Irregular migration to turkey

Push Factors of Irregular Migration to Turkey Julia Retta

April 26, 2013

Created for Global Urban Lab Rice University: School of Social Sciences & Kinder Institute for Urban Research

Table of Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... 2 The Issue ........................................................................................................................................ 3 The Research .................................................................................................................................. 4 The Findings .................................................................................................................................. 5 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 8 Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 10 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 11

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Executive Summary This paper explores the phenomenon of irregular migration to Turkey. I ask: Where do irregular migrants to Turkey predominantly migrate from? And what are the push factors that cause them to leave their home countries? To answer the first questions, the paper determines the top five countries of origin for irregular migrants from 2000-2011. Next, I explore the push factors that characterize migration from these countries, examining economic conditions and conflict as two main push forces. Data on irregular migration reveals that for the top five sending countries, the numbers of apprehended irregular immigrants have declined since the early 2000s. The findings also indicate that conflict-related deaths appear to be a prominent push factor for the top three sending countries, whereas all five countries were characterized by stagnant economic conditions, as indicated by low GDP per capita and high poverty levels.

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I. The Issue Turkey is situated not only as a bridge between two continents but also as a space that facilitates the flow of people across borders. Turkey has seen changing patterns in migratory flows over the recent decades; according to migration expert Professor Ahmet İçduygu, there are four distinct periods of migration patterns in Turkey. Since the creation of the Republic of Turkey in the early 1920s through the 1950s, Turkey was a country of both emigration and immigration—non-Muslim Turks were emigrating in large numbers, and Turks and Muslims from the Balkans and other areas were immigrating, a period İçduygu describes as “international migration through nationalism” (İçduygu). The next period, spanning the 1950s to 1980, is characterized by the emigration of Turkish citizens to Germany and the emigration of many nonMuslim Turkish citizens. 1980-2000 saw the rise of globalism and transnationalism—most notably, the rise of immigration flows of asylum seekers, refugees, transit migrants, and clandestine laborers (İçduygu, Irregular Migration in Turkey 12). Since 2000, forces of globalism and “EU-zation” shape migratory flows, including the immigration of non-Turks and non-Muslims and the emigration of Turkish citizens (İçduygu, Personal notes).

This paper explores the issue of irregular migration to Turkey, a term which refers to migration that occurs outside of legal channels and in the United States is usually described as “illegal” or “undocumented” immigration. Irregular migration to Turkey has increased steadily since the 1980s and represents the biggest change Turkey has experienced in its migratory flows post-World War II (İçduygu, Demographic Mobility, 89). According to most estimates, irregular migrants make up a far larger share of Turkey’s migrant population than regular migrants, thus irregular status can be regarded as “normality” among migrants in Turkey (Pusch 174).

Furthermore, irregular immigration is a topic of vital concern in light of Turkey’s desire to join the European Union. Turkey does not have an established or comprehensive set of immigration practices and policies, yet as Turkey moves towards formalizing cooperation with Western Europe, the issue of irregular migration flows is at the center of EU-Turkish relations (İçduygu, Irregular Migration in Turkey 9).

Finally, Istanbul’s status as a global city makes it a “hotspot for all the migration movements” within Turkey—one of the few economic centers at the frontier of the EU (Pusch 168). Istanbul’s location and economic draw illustrates its importance to the region and its attraction for various migrant groups.

Context of irregular migration The term “irregular migration” includes diverse and overlapping categories such as migrants who enter illegally, migrants who overstay their visas, rejected asylum seekers, and transit migrants passing through Turkey on their way to a different country (İçduygu, Irregular Migration in Turkey 17). Furthermore, due to the clandestine nature of irregular migration, the best estimates of their number are based on official immigration and police records and thus probably vastly underestimate the actual number of irregular migrants.

Research on migration typically identifies the “push” and “pull” factors that characterize the direction of migratory flows. Push factors make migrants’ homeland seem relatively less attractive and provide the incentive for them to emigrate; pull factors make the country of destination seem more desirable in comparison and thus attract immigrants (Lee). Looking 3|Page

specifically at irregular immigration to Turkey, İçduygu identifies four factors that shape the direction of the flow: 1) ongoing political turmoil and conflict in neighboring countries that push people out of their homelands, 2) Turkey’s geographical location serving as a “transit zone” for migrants intending to reach western and northern countries, 3) restrictive immigration policies in Europe that divert immigration flows to the peripheral zones around Europe (including Turkey), and 4) Turkey’s relative economic prosperity, which attracts migrants from various countries who want to improve their standard of living and economic opportunity (İçduygu, Demographic Mobility 89-90).

