The European Security and Defence Union Issue 15

ISSN 2192-6921

Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Volume No 15

SPECIAL TOPIC

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism

Photo: Roby Ferrari, CC by SA 2.0, flickr

Solidarity in civil protection – the EU is a global player Why we now need a United States of Europe

Civil protection from a Swiss perspective

Viviane Reding, Vice-President, European Commission, Brussels

Federal President, Ueli Maurer, Head of Department DDPS, Bern

www.magazine-the-european.com ProPress Publishing Group

Edition 1/2013

EUROPE’S EVENTS

SECURITY and DEFENCE POLICE 16th EUROPEAN POLICE CONGRESS Berlin, 19/20 Feb 2013 www.european-police.eu

SECURITY:

DISASTER MANAGEMENT 9th EUROPEAN CONGRESS ON CIVIL PROTECTION Bonn, 18/19 Sept 2013 www.disaster-management.eu

SECURITY:

BSC BERLIN SECURITY CONFERENCE 2013 – 12th CONGRESS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE Berlin, 26/27 Nov 2013 www.euro-defence.eu

SECURITY AND DEFENCE:

Main Speakers

Noburo Nakatani, Executive Director IGCI, INTERPOL

Michèle Coninsx, President, EurojustCollegium

Troels Oerting, Assistant Director, Head of European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), Europol

Main Speakers at the last congress

Dr. Hans-Peter Friedrich, Minister, Federal Ministry of the Interior

Ueli Maurer, Head of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports

Claus Sørensen, Director General, DG ECHO, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, European Commission

Main Speakers at the last congress

Andrey Denisov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation

Dr. Erato KozakouMarcoullis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus

General Patrick de Rousiers, Chairman of the EU Military Committee

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Editorial

The Elysee Treaty Since the signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer in 1962 there have been far-reaching changes that have placed the relationship between the two nations in a fundamentally different context.

The Elysee Treaty, whose 50th anniversary was celebrated recently in Berlin, did not mark the beginning of peace and reconciliation but was rather the culmination of the process launched earlier by Robert Schuman and other wise politicians.

Germany, no longer a threat, had rejoined the community of nations. The Treaty has lost none of its unique significance.

Today it has become a symbol: it shows that part of Europe at least was able to overcome its tragic past. The methods of the time are no longer applicable today, however.

De Gaulle described Europe as “a coach with horses, with Germany as the horse and France the coachman”. And indeed Germany, from its position of political weakness, under the weight of the unspeakable events of its recent history, continued into this century to live up to that image. The Germans have always craved more recognition, while France has been consistently pragmatic in its attitude towards Germany, guided in its actions also by the concern to protect its interests. But now the grande nation faces the tough challenge of having to act from a position of weakness, while Germany, conversely, is still struggling to come to grips with its powerful position as the EU’s economically strongest member. As a result, Europe’s Franco-German engine is beginning to stall.

Currently the Germans are worried about France’s economic stability; yet they also wonder at its international influence, but respect the way in which François Hollande assumed his role of chef de guerre, deploying troops to Mali to defend our common security, when for Germany Africa seems so far away.

For the French the use of military capabilities is an obvious political necessity, while for German society, with the pacifism

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049/1723 282 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr ; Hartmut.buehl@euro-defence.eu Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Karin Dornbusch Phone: +49/228/970 97-40 E-Mail: Karin.dornbusch@euro-defence.eu

that has become deeply entrenched as a result of its past, the use of weapons is an exceptional measure. This remains a glaring difference between the two countries. I think that France deserves Europe’s admiration for the way in which, in spite of limited resources, it is able time and again – taking the solidarity of its partners as a given – to successfully engage its forces.

Hartmut Bühl

Global threats have now reached Europe’s borders, forcing the European Union, if it is to continue to have any influence over events, to take decisive action. This is true in economic and financial, as well as human terms. It also applies to its strategically deployable military potential. There is nothing anachronistic about the projection of military power, but without economic strength, military might cannot last for long. Relying largely on economic power alone offers no guarantee of being able to withstand threats to freedom. Europe needs economically stable nations that are willing and able to contribute in a spirit of solidarity to defending it against such threats.

The Elysee Treaty did a great deal for the relations between France and Germany, bringing forward Europe as a whole. Now both the ideals of that pact and the crisis-ridden Union are being put to the test and new impetus is needed. Fruitful cooperation between France and Germany can continue in the future to contribute to the resolution of crises and bring about progress for Europe.

Hartmut Bühl, Editor-in-Chief

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: nannette.b@gmx.net Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management.

For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.magazine-the-european.com Suscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin.

The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription) 3 copies for one year: 66 Euro (International subscription) including postage and dispatch (3 issues) © 2013 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin ProPress Publishing Group is the holding of the trade mark BEHOERDEN SPIEGEL.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Dr Hans-Peter Friedrich Federal Minister of the Interior, Berlin

Claus Haugaard Sørensen Director General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, EU Commission, Brussels

POLICY and POLITICS 3

Editorial

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The EU Presidency Programme of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union

The EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Policy 21

The European Union is a global player Tying together EU and national requirements

The European Union 8

Vice-President Viviane Reding, European Commission, Brussels

24

Armand de Decker, Brussels

Give Europe its army Fruitless discussions

11

Interview with Dr Hans-Peter Friedrich, Berlin

The EU’s civil protection policy versus national interests Solidarity starts with the planning of resources

Why we now need a United States of Europe A powerful vision for the future

10

Interview with Claus Haugaard Sørensen, Brussels

28

Christoph Unger, Bonn

How Germany organises crisis prevention Being prepared for the next event

Jean Dominique Giuliani, Paris

The Franco-German exception There is no substitute

30

Helena Lindberg, Stockholm

Trans-boundary risk management How to organise and prepare

12 Ceremonies in honour of 50 years of the Elysée Treaty Reconciliation – Peace – Europe

14

16

Michael Gahler MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

34

Ueli Maurer, Bern

35

Daniel Calleja Crespo,Brussels

The EU’s “Horizon 2020” Research Programme Keeping up with threats to our societies

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Hartmut Bühl, Brussels

Mali – how to engage while avoiding a “Sahelistan” The question of solidarity

Potential of EU civil-military and military cooperation Stop disguising the facts

Cooperation at all levels Civil protection from a Swiss perspective

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32

Rachel Suissa, Haifa

CBRN in the cyber era Nothing seems unlikely Nannette Cazaubon, Paris

Modern training for the EU Crisis Mechanism Investing in efficient crisis management

Content

Pietro Borgo Member of the Executive Board of Rheinmetall Defence and Chairman of the Executive Board of Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles (RMMV), Düsseldorf and Munich

Dr Rachel Suissa Professor (adj.) Haifa University, Haifa

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS EU/NATO The EU Cyber Security Policy

Organised Crime

37

51

Dr Peter Martini, Bonn

The Cyber Threat and European Societies Deep concerns on societal stability

38

Zoran Stančicˇ, Brussels

The EU Cyber Strategy and the way ahead The clear rise of attacks

Crisis management 54

41

Sylvain Paile, Paris

Comprehensive approach to basic officer training Being better prepared for missions

Christoph Raab, Brussels

Does the EU Cyber Strategy really meet up to expectations?

Nothing should be cast in stone

42

Interview with Pierre Reuland, Brussels and Ralph Markert, Lyon

The role of INTERPOL in European Security The fight against cross-border crime

56

Pietro Borgo, Düsseldorf

Protection for the protectors…

Role in crisis-management operations

Monika Hohlmeier MEP, Strasbourg/Brussels

The European Cyber Security Environment The underestimated role of the European Parliament

Maritime Security 44

Arne Schönbohm, Munich

A plea for an EU Industry Cyber Defence Strategy The private sector needs coordination

46

Gamechanger ATALANTA and PCAST Pirates activities slow down

60

Dr Olaf Mager, Hamburg

Greener, leaner, cleaner Fuel Sharing in Shipping

Volker Smid, Böblingen

Secure information superiority Capabilities in the cyber age

49

Dr Michael Stehr, Bonn

Maurice A.Cashman, Munich

Cyber Security enables resilience Building trust

48

59

61 List of authors and articles in 2012

Troels Oerting, The Hague

The EUROPEAN CYBERCRIME CENTRE (EC3) The role of Europol

“The European − Security and Defence Union” is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence

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The EU-Presidency

Documentation Programme of the Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (excerpts) “Europe and the world Europe must look outside its borders and engage with its global partners. Ireland, as Presidency will provide active support for the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service in the task of strengthening the EU’s external policy effectiveness and coherence, and responding to major foreign policy and security challenges.

Sustaining and supporting peace, security and democracy The awarding of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union has served to remind the international community of the values on which the Union was built. These values, foremost among them a deep commitment to peace, democracy and human rights, are central to Ireland’s foreign policy. They inform the contributions we make to the development of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and its Common Security and Defence Policy. They will be at the heart of the support we provide during our Presidency for the work of the High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Issues which have particular resonance for Ireland include the protection and advancement of human rights, the pursuit of global disarmament and non-proliferation goals and the contribution which the Union can make to crisis management and to conflict prevention and resolution around the world. As Presidency, we will work to promote implementation of the EU’s human rights strategy; we will help to shape EU positions in key disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations; and we will assist in the work of strengthening the EU’s capacities in the areas of conflict prevention and resolution.

Cyber Security As part of its prioritisation of the Digital Single Market and the Digital Agenda, the Presidency looks forward to the anticipated joint statement by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on a European Strategy for cyber security in early 2013. The aim of the strategy is to achieve a safe, secure and resilient digital environment for all EU citizens, businesses and public bodies and to strengthen the EU’s contribution to

Inaugural meeting of the Irish EU Presidency with the European Commission, Dublin, 10 January 2013. From left to right: Eamon Gilmore, Irish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Naoise Ó Muirí, Lord Mayor of Dublin, José Manuel Barroso and Enda Kenny. photo: European Commission (Audiovisual Service)

international cooperation on cyber security and combating cyber crime. During the Presidency, Ireland will work to advance the development of an integrated and coherent approach to cyber security at EU level to promote business and consumer trust and confidence which will drive online growth.

Defence Policy The EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) aims to strengthen the EU’s external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities for Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management. As Presidency, Ireland will work closely with the EEAS in further developing deployable military capabilities in support of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Ireland will continue to support current and new EU crisis management operations and the development of EU battlegroups. Ireland will seek to strengthen relations between regional organisations and the UN, in particular, through EU engagement and participation in UN Peacekeeping operations. A seminar on “Regional Organisations’ Co-operation with the UN in the area of Crisis Management and Peace Support Operations” will take place in Dublin in February 2013. The Irish Presidency will also seek to improve cooperation in the area of Maritime Security and Surveillance. Ireland

will work closely with the European Defence Agency (EDA), supporting greater collaboration among Member States in the provision of defence capabilities under the EDA’s “Pooling and Sharing” initiatives, building on the December 2012 European Council conclusions. The Irish Presidency, in close coordination with the EEAS, will assist in initial preparatory discussions in the lead up to a planned discussion on defence issues at the European Council in December 2013.

Research and Innovation Horizon 2020: In the context of overall agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the Presidency is aiming for agreement on Horizon 2020, the EU programme for research and innovation.

Horizon 2020 can play a decisive role for jobs and growth and help create the European economy of the future. The programme also supports the Innovation Union which is a Europe 2020 flagship initiative aimed at boosting Europe’s global competitiveness.

One of key objectives of Horizon 2020 is to simplify all research and innovation funding that the EU currently provides through one single set of rules. This will make it easier for applicants to seek funding (…) ” > More information on the Irish Presidency: http://eu2013.ie

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More Europe! Crises call for changes: but how to organise these and in which political form? A United Europe had been a dream for a long time, then it became a vision. The current Union is no more than an interlude.

Realistic proposals in the direction of federal structures are gaining ground. It would seem that only a couple of generations are needed to achieve a United Europe: but which direction to take?

A powerful vision for the future

Why we now need a United States of Europe

by Viviane Reding, European Commission Vice-President and Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, Brussels To find its way out of the current debt and financial crises, the European Union should start moving towards a United States of Europe. This is the way to greater democracy and a model of government that draws the right lessons from the errors of the past.

“A day will come when you France, you Russia, you Italy, you England, you Germany, all of you, nations of the continent, will, without losing your distinct qualities and your glorious individuality, merge in a close and higher unity ...”

This vision of a United States of Europe was articulated by the French author Victor Hugo back in the mid-nineteenth century.

At that point bloody conflicts still lay ahead for this part of the world, conflicts that would bring the most brutal devastation to Europe twice within 20 years. And yet we Europeans have created something extraordinary, something we too rarely feel proud of: today, 500 million people live in the European Union in peace and freedom. Over 315 million people share the euro as their currency. With all the crises in the news, one might well think that Europe was in a bad way. It is true that a number of EU Member States have major problems. However, the many nightmare scenarios of disintegration prophesied for the euro-zone over recent months have not been fulfilled. And they will not be.

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The right way forward Now it is time to decide on the right way forward. To solve problems, we also need to properly analyse their causes.

When European Monetary Union was born in Maastricht in 1991, an independent European Central Bank was created – but no European economic government. There was no single European finance minister to flank the powerful ECB President, but 17 national finance ministers. There is a common European currency, but no substantial common European budget that can be used efficiently to achieve economic policy goals. For months now Europe has been engaged in dramatic debates about whether to use 1 percent or 1.05 percent of the EU’s gross domestic product as a common fund in the form of the EU budget – and then we are surprised that we Europeans face more problems than the USA when we want to boost our economic growth. In the USA, Washington has a Federal budget of around 35% of the country’s gross domestic product.

Viviane Reding is European Commission Vice-President, responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship. She is the longest serving Commissioner and has been in European politics for over 22 years. Born in Esch-surAlzette, she started her career as a journalist before becoming a member of the Parliament of Luxembourg in 1979. She then served two mandates in the European Parliament before joining the European Commission in 1999. This is her third mandate as a Commissioner, having previously headed the portfolios of Information Society and Media (2004-1010) and Education, Culture, Youth, Media and Sports (1999-2004).

