youths used pepper spraying bottles to scare people around them and take advantage of the confusion to rob them of their possessions, such as purses, phones and jewellery. Somebody in the crowd then shouted there was a bomb attack, which unleashed a mass panic, with people scrambling to get out of the sealed off projection area. In the ensuing stampede, three people died and more than 1,500 were injured.

Three critical points and lessons learnt

The ensuing review of the event highlighted three main critical points. The first is that the whole security strategy for the event was based on deterring a terrorist attack from the outside. It did not contemplate a possible incident happening among the attendees.

> The lesson learnt here is that it is also imperative to take into account threats that can come “from the inside”.

The second is that the Municipal and National Police in charge of monitoring the event were for quite some time unable to correctly identify what was going on because of the general confusion in the square.

> The lesson learnt here is that crisis management plans must include measures enabling law enforcement and other relevant actors to correctly assess the situation.

The third is a lack of coordination between the Municipal Police, which was only tasked with monitoring the consumption of alcohol on site, and the National Police. The former had to wait for a long time for the latter’s instruction to evacuate the public.

> The lesson learnt here is that, as also shown in the Madrid case above, seamless cooperation between the different police forces is key.

Local and regional authorities are on the front line to identify and respond to issues that concern citizens the most. They have outstanding capabilities for innovation and solidarity, and for designing integrated, sustainable policies.

On the other hand, protecting public spaces is a constantly evolving challenge, which requires regularly revising and updating strategies, policies and measures. The evolving nature of terrorism and the emergence of new security threats call upon cities and regions to step up their efforts and devise strategies that better equip them to respond to such threats affecting public spaces. Recent climate disasters have highlighted how climate change is set to increasingly affect our urban public spaces in the near future. How do cities prepare and adapt? The current energy crisis and the fact that cities across Europe are dimming (or turning off) public lighting at night calls for revisiting its role in public security. How do you keep a city safe at night and citizens safe from the fear of crime without, or with less, public lighting? With the work from home culture borne out of the Covid pandemic, should we now consider the virtual space as another dimension of our urban public spaces? How do we protect that space, and whom in it?

These are some of the questions that have recently emerged regarding the protection of urban public spaces and the role of local authorities in doing so. The European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) works permanently on this key issue for local authorities, whether through other EU-funded projects, such as IcARUS and Secu4All, or through its regular activities, such as its Security, Democracy and Cities (SDC) conference, its dedicated working groups, and the numerous workshops, web conferences and other meetings it regularly organises onand offline. This issue will be a central topic in Efus’ upcoming IcARUS and SDC conferences, both scheduled for 2024.

Concluding four years of work on a wide range of issues related to the protection of public spaces against terrorist and other threats, the

PACTESUR project proposed a series of recommendations for European local and regional authorities that are expressed in the Declaration of Brussels, which we publish hereafter. It was adopted at the end of the project’s final conference in that city, on 23-24 November 2022. One of the Declaration’s central planks is that local and regional authorities, as the level of governance closest to citizens, have a key role to play in protecting public spaces and as such should be better listened to and supported by national governments and European institutions. Another key idea is that improving and/or strengthening the security of public spaces should always be done while preserving their inherent openness, thus the possibility for all groups of the population to access and use them. Based on these two basic principles, the Declaration suggests several ways in which local and regional authorities can intervene to better protect their public spaces, which all rely on multi-stakeholder partnerships, i.e. the involvement of all relevant stakeholders, whether they are the local police, local businesses, the creative sector or, above all, citizens themselves.

Recommendations

The Declaration of Brussels

Adopted in Brussels on 23 November 2022

We, local elected officials and representatives of local and regional authorities that are members of the PACTESUR project, on the basis of the Nice Declaration of 29 September 2017 calling for action to prevent violent extremism and ensure the security of European and Mediterranean cities; of the Declaration adopted on 22 October 2021 in Nice by Efus members during the Security, Democracy and Cities international conference; of the work carried out over the past four years in the framework of the PACTESUR project, and on the basis of the consensus established within this partnership,

We strongly believe that:

We play a central role in the development and implementation of cross-cutting security policies based on a global and integrated approach to the protection of public spaces.

We share a common reflection on the means to be implemented to better protect our urban public spaces in the face of evolving threats while ensuring that they remain open and accessible to all.

We have a lot to gain from furthering our exchanges on our local strategies, our innovative tools and our best practices.

We are fully engaged in a process of continuous and productive collaboration with national and European institutions to implement appropriate policies and real actions with the support of a community of multidisciplinary international experts.

We are also invested in local security partnerships as local actors are often best placed to identify, prevent and manage issues on the ground.

We, local elected officials and representatives of the local and regional authorities that are members of the PACTESUR project, gathered at the closing event of the PACTESUR project, commit to:

Recognise the evolving nature of the threats and risks inherent to public spaces. Such consideration reinforces the need for frequent risk assessments.