Research question The research question of this paper is: What are the top five sending countries of irregular immigrants to Turkey, and what are the primary social and economic push factors that bring them to Turkey? Exploring the present context of irregular migration can illuminate some possible reasons why migrants evade legal channels of regular migration and risk being caught and deported by immigration law enforcement.

II. The Research Theories of migration are defined typically by their level of analysis, explaining the cause of migration by focusing on the individual, collectives/social networks, or the macro-level opportunity structure (Faist). Since this paper explores irregular migration by looking at the top five sending countries, a macro-level analysis makes the most sense. Thus, it will focus on characteristics of the national opportunity structure rather than characteristics of the individuals or communities/networks implicated in irregular migration.

Country-level push factors encompass a wide variety of economic, social, and political conditions, including opportunities in the labor market, access to education and health care, religious or political persecution, etc. (Lee). To gain an accurate picture of what compels people to leave their homes and migrate to a new country requires looking at all of these factors together. Two of the factors mentioned by İçduygu that shape the direction of irregular migration flows are ongoing conflict and the desire to improve one’s standard of living and economic opportunity. If this is true, then the countries that send the most irregular migrants to Turkey should have at least one of these two characteristics—ongoing conflict or poor economic performance.

Background research In Turkey, the state authorities consider any foreigner who breaches migration legislation (whether by passport, visa, residence, or work permit) to be an “illegal migrant,” and although there is no systemic or precise estimation of the number of these migrants, the only statistics available come from the number of irregular migrants apprehended. According to official data, more than 50,000 migrants are apprehended yearly in Turkey (Erder and Kaşka 119). İçduygu identifies three main trends of irregular migration flows into Turkey (İçduygu, Irregular Migration in Turkey 17-18). The first trend consists of migrants from Eastern European countries such as Romania and Moldova, who come to Turkey in search of work. The second 4|Page

group of irregular migrants come from the Middle East—mainly Iran and Iraq—as well as African countries, originally intending to use Turkey as a transit zone from which to enter Western European countries, but many of these migrants “drift into illegality” as they either overstay tourist visas or entered illegally to begin with (İçduygu, Irregular Migration in Turkey 18). Finally, the third category of irregular migrants are rejected asylum seekers who remain in Turkey illegally in search of work and/or opportunities to migrate to another country.

However, further research on irregular migration in Turkey reveals that this category is even more diverse. It appears to be mostly composed of labor migrants but also includes transit migrants, trafficked persons, and migrants who are not employed in the labor market (TÜSİAD 74). Irregular migrants play an important role in the informal labor market in Turkey, and researchers observe that irregular migrants are mostly employed in certain sectors of the labor market such as agriculture, construction, domestic work, textiles, etc (Erder and Kaşka 125-127).

Erder and Kaşka have also claimed that there is a division of labor among irregular migrants by origin, by gender, and by purpose of stay (129), although this is difficult to verify without further research.

Methodology First, this paper will identify the top five countries that send irregular migrants to Turkey.

Irregular migration is difficult to measure because of its clandestine nature, but the Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) produced a report in 2012 that compiles data of apprehended irregular migrants, obtained from the Ministry of the Interior. The SOPEMI report contains figures for irregular migrants in Turkey from 2000-2011.

This paper will then examine the push factors that affect the standard of living within the top five sending countries: GDP per capita, unemployment rate, life expectancy at birth, battlerelated deaths per year, expected years of schooling for females and males, and poverty ratio.

This data was gathered from the World Bank’s online DataBank and the World Economic Forum for the years 2000-2011, using averages of each indicator. If there was not enough data available to take the average, the most recent statistic was used.

The analysis of the data will include a comparison of push factors across the five sending countries to determine whether certain factors were more salient for some than others, and which push factors were present in all five countries.

III. The Findings Data on irregular migration from the SOPEMI report showed that in the period from 2000-2011, the top five sending countries for irregular migrants to Turkey were: Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Moldova, and Georgia (İçduygu, Turkey and International Migration). It is noteworthy that only two of these countries (Iraq and Georgia) share a border with Turkey.