Photo: Justus Bluemer/flickr/CC BY 2.0

The European Union

The European Union

If we want a budget policy that is sound in the long term and also a force for solidarity, we need a European finance minister who is answerable to the European Parliament and has clear powers of intervention in relation to the Member States.

We also need a European budget with the wherewithal to shape a real growth policy in the interest of all Europeans.

al shift is right, indeed overdue. I myself have already been elected to the European Parliament five times in a row by the citizens of Luxembourg, and I would like to see the prior election of Commission members to the European Parliament become the rule rather than the exception in future. The 2014 European elections will be the next opportunity to vote on these changes.

A European finance minister A lot has been done over the last three years to stabilise the monetary union. The new European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which can mobilise up to 500 billion euro, is a historic achievement, as is the European Fiscal Compact, under which 25 Member States have made credible commitments to maintain sound public finances and apply national “debt brakes”. The action taken by the European Central Bank to maintain the stability of the euro is also of inestimable importance. All these measures to curb the crisis are important.

They can buy time, but they are no substitute for sustainable stabilisation of the fragile structure built up on the basis of Maastricht.

Deepening political and democratic foundations What we need is to radically deepen the political and democratic foundations of the European Union. In the heat of the crisis, both the Fiscal Compact and the European Stability Mechanism had to be set up outside the framework of the European Treaties. But from a democratic and parliamentary point of view, this cannot and must not be a long-term solution. Decisions must not be left exclusively to “troikas” of independent financial experts! On the contrary, I believe that debates about which requirements should or should not be imposed must be conducted in full view of the public in the European Parliament. At the beginning of this year, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for the EU-Commission to become a European government. I believe that this conceptu-

A two-chamber system As in the USA, we will need a two-chamber system for the United States of Europe. Perhaps one day in the future we will need a directly elected President of the European Commission, something which the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has already proposed and which the European People’s Party has recently included in its manifesto. The Presidential election campaign in the USA has shown us what a mobilising effect such a decision about a single person can have for a whole continent. True, this requires politicians to be ready and able to engage in direct dialogue with ordinary citizens, even in a town hall in deepest Ohio. In Europe however, probably only candidates who speak several languages will have a chance in such a direct election campaign.

Of course, we cannot create the United States of Europe overnight. To do so we shall certainly need new treaties, and Germany will probably also need to amend its Basic Law. We shall have to find out whether all Member States, or only the euro-zone countries, want to embark on the venture of a Federal Europe. A key factor here will be the position adopted by the United Kingdom. In their book This Time is Different, the economists Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart predict, on the basis of a detailed analysis of the financial crises of the last eight centuries, that “the pressure of the crisis may unleash a dynamism that we cannot imagine in our wildest dreams. In the end the United States of Europe may come about much faster than most people think.”

News: European Year of Citizens 2013 (The E/Nc) 2013 is the European Year of Citizens. The aim of this initiative, which was officially launched on 10 January 2013 in Dublin, is to ensure that people know their rights as EU citizens and how to exercise them to the full. Dialogue between all levels of government, civil society and business should be enhanced at events and conferences around Europe to discuss those EU rights and build a vision of how the EU

should be in 2020. On the occasion the website “Your Europe” was launched, giving an overview on news and planned events on the theme of European citizenship in different European cities. All languages are available on the website at the following address:

> “Your Europe” website: http://europa.eu/citizens-2013/en/home

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Now the time has come

Give Europe its army

by Armand De Decker, Senator, Minister of State, Brussels* The context of instability in the Arab world today, against the background of the Israel-Palestine conflict, fanned by Iran, should make us open our eyes, at last.

The idea is not new, because it was to guarantee Europe’s security that the idea of European unification was born after two world wars which both originated in Europe. Sixty years later, however, an European army has not yet seen the light of day: every Member State of the European Union still has its own small army, proudly flying the national flag.

Armand De Decker is Vice President of the Belgian Senate and has been Minister of State since November 1999. He was born in 1948 in Brussel, holds a Bachelor of Law from the University of Brussels and is a barrister. Several times he was elected as Senator, President of the Belgian Senate and Member of the House of Representatives. He is member of the inter-parliamentary European Security and Defence Association (ESDA).

No response for Europe’s security This situation is respectable, but at the same time, regrettable, because this is no real response for Europe’s security which today is seriously threatened. We are all aware that we live in a globalised world: regional conflicts are highly likely to spread and have an influence on people’s lives all over the planet. We were reminded recently by President Ouattara from the Ivory Coast that, if the Sahel becomes a sanctuary for the Jihad and a training ground for Al Qaïda is established in an Islamic Maghreb, the European continent might as well forget about living in peace and security. And the example of Mali reminds us, yet again, that no European state is now capable of intervening alone in any operational area, whether it be in terms of time or efficiency. France has had to turn to the USA, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Russian and Ukrainian private companies to transport its troops and their equipment, in the hope that other European states will join in, to help the African Union to pacify the Sahel.

An historical review In 1948, in the face of threats from Stalin’s Soviet Union, the Brussels Treaty was adopted by France, Great Britain, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg after less than a month of negotiations, thanks to the lucidity of the Belgian, Paul-Henri Spaak and the Briton, Ernest Bevin. They set up the Western Union which, via its Article V, legally organised the collective defence of these five states.

This treaty paved the way for the birth of the transatlantic Washington Treaty in the following year which set up NATO and it was also the base for the suggestion by the France of Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann and René Pleven to set up an army common to six European states: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands.

The European Defence Community, was born with the signature of its treaty in May 1952, but disappeared in August 1954 with the no-vote to the ratification of the treaty by the French National Assembly.

Europe’s military incompetence The military parades which we hold in France and Belgium on the 14th and 21st of July each year are very moving: they remind us of the sacrifices made during two world wars. But these parades, paradoxically, have also become a symbol of our European impotence.

The present conjunction of the instability of the Arab world in full evolution, of the tragic civil war in Syria, of the Sahara with its strategic subsoil which the different groups of Jihadists seek to control while imposing Sharia law from Dakar to Djibouti and from Algiers as far as the Congoriver, all this against the background of the Israel-Palestine conflict, fanned

by Iran, should make us open our eyes, at last. That is why Europe needs a common foreign policy and an integrated army. This is an absolute necessity which goes together with the idea of establishing a hard core of European countries prepared to constitute a political and military union.

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No vision, no political will The main reasons for the failure of the EDC have all disappeared; in addition France is back as a full member of all NATO structures. What is missing today is vision, political will and a deep understanding of the higher interests of our peoples.

Integrating the budgetary means of the states which would wish to take part is the sine qua non which will allow the considerable economies of scale and the acquisition of military equipment necessary for this worthy task: keeping the peace in Europe, helping stabilise the world and defending our values in the face of all the dark forces.

* The article was published in parallel in La Libre Belgique under the title “Dotons l´Europe d` une armée commune” on 23.1.2013

The European Union

Germany and France have responsibilities in and for Europe

The Franco-German exception

by Dr Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Chairman, Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris No other two states in the world could have matched the feat that occurred on 22 January last in Berlin. Two governments and two parliamentary assemblies convened for debate. It was highly symbolic and equal to the success embodied by FrancoGerman reconciliation. Since the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 and the declarations by General de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer on 22 January 1963, a multitude of initiatives have contributed towards making this exemplary achievement complete, since it has orchestrated not only systematic cooperation between two governments but also fraternity between two peoples.

Europe was the aim from the beginning In the past the rivalry between the two states led to three major wars, two of which engulfed the entire world. Quite uniquely, lessons were learned from this, enabling the launch of the unification of the European continent.

The alliance between Germany and France is not simply of a bilateral nature. From the beginning its aim has been the unity of Europe. The method has been a simple one: we share the things we might fight over most in a way that is open to others.

Enough links are created between partners for them to have an interest in deciding together, rather than alone.

Today the European Union is still run according to the same idea. It offers a legal framework, in the form of treaties, procedures and institutions within which differences are settled and are necessarily concluded with joint decisions.

During the crisis France and Germany have been called upon once more. Economic, social, financial and political differences have only been overcome thanks to a prior Franco-German Agreement, which is not intended to be a so-called Directoire but a generator of compromise, and which has gradually shaped Europe anew.

Verdun 22.9 1984 – Reconcilation over the graves

Source: Bühl, privat

the international arena and everyone has his methods and constraints. We simply have to look at the specifics of what this entails, in terms, for example, of deploying troops, exposing human lives or putting military and democratic requirements on the line.

Again, only political determination and exceptional courage will help us, conditions permitting, to take the last steps along the arduous path towards the union of Europe.

And so, on the basis of reasoned decisions worthy of those of our glorious predecessors, we must prepare with pragmatism and optimism for a future common European army led by one chief, an elected and politically responsible leader.

We need political determination and exceptional courage to move forward Nearly all areas of public action have been involved in the application of this successful method. Now work has to be finalised by moving into all domains in which sovereignty proves difficult to share – including that of security and defence. A great deal has been done, but much more work remains ahead.

Our visions of the future have to be brought closer together and this will be difficult, because our experiences of the past are so different. We have to project ourselves into a world of uncertainty with the same goals and this is not easy in view of the divergences between us. We have to be able to influence

Professor Jean-Dominique Giuliani has been Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris, of which he was one of the founders, since 2000. He was born in 1956. J-P. Giuliani has a degree in law from the Institute of Political Studies. From 1992 to 1998 he was Director of the Office of the President of the Senate, René Monory. He then became the Director for the General Management of TNS Sofres, Paris. In 2002 he founded JD-G.Com International Consultants and has been Special Adviser to the European Commission since 2006.

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From reconciliation to striving for Europe

Ceremonies in honour of 50 years of the Elysée Treaty

by Hartmut Bühl

On 22 January 2013 a cornerstone of peace in Europe was celebrated and the common will of Germany and France to continue playing an essential role in the construction of Europe was documented. The impressive range of events and addresses was in keeping with the historic significance of the day on which, in 1963, Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer finally succeeded in overcoming the traditional enmity between their two countries in order to focus on a common European future. It was without enthusiasm, but nonetheless with grandeur, that the Elysée Treaty, which became the unquestioned political foundation for the relations between France and Germany, was commemorated.

Over the decades, France and Germany have been the ones to convince their European partners to realise this vision of Europe in a spirit of compromise, leading to the coining of the term “Franco-German engine”.

Symbolic events The two governments first held a joint cabinet session at the Chancellery, where it was agreed to jointly document progress until the summer, followed by a joint session of the Bundestag an Assemblée Nationale at the Reichstag in Berlin at which over one thousand French and German members of parliament participated in. The day’s events ended with a ceremony in the Philharmonics, including a concert and a speech by German President Joachim Gauck, in which he said to his French guests, “Yes, the Germans want Europe. And one thing is absolutely certain: we will always want it and we only want it in deep friendship with France.”

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photo: markhillary, cc BY 2.0, flickr; photo composition: dach

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The relationship On this memorable day wise words were spoken but not too much was promised, so that everyone could sense that the French and Germans were serious about a united Europe. Bundestag President Dr Norbert Lammert observed that in any relationship there are both times of passion and periods of reason and described the current state of Franco-German relations as a “phase rather of passionate reason than of romantic passion.”

Many perceived this as a subtle allusion to the relationship between Angela Merkel and Francois Hollande. The two did not comment, but smiled.

Interview with Emilia Jurke (16) and Aline Fetting at the Federal President’s reception in the Philharm The European: How do you perceive Franco-German relations 50 years after the signing of the Elysée Treaty?

Emilia Jurke: I think that de Gaulle and Adenauer did a really good job. Our generation takes the friendship between the French and Germans for granted, but looking back in time you realise that the treaty was not self-evident.

Jutta and Aline are both involved in the Franco-German “Grand méchant loup” (Big Bad Wolf) pr www.mechant-loup.,schule.de

The European Union

The basis for relations: The youth programme and the town partnerships tion. The Elysee Treaty concept of exchanges among young people and partnerships between communities remains the basis for relations; it is an example for Europe.

photo: © DFJW

The European: Mr Gramlich and Mr Philippot, as two mayors whose communities are linked by a partnership, what were your impressions of the Elysee Treaty 50th anniversary celebrations?

Mr. Gramlich, Adelsheim: The ceremonies in Berlin showed that the treaty is still alive. It provided the basis for reconciliation, which was achieved, much faster than we could have hoped, by bringing people of all ages together. The FrancoGerman example could contribute to the creation of a real European citizenship… Europe is an opportunity for our children.

Mr Philippot, Berchères-sur-Vesgre: The Berlin ceremonies were a very moving experience, bringing back to mind the joint ceremonies with Adelsheim held in my village on 8 and 9 May 2010 to commemorate the end of the war and celebrate Europe Day. Solemn but forward-looking speeches, national anthems and the European hymn… a lot of emo-

(17) from Berlin monics, 22 January 2013 The European: What do you expect of Franco-German relations in the near future?

Aline Fetting: In my opinion, the friendship between the two countries will help to shape Europe. They can share experience, build trust and set an example. It may still take some time before we have a real Europe, but it will come. We must keep this goal in mind and work actively towards achieving it. It is up to each and every one of us.

roject for children and teenagers at the Lycée Francais in Berlin.

Signature of the partnership by the two mayors in Germany and the unveiling of the partnership – sign through them in France. photos: J.J. Thiébaut, Berchères-s-Vesgres

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In preparation of the 2013 European Council on Defence

Potential of EU civil-military and military cooperation

by Michael Gahler MEP, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg Whether or not 2013 turns out to be a promising year for Europe’s security and defence policy will depend on two things. On the one hand, there are non-predictable events that direct the course of global security and defence affairs, and these are hard to influence. But on the other hand, there are developments with a foreseeably huge political impact, like the continuing cuts in national defence budgets, the United States’ re-orientation of its strategic interests and the slow implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon. If the Heads of State and Government are honest with each other during the planned European Council on Defence in December 2013 and actually implement the decisions already taken, the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will look much brighter than it has been the case in recent years.

