The European Security and Defence Union Issue 14

ISSN 2192-6921

Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Volume No 14

SPECIAL TOPIC

Photo: !Koss/cc by ND2.0/flickr; collage: The European

EU and Russia

Europe is a strategic partner in the Transatlantic Security Region Russia is a partner for peace

Cyprus’ role as a mentor

H.E. Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the EU, Brussels

Dr Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Nikosia

www.magazine-the-european.com ProPress Publishing Group

Edition 3/2012

Editorial

The Nobel Prize for the European Union (EU) and national interests The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union shows well-deserved recognition of the EU’s efforts to achieve peace and unification. But it is also a call to the continent to continue its peaceful development and to unrelentingly pursue its search for an identity and a common purpose, for this is the only way to carve out a place for itself in a world of global competition.

For me, somehow, this prize has to do in particular with Germany, which was at the origin of two world wars, and with the efforts of the surrounding nations to ensure its re-integration after the Second World War. For decades now it has been a strong democracy with a widely envied economic model and stable state institutions. The Germans owe that achievement to a handful of great politicians, notably Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi and Winston Churchill, who were sufficiently farsighted to realise that humiliation was not the way to establish peace and harmony in Europe and that the construction of a united Europe was not possible without, at its heart, a democratic Germany as a partner in the peace process. Schuman’s vision was one not of subjection but above all, of equal partnership.

Conscious of its historical responsibility, which was already recognised by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Germany has never striven to play the leading role in Europe. Whenever it was necessary to forge ahead with Europe’s development and the process of integration, this was always done in cooperation with Germany’s close allies, above all France. Should France no longer be a partner, it would leave a vacuum. Paris would do well to consider this.

Although some European states are calling for Germany to take the lead, Berlin’s stance in the financial crisis has also awakened fears in Europe that it could let itself be too strongly

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049/1723 282 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr ; Hartmut.buehl@euro-defence.eu Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Karin Dornbusch Phone: +49/228/970 97-40 E-Mail: Karin.dornbusch@euro-defence.eu

guided by national interests. It is worth noting that similar fears were sparked by the failure of the merger between EADS and British Aerospace last month. And indeed it is true that the three EU countries France, the UK and Germany have missed a major opportunity here, not only for the European economy but also for Europe as a whole.

Hartmut Bühl

The man behind that initiative, Dr Thomas Enders, CEO, EADS, is a German industry chief of the new generation: a convinced European with an international vision who was already actively involved in the creation of EADS. And yet petty national interests and a lack of economic and political foresight have led to that wasted opportunity for Europe.

Europe’s security and defence industries are at a crossroads.

The Brussels Commission has recognised this. What Europe needs to move forward are great industry chiefs of the ilk of Tom Enders, with a European vision, the ability to identify challenges to Europe and the readiness to take action in order to establish an enduringly viable European economy and industry in the face of competition from China, the US and certainly also India in the future.

But all those efforts would be futile without a new generation of politicians with the farsightedness and creative energy of a Schuman or de Gasperi, capable of taking decisions in the common European interest.

Hartmut Bühl, Editor-in-Chief

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: nannette.b@gmx.net Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management.

For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.magazine-the-european.com Suscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin.

The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription) 3 copies for one year: 66 Euro (International subscription) including postage and dispatch (3 issues) © 2012 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin ProPress Publishing Group is the holding of the trade mark BEHOERDEN SPIEGEL.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Elmar Brok MEP Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament, Strasbourg/Brussels

Claude France Arnould CEO, European Defence Agency, Brussels

POLICY and POLITICS 3

Editorial

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Dr Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, Nikosia

The Common Security and Defence Policy A stable Mediterranean Region is a prerequisite for Europe’s welfare Striving for peace

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The Lisbon Comprehensive Approach and the consequences for the CSDP Declining ability through shrinking budgets

Dirk Brengelmann, Brussels

NATO after Chicago – implementing the Strategic Concept Turning political decisions into reality

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Elmar Brok MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

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SPECIAL TOPIC

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32 Conferences report 34

Objectives of the EU’s Russia policy The EU needs a partnership for stability

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Vladimir M. Grinin, Berlin

Missile defence – is a political decision feasible?

Russian interests are not respected

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Jean-Paul Perruche, Paris

No Europe without defence, no defence without Europe!

Defence capabilities – a dangerous decline

The NATO-Russia Council and the Missile Defence project How to create mutual confidence

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Reinhard Bütikofer MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

Last exit cooperation – is Europe missing out on the pooling and sharing project?

Alternative approaches for a new concept

Hannes Swoboda MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

Dr Klaus Olshausen, Meckenheim

Jacques Favin-Lévêque, Versailles

Lancaster House – against the spirit of European integration?

No great outcome

Vladimir Chizhov, Brussels

Time to enhance the security and economic pillars Russia’s contribution is decisive for peace

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Thomas Homberg, Schrobenhausen

Plea for a common European industry strategy The EU must focus on developing its own capabilities

Oliver Bruzek, Warsaw

From confrontation to realistic cooperation Dialog and confidence building

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Denis Verret,Paris

The failed merger between EADS and British Aerospace (BAE) Putting a stop to national ambiguities once and for all

The European Union, Russia and NATO

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Claude-France Arnould, Brussels

The European Defence Agency – taking stock The main objective is to deliver capabilities

The EEAS – a critical review For more strategic and political consistency

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Arnaud Danjean MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

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Christina Balis,Washington/Paris

Transatlantic defence cooperation Leaderless Europe

Content

Hannes Swoboda MEP Leader of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

Håkan Buskhe President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Saab AB, Stockholm

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS EU/NATO

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Stefano Manservisi, Brussels

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Klaus-Peter Treche, Brussels

AFCEA Europe – the organisation to head industry’s contribution to user requirements Support industries by showing what line to take

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Dr Charles Tannock MEP

Dorothee Frank, Meckenheim

A new corvette for multiple types of engagement New mission capabilities

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Rainer Jentzsch, Stuttgart

I-MAST: a revolution in naval vessel construction Excellent communications are pivotal

Håkan Buskhe, Stockholm

Air power for forces protection The right mix of aircraft and UAS Lutz Kampmann, Kreuzlingen

A post-Afghanistan strategy for armoured vehicles Meeting military requirements through modularity

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Stefan Pauwels, Leuven

Crisis Management

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Maritime Security An EU Strategy for the Horn of Africa Europe has a role to play

High performance visualisation for command and control superiority Creating a new quality of situational awareness

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Andreas Beer, Flensburg

FFG’s new PMMC G5 Using the progress of high technology

The development of the Schengen area Progress in terms of mindset and capabilities

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Sven and Richard Boger, Aulendorf

Closing the gap of unexploited reconnaissance capabilities Future of COMINT and SIGINT in a naval environment

Horst Schuchmann, Bremen

“Bespoke Suit” made from steel Individual container solutions

“The European − Security and Defence Union” is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence

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EU-Presidency

A view from Cyprus

A stable Mediterranean Region is a prerequisite for Europe’s welfare

by Dr Erato Kazakou-Marcoullis*, Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Nikosia

As European Union membership broadened, so have its borders become longer and geographically varied. With the inclusion of Cyprus in 2004 the EU has effectively come to share a sea border with all countries of the Mediterranean. This development, coupled with recent upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East, has come to mean that the significance of the ‘Southern Neighbourhood,’ has now taken on additional importance for Europe. Indeed, it is no longer possible to contemplate a prosperous and stable Europe without similar conditions in the countries of the Mediterranean.

A strategy for stability The only way that Europe can contribute to improving the situation is by following a three pronged strategy which includes economic engagement, reinforcing legal frameworks of cooperation, and remaining vigilant and steadfast in its values.

The EU has been economically engaged in the countries of the Mediterranean for years. However the challenges faced by many countries of the ‘Arab Spring’ are not simply economic, but a combination of factors including an explosive demography, tensions within the social and ethnic fabric, extreme climate change, and an underdeveloped system of political inclusion. This requires sophisticated and innovative engagement combining economic, developmental and educational tools. The recent meeting in Cairo of the EU-Egypt task force is an example of the sort of economic engagement needed.

Legal framework is a precondition However, economic and development initiatives can only bear fruit if there are the necessary legal frameworks to sustain them. These can only come about through a broad network of agreements which comply with both the EU aquis and with international law. A case in point is the Cypriot approach to managing the natural wealth in our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It is obvious to us that in an area of such high tensions, the only way to move forward and benefit from the wealth in our seas is through respect of our neighbours and of international law. We therefore moved toward the establishment of a series of bilateral agreements which delineate the borders of our EEZ with our neighbours. We did so in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and in complete cooperation with our neighbours: Egypt, in 2002, Lebanon , in 2007, and Israel in 2010. We are now in the process of refining existing agreements, defining future cooperation, and by

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extension, creating the necessary stability in an area not famous for calm.

Faithful cooperation We believe that honest, negotiated and joint collaboration is the only way to move forward in what is essentially a shared space - shared by the EU European Union and its Southern Neighbours. If the enormous investments necessary will be made available to exploit the natural wealth in the Eastern Mediterranean - all sides must benefit. The ultimate result will come in the form of more jobs, greater prosperity, and development. This process which we have already begun in the Eastern Mediterranean must be expanded throughout the broader Mediterranean. It may prove, if applied in good faith and with a shared future as our goal, to be an important tool in furthering stability and prosperity. Nonetheless, the situation in the foreseeable future also requires that the EU remain vigilant and take a pro-active role in securing the Mediterranean and its borders. This does not imply draconian measures, or even that stability can only be ensured through military or police means; nonetheless, these cannot be disregarded.

Shared values The EU is based on a set of shared values which emphasize freedoms – of the individual, of society, of economy. However, they also require adherence to a set of rules which protect these freedoms. One of the problems now facing Europe in its southern neighbourhood is that these European values are either rejected outright or are in the process of being challenged. On the other hand, this does not mean that Europe has ceased to be an attractive destination for those who do not share the European set of values. So, what is to be done?

Clearly, Europe cannot remain apathetic. It must remain steadfast in the essential good of its values of freedoms, continue to believe that these are freedoms that all humans aspire toward, but also remain vigilant in the protection of these values.

Europe must be willing take the lead in efforts to stabilize the southern neighbourhood, and show a determined presence in times of crisis. No less important is the willingness of Europe to show solidarity to its member states that have physical borders in the Mediterranean. *Dr Kozakou-Marcoullis assumed office as Minister of Foreign Affairs on 5 August 2011. She had served as Minister of Communications and Works since 2 March 2010, Ambassador to the United States of America from 1998 to 2003.

Photo: Justus Bluemer/flickr/CC BY 2.0

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

NATO

NATO is shaping its future

NATO after Chicago – implementing the Strategic Concept

by Dirk Brengelmann, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, NATO, Brussels

Earlier this year, NATO held its largest Summit meeting ever.

Over 60 nations and international organisations gathered in Chicago and took significant decisions that will shape the continuing evolution of the Alliance, our operations, and our relationship with our partners.

The main priorities for NATO Six months on from this important Summit, the focus is now on turning those political decisions into reality. Although work is progressing on many different tracks, three key priorities stand out: Afghanistan Our mission there remains NATO’s single most important operational priority. Together with our 22 partner countries in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), we want to help Afghanistan to stand on its own feet; to become a nation that is secure and stable; and to be a country that will never again be a base for terrorists to launch attacks against us.

The most effective way to do this is to help the Afghan authorities to take responsibility for security in their own country.

Very significant progress has already been achieved. We are steadily handing over security responsibility to the Afghans across the whole of the country. At the same time, we are helping the Afghans to develop and improve their own capabilities.

Our timeline is to complete this transition by the end of 2014 – a date set two years ago at the suggestion of President Karzai.

Already, nearly 352,000 Afghan National Security Forces – both Army and Police – have been trained. And more than 75% of the Afghan population is now protected and secured by Afghan forces. Next year, the whole of the country will come under lead Afghan security responsibility. And by the end of 2014, the whole of the country will be under full Afghan security responsibility. At this time, NATO’s combat role will come to an end – but NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan will endure.

The Chicago Summit sent a clear message in this regard: while NATO will end its combat mission at the end of 2014, we will not abandon Afghanistan or the Afghan people. In October, NATO Defence Ministers approved the framework for a NATOled mission to provide training, advice and assistance to the Afghan Security Forces beyond 2014. The Taliban should be under no illusion that they can simply wait us out.

However, security is only one part of the problem, and NATO is

Dirk Brengelmann Ambassador Dirk Brengelmann has been NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy since the beginning of 2010.

He entered the German Foreign Service in 1984.

He served as the Private Secretary of Jürgen Möllemann, Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office, and subsequently served as Political Counselor at the German Embassy in London, Deputy European Correspondent in the Federal Foreign Office, and Political Counselor at the German Embassy in Washington DC. From 2000 to 2003, he served as Deputy Director in the Private Office of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson. After serving as Director and Head of the Defence and Security Policy Division at the Federal Foreign Office, he returned to Brussels in 2008 as Minister Plenipotentiary in the German Delegation to NATO, before taking up his current post.

only one part of the solution. Afghanistan’s leaders have to shoulder their responsibility for the country’s future. They have to move in the right direction in building a functioning, prosperous state that can maintain the support of the Afghan people. They have pledged to do so – with the coordinated help of the international community – and it is now vital that all these pledges be fulfilled.

Capabilities The second key priority area of work within the Alliance is ensuring that NATO has the right capabilities to carry out our three core roles – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security – set down in the new Strategic Concept two years ago.

The current economic climate has made it more difficult to acquire and deploy these capabilities. When government expenditure is under pressure across many fronts in many Allied nations, defence budgets cannot always be exempt from reductions. However, in today’s unpredictable world, security cannot be put on the backburner. We must prevent that underinvestment in our defence capabilities means that today’s economic crisis becomes tomorrow’s security crisis.

At Chicago, we acknowledged these challenges, and we agreed a way to overcome them. We set ourselves the goal of “NATO Forces 2020” – forces that are well equipped, well

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Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government on May 21 st in Chicago.

trained, and able to operate effectively with Allies as well as with partners.

As a way to achieve this goal, we agreed on “Smart Defence”.

This new guiding principle for capability development is all about greater prioritisation, specialisation and, most importantly, multinational cooperation.

Since Chicago, we are already moving ahead with over twenty multinational projects under the Smart Defence banner. These cover a wide array of capabilities, from countering Improvised Explosive Devices to sharing smart munitions. And many more projects are coming through the pipeline.

Another important feature of Smart Defence is that it is a truly transatlantic effort. Europeans are involved in all current projects; they are leading two thirds of them; and one third of the projects are purely European in terms of participation. By cooperating more in this manner, European Allies reinforce each other, reinforce Europe, and reinforce NATO. One of the most high profile multinational capability projects is Missile Defence. In many ways, this is Smart Defence at its best. Four countries – Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Spain – have agreed to host United States’ missile defence assets; and all 28 Allies have agreed to invest over 1 billion dollars in the command and control and communications infrastructure needed to support the NATO ballistic missile defence system.

We still hope to reach agreement with Russia over how we can work together on this vital capability. Just like NATO, Russia also faces a growing threat from missile proliferation, and it makes sense for us to work together in addressing that threat.

Partnership NATO’s partnerships over the past two decades have been a real success story. While the focus was initially on Central and Eastern Europe, the Alliance now has partners on all five continents, engaging with us in a variety of ways. For all our partners, political consultations are the priority. But many also choose to make extremely valuable contributions in other

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Photo: Thorsten Bohlmann /NATO

fields, such as participating in our operations, or providing political and financial support to our operations.

Here in Europe, we have several partners who aspire to join the Alliance. These nations know that NATO’s door remains open to them, but they also know that they need to continue and complete various reforms before they will be ready to assume the obligations and responsibilities of membership.

NATO will continue to help those countries, because we want to see the day when Europe is finally whole and free. But, ultimately reforms can only be done by the countries themselves.

Partnerships are also vital to our security interests in Europe’s neighbourhood. This time last year, NATO was concluding its historic operation to protect the people of Libya. That successful operation showed that our security is linked with that of the countries across North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf region, and it has sparked greater interest in working together to deal with other common challenges, such as terrorism, maritime security, proliferation, and security sector reform.

Transition throughout that region will be a long process. At the Chicago Summit, NATO offered its support to those countries in transition that would like our help. The Alliance has unrivalled expertise in this area from helping to transform the countries of Central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War. If requested, we can bring this expertise to bear to assist countries of the Middle East and North Africa region in their chosen path of transition.

The way ahead The Chicago Summit was an important milestone in translating the new Strategic Concept into reality – but more work lies ahead in Afghanistan, on our defence capabilities, and in our engagement with partners. Six months on from Chicago, the Alliance is moving forward on all these fronts, to ensure the collective defence of our members; to undertake effective crisis management; and to engage in cooperative security with partners across the globe.

The European External Action Service

The EU is committed to achieving a more democratic and effective European foreign policy

The EEAS – a critical review Interview with Elmar Brok MEP, Chairman AFET Committee, European Parliament, Strasbourg/Brussels

The European: Mr Brok, you are back in the Chair of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee. From the outset you have been highly committed to making the European External Action Service (EEAS) an instrument for providing powerful added value to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and to ensuring influence and scrutiny on the part of the European Parliament. Are you satisfied with the results of the EEAS so far?

Elmar Brok: The EEAS is still in the process of developing its full capacities. It is a huge step forward for European foreign policy as it finally embodies the concept of the one voice policy within an institution. However, we need to be patient.

To build up a foreign service is a huge task. We in the European institutions, as well as the officials in the member state institutions, must adapt and learn how to use this new service most efficiently. This will take some time.

The European: Generally speaking, then, you recognise the role of this service in giving the European institutions and nations the chance to deliver a single EU message on key political issues. You underlined this in your report voted by the EP in September. Could you elaborate?

Elmar Brok: The main message of my report was to signal to the citizens of Europe that the EU is committed to achieving a more democratic and effective European foreign policy that puts their interests at its core: i.e. the promotion of security, economic prosperity and democracy starting in our neighbourhood and in our broader external relations. In doing this I believe it confirms the argument that for the EU’s external action to be coherent, effective and give value for money it must be better coordinated and clear strategic priorities starting with our commitment to the Neighbourhood have to be identified. I offered our full support for the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) to show leadership in representing the security and economic interests of the Union by addressing serious challenges in particular in the negotiations with Iran, in responding to the Arab Spring and in working to stop the bloodshed in Syria as well as in upholding democracy in our Neighbourhood.

The European: Let me focus on three of the points you made in the report, starting with the “appropriate mechanism” that you wish to see created. What do you aim to achieve and what line should be taken?

Elmar Brok: We need to find appropriate mechanisms in order to have an efficient and smart cooperation and division of

Elmar Brok MEP Elmar Brok MEP has been Chairman of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee since 2011. He is also a member of the Conference of Committee Chairs and of the Delegation for relations with the People’s Republic of China. He was born 1946, studied law and politics in Germany and then worked as a radio journalist and newspaper correspondent. He was elected Member of the European Parliament in 1980. He was the Parliament representative at the Intergovernmental Conferences on the Amsterdam Treaty (1996/1997), the Nice Treaty (2000), the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and the EU Constitution (2003/2004), as well as in the Council’s Reflection Group for Maastricht II (1994/1995).

tasks between the different European institutions and also between the EU institutions and their counterparts at Member State level.

The European: That brings me directly to my next point: synergies. What needs to be done in order to achieve synergies in implementing the EEAS? How do you see this issue developing?

Elmar Brok: There are a vast number of potential synergies that we must exploit to the fullest possible extent, especially at a time in which debt reduction is called for. There are synergies on all levels, for instance between the EEAS and the Commission’s country desks, the member states’ foreign services, Parliamentary country desks etc.

This is a difficult process, as the exploitation of synergies is sometimes perceived to be bad for some employees, if they had to move their desks to the EEAS, for instance. However on the member state level we are already seeing a major step forward. Some smaller member states have decided to close down some of their foreign representations and the EU representation will start to provide consular services for these countries. Imagine the effect for the EU’s outward representation; this is fantastic!

The European: Indeed, and what perspectives for other members! My third point: the monitoring of the gender balance within the EEAS staff itself and the posting of national diplomats to senior responsibilities in the capitals. Are nations ready to recruit “EU driven” diplomats and do nations accept the HR/VP exerting influence on these personalities? Or do nations try to make them work in favour of national interests?

Elmar Brok: We have always had and will continue to have for a long time to come this difficult balance between national and EU interests. It is clear that this is not something that will

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be resolved in a short time. The HR/VP is doing a good job in giving European foreign policy a face and a voice. Understandably the British, or French, or Polish or German foreign ministers will also speak out for their countries, but the coordination between all national interests can be greatly facilitated by the EEAS and its representative. In the long run, the HR/VP will be the voice of the European Union; no-one is to blame for the fact that it will take time to build this capacity and the networks needed to fill this role.

The European: Turning to the issue of security and defence: in your report you criticise the fact that the HR/VP has not started the process that will lead to Council conclusions on Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of the CSDP and that there is a lack of guidelines for the systematic use of coalitions.

Elmar Brok: We initially focused on the task of setting up the EEAS, but we also need to develop the important Lisbon Treaty provisions on European defence. In my report I want to start this debate by calling for guidelines for drawing on the defence expertise of “core groups” of Member States as well as to launch a process that will lead to European Council discussions on defence. In fact I am pleased that this idea is being taken up by the President of the European Council, Mr van Rompuy, who will be organising a European Council debate on defence in the second half of next year.

The European: In a recent draft report on the implementation of the CSDP, SEDE Chairman Arnauld Danjean called for a European White Paper on Security and Defence that should precisely define the EU’s strategic interests and take account of changing threats and the development of relations with the EU’s allies and partners, but also with emerging countries. The 2003 European Security Strategy does indeed look outdated. Is there a chance that we will see the birth of such a White Paper soon?

