Annex 3: Preventing vehicle attacks: the experience of the UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is the UK Government’s technical authority for physical and personal security. It conducted a study on the prevention of vehicle borne threats and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). This is a summary of the main findings.

Vehicles have been used for decades to facilitate terrorist attacks, traditionally the most recognised form being a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED), in other words a vehicle full of explosives. Vehicles have also been used in countless attacks to facilitate armed assaults on sites and people, either using the vehicle to ram through protective security measures or simply transporting attackers and their materiel.

As with all threats, their nature and frequency fluctuate, and the attack methodologies evolve. In recent years, Vehicle As a Weapon (VAW) has been the most prominent vehicle borne threat, however VAW attacks are not new.

In order to complement their longstanding countermeasure development programme and develop contemporary risk-based security advice, CPNI have reviewed over 150 VAW attacks to develop a detailed understanding of how they manifest themselves.

There have been over 140 VAW attacks between 2014 and 2021, predominantly in Europe, North America and Western Asia, the majority of those occurring in publicly accessible locations. The vast majority can be attributed to extreme Islamist terrorists, and a significant number to extreme right-wing terrorists.

Collaboration with key stakeholders is essential

Justifying counter-terrorism protection of Publically Accessible Locations (PALs) is challenging. PALs are mostly mixed economies, a blend of hospitality, entertainment, social, shopping, business, residential, public and people transit spaces.

A terrorist attacker will exploit any opportunity or weaknesses. As such, layered security and collaboration with key stakeholders is essential to effective mitigation. The opportunities for public / private partnership are great and the benefits are often mutually symbiotic.

For local authorities and businesses, robust governance structures, access to detailed threat information and security advice are essential. Following structured risk management processes helps identify the challenges, opportunities, and risks, and will help develop cohesive and reasonably practicable mitigation strategies.

Close collaboration with counter-terrorism security specialists will help inform threat, planning assumptions and where appropriate help develop risk-based options, designs and implementation of operational and physical protective security measures to Deter, Detect, Delay, Mitigate and Respond to incidents and attacks.

Counter-terrorism security measures should be a supplement to Designing out Crime and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design practices.

At a strategic level, best practice would address six priorities:

1. Development of protective security risk frameworks to help local authorities prioritise places to protect and manage residual risks.

2. Providing counter-terrorism protective security guidance, training and advice to businesses, local authorities and the emergency services.

3. Cross Government collaboration (at local and national levels).

4. Collaborate with, and professionalise, reputable security consultancies and security professionals.

5. Collaborate and, where appropriate, unify emergency response practices.

6. Be prepared to adapt as the threats will continue to evolve and potentially surge.

Vehicle Borne Threats – Physical Mitigation

Understanding how VAW attacks manifest themselves, including the environments they occur in and the response of people and security operations and emergency services, provides opportunities to apply risk-based VAW mitigation strategies that encompass ‘layered’ security.

The proven method of stopping a hostile vehicle is through the deployment of Vehicle Security Barriers (VSB) in accordance with internationally recognised standards and performance rating. There are well over 500 rated VSBs available, of which 470 are listed in CPNI’s Catalogue of Security Equipment that can stop a range of threat vehicles at different speeds and impact angles.

VSBs come in many shapes and sizes; overt and robust in appearance, blended and visually pleasing, dual use such as seating, information signs and other street furniture, landscape such as bunds and berms and temporary barriers.

Manufacturers of vehicle security barriers and street furniture have also invested heavily in making the products adaptable to the urban environment, creating barriers that have very shallow foundations and or no fixtures, thus saving considerable sums in civil costs and avoiding moving services.

In the built environment, counter-terrorism security measures need not be expensive, overt or oppressive. Done well, they can complement the architecture, help build a sense of space, assure the public and indirectly present additional business, social, environmental and economic opportunities.

But it’s not just about the products available. The way in which VSBs are installed is as important as the level of protection they provide. Clearly, VSBs should be installed in the same configuration in which they received their rating, but beyond that there are a multitude of protective security schemes that urban designers and security risk owners should consider, including:

Total traffic exclusion (no vehicles allowed)

Controlled vehicle inclusion (some vehicles allowed)

Footway protection (pedestrian protection on the footway)

Traffic calming to enforce slower vehicle speeds

Semi-permanent protection (permanently installed gates or socketed barriers, occasionally closed)

Temporary protection (short-term deployment of portable barriers)

Do nothing (no protection)

Security personnel are an asset too

An individual or group may identify a PAL as a potential target, and in doing so they will want to obtain current, reliable and credible information by conducting hostile reconnaissance to inform their attack planning. Ensuring organisations have security minded communications strategies is essential to this. It will ensure the right security messages are placed in the public domain and also ensure sensitive information is not released.

Authorities and businesses employ a broad range of staff and contractors, many of whom will know and spend much time in PALs. They are a security asset so it is important to ensure they are vigilant and responsive to suspicious or aggressive activity, abandoned bags or attempts at concealing devices in various street furniture.

The posture and professionalism of security staff is critical in the perception a hostile will build of a PAL, and play a role in deterring hostile reconnaissance and an attack.

Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) is a discipline, and one of its fundamentals is risk reduction. Knowing the threat, vulnerabilities and consequences of an attack will help duty owners assess, mitigate and/or accept the residual risk.

> This is a summary of an article published in PACTESUR’s Publication Series in September 2021. The full version is available here.