EU space programmes – in search of autonomy The EU and its Member States must further improve their cooperation in the field of satellite programmes that support CSDP missions. This issue is relevant, because the EU has developed its own space assets and the nations have been “space users” for a long time. At EU level we have the Galileo programme, Europe’s future satellite navigation system, and the European Earth Observation Programme Copernicus, previously known as Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES). Two areas of concern are still pending.

Galileo and Copernicus: firstly, there is the long-standing question of how to link the civilian-led Galileo programme with military users. So far Europe’s armed forces have been satisfied to use US Global Positioning System (GPS). This raises the question of whether the military is ready to use Europe’s future Galileo system due to become operational in 2014.

Although transatlantic cooperation is one of the cornerstones

Michael Gahler MEP was born in 1960 in Frankfurt/Main. Since April 1999 he has been a Member of the European Parliament. Currently he is a Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Transport and Tourism Committee, and serves as the EPP Coordinator in the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. In addition he is Chairman of the Delegation for Relations with the Pan-African Parliament and was Head of the EU Election Observation Missions in Pakistan, in February 2008, and Tunisia, on 23 October 2011.

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of Europe’s security, the EU needs to take advantage of the Galileo system for its strategic autonomy. Moreover, the profitability of Galileo can scarcely be achieved without a military segment, as all competing systems started out with a military purpose; the civilian applications were “collateral benefits”.

Space Situational Awareness (SSA): Secondly, it still remains unclear how European cooperation in the field of space situational awareness (SSA) should be organised in order to protect against “potential collisions between objects orbiting the Earth” and to provide alerts on “when and where debris reenters the Earth’s atmosphere”. The problem with satellites is that they may have to make emergency manoeuvres to avert a possible collision, critical for tactical communications satellites supporting CSDP operations. At the moment the EU relies on information provided by US agencies. Recognising this gap, the nations and the Commission have started SSA projects at EU level and within the European Space Agency. Limited space observation capacities exist between the armed forces of France and Germany. The urgent nature of the subject calls for all relevant actors to cooperate and to find sustainable forms of governance and financing.

Single Sky – the ignorance of Defence Ministers The implementation of the Single European Sky (SES) and the reluctance of European armed forces to prepare for full participation is another example of the lack of cooperation at EU level. The Commission initiated the legislative work on the SES in the late 1990s in order to meet the demands of civil aviation for common rules and procedures. The overall goal was to “meet future capacity and safety needs through legislation”, leading to the adoption of SES regulations in 2004 and 2008.

Military expertise has been present at the technical level of civil-military air traffic management (Eurocontrol). However, a military counterpart to the Commission in order to co-define the operational procedures is lacking. It is hard to understand why it was only in 2012 that the Member States finally tasked the European Defence Agency with representing defence interests at the EU level within the SES process.

In addition, in 2012 defence ministers had still not implemented their earlier decision to guarantee the participation of the military air fleet in the SES deployment phase. The 27 Member States need to invest around € 7 billion in military equipment.

So far no European defence minister has reported investing even a portion of his country’s share. The EP Committee on

The European Union

Foreign Affairs has called on the Member States to “guarantee the timely deployment of SESAR by the military”. With the SES deployment phase due to start in 2014, time is running short.

Pooling and Sharing(P&S) – missed opportunities Since the launch of the Ghent initiative in 2010 Member States have supported this P&S initiative in order to strengthen cooperation on the development and use of military capabilities. Although the P&S initiative got off to a promising start, so far it is still lagging far behind expectations. It has had no significant effect, if any at all, on the well-known capability shortfalls. These gaps were identified in the Helsinki Headline Goals (HG) back in 1999 and reformulated as the HG 2010. As a result of this inaction the December 2011 Council extended the deadline for achieving the HG objectives without setting a specific date. However, the critical observer might well ask what the Member States have achieved in this field since 1999.

Substantial progress: just another PR campaign Air-to-air refuelling: During NATO’s May 2012 summit, HR/VP Ashton presented the EU´s “substantial progress” on air-to-air refuelling and medical field hospitals as examples of successful P&S projects. But a closer look at the air-to-air refuelling project alone raises a lot of doubt as to what this means.

Indeed, France, one of the lead nations, intends to procure new but Paris will only replace existing capabilities. Germany, supports the initiative, but Berlin does not need own additional capabilities. In neither case will there be any additional airto-air refuelling capabilities that might fill the gap that was “recently” discovered during NATO’s “Unified Protector“ air campaign in Libya.

Code of Conduct: The last “diplomatic coup“ within the P&S initiative was the creation of a voluntary “Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing” by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in November 2012. Member States agreed on this non-binding code of conduct because it is a basis for “virtual activities”, giving each defence minister a national veto card to justify why P&S might not be applicable in any given field. Will the code create the necessary momentum to move forward with the P&S initiative and to fill the known capability gaps?

The definition of European security interests A lot remains still to be done in the field of European civil-military and military cooperation. For me it is clear that only better cooperation between the EU and its Member States and the active implementation of the new possibilities provided by the Treaty of Lisbon will give Europe any guarantee of being able to maintain its influence over global foreign, security and defence affairs. The EU need a European defence review and a European White Book on Security and Defence, as proposed by the European Parliament. This White Book would define the EU’s security interests and set out the strategic framework for future capability development in order to bridge the gap between current assets and aspirations.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Civil protection from a Swiss perspective

Cooperation at all levels

by Federal President Ueli Maurer, Head of the Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, DDPS, Bern The Swiss civil protection organisation is an integrated system; it is equally based on the cooperation of partner organisations as on that of authorities at all levels. Disasters cannot be restrained by national borders, so that collaboration with neighbouring states is important. Its many common traits make Germany a special partner for Switzerland.

Swiss civil protection faces numerous and manifold challenges that can also be explained by Switzerland’s topography, its high density of population and exploitation, and its federal structure. One has to take both natural and man-induced dangers into account. Floods, landslides, avalanches, dry and cold spells in the Alpine region threaten to be aggravated by climate change. In the high-tech environment of Switzerland, however, danger analyses must take chemical accidents or the breakdown of critical infrastructure (such as electric power supply) just as much into account. Pandemics, earthquakes or nuclear reactor accidents could paralyse an entire society.

Switzerland is characterised by its four national languages and cultures and a small spatial structure – with 26 cantons it houses more federal states than Germany. In addition there is the strong autonomy of more than 2,500 communes. Civil protection has a correspondingly federal structure. That, how-

ever, is practical as many incidents are local or regional regards impact and local persons in charge and indigenous tasks forces are best familiar with the particular situation and dangers.

Civil protection network Our civil protection is not an organisation in the original sense of the word, but a network: Each of the five partner organisations – police, fire departments, medical services, technical facilities and civil protection organisation (CPO) – is accountable for its respective area of responsibility and they provide mutual support in dealing with an incident. In the event of a disaster a joint, politically legitimised management body comes to play. Civil protection is the only partner organisation that is not primarily focused on managing every-day tasks, but on dealing with disasters and emergencies. Although it is based on compulsory national civil protection service, the cantons are also largely in charge of civil protection issues.

The on-going ‘Civil Protection and CPO 2015 +’ project is particularly aimed at improving the CPO’s interoperability, adapting its manpower and establishing inter-cantonal bases to improve its responsive capability.

At the national level, the armed forces constitute the actual instrument for civil protection. Relevant cantonal authorities are allowed to request the support of the armed forces according to the principle of subsidiarity. Basically, the principle applies that military support is only requested by the civilian authorities when regionally or cantonally networked civil protection resources have been exhausted or required means are lacking. The armed forces provide support in the form of subsidiary security operations (especially guard duties), military disaster relief and general support operations (road and air transports, engineer tasks).

Swiss National Security Network (NSN)

Federal President Ueli Maurer

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Source: DCPS, Bern

Armed forces and civil protection are two central security instruments. The Swiss National Security Network (NSN) initiated last year is to enhance domestic cooperation and to improve the interaction of all national security instruments.

Confederation and cantons have agreed to jointly explore security policy issues in greater depth. Although the basic concept of the NSN is not new, for Switzerland its institutionalisation is: The NSN is jointly supported by Confederation and cantons, a delegate manages the office. Thus, conditions are established to jointly deal with concrete security issues such as embassy and border protection, crisis management or cyber crime. Correspondingly, an extensive security network exercise is planned for 2014.

The European Union

Maintenance work of the civil protection organisation in mountain terrain.

Source: DCPS, Bern

Cooperation between Switzerland and Germany Extensive cooperation within Switzerland also has its limits: dangers and disasters cannot be restrained simply by political borders. Therefore, Switzerland strives to extend the cooperation concept that applies between Confederation and cantons beyond its borders. Switzerland has mutual assistance agreements with all its neighbouring states for the event of disasters. Since 1988, with Germany too, a country that serves as Switzerland’s primary partner. This is a consequence of their many common traits, the comparable challenges both countries face and their similar manner of resolving problems.

With regard to a joint operation it is important to be familiar with the partner on the other side of the border. Knowing its resources, procedures and options is a success factor. In joint exercises cooperation can be optimised. Exercises promote understanding of the partner and reveal areas that could be improved. In the regions of Basel and Schaffhausen major exercises with differing scenarios (‘RegioCat’, ‘Nimbus’) were carried out in recent years. Particularly challenging are scenarios with extensive damage areas, as they were addressed in the ‘Seismo’ earthquake exercise last year or during the emergency exercises of the Gosgen and Leibstadt nuclear power plants.

Cooperation between the FOCP and the BBK However, not only trans-border cooperation between both states is worth mentioning, which is primarily regional. Rather there are meetings at management and expert levels: the Swiss Federal Office for Civil Protection (FOCP) and the German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) maintain friendly relations and have professional consultations. Thus, the BBK incorporates in its work the directives of

the Confederation to the cantons for extensive evacuation for the event of a nuclear power plant accident. A joint project relating to evacuation simulation is also planned. Another example is the exchange of expertise between the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) in the FOCP and the Joint Registration and Situation Centre of Federation and States (GMLZ) of the BBK. Cooperation between Switzerland and Germany in civil protection is really exemplary and is to be consolidated even more.

Although Switzerland is open to sharing opinions and ideas with other partners and maintains various contacts, it has relatively extensive experience in civil protection and CPO. Substantial cooperation with its neighbours has, however, priority for Switzerland. Its focus on exchange of information with its neighbours is appropriate as common challenges are best dealt with jointly.

Ueli Maurer holds the office of President of the Swiss Confederation in 2013.

He was born in 1950 as citizen of Adelboden (BE) and Hinwil (ZH). From the very beginning, his vocational career was closely associated with agriculture and trade. Ueli Maurer’s political career began in 1978 with his election as member of the Communal Council of Hinwil. In 1983, he was elected member of the Cantonal Parliament of Zurich. From 1995 to 2003, he was member of the Environment, Spatial Planning and Energy Committee. Afterwards, he was engaged as member of the Finance Committee and in 2007, as member of the Social Security and Health Committee. From 1996 to 2008, he was chairman of the Swiss People’s Party. On 10 December 2008, Ueli Maurer was elected member of the Federal Council in charge of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport.

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The European Union

Keeping Europe at the top

The EU’s “Horizon 2020” Research Programme

by Daniel Calleja Crespo, Director General, DG Enterprise and Industry, European Commission, Brussels Horizon 2020 is the financial instrument implementing the Innovation Union, a Europe 2020 flagship initiative aimed at securing Europe’s global competitiveness. Running from 2014 to 2020 with a foreseen € 80 billion budget, the EU’s new programme for research and innovation is part of the drive to create new growth and jobs in Europe. Security research is embedded in the societal challenges set out in Horizon 2020 under the header “secure societies”.

Daniel Calleja Crespo has been Director General of DG Enterprise and Industry and the Special Envoy for SMEs since 2009.

The creation of the Single European Sky, the EASA and Galileo took place in his time as the EC-Director for Air Transport (2004–2011).

A transition period for EU security research EU security research is currently in a decisive transition period between the last year of the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Development (FP7) and the start of Horizon 2020. This is certainly an excellent time to reflect on how the lessons of the past can contribute to the shaping of the future.

The aim of the FP7 Security Theme has always been twofold: supporting the implementation of EU security policy through the co-financing of research projects and enhancing the competitiveness of the EU security industry. Security research has been the object of a considerable evolution over the course of FP7. From humble beginnings at the start of FP7 in 2007, the Security Theme has grown into the role of a key player.

Even though an increasing number of Member States have launched national security research programmes, the Commission is still providing over 50% of the EU public funding for security research. The Commission has been instrumental in bringing together stakeholders from research, public authorities, industry, end-users and academia, thus creating a real European security research community. To date, the Commission has committed over a billion Euros across 249 research projects, addressing a range of areas such as crisis management, secure communications, border security and the protection of critical infrastructure. Through these research projects, the Commission is not only providing innovative technologies for the security of European citizens, but also ensuring that the EU remains among the world’s technological front-runners.

Horizon 2020 – shaping the future By introducing novel funding schemes, such as Pre-Operational Validation, the financing of large-scale demonstration programmes and the promotion of EU-wide standards, the Security Theme has always focused on bringing research as close as possible to the markets. Our task now is to ensure the continuity of this progress throughout Horizon 2020. A central characteristic of security research is the absolute necessity for it to adapt itself to the ever-changing threats and needs with which we are confronted. This does not mean that we should con-

stantly reinvent ourselves; we do, however, need to ensure that we keep up with the needs and threats confronting our society.