Elmar Brok: It is important that we do not confuse two very important but separate issues. On the one hand we have had calls, including from the European Parliament, for a revision or update of the 2003 European Security Strategy. Others call for the same thing but give it another name; for instance, I had a discussion on this topic recently in AFET with Mr Bildt, who referred to the need for a “European Global Strategy”.

In addition, in my Annual Report I call for a more focused and operational discussion to bring to life the Lisbon Treaty provisions on European defence. Both a European Council-level discussion on European defence and Mr Danjean’s call for a White Paper would help this more focused discussion. I believe both approaches are complementary, on the one hand reflecting upon the fast-changing strategic environment while, on the other, looking at what capabilities and resources we need in order to deliver peace and economic prosperity for the citizens of Europe.

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The European: I follow you. Let me descend to the level below, that of crisis-management forces. From the very beginning the limits of the concept of EU forces were evident, but battlegroups, for example, were for long time a “prestige issue” for the Parliament. At the very latest with the comprehensive approach of the Lisbon Treaty was it not clear that the purely military battlegroup concept had become outdated?

Elmar Brok: The European Parliament has always called for developing both a civilian capacity as well as a defence capacity for responding to conflicts and helping to promote peace and security in our neighbourhood and further afield. We know that there is never a military-only solution to complex conflicts. Ever since we started to develop an EU CFSP we have looked at developing both the diplomatic means for conflict prevention and at the same time the civilian and military capabilities needed to stop conflicts escalating or to accompany peace processes. But let me be clear, the task of developing civilian capabilities is more about creating something new in the form of new EUSRs, the EEAS, or Civilian Response Teams, whereas in the area of defence we have to re-design a system, where 2 million men and women and € 200 billion per year must be re-organised to meet the security needs of Europe’s citizens. We can create a new EUSR such as for the Horn of Africa in a few months, but it takes much investment and many years to make sure we have the ships, planes, logistic capabilities and specialised troops to tackle piracy and bring stability to that region.

The European: What is still missing is a civilian-military planning capability with a long-term perspective incorporating the human and financial resources needed for crisis prevention and post-conflict peace and nation building. There still seems to be a lack of common sense on this point both within the EU institutions and the nations. What is the way forward in your view?

Elmar Brok: The EU has come a long way over the last ten years in bringing together civilian and military experts for crisis management and peace-building. We have reinforced our planning and decision-making capacity. Now for the first time we have activated an Operations Centre to coordinate the civilian and military missions for the Horn of Africa. I look forward to monitoring how this Operations Centre brings new added value to the coordination of CSDP missions alongside the political coordination under the EUSR and the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. If the Operations Centre is successful it will give strong arguments to those who think our capacities could be further reinforced with a permanent Operational Headquarters that brings all our civilian and military expertise together. As Chair of AFET I will be closely following this issue and preparing for the bigger debate on European defence that should take place in 2013.

The European: Mr Brok, thank you for the interview.

SPECIAL TOPIC Photo: Bernd Rostad, CC BY 2.0, flickr

The European Union, Russia and NATO The cold war ended 20 years ago and confrontational rhetoric is no longer the way to achieve progress in the Transatlantic Security and Economic Region. The time has now come for Europe, NATO and Russia to develop their relations for the coming decades. Only through a persistent dialogue at all levels and in all sectors of interest can confidence be built.

Change through rapprochement

From confrontation to realistic cooperation

by Oliver Bruzek*, General Manager, Vice Versa Central Eastern Consultancy Group, Warsaw

Future relations with Russia must be defined on the basis of the EU’s conception of itself and of a realistic assessment of its geopolitical role. It is therefore helpful to start by considering the transatlantic relationship. These days, there is concern and suspicion in Europe about what is perceived as an increasing tendency on the part of the United States to turn away from Europe and towards the Pacific region. It is implied that Europe is losing its strategic importance in the eyes of the US and hence globally. But this is to disregard that: It there is no partner able in the foreseeable future to take Europe’s place alongside the United States with anywhere near the same level of strategic relevance. This has to do not just with their many shared values, but also with a whole host of other factors, ranging from Europe’s role as a logistic hub for the United States’ global missions to the numbers of European military units deployed on operations under US leadership or alongside American troops.

Europe’s strategic relevance for the US It is precisely because the US has such a reliable partner in Europe that it is able to broaden its strategic horizon and seek new partnerships. This is a policy that has become possible in the changed world order and the US Administration would be foolish not to pursue it, for it is quite simply in the national interest.

Europe must also define and exploit its geopolitical room for manoeuvre. Indeed this is a process that already began with the EU’s eastwards enlargement. As a result, Russia has not only become the EU’s direct neighbour, but in many respects also its most important one. There is much discussion of the economic implications of that proximity and the interdependence it entails, but – although this may sound old-fashioned in

an era of global asymmetric threats – an essential point as regards the geostrategic and security environment is being overlooked: alongside the US Russia is the only country to possess a nuclear second strike capability. A renewed awareness of that fact has consequences when it comes to shaping the future relations with Russia.

The way ahead is stony, but promising 1. The European Union must understand the necessity of stronger military and also armaments cooperation: confidence-building through cooperation with the long-term objective of disarmament. The shift in the US doctrine under President Obama – from confrontation to cooperation – may be conducive to that approach.

2. It is necessary to build effective crisis-communication instruments. These are in the EU’s own interest, in particular with a view to the unresolved conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood.

3. There has to be a realistic perception of the possibilities for exerting influence on the Russian Government on internal political issues: the changes that are quite rightly called for in terms of respect for the rules of democracy, freedom of the press and of opinion and more generally speaking, human rights (to which Russia is also committed within the Council of Europe) must no longer be made a condition for establishing certain relations, but should rather be achieved on the road towards partnership. We need to give fresh thought to the concept of “change through rapprochement”. *Oliver Bruzek advises on political matters and supports clients in Central and Eastern Europe. He has set up a strategic group composed of German and Polish Politicians, Experts and Decision-Makers in the field of Security and Defence Policy.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The Russia-EU Strategic Partnership

Time to enhance the security and economic pillars

by Vladimir Chizhov, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the EU, Brussels

Furthering the relationship with the European Union and incrementally progressing towards a common space of economic interaction, human contacts and regional security remains at the heart of Russia’s foreign policy. Our unwavering belief in the vitality of European integration as well as the EU’s ability to overcome the ongoing financial and economic calamities is best manifested by sheer numbers. Russia remains the EU’s third largest trade partner with steep rates of growth, having attained a total trade volume of 307 billion euros in 2011. Approximately 40 percent of Russia’s foreign currency reserves, again the third largest in the world, are nominated in the single European currency.

The objective ...

As Russia and the EU weather the storms of a global downturn, elaborate modernization agendas and work in parallel to ensure political, economic and social cohesion, areas of distinct interest overlap are clearly emerging. That is precisely the thinking behind the strategic objective put forward by President Putin earlier this year of advancing towards “a single market from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean with a total volume of trillions of euros”. At the dawn of what has been dubbed “the Asia-Pacific century” the alternative between completing the pan-European project of a continent free of dividing lines from Lisbon to Vladivostok, or facing dwindling political and economic relevance has never been clearer.

Making the right choice involves, above all, jointly searching for interfaces for linking the massive comparative advantages Russia and the EU can offer each other in terms of mineral and energy resources and infrastructure, innovative technologies, investments and Eurasian transport routes. Above all, we should do our utmost to tap into the superior quality of human capital, that has for centuries been a hallmark of Europe, of which Russia is undoubtedly a part.

... And how to get there Progress on visa liberalization and the expeditious conclusion of a Russia-EU visa waiver agreement on short-term travel would immediately translate into tangible economic benefits for both sides, while accelerating the modernizing two-way flow of ideas, culture and best practices. Updating the RussiaEU legal framework, presently embodied by a largely obsolete 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, remains essen-

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tial to instilling our relationship with a robust and forwardlooking agenda. Our Partnership for Modernization initiative already serves as a valid platform for harmonizing technical and environmental standards. It can bring sustained mutual benefit, keeping our social infrastructure, scientific capabilities, educational and medical systems on the global cutting edge. Finally, as regional integration efforts unfold across the post-Soviet space, we should explore ways of forging institutional links between the European Commission and the newly established Eurasian Economic Commission with a view to creating a mutually reinforcing trade potential.

Staying ambitious is our only option. Consigning relations to idle drift would allow centrifugal elements to gain traction, thus elevating risks of stalling on pressing issues and backpedalling on the time-honoured heritage of Russia-EU cooperation. What we should avoid is a disheartening build-up of cases of artificial linkages between detached portfolios, blatantly politicized treatment of selective human rights files, as well as attempts to exploit relations for short-term financial gains.

Benefits from long-term energy cooperation The latter applies in particular to the energy sector, where Russia has for decades been a trusted partner in satisfying EU member countries’ growing oil and gas needs. The EU Third Energy Package, the projected Transcaspian gas pipeline as well as the recent decision by the EU Commission to open

Vladimir Chizhov Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Born Dec. 3, 1953. Graduated with honours from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1976. Joined diplomatic service in the same year. 1995 Deputy Head, Russian Delegation to the OSCE, 1996 Deputy High Representative for Bosnia Peace Implementation, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 1997 Director, 3rd European Dept., MFA, Moscow; 1999 Director, European Multilateral Cooperation Dept., MFA, Moscow; 2002 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moscow; 2005 Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Communities, Brussels. He has conducted analytical research work on European security, OSCE, Russia-EU and Russia-NATO relations, Mediterranean, Balkans, problems of Cyprus and Northern Ireland and UN peacekeeping.

Russian Special Representative for Cyprus (1997–2000), for the Balkans (2000–2002).

The European Union, Russia and NATO

Press-conference following the Russia-EU summit held on 3-4 June 2012 in St. Petersburg, Russia. Left to right: Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission.

Photo: press service of the Executive office of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow

antitrust proceedings against Gazprom, while being separate cases with a specific background, have one commonality. They could adversely affect conditions for Russian involvement in EU energy markets, thereby impacting on EU long-term energy security amidst volatile global conditions and ultimately jeopardizing the interests of European consumers. In the case of the Transcaspian gas pipeline hasty EU action could also entail a lasting environmental hazard to the fauna and flora of the Caspian sea basin and coastal regions.

Problematic issues like these should be resolved in a sensible and pragmatic manner, reflecting the strategic nature of the Russia-EU partnership and our economic interdependence.

More importantly, the centrality of our relationship’s economic pillar must be reaffirmed through real-time trade and investment as well as by setting far-sighted policy goals while respecting the delicate fabric of agreements in force.

The security agenda As two neighbours, adjoining a regional arc of volatility fraught with transnational threats and challenges, Russia and the EU stand to gain from forging closer ties in the area of security. True, we can take pride in successfully thwarting pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa through joint navy patrols, collaborating in key international negotiating formats on Iran, the Middle East or Transdniestria, as well as regularly consulting on foreign policy issues at almost every level of seniority and expertise. Nevertheless, this impressive record of cooperation is still a long way from exhausting its vast potential. The amplified post-Lisbon setup of EU CFSP has yet to be matched by commensurate advances in the number and scope of concerted crisis management ventures, joint foreign policy actions and statements.

That is why Russia is pushing for a proactive security agenda with the EU. Above all, our crisis management efforts should be underpinned by a solid conceptual and legal setting elabo-

rated in the spirit of equality. This will cut “red tape” and enable a rapid Russia-EU response to an emerging crisis. In 2007-2009 the time ratio between the actual deployment of Russian forces to an EU-led Mission in Chad/Central African Republic and overcoming inherent decision-making and legal hurdles was around 1:8. If we are serious about containing regional instability together, those numbers need at the very least to be reversed.

Despite having established a productive framework for military-to-military contacts in 2010, Russia-EU defense-industrial cooperation is still fledgling. Yet in such vital areas as helicopter construction and maintenance, strategic airlift and maritime surveillance Russia stands ready to provide reliable and economical solutions to EU shortfalls.

Achieving genuine partnership Upgrading our “modus operandi” in foreign and security policy will ultimately require a platform for joint decision-making, strategic guidance and comprehensive political control of crisis management efforts. The Meseberg initiative, proposed

by Germany in 2010 and supported by Russia, should serve as a valuable blueprint and deserves to be seized in a decisive manner without linkages to narrower regional issues.

Last but not least, achieving genuine strategic partnership implies shifting mental perspective. Our “Common Neighbourhood” in EU terms needs to be viewed as such, not as an arena for a “friend or foe” stigmatization and zero-sum stratagems.

To succeed globally Russia and the EU must steer closely alongside each other while executing a concerted turn towards economic, social and technological modernization as well as a coherent response to regional security challenges. If bearings are misaligned both sides could end up drifting away from each other, or risking collision. The upcoming Russia-EU summit in Brussels in December presents a golden “window of opportunity” to plot our course into the future.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Indispensable: shared fundamental values

Objectives of the EU’s Russia policy

by Hannes Swoboda MEP, President of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EP, Rapporteur on a new EU-Russia agreement, Strasbourg/Brussels In its December 2012 plenary session, the European Parliament will vote on the recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) on the negotiations for the new EU-Russia agreement. The recommendation was adopted in the foreign affairs committee at the beginning of October with an overwhelming majority: 53 votes in favour, one against. The recommendation focuses on the ambition of a strategic partnership with Russia, as a neighbour of the EU and as an important global and regional player. However, this kind of partnership can only be achieved on the basis of shared fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for the principles of the UN Charter and international law.

Unfortunately, in recent months Russia has been moving away from these values, for example, in adopting new laws that significantly hamper the work of independent NGOs and limit freedom of expression. As a member of the UN Security Council, Russia also has to fulfil its global obligations in upholding the principles of international law and peaceful resolution of conflicts. In this context, the EU looks to Russia to show a more constructive attitude to the ongoing crisis in Syria and unsolved conflicts in Georgia. Bearing in mind these differences of approach, even more effort is needed to forge a real partnership between European and Russian societies.

Shaping the EU’s new Russia policy Writing the report on the new EU-Russia agreement – the socalled ‘Russia report‘ – it was very important to cooperate openly and honestly with counterparts in the other political

Hannes Swoboda MEP Hannes Swoboda MEP was elected as President of the S&D group in the European Parliament in 2012. He was born in 1946 and studied law and economics at the University of Vienna. As a member of the Social Democratic Party in Austria (SPÖ) he joined the European Parliament right after Austria’s accession to the EU and was the leading SPÖ candidate in the following elections (2004, 2009). He has served on 15 committees, 11 delegations and has been the Rapporteur for countless reports with a regional focus on south-east Europe, central Asia and Russia. Having served as a vice-president of the S&D, his law and economics background, the 14 years representing the interest of employees in the Vienna chamber of labour as well as the nine years he served in the Vienna Assembly and Municipal Council provided him with vast prior experience and knowledge of foreign affairs, urban development, education, health, housing and labour policies.

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groups in the European Parliament. At the same time it was – and still is – vital to include the views of people on the spot.

The report’s development benefited from a visit to Moscow and numerous meetings with representatives from Russian politics, civil society and administration, as well as election observers in Russia and Brussels.

After researching, debating and collecting information – what are the objectives of the new EU-Russia agreement? The main objective has to be to ensure the new agreement provides a comprehensive, forward-looking and legally binding framework for the further development of relations with Russia in future years. It must take into account the need to step up cooperation in all areas in which EU and Russian interests are likely to coincide, while promoting European interests and values in areas where interests diverge, as well as supporting the democratisation and modernisation of the country.

Political dialogue and cooperation It is important to closely monitor Russia’s internal evolution, to work together with all major political protagonists, support Russian institution-building and the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. To do so we must actively support social initiatives seeking to build a civil society based on democratic principles and the rule of law.

One of the most important objectives must be to strengthen EU-Russia dialogue on human rights so that it becomes an effective and result-oriented tool for advancing human rights in Russia. The EU should express its concern at the deteriorating situation for civil society in Russia, in particular the recent adoption of laws on demonstrations, NGOs, defamation and the regulation of the internet which contain ambiguous provisions and could expose citizens to arbitrary enforcement.

I would like to stress that the repeated attempts at regional and federal levels to curtail human rights – notably on freedom of expression and assembly, sexual orientation and gender identity – run counter to Russia’s commitments under its constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Furthermore, it is important to promote the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia in meeting global challenges such as non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, peaceful resolution of protracted or new conflicts through the principles of the UN Charter and existing international law, security of energy supply, management of the Arctic dimension, climate change and poverty reduction.

The European Union, Russia and NATO

Hannes Swoboda MEP, President of the Socialists and Democrats Group in the European Parliament

Economic dependence as the mainspring When it comes to economic aspects of EU-Russia cooperation, the growing economic cooperation between EU and Russia, as reciprocal import markets and suppliers of goods, services and energy, has to be taken into account. The EU is one of Russia’s strategic trade partners, ranking as its first source of imports, its main export destination and a key investment partner. At the same time, Russia has become the EU’s second source of imports (with a value of € 158.6 billion) and its fourth destination for exports (€ 86.1 billion). The report therefore welcomes Russia’s membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and underlines how it can facilitate trade flows between the

Photo: ©S&D Group European Parliament

EU and Russia, while stimulating economic growth and job creation on both sides. We must support Russia’s willingness to use WTO membership as a driver for structural reforms and encourage Russia‘s bid for membership of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development).

Concluding the ideas on the EU’s objectives towards Russia, I believe that – despite some deep and growing divergences with the Russian leadership on fundamental values and key foreign policy issues – the way forward is not through Cold War-style confrontational rhetoric but through dialogue and pragmatic cooperation on issues of common interest.

News: Catherine Ashton’s statement on Russia “(…) The EU has been encouraging newlyelected President Putin to pursue the political and economic reforms started by President Medvedev. We also offered our support in working on our shared modernisation agenda. (…) There had been some encouraging initial steps in Spring to further develop Russia’s democratic institutions, notably the easing of party registration rules and requirements for presidential candidates as well as direct elections of regional governors. (…)

Since May, however, we have been seeing less and less dialogue and openness on the side of the authorities, and rather more intolerance of any expression of dissenting views. Instead of stronger safeguards for the

exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms, we have seen a string of measures all chipping away at them (…)

This trend raises serious questions as to the state of the rule of law in the country, in particular the use of legal and law enforcement structures and other instruments for political purposes rather than for protecting and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the citizens of Russia. (…)

We remain ready to support Russia in all its positive reform efforts, working closely together in our Partnership for Modernisation, the full integration into the international rules-based system, and the development of citizens’ rights and freedoms which must be the basis for stability and prosperity. But we

should not shy away from our responsibilities as a strategic partner, who is also tied by common international obligations and responsibilities, to express our concerns with recent developments. The recent set of steps taken by the government sets the country on the wrong path, and wastes the opportunity for effective modernisation and democratic development provided by the political awakening of Russia’s new middle classes.”

Statement in the European Parliament on the political use of justice in Russia, Strasbourg, 11 September 2012 Source: European Parliament

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Protection for Europe – and Russian suspicion

The NATO-Russia Council and the Missile Defence project

by Dr Klaus Olshausen, Lt.Gen. (ret.), President, Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, Hamburg

In early May this year the international media were buzzing with reports of the violent condemnation by Russian Defence Chief General Nicolai Makarov, pronounced during a conference in Moscow, of NATO’s plan to achieve an interim missile defence (MD) capability by its Chicago summit. Makarov even suggested pre-emptive attacks against missile installations in allied countries as a potential Russian response.

Only days later did some of the media take note of remarks made at the same conference by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow explaining in great detail why NATO’s MD project, aimed at providing comprehensive protection of allied territories and populations against present and future threats, was a responsible step forward.

Those statements highlight the fact that the combination of NATO, Russia and missile defence brings with it opportunities but also the risk of severe friction or even failure.

Dr Klaus Olshausen Dr Klaus Olshausen was born in Eisenberg on April 25, 1945. On graduation from high school he joined the Bundeswehr. 1967-1972 studies of history and political sciences and PhD at the Albert-Ludwigs-University, Freiburg. 1978 completion of general staff officer training.

1979–1985 G2 12th (GE) Armoured Division; attendee of the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, USA and Foreign and security policy directorate at the Federal Chancellery, Bonn and Commander of Engineer Battalion 2.

1985: Planning Staff of MoD. 1987 Military Attaché in Washington, DC, USA. 1990 Commander (GE) Infantry Brigade 31. 1994 as a Brigadier General Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Army Support Command.

1996 Deputy Commanding General EUROCORPS in Strasbourg. 1998 Deputy Commander HQ IV. Corps (Deputy Commander GE KFOR (KOSOVO). 2000–2006 German Military Representative to the MC/NATO, WEU and EU on 1 October 2000 with the rank of Lieutenant General.

A historical snapshot The development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and the 9/11 terror attacks prompting a focus on the wider Middle East were critical factors in the Bush administration’s decision to denounce the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty dating back to the early 1970s. The requirement for a limited defence capability against future long-range ballistic missiles from those countries/regions made this step unavoidable, according to the US rationale. Moreover, notwithstanding all the criticism on the part of the international community and Russia, the then Russian President Putin coolly claimed that Russian offensive capabilities would in any case easily be able to overwhelm those defences.

Creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Three years following the controversy over the decision to launch the Kosovo air campaign, the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted increased interest on the part of both Russia and NATO in seeking ways of coming closer with a view to combating transnational terrorism. At that time NATO had also embarked on the final stages of its decision-making process on the accession of seven new members, including the three Baltic States. The creation of the NRC was therefore also perceived as a means of mitigating the repercussions for Russia of former USSR member states joining NATO. It is worth mentioning in this context that the Rome Declaration of 28 May 2002, besides general military-to-military

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cooperation, already included Theatre Missile Defence as one of the nine areas in which cooperative efforts were to be taken forward.

