THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION
Protection for Europe – and Russian suspicion
The NATO-Russia Council and the Missile Defence project by Dr Klaus Olshausen, Lt.Gen. (ret.), President, Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, Hamburg
In early May this year the international media were buzzing with reports of the violent condemnation by Russian Defence Chief General Nicolai Makarov, pronounced during a conference in Moscow, of NATO’s plan to achieve an interim missile defence (MD) capability by its Chicago summit. Makarov even suggested pre-emptive attacks against missile installations in allied countries as a potential Russian response. Only days later did some of the media take note of remarks made at the same conference by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow explaining in great detail why NATO’s MD project, aimed at providing comprehensive protection of allied territories and populations against present and future threats, was a responsible step forward. Those statements highlight the fact that the combination of NATO, Russia and missile defence brings with it opportunities but also the risk of severe friction or even failure.
Dr Klaus Olshausen Dr Klaus Olshausen was born in Eisenberg on April 25, 1945. On graduation from high school he joined the Bundeswehr. 1967-1972 studies of history and political sciences and PhD at the Albert-Ludwigs-University, Freiburg. 1978 completion of general staff officer training. 1979–1985 G2 12th (GE) Armoured Division; attendee of the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, USA and Foreign and security policy directorate at the Federal Chancellery, Bonn and Commander of Engineer Battalion 2. 1985: Planning Staff of MoD. 1987 Military Attaché in Washington, DC, USA. 1990 Commander (GE) Infantry Brigade 31. 1994 as a Brigadier General Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Army Support Command. 1996 Deputy Commanding General EUROCORPS in Strasbourg. 1998 Deputy Commander HQ IV. Corps (Deputy Commander GE KFOR (KOSOVO). 2000–2006 German Military Representative to the MC/NATO, WEU and EU on 1 October 2000 with the rank of Lieutenant General.
A historical snapshot The development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and the 9/11 terror attacks prompting a focus on the wider Middle East were critical factors in the Bush administration’s decision to denounce the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty dating back to the early 1970s. The requirement for a limited defence capability against future long-range ballistic missiles from those countries/regions made this step unavoidable, according to the US rationale. Moreover, notwithstanding all the criticism on the part of the international community and Russia, the then Russian President Putin coolly claimed that Russian offensive capabilities would in any case easily be able to overwhelm those defences.
Creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Three years following the controversy over the decision to launch the Kosovo air campaign, the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted increased interest on the part of both Russia and NATO in seeking ways of coming closer with a view to combating transnational terrorism. At that time NATO had also embarked on the final stages of its decision-making process on the accession of seven new members, including the three Baltic States. The creation of the NRC was therefore also perceived as a means of mitigating the repercussions for Russia of former USSR member states joining NATO. It is worth mentioning in this context that the Rome Declaration of 28 May 2002, besides general military-to-military
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cooperation, already included Theatre Missile Defence as one of the nine areas in which cooperative efforts were to be taken forward.
Missile defence as a NATO project But before delving deeper into the topic of missile defence it is helpful to establish the perspective and intentions on both sides that led to the creation of the NRC. While NATO nations were eager to engage with Russia, at least to a certain extent, but without (Russian-imposed) constraints, Russia was seeking to create a forum of equal partners in order to take decisions on significant European security issues. “Both sides want to lead but not be led”. From SDI to the Rumsfeld report of 1998, from the Bush administration’s National Missile Defense Project (including cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic) to the “phased approach” of the Obama administration, missile defence was and remains a critical US project. It was only with Obama’s adaptation of the programme and his readiness to enlarge its scope to cover the whole of NATO Europe that the Allies rallied behind the programme, with the additional prospect of broad transparency vis-à-vis Russia and deliberate coordination or even the broadest possible cooperation with it. Although the then President Medvejev agreed at the 2010 Lisbon summit to such cooperation in general, Russia had