The recent Security Industrial Policy Communication, the “Action Plan for an innovative and competitive Security Industry“, already sets out some of the cornerstones that will shape security research in Horizon 2020.1

Close involvement of end-users A central aspect will be to widen the use of Pre-Operational Validation (POV) and Pre-Commercial Procurement (PCP) across Horizon 2020 security research, based on the experience gathered in FP7. The advantage of POV/PCP over other funding schemes lies in the involvement of end-users as of the conceptual phase of a project. This close involvement of end-users guarantees that the technology developed through the project is perfectly suited to the needs of the final customer. PCP should enable public users to play a more central role in the innovation cycle through the purchase of novel technologies.

Procurers should act as “agents of change” New rules on intellectual property rights The new rules on intellectual property rights will allow the Commission and its Member States not only to have access to the foreground of security research projects, but also to make use of that foreground in subsequent procurement. This will, in more concrete terms, enable the Commission and the Member States not only to develop, but also to test and validate actual prototypes. This should lead to a more direct and faster exploitation of the results of EU security research by the national authorities and closer cooperation with the mostly public endusers, thus enhancing greatly the efforts to overcome the gap from research to market in the security area.

Cybercrime and the external dimension of security Further areas which will need to be addressed more deeply in Horizon 2020 are those of cyber-crime/cyber-terrorism and the external dimension of security. Both areas are highly represen-

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

tative of the challenges faced by the EU in the 21st century.

Nowadays, there is virtually no security technology that does not at least partially rely on cyber components. While this opens countless opportunities, it also creates numerous vulnerabilities that need to be properly addressed.

At the same time, the traditional separation between internal and external security is becoming increasingly blurred. Organised crime does not limit itself any more to single regions and countries. Smugglers have established networks that spread across all continents. The natural disasters over the last ten years have taken such catastrophic proportions that no single country, even the most highly developed, can overcome them by themselves. Global problems need global solutions.

Maximise benefits by civilian-military synergies Finally, a reality that clearly we must face up to is that in these times of financial austerity, we need to maximise the benefits of public spending. The continuous budgetary cuts at national and European level force us to seek new cross-sectoral synergies. I believe that, in this context, the excellent cooperation on research between DG Enterprise and the European Defence Agency (EDA) is a remarkable example.

The European Framework Cooperation we have established with the EDA has enabled us to streamline our research agendas, benefit from each other's knowledge and, most important-

ly, reduce the duplication of funding. A highly promising field where civilian-military synergies should be sought is the development of “hybrid standards�, i.e. standards that apply both to civil security and defence technologies. Those developments should focus on those areas where the technologies are the same and the fields of application very similar.

Civilian-military synergies is also likely to be a central theme in the forthcoming Commission Communication on defence industries and markets which is planned for adoption in the 2nd quarter of next year. Although still at the early stages of development, we expect it to address the considerable potential for both defence and the security sectors to be mutually reinforcing while respecting the important different competencies involved and the rules governing the various Commission and EDA programmes. There is a clear opportunity for the Commission to add value in this critical area and I am determined that we should seize it.

We believe that Horizon 2020 provides us with the tools necessary to ensure not only that the technological development within the EU meets the security challenges faced by the EU, but also to increase the competitiveness of the European security industry.

The realisation of these goals, however, depends on the active and fruitful participation of all stakeholders, whether it be the public authorities, the research community or industry.

Photo: Pfc. Joshua Kruger/U.S. Army/flickr.com, cc by SA 2.0

The EU’s Crisis Prevention, Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Policy The world is changing and the number of disasters is rising worldwide. To render every assistance and to save lives, the European Union needs a crisis management system that guarantees the availability of key assets for immediate deployment.

Focus on cooperation with the nations

The European Union is a global player Interview with Claus Haugaard Sørensen, Director General DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), EU Commission, Brussels The European: The Lisbon Treaty called for more efficient crisis management and improved civil protection. It urged the EU to assume a degree of leadership in an environment fragmented among the nations, if may say so?

Haugaard Sørensen: The Treaty has given a new mandate to the EU to encourage cooperation between Member States (MS) in order to improve the effectiveness of systems for preventing and protecting against natural or man-made disasters. Civil protection has now become an ordinary policy of the EU and the European Parliament is now involved. With our legislative proposal updating the Civil Protection Mechanism, the Commission fully acknowledges this more important role for the EU in the field of disaster management, in particular where the Treaty now explicitly mentions disaster prevention.

However, the Union’s role is one of supporting, coordinating, and complementing MS actions at national, regional and local level. So the Commission’s proposal does not replace the MS in any of their responsibilities to protect their citizens, but merely reinforces cooperation in Europe and improves joint planning and coordination.

Claus Haugaard Sørensen has been the Director General of the DG ECHO in the European Commission since 2011. He was born in 1951 and holds a Master of Economic Science from the University of Aarhus.

In 1977, Mr. Sørensen joined the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1981 to 1984 he was First Secretary at the Danish Delegation to OECD in Paris as well as Chairman of the Working Party of the Trade Committee.

In 1988 Mr. Sørensen came to Brussels working as Counselor at the Danish Permanent Representation. He then was amongst other positions, Head of Commissioner Nielson’s Cabinet engaged in Development and ECHO, and prior to his current position he was the Director General of DG Communication.

The European: That means that the Commission is shifting from ad hoc coordination to a system in which joint planning with the nations allows core assets to be made available rapidly.

Haugaard Sørensen: In the past, the Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) would dispatch the official request for assistance from a disaster-stricken country to all national contact points and then wait until offers were made

by Member State authorities. This system has already proven to offer huge advantages over a system where a country in need, inside or outside the EU, would need to establish all of these contacts itself.

The European: But experience has shown that you can do more.

Haugaard Sørensen: Imagine a system where one Member State has already a good knowledge of what particular modules or assets the others can likely offer and can therefore focus its decision-making on the most urgent outstanding needs. The Commission proposal goes even further and proposes that Member States communicate to each other beforehand which assets would be available in the immediate future in case of a disaster. We call this the Voluntary Pool of response assets. It will be managed at EU level. In such a system the Member States and the Commission can come together and engage in a meaningful joint forward planning of the best ways to respond, during the event ... and already in the preparedness phase before.

The European: May I come back to what you just said about the new legislation? There are to be concrete proposals to enable the tools that you are currently lacking to be added to the system of capabilities. But they will always be made available on a voluntary basis, which means that the EU must again depend on the nations. Will this be sufficient?

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Haugaard Sørensen: Civil protection cooperation in Europe will continue to be entirely based on voluntary contributions of national authorities. The EU will not have its own response assets. It is a matter of subsidiarity, i.e. to handle the emergency at the level of the least centralized authority capable of addressing that matter effectively...

The European: I see your point and understand that you have to rely on the text of the Lisbon Treaty. But… Haugaard Sørensen: … of course each level of organisation, local, regional, national, and also EU has to play its role. The EU can add value where the planning and coordination of disaster management resources reach cross-border dimensions or cause European-wide effects. It would be inexcusable to have ignored a possibly serious pan-European risk just because it happens very rarely or requires a high degree of coordination.

The European: Did this system work in the past?

Haugaard Sørensen: Yes indeed. I would like to highlight that the – in practice – voluntary system has worked very well in the past. National civil protection authorities have been very forthcoming in helping each other. The common preparedness work of training personal, engaging in multinational large emergency exercises, and the exchange of experts programmes are all excellent examples of the European spirit.

The future cooperation in the field of disaster risk management and prevention planning will add another strong component of information exchange and European cooperation.

The European: The lowest common denominator. The concept of subsidiarity is fine, but not always sufficient when it becomes urgent to deploy capabilities. What are needed are some EUfunded assets that could be managed by nations, but which would be earmarked for the EU and be on call for the ERC. Haugaard Sørensen: Actually, we have considered the question of high EU co-financing of response assets rather carefully and even tested concepts of shared resources over the years.

Our so-called preparatory action and pilot projects were predominantly financed by the EU budget, for a limited duration.

The European: What was the outcome?

Haugaard Sørensen: First, if quality is assured, full EU transport funding of response assets can decisively speed up the deployment process. If applied to the planned voluntary pool of response assets, such a high EU contribution would represent a fair compensation for the extra commitment and effort that MS make for the common European use.• Secondly, we believe there are areas of risks, where the risk profile and sudden peak risks are so difficult to predict, that a pooling of response assets actually offers important economic advantages for everybody affected. The problem is that for the known risks, such as forest fires, they are not evenly distributed over the whole of the EU, and a solution may be more appropriate at regional level.

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The European: But what about the risks as yet unaccounted for?

Haugaard Sørensen: Have we not been surprised again and again by the sheer forces of nature and the effects created by increasing interdependencies in our societies? I am thinking of a “simple” event like the ash cloud from Iceland or a possible nuclear incident with mass effects in Europe. With these unknown risks in mind, the Commission proposal also includes the idea of providing limited additional funding for European solution to problems of European dimensions. Is it indeed too early for this?

The European: Well-prepared planning for an EU engagement is based on a continuously updated risk analysis. This means using computer-based simulation to simulate the different scenarios in order to learn lessons for a case that may never arise. Are you satisfied with the means available to the ERC for crisis analyses and simulation, and what about the nations’?

Haugaard Sørensen: Any planning should be based on evidence and assessments of risks and capabilities. MS are making great efforts to refine their risk assessment processes and share them with the other Member States. Modern early-warning and decision-support systems all use computerised simulation models handling massive amounts of data to predict river or coastal flooding, forest-fire risks, earthquake effects on populations, or the propagation of tsunami waves in the Mediterranean. The European Commission has focused on the most significant of these hazards in Europe and provides complementary analysis and prediction tools through its cooperation with the Member States’ authorities, the Joint Research Centre, the UN, and others. Early warning systems are continuously becoming better and more reliable.

The European: Is the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) reliable?

Haugaard Sørensen: EFFIS has allowed better coordination of affected nations during the summer season. EFAS, the European Flood Awareness System, has accurately predicted crossborder effects of river floods. GDACS, the Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System, developed in collaboration with UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) has become a worldwide reference as a useful tool.

NEAMTWS, the North-Eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean and connected seas tsunami warning system, requires close collaboration among all relevant alert centres.

The European: If some nations are unable to guarantee their preparedness through risk analysis, could you not assist them by creating regionally centralised risk analysis centres?

Haugaard Sørensen: You make an interesting suggestion. I can see a strong willingness among Member States to support each other in the evolving area of risk assessment and disaster risk management planning. From the EU vantage point we will encourage and support these initiatives and bring the different actors together in the interest of a safer Europe. The new

The EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Policy

legislation will task the Commission with a number of supporting actions, including an EU overview of risks. We are still at the beginning of a longer process that will lead to a multitude of cooperation measures among MS and at the EU level. The EUsupported exchange of experts programme is a case in point.

The European: Cooperation between the EU and the nations is one side of the coin. The other side is the production of assets by industry. Each nation’s industry produces according to its own standards because the EU has not yet been able to put forward a set of agreed standards. Does this not constitute a real obstacle to future cooperation, particularly when the time comes for the EU to procure assets such as water treatment plants, medical supplies or first responders’ equipment?

Haugaard Sørensen: Higher interoperability of the first responders is of course one of our priorities. In fact there are certain standards used in the MS for equipment (e.g. Stortz standards used by high-capacity pumping modules) and the work will be continued together with international standardisation bodies.

But equipment standardisation is not the only dimension.

Equally important for an effective response are common or similar procedures. For example, common standard operating procedures should be used for assistance teams and modules (such as INSARAG for search and rescue teams). Actually, our minimum requirements for modules will be used to define quality requirements for the future voluntary pool.

The European: You mentioned training. Do you use computerbased simulation within the ERC and during exercises with the nations in order to promote innovation and effectiveness?

Haugaard Sørensen: Yes, computerised learning and simulation tools are becoming a regular feature in our programmes, but I see still a lot of future potential.

One good example is the global tsunami informal monitoring service, which is using a scenario database (computer-based simulations) and a tsunami analysis tool. The service is being used in exercises, thus helping the tsunami warning centres to use the various tools, such as sensor systems, geo-information repositories, simulation and data-fusion tools, geographical management systems, etc., and to be prepared when they need to use them in the event of a real tsunami in the Mediterranean Sea or North Atlantic Ocean.

The European: Some days ago you received your budget allocation for 2013 to the tune of €661 million, plus a reserve for emergencies. Is that a satisfactory level of resources?

Haugaard Sørensen: The amount that you mention would certainly not be sufficient. However, thatsum (€661 million) only represents the amount of the World-Wide Decision 2013, which pre-allocates funds to regions and countries on the basis of the needs assessment. Every year we keep an “operational reserve”, amounting to €146 million in 2013, to cater for relatively small crises occurring during the year. The decision to mobilise this reserve, which is usually depleted at the end of

Haugaard Sørensen and the Editor in Chief, Hartmut Bühl.

photo: EU, ECHO

the year, is internal to DG ECHO only. On top of that, the EU budget includes an Emergency Aid Reserve, amounting to € 264 million in 2013, which is used, following the agreement of the Budget Authority (the European Parliament and the Council), to tackle major crises (new crisis, or deterioration of existing situations).

The European: The EU received the Nobel Peace Prize together with some funds.

Haugaard Sørensen: We are also managing the funds received from the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the EU in 2012 for its achievements in peace on the European continent. Doubled up to €2 million on our side, the amount was dedicated to humanitarian projects providing education to children affected by conflict. This “EU Children of Peace” initiative will help 23,000 boys and girls affected by war or fighting in six countries across the globe gain better access to education. In Iraq, we will fund education for Syrian child refugees, in Ecuador and Columbia we will help improve access to education for children affected by the violence in Columbia, in Ethiopia and DRC we will be reaching out to the displaced children and we will be providing learning opportunities to Pakistani children affected by the conflict in the north of the country.

The European: And how do you control the 200 partner organisations in more than 60 countries?

Haugaard Sørensen: The integrity of our implementing partners and the proper implementation of DG ECHO-funded operations is ensured through several layers of checks and controls at the various stages of the project cycle of humanitarian operations.