Missile defence as a NATO project But before delving deeper into the topic of missile defence it is helpful to establish the perspective and intentions on both sides that led to the creation of the NRC. While NATO nations were eager to engage with Russia, at least to a certain extent, but without (Russian-imposed) constraints, Russia was seeking to create a forum of equal partners in order to take decisions on significant European security issues. “Both sides want to lead but not be led”.

From SDI to the Rumsfeld report of 1998, from the Bush administration’s National Missile Defense Project (including cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic) to the “phased approach” of the Obama administration, missile defence was and remains a critical US project. It was only with Obama’s adaptation of the programme and his readiness to enlarge its scope to cover the whole of NATO Europe that the Allies rallied behind the programme, with the additional prospect of broad transparency vis-à-vis Russia and deliberate coordination or even the broadest possible cooperation with it. Although the then President Medvejev agreed at the 2010 Lisbon summit to such cooperation in general, Russia had

The European Union, Russia and NATO

already placed its own emergency brake on the New START Treaty in the spring of that year.

NATO’s cooperation path In an attempt to accommodate Russian concerns the Alliance suggested several areas of cooperation: • Firstly, an effort to draw up a common threat assessment.

This assessment was agreed in principle at the NRC CHODs meeting in April 2012; • Secondly, the creation of two “NATO-Russia missile defence centres” with mixed teams working together around the clock.

The first was planned to be a Missile Defence Data Fusion Centre in order to create – using data from all sensors – a common operational picture of possible third country missile launches. The second was to be a Missile Defence Planning & Operations Centre which would concentrate on operating concepts, rules of engagement and preplanned responses to be implemented in the event of an actual attack by a third country.

Russia’s perceptions and requirements An article written by Sergey Koshelev in May 2012 describes the Russian perception of NATO’s MD project as a potential threat against Russia’s own nuclear arsenal that would negate its capacity for retaliation. Clearly the presumption underlying that perception is that of a US and/or NATO attack requiring an overwhelming nuclear response from Russia. Or else Russia is thinking of contingencies involving a conventional attack against NATO territory, but where a nuclear retaliatory capability would be required in order to deter a nuclear response from NATO. Both scenarios look far-fetched but are triggering unrealistic demands on the part of Moscow.

Instead of making the most of the offers of cooperation to enhance its own situational awareness and influence, Russia is insisting on two far-reaching and – for NATO – impossible demands. Ultimately, what Moscow wants is a missile defence in and for Europe for which the strategic deployment decisions are taken by the NRC and not by the NAC or even SACEUR alone. As long as this is not achievable Moscow is insisting on a legally binding guarantee that MD will not be used against Russia.

The first demand is unacceptable to the Alliance since the use of missile defence, as a matter of collective defence falling under Article 5, cannot be placed in the hands of a third country. And the second would constitute a self-imposed longterm and legally binding limitation of the Alliance’s scope for action that neither the US nor any other NATO member nation would be willing to accept.

The way forward Since the Chicago summit there have been no recognisable activities between NATO and Russia in the field of missile

defence. Against the current backdrop of Russian disapproval or downright rejection and the first interim MD capability having been established at the time of the Chicago summit, the following points should guide NATO’s approach: • The MD project is designed for the protection of territories, populations and deployed forces against a limited number of ballistic missile attacks.

• Risks, dangers and threats arising from the proliferation of ballistic missiles already exist and are likely to increase in terms of the types of threat, their number and their geographic extension.

• In a spirit of solidarity, common reponsibility and burden sharing the participation of many if not all member nations is required, not least of all to master this technologically, financially and politically challenging endeavour.

• NATO’s limited MD is not directed against Russia and will never develop the technical or operational magnitude that would allow it to undermine Russia’s retaliatory capabilities.

• All offers of cooperation with Russia regarding threat analysis, early warning and operational planning remain valid and will be further pursued with the Russian authorities.

Unjustified Russian objections which are possibly no more than an attempt to hide the fact that Russia does not want NATO/US installations on the territory of “new” Alliance members in central and south-eastern Europe and to drive a wedge between Alliance members cannot and must not be allowed to stand in the way of the useful and affordable contribution that MD can make to the comprehensive collective defence of the Alliance.

But even if all these points are followed through, the technological challenges – such as intelligence & reconnaissance, target recognition & identification and improved weapons effectiveness – will require a long-lasting effort in order to create operationally effective systems. This might also give rise to critical questions on the part of the nations concerned.

The time must also be used in order to work out acceptable solutions for the political issues as well – and not only with Russia.

News: NATO-Russia Council On 13-14 November 2012, a simulated computer-based exercise to test the NATO-Russia Council’s Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI) Information Exchange System (IES) took place over three CAI geographical areas of operational interest: Bodø/Murmansk, Warsaw/ Kaliningrad and Ankara/Rostov-on-Don. The purpose of CAI is to foster cooperation on airspace surveillance and air traffic coordination against terrorist attacks using civilian aircraft. The exercise, called “Vigilant Skies 2012” builds on the achievements of previous CAI exercises and workshops and will help to build towards a possible live exercise in 2013 over the Black Sea area.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

There has been no consensus on Missile Defence over the years between NATO and Russia

Missile defence – is a political decision feasible?

by Vladimir M. Grinin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Germany, Berlin

The participants in the Russia-NATO Council (RNC) meeting in Lisbon, 2010, admitted in “The Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges” that there was a danger of missile risks developing into missile threats. The Missile Defence (MD) was proclaimed as one of the most promising areas of cooperation. The Russian Federation has not only supported the idea to cooperate on developing a joint MD system, but also proposed parameters of such cooperation in form of creating a Sectoral Missile Defense system that would protect the entire Euro-Atlantic region.

Controversies and misunderstandings As it turned out our RNC partners, however, interpret the definition of “joint” on their own. They believe that there should be two systems, linked by a sort of interface, and insist, however, that as for NATO’s system, it’s NATO countries, first of all, the US, that should determine its configuration and parameters. As a result the idea of a joint MD that seemed to be a unifying project has become a subject of much controversy and still could not be moved to an implemention phase. Moreover, a unilateral implemention of the US-led MD project has become one of the key issues on today’s agenda.

“We believe there is still time to find mutually acceptable solutions” Vladimir M. Grinin

We believe that deployment of such missile defense system elements in close proximity to Russian borders is directed against this country’s strategic nuclear forces and may pose a threat to its national security. Meanwhile the alliance declared initial operational readiness of the system at an alliance summit in Chicago on May 20, an indication that it is willing to go ahead with its plans without Russian accord giving as a reason that the proposed scheme is ideal. At the same time we are concerned over American plans to deploy a new regional MD shield in Southeast Asia that might be established in addition to the geography and the U.S. capability to deploy these assets in different locations.

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Vladimir M. Grinin Vladimir M. Grinin was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to Germany in June 2010. He was born in 1947. After graduating from the Moscow State Institute for International Relations he joined the diplomatic service in 1971. From 1973 to 1980 he worked at the Soviet Union Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1982 he graduated from the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1983 to 1986 he took part in the Soviet-U.S. Nuclear and Space Arms Talks.

From 1986 to 1990 he was a member of staff at the USSR/Russian Federation Embassy in the German Democratic Republic, and following that at the Russian Embassy in the FRG. Before taking up his current post he served as Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Austria (1996–2000), Finland (2003–2006) and Poland (2006–2010).

What is the essence?

The ambition is to upset the strategic global balance of nuclear power that guarantees peace and stability for decades.

One of the core elements of approach to maintaining strategic stability is the indissoluble interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. The logic is simple and clear: an increase of ABM capabilities by one side forces the other side to take compensatory measure. It is impossible to consider the implementation of the US global missile defense as something apart and as a “purely defensive” action, for it affects global strategic balance and leads to the creation of potential for the first disarming strike. Therefore Russia has no intention of unilateral cutting weapons from its nuclear force in the absence of comparable steps by other powers. As our American partners proceed with developing their own missile defense we shall have to think of how we can defend ourselves and preserve the strategic balance.

In our view, the planned US deployment of a missile defense system in Europe could become a throwback to the Cold War era. A purely American missile defense project would be damaging strategic stability in violation of all the OSCE members’ obligations not to strengthen their security at the expense of others. Such a system could create new diving lines in Europe and serve as an incentive for the resumption of the arms race, including the MD arms race. It also may negatively affect the disarmament process.

The European Union, Russia and NATO

Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, at the Russia-NATO Council 2012.

Photo: Russian Foreign Ministry

Concern about stability We believe that if such a system undermines strategic stability and is capable of intercepting Russian missiles, partnership in building it makes no sense. That’s the reason for our strong believe that any substantial negotiations on the configuration of the system should start with the presentation of legallybinding guarantees that the NATO missile defense assets will never be used to the prejudice of our country’s interests and will not be targeted against Russian deterrent systems that are part of the strategic equation. These guarantees should be expressed not in the form of verbal assurances.

Unfortunately, political promises have a short life. We already had some occasions to ascertain this. That’s why we need clear, unambiguous guarantees, preferably in the form of military-political criteria together with the exact technological and geographical parameters such as the locations of the deployment of interceptors, electronic warfare, the speed of interceptor warheads and the number of such warheads.

How to get a breakthrough It is important that Washington eases these concerns. Either we do something together passing this test of cooperation and responding together to new missile challenges and threats, or our partners work on their project without us. But in that case we will take appropriate military-technical measures based on the developments at each phase of implementation of the US Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense.

Is it possible to find a solution to the problem? Theoretically, yes. Russia is set to continue the dialogue on the matter. We must honestly talk to each other about our concerns in the spirit of the Lisbon agreement and try to troubleshoot them.

First of all, it is necessary to define clear-cut legal aspects of

missile defense interaction between the Russian Federation and the United States. Without a clear understanding of the “final product” starting substantive negotiations on one or two points would make no sense and we could end up in a situation similar to the one NATO countries created several years ago when we started to cooperate with the alliance on the project of missile defense.

Our principal position on MD is still based on the need for multilateral approach for assessing missile risks and threats in the world as well as on collective response to them. Russia is ready to assume its part of responsibility in addressing a shared goal of protecting the European continent from eventual missile challenges and threats. We are convinced that a true European missile defense (covering all countries of Europe) should be built on the basis of equality, indivisibility of security and mutual respect of interests. We strongly believe that any unilateral solution, any unlimited buildup of the missile capability by one state or a group of states will not benefit stability in the world. Global nature of contemporary challenges and threats, on one hand, and the interdependence of all countries, on the other hand, proves that security in modern world is indivisible and, thus, should be ensured collectively. And then the Euro-Atlantic region will truly turn into a region of stability and peace and the military instruments, including those organizations that were set up back in the era of confrontation, will play a lesser role in determining the key criteria of such a new security order.

The way ahead for a political decision A political decision is only feasible, if there is a will to seek compromise. We invite our partners to sit down at the negotiating table and to analyze the threats and methods to neutralize them, as well as the possibility of solving the problems by diplomatic and political means. The differences on the issue can only be solved if both sides accept as an axiom that they are reliable partners and allies for each other. That would mean the parties jointly do missile threat assessments and control this defense system together.

We believe there is still time to find mutually acceptable solutions. Today we have all necessary preconditions to turn missile defense in an area of cooperation and to put an end once and for all the formerly prevailing confrontation. We should not lose this chance. In the period of acute economic and financial crisis the increase of expenditures at the cost of building the BM sites is obviously not an option. It does not respond to the interests of Europe and the whole world. If Russia and NATO succeed to agree to cooperate in the area of missile defense, this would become an emblematic event in Russia-US, Russia-NATO relations, and there would be a clear and feasible prospect for rising to a qualitative new level of interaction. Then we would have a full reason to say that the Cold War is definitely over.

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Photo: The European/archive

The Common Security and Defence Policy The EU has proven that it has the political, civil and, with evident limitations, military capabilities to contribute to the settlement of conflicts. But the crisis management engagement in Libya by several European Air Forces showed that Europe is not able to conduct peace-enforcement missions on its own due to a lack of crucial strategic capabilities. Europe’s leaders will have to change course to master the cap.

Carrying out a foreign policy based on the comprehensive approach is absolutely essential

The Lisbon Comprehensive Approach and the consequences for the CSDP

by Arnauld Danjean MEP, Chairman SEDE Committee, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

The European Union has the ability to mobilise a wide range of political, economic, and humanitarian instruments like no other organisation in the world. This unique potential has allowed the progressive shaping of EU foreign policy in a comprehensive way, whereby all EU instruments are combined in order to deal simultaneously with the different challenges posed by a particular crisis. The Lisbon Treaty has officially sanctioned this “comprehensive approach”, notably with the appointment of a new “double-hatted” High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). It has provided the EU with a flexible and efficient framework in which to conduct its foreign policy.

The EU has already started to implement the comprehensive approach. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, the EU engagement tackles all aspects of instability by combining CSDP military and civilian operations (EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor) with political and diplomatic efforts and legal action, as well as training and development assistance through the EU Instrument for Stability and Development Fund. All these supporting actions are strongly entrenched within a system of close coordination with African and other international partners.

In a totally different context, the Western Balkans can also be seen as a key region for the EU’s efforts to combine all instruments at its disposal in order to move from a post-conflict policy towards an integration policy. Its commitments still include a military mission (in Bosnia-Herzegovina), a large and

crucial civilian one (Eulex Kosovo) and financial, diplomatic and economic engagements through pre-accession funds, enlargement policy and trade agreements.

Carrying out a foreign policy based on the comprehensive approach is absolutely essential if the EU and its Member States want to meet the evolving challenges and threats of today’s world. Indeed, dealing efficiently and for the long term with crises means being able to simultaneously tackle both the current symptoms, with rapid crisis-management instruments like the CSDP, and the root causes of the problem, using economic, development and humanitarian means.

The CSDP is the cornerstone of the EU’s security policy. Today 14 CSDP operations – 11 civilian and three military – are under way thoughout the world. Of the 11 civilian missions, three were launched in the summer of 2012 (EUCAP Nestor in the Horn of Africa, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUAVSEC South Sudan), and another is being considered in order to support border

News: EP Resolutions on CSDP Four Resolutions on CSDP issues, prepared by the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, have been on the agenda of the European Parliament’s Plenary Session from 19-22 November 2012. The topics were the implementation of the CSDP (Rapporteur: Arnauld Danjean); the political and operational dimensions of the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses (Rapporteur: Ioan Mircea Paşcu); the role of CSDP in case of climate driven crises and natural disaster (Rapporteur: Indrek Tarand), and Cyber Security and Defence (Rapporteur: Tunne Kelam).

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management in Libya. Through these operations the CSDP gives the Union’s actions political credibility and visibility. It is therefore imperative that the CSDP remains a decisive part of EU’s “comprehensive approach” – the EU’s preferred crisismanagement instrument. It should not be marginalised on any account.

Indeed the risk of considering CDSP as a relatively marginal dimension of the comprehensive approach cannot be ruled out. This is especially the case with regard to the CSDP’s military component, which has thoroughly been left aside in recent years, with the exception of EUTM Somalia; and even though a number of crises would have justified an EU intervention (for instance in Libya and Mali), no new military operations have been launched since 2008.

intervene when needed (as the conflict in Libya – and before that the conflict in the Balkans – showed) and at the same time weaken our position in the international arena; but more worryingly, it could put at risk our own security, especially since it means that we are willing to delegate it – at least partly – to others.

In that perspective, while the development of the “comprehensive approach” is to be welcomed, it should under no circumstances rule out recourse to military means. If the EU is to assert its status as a major player in the international arena it must give itself the means to do so.

Arnauld Danjean MEP Hence, all in all, it seems that EU decision-makers have come to favour a civilian approach to external action. This shift in EU foreign policy is nonetheless to be questioned in terms of the limits to “soft power”. At a time when the US is reorienting its defence policy priorities towards the Asia-Pacific area and when the financial and economic crisis has deeply challenged the EU Member States’ defence budgets and ability to act on their own, narrowing EU security policy to “soft power” would indeed seem to be quite a hazardous strategy. Two unwanted consequences could arise from this policy choice: it could profoundly, and for the long term, hamper our ability to

Chairman of the EP Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) since 2009. He was born in 1971 in Louhans.

Graduate (1992) and Postgraduate Diploma (DEA) in politics from the Paris Institute of Political Studies (1993). 1994–2004, Ministry of Defence, Paris. 2004–2005, Representative of the Secretary-General of the EU-Council/HR for the CFSP in Kosovo.

2005–2007, Adviser in the private office of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Director-adviser, EZL Consulting, Paris. Mr. Danjean is Member of the National Council of the UMP (Saône-et-Loire) and he is an elected member of the Bourgogne Regional Council.

News: Cyber news

Creation of a Cyber Academy With the development of computer technology IT security is becoming an increasingly important area. The widespread use of the Internet for private and business communications provides greater opportunities for criminal activity in the field of information and communications technology (ICT).

Attacks by cyber terrorists against critical infrastructure constitute a further threat, and developments such as cloud computing and social networks pose a huge challenge for police, public prosecutors and local authorities. Those issues as well as data protection and compliance are addressed by the newly created Cyber Academy (CAK) in Germany.

The Academy offers training and further training to keep pace with this rapid development of ICT and cyber crime. The course content is geared to participants’ require-

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ments, enabling them to identify threats and to take appropriate action. The different training modules are geared to real-life situations and aim to maintain and increase participants’ professional performance potential thereby enhancing the administration’s quality and flexibility.

The objective is to achieve a percentage of 30% of participants taking a certification exam (ISO 27001). > For further information: www.cyber-akademie.de

ESRT Global Cyber Security Conference The European Security Round Table (ESRT) together with the Ministry of Defence of Estonia is organising a high-level Global Cyber Security Conference on the 30th of January 2013 in Brussels.

This is the third major conference in the framework of the ESRT Cyber Security Cycle, with previous Conferences in Brussels in June 2011 (European Cyber Security) and Washin-

ton D.C. in May 2012 (Transatlantic Dimensions of Cyber Security). The upcoming Global Cyber Security Conference is a logical step further, aimed at establishing a broader forum beyond the European and Transatlantic level and focused on the cyber crime, digital and foreign dimensions of Cyber Security. The Conference takes place in the context of the issuance of the EU Cyber Security Strategy and aims at giving an opportunity to exchange views on the challenges of cyber security and convey the need of enhanced international coordination action in the field. > For more information: www.security-round-table.eu

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Pooling and Sharing is at the heart of the efforts

The European Defence Agency – taking stock Interview with Claude-France Arnould, CEO, European Defence Agency (EDA), Brussels The European: Madame Arnould, you are the Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA). You have been CE for almost two years and it seems that EDA has become better known and is moving strongly forward with new ideas and approaches. What is your mission?

Claude-France Arnould: Ultimately our mission is about delivering capabilities. I believe that Europe’s financial crisis and its impact on defence budgets is a major issue for European defence cooperation and the EDA is part of the solution. We have achieved significant progress, making sure the EDA is ready to fulfil our Member States’ needs and that they in turn are ready to use us. Now we have to keep delivering concrete results and foster a more systematic approach. Additionally, our mission is to support Europe’s industrial and technological basis as well as research and development.

The European: In which fields have you made progress with your team?

Claude-France Arnould: I think we can sum up our progress by looking at the pooling and sharing priorities. Three projects that I deem most critical are our efforts in the field of air-to-air refuelling, satellite communications and medical field hospitals. The campaign in Libya has shown our dramatic shortfalls in terms of in-flight refuelling. Without our American allies, the European fighter jet fleet could hardly have been kept operational. EU defence ministers acknowledged this and gave us the task to urgently look into the situation. In terms of commercial satellite capacity, we have just signed a contract with Astrium Services ensuring the common procurement of telecommunication services on behalf of five Member States.

Regarding medical field hospitals fourteen Member States are coming together, facilitated by the EDA, to build the Modular Multinational Medical Unit, a key enabler for any operation and a project impossible for Member States to undertake alone.

The European: That is an impressive list, but what makes the difference between now and the time before the EDA? Claude-France Arnould: EDA is there to offer a central place for cooperation and to propose a coherent approach based on expertise, lessons learned, and transparency. Defence ministers give the impetus for priorities or new projects in the Board.

Capabilities, armament as well as research and technology experts work together which allows for an approach combining bottom-up expertise on requirements and top-down direction.

Long ago and before the EDA some excellent cooperative defence projects were launched but on an ad hoc basis. Lessons from common projects were often lost. Because the EDA

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Claude-France Arnould Claude-France Arnould, Chief Executive Officer of the European Defence Agency (EDA). She is a former student of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, and holds an aggregation in Classics, a degree in art and archaeology and she studied at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), Paris.

Earlier in her career she was from 1994–1998 a First Councillor at the French Embassy in Bonn. 1998–2001, Mrs Arnould worked as a Director of International and Strategic Affaires at the Prime Ministers Defence General Secretariat (SGDN). Paris 2001–2009, Director for Defence Issues at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Brussels, 2009–2010, Head of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Brussels.

gathers expertise from across the continent and from the full spectrum of defence under a single roof, we can share our experiences, and make our work more effective.

The European: Looking ahead, what are your objectives for the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?

Surely it is more than just the “road from Ghent”?

Claude-France Arnould: Well, we do not only talk but we act.

We work closely together with Member States to identify priorities, to consolidate demand and above all to further increase cooperation. In the air domain for example, the Agency addresses military capability shortfalls in several ways: we support Member States in developing new and improved military capacity. We have a large and successful training programme, for helicopter and fixed wing aircraft. We are addressing military airworthiness requirements, UAS insertion, the military aspects of Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and we seek to reduce aircraft through-life costs by pooling and sharing of maintenance facilities and high value aircraft components. And in order to keep our industrial and technological capabilities, we proposed a consistent roadmap during the ILA Berlin last October.

The European: Pooling and sharing is currently at the heart of every political discussion. How does the Agency convince Member States to pool and share capabilities?