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Table 1: Top Five Sending Countries for Irregular Migration to Turkey, 2000-2011 Country

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Total

Iraq

17,280

18,846

20,926

3,757

6,393

3,591

6,412

9,384

4,818

1,128

1,327

1,142

95,004

Pakistan

5,027

4,829

4,813

6,258

9,396

11,001

3,508

6,970

9,186

2,774

1,842

2,226

67,830

Afghanistan 8,746

9,701

4,246

2,178

3,442

2,363

3,665

6,614

10,839

3,917

2,725

3,843

62,279

Moldova

8,312

11,454

9,611

7,728

5,728

3,462

1,575

1,095

600

318

405

491

50,779

Georgia

3,300

2,693

3,115

1,826

2,294

2,348

1,989

2,439

2,702

1,769

835

1,649

26,959

These five countries seem to fit the general trend of newly or recently democratized countries, as İçduygu noted that “In recent years Turkey has become a destination country for nationals of transitional democracies, who are in search of better living conditions and job opportunities abroad in the face of conflicts or economic and social hardships prevailing in their own countries” (İçduygu, Demographic Mobility 93). But the patterns of these conflicts or other hardships changes with time, impacting migratory flows, as the next graph demonstrates.

Figure 1: Number of irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey, by year 25,000

20,000 Iraq

15,000

Pakistan Afghanistan

10,000

Moldova Georgia

5,000

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

(World Bank Development Data Group) (World Bank Development Data Group) (World Bank Development Data Group) 6|Page

Irregular migration from each country is characterized by shifting flows. Iraq, the country with the highest total number of irregular migrants to Turkey, was sending huge numbers of migrants from 2000 to 2002, but this wave dropped off sharply in 2003, and after another brief peak in 2007, the numbers of migrants from Iraq dropped even lower in recent years. Indeed, the estimates of irregular migrants from four of the five countries dropped decreased in 2003, except for Pakistan, where migration trended upward until hitting a peak in 2005, which is also when the Kashmir earthquake devastated the northern part of the country in early October, with an estimated death toll of more than 73,000 (BBC). Irregular migration from Afghanistan for this period peaked in 2008, which could be related to the war—reports show that the number of civilians killed in Afghanistan increased by nearly 40 percent in 2008, the highest civilian death toll since the Taliban was ousted in 2001 (Filkins). Indeed, irregular migration from the three conflict-afflicted countries—Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—picked up during the period of 2007-2008 before declining again in 2009. The most recent estimates for 2011 show very low levels of irregular migration for all five countries.

But beyond discovering where irregular migrants to Turkey come from, the more pressing question is: Why do they migrate? The next part of the research question concerns the push factors that describe living conditions in migrants’ countries of origin, using indicators gathered from the World Bank’s online DataBank (World Bank Development Data Group).

Table 2: Push Factors for Sending Countries, 2000-2011 Push Factor

Iraq

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Moldova

Georgia

3,359

2,186

814

2,404

3,822

18% (2009)

6% (2010)

36% (2008)

9% (2010)

16% (2010)

Life expectancy at birth

69

64

47

68

73

Battle-related deaths per year

2,409

1,572

3,224

—

324

Expected years of schooling (female)

8

6

5

12

12

Expected years of schooling (male)

10

7

9

12

12

36%

79%

36%

33%

48%

GDP per capita (PPP) Unemployment rate (most recent measure)

Poverty headcount ratio at $2.50/day PPP (% of total population)

All five countries have low measures of GDP per capita, ranging from $814 - $3,822.

This is significantly lower than Turkey’s GDP per capita of $10,524. Poverty levels were also high in all five countries, which indicates that it is one of the main push factors for migrants.

Education levels varied, probably a more significant factor for Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan than for Georgia and Moldova. Furthermore, the gender gap in expected years of education for 7|Page

Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan may also contribute to migration patterns, since inequality can also drive migration (Hagen-Zanker 20). Life expectancy in Georgia is comparable to Turkey, but the other countries have slightly lower numbers, especially Afghanistan.

Conflict (measured by battle-related deaths) was a prominent feature in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan during this period of time. Moldova and Georgia are unique cases, since ongoing conflict is not a significant push factor in these countries as it is for the other three.