The main aspects of the control strategy developed by DG ECHO are strict selection and quality control of implementing partners, regular assessment, strictly needs-based systems for the identification of the actions to be funded, almost daily project appraisal on paper and in the field, reporting, auditing, and other measures. I am confident that these controls taken together can provide us overall reasonable assurance on our partners and on the legality and regularity of all transactions.

The European: Mr Sørensen, thank you for this conversation.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

European debate on civil protection

The EU’s civil protection policy versus national interests Interview with Dr Hans-Peter Friedrich, Federal Minister of the Interior, Berlin

The European: Minister Friedrich, at the Behörden Spiegel’s European Congress on Civil Protection in Bonn last September, you gave a remarkable speech in which you pointed out the balancing act between European solidarity and national obligations in civil protection and crisis prevention.

What are the essentials for the Member States with regard to the EU’s Community Civil Protection Mechanism? Doesn’t the Lisbon solidarity clause, with its politically and ethically binding effect, have a major influence on the Member States’ crisis mechanisms for civil protection?

Hans-Peter Friedrich: First of all, in Germany’s view the subsidiarity principle is essential. In Germany, civil protection is built from the bottom up. Locating responsibility for civil protection as close to stakeholders as possible, that is primarily at local level, has proved effective, as these authorities are most familiar with local conditions and able to respond quickly and directly. This should not be changed in Germany, nor could we agree to European rules shifting the operational responsibility for civil protection from the Member States to the Community.

We value the EU Community Mechanism as an effective instrument to help in coordinating joint assistance from the Member States, both within the EU and in third countries. We intend to take an active part in further improving this mechanism.

photo: Behörden Spiegel-Group, J. Fieseler

“The subsidiarity principle is essential” Dr Hans-Peter Friedrich

The European: How do you see solidarity?

Hans-Peter Friedrich: As part of the upcoming amendment to the legislation, we are working in Brussels to maintain a suitable balance between solidarity with countries hit by disasters and the national responsibility every nation has to protect its civil population.

Solidarity does not mean providing assistance at all times free of charge. In case of disaster, the Member States affected should be able to rely on the support of other Member States, but should as a rule reimburse the expense incurred. Such a division of labour, in which Member States do not need to acquire and maintain own resources for every possible risk, enables cost-effective cooperation and creates real European added value.

Wherever nations are overwhelmed by extraordinary events that go beyond the appropriate framework for readiness planning, reimbursement of expenses may be waived. And we have waived reimbursement in many cases. However, guaranteeing assistance at all times and at no charge via the future

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EU Civil Protection Mechanism would send the wrong signal. It could lead to a reduction in national efforts, which would certainly not help raise the level of security in the EU. The solidarity clause that Member States may invoke in case of extreme emergencies with especially serious impacts does not invalidate the principles I have mentioned.

The European: But it does create an obligation to provide assistance.

Hans-Peter Friedrich: The choice of most appropriate means is left up to the Member States asked to provide assistance. So the solidarity clause neither creates an independent operational instrument, nor does it specify concrete rules for applying existing legal instruments such as the EU’s Community Civil Protection Mechanism. In truly extreme situations, however, the Member States will neither want to nor be able to shirk their political and ethical obligation to help that is postulated in the clause. The future EU civil protection mecha-

The EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Policy

nism will provide an appropriate framework for mutual support.

The European: How much power over the Member States should the EU be allowed to wield through the civil protection mechanism? After all, the EU has no systems of its own and must rely on Member States’ solidarity.

Hans-Peter Friedrich: Article 196 of the Lisbon Treaty gives the Commission the competence to support and complement Member States’ action on civil protection. This does not mean having the power to tell the Member States what to do. Member States’ participation in the future EU civil protection mechanism will continue to be voluntary, as it has been up to now. The Commission wants to improve its ability to plan joint assistance in advance – a concern we share – and to do so, it is planning to set up a voluntary resource pool: On a voluntary basis, Member States will report mission capacities available to this pool and agree to make these capacities available immediately at the Commission’s request in case of disaster.

We support the Commission’s desire to be better able to plan joint assistance missions, and we will contribute German teams to the voluntary resource pool.

The European: But that would mean that the EU should actually have its own resources in certain specific areas so that it could take action quickly and without complicated transfer and release procedures.

Hans-Peter Friedrich: I don’t see it that way.

The European: I am talking about a relatively simple but still politically controversial undertaking: The EU and the Member States jointly decide what resources will be needed immediately in which emergencies. These resources are acquired by the EU (EU-owned) and handed over to one or two Member States, which operate them and provide the necessary staff and mission training (Member States-operated). The necessary funding

Dr Hans-Peter Friedrich has been Federal Minister of the Interior since March 2011. He was born in 1957 in Naila, Bavaria, studied law and economics and received his PhD in law 1988. Seconded to the German Embassy in Washington D.C. Dr Friedrich has been a Member of the German Bundestag since 1998, where he was Deputy chair of the Committee of Inquiry into Party Donations from 2002–2005, Deputy chairman of the CDU/CU parliamentary group responsible for transport, building, urban development, tourism and local politics (2005–2009), and Chairman of the group of CSU parliamentarians in the German Bundestag (2009-March 2013).

is provided by the EU; in return, mission readiness is guaranteed.

Hans-Peter Friedrich: The EU Member States have a large number of rapidly deployable modules, which in our view offer a solid basis for mutual assistance and aid to third countries.

The rapid response units of the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), for example, are ready to deploy in six hours, whether under the terms of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism or in the framework of a bilateral mission. EU-owned resources could not be mobilised any faster.

In my view, acquiring EU-owned response capacities would shift the responsibility for paying for civil protection from the national budgets to the Community budget, which would ultimately not lead to a higher level of security, as I have already indicated.

Further, introducing EU-owned response capacities would constitute a major change from the current system of cooperation among the Member States to a civil protection system largely managed by the EU, which would not be compatible with the competence to support and complement the Member States’ activities in the field of civil protection.

The European: At the European Congress on Civil Protection in

The German Rapid Reaction Unity for search and rescue (THW) engaging in a disaster.

photo: Bilderheld, flickr, cc by2.0

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The Federal Minister with the Editor in Chief, Hartmut Bühl, during their discussion on civil protection.

Bonn, the Commission's Director General responsible for civil protection and humanitarian aid, Claus Sørensen, described Germany’s system of civil protection as highly cooperative, innovative and rigorous. He said that, in Germany, cooperation on civil protection is excellent. How would you respond to this recognition from the EU? Hans-Peter Friedrich: We are naturally delighted with such praise, which also shows that, for Germany, solidarity in civil protection is not an empty phrase but rather an obligation that we are meeting in the European context and also in joint missions in third countries.

With our EU modules, such as the THW’s rapid response units for search and rescue and for water purification as well as high-capacity pumps to deal with flooding, to mention only a few, Germany is well prepared for missions abroad.

Germany’s more strategically oriented Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) has the necessary expertise to provide advising on immediate assistance in case of disaster, including support for longer-term structural projects and psychological counselling. The BBK can also provide advising in special areas such as dealing with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks.

The European: You mentioned the strategic-operational capacities offered by the BBK and how the THW is well-equipped and highly operational. Shouldn’t these capacities be the standard for the EU? How could Germany help other Member States that can’t even afford the capacities e.g. for risk analysis?

Hans-Peter Friedrich: In addition to direct disaster assistance, one of the major strengths of the EU civil protection mechanism is the opportunity to learn from each other. Germany contributes its experience and knowledge, e. g. in defining function and quality requirements for EU civil protection modules, which also helps improve national capacities.

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photo: Behörden Spiegel-Group, J. Fieseler

In mentioning risk analysis, you bring up the areas of prevention and readiness, which we believe are especially important. In the new EU civil protection mechanism, the Commission provides for greater cooperation in these areas. This cooperation will enable the Member States to benefit more from the efforts of others who are further along in terms of risk analysis, risk assessment and risk management planning.

This is exactly what we want to see. We of course also offer bilateral advising, for example within the framework of the expert exchange programme supported by the EU. The European: I would like to close by asking you about Schengen. Under what circumstances do you believe that temporary border checks are justified?

Hans-Peter Friedrich: According to the Schengen Borders Code, a binding EU regulation, Member States may reinstate checks at their internal Schengen borders in case of serious threats to public security. Because being able to travel within the Schengen area without having to undergo border checks is such a significant achievement, the decision to reinstate border checks always requires careful consideration in the individual case. It might be considered for example in the case of major sport or political events, such as a football World Cup or an international summit meeting, as has happened in the past. Terrorist threats are another possible reason. So it largely depends on the assessment of the threat situation.

Additions to the Schengen Borders Code are currently being negotiated at European level. These are intended to counter any major deficits in the protection of the external borders.

The temporary reintroduction of border checks could then be considered as a last resort.

The European: Minister, I thank you for this conversation.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Crisis prevention in a federal system

How Germany organises crisis prevention

by Christoph Unger, President of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) One can do either too little or too much to counter an alleged hazard, or one can invest in the wrong kind of prevention.

However, it is abundantly clear from today’s crises and disasters that a preventive approach to risks is an essential part of risk management and that forward planning is indispensable in crisis management in order to manage and, where possible, avert disasters.

ment. The civil protection system must always be in a state of readiness; hence the phase preceding the next disaster – which can be long – may be the most important one. Capabilities must be used in a structured and focused fashion in order to detect and evaluate risks, so as to be able to respond swiftly and effectively in the event of a crisis.

The process of risk management Prevention pays Germany has effective civilian structures for the protection of the population against exceptional risks and incidents occurring within its borders. These structures, which include an efficient system for the delivery of assistance by the civil protection services of the Länder in particular, function according to the principle of subsidiarity and have proven their worth. In the event of incidents on a supra-regional or national scale the Länder receive support from the Federal Government in the form of resources, information, coordination and advice.

An ongoing process of risk and crisis management within the civil protection system provides essential added value for all administrative levels in their respective spheres of competence.

Risk and crisis management in the field of civil protection are not just two sides of the same coin. The two processes are in constant interaction with each other and include both the capacity to prepare for crises or disasters and their manage-

Effective risk management can attenuate the effects of an incident or even, under ideal circumstances, totally avert any negative impact on protected assets. This process can therefore also lighten the burden for crisis-management forces.

The process of risk management is complex and time-consuming; it calls for common instruments and a coordinated approach.

Risk analysis as a central component of risk management (based on ISO 31000) Source: BBK, Bonn

In Germany, risk analysis is a vital component of risk management, conducted in close cooperation between the Federal Government and the Länder. It provides the basis for reliable information on hazards, risks and available capabilities. It is a tool for political decision-making and administrative planning that can be systematically applied at all (federal, state and local) administrative levels, thus ensuring that the planning of risk prevention and civil protection measures is geared to real risks and requirements. Moreover, risk analysis is closely related to other current initiatives in the area of security policy, such as the National Strategy for the Protection of Critical Infrastructure and the Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change, as well as the respective measures for their implementation.

The risk and crisis-management processes

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Source: BBK, Bonn

The findings from the risk analysis can also be used to support the decision-making process on measures to protect the population against the extreme effects of climate change or

The EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Policy

from the consequences of a disruption of critical infrastructure.

The operators of critical infrastructure use risk analyses to reduce the vulnerability of vital services and production processes.

Risk analysis and civil protection The method developed by the BBK – “Risk Analysis for Civil Protection Germany” – is a cross-level risk-management system that is currently being implemented at all administrative levels in Germany: in the Länder and the lower levels according to a similar principle and under their own responsibility. Since 2009 its implementation has been enshrined in federal law and the Federal Ministry of the Interior must report annually to Parliament on the results.

This method provides Germany with a major decision-making and planning tool in order to optimise the national emergency prevention and civil protection systems.

Moreover, the use of this common system could considerably reduce the costs of procuring information for individual stakeholders.

In addition to the method itself, a clear cooperation structure also needed to be defined for its implementation. This has been done on the basis of an inter-ministerial consensus.

Implementation Implementation of the method of Risk Analysis for Civil Protection at federal level requires a formally agreed procedure for coordination between the ministries and their department authorities; where necessary, expertise from the scientific, economic or other communities may be called upon for specific topics. An inter-ministerial steering committee selects and prioritises the risks to be considered. This also entails setting up a working group among the departments concerned and agreements on technical cooperation.

The federal administration places the emphasis in the risk analysis for civil protection on types of hazards that have potential national relevance. These could be incidents on such a scale that they affect several Länder at the same time and require the deployment of extensive federal resources. Or, they could be events on a smaller geographic scale but of a politically explosive nature that could trigger a national crisis.

Events originating abroad but with repercussions within Germany may also be considered as being of national relevance.

An all-hazards approach requires a systematic classification of hazards according to the possible forms they may take, and, following on from this, the probability of their occurrence and the likely extent of the damage.

In 2012, risk analyses for civil protection purposes were carried out at federal level on the scenarios: “Unusual epidemic outbreak” and “Extreme snow-melt floods from low mountain areas”. The corresponding report was presented to the German Parliament at the end of 2012.

Christoph Unger has been President of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) since its creation in 2004. He was born in 1958 in Braunschweig, Germany. After his law studies at the Free University of Berlin and at the University of Hanover, he worked for the Interior Ministry of the Land of Lower Saxony, where he was placed in charge of police law and association law in 1994, before being appointed head of staff of Lower Saxony’s Interior Minister, Heiner Bartling, and overall head of the Department for Sport, Budget, Cabinet and Gambling in 1998. Before taking up his position as President of the BBK he was head of Lower Saxony’s Civil Protection Department and of its Competence Centre for Large-Scale Incidents.

Risk management in the international context Germany and its neighbours have concluded bilateral agreements on the provision of mutual assistance in the event of accidents and disasters. A core element of those agreements is the exchange of information about preventive measures.

Germany also attaches great importance to the drawing up and implementation of risk analyses at European level. The bi- and multilateral activities of the European Commission in the field of civil protection constitute the right approach with a view to guaranteeing the aims of civil protection throughout the territory of the European Union whilst upholding the principle of subsidiarity and promoting the idea of prevention within Europe as a whole. Those activities include the exchange of information, methods and good practices. The German Government cooperates closely for that purpose both with the other Member States and with the European Commission.