Claude-France Arnould: Firstly, we demonstrate our ability to deliver concrete benefits for European defence as well as our credibility through projects. Secondly, we have prepared a code of conduct which looks at how to sustain the pooling and sharing initiative in the longer term. This code of conduct proposes several specific measures and principles to be implemented by Member States – on a voluntary basis of course.

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“The objective now is to demonstrate the concrete ability to deliver on what matters for defence ministers.”

One of the central measures – and key messages for me – is that Member States should consider cooperation or pooling and sharing as the preferred option when they examine national requirements. Another important point is to implement pooling and sharing throughout the whole lifecycle of an asset – from cradle to crave so to say. Initial feedback from Member States was very positive. Finally it is about looking for the best way to harness investment and to ensure coherence while the reality of pooling and sharing will be largely delivered at regional and bilateral level.

The European: I am convinced that pooling and sharing requires a certain culture and I am not sure that the move from national to international – if there are more than two or three partners – has really been properly digested within the national administrations, especially if one considers continuous interdependence as a barrier to national independence.

Claude-France Arnould: You are right to say that we are not quite there yet, but I think trust is building – it has to, as governments realise they cannot do it alone any more. You mention activities done by smaller number of partners; I support that. We apply an “à la carte” approach. This means that Member States can use the services and expertise of the Agency when and where they see fit. But “à la carte” can be more efficient combined with transparency and coherence.

The European: Is the modular field hospital a good example?

Claude-France Arnould: Yes, modular field hospitals are expensive to maintain, and many states struggle to find enough staff

Key issues of Pooling and Sharing: Mobile Field Hospital

with the specialist training involved – so this capability will be really important when it is delivered. Ministers of defence signed a declaration committing themselves to the project in March this year, and the pre-deployment training centre should be operational by 2014. It is a hugely flexible capability that will help in combat, crisis management or disaster relief alike. It is also an excellent example of non-duplication with NATO: we ensured together with Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk that our activities are complementary and this capability will be available to be deployed by Member States in theatre where they decide to operate.

The European: May I ask you about the field of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), which seems to be a strategic area? How could you imagine coordinating the forthcoming efforts of national industries to develop all-purpose UAS capabilities? Do you see synergies for the CSDP? Claude-France Arnould: UAS is an area that the Agency has worked on since its inception, and it continues to be an important part of our work today. We are working closely with the Commission on inserting UASs in civilian airspace, and our demonstration project on a mid-air collision avoidance system for unmanned vehicles was very well received. We now follow with the Joint Investment Programme (JIP) further technological steps key to airworthiness. This is essential for our industry and for our Commanders regarding redeployment and training.

The European: Your Agency worked hard on practical advice on CBRN and this subject was in vogue in Brussels for years, but now it seems to have lost visibility. Does this mean that crisismanagement forces have in the meantime become well-prepared in that field?

Claude-France Arnould: I think crisis management forces are well prepared for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) events, but there is still a lot of work to do – and that work is happening, even though it may not be making the headlines. Our Biological Equipment Development and Enhancement Programme (BioEDEP) will allow our forces to

air-to-air refueling

Photos: Zeppelin/Airbus

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

operate in a biological threat environment. We are conducting research to improve detection of chemical agents and analyse chemical, biological and radiological. We have run courses for Incident Commanders, Staff Planners and Intelligence Analysts, to help ensure that everyone involved is fully prepared to react to such a threat. We will further cooperate with OCCAR on the basis of our agreement.

The European: Is NATO for you a partner to cooperate with?

Claude-France Arnould: We work closely together. The cooperation functions efficiently on capabilities, be it with ACT or the international secretariat of defence investment in particular. We pay particular attention to not duplicate but to complement efforts. We can take our respective helicopter initiatives as an example: while NATO is looking at equipment, we work on multinational training. NATO’s work to accredit centres of excellence has been valuable, too. We have a systematic coordination of pooling and sharing activities and NATO’s smart defence also in Single European Sky where EDA facilitates taking into consideration NATO’s missions and interests.

The European: You signed an agreement with OCCAR. What is the motivation behind it?

Claude-France Arnould: For me, the agreement we signed with OCCAR in July is essential. We had already worked with OCCAR on several projects on an ad hoc basis – projects like Software Defined Radio, BioEDEP, MUSIS and Maritime Mine CounterMeasures. We wanted to formalise the lessons we’d learned in those collaborations, and smooth the way for future collaboration. That helps us serve our Member States even better. OCCAR manages the A400M programme. Thus our collaboration will be instrumental on air-to-air refuelling and all the training, logistics and employment aspects of using the A400M. The European: Let me turn now to your own agency. The EDA has been under-financed since the beginning and is thus unable to cover all areas. Can you imagine the EDA one day developing into a different organisation? I have in mind something like the very successful European Space Agency (ESA).

Claude-France Arnould: The present budget (circa 30 million Euro) has allowed us to achieve the results I have just illustrated. And I could comment on more of them... We should never forget that on top of this rather small budget, we have for example gathered around 200 million per year for the MIDCAS (anti-collision programme for UAS). Additional “à la carte” financing is also essential. As regards the further development of the EDA, this is in the Member States’ hands. Lisbon provides for an even more ambitious role. The EDA is clearly at the service of Member States, if they see our role evolving, the EDA will be ready for it. The objective now is to demonstrate the concrete ability to deliver on what matters for defence ministers.

The European: Madame Arnould, thank you for the interview.

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A missed opportunity but there will certainly be other mo

The failed merger between

by Denis Verret, President, Dv-Conseil, Paris

Not everyone may agree with the following remarks, but they will certainly find sympathy with anyone who considers that Europe’s geopolitical role should be more commensurate with its economic might, even in the current period of debt and economic crisis. Geopolitical weight presupposes autonomous operational and technological defence capacities.

An imbalanced Alliance We are part of an Alliance that is indivisible and invaluable. But we cannot hide the fact that our Alliance is widely imbalanced.

On the one hand the US rightly complains about Europe’s growing deficiencies in terms of burden sharing. On the other hand, however, the US, the sole NATO member to be self-reliant in operational and technological defence capabilities, continues to impose limitations on all its allies in terms of access to its best operational and technological capacities, its market and export licences. No European nation alone has the financial means to build completely autonomous operational and technological capacities. So a Europe of the willing is our only possible answer, building on shared sovereignty and mutually committed security of supply. The “magic formula” (programme, consolidation, integration) applied by European states and industries already allowed us to build a decent competitive industrial base, but it was fragile because insufficiently comprehensive.

Protected US military dominance US military dominance is built on unrivalled technological leadership in this sensitive industry, which is dual in essence – commercial and military, covering various segments of aeronautical, space, security and defence activities, built on cuttingedge technology with considerable spill-over effects on other industrial sectors. The European commercial aerospace industry, based on the Airbus model of programmes, consolidation and integration is now on a par with the American one. This is also the case for helicopters, space, military transport aircraft and tactical missiles. But where Europe continues to suffer from fragmentation of both public procurements and industrial supplies, its DTIB (Defence Technological and Industrial Base) is overtaken by that of the US. The growing gap between the American and European defence equipment budgets only aggravates the problem.

All this proves how right the project of a full merger between EADS and BAE Systems was (and could still be): • It has to be seen as phase 2 of a move triggered by the creation of EADS itself in 2000. EADS was the right answer at that time to the electro-shock of the Boeing/MDD merger: a “co-pro-

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ves to come!

EADS and British Aerospace (BAE) Denis Verret duction” of the US government and Boeing aimed at building a group five times bigger than Aerospatiale or DASA, occupying 84 % of the worldwide installed fleet of commercial aircraft of more than 100 seats, henceforth backed by the deep pockets of the Pentagon and Nasa, for which MDD was the first supplier.

Europe’s reaction was a “matter of necessity”: its answer was its own “co-production” joining the visions of three governments and of two great industry captains. Even if EADS has been an impressive success story in terms of market shares, jobs and cash creation, it remains imbalanced, with a weak leg in defence, compared to Boeing. Conversely, BAE Systems is by far too much of a pure defence player, overexposed to the countercyclical effects of the UK and US defence budgets. EADS and BAE Systems were (and still would be) the right match.

• The past 10 years have been marked by a standstill in terms of trans-border and dual consolidation throughout Europe. By the same token, the opposite wave of purely national and defenceonly consolidations has flourished, the business model invoked being: “ ‘saturate’ my domestic defence market and use it as a springboard to compete fiercely on the export markets of my rivals (notably European)”: i.e. a sort of nineteenth century colonial empire model exhausting the national taxpayers in fratricidal rivalry. The managements of EADS and BAE Systems were absolutely right in their resolve to back European and dual consolidation. It was like a non-exclusive Lancaster House translated into industrial assets. The private reference shareholders of EADS supported the project as well as the British and French governments, despite the tight schedule. But the German government was divided and the “Nein” won the day!

The Eurofighter is a EADS-BAE product together with the Italian and Spanish industries.

Photo: max.pfandl/CC BY 2.0/flickr

Denis Verret was born in 1949 in Paris.

1971: studies at Paris Institute of Political Science. 1976: Master’s degree in Public Law, (ENA). 1976: Urban Planning and Architecture Administration. 1981 to 1983: Commercial Counsellor, French Embassy in Washington DC. 1982: Technical Advisor for International Economic Affairs to the French Minister of Industry and then the Prime Minister. 1986: Denis Verret joined Thomson CSF. 1994: Aerospatiale, Corporate Vice President in charge of International and Commercial Affairs. 2003: Coordination and Support, EADS International Paris.

2008: Senior Vice President for Strategic Business and International Relations in the Strategy and Marketing Organisation (SMO) of EADS. 2010: Denis Verret created his own company, DV-Conseil, consulting in international, institutional and strategic affairs.

Conclusions and consequences I think that it serves no purpose to apportion blame if ultimately our aim is to achieve consensus on such a project or any other project for a larger and more balanced European sovereign industry champion. We must first better understand the roots of the “Nein” in order to measure the chances of converting it into a resounding “Ja”, like in 2000 for EADS. Some Germans were still suspicious following the Lancaster House Treaty presented originally as an exclusive dynamic, open neither to Germany nor to others. Some Germans still probably supported a German Defence Cy model as the mirror of a French Defence Cy model in construction under Dassault leadership. Other Germans remained reluctant to accede to what they saw as a future monopoly, not sufficiently realising, perhaps, that the more competitive your prime contractor, the more jobs can be secured internally and through the supply chain.

• In reality, nobody denies that the schedule (due to the famous leaks) was too tight to allow the necessary pedagogical exercise for all the stakeholders. For such a strategic project, the “co-production of consensus” between the states and the industry and their respective legitimate interests takes more time.

• We have to face the risk that the advocates of the purely national defence company vision will take advantage of that failure to develop their inward-looking strategy, even in a context of shrinking domestic markets.

• It is precisely in the interests and the duty of all European stakeholders, states and industries concerned to work together on the concrete foundations of the necessary future European consolidation: joint and specialised efforts in R&T, joint programmes corresponding to urgent operational capabilities (such as drones, space projects and missile defence).

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Creating synergies to continue offering high-value products and services

Plea for a common European industry strategy Interview with Thomas Homberg, CEO, MBDA Deutschland GmbH, Schrobenhausen

The European: Mr Homberg, you headed the Corporate Strategy at EADS for the past few years; on 1 August 2012 you assumed the position of Managing Director of the German missile systems company MBDA Deutschland GmbH. What is the main focus of MBDA Deutschland as a part of MBDA? Thomas Homberg: After my responsibility at EADS, I’m looking forward to being responsible for the operational management of MBDA Deutschland. The company is special in many respects. We supply equipment to all three branches of the armed services – Air Force, Army and Navy. We have highly motivated employees and some unique specialists on board.

We cover guided-missile systems from A to Z. This comprises the development and production of guided missiles and their main components such as seeker heads, warhead systems from our wholly owned subsidiary TDW and propulsion systems from Bayern-Chemie, another wholly owned subsidiary of MBDA Deutschland.

Our competence covers the entire system architecture as well as the integration of missiles in their system environment. We also handle system support, maintenance and modifications throughout the life cycle of our products. We’ve been active in the air defence segment for over 50 years. In this sector, we possess know-how that is unique in Germany, along with an ultramodern infrastructure. MBDA is benefiting from these competencies. At the same time we are benefiting from MBDA’s resources, competencies and market reach.

The European: Could you tell us more about how you are securing your current position?

Thomas Homberg: First of all we have concentrated all our competencies at our headquarters in Schrobenhausen, near Augsburg in Bavaria – design, testing, development, production, integration and logistics. We are thus creating synergies that will enable us to continue to offer high-value products and services and to compete both at a national and international level. Secondly, our portfolio is future-oriented. With our competencies in the air defence segment, we have no reason to fear comparison.

We have advanced to the global forefront in laser weapon systems. We are pursuing new projects using our own resources. KFK – a small lightweight missile for infantry use – and BatCat – a missile concept for precise joint fire support operations – are just two examples of this. In all new and continuing developments, we are working closely with the German and NATO forces, and taking the actual mission experience of the troops into account.

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Thomas Homberg Thomas Homberg has been CEO of MBDA Deutschland GmbH since August 2012. He graduated as a paratroop officer in the German Armed Forces and from the University of the Bundeswehr, Hamburg (Economics). In 2002, he graduated from the German General Staff Courses, Hamburg, and the French Collège Interarmées de Défense in Paris. Before joining EADS, Mr. Homberg was a Military Attaché at the German Embassy in Paris and responsible for French-German defence cooperation. Before taking up his current post, he has been Corporate Vice President and Head of EADS Strategic Coordination (2008–2012). Between 2005–2008 he was Senior Vice President at the helm of EADS “Corporate Strategy & Planning” department and served previously as Vice President of “Strategy & Planning” for Strategic Business Development in Defence & Security Systems.

The European: And the consequences of shrinking budgets?

Thomas Homberg: In the coming years we need to expand our market and customer base. The German forces will remain our most important partner, but given the national budget constraints, it will become increasingly difficult to competitively offer high technology in the defence sector and retain key competencies. So we will also expand our international business further.

The European: The MBDA Group was created through the consolidation of the European guided missile industry in 2006. How do you assess this consolidation process from the perspective of your company?

Thomas Homberg: The European guided missile industry has undergone a fundamental change. In 2001, France, the UK and Italy concentrated their guided missile industries on the European level. Through the inclusion of LFK GmbH (today MBDA Deutschland – ed.) in 2006, MBDA became a European-based global enterprise in the area of guided missile systems. Today, MBDA is the leader in its European home markets – Germany, the UK, France, Italy and Spain – and competes globally on an equal footing with American competitors. This created a stable industrial base for finding the answers to our customers’ requirements.

The European: What is your role within MBDA? Thomas Homberg: After over six years as a part of MBDA, MBDA Deutschland plays an important and active role. We are represented on the MBDA Executive Committee, we are respon-

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sible for the German market, we cover the majority of the transatlantic programmes and head up multinational projects within the Group, such as the new KFK (KFK=Kleinflugkörper/ Small Missiles) project. We benefit from the budgets of a €3 billion enterprise for new products and technologies. We receive key support from the Export Department of MBDA and better access to export markets.

The European: Could you give us some examples?

Thomas Homberg: Our chances, e.g. for the sale of the long range antitank weapon PARS 3 LR to India, are greatly enhanced through our integration in MBDA. Or, with the Group’s support, we were able to undertake major investments to expand and modernise our German headquarters.

The European: I quite understand, but how to maintain national core competencies?

Thomas Homberg: From my perspective, maintaining national core competencies and their competitiveness is possible in the long term only within European structures. Ultimately, everyone benefits. I believe that increasing cooperation on the European level, our belonging to MBDA and our many years of experience with international partners – particularly in transatlantic cooperation – give MBDA Deutschland a decisive advantage in maintaining sovereign capabilities.

The European: You mentioned the European level. May I take your remark as an opportunity to discuss this positioning now in the context of Europe and the efforts of the EU to establish a common European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which don’t seem to be entirely successful? Could MBDA serve as a role model?

Thomas Homberg: Yes, definitely. Today, MBDA offers its European customers the ideal industrial structures for expanded cooperation possibilities. Take the important issue of future air defence: our membership in the European MBDA Group enables us to provide our customers with the full, concentrated know-how in this field. For example, the development results from the MEADS programme can be utilised in an urgently needed, state-of-the-art European air defence system and combined with other European competencies.

The European: Keeping in mind what needs to be done on the national market?

Thomas Homberg: Establishing a European industrial base also requires further optimisation of the national market, so that we don’t need to develop and produce extremely small quantities in national competition, in some cases redundantly. A less fragmented supplier field and a greater degree of cooperation and integration help to prevent economic inefficiencies.

The European: Let me pick up on that. To date, efforts to develop a European industrial strategy have failed. Why is an industrial strategy so important for your company?

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

MBDA at ILA Berlin Air Show 2012 showing its latest products Photo: MBDA

Thomas Homberg: For us, a European industrial strategy is important because small and medium-sized enterprises face increasing challenges to engage in particularly research- and capital-intensive sectors. The national budgetary bottlenecks hit small and medium-sized enterprises particularly hard. Some of them are suffering from capacity utilisation fluctuations that threaten their existence. This impacts the highly specialised guided missile system industry. In the worst case, important technologies for equipping the German forces will be lost. Core competencies and minimum capacities can scarcely be secured over the long term if the home-country demand is low.

The European: Were the British facing similar challenges five years ago?

Thomas Homberg: You are right. The UK solution was implemented under the title “Team Complex Weapon”. This describes a partnering initiative of the British Ministry of Defence and the industry, including small and medium-sized enterprises. The aim is to maintain technological competence concurrently with greater planning certainty and budget efficiency.

This approach has since been expanded to include greater cooperation between the UK and France in the guided missile system sector.

The European: What advise would you give your country?

Thomas Homberg: Giving advise to a whole country is over-ambitious. However, with respect to the question of partnerships, I suggest to intensively examine the experience from such forms of cooperation. However, the prerequisite is a political guidance and decision to the German guided missile system industry as a strategically important sector. It also implies the need to sustain industrial capabilities in Germany.

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The European: Politically and strategically, NATO missile defence is at the top of the agenda right now. How can MBDA Deutschland contribute?

Thomas Homberg: MBDA Deutschland has decades of experience in the area of air defence systems. There has been no major programme in which we were not involved, whether MEADS, Patriot, Stinger, Roland or Gepard.

Right now, Germany is formulating concepts regarding its future air defence. Germany intends to use the development results of MEADS for its future air defence architecture, but in the European context as well.

MBDA Deutschland is the main national supplier in MEADS. Within the context of ongoing development, we are working with our partners toward making the technology available for follow-on activities by 2014, as contractually agreed. This also requires that the US co-finance development through 2014. But I‘m optimistic that the budget will be granted in the frame work of our transatlantic partnership.

The European: In concluding this interview, how would you summarise your experience in your first months at MBDA? Thomas Homberg: MBDA is a blueprint for the European defence industry, a global market leader that concentrates European competencies and technologies in a single enterprise while remaining firmly embedded in its national home markets. After 18 years of service as an airborne officer, something else is also important to me that I have discovered in the MBDA team: professionalism, maximum motivation and a sense of patriotism.

The European: Mr Homberg, it was a pleasure to do this interview with you. Thank you.

The Common Security and Defence Policy

Up to now: no great outcome from the Franco-British armaments treaties

Lancaster House: against the spirit of European integration?

by Major General (ret.) Jacques Favin-Lèvêque, EuroDéfense-France, Paris

For a few years now the United Kingdom (UK) has stood quite clearly aloof from the European Union, whose community vision it is increasingly less able to share. Can the Lancaster House treaties signed on 2 November 2010 by France and the UK be described as a major breach of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)?

An obvious discrepancy The question is the logical conclusion to be drawn from an increasingly obvious discrepancy between two contradictory conceptions of the process of European integration. So it is a fair question to which, moreover, an irreverent answer is permitted! What, in fact, are we seeing since the crisis hit the EU with full force? In numerous EU member states within the euro zone at least, there is a tendency to strengthen ties in order to bring the different parts of the Union together in a quasi-federal system. In others, there is a desire for independence and an exaltation of liberalism leading it to reject all community-based approaches and to give absolute priority to national interests as perceived by London.

pean defence is strengthened by the bilateral cooperation established under the Lancaster House treaties. But didn’t those treaties make provision, among other things, for a pooling of the two countries’ naval air defence capabilities? Such mutual trust between two navies whose rivalry is legendary would be a strong signal indeed!

So what about that pooling, not even two years since the signing of the treaty? Alas, Britain’s recent decision to abandon catapult systems on its two future aircraft carriers abruptly and unilaterally shattered the dream of operational interoperability between the two countries’ naval aviation capabilities embodied in the treaty. Was the treaty a casting mistake on the part of France or a strategic breach of the European spirit? Perhaps the answer is both at once.

How could France sign this contract?

The UK has gradually toughened its stance, in particular during the elaboration of the measures for safeguarding the euro zone and resolving the sovereign debt crisis. In parallel to this distancing of itself from the continent, the UK has for decades now opposed any development of the EU’s political-military structures that would give the EU greater responsibility in the field of collective defence. And on the fallacious pretext of wishing to avoid a duplication of assets. Foreign Minister William Hague stated on 17 July 2011, “the UK will not agree to a permanent operational HQ. We will not agree to it now and we will not agree to it in the future. That is a red line”. But how is it possible to ensure appropriately swift and effective intervention without a permanent capability for the planning and conduct of military or civil-military operations?

The CSDP as defined in Lisbon entails ensuring that the EU has the necessary military capabilities to be able to meet the demands of a foreign policy that is in keeping with its geopolitical and geo-economic weight and to assume full responsibility for the conduct of operations beyond its borders. Lisbon contains provisions aimed at establishing a process of permanent cooperation and opportunities for enhanced cooperation within the EU, in both the operational and the technological and industrial spheres. The bilateral treaty and the lack of consultation with the other European partners are in fact quite the opposite of the process that is advocated in order to give the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) its proper dimension. This is how the Franco-British position was perceived by many member states, and in particular by Germany. What degree of credibility can now be accorded to France when it calls for a CSDP geared to the community perspective, in both the operational and industrial areas? The naval aviation component of Lancaster House is already beginning to come apart at the seams and the agreements have yet not really proven themselves, except perhaps in the case of Libya, and even then only indirectly.