Prioritise responses to threats based on risk and vulnerability assessments in order to promote a preventive approach and design tailored and targeted solutions to deliver safer public spaces.

Adopt a comprehensive and integrated security approach, where the installation of equipment is considered an additional element as part of a general security policy for the protection of public spaces, which involves all the competent local services and not the only local security actors.

Also consider temporary security solutions instead of investing only in permanent solutions. An integrated and comprehensive approach to security must combine short and long term solutions and be able to adapt to evolving situations.

Prioritise the development of a prevention culture as regards security in order to improve public perceptions and strengthen citizen participation in the decision-making process.

Encourage civil society initiatives by promoting solutions that are creative, add an artistic or cultural value, or are seamlessly integrated in the urban landscape, and by paying particular attention to solutions that have an impact on attractiveness, accessibility and openness.

Improve communication and awareness actions before, during and after the installation of physical security equipment in order to increase public acceptance.

Respond to legal, societal and ethical concerns when planning and managing public spaces, in particular by providing the necessary guarantees for the protection of fundamental rights.

Continue to work in close cooperation with European institutions and bring citizens closer to the European Union through exchanges and enhanced collaborations between local, regional and European levels of urban governance.

We, local elected officials and representatives of the local and regional authorities that are members of the PACTESUR project, invite the European institutions to:

Further develop the harmonisation of standards, especially in terms of equipment, and promote the exchange of good practices for the protection and development of public spaces.

Continue their support for the exchange of experience and cooperation between European cities on urban security.

Facilitate European cities’ and communities’ access to funding, advice and training to enable them to respond to topical security challenges.

Annex 1: Twenty-five techniques of situational prevention

1. Target harden

- Steering column locks and immobilisers

- Anti-robbery screens

- Tamper-proof packaging

2. Control access to facilities

- Entry phones

- Electronic card access

- Baggage screening

3. Screen exits

- Ticket needed for exit

- Export documents

- Electronic merchandise tags

6. Extend guardianship

- Take routine precautions: go out in groups at night, leave signs of occupancy, carry phone

- “Cocoon” neighborhood watch

7. Assist natural surveillance

- Improved street lighting

- Defensible space design

- Support whistleblowers

8. Reduce anonymity

- Taxi driver IDs

- “How’s my driving?” decals

- School uniforms

11. Conceal targets

- Off-street parking

- Gender-neutral phone directories

- Unmarked bullion trucks

12. Remove targets

- Removable car radio

- Women’s refuges

- Pre-paid cards for pay phones

13. Identify property

- Property marking

- Vehicle licencing and parts marking

- Cattle branding

16. Reduce frustrations and stress

- Efficient queues and polite service

- Expanded seating

- Soothing music/muted lights

17. Avoid disputes

- Separate enclosures for rival football fans

- Reduce crowding in pubs - Fixed taxi fares

18. Reduce emotional arousal

- Controls on violent pornography

- Enforce good behaviour on soccer field

- Prohibit racial slurs

21. Set rules

- Rental agreements

- Harassment codes

- Hotel registration

22. Post instructions

- “No Parking”

- “Private Property”

- “Extinguish camp fires”

23. Alert conscience

- Roadside speed display boards

- Signatures for customs declarations

- “Shoplifting is stealing”

4. Deflect offenders

- Street closures

- Separate bathrooms for women

- Disperse pubs

5. Control tools/weapons

- “Smart” guns

- Disabling stolen mobile phones

- Restrict spray paint sales to juveniles

9. Utilise place managers

- CCTV for double-deck buses

- Two shop assistants for local stores

- Reward vigilance

10. Strengthen formal surveillance

- Red light cameras

- Burglar alarms

- Security guards

14. Disrupt markets

- Monitor pawn shops

- Controls on classified ads

- Licence street vendors

15. Deny benefits

- Ink merchandise tags

- Graffiti cleaning

- Speed humps

19. Neutralise peer pressure

- “Idiots drink and drive”

- “It’s OK to say No”

- Disperse troublemakers at school

20. Discourage imitation

- Rapid repair of vandalism

- V-chips in TVs

- Censor details of modus operandi

24. Assist compliance

- Easy library checkout

- Public lavatories

- Litter bins

25. Control drugs and alcohol

- Breathalysers in pubs

- Server intervention

- Alcohol-free events

Annex 2: Standardisation in crime prevention can be effective and fun

This article gathers guidelines and other resources on CPTED processes and principles for public space protection.

Standardisation in crime prevention can be effective and fun, by

Paul van Soomeren, Founder DSP Groep

It is common knowledge that the prevention of crime, incivilities and feelings of insecurity require an approach in which local authorities and law enforcement agencies work together with social managers, urban/regional planners and designers and local residents and businesses. The same goes for Security by Design (SbD), Crime Prevention through Urban Design, Planning and Management (CP-UDP), and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). In this article, we will use the term CPTED.