Germany advocates the establishment of appropriate Europewide protection standards and is offering its concept for the implementation of risk analyses, which can make an important contribution to prevention. Important aspects of prevention are common training and exercises in the framework of the EU community mechanism.

Conclusion Germany’s civil protection system as a whole benefits from the broad application of the new procedures. However, these require intensive communications between policy-makers and the authorities, and between the latter and citizens. However, state provisions alone cannot guarantee the total protection of the population: there is also a need for close cooperation with the operators of critical infrastructure, and for an “event-oriented” preparation of citizens themselves (creation and development of self-help capabilities). Comprehensive and sustainable risk and crisis management calls, then, for crosssector cooperation, a close link between risk analysis and planning, a strengthening of the role of risk and crisis communications and networking between the scientific community and those responsible for practical implementation.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Time for a joint approach

Trans-boundary risk management

by Helena Lindberg, Director General, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), Karlstadt At the end of January world leaders gathered once again at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, in Davos, to discuss the state of global affairs. One of the items on the agenda was the Global Risks Report 2013, outlining some of the most pressing risk challenges ahead.1

Fostering awareness of global risks The report paints a worrying and complex picture of how different constellations of risks may interact and cause havoc to populations around the world. Pinpointed in the overall global risk matrix we find a range of daunting risk scenarios such as “water supply crises”, “critical systems failure”, “the spread of antibiotic resistant bacteria”, “massive digital misinformation” and “vulnerability to geomagnetic storms”.

The analysis presented in the Global Risks Report deserves a close reading, although the messages conveyed are not new.

What we have seen over the past decade is a steady growth of fora and publications focused on complex risks and risk governance at different levels. Organisations like the OECD, the G20, the World Bank, the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) and large reinsurance companies like Swiss Re or Munich Re, regularly produce studies exploring the rapidly evolving, globalised risk landscape and the methods needed to cope with it.

National approaches to risk management One of the effects of this global surge in attention to complex risks has been an increased focus on the development of national approaches to risk management. Within the EU, the UK and the Netherlands were pioneers and published their first national risk inventories in 2007/2008. Since then other countries have followed suit. Norway presented its first risk report in 2011 and in Sweden we will have our first national assessment ready this year.

Establishing a process for assessing and managing risks at the national level is a challenging task, particularly for countries with a federal structure or countries where there is a lack of tradition and incentives for cooperation across levels or sectors. One of the main difficulties is to find ways of engaging all relevant stakeholders in the process. In recent years there has also been a growing emphasis on the need to move beyond a more narrowly defined “whole-of-government” approach (a challenge in itself) and apply a “whole-of-society” perspective on issues of national safety and security.

In Sweden we have been rather successful at developing the multi-level and multi-sectoral aspects of our national risk work. In fact, one of the core missions of the agency that I

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Helena Lindberg Director General for the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency (MSB) in Karlstadt since 2009.

Helena Lindberg has a Master’s Degree in Law and worked as an Associate Judge of Appeals, before joining the Swedish Ministry of Justice as a Deputy Director. She served also as the Director General for Legal and Administrative Affairs at the Ministry of Defence in Stockholm.

When the Agency for Swedish Civil Contingency started its work in 2009, Helena Lindberg, became the first Director General.

lead, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), is to support and facilitate coordination across levels and sectors in preventing, planning for, responding to and learning from various risk events. But even if our cooperation on risks includes many of the relevant stakeholders, we still have some ground to cover in the private sector and among volunteer associations before we have a “whole-of-society” approach in place. 2

Trans-boundary cooperation and the role of the EU Another challenge we face in Sweden – a challenge that I believe we share with a majority of Member States in the EU – is the need to widen our approach to risks across national borders. This is particularly urgent for coping with the kind of “systemic risks” we find, for example, in the Global Risks Report.

Systemic risks (often defined as risks which may affect the functionality of the systems upon which society depends) are “trans-boundary” in many dimensions, with impacts way beyond their geographic or sectoral origins.3 Examples of trans-boundary risks with a European dimension would be a massive power failure affecting a large number of Member States (possibly caused by a geomagnetic storm), a Fukushima-type event on Union territory or the spread of a new lethal disease across the European continent.

The European Union has a unique role to play in promoting Member States’ capacity to cope with such risks. A lot has already been achieved over the past years, largely in response to occurred events. There are a dozen rapid alert and warning systems (RAS), allowing Member States to communicate early signals of risk. There is also monitoring capacity across a range of policy areas, including a few operational centres – one of them being the Emergency Response Centre (ERC) in the Commission (DG ECHO), which is now turning into a fully-

The EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Policy

fledged 24/7 hub for responding to major risk events, inside and outside Union territory.

Current policy developments In addition to existing capacities, current policy developments are offering new opportunities for enhanced cooperation on trans-boundary risk management. In the area of civil protection, Member States are currently negotiating a new legislative proposal, which will hopefully provide a basis for a dynamic development over the coming years. According to the proposal, Member States will regularly report elements of their national risk assessments, including assessments of their capability to prevent and manage those risks. This will allow Member States to share best practices, develop methodologies and gradually build a more joined-up capacity for tackling trans-boundary risks. Based on the outcome from the Swedish EU Presidency in 2009, the Commission (DG ECHO) has also been tasked with providing an overview of the major risks the Union is facing, partly drawing on risk information provided by Member States.

Sweden has been an active proponent of these initiatives and has also advocated the need for the EU to serve as a platform for wider international cooperation on global risks. Enhanced cooperation with organisations like the OECD and its High-Level Risk Forum, or the UNISDR (Hyogo Framework for Action) is essential and should be further institutionalised.

In parallel with the negotiations on the new legislative proposal for civil protection, Member States are also reviewing the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). One of the suggested ways forward (according to a recent food-for-thought paper from the Commission) is an increased focus on risk management. As a first step, Member States will be asked to study risks in relation to critical interdependencies across sectors and borders. The concept of “resilience” is also brought forth (rather than a more narrow focus on “protection”) and the Commission (DG HOME) suggests a “systems-level” approach to risk assessment (rather than an approach focused on individual assets). The main ideas for a revised EPCIP are in line with the Swedish way of approaching risk in vital societal functions and should provide a good basis for developing further work. What seems important is to make sure that the work delivers synergies in relation to initiatives in other policy areas, such as civil protection.

The need for a coordinated approach to EU risk management is also stressed in the long-awaited proposal for the implementation of the Solidarity Clause.4 An important element in this proposal is the establishment of a process for “integrated threat and risk assessment” at Union level. Starting in 2015, the Commission and the High Representative will be asked to develop joint risk and threat reports as a basis for a regular assessment by the European Council. The suggested approach is ambitious – according to the proposal, the integrated report shall “…build on assessments of threats, hazards and risks currently compiled in various sectors (e.g. terrorism, organized

crime, civil protection, health, environment, climate change, etc.), based notably on monitoring, interpretation and sharing of information provided by Member States (through existing sectorial networks or from crisis centers) and Union Agencies as well as relevant international organizations”.

Next steps – seizing the opportunities for enhanced cooperation Recent developments in the EU hold a lot of promise. Transboundary risk management is an area where the EU can provide significant added value to the efforts of Member States.

Thanks to the initiatives that are under way, Member States will be in a stronger position to develop cooperative tools and methods adapted to future risk challenges.

And there is a lot at stake. Over the past few years Europe has experienced a number of “unexpected” risk events, such as the tragic terror attacks against Norway in July 2011 or the widespread impact of the volcanic ash cloud in 2010. In an age of social media, where risk management strategies are communicated widely from a variety of sources, a failure to cooperate across borders may not only entail a cost in terms of the lives and health of our citizens, but also a political cost. Europe may be whole and free…. but our globalised risk society is here to stay. It is time to face up to this reality.

1

See http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2013/ See Helena Lindberg and Bengt Sundelius, “Whole-of-society disaster resilience: the Swedish way” in the McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook,

by David Kamien (ed.), pp.1295-1317.

3 See Boin, A. et al (2010), “Managing Trans-boundary Crises: Identifying the Building Blocks of an Effective Response System”, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 18, N.4, Blackwell Publishing. See also the report from the International Risk Governance Council (2011), “Risk Governance Deficits” http://irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_rgd_web_final.pdf 4 See “Joint Proposal for a Council Decision on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the Solidarity Clause”, JOIN(2012) 39 final, Brussels 21.12.2012 2

News: CBRNE Agenda On 11 December 2012, the Council of the EU adopted Conclusions on the new CBRNE agenda aiming to develop a more strategic and overarching approach to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) and explosives (E) policy fields, that involves internal and external safety and security aspects.

The revised policy should “identify and develop common prioritised focus areas for reviews on a regular basis; strengthen the prevention of CBRNE risks on the basis of best practice and recommendations; use synergies between the abovementioned Action Plans, encouraging the development of prevention and detection measures, awareness raising, and research on the security of CBRN materials and explosives, as well as the exchange, as appropriate, of information and knowledge regarding the management and handling of incidents with CBRN materials and explosives, while also keeping in mind relevant differences during future work (…).” > For the Council Conclusions: http://tinyurl.com/bvywnsv

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photo: EMA ECPAD, Paris

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Europe’s interests in Africa

Mali – how to engage while avoiding a “Sahelistan”

by Hartmut Bühl, Brussels

After French and Malian forces – after only three weeks of operations and much sooner than expected – had taken Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal without meeting any major resistance from the jihadists, the French President let slip the remark that victory was near. This was perhaps the first mistake by the commander-in-chief of an operation that had been well prepared in terms of the timing and content. He had withdrawn his troops from Afghanistan in good time and secured Algeria’s permission for French forces to overfly its territory, prompting speculation about what Algeria was to get in exchange for this deal.

Coordination with the European states appears to have been less intensive. Hollande no doubt expected solidarity from his European partners and was banking on their support, but this was not readily forthcoming: a problem of motivation and with the political objective?

Extension of the intervention objectives Initially the aim was to secure the south of the country against terrorists, then the troops were ordered to move northwards in order to free the population there from the hands of the jihadists. The enemy suffered losses from French air strikes but has not been permanently weakened. It is scarcely offering resistance any more: to save its strength – and also to escape satellite detection – it has retreated up into the Ifoghas mountains on the border with Algeria, or else into the endless

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expanses of the Sahel desert which are impossible to control, and where it is quite capable of holding out until the French withdraw. The French have made it clear that they do not intend to enter into a long-term engagement in the Sahel. This they consider to be a task for ECOWAS, whose troops are to be trained mainly by Germany.

How are these “black” forces to solve the problem of skin colour with the “white” Tuareg? The Tuareg will not bow to any black authority. The latest incursions prove that there is an ethnic line of conflict cutting right across Mali: there is no ready-made solution.

Is history repeating itself?

In autumn 2001 after six weeks’ resistance the Taliban withdrew from Kabul in order to hide in the mountains on the border with Pakistan. The then US President George Bush cried victory. In spite of the presence of more than 150 000 soldiers deployed to fight them, the Taliban still control the southern and eastern parts of the country and are waiting for the final drawdown of US troops. Then they will try to regain power. Could the same thing happen in the Sahel region and how can a “Sahelistan” be avoided?

Political aims Implementation of the UN mandate for the protection of the Malian population is not being called into question and will

The EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Policy

source: Orionist, wikimedia, CC BY-SA 3.0

French troups securing the village o Mopti photo: EMA ECPA-D

On 26 January 2013 more African allies coming from Niger and from Tschad at their arrival at the airport of Gao. photo: EMA ECPAD

take place. Does Hollande really want to re-establish Mali’s unity and move his troops up north, when every extra kilometre lengthens the logistic supply routes and reduces sustainability? Neither could the French President’s aim have been to wipe out the jihadists, because this would have been far too ambitious and indeed impossible to achieve in light of the framework conditions for this engagement. All governments have at least learnt that much from the experience in Afghanistan.

Are there economic objectives? The answer is certainly yes, because not only are there reserves of uranium, which France needs in order to guarantee the supply of fuel for its nuclear power stations, but also rare earths, which are vitally important for Europe and the US, and a secure supply of which would reduce their dependence on China.

The new role of France in Africa But perhaps there is something quite different behind all this: could this be the beginning of a new Africa policy for France,

one that could have a European dimension, with France as the lead power? That would make sense, given the sympathy for France that still exists in Africa, and the excellent grasp that France has of the conditions there due to its colonial past.

The starting point for this line of reasoning is the undeniable progress that the ECOWAS states have achieved over the past few years towards building democracy, a sense of community and mutual understanding. France’s commendable intervention in Mali can only strengthen the states of the whole region, enabling them to exercise sovereignty over their territory, which also means being able to resist attacks from terrorists.

If this is the policy being pursued, then history will not repeat itself: there will be no second Afghanistan, no “Sahelistan”.

But major challenges remain ahead that France and Europe must meet together. And the second phase of the war has just begun.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Threat of paradoxical implications for First Responders

CBRNe in the cyber era

by Dr Rachel Suissa, University of Haifa, Haifa The use of cyber capabilities by state actors to manage different types of conflicts increases the risk of violent asymmetrical scenarios. CBRNe terrorism becomes a weapon of the weak because it provides a relational advantage. This paradox stems from the irrelevance of cyber capabilities for CBRNe detection as well as from an actor’s cyber capability inferiority. When an actor perceives that his enemy’s cyber capability narrows his strategic operational spectrum and reveals his inferiority, he may consider the use of CBRNe weapons. This scenario is realised in conflicts between state and non-state actors.

Another paradox arises when cyber capability becomes relevant for managing a CBRNe event. The response phase is carried out in accordance with the rationale of interdependence and interconnectedness among emergency forces embedded in virtual critical information and communication platforms and infrastructures. Dependence on a virtual capability amplifies the security risk for first responders in a CBRNe event because of the potential threat of a cyber attack against the management of such an event.