Franco-British cooperation – a disappointing result

A common European defence without the UK?

One may of course counter with the success of the FrancoBritish initiative for intervention in Libya, which demonstrated a joint geostrategic approach, the effective joint use of intervention capabilities and the availability of the NATO command structures. One may also argue that a rapprochement between the EU’s only two nuclear powers makes sense and that Euro-

Given the rumours about the possibility of the UK holding a referendum on its relative disengagement from Europe, that question is hardly unreasonable. But sooner or later the UK will be reconciled with the continent of which, whatever it may believe, it is it the most western extension! The UK is indeed a piece of the European puzzle.

British opposition to a European defence

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Brussels Conference on new strategic challenges fo (The European, Nc.) On 25 September 2012, the European Security Roundtable (ESRT) held its Annual Conference on “New Strategic Challenges for the European Union”, which was organised in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

For the fifth time, this forum gathered relevant stakeholders from the Brussels Security and Defence Community to discuss the future perspectives of the European Security and Defence Policy.

After an opening keynote speech delivered by the the Secretary General of the European External Action Service, Pierre Vimont, two panel sessions further explored the strategic implications of EU maritime interests and capability development in times of austerity.

The complexity of the EEAS

Pierre Vimont (EEAS) during his speech.

Photo: ESRT

also made clear that to effectively play this role the EU must face a number of challenges like the cuts in public spending and In his presentation, Secretary General Vimont, shared his views divisions among its member states. He therefore stressed the on the role of the European Union as a Peace-Builder. He underneed to strengthen Europe’s capabilities lined that although the context in which by multiplying Pooling & Sharing the EU operates has become more initiatives and that EU’s operations complex than ever before, the role of should be more integrated within a the EU in this changing environment Conference Reports comprehensive approach. could be a useful one. Nevertheless he

The Common Security and Defence Policy

or the European Union Capability Development Under the chairmanship of Michael Gahler MEP, the second panel discussed how effective capability building in times of austerity can be achieved. This included the different views from the Parliament, Military Representatives and the EUMS, as well as the European Commission.

The Panel discussed not only the Georgios Koumoutsakos MEP (left), presenting progress in Maritime Security. Michael Gahler MEP Photos: ESRT (right), chairing the panel on “Capability Development in times of austerity� possibilities of enhanced Pooling & Sharing, but also the perspectives of European Armaments Policy against the backdrop of the EC Defence Task Force.

Maritime Security The Conference was very successful in highlighting two issues The first panel, chaired by Georgios Koumoutsakos MEP of increasing importance that will with no doubt influence brought together very different perspectives from civil and European Security and Defence Policy-making during the military stakeholders on European maritime policy. The discuscoming years. The ESRT will also continue to discuss them sants underlined that the EU needs a comprehensive approach throughout its further event program. The next Annual Conferincluding all relevant policy areas to be capable of addressing ence of the ESRT will be held in Brussels in mid-2013. its maritime interests in such a complex environment.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Europe excels in spending defence budgets ineffectively

Last exit cooperation – is Europe missing out on the pooling and sharing project?

by Reinhard Bütikofer MEP, European Parliament, Strasbourg/Brussels

Over the last 12 months, Europeans learned two tough strategic military lessons. These lessons are connected to the NATO mission in Libya and the new US Security Strategy. Both are pointing in the same direction, are a cause for concern, but neither are being debated as much as they should be. They concern the future of the operational capability of the NATO alliance and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU.

Learning the hard way: Libya and the pivot The development of the Libya operation should be disquieting for everyone who believes that Europe should at least have limited military deployment capabilities. Although the Libya mission can be considered to have been a success since all military objectives were achieved and – compared to other interventions – caused a relatively small number of victims among the civilian population. It is noteworthy is that this operation was only for a very limited part European; without the massive support from the US, the two largest armies in Europe might have failed to overwhelm Gadhafi’s mercenaries.

The second lesson was clearly communicated by the US: their political and military focus will be the Asia-Pacific region. As a consequence Europe cannot expect that the US will automatically fill Europe’s military gaps.

These two lessons carry consequences that cannot be ignored.

Europe needs, whether within NATO or the EU, to develop a distinctive and sustainable set of capabilities when if it wants to be prepared for future low- or medium-high intensity military conflicts in its immediate surroundings.

Reinhard Bütikofer MEP Reinhard Bütikofer has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2009. He was born in 1953. Before becoming an MEP he was financial affairs then European affairs spokesman for the Greens in the BadenWürttemberg State Parliament (1988 and 1992 respectively), Chairman of the Baden-Württemberg branch of the Greens (1997), National Executive Director then Chairman of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (1998 and 2002-2008).

In the European Parliament he is currently Vice-President and Treasurer of the Green/EFA Group, a full member of the Industrial Committee and a substitute member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Subcommittee on Security and Defence. He is also a full member of the Delegation for relations with the US and a substitute member of the Delegation for relations with China.

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Reinhard Bütikofer – in very fine company!

Photo: private

Shrinking defence budgets As the Libya mission showed, none of the European countries involved were up to par. To put it bluntly: Europe excels in spending defence budgets ineffectively. European countries, despite the financial crisis and shrinking defence budgets, continue to invest in military projects that primarily aim for economic ends, instead of focusing on the protection of the men and women in the field, who if they are sent into operations should be provided with the best possible equipment.

What follows from all this? If all European countries have serious military capability gaps and are not capable of undertaking joint missions beyond mere stabilization operations; if all European Member states experience pressure on their defence budgets with the likelihood that they will continue to decrease; if Europe on the other hand needs to be more selfreliant when it comes to our own security, then there is only one rational response: cooperation, cooperation, cooperation!

Try. Fail. Try again. Fail better.

To understand the pooling and sharing process, let us take a step back. In 1999, the EU Heads of State agreed under the Helsinki Headline Goals to generate by 2003 forces of 50.000

The Common Security and Defence Policy

BOOKS:

Defense

by Hans H. Kühl

A book on the security of the soldier as a strategic concept to 60.000 soldiers including the Navy and Air Force, for two parallel missions, which could start within 60 days and last up to a year. In 2003 however, the forces were not available, and so it was decided to postpone the goal to 2010. In order to generate the forces, several Capabilities Commitment Conferences were held. But over a period of 11 years all of this resulted primarily in the better identification of capability gaps.

In autumn 2010, the Swedish and German Defence Ministers then initiated a total change of system at the meeting in Ghent, proposing pooling and sharing. The method of pooling and sharing required all the members to screen their forces on cooperation ability and to organise them according to three different categories, i.e.: 1) Forces considered exclusively national, 2) Forces that could be shared, and 3) Forces that could be pooled. The new method was supposed to lead to a variety of very specific cooperation projects. It was expected that most forces would be categorised under alternatives 2 and 3. In December 2010, the initiative was made official by a decision of Defence Ministers.

Until spring 2011, national general staffs reported up to 300 potential pooling and sharing projects to the chairman of the EU Military Committee. Until November 2011, work on specific projects followed in cooperation with the national authorities and the European Defense Agency. Then, twelve specific projects were approved.

Where is the political will?

The European Parliament supported this process with particular intensity in the second half of 2011 through the so-called Lisek Report regarding the defence sector and the financial crisis. With the adoption of the report by the Parliament certainly a good contribution to the debate was made. But by that time lack of political will at the level of Member States had already become obvious. The political engine of the whole exercise had run out of fuel only shortly after the start.

While national and European military experts were able to develop hundreds of ideas, the leadership failed to produce the efforts needed for their implementation.

Time is running out In order to establish a less costly, a smarter and a more effective defence, Europe will need to engage more seriously in pooling and sharing. And rapidly, because time is running short mercilessly. Does anybody care?

In his comprehensive guide to the current state of defense against WMD, Kühl provides a

Frankfurter Allgem. Buch, 2012. Hardback.

unique contribution to the scientific terminology of CBRN, to the theory of military strategy with an emphasis on the operational dimension, and to the practical balance between threat and protection in terms of physiological burden and the impact on operational capability and protection. Kühl’s careful indepth analysis of the consequences for the design of individual protection explains why this level should be considered as a strategic level.

The approach Kühl’s professional scientific and military background as a leading expert in CBRN protection contributes to a consolidated scientific approach to the versatile and elusive aspects of this threat to national security as well as to the international strategic environment. Thus the conceptualization of the political aspects and international legal norms relevant to CBRN weapons is carried within a genuinely responsible analysis covering WMD, historical and future trends in the strategic environment, paradigm shifts in conflicts and a careful CBRN integrated threat assessment that detects the core sensitivities of the CBRN challenge and their implications for military operations.

The NBC paradox The insightful factual complexity of the strategic global environment that Kühl describes is characterized by the NBC paradox in which the majority of states

ISBN: 978-3-89981-276

tend to renounce the possession or use of CBRN weapons whereas other actors pursue them. In an important historical comparative perspective, Kühl refers to the dynamic conditions of the security environment in terms of state and non-state actors, and provides an up-to-date analysis of the asymmetrical aspects of terrorism profiles in relation to CBRN and their implications for the strategic environment.

The security of the soldier a strategic challenge At the center of this study stands one particular aspect of CBRN defense - individual protection.

The depth and clarity which Kühl attains in the examination of this aspect allows us to situate individual protection as a strategic concept. The security of the soldier is dramatically posed as a strategic challenge in a different paradoxical dimension in which an inversion between the post-modern profile of the general military and the civil-defense and first responders are far beyond the strategic concepts of military technology, especially in its Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) terms.

Rachel Suissa, Adjunct Professor and Research Fellow, Haifa University, Israel rswisa@univ.haifa.ac.il

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

CSDP is lacking an overview of the defence requirements of our continent as a political entity

No Europe without defence, no defence without Europe!

1)

by Lieutnant-General (ret.) Jean Paul Perruche, President EuroDéfense-France, Paris

More than 10 years on from the creation of the current CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) structures, clearly there has been little progress towards developing autonomous European capabilities; indeed, against the current backdrop of financial and budgetary crisis those capabilities look set to decline.

Why do we need European military capabilities?

Yet the development of a European defence within the EU makes more sense than ever at a time when total dependence on the United States (by its own admission) 2) no longer appears to be a viable solution for the future and when not even the most powerful European states are able any more, on their own, to cover the full range of capabilities needed for their defence. As the place in which the member states create common interests, the EU quite naturally provides the most realistic and effective framework in which to build the capabilities that the European states need. Moreover, in addition to their geographic proximity those states have similar budgetary constraints. But a responsible European defence can only be credible if it is autonomous, which means that the essential pooling and sharing of assets has to be organised by and within the EU, drawing on the full range of civil and military instruments that this organisation has to offer.

NATO and European defence Arguments frequently put forward against that option are: the desire not to upset the United States, the existence of NATO and the refusal to bear the costs of duplication. However, these arguments are scarcely convincing: the US itself is calling on the European states to shoulder a greater share of the burden for their security, in terms both of the responsibility and of capabilities. As for the duplication that supposedly might arise from the creation of capabilities within the EU, this would be practically negligible, given that military assets are made available both to the EU and NATO by their member states. All that would need to exist within both organisations would be the command structures, but these would represent a minute fraction of their budgets.

Finally, there is no proof that NATO would be affected by the EU’s becoming a genuine player in the fields of security (which it already is to some extent) and defence, provided that the EU is given the command structures that would enable it either to take autonomous action (when the US does not intervene) or

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Jean Paul Perruche Lieutnant-General (ret.) Jean Paul Perruche is President of EuroDéfense-France. He is a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States and a member of the Board of the Institute for Higher National Defence Studies (IHEDN, Institut des hautes études de défense nationale).

General Perruche, was also an associate research fellow at IRSEM. He is a graduate of the War College and of the IHEDN (46th national session) and holds a master’s degree in defence from Paris 2 University (Sorbonne-Panthéon).

His military deployments include Chad in 1978/79, Central Africa in 1991 and Somalia in 1992/93. Chief of the French military mission to SACEUR (1999 to 2001) and Deputy Commander of KFOR in 2003. Finally, he was Director-General of the EU Military Staff in Brussels from 2004 to 2007.

to be incorporated into the transatlantic chain of command in the event of an operation under US leadership. A more responsible and more capable European partner, on the contrary, could only strengthen the transatlantic link by offering the prospect of a fairer sharing of the security burden with the US.

The best way to strengthen the transatlantic link The EU integration project, which is not the same as that of NATO, only makes sense if it is aimed not only at the creation of an integrated chain of command using national assets (as is the case for NATO) but also at the development, through pooling and sharing, of integrated European military capabilities, which in turn implies the gradual creation of a political chain of command that is itself integrated.

This is inconceivable without the understanding and support of European citizens. Hence the priority is to inform our fellow citizens about the common security interests of the EU countries and the advantages of a common approach to their defence, but also about the need for solidarity that this entails. In particular they must understand that the only alternative to the loss of national sovereignty is a sharing of sovereignty at European level. Only a clear and ambitious project has any chance of mobilising their support.

EU is no longer the mere sum of 27 national policies European defence thus far has not been the expression of an EU defence policy, but rather the common core of the member

The Common Security and Defence Policy

states’ national defence policies. Yet it is clear that the simple addition of 27 heterogeneous and in some cases divergent security policies cannot meet the EU’s defence requirements and the challenges these represent. Without a comprehensive European approach there can be no European defence strategy!

A common defence and the matrix formed by the 27 nations But there can be no European defence without a European identity, and that in turn cannot exist unless our citizens have adopted it as their own. What is needed, therefore, is a global European vision of defence requirements. This means that European defence must be seen not as the point of intersection between the 27 national defence policies, but as a matrix formed by them. Instead of taking national requirements as the starting point, and then deciding what can be pooled at European level, it is necessary to express global European requirements and to compare these with the result of an addition of national requirements.

A process of rationalisation should then make for greater overall coherence of Europe’s capabilities, greater strategic effectiveness of pooling and sharing, and a better understanding on the part of citizens of the global defence challenges.

Citizens of the Baltic States would then more easily understand how they are affected by security problems in the Mediterranean, while southern Europeans would have a better grasp

of the issues at stake for the Eastern European states that share their neighbourhood with Russia.

European defence – a collective challenge The European Union’s strength lies in its defence of the European states’ common interests, and less in that of their specific national interests. As in any team sport, success depends not only on the calibre of the players, but also and above all on their ability to work as a team. The Union strengthens the power of its member states by means of a collective approach: if confined to being no more than an instrument at the service of national policies, its limits would soon be reached. Any role attributed to the Union must take into account the interests of all its members. National interests must, in order to be asserted and defended, be part and parcel of the Union’s general interests. This is particularly true of defence, at a time when it is becoming increasingly difficult to implement it at national level. Without a doubt this is the most effective way of making the European states stronger and more responsible, which is precisely what our American partner expects of us.

1)This article is based on the work done in recent months by EuroDéfense-France.

2) Cf. the United States’ new Strategic Defense Initiative of January 2012 (presented by President Obama and in the statements by Secretaries of State Gates then Panetta in 2012).

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The Common Security and Defence Policy

Europe’s weakness denies America a key partner

Transatlantic defence cooperation

by Dr Christina Balis, The Avascent Group, Washington/Paris What The Economist hailed as the most important election for decades was possibly the most inconsequential for Europe.

Such a conclusion has little to do with the winner of the recent US presidential race. Rather, it is the inevitable outcome of a seriously unbalanced security relationship – a situation perpetuated by those who would rather deny or accept it than confront it.

Europeans’ relief at the re-election of President Barak Obama, however understandable, masks both recent experience and future disappointments. Not only is Mr Obama the least “European” of US presidents in recent memory, his administration’s policies – including its much-trumpeted “Asia Pivot” – underline a shift in America’s relations with Europe that transcends the current White House.

From US complaints in the 1990s over disproportionate burden sharing to Secretary Robert Gates’ warning last year that Europe risked “collective military irrelevance,” the message has been clear and consistent. Yet, the response has been a litany of new challenges: NATO’s mid-life crisis, US unilateralism, European insularity, the “rise of the rest.” In reality, transatlantic cooperation suffers from three fundamental weaknesses related to Europe’s military capability, institutions, and political leadership.

Eroding military capability Statistically, Europe still accounts for a third of global non-US defence spending, but such a figure is meaningless when considering that real spending for two-thirds of European NATO has been steadily declining and three-fourths of EU defence outlays support purely national programs. Faced with such stubborn facts, neither NATO’s Smart Defence nor the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiative stands much chance of success. NATO’s Libya operation was only the latest reminder of Europe’s persistent military flaws, ranging from insufficient precision munitions to poor intelligence gathering.

State Department, is almost absent in matters of defence.

Moreover, judging from the experience of NATO’s Air Ground Surveillance and the multi-national Medium Extended Air Defense System, international cooperative programs face too many hurdles to serve as a model for strengthening transatlantic ties.

Leaderless Europe None of Europe’s largest states appears suited to claim the mantle of leadership. Germany, the world’s third-largest exporter, is regressing to economic nationalism after opposing a much-needed jolt to Europe’s fragmented defence industrial base, the proposed merger between EADS and BAE Systems.

Britain is flirting with the idea of an EU exit at a time when it should be seeking greater influence within tthe only forum in which its voice still carries some weight. Meanwhile, France is pursuing a “competitiveness pact” against the advice of many who believe only shock therapy can reverse the country’s global competitiveness decline.

That Europe’s leaders will be forced to embrace defence cooperation, market competition and industrial consolidation is only a question of time. Yet, neither the timing nor the outcome will be within their control, unless they shed, in the words of recently departed EU Military Committee chairman General Håkan Syrén, their current “culture of denial” and take pooling and sharing to the next level.

In his acerbic wit, US critic H.L. Mencken once defined puritanism as “the haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy.” For Europeans, complaints about US unilateralism could soon get exposed as the fear that someone, somewhere, may sooner or later call Europe’s bluff.

Political fragmentation, institutional paralysis While Nordic states have made strides in deepening military cooperation, in key defence areas, Europe has no coherent policy or shared investment approach. This explains why Europeans still lack their own advanced unmanned aerial vehicle program even as they continue to support more than a dozen armoured personnel vehicle providers. It also explains why US policymakers see little value in transatlantic defence cooperation. The recent close working relationship between the European Central Bank and the US Treasury, and even between the European Union External Action Service and the

Christina Balis Christina Balis is the head of the European operations and a principal at The Avascent Group (www.avascent.com), a leading strategy and management consulting firm specialising in defence, security, and government-driven markets.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Allowing persons to travel without being subjected to checks is a most tangible achievement

The development of the Schengen area

by Stefano Manservisi, Director General , DG Home Affaires, European Commission, Brussels

In 1985, five Member States met in Schengen, Luxembourg, to sign an agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at common borders and in 1990, this was followed by the signing of the Convention implementing that agreement. With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the Schengen acquis was incorporated into the EU framework. Today, the Schengen area encompasses most of the EU Member States and four associated non-EU countries.

The creation of the Schengen area, allowing persons to travel without being subjected to checks, is one of the most tangible and valued achievements of the EU. Some 420 million people are now residing in the area, moving freely across the internal borders, making some 1.25 billion journeys within the EU every year. Still, it should be kept in mind that the Schengen concept is built on Member States’ trust in each other’s capacity to apply the common rules and that continuous vigilance is needed to safeguard this great success.

A strengthened Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism In September 2011, the Commission adopted a communication and two legislative proposals aimed at strengthening the overall functioning and sustainability of the Schengen area.

Currently, there is a Schengen evaluation mechanism in place to evaluate Member States’ implementation of the Schengen acquis. This was established during the early years, when the Schengen area encompassed only six Member States and their cooperation was completely inter-governmental. Such

Stefano Manservisi Stefano Manservisi is the first Director General for DG Home Affairs since its creation in July 2012. He was born in 1956. Stefano Manservisi holds a law degree from the University of Bologna and also studied at the University of Paris I Panthéon – Sorbonne, and the University of Strasbourg. Stefano Manservisi joined the European Commission in 1983 where he worked as administrator in the Directorates-General of Agriculture and Development until 1991, and then as principal administrator and Member of Cabinet to Vice-President Pandolfi. In 2001 he was appointed Head of Cabinet for Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission and stayed in that position until joining DG Development as Director General. Before holding his actual position at DG Home, he served as Director General for Development and Relations with Africa, Caribbean, Pacific States.

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an approach, however, has progressively shown its limits and its inadequacy for an area of 26 participating countries, where the core of the matter now forms part of the framework of the EU acquis. Over time a need has therefore emerged to create a new mechanism, capable of identifying deficiencies at an early stage and ensuring the appropriate remedy and followup. The Commission’s proposed revised mechanism would serve this purpose, while at the same time granting more transparency.

Still, there might be situations where the recommendations for remedial action are not sufficient to ensure that persistent serious deficiencies in a Member State’s control of its external borders are adequately, or sufficiently swiftly, remedied. The Commission proposals therefore allow for a decision, triggered by the Commission, to be taken at EU-level on the temporary reintroduction of controls at internal borders vis-àvis a Member State failing to manage its external borders.

This is an exceptional measure of last resort in a truly critical situation to ensure that the problems can be resolved, while minimising the impact on free movement.

EU-based safeguards for reintroduction of controls at internal borders The implementation of the Schengen acquis requires safeguards which enable it to deal with exceptional or unforeseen situations. Member States are already today permitted to temporarily reintroduce control at some internal borders in order to deal with serious threats to public policy or internal security of the Member States in question. The Commission’s proposals aim to ensure that such decisions take into account the interests of the Union as a whole and the EU citizens, whose right to free movement cannot be limited.