However, the research on irregular migration shows a historic pattern of migrants from countries such as Moldova, Bulgaria, Georgia, and other Eastern European countries working informally in domestic work in Turkey (Erder and Kaşka 126). Therefore, it is possible—and even highly likely—that irregular labor migration from Moldova and Georgia is feminized, as there are more jobs in Turkey in the entertainment, domestic work, and textile sectors for women than for men (Korfalı, Üstübici and De Clerck 30).

In comparing all five countries, it appears that either ongoing conflict or poor economic conditions (or both factors combined) are present in the top five sending countries for irregular migration to Turkey. The top three sending countries—Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which sent a combined total of 225,113 irregular migrants to Turkey over the period 2000-2011—are all characterized by conflict-related deaths as the most prominent push factor, in addition to the economic factors such as low GDP per capita and high poverty levels that were present across all five countries.

IV. Conclusions Irregular migration is a common reality for foreigners in Turkey. As Erder and Kaşka note, due to Turkey’s fairly liberal border policy for arrivals, it is still a relatively closed society in terms of rules and regulation on allowing long-term residence or work permits to foreigners (Erder and Kaşka 115). Irregularity impacts not only the state’s ability to manage migratory flows but also migrants’ ability to access labor markets and social services. However, given that irregular status can also create conditions where migrants are vulnerable to exploitation, a fair migration policy would take into acount the experience of irregular migrants living and working in Turkish society as well as the political and economic conditions of the migrant-sending countries. In other words, the push and pull factors that shape migratory flows will inform a better perspective on what drives population movement and how to manage these flows.

The push factors included in this study give insight into why migrants from these five sending countries choose to emigrate by describing the standard of living in these countries.

However, it appears that different push factors exert a greater influence in certain countries. The most striking factors are poverty level and GDP per capita, both measures of the economic performance of the country as it relates to the standard of living. GDP per capita averaged below $4,000 throughout 2000-2011 for all five countries, which is extremely low—the United States’ GDP per capita in 2011 was $48,112 (World Bank Development Data Group).

There are several directions for future research. In order to make a better connection between levels of migration and push factors, a cross-sectional time-series analysis of the data would specify a far more precise correlation between the data, and the analysis should be extended to capture the pre-2000 years to see what migration patterns looked like before conflict became a major factor in some of the sending countries.

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But more significantly, irregular migration is a complex phenomenon, and the subcategories within it (transit migrants, circular migrants, female vs. male, etc.) are often overlapping and interrelated. With better data, future research could focus on these distinct subgroups, who may occupy different positions in the Turkish labor market and whose migration patterns are probably influenced by different factors. Further research should focus on the phenomenon of labor migration in particular, since economic push factors seem to be so prominent, as well as the pull factors that draw migrants to Turkey. These factors tend to be complementary, since migration occurs if the “push” or reason to emigrate is remedied by a corresponding pull in the destination country. War/conflict as a push factor should also be more closely studied in light of Turkey’s significant population of asylum-seeker, since asylumseekers who have their cases rejected become irregular migrants if they choose to stay in Turkey.

We could also draw further conclusions about push and pull factors if we knew more about the characteristics of irregular migrants. Current data only shows the number of migrants apprehended, but information about their education, age, gender, and other demographics is lacking.

In conclusion, a variety of economic and social factors contribute to the flow of irregular migration into Turkey. Poverty and GDP per capita were push forces that were present in all five countries, although conflict-related deaths were also extremely high in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These push factors are important because they cause migrants to break the rules and restrictions of regular migration and risk being apprehended and deported by law enforcement.

Understanding the phenomenon of irregular migration highlights the numerous factors that contribute to and perpetuate it. In one sense, irregularity is the “repercussion of the failure of the current policies in dealing with this new global challenge” (Erder and Kaşka 113). How Turkey responds to this new challenge will impact its external relations with regional countries as well as internal economic and social structures.

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Acknowledgements I would like to thank Professor Ahmet İçduygu of Koç University, whose expertise and extensive research on migration was invaluable to my own research project. Professor Korel Göymen of the Istanbul Policy Center pointed me to some very helpful sources for data on migration. Dr. Michael Emerson’s constructive comments, feedback, and guidance on this paper were indispensable. And finally, thanks to Ipek Martinez and Abbey Godley, whose unending patience, flexibility, and creative planning made the trip to Istanbul such a wonderful experience!

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