The role of cyber capability in CBRN detection Do the following detection strategies rely on cyber capability?

Detection is about prevention, which is one of the five major phases in the CBRNe Defence Chain.

“Dirty bombs” pose a challenge. They are difficult to detect because of the simplicity of the materials involved in their creation. Most of the necessary substances can be obtained within the country in which they are built, hence terrorists do not need to smuggle them in. Although some of the substances can be easily detected, these detection technologies and strategies are not necessarily applied in a cyber space environment.

Dr. Rachel Suissa Dr. Rachel Suissa is an Assistant Professor at the National Security Program in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa, and a research fellow in different academic affiliations due to her multidisciplinary professional background: Center for Public Management and Policy (U-Haifa), the department of Geography (U-Haifa), Haifa Center for European and German Studies. Her research interests include security and military studies, intelligence cooperation, strategic alliances, cyber security and EU foreign and security policy. Among her publications: Military Resilience in Low-Intensity Conflict- New Directions; “Conflict as a Learning Process: States Conflict Versus State and Non-State Actor Conflict” ; “Cyber Terrorism and Cyber-deterrence within Conflict Transformation”; “The Psychological Dimensions of Cyber Security Methodology Components”.

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Nuclear substances are relatively easy to detect through active measuring devices or passive detection devices. These devices measure the radiation emitted over a certain period at a certain location. Although technology is involved in this type of detection, it is of no relevance to cyber capability. Even when satellite detection of portable nuclear weapons is possible, their detection in terms of a cyber operation that will prevent the threat from becoming an actual disaster remains limited.

Biological substances have been carried across borders. A key focus of the efforts by customs authorities has always been to control the importation of active biological substances, in order to prevent viruses, harmful insects or harmful plants from entering the territory. However, customs authorities are not in a position to easily detect certain harmful biological substances such as bacteria, viruses or fungi.

Chemical substance detection poses the difficulty of identifying the target substance, since there are many structurally related chemicals and many harmful substances that mimic innocuous ones. As a result, customs authorities are poorly placed to intercept harmful chemical substances. However, unlike biological substances, chemical substances contain easily measurable indicators. For example, their acidity can be measured using a pH-meter or a mass spectrometer. Despite the detection technologies used by customs authorities, such as sniffer dogs, Geiger counters and wipe tests, chemical substances are irrelevant in terms of cyber detection.

CBRNe cyber detection is irrelevant The important phase of prevention is not necessarily based on cyber infrastructure in terms of the criteria that characterise this type of infrastructure such as embeddedness, transparency, reach or scope, links with conventions of practice, embodiment of standards, construction on an installed base or the fact of being invisible unless it breaks down. These virtual criteria make it accessible to cyber defensive actions. However, although the detection of CBRNe might exist in the IT dimensions of physical environments like those described above, it is not embedded in virtual ones. Thus CBRNe cyber detection is irrelevant, and this irrelevance is also valid for other phases of the CBRNe defence chain, such as Proact-Prevent.

The relevance of cyber capability for the CBRNe response phase The most crucial phase of the CBRNe defence chain is the Response phase. This phase includes measures taken during or immediately following a disaster to provide adequate support to the people affected by the disaster. However, an immediate

The EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Policy

response is difficult when critical infrastructure is under cyber attack, because most first responders (i.e. fire brigades, emergency medical services and police) depend on a unified communications system. This type of system allows multiple first responder forces to gain comprehensive situational awareness and communicate freely with everyone. It also includes a robust communications system that unifies all communications, while supporting multiple communication standards.

A crucial structural challenge that cyber attack poses for first responders is that it endangers the success of interventions that depend strongly on organisation in terms of connectedness, interdependence and joint efforts. Communication among the different hierarchical levels and cooperating units can become a crucial issue; gaps in communication and their circumvention depend on the standardisation of communication flows at multiple and integrated levels that also depend on cyber platforms. A malicious cyber act is not only damaging in organisational terms but also poses functional challenges for first responders in human terms. These first responders face motivators and stressors that affect their ability to take proper action.

Concluding insights Most strategies for the detection of CBRNe, their distribution and their uses are not embedded in cyber platforms. This increases the chances for their realisation in a future in which a

cyber-war capability will increase the asymmetrical dimensions of violent conflicts, affecting their strategic, tactical and logistical aspects.

CBRNe weapons escape virtual environments, yet their disastrous consequences are amplified by the launch of a cyber attack during the management of a CBRNe event. In this scenario, first responders are important and decisive and need to be protected as strategic assets. The great physical, psychological and emotional demands on first responders during a CBRNe emergency challenge their resilience. They often work long hours under stressful conditions, witnessing the human harm, physical destruction and psychological devastation that can accompany disasters. Thus, not only must their wellbeing be taken care of through the use of optimum precautionary and protective equipment, but they must also be convinced that they are protected. They must believe that those who send them to rescue others at the risk of their own lives care about their protection. This knowledge is a core pillar of first responders’ mental resilience, even years after the event.

All simulation and modelling of crisis-management programmes with a hybrid threat of CBRNe and cyber attack should consider a bottom-up rationale. It is important to take into account the protection of first responders as a low cost investment that has a critical impact on the quality of the higher strategic levels.

A simulation competence centre for EU crisis-management training

Modern training for the EU Crisis Mechanism

by Nannette Cazaubon, Journalist, Paris With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has been given an important role in supplementing and coordinating the EU Member States’ responsibilities in the area of civil protection.

The Commission’s 2011 legislative proposal for a new Civil Protection Mechanism for the Union (for the period 2014-2020) to replace the current reactive and ad hoc arrangements is currently on the table in the European Parliament. A legislative resolution on the issue is expected to be adopted in March 2013. The idea is to take an integrated approach to European disaster management.

Increased prevention and preparedness This Commission proposal for a new Civil Protection Mechanism is a response to the EU’s new role after Lisbon in supporting, coordinating and supplementing action taken by the Member States in the field of civil protection in order to enhance the effectiveness of the systems for preventing, preparing for and responding to all types of natural and man-made disasters within and outside the Union. It makes provision for

enlarging the scope of the current EU preparedness actions in the field of training, including through the establishment of a training network and diversification of the training programme.

Bridging the gap between civilian and military In this field, given the complexity of possible crisis management scenarios, computer-based simulation technologies appear to be an interesting and effective new tool for preparation, training and coordination.

Natural and man-made disasters are increasing in number and in scope on a global scale. Our crisis and disaster management missions have become a complex task with a wide range of scenarios and a large variety of civilian and military actors involved on the ground. Up to now training has for the large part remained very conservative and expensive, although new training procedures such as simulation exist and have proven their efficiency. To be effective, a common engagement by EU Member States affected by cross-border disasters requires

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Nannette Cazaubon is Deputy-Editor-in-Chief of the Magazine “The European – Security and Defence Union”. She was born in 1968 in Germany, studied literature at the University of Bonn, and political sciences at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (IEP) in Paris.

She lives in Paris since 1998 where she is working as independent journalist specialised in European Security and Defence.

intensive early training on virtual scenarios. Simulation makes it possible to identify and understand key factors and to detect the interaction and interdependencies between processes in the real world, and then to create the corresponding models in a virtual world. While simulation has a long history in the military sector, within the civil protection domain computer-based simulation is still an emerging technology.

Computer-based simulation has proven its worth In the military sector, computer-based simulation tools have proven their worth for training management and active staff.

The German Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) is using, with great success, the SIRA system that the armed forces of six European countries have been using for command and staff training simulation for the last 15 years. SIRA is based on the GESI simulation software developed by CAE Elektronik GmbH, a subsidiary of the Canadabased company CAE Inc., a worldwide leader in the fields of modelling and simulation and technologies. This cooperation between military and civil forces in Germany even extends to coordination on the further development of simulation technology with a view to exploiting all possible synergies.

Couldn’t this civilian-military cooperation in the domain of disaster management be a model for the European Union?

Limited budgets call for efficiency When considering crisis management, one must take into account the increasing pressure on EU civil security authorities to safeguard citizens’ security, against a backdrop of limited resources, budgetary cutbacks and a broad spectrum of potential threats. It therefore seems evident that the modern simulation technology used in the military sector could also provide decisive support for crisis management in Europe.

Simulation technology allows the complexity of the real world to be replicated in a digitised one. One can, for example, replicate a region with its topography, climate, infrastructure and population, along with its civil protection organisations and emergency response capabilities, and then investigate the consequences for the affected population and critical infrastructure of any crisis situation or disaster event that might occur there. Using simulation technology crisis managers would thus be better able to understand interdependencies, test the different response plans and identify the possible

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consequences of their actions and decisions. Simulation technology could also be an enabling factor for bringing European crisis managers together in order to train them using realistic cross-border scenarios to cooperate with maximum efficiency for the coordinated management of all kinds of crisis situations.

Towards an EU simulation capacity?

One of the key elements of the European Commission’s proposal is the creation of a European Emergency Response Centre (ERC) on the basis of the existing Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC). This centre should serve as a platform for a more efficient EU response by collecting information on disasters, monitoring hazards, preparing scenarios and coordinating the EU’s disaster-response efforts. But why not go a step further and imagine the EU developing its own simulation capacity by creating a kind of “European CrisisManagement Planning & Training Network” that would technically and conceptually link up all European crisis-management competencies with a view to joint planning and training? The core element could be an “EU Simulation Competence Centre” which would coordinate EU-wide simulation activities. The EU would then be able to conduct its own simulation-assisted training courses and at the same time support the EU Member States in setting up their own courses. Moreover, in crisis situations the Centre could provide simulation-based forecasts on the course of disasters and evaluate the possible countermeasures at EU level.

Documentation European Commission Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism – COM(2011)0934] - 20.12.2011 (excerpt) “(…) Article 13: Training, lessons learnt and knowledge dissemination 1. The Commission shall carry out the following tasks in the field of training, lessons learnt and knowledge dissemination: (a) setting up a training programme and training network for civil protection and other emergency management personnel on disaster prevention, preparedness, and response (…). The programme shall include joint courses, exercises and exchange of experts system, whereby individuals may be seconded to other Member States; (b) developing guidance on Union and international civil protection training, including training on prevention, preparedness and response; (c) organising and supporting workshops, seminars and pilot projects on major aspects of prevention, preparedness and response; (d) setting up a programme of lessons learned from the interventions, exercises and trainings conducted within the framework of the Mechanism, (…) (e) stimulating and encouraging the introduction and use of new technologies for the purpose of the Mechanism.” (…)

The cyber threat is real. The challenge for the EU is to assist nations in making cyber space secure for citizens, public services and the private sector. The level of preparedness in cyber defence varies from nation to nation, a fact which does not allow an implementation of a EU-wide policy. The EU has an interest in supporting nations in developing their strategies in order to then bundle them on a European level.

Approach in line with the essentials of European societies

The Cyber Threat and European Societies

by Dr Peter Martini, Director Fraunhofer Institute (FKIE), Bonn For decades, the world of IT systems evolved as a domain in which reliability and security played no major role. Re-boot became the widely accepted approach for fixing technical problems. If re-boot does not fix the problem, we have become accustomed to re-installing the software. If re-install does not help, many people are happy that – finally – they have an argument to convince their boss, their controller or their loved one that they really need a new computer. The industry cannot be blamed for producing what the customers buy. Customers are going for applications that are fast, cheap and good. If they can only get two out of these three, they usually sacrifice “good” and go for something fast, cheap and (hopefully) still good enough. In many cases, the “enough” can be extended by auto-saving the data to a safe place … somewhere in a cloud, which allows us to re-boot and/or re-install and be up and running again in almost no time.

For many applications and for the vast majority of users, the approach sketched out here is both acceptable and desirable.

For almost the entire range of conventional IT applications, this approach used to be, is and will remain essential for innovation: a “digital playground” with creativity not limited by regulatory authorities, where security is not a major concern.

Of course, reliable IT systems, i.e. systems far beyond the digital playground, have become essential for our daily lives.

For our critical infrastructures we are still far from having solved the problems. Yet, awareness is high and in some areas considerable progress already has been achieved.

However, progress is far too slow in almost all areas of cyber security. While the “good guys” are discussing in think tanks, alliances, consortia and all flavours of public-private partnership, the “bad guys” are basically free to behave like the marauding bandits of the Middle Ages. In fact, protecting individual IT systems from cyber threats by means of a usercentric approach has a lot in common with building castles in

the Middle Ages. From then we learn that it only helps against small groups of bandits and that an appropriate feudal system is much more efficient and provides much more protection than individual fortification schemes. It has been argued that cyber security already has become a feudal system, that we have given up the user-centric approach of traditional computer security (individually operated anti-virus software and firewalls, etc.) and that we have pledged allegiance to our feudal lords Google, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon and others, who hopefully will treat us well and protect us from harm. It has been argued that it is time for the regulatory authorities to step in and protect both us vassals and the lords. There is a lot of truth in this argument. It is also true that we need both national and international activities in this context. And, of course, we need a European approach to cyber security – an approach in line with the essentials of European societies.

The tricky part on the road ahead will be to bridge the gap between the technical experts with their strong background in all the picky technical details and the “policymakers” with their strong background in general aspects of strategic security policy. Today, we see far too many separate communities.

Professor Peter Martini is Director of the Fraunhofer Institute for Communication, Information Processing and Ergonomics (FKIE). After obtaining a degree in Computer Science in 1986, he spent four years as a research fellow at the Institute for Computer Science of the Technical University of Aachen, where he finished his PhD in 1988. In 1990 he was appointed Professor of Applied Computer Science at the University of Paderborn. Since 1996 he has been Professor of Computer Science and Head, Institute of Computer Science IV at the University of Bonn.

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Photo: Ministry of the Interior, North Rhine-Westfalia

The EU’s Cyber Security Policy

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Incidents and attacks are on the rise.