The abolition of controls at internal borders goes hand-inhand with accompanying measures, including a common visa policy, police and judicial cooperation, and common rules on the return of irregular migrants. In particular, Member States are obliged to ensure that their section of the external border of the Schengen area is effectively controlled, including the deployment of appropriate resources. Hence, safeguarding the area without control at internal borders is closely interlinked with measures strengthening the control of external border, like a stronger monitoring by the Commission (as explained above), the strengthening of Frontex’ mandate or the establishment of Eurosur.

The Common Security and Defence Policy

Strengthening Frontex One of the most important measures to reinforce the control at the external borders and express solidarity between the Member States is the revision of the legal framework of Frontex, which coordinates Member States’ operational cooperation at the external border. The revised mandate entered into force in December 2011 and provides Frontex with the necessary tools to enhance the security at the external border, creating European border guard teams that consist of national border guards assigned or seconded by Member States to the agency for joint operations, rapid interventions and pilot projects. Frontex’ operational capacity has also been strengthened by allowing it to acquire or lease its own technical equipment and obliging Member States to contribute to a mechanism to put technical and human resources at the agency’s disposal.

Another very important part of Frontex’ revised framework is the focus on fundamental rights. For instance: A Fundamental Rights Officer is posted in the agency to assist in matters having implications for fundamental rights and a Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights is established, also involving relevant international organisations and NGOs. Return operations will be monitored according to objective and transparent criteria. Furthermore, cooperation with the relevant authorities of Third Countries is enhanced, on the basis of dedicated working arrangements. Finally, Frontex now has a clear mandate to process personal data obtained during operations, in order to allow for EU law enforcement authorities to step up the fight against criminality, human trafficking and irregular immigration.

Establishment of EUROSUR In 2008 the Commission presented a roadmap to establish the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) by 2013. The purpose of EUROSUR is threefold: to prevent irregular migration and cross-border crime, such as drug smuggling, as well as to considerably reduce the number of losses of lives of migrants (according to UNHCR 1 500 drowned in the Mediterranean Sea in 2011 alone). This shall be achieved by improving the situational awareness and reaction capability of Member States’ authorities and Frontex through near real time information exchange, interagency cooperation and the use of modern surveillance technology. The intention is to move from a ‘patrolling-driven’ to an ‘intelligence-driven’ approach in border surveillance.

At the end of 2011 the Commission presented a legislative proposal for EUROSUR, which is expected to be adopted by the Council and the European Parliament during the 1st half of 2013. According to this proposal, EUROSUR should become gradually operational as of 1 October 2013. By December 2012, all 18 Member States located at the eastern and southern external borders will have established the required national

coordination centres for border surveillance. And Frontex will have connected all these centres via the secured EUROSUR communication network on a pilot basis by December 2012, allowing for further testing in 2013 in order to make EUROSUR operational as of October 2013.

The way ahead The Commission welcomes the support received from the European Parliament and the Council on Eurosur. The Commission also hopes that the European Parliament and the Council will be able to reach an agreement on the proposal for a strengthened Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism. By now seizing the initiative, we will ensure that the Schengen area is better equipped to withstand the pressures it will inevitably be faced with. Furthermore, our biannual reports on the functioning of the Schengen area will continue to serve as basis for regular debates in the European Parliament as well as in the Council on this topic. These debates provide an improved political guidance on relevant issues and allow for timely decisions to be taken on future developments. I am looking forward to working intensively together with all parties concerned over the coming weeks and months, and to even more fruitful collaboration in the years ahead.

Documentation The EP’s position on the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders European Parliament Draft Resolution of 14 June 2012* Explanatory statement by Rapporteur Renate Weber (…) The fundamentals of the Schengen cooperation are relatively sound. However recent developments have undermined the confidence in the ability of some Member States to manage the borders in a way that is not detrimental to the free movement of people inside the Schengen area. These events challenged the balance that has to be found between security and freedom of movement. Your Rapporteur insists on the fact that migration per se is not a threat to public policy and national security. Therefore she categorically opposes any attempt to introduce new grounds such as migration flows for reintroducing controls at the internal borders. The root cause of the problems is not external, but internal. Indeed these recent events are symptoms that the current Schengen system, relying on an inter-governmental system of peer review, is not strong enough to remedy weaknesses of some of its Members and to prevent potential abuses. (…)

Your Rapporteur supports the principle of a more coordinated and collective decision-making process in case of reintroduction of controls at the internal borders. (…) *Draft European Parliament legislative Resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances

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A worldwide non-profit organisation offering services to industry and government

AFCEA Europe – the organisation to head industry’s contribution to user requirements Interview with Klaus-Peter Treche, Major General (ret.), GenManager, AFCEA Europe, Brussels

The European: Major General Treche, you are the General Manager of AFCEA Europe, which has its headquarters in Brussels. Today we are in Rome for the first day of AFCEA Europe’s TechNet International being organised in cooperation with the “new” NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCI Agency). You have just opened the Congress. Could you tell us a bit about AFCEA? Klaus-Peter Treche: AFCEA (Armed Forces Communication and Electronic Association) has more than 35 000 individual members and about 2300 corporate members. It is divided into 140 Chapters and Subchapters in more than 34 countries.

It was created in 1946 as a non-profit association.

The European: What is the purpose of AFCEA? Klaus-Peter Treche: AFCEA provides a panoply of organisations and institutions, including of course the military itself and governments, industry and academia, with an ethical forum for promoting professional knowledge and relations in several areas of security and defence.

The European: Which particular areas are you working on?

Klaus-Peter Treche: Roughly speaking, communication and information applications.

The European: And this year’s conference is being held in cooperation with the emergent NATO agency NCI to debate the topic "Creating tomorrow’s C4ISR". What are the respective aims of industry and NCI in organising this event?

Klaus-Peter Treche: Our common aim is to inform participants about current and upcoming business opportunities and major

Klaus-Peter Treche Klaus-Peter Treche, Major General (GAF) ret.

General Manager AFCEA, Europe, Brussels since 2011.

He was born 1946 in Hannover and graduated 1973 from the University Aachen as an Air and Spacecraft Engineer.

1978–1980 General Staff College Hamburg. He held positions as: 1990–1993 Deputy Director and Chief of Staff of German Armed Forces Command in Washington, 1998–2001 Director Air Force Material Command , Cologne 2005–2008 Deputy Commander, Joint Support Command , Cologne.

Before taking over his new function Peter Treche was from 1999 to 2010 Vice-President and Chapter President AFCEA, Bonn e.V.

procurements. On the one hand, we will explain in a dialogue with industry how the Alliance is addressing capability and service delivery, and on the other hand we will learn from industry – through exhibits, presentations and workshops during the conference – about current and forthcoming capabilities.

FIRST DAY The European: Which is the highlight today that must not be missed?

Klaus-Peter Treche: I would say that there will be not just one but a number of highlights during the course of the conference. For example, the panel discussions with NCI managers and industry experts on Smart Defence, the Future Mission Network, Big Data, the NATO-Cloud, UAS Technology and of

Public in the fully outbooked Conference Center (left); General Manager AFCEA Europe, Klaus Peter Treche, opening the Conference Photos: Wolfgang Taubert, Brussels

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Security and Security Solutions EU/NATO

Kent Schneider, President AFCEA Int. with Al Grasso, Chairman of the Board, AFCEA International, at Finmeccanica ‘s booth (left). An always Photos: Wolfgang Taubert, Brussels attentive audience (right)

course Cyber Security. You should not miss today’s keynote speeches and I’m sure that the issue of NATO Agency reform will be of great interest to your readership:

national Chapter. Traditionally, for Italy, Finmeccanica as a leading company in the sectors I mentioned previously plays a big part.

The European: Your programme clearly covers a broad spectrum. What are your first impressions at the end of the first day’s events?

Klaus-Peter Treche: The keynote speech by the Italian Minister of Defence, H.E. Gianpaolo Di Paola, was particularly thrilling and enlightening. He took the subtitles of the conference and presented in a unique, very profound but also humorous way his thoughts on partnership, innovation and imagination at a time of shrinking budgets but increasing challenges. He called for openness to new solutions and encouraged the audience to cope with the challenges we are facing: altogether a very motivating opening address.

SECOND DAY

The European: So this means that Finmeccanica heads the list of sponsoring industries from which you and your Italian Chapter receive the necessary support, but without losing your independence.

Klaus-Peter Treche: You have touched upon a sensitive point but the answer is straightforward. As I mentioned earlier, AFCEA is a non-profit organisation that has far-reaching ties with the industrial sector and with NATO. We promote NATO and industry and that support is necessary. And as you can see, we have not only the big ones on board but also many SMEs supporting AFCEA, the right mix! Not to forget that we also organised a pre-conference B2B session to bring together the “market leaders” and SMEs, with about 20 “small ones” in attendance.

The European: We have come to the end of the second day of the conference and I am particularly impressed by the exhibition.

We are at the stand of Finmeccanica, a company that is clearly playing a major role in the Conference in various ways.

Klaus-Peter Treche: Over the course of the year we hold several conferences each organised by the corresponding

The European: At the end of the second day I must say that the presentations from industry were excellent. But I couldn’t help noticing that there were many parallel efforts in the same direction. How can companies’ efforts be brought together?

Klaus-Peter Treche: “Smart Defence” as promoted by NATO or

AFCEA Conference Rome – First day’s Programme (excerpts) Opening Remarks:

Koen Gijsbers, Gen Manager NCI Agency Klaus-Peter Treche, General Manager AFCEA Europe, Brussels

Panel Session 1 Chair:

NATO Agency Reform Koen Gijsberts, GenManager NCI Agency

Keynotes:

Adm (ret) Giampolo Di Paola, Def Min Italy Amb. Alexander Vershbow, DepSecGen NATO Lt Gen Walter E. Gaskin, Dep Chairman MC NATO

Panel session 2 Chair:

Smart Defence &Industry Dr Velizar Shalamanow, Dir. Demand Management NCI Agency

Partnership message: Kent Schneider, President & CEO AFCEA

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“Pooling & Sharing”, a similar programme run by the European Defence Agency might be key. Smart Defence makes it a prerequisite for industry to harmonise its efforts and the military to curtail its requirements by partnering. The ethical dialogue between industry and procurement agencies must focus on best value for the money to be spent by government.

THIRD DAY The European: The conference is ending in a few moments. Are you satisfied?

Klaus-Peter Treche: Yes! I’m deeply convinced that TechNet International 2012, held together with the NCI Agency’s annual

COMMENT:

Industry Conference, has been one of the best and most successful conferences we ever organised. Teaming up and creating a truly joint programme has turned out to be more successful than originally anticipated. We were able to welcome nearly 600 attendees (a 25 % increase compared with last year’s conference in Heidelberg) from 25 out of 28 NATO member countries , with 185 companies participating.

So, I really have to thank my partners on the NCI Agency side and our partners from industry. They all helped to make TechNet International 2012 such a great success.

The European: Thank you for three interesting days in Rome!

Rome was a great partnership event

by Kent Schneider, President and CEO, AFCEA International The European: Mr Schneider you have been observing the Rome AFCEA Conference. What is your impression?

Kent Schneider: This is a great partnership between AFCEA Europe and the new NATO Communications and Information Agency. We have excellent speakers from NATO and industry talking about NATO restructuring and the technologies necessary to support mission success.

The European: The European Chapters are certainly playing a special role in AFCEA with close relations with NATO. Will this continue or will other partners eg. in Asia become more influential?

Kent Schneider: We will continue to

focus on NATO, which we will have supported for over 50 years. As our attention to internal security grows, we are developing relations with the European Union as well. I have asked KlausPeter Treche to build chapters in the Middle East and in North Africa. We already have an international presence in the Asia-Pacific theatre today. As military forces are rebalancing from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Pacific, we will expand to support that growth – but not at the expense of Europe.

The European: Besides hosting conferences and exhibitions you have a wide range of other services. Which is the most innovative one?

Kent Schneider, President and CEO AFCEA International

Kent Schneider: We help governments with thought leadership and vision, leveraging the expertise in C4ISR and cyber security from our 2300 member companies worldwide. As defence and security forces globally are realigning to become more effective and efficient, input from industry on technology exploitation and evolution becomes most critical. Our member companies are ideally suited to play this role.

News: EU initiatives for the security and defence industry Action programme for Europe’s security industry On 30 July 2012, the European Commission proposed an action programme to boost Europe’s security industry. The EU security market has an estimated market value of between €26 billion and € 36.5 billion with around 180,000 employees. The priority is to overcome fragmentation of this market by harmonising standards and certification procedures for security technologies.

Emphasis should be given to a better exploitation of synergies between (civil) security and defence research. To reduce the gap between research and market, especially in European and international procurement,

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the Commission will use novel funding schemes foreseen in Horizon 2020 such as Pre-commercial Procurement, to test and validate results stemming from EU security research projects. A dedicated Expert Group will meet at least once per year to bring together all relevant actors in the field of security.

Communication on strengthening of European industry On 10 October 2012, Commissioner Antonio Tajani, responsible for enterprise and entrepreneurship, presented the Communication “Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery”. As regards

the security and defence sector, the Communication states: “Further progress needs to be made towards the full internal market integration of certain sectors, such as security and defence. Despite the implementation of the Defence package, the defence sector still maintains a strongly national dimension and is therefore unable to benefit from the potential economies of scale that are necessary to improve competitiveness and profitability.”

Communication on the defence market The Commission will develop a comprehensive strategy to support the competitiveness of the defence industry. A Communication is expected by April 2013.

Security and Security Solutions EU/NATO

Creating a new quality of situation awareness

High performance visualisation for command and control superiority Interview with Stefan Pauwels, Sales Manager DACH/NATO, Luciad

The European: Luciad started business in 1999 as a privately owned company with its European headquarters in Leuven Belgium and its US headquarters in Washington DC. The company also has local offices in France and Turkey. Luciad is recognised as the worldwide leader for high performance geospatial situational awareness. You support the world’s leading integrators in their situational awareness applications?

Stefan Pauwels: Correct, Luciad is the supplier of choice for leading systems integrators, at both the national and international level, for their situational awareness applications.

Luciad is focused on the defence and security as well as aviation industries.

Luciad products are perfectly geared to bringing situational awareness into C2 Systems. These systems always require retained accuracy and performance and traditional GIS solutions often cannot cope with those requirements.

Luciad offers a product range that covers the requirements for the different levels of command, from headquarters level to usage in the field by the individual soldier.

The European: What is the benefit for your customers of using LuciadLightspeed?

Stefan Pauwels: Some of the benefits that Luciad customers appreciate about all Luciad products are the domain focus, the clean design, the unparalleled performance and the retained accuracy.

Due to the Luciad domain focus on defence & security and aviation and our cooperation with the major worldwide systems integrators we have built up an industry expertise.

The clean design of the Luciad products enables developers to achieve a higher speed of development and bring their solutions to market much quicker. New customers are often surprised by the capabilities that Luciad offers out of the box.

When talking to systems integrators I often hear that fielded systems lack certain functionalities; with LuciadLightspeed it is easy to fill these functionality gaps because of the flexible nature of the product.

All Luciad products enable you to build “sustainable applications”. Especially in the current economically challenging times, customers want their system to meet future requirements and evolve to the 2nd phase, and possibly to a 3rd phase.

Luciad can help to deliver “sustainable applications” through our Committed Lifecycle Methodology.

Stefan Pauwels Stefan Pauwels is Sales Manager at Luciad. He is responsible for Luciad’s business in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Stefan Pauwels is also involved in the day-to-day business with NATO. Stefan Pauwels obtained a Masters in Economic Sciences at the HUB in Brussels where he specialised in International Relations. After university he worked in several positions within the ICT Market. Prior to joining Luciad in 2008, he was EMEA Region Manager for Brooktrout.

The European: Where are Luciad products typically used?

Stefan Pauwels: Luciad’s worldwide customer database includes organisations in national departments of defence and security agencies in all major European countries, and at NATO level. Examples of applications are NATO ICC & iGeoSIT. In addition, Luciad products are often used in applications for the aviation industry, for example by the FAA, Eurocontrol and Belgocontrol.

The European: Are you in direct contact with customers’ development teams?

Stefan Pauwels: Absolutely. It is important to have a good relationship with customers’ development teams. This enables us to better understand the customer’s requirements and to support them where needed. The Luciad Support Desk has an excellent reputation in supporting our customers’ needs.

In addition to our technical support team we have a Professional Services division. The Luciad Professional Services team provides training, consultancy and also application development support. Working with our experienced software developers is not only a solution for customers with limited resources, but also helps customers to reduce their development time and budget.

The European: As the protection of crisis-management forces is a crucial issue for societies, has Luciad met the requirement to give information superiority to single soldiers or civil servants before and during engagement and to integrate them into the full system of conduct of operations?

Stefan Pauwels: The homeland security market is an interesting and growing market.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Picture 1: Real-time video draping from a UAV feed; picture 2: Overlay any type of data, in different geo-references, into a COP with high performPhotos: Luciad ance and accuracy; picture 3: Clear visualization of military symbology, at any scale, during a joint exercise of Armed Forces

Police and security forces need situational awareness solutions to support them in their day-to-day work. Luciad products add high value to these domains as well. For example, Luciad products have been used by leading systems integrators to develop solutions for dispatch centres, emergency operation centres and mobile display solutions.

The European: Luciad offers a product called LuciadMobile that has been specifically developed for the Integrated Soldier and which runs on the Android operating system. How is it that LuciadMobile is so perfectly suited to the needs of the Integrated Soldier?

Stefan Pauwels: Luciad developed LuciadMobile in very close cooperation with Thales Canada and the Canadian Army.

Thales Canada did a thorough investigation of the needs of the Integrated Soldier. This investigation was conducted in direct cooperation with the Canadian Army and through a detailed analysis and field trials. LuciadMobile was developed to include all the capabilities that Thales Canada and the Canadian Army indicated as being important for the situational awareness of the Integrated Soldier. As a result, LuciadMobile offers a set of readily available capabilities for the integrated soldier and is a unique product in the market.

The European: Are civil organisations interested in your capacities for creating situational awareness?

Stefan Pauwels: Yes, civilian industry has an increasing need to incorporate situational awareness into its systems. Civil organisations often have a lot of valuable data available but no applications to take advantage of those collected data.

Luciad is already in use in many applications for civilian industry, for example in the chemical, mining and maritime sectors. There is a large and growing potential for situational awareness on the civilian market.

The European: Luciad has been working for years for NATO’s ICC, the world Integrated Command and Control software for Air Operations. Why was Luciad chosen by the Alliance and what is the added value for your company in terms of your portfolio?

Stefan Pauwels: The NATO-wide Integrated Command and Control software for Air Operations (ICC) is an integrated Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I)

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system that provides information management and decision support to NATO air operation activities during peacetime, exercises and wartime. Over the years, ICC has also become a capability for joint operations. NATO selected Luciad products to provide the geographic digital map component of the everevolving ICC system. Luciad has been able to meet these evolving needs by continuously increasing its product capabilities. The company has succeeded in providing NATO with the first C2 system able to provide a Common Operational Picture showing situational awareness both at theatre and local level.

The system can use map data in many formats and is equally compatible with the latest Open GIS Consortium standards (WMS, WFS).

The European: Luciad invests a lot into technology research.

Why is this important for Luciad?

Stefan Pauwels: Luciad has a strong reputation in the industry for its R&D efforts and is an important participant in many international research projects such as Astute, FedSS and OGC OWS working groups. By participating in these international research projects, Luciad wants to cooperate with the industry and end-users in order to take situational awareness to the next level.

The European: The EU is trying to organise the EDTIB, the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base in order to finally achieve the EDEM, the European Defence Equipment Market. A new effort was made by the Commission in creating a Defence Task Force to place SMEs in a better position on the market. What is your opinion of the added value?

Stefan Pauwels: The EU’s Defence Task Force initiative is a means of protecting the European defence industry and helping industry to operate freely in all Member States.

I’m very much in favour of such initiatives. I think that the European defence industry is very capable and that companies can offer very good and powerful solutions.

We must also do more to ensure that when tenders are issued the defence customer does not narrow down the technological options and that competition remains open to the best of breed solution providers.

The European: Mr Pauwel, thank you for this interview.

The capacity to provide a real-time situation assessment of moving and stationary objects on the ground as well as an all-weather around-the-clock intervention capability are critical for the support of NATO and EU forces during operations. The mix of UAS and fighter aircraft will make the difference.

What is important is a combination of systems and the interaction between them

Air power for forces protection Interview with Håkan Buskhe*, CEO & President, Saab, Stockholm

The European: Mr Buskhe, you are CEO and President of Saab, an aerospace, defence and security company founded 75 years ago in Trollhättan, nowadays one of the most successful and important companies in the aerospace and defence sectors.

May I ask you to elaborate on Saab’s structure and its economic data, for example turnover?

Håkan Buskhe: The company is rather unique as it was founded in 1937 at the behest of and on the basis of a resolution adopted by the Swedish Parliament. With the Second World War looming and the hard times ahead it was obvious that there would be a shortage of equipment, which Sweden procured from international suppliers, so Parliament decided that the country needed its own capacity for the production of fighter aircraft.

The European: I believe this is unique. So you started from scratch; how many aircraft did you produce?

Håkan Buskhe: Since then we have produced 5 000 aircraft.

During the cold war we produced one fighter aircraft per day.

Thus Sweden is home to one of the largest aircraft producers in the world. Moreover, Saab has developed many different types of aircraft. The company was also involved in the automobile business, but soon sold that part of its activities, and also the computer business.

The European: Sweden spent a lot of money on defence during the Second World War and following that the Government supported Saab for the development of fighter aircraft like the Gripen. Has the state retired from that sector since the end of the cold war?

Håkan Buskhe: As development costs were constantly increasing it was decided during the mid-seventies to crack the cost curve; this is what prompted the launch of development work

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on the Gripen, a new technology, as a new way to reduce the lifetime cost of an aircraft.

The European: Did you export the Gripen?

Håkan Buskhe: Yes, we are now in the 2nd generation of Gripen and are starting to develop the new Gripen version, called the Gripen E/F. We have sold the Gripen aircraft to five countries: South Africa, Thailand, Hungary, the Czech Republic and of course Sweden, and the test pilot school in Great Britain is using the Gripen for end flight evaluation and training. In total we have built around 260-270 Gripen, of which some 150 are currently in service within the Swedish Air Force.

The European: I have the impression that you are currently strongly geared to exports with your full range of products.

Håkan Buskhe: Before the cold war 80% of Saab’s sales were to Sweden, but after the end of the cold war the Swedish defence budget was cut and Saab needed to re-orient its activities towards the export market. Today exports account for 75% of our total turnover, with all our products being sold to more than 100 countries. We have also consolidated most of the Swedish defence industry, so today Saab produces everything from aircraft to cruise missiles, ground-based air defence systems, sensors, torpedoes etc.

The European: What is your turnover?

Håkan Buskhe: Our turnover today is roughly 2.7 billion €; profits stand at 7.5% and our net cash position at 600 million €. We have 10000 employees in Sweden and about 4000 employees abroad.

The European: I would like to turn to a more political issue

Photo: Billy Johnston/U.S. Air Force

Crisis Management

Crisis Management

before coming back to your systems. In light of the EU’s efforts to establish a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and a fully-fledged European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) in the future our readers would certainly be interested to know Saab’s position on cooperation. Are you in favour of such a consolidation process?

Håkan Buskhe: As I understand it, the EU is among other things encouraging the establishment of centres of excellence.

But this means that it is would be the politicians who decide where production is to take place, which to me is reminiscent of the economic policy of the former Eastern Bloc. I am attached to the idea of free trade and open competition based on a Level Playing Field, which for me is the best way to find out where such “excellence” is located and to determine who should produce what, including on the European defence market. The EU’s and the Commission’s job should rather be to foster better conditions for competition.

First Gripen flight for Saab CEO Håkan Buskhe

The European: That sounds reasonable. Against that backdrop, on the basis of which criteria do you choose your cooperation partners?

Håkan Buskhe: There is indeed a good technology base in Europe, with many skilled companies. I believe that from a defence industry perspective and for the development of that industry the EU needs to understand what the defence industry can offer other branches in terms of high tech. Having said that, this does not mean that there is no responsibility within the industry itself.

The European: What does that responsibility entail?

Håkan Buskhe: We have to move forward, we have to be innovative, we have to increase our efficiency. We need to develop more effectively and to help the 27 nations obtain more cost-efficient high-end products.

The European: So what needs to be done?

Håkan Buskhe: There are two things we have to do: we have to recognise that there are many European countries with technological excellence that we need to further develop. For us as a group of nations this is really an asset, but we as an industry must also address the challenge of cost-efficiency in the defence and security sector.

The European: We already spoke about the efforts being made by the EU Commission. The newly created EU Defence Task Force should allow small and medium-sized companies to be better integrated into cooperation with big companies without losing their identity. Might this be interesting for Saab and is it consistent with your strategy?

Håkan Buskhe: Yes, but cooperation does not solve every problem and does not mean more efficient products and production. Again, it is important to promote an open defence industry, through pressure on both the political and industry

Photo: Saab, Stockholm

sides. I think that this will automatically lead to an environment in which companies will start working together, because then there will be a “natural” selection of companies in terms of production, cost efficiency, technology etc.

The European: Allow me to come back to Saab and to your fighter aircraft: just a few weeks ago you won a tender in Sweden for some 50 systems worth about 10 billion and some months ago Switzerland chose the Gripen as the aircraft most adapted to its requirements. Is it becoming a rule for European forces to turn to the Gripen following its first successes in Hungary and the Czech Republic? And why do you think there is a certain run on your products?

Håkan Buskhe: We have proven that the Gripen is one of NATO’s best aircraft. In 2010 a Czech squadron won the Silver Tiger Award at the NATO Tiger Meet using Gripen fighters.

The European: Do you think nations will need to rethink their requirements in view of their shrinking budgets and to adapt to a “smart defence” approach, which means not necessarily procuring the most expensive systems but rather those that are best suited to the mission at hand while at the same time still being affordable?

Håkan Buskhe: I think that both the defence industry and the forces believe in a totally wrong paradigm: that what is expensive is necessarily good.

The European: But your Gripen is good and not that expensive.

How come?

Håkan Buskhe: We have an extremely good aircraft that compared to our competitors’ products is above all extremely cost-effective. And I think that this is the future for everyone:

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Congo in 1962. 50 years later, Libya. As you know our Gripen is totally NATO compatible. So it worked very well, indeed there are lessons learned, processes that need to be fixed, but at least I got the feedback that it worked well.

Skelder

Photo: Saab, Stockholm

we need a product that can “win the war”. We cannot compromise on quality but at the same time we cannot make our nations bankrupt by building excessively expensive products.

This is how you put the industry in the right context with respect to society – we are here to help. Other industries, for example the automobile and computer sectors, are offering more for less. We can do this too at Saab.

The European: Let me turn to the issue of EU-NATO armament cooperation. In the EU we talk about “pooling and sharing” and within NATO about “smart defence”. I think there is a degree of compatibility between the two concepts, but in my view what the problem of insufficient armaments cooperation boils down to besides the political issues - is the question of military requirements. In Europe it would appear that our CHODs (Chiefs of Defence) are unable to arrive at compromises on military requirements because of a concern to protect their national industries.

Do you believe that industry can help by defining those requirements?

Håkan Buskhe: I am strongly in favour of our defence forces trying to define common products, their common use and a common supply chain, in order to enable us to develop products for less. I think this is the way forward for Europe and the right way to go. It will also help create a competitive environment in which industry can meet European forces’ requirements on the basis of such common definitions.

The European: I agree, let us hope that nations will become less strongly protective of their own industries.

Håkan Buskhe: Let me turn now to operational questions: Sweden was engaged with its JAS Gripen alongside allied forces in Libya, its first participation in such an operation since the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo in the 1960s. What are the lessons learned? Did cooperation work? Were there any deficiencies? For us as a nation, having our rather large air force involved in a combat situation was of course very interesting. It is true that the last such deployment by our air force was in the

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The European: Has there been cooperation on Unmanned Air Systems? Saab is strongly involved in the unmanned aircraft sector. Where do the advantages of UAVs lie in your view: in reconnaissance, in surveillance or in their use on the battlefield?

Håkan Buskhe: I think it is a combination of all those things.

The functions we have developed – our flight control system, computer capacity, smarter weapons integration and overall surveillance capabilities – can be integrated into systems that are unmanned. So for me it is not just a matter of one vehicle flying around performing one task, but rather there is interaction between different types of systems, many of which will be unmanned; but you will also have manned systems.

The European: And what are your arguments for this?

Håkan Buskhe: One argument is that the human brain can cope with other assignments in a fighter aircraft than just flying around. First of all I see many companies in Europe that are catching up with the US and I see a trend towards greater interaction among aircraft. UAVs have to be seen as a new and interesting system, not as a vehicle without a person sitting in it.

The European: From what I see there is a widespread tendency not to engage for the development of the next generation of an aircraft. Do you think there will be two or three more fighter aircraft in Europe, or possibly only one?

Håkan Buskhe: I sort of predict that. Diversity in some ways is a good thing, but on the other hand industry also needs to be efficient. From an operational perspective it may not be needed and I think at the end of the day the requirements of defending our nation and Europe should dictate what should be produced and not what industry is able, structurally speaking, to deliver.

From a European perspective we have a very skilled industry, that is what we should pay attention to and not just scrap knowledge.

The European: Let me jump to another of Saab’s areas of excellences: computer-based simulation for training. I can imagine, with countries’ shrinking budgets, that such systems are becoming increasingly popular. Are you able to combine the training for fighter aircraft and UAS? Håkan Buskhe: Indeed we are able to combine the training; moreover this is in line with what I mentioned earlier, the combination of systems. Interlinking of the different domains – naval, land, air – to get more intelligence is also where the future lies. * Hakan Buskhe has been President and CEO of Saab since 2010. He was born in 1963 and holds a MA and Licentiale of Engeneering degrees. Prior to the actual position he was CEO of E.On Nordic AB

Crisis Management

Protection, Mobility and Capability are the cornerstones for our vehicle design

A post-Afghanistan strategy for armoured vehicles Interview with Lutz Kampmann, Vice President Marketing & Business Development at GDELS

The European: Mr. Kampmann, one of General Dynamics European Land Systems’ (GDELS) core businesses is the development and production of armoured wheeled and tracked vehicles. For many years, your customers have been using your vehicles very successfully in Afghanistan. What are the products in your portfolio and where do you have subsidiaries?

Lutz Kampmann: We have developed and produced various types of vehicles that are currently used by soldiers in Afghanistan. These products in service there represent only a small selection of our product portfolio. When designing our products, we understand that any armed force needs a vehicle that can be used for at least the next 20 years. A lot can happen in such a period of time. Therefore, we initially design our systems for all types of terrains, climates and environments.

Flexibility is the key for a successful product.

Our production facilities are located in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Spain. In addition to our own facilities we run production facilities with subcontractors and partners in Belgium, the Czech Republic and Romania.

The European: How is your vehicle portfolio divided up?

Lutz Kampmann: It is divided into four product lines: Wheeled Vehicles, Bridge Systems, Tracked Vehicles and Artillery & Ammunition. Within the Wheeled Vehicles product line we produce Light Tactical Vehicles and Wheeled Combat Vehicles.

The Light Tactical Vehicles EAGLE and DURO are available in 4x4 and 6x6 configurations. The De-Dion suspension gives them unrivalled mobility and their modular armouring concept allows us to adapt the vehicle protection levels to the expected threats.

The Wheeled Combat Vehicles, PIRANHA and PANDUR, are hull-based. The heritage of those vehicles goes back over 60 years. During this time we have gained valuable in-service and combat experience with our vehicles.

The GDELS Wheeled Vehicles are specifically designed and produced for military applications. Therefore our vehicles are able to show an extraordinary performance in rough environments and under extreme conditions and the latest version of the medium tracked vehicle, the ASCOD 2, is considered to be the most modern infantry fighting vehicle in its class.

The European: So over the years you have inherited a variety of vehicle systems. Do they still fit into your concept?

Lutz Kampmann Lutz Kampmann has been Vice President Marketing & Business Development at General Dynamics European Land Systems, Spain, since 2011. He was born in 1964 and holds a Masters Degree in Material Science/Welding Technology (Dipl.-Ing.) from Clausthal University, Germany. Before taking up his current post he was Vice President Sales & Marketing at General Dynamics European Land Systems, Austria (2009–2010). Prior to that he was Vice President Wheeled Vehicles (2006–2008) and Director of Program Management at MOWAG GmbH (a General Dynamics Company), Switzerland (2003–2006); Chief Operating Officer at Swiss LEM Hochdorf, Switzerland (2000–2003); Executive Director, Material Development at Algroup Alusuisse, Switzerland (1992–2000); and Systems Engineer at MBB/ERNO, Germany

Lutz Kampmann: Our basic vehicle concept is centred on the three main drivers – protection, mobility and vehicle payload.

Our vehicles, other than for example the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, are always designed to meet the “Protected Mobility” approach. The first generation was highly protected but not very agile in off-road conditions.

The European: And what about affordability?

Lutz Kampmann: Mobility, capability and survivability still remain the cornerstones of our vehicle design. However, affordability has become an increasingly crucial element. Not the initial investment for a vehicle is important, but the total costs of ownership over the entire life cycle.

Low total cost of ownership of vehicle fleets is one of our key objectives. Even if the initial sales price per vehicle might appear high, in the long run we will enable our customers to have more funds available for improved infrastructure, thorough training and other operational needs. This is the spirit of spend to save.

The European: You mentioned that you are adapting and modernising your concept. In my opinion, “lessons learned” should be applied. But do you have a strategy on how to develop your systems in a “post-combat Afghanistan” era in order to meet new operational requirements in the future?

Lutz Kampmann: First of all, I would like to dwell on how we gain our knowledge to implement the “lessons learned” process. As mentioned before, GDELS products are used all over the world. Thus we gain and analyse information from a large number of nations that specified not only Afghanistan

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

1

2 photo 1: EAGLE 4x4

photo 2: PIRANHA 5 8x8

requirements. In a strategic planning process we identify and analyse potential surging conflict scenarios and derive our modular product portfolio accordingly. Because of the complexity of many of our products, we believe that the best manner to cooperate with our clients is by establishing strategic partnerships.

The European: What is behind the strategic partnership?

Lutz Kampmann: This means that we go far beyond simply delivering goods and services. A strategic partnership is based on trust and mutual benefit. This type of partnership ensures an extensive exchange of information and a much more efficient approach to cooperation than just working on a pure commercial basis. Both sides talk with each other on all levels, ensuring a fruitful exchange of experience and knowledge.

The European: So your products were not designed for a specific role and are thus not limited to a certain mission profile?

Lutz Kampmann: No, the basic design purpose was and still is to enable governments to defend their national interests by force if necessary, whilst protecting their people as far as possible. I fear that as long as humans desire their neighbour’s wealth, there will be conflict. Because of continuing globalisation and its consequences, it is more than likely that each and every government will eventually encounter asymmetric warfare in its political sphere of influence. Urgent procurements will no longer be commonplace. However, there is an ever-increasing need for the type of products offered by GDELS. The European: Let us talk about future platforms.

Lutz Kampmann: The “one platform fits all” approach is what everybody is dreaming of. I would say the “one platform” approach is a “one family” approach. A good example is the EAGLE or the PIRANHA family of vehicles. If we have a closer look at the EAGLE family we will find a product that covers the whole range of up to 15 to. Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW). The EAGLE can be configured as a 4x4 or 6x6 and all types of variants from Open Top to Ambulance and Recovery are available with scalable protection kits.

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3 photo 3: EAGLE Family (4x4 and 6x6)

Photos: GDELS

The European: What is the advantage of this “family of vehicles” concept for the customer?

Lutz Kampmann: The main advantage is a significantly reduced cost of ownership! Instead of having a vehicle type for every mission role, we offer a vehicle family that can cover all roles. A common platform requires less training of the user and the mechanics. In addition to the reduced amount of training, a far smaller stock of spare parts is needed and this provides overall cost savings through standardisation and reduced Integrated Logistics Support (ILS).

The European: Let me come back to ILS. How do you differentiate yourself from the competition in this area?

Lutz Kampmann: As our products are specifically designed military products and not based on commercial components, we as the OEM are able to provide parts and services independently without any major obsolescence issues.

The European: Could you give us an example?

Lutz Kampmann: The PIRANHA drivelines are an example: We have the design authority and are the manufactory of all the drivelines used on PIRANHA’s, LAV’s and Stryker’s. We are therefore in more or less constant production for those drivelines – even for legacy products. Another main focus of our business is to design products that are easy to maintain.

The European: And what about upgrades?

Lutz Kampmann: In addition to the availability of parts and the ease of maintenance, the modularity and compatibility (family concept) allows an easy and cost effective approach to upgrade protection, mobility and payload. The strategic partnership with customers enables us to upgrade products of our portfolio in a sustainable way with lowest total cost of ownership.

For instance, if a customer is running a fleet of PIRANHA 3 vehicles with an 18 to driveline, we can offer solutions to upgrade the vehicle with a 22 to or 25 to driveline.

Such an upgrade provides additional payload that can be used, for example, for additional protection.

The European: Mr. Kampmann, thank you for this discussion.

Crisis Management

Container solutions tailored and adapted to the mission

“Bespoke Suit” made from steel

by Horst Schuchmann*, FHF GmbH, Bremen Containers are experiencing a boom. Not only are they needed for all kinds of logistic transport, they also play a major role during crisis-management operations, where they are used not only to ensure the safety of personnel and to optimise work stations, but also to house medical services during operations and in disaster zones.

FHF has developed to market leader With a company history spanning in excess of 20 years, FHF GmbH based in Bremen, Germany, has developed into a market leader in the design and production of special and customised containers, complemented by the integration of customer-specific systems and components.

FHF implements individual customer’s requests through: • Conception, design and construction of new solutions – completed in close cooperation with the customer; • Adaptation of standard containers to the customer’s requirements.

The flexible utilisation of containers allows a variety of functional container applications, both as an individual or as a comprehensive (independent) container plant. With many years of experience and expertise FHF has extensive know-how of developing solutions for these applications. All functions of a mobile solution, such as accommodation, sanitary facilities, kitchens, utilities, laundry, water and sewage disposal, can be supplied by FHF as a single source. FHF can also supply comprehensive facilities operation capabilities.

Military applications For military applications, FHF has developed a number of different functional containers, which have been supplied globally. These include Service Container for system support, workshop containers, medical containers and special containers for use on ships.

Autonomous workshop with integrated power unit

A world first is one recent example of the performance of FHF. In just a few months, an extendable 1:3 Shelter incorporating integrated hydraulic leveling features was conceived, designed and manufactured. The integration of power generation, CBRN protection and ventilation allows autonomous operation – both on a vehicle and when ground dropped, individually or as part of a series of containers forming a comprehensive command centre.

Since autumn 2010, FHF has been delivering a unique adaptive protection system for ISO containers to the Bundeswehr, concerning protection against mortar and rocket fire.

Protection The flexibility of the adaptive system allows for a variety of installation options (create larger rooms, multiple floors) with a constant level of protection. Through the bolted design it can be dismantled, replaced, stored or re-assigned easily, making this system an optimal solution also from an economic point of view. This system can also be utilised on the newly developed 1:3 – Shelter, with minor adjustment. Even a short term or temporary requirement can be covered by FHF. In addition to individual containers, such as switchgear, (power generating units), workshop containers, supply containers, laboratory container or alternative energy (e.g. solar) for the independent operation of facilities implemented, FHF also constructs container systems (for example power supply) for schools, hospitals, industrial plants or bank buildings.

With more than 100 employees – supported by vendors for specific trades – FHF constructs approximately 1000 container systems / year, with the export market accounting for almost 98% of their total business. *Former career officer in the German army. For the last 6 years he has been working as an independent consultant in the field of Military Logistics – and he is a consultant for FHF GmbH

Worldwide unique innovation ready to deliver to the costumer photo: FHF GmbH

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The next generation of armoured vehicles is a Protected Mission Module Carrier (PMMC)

FFG’s new PMMC G5

by Andreas Beer, FFG GmbH, Flensburg* tion system and storage devices. The fully standardised mission modules consist of the roof plate and all interior equipment necessary to complete the configuration of a given vehicle variant. Defined and standardised interfaces make for an easy change of mission module. In this way it is possible, for example, to switch very quickly between an armoured personSurvivability and manoeuvrability nel carrier and an ambulance. All stand-by mission modules can As regards survivability, the current scope of missions requires be stored in standardised containers. This multi-role capability innovative vehicles with both high operational and tactical reduces life cycle costs to a new stanmanoeuvrability and the highest available dard and has the further advantage of protection level. To meet these requireproviding armed forces with new tactiments FFG has developed the PMMC G5. cal and operational capabilities. It is no The PMMC G5, with a weight of 25 tonnes, longer necessary to transport a huge has been especially designed with the number of different vehicle variants focus on outstanding protection capabiliabroad; all that now needs to be transties. Even the basic PMMC G5 vehicle ported are the basic PMMC G5 vehicles offers high-level mine protection as well together with a defined number of as ballistic and IED protection. Through PMMC G5 in field tests mission modules in their containers. further add-on protection the PMMC G5 During the mission the field commander becomes the best-protected vehicle in its is free to equip the basic vehicles with weight class. As a tracked vehicle with a the different mission modules he very robust hull it is functional on any tactically needs. With its modular terrain worldwide. Its special engine concept the vehicle can be adapted to management system, air filtration concept every possible vehicle variant. Thanks and air conditioning system for the crew to this FFG concept the PMMC G5 has compartment make for the best desert enormous future growth potential. operation performance and mission The PMMC G5 at Eurosatory 2012 fulfilment under very high ambient temperatures.

The PMMC GS is attractive to forces Due to the extensive use of MOTS and COTS products and a very robust vehicle design in combination with easy service and New standards and multi-role capability maintenance, which can also be carried out in the field, the With its huge payload and an all-round protected inner volume PMMC G5 constitutes a very cost-effective vehicle solution with of 14.5 m3 the PMMC G5 sets new standards for armoured low life cycle costs. This makes the PMMC G5 especially attracvehicles in this vehicle class and offers the user new possibilitive to all armed forces needing to replace the existing vehicles ties with regard to interior sets, crew size and all kinds of in their inventory. equipment. For self-defence purposes the PMMC G5 is pre* Andreas Beer, FFG Sales Manager pared for the integration of weapons stations. As regards situational awareness, the driver has an outstanding view through protected glass, the rear area is equipped with FFG Flensburger Fahrzeugbau periscopes and there is an integrated 360° camera system.

Gesellschaft GmbH With the approval of local authorities the special design of the FFG is an independent manufacturing and servicing company with driver’s station allows the driver to drive on public roads nearly 500 employees, with its HQ in Flensburg. FFG has been a without a commander, an innovation for tracked vehicles. reliable industrial partner to the Bundeswehr and globally more Furthermore the PMMC G5 offers a multi-role capability that is than 40 other armed forces around the world. The core areas of of a new type worldwide: the basic PMMC G5 vehicle comprises FFG expertise include the manufacture and industrial maintenance the complete hull without a roof, but with the suspension of armoured tracked and wheeled vehicles as well as system engineering and the integration of all kinds of military systems. system, the engine compartment, the complete driver’s station, With its subsidiaries FTN Fahrzeugtechnik Nord GmbH, JWT radios, batteries, a fire-fighting system for the engine compartJungenthal Wehrtechnik and Rexxon, FFG is a one-stop shop for all ment, a fire-suppression system for the crew compartment, the issues involving armoured vehicles. air-conditioning system, the heating system, the NBC protecChanges in security conditions over the last decade have created a need, these days, for worldwide military missions focused on peacekeeping or peace building and the protection of human rights, but also the fight against international terrorism.

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Photo: © Bundeswehr/PIZ Marine, flickr CC BY ND2.0

Maritime Security The Horn of Africa continues to be a focus of attention for the international community. The European Union has now adopted a strategy for establishing peace in this region. The systematic civil-military coordination during the planning and implementation of EU action is beginning to bear fruit. The military intervention against pirates’ land bases in Somalia was a decisive turning-point.

The EU strategy will help to reach incremental progress towards peace

An EU-Strategy for the Horn of Africa

by Dr Charles Tannock MEP, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

The Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict-prone and tense regions in the world. The countries of the region (continue to face a myriad of internal issues that exert pressure both within their borders and upon their neighbours and has led to a region characterised by instability and strife; tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and Somalia, tensions between Eritrea and Djibouti, absence of the rule of law, drug smuggling and piracy, terrorist activity by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Al Quaeda, and famine and poverty are just some of the many problems that paint a bleak picture of a region plagued by problems and to which no easy answers can seemingly be found.

A new international approach Yet despite the plethora of these entrenched challenges, the Horn of Africa continues to be a focus of attention for the international community. In February this year, international actors gathered at the London conference on Somalia with the aim of delivering a new international approach to the country.

In October 2011, the EU published its five pronged strategy for the Horn of Africa. In the European Parliament‘s Foreign Affairs Committee I am the Rapporteur charged with preparing a resolution on an EU strategy for the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the EU has recently appointed not just one but two special representatives in an effort to promote regular dialogue between the EU and countries within the region. Such recent developments attest to the focus that the international community continues to place on the region for a number of reasons.

The importance of a stable Horn of Africa Firstly, a stable Horn of Africa is of paramount importance to the global economy. Africa itself presents huge economic potential. It has a fifth of the world uncultivated arable land

available, a growing middle class keen with rising purchasing power, a growing labour pool expected to be the largest continental workforce by 2040 and vast reserves of raw materials and resources such as oil, gold and copper. A stable horn of Africa is therefore of importance to a stable and economically productive continent.

Secondly, the Horn of Africa has remained a blot on the international conscience in terms of fundamental human rights for far too long and for which solutions are now demanded, not asked. Poverty is rife and due to a particularly bad drought in 2008/9 and its resulting famine it is estimated that over 13 million people are now in need of emergency assistance in the entire Horn of Africa. Moreover, we are now reaching a point in which young people growing up in towns such as Mogadishu, have only ever known violence and war.

Furthermore the lack of stable democratic and economic prospects for the population, particularly the young, coupled

Charles Tannock MEP Dr Charles Tannock MEP was first elected to the European Parliament in 1999. He is currently Vice-President of the EP Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, UK Conservative Foreign Affairs Spokesman and ECR coordinator on the Foreign Affairs Committee and a Vice-Chairman of European Friends of Israel. He was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and Middlesex Hospital Medical School. Before being elected as a member of the European Parliament he was a Consultant psychiatrist at University College Hospital.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

with an absence of the rule of law, will continue to provide fertile ground for encouraging criminal activities, including piracy and drug smuggling, and sustain Al Quaeda affiliated terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab. Unless these issues are addressed, the scourge of piracy will continue to plague the Gulf of Aden and threaten the security of the global merchant marine sector. Already this illegal activity is costing the world shipping industry an estimated £4.1 billion per year and in and 555 seafarers were taken hostage in 2011. Recent raids by pirates have also shown that the range and sophistication of the pirates’ operations is constantly increasing and requiring more and more effort and resources from maritime counter piracy operations such as EUNAVFOR‘s Operation ATALANTA.

The right strategy The creation of a stable and prosperous Horn of Africa is therefore a complex and demanding task, but with the right strategy I believe incremental progress can be made.

Firstly, we must ensure that while the international community should stand ready to provide assistance when required, the political resources and political impetus come from within the region itself, led by the Horn of Africa nations. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have all provided valuable military and political support to the efforts to achieve stability in the region, and their successes in retaking Mogadishu in August 2011 as well as the retaking of Kismayo on 1 October this year prove that a viable solution for security and stability in the region can and should be African-owned and African-led. That said, the EU has to continue to provide technical assistance to such forces through training missions. It is imperative that such training is given so that regional security forces can themselves deal with the threats faced. Already we have seen success through EUTM Somalia with the training of security personnel in

BOOKS:

Uganda. This strategy is now set to continue with the launching of EUCAP Nestor with the aim of strengthening the Rule of Law in Somalia by supporting the development of a coastal police force and judiciary as well as the sea going maritime capacity of Djibouti, Kenya and the Seychelles.

Solutions are not purely military However, despite the advances in EU CSDP missions we remain fully aware that solutions in the Horn of Africa will never, and should never, be purely military. Political coordination needs to be a priority and as such the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) can play a key role as a regional player in developing a system of good governance. It can help develop effective political dialogue and consensusbuilding mechanisms amongst all its member states and promote a regional institutional framework. Matters on which to provide coordination are all to pressing such as coordination over water resources, with the ongoing negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt over the Grand Renaissance Blue Nile Dam project proving a case in point.

Despite the region’s many problems, there is reason for cautious optimism on the prospects for enduring peace and stability. We have seen that EU and African Union troops can work together to achieve common aims. Pockets of stability, such as Somaliland, have proved to be capable of developing effective judiciaries, democratic institutions and security forces for combating disruptive forces. The recent elections in Somalia to replace the Transitional Federal Government and the near peaceful split of Sudan into two sovereign states gives rise to the hope that with assistance from international partners coordinated by the Horn of Africa’s own governments, democracy, stability and prosperity will one day be achieved.

SENTINELLE DES MERS Regard sur la Marine Nationale au XXIE Siècle

All empires were built or sunk by sea. France has only had three statesmen able to understand the political and strategic dimension of the sea: Richelieu, Louis XVI and Napoléon 3rd. French Navy people are mostly thinkers, strategists or painters but rarely wrote about challenges from the sea. Taken between “publish or perish” or “write and betray”, this might explain why French politicians fundamentally ignore maritime challenges. The book “Sentinels of the sea”(1) remains a “French” exception and was

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therefore a topic during last Euronaval defence and maritime exhibition. According to Commander Philippe Metzger, “the evolution of the French Navy shows both a technological and a cultural mutation. New ships like the FREMM multi-mission frigates, off-shore patrol boats (OPV) like L’Adroit or the forthcoming Barracuda generation of nuclear subs are figurative of tomorrow’s navies. New format of crews and levels of competence are structuring the human dimension of navies for the next decades”.

A sailor’s view Each page of this kaleidoscopic account of the sea has its own weight while being so narrowly tied to the previous or following one and provides a mix of thoughts, testimonies, hints and outright descriptions that blow seawater spray on the reader’s hands, whetting his reading appetite. The accounts unravel on a backdrop of all possible navy hues, building a huge panoramic picture. This opus casts a fresh look on an institution whose traditions have survived transfor-

Philippe Metzger, Alain Zimeray Emmanuel Desclèves, Benoît Lugan Préface Didier Decoin Éditions Marines; 300 x 240 mm, ISBN: 978-2-35743-092-1

mations and whose backbone is made up of those sailors who have carried over the tales, and wrought the character and values, of the France’s “Marine Nationale” in the 21st century.

Joël-François Dumont

Maritime Security

A smart response to new threats on the seas

A new corvette for multiple types of engagement

by Dorothee Frank*, Editor technology, Behörden Spiegel, Bonn

The Netherlands has participated in most NATO missions. In theatres ranging from Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa, Dutch troops, planes and ships have made a valuable contribution in cooperation with their partners. The focus on military missions (most of them abroad), on the one hand, and an increasingly tight defence budget, on the other, has led to a new project: the Oceangoing Patrol Vessel HNLMS Holland.

The need for a new patrol vessel This new corvette is the result of a study conducted by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, which identified a shortage of Dutch naval capabilities adapted to missions in narrow seas, which require boats that are smaller and faster than frigates.

The study also pointed to a possible increase in the number of counter-piracy operations in the China Sea and Indian Ocean and to the likelihood of more and longer-lasting missions in the Mediterranean Ocean in the wake of the Arab Spring.

Moreover, since (almost) no-one foresaw the Arab Spring, the study was relatively reserved about other possible future areas of engagement. It concluded, therefore, that what was needed was a platform that could perform multiple types of missions, from mine-clearance to pirate hunting.

The Holland is a corvette that could be described as coming somewhere between the German S-boat and the MKS 180: it is bigger and slower than the former, but smaller than the latter.

The lower speed is a necessary corollary to the larger size needed to accommodate the containerised modules and the helicopter deck, although in terms of size the Dutch corvette is closer to the Braunschweig corvette than to the MKS.

Holland-Class Length: 108 metres Beam: 16 metres Draught: 4.55 metres Displacement: 3,750 tonnes Maximum speed: 20 kts (about 37 km/h) Engine: 2 x 5.400 KW Crew: Regular crew of 50 soldiers plus 40 additional crew (for example a medical team). The corvette has temporary room for up to 100 additional people for a limited period.

Armaments Guns: 76mm Oto Melara and 30mm Marlin rapid-fire.

50 machine guns.

Additional capabilities: Helicopter deck for one NH-90.

Two FRISC speedboats. One Fast Rescue Boat.

Commissioning: the first corvette, the HNLMS Holland, was commissioned on July 6th 2012. Three more ships are being built at the moment.

The HNLMS Holland

Photo: Netherlands Ministry of Defence

Plug-and-play technology for multiple missions What is so unique about this corvette is that it is totally based on the so-called plug-and-play technology, from the i-mast (built separately and simply “stuck on”) to the mission capabilities. Thus every part of the ship can be used for other future systems, thereby reducing the cost of future projects.

Thanks to what are very effective sensors for such a comparatively small ship the corvette is suited to almost every type of mission, including, for instance, reconnaissance operations in the Mediterranean Ocean in order to monitor the situation in North Africa and the Middle East.

The modular design of the corvette is in keeping with the uncertainty of future engagements. Thus it can become a medical support ship with 40 medics and surgery facilities for use in disaster areas, or else an evacuation vessel capable of transporting up to 100 passengers to a safe haven. Or with its speedboats and helicopter it can be deployed for counter-piracy operations. The Holland class, then, is typical of the new era of defence technology: a non-specialised vessel that can be adapted to multiple missions. In an unstable world that makes it difficult to predict the nature of future NATO missions this one-model-fits-all concept would seem to be the right solution. The HNLMS Holland is currently undergoing tests with promising results. Four corvettes are planned, with the last one being commissioned in 2013. Many nations have already shown an interest in the HNLMS Holland, proving the relevance of the Dutch Navy’s state-of-the-art concept in today’s uncertain security situation. *Dorothee Frank has been Editor for security policy and defence technology at the Behörden Spiegel in Bonn since January 2009.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

What seemed impossible just a few years ago has become a reality

I-MAST: a revolution in naval vessel construction

by Rainer Jentzsch*, Key Account Director, Navy & Shipyards, Thales Deutschland, Stuttgart

Excellent communication links are pivotal for naval vessels.

Ships must be able to communicate with one another, with onshore stations, and with aircraft and helicopters. Steadily growing communications demands are leading to the deployment of more and more systems on board ships, which significantly impact the ships’ topside design. This causes problems such as electromagnetic interference (EMI) and negatively affects the field of vision of systems and sensors. Ultimately, these factors limit a ship’s operational performance an here the concept of Thales’s integrated mast comes into play.

Technical challenges and risks The traditional topside design of a ship makes designing, building, integrating and testing naval vessels and their sensors, weapons and communications systems difficult.

Electronic control cubicles, radio receivers, radio and radar transmitters, signal and data processing equipment, power supplies and cooling units must all be installed below deck.

Radar wave guides, cooling lines and cables for the power supplies and data lines must be installed to connect the control cabinets with the topside systems. All of these factors present to shipyards, electronic equipment manufacturers and customers with significant technical challenges and raise the risk associated with the project design phase, ship’s delivery reliability, system integration and acceptance tests. Thales has developed an innovative concept called the I-MAST, which not only addresses these problems, but also enhances the performance capabilities of the entire weapons system.

design. The process of building, configuring and testing the sensors and communication systems can now be completely independent of the ship’s construction cycle. Furthermore, the paradigms associated with configuring the ship’s key sensors are changed completely. No longer is it necessary to supply individual items of equipment for installation on board ship at the yard, followed by exhaustive and costly tests during a lengthy installation process, first on the individual devices themselves and then on the integrated system; instead, the entire sensor and communications suite is delivered as a prefabricated, integrated and pretested unit to the shipyard, where it can be installed on board as is and risk-free during the final phase of the construction process.

The development of the I-MAST and the associated quantum leap in performance was primarily made possible by the technical progress that has been made in reducing the size of the electronic components. What seemed impossible just a few short years ago is today a reality: in addition to an integrated communication antenna system (ICAS), an SHF SATCOM system and non-rotating S-band surveillance radar (SEA MASTER 400), a mast with a surface area of sixty-four square meters can accommodate a high resolution medium-range radar system (SEA WATCHER 100), a non-rotating friend or foe identification system (NR-IFF) and an electro-optic closerange surveillance device (GATEKEEPER).

1

The end of traditional topside design By positioning all sensors on a single integrated mast, the company has been able to put an end to the dictates of traditional topside

2

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1: A schematic sectional view of the I-MAST 2: Installation of the I-MAST at Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding 3: The second I-MAST is presently being built by Thales in Hengelo. It will be installed on the second Patrol Ship “Zeeland” early 2013.

4: Thales I MAST 400 on bord of the patrol vessel “Holland” Photos: Thales

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4

Maritime Security

SEA MASTER 400 SEA MASTER 400 is a non-rotating S-band surveillance radar system (NATO E/F band) with four faces. It was designed to provide air surveillance, helicopter control, surface surveillance and weapons control functions simultaneously. The system uses phase-controlled multi-beam technology, which enables it to provide critical situational and overall threat awareness in one highly automated operating mode. SEA MASTER 400’s ultramodern systems architecture is based on proven multi-beam and Doppler processing principles that rely on high update rates to provide simultaneous functions that are independent of environmental conditions and interference.

Among other things, features include a very wide search area with high elevation coverage, reliable detection of small targets, rapid automatic target tracking, few false alarms, as well as helicopter detection and approach control.

gets. GATEKEEPER was designed to be used as an independent and automated security sensor system for the immediate vicinity of the user’s own ship, whether it be in harbour, at anchor or sailing through unsafe coastal regions. The system provides around-the-clock surveillance. This reduces the number of persons required on board and the crew can remain inside the ship in a protected, airconditioned environment instead of keeping watch on deck. GATEKEEPER has up to four sensor heads, each of which has one uncooled infrared camera and three TV cameras with a combined azimuth angle of 120°.

The 360° panoramic image is displayed at various operator consoles. Users can zoom in on section views of the displayed image. GATEKEEPER can also be used as a standalone system for naval units or other objects such as maritime drilling platforms or other valuable onshore assets and depots/camps for protection against asymmetric threats or pirates.

SEA WATCHER 100

ICAS

SEA WATCHER 100 offers high resolution surface surveillance on the open seas and in coastal regions. An active phase-controlled X-band radar system (NATO I/J band), it is able to automatically detect and track the most challenging surface targets, such as mines, periscopes, swimmers and small watercraft, even during inclement weather. SEA WATCHER 100’s operation is fully automated and is based on advanced algorithms for beam control and transmission scheduling, which guarantees both high Doppler resolution and high data update rates. SEA WATCHER 100 simultaneously uses three different search patterns with different update rates; as a result, the optimum search patterns for close, medium and long-range surveillance are automatically applied. SEA WATCHER 100’s modular design, which can accommodate from one to four fixed antenna surfaces, is ideally suited to the IMAST concept. The version with four elements provides continuous 360° surveillance of the water surface from a minimum distance of eighty metres to the radar horizon under all weather conditions.

The I-MAST is not only equipped with sensors, but also with ICAS, a communications system developed especially for the integrated mast. ICAS uses flatpanel antennae mounted on the side of the mast, each of which covers a 90° section. Four antennae in combination thus provide 360° coverage. The ICAS infrastructure, which enables the radios used by the Navy to be connected to the ICAS antennae mounted on the side of the mast, is built into the mast itself. The ICAS infrastructure consists of two housings so that several systems can utilise the antennae simultaneously. The unique thing about ICAS is that it is able to simultaneously amplify and transmit several communication signals at different frequencies without transformation. In summary, the I-MAST concept offers: - operational performance enhancement - unobstructed 360° field of vision for sensors - easy to integrate into a vessel without risk - reduced personnel levels - flexible I-MAST configuration and subsystem selection - lower lifecycle cost.

NR-IFF-ANTENNE

First: I-MAST for Royal Netherland Navy

The non-rotating NR IFF friend or foe detection antenna uses a cylindrical antenna array mounted at the top of the mast and is designed to work together with standard IFF interrogators and transponder systems. The system was optimised to work in conjunction with a fixed primary radar system. It features very high bearing accuracy in Mode 5/S and meets specifications for longer target detection in Mode 5/S Level 2.

In November 2011 the first Integrated Mast (IM400) has successfully passed the Factory Acceptance Test at Royal Netherlands Navy. Since the I-MAST consists of various subsystems, the actual FAT comprised several tests. After the successful tests the contract partner accepted the first Integrated Mast.

Following the FAT, the I-MAST was shipped to Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding and successfully installed on the first patrol vessel “Holland”. The second I-MAST is presently being built by Thales in Hengelo. It will be installed on the second Patrol Ship “Zeeland” early 2013.

GATEKEEPER GATEKEEPER is the most recently developed member of Thales’ passive surveillance systems family. It is an electro-optic system with infrared and colour TV cameras that offer users a 360° panoramic view for situational assessment and surveillance of their own ship’s surroundings in real time. Its target tracking system is capable of following even very small tar-

* Rainer Jentzsch, a business management graduate, is Key Account Director Navy & Shipyards, in which capacity he is responsible for all matters pertaining to the German Navy and to all shipyards located in Germany. Before joining Thales Deutschland in 2010 he spent 20 years in the Marketing & Sales department of Thales Nederland B.V.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The future of COMINT and SIGINT in a naval environment

Closing the gap of unexploited reconnaissance capabilities

by Sven and Richard Boger, boger electronics GmbH, Aulendorf

New threats and risks caused by changing operational areas and operational concepts require new reconnaissance possibilities to protect ships on their missions. While in the past the enemy came with big ships and was clearly recognizable, the enemy now comes in sneakers and wooden boats – but there is a fact they have all got in common: the need for communication. This is precisely the point, where our systems come in…

Richard Boger Richard Boger, founder in 1978 and shareholder of boger electronics GmbH, Aulendorf.

Richard Boger was born 1951 in Schwäbisch Hall.

He is general manager of boger electronics swiss GmbH, Gais and has been the technical director of boger electronics GmbH in Germany since 1978.

Reliable Detection of Communication With our automatic COMINT (Communication Intelligence) and SIGINT (Signal Intelligence) Systems it is possible to detect attackers in a very reliable way, even if they come in a wooden boat. Terrorists and pirates mostly use simple and cheap walkie-talkies, to coordinate themselves. These speech-emissions can be detected fully automatically and if required for detailed reconnaissance, recording of the emissions is possible. Even reconnaissance and monitoring of coastlines are possible with our systems, independently of environmental conditions, like rain, fog or other physical distur-bances. While most of terrorists’ conversations are still analog transmissions in the VHF-frequency ranges, we are already prepared for future technologies. With decoding capabilities for digital modes like TETRA, dPMR, NXDN, DMR etc. our systems are well prepared for future threats, in order to detect or to prevent for example smuggling or illegal immigration.

While our systems are in use in land based vehicles and stationary applications in various regions worldwide, the demand for COMINT and SIGINT on ships is growing. In the meanwhile our systems have been approved for naval environments. A number of systems have been successfully installed and passed all acceptance tests.

boger electronics GmbH boger electronics, a family-owned enterprise established 1978, is one of the leading suppliers for complete COMINT-Systems in the HF-/VHF-/UHF- and SHF-Frequency ranges, as well as for system components like wideband communication receiver, Signal-Processing Software and special products for communication monitoring and communication surveillance. The Monitoring-Systems of boger electronics are in use for many European armies as well as for armies all around the world, especially in the Middle East region.

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Sven Boger Sven Boger, head of sales and marketing, boger electronics GmbH, Aulendorf, since 2010. Sven Boger was born in 1986 in Ravensburg. He studied Industrial Management at the University of Cooperative Education in Ravensburg and graduated as Bachelor of Arts in Industrial Management and Bachelor of Honours in Business Administration in 2010.

Latest Reception Technology For many years boger electronics has been developing receiving systems for military applications and gathered a lot of experience. It is therefore able to provide single components like own-developed wideband receivers up to 9 GHz (our BOreceiver range) or customized antennas including corresponding signal-distribution up to 40 GHz as well as complete receiving systems. Suitable for our systems we provide corresponding software applications like wideband / narrowband rfrecording (iq-data) of a specific spectrum or of a specific signal for signal intelligence purposes as well as Signal-Classification including automatic speech-recognition. Our intelligent receiving-systems are the ideal supplement to other reconnaissance systems like ships radar etc. and enrich the ships capabilities for detection of unusual objects.

Result Using state-of-the-art receivers in combination with powerful signal-processing and – analysis tools is the ideal complement to customary reconnaissance tools and enriches the capabilities of future ships, like patrol vessels etc. Our monitoring-systems capabilities, which are well approved and in use in land based vehicles, can be adapted to the naval environment.