The EU Cyber Strategy and the way ahead

by Zoran Stančič, Dep. Director General, DG CONNECT, European Commission, Brussels Every day, people worldwide rely on digital technologies and on the Internet for any kind of activity, spanning from communication to healthcare and banking. Business in virtually all sectors and governments also rely on digital networks and infrastructure to provide their essential services. Growing cybersecurity risks and higher vulnerability of networks and systems may hinder the benefits we reap in terms of productivity, innovation, growth and high-quality jobs. The World Economic Forum indicated that in the next ten years there is a 10% likelihood of a major Critical Information Infrastructure breakdown, with potential economic damages of over $250 billion.

Incidents of a cross-border nature

has been Deputy Director General for the Information Society and Media (today: DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology) in the European Commission, since 2009, Brussels.

He started his professional career as a research assistant for Archaeology at the University of Ljubljana in 1994. Later he was the Head of the Spatial Information at the Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts. From 1990–2000 he was a research fellow/ visiting professor at several Universities in Europe and the U.S., before he became in 2004 State Secretary for Science at the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport in Slovenia. Thereafter until 2009 he was a Deputy Director-General in the European Commission, DG Research in Brussels.

Incidents and attacks are clearly on the rise. The majority of respondents to the public consultation on network and information security that we recently run in the EU affirmed having experienced in the past year an incident with a significant impact on their activities. Such disruptions can have direct repercussions on the EU internal market as each year 200 million Europeans (40% of all citizens) buy over the Internet and thousands of EU jobs are associated to e-commerce.

Due to global interconnectedness, cybersecurity challenges have a cross-border nature. The responsibility to ensure cybersecurity does not stop at the Member States’ or at the EU’s borders. This is a global problem which requires a global response.

Team for the EU institutions has been recently established on a stable footing. The Cybersecurity Strategy for the EU that Commission Vice-President Neelie Kroes has recently presented as a joint initiative with Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and High Representative Catherine Ashton puts forward a comprehensive vision on cybersecurity for the years to come.

The Strategy proposes a joined-up approach aimed at improving the resilience of network and information systems, stepping up the fight against cybercrime, strengthening the external EU cyber security policy and exploring synergies between the civilian and the military dimension.

Integrated risk management

Network and Information Security

Since more than ten years, the Commission has adopted policy initiatives to boost cooperation across the EU. But we believe that we need to do more. We should explore synergies and aim for an integrated risk management involving different dimensions of cybersecurity.

As public sector, it is our role to provide incentives to companies to invest more in security and to be transparent regarding threats and incidents. According to Eurostat, by January 2012, only 26% of enterprises in the EU had a formally defined ICT security policy with a plan for regular review; this share rose to over 50% among those enterprises whose principal activity was ICT. This is however not enough. Moreover, a very large majority of the respondents to our public consultation said that users are not sufficiently aware of the threat landscape.

I would like to particularly focus on the area under our remit, which is Network and Information Security. Our key priorities in this regard are to ensure risk management, enhance trust and cooperation between the public and the private sector and across borders and ultimately promote a culture of network and information security. This is why the Strategy is accompanied by a proposal for a Directive on Network and Information Security (NIS) across the EU, aimed at ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market.

Across the EU, national preparedness is not sufficient. There are still gaps in the Member States‘ capabilities and this hinders EU-level cooperation, which still involves only a limited number of Member States. Also, cooperation on cybersecurity should involve both the public and the private sector, which owns or runs most of the infrastructure.

The proposal aims at raising national NIS preparedness, by requiring the Member States to be appropriately equipped, e.g. via a well-functioning Computer Emergency Response

A comprehensive vision of cyber security Governments should lead by example and strengthen their preparedness. In the EU, a Computer Emergency Response

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Zoran Stanc̆ic̆

The EU Cyber Security Policy

Cyber world photo: ŠShutterstock #72963958 Spartak

Team and a competent authority for network and information security). National preparedness would be a pre-requisite for EU-level cooperation. The Member States‘ NIS competent authorities would also be required to cooperate with each other at EU level.

The Commission will also propose to extend to new sectors, which are vital for our economy and society, (energy, transport, banking, healthcare, key Internet companies) the obligations to adopt NIS risk management measures and to report significant incidents to national authorities that currently apply in the telecom sector in the EU.

What the EU Cyber Security Strategy will bring These days, more and more sectors interact with and critically depend on ICT: there is an urgent case for creating a level playing field and our public consultation confirmed this assessment. To strengthen cyber resilience and network and information security, the Strategy steps up current policy initiatives on fighting botnets; security and resilience of Industrial Control Systems; and users’ awareness. We should not forget that ensuring cybersecurity is a common responsibility.

The Strategy will help the European ICT security market to emerge. In particular, it puts forward initiatives and incentives to ensure that all players in the ICT value chain (e.g. equip-

ment manufacturers, software vendors, service providers, operators, banks, online retailers) embrace a cybersecurity culture and to foster R&D investments. R&D is a practical tool to boost our industrial policy, promote a trustworthy European ICT industry, advance the internal market and reduce European dependence on foreign technologies.

Next steps To achieve all this, Public-Private Partnerships will be further developed. International cooperation on Cybersecurity, both with key partners such as the US and within international organisations, is also one of our most important priorities. In all international activities we strive to promote fundamental rights and EU core values, including freedom of expression and access to information as well as data protection and privacy.

I am confident that the Strategy will help Europe get its own house in order and become an even more trusted partner at the international level. To achieve this, all of us governments, private sector and individuals have a role to play. This is why each contribution to this debate will be a precious stone in the process that we intend to steer in the years ahead of us. We are looking forward to your participation. This will make each and all of us more secure and in turn truly part of our growing digital society.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Documentation The new Cyber Security Strategy for the EU On 7 February 2013, the European Commission (EC), together with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, published the Communication Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace alongside a Commission proposed directive on network and information security (NIS). The proposals have been presented in a joint Press Conference by High Representative Catherine Ashton, Neelie Kroes, Vice-President of the EC in charge of the Digital Agenda and Cecilia Malmström, Member of the EC in charge of Home Affairs.

institutions, Member States or industry.

The EU vision presented in this strategy is articulated in five strategic priorities, which address the challenges highlighted above: • Achieving cyber resilience • Drastically reducing cybercrime • Developing cyberdefence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) • Develop the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity • Establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and promote core EU values

Achieving cyber resilience Cyber Security Strategy (excerpts) (…)

Context Over the last two decades, the Internet and more broadly cyberspace has had a tremendous impact on all parts of society. Our daily life, fundamental rights, social interactions and economies depend on information and communication technology working seamlessly. An open and free cyberspace has promoted political and social inclusion worldwide; it has broken down barriers between countries, communities and citizens, allowing interaction and sharing of information and ideas across the globe; it has provided a forum for freedom of expression and exercise of fundamental rights, and empowered people in their quest for democratic and more just societies - most strikingly during the Arab Spring.

For cyberspace to remain open and free, the same norms, principles and values that the EU upholds offline, should also apply online.

Fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law need to be protected in cyberspace. (…)

Strategic priorities and actions The EU should safeguard an online environment providing the highest possible freedom and security for the benefit of everyone. While acknowledging that it is predominantly the task of Member States to deal with security challenges in cyberspace, this strategy proposes specific actions that can enhance the EU’s overall performance.

These actions are both short and long term, they include a variety of policy tools7 and involve different types of actors, be it the EU

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To promote cyber resilience in the EU, both public authorities and the private sector must develop capabilities and cooperate effectively. Building on the positive results achieved via the activities carried out to date further EU action can help in particular to counter cyber risks and threats having a cross-border dimension, and contribute to a coordinated response in emergency situations. This will strongly support the good

national competent authorities for NIS; set up a well functioning CERT; and adopt a national NIS strategy and a national NIS cooperation plan. Capacity building and coordination also concern the EU institutions: a Computer Emergency Response Team responsible for the security of the IT systems of the EU institutions, agencies and bodies (“CERT-EU”) was permanently established in 2012.

• set up coordinated prevention, detection, mitigation and response mechanisms, enabling information sharing and mutual assistance amongst the national NIS competent authorities. National NIS competent authorities will be asked to ensure appropriate EU wide cooperation, notably on the basis of a Union NIS cooperation plan, designed to respond to cyber incidents with cross-border dimension. This cooperation will also build upon the progress made in the context of the “European Forum for Member States (EFMS)”, which has held productive discussions and exchanges on NIS public policy and can be integrated in the cooper-

“For cyberspace to remain open and free, the same norms, principles and values that the EU upholds offline, should also apply online. Fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law need to be protected in cyberspace. The EU works with its international partners as well as civil society and the private sector to promote these rights globally.”

Catherine Ashton at the press conference on 7 February 2013

functioning of the internal market and boost the internal security of the EU. Europe will remain vulnerable without a substantial effort to enhance public and private capacities, resources and processes to prevent, detect and handle cyber security incidents. This is why the Commission has developed a policy on Network and Information Security (NIS). (…)

This strategy is accompanied by a proposal for legislation to notably: • establish common minimum requirements for NIS at national level which would oblige Member States to: designate

ation mechanism once in place.

• improve preparedness and engagement of the private sector. Since the large majority of network and information systems are privately owned and operated, improving engagement with the private sector to foster cybersecurity is crucial. The private sector should develop, at technical level, its own cyber resilience capacities and share best practices across sectors. The tools developed by industry to respond to incidents, identify causes and conduct forensic investigations should also benefit the public sector. > For the relevant documents: http://tinyurl.com/ap22e6g

The EU Cyber Security Policy

The EU’s responsibility for cyber security

Does the EU Cyber Strategy really meet up to expectations?

Interview with Christoph Raab, General Manager European Security Round Table (ESRT), Brussels The European: You organised and chaired an ESRT cyber conference in Brussels with 230 specialists only a few days before the release of a Commission Communication on cyber strategy.

Today it was published. Does this paper meet the expectations of the conference participants?

Christoph Raab: The European Security Round Table (ESRT) works with a broad range of actors. Indeed, we had representatives from some 35 countries from all over the world at our conference. Hence, from one participant to another, expectations were very different.

The European: And where does the difference lie?

Christoph Raab: For example members of the private sector have to cope with a heterogeneous cyber security landscape in Europe. In order to address this shortfall, standards should be more homogeneous, and clearer crisis response procedures should be developed. For instance, a “112-type” number could be implemented for private actors to report cyber security threats and incidents. On the other hand in the public sector national procedures function well even though the biggest capacities are concentrated in the larger Member States. In this case, the challenge lies in developing well-functioning procedures across EU Member States as well as internationally.

It seems that the Cyber Security strategy will provide progress in that sense, in particular with the proposed Directive on Network and Information Security (NIS).

The European: As far as the NIS proposal is concerned, do you believe that really efficient cooperation between public sector players is possible?

Christoph Raab: If the proposed NIS directive contributes to more equal standards, procedures and leads towards a more common understanding of what’s needed, then yes. Nonetheless, one must not underestimate issues linked to rivalries among institutions at all levels including nationally, at EU level but also between civilian and military institutions. Progress will undoubtedly be slow and a step by step process; expectations are not to be too high.

The European: Do you think the application of the new Strategy will help Europe to get rid of the mistrust of other big players with respect to its security standards?

Christoph Raab: First of all I wouldn’t call it mistrust but rather low expectations with regards to cross-country capabilities for crisis management. Consequently, proper “risk management“and intelligent procedures are needed to enhance cooperation between private and public sectors.

Notwithstanding, the private sector is often seen as the first line of defence against cyber threats because through its telecommunication databases it has a large overview of the cyber network. However, one cannot expect these private actors to bear all the risks and responsibility linked to cyber security.

The European: If I understand well, a well-adapted framework for cyber security in Europe could emerge if properly implemented?

Christoph Raab: In turn this would enhance the EU’s position as a global cyber security actor by setting standards.

The Interview was led by Hartmut Bühl

Joint press conference on the adoption of the EU Cyber Security Strategy, Brussels, 7 February 2013. From left to right: Neelie Kroes, Catherine Ashton and Cecilia Malmström. photo: European Commission (Audiovisual Service)

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Role to be played by the European Parliament

The European Cyber Security Environment

by Monika Hohlmeier MEP, European Parliament, EP Rapporteur for the Directive on attacks against information systems, Brussels/Strasbourg Cyber security is high on the European policy agenda and recent attacks against governments, industry and business have brought home the need for action to prevent and react appropriately to potentially dangerous attacks. Although discussions have flourished only recently, cyber crime is a phenomenon that has been known for quite some time. While formerly it was mainly a matter of espionage or attacks against large infrastructure or financial institutions, today’s mass of internet users and the wide range of applications such as mobile apps have made for a much broader criminal market which also threatens our citizens and small and medium enterprises in the EU.

Criminal networks on a global scale One of the most serious and disturbing crimes disseminated via the internet is child sexual exploitation. Criminals operate in networks on a global scale for the production of child abuse images and their online dissemination. To cover their activities, these groups do not operate on the surface internet but in parts that cannot be discovered by ordinary means. If we see the internet to be like an ocean, search engines work like a trawler searching for information close to the surface of the sea, while criminal activities often take place in the deep waters of the internet where they are hard to detect. The deep net is not criminal per se, but in view of its use by criminals as a means to cover their activities, it does harbour a particular risk.

Cross-border information exchange is crucial The tracking down of a criminal network therefore often starts not online, but offline. In the case of an operation named “Sunflower” which took place last year in the United States, investigators were able to identify the offender on the basis of a particular road sign visible in the background of a photo.

Within only a few days the offender could be arrested and the victim, an 11 year-old girl, saved. Operation Sunflower also led to the arrest of more than 250 paedophiles and to more than 100 minors being saved from further abuse. To uncover these networks and identify their elements, cross-border cooperation and the fast exchange of information are crucial. In 2011, the Danish police were able to secure the arrest of more than 122 persons in over 22 European countries in connection with child pornography offences; more than 9 000 hours of video were seized. The seized material enabled the identification of more paedophiles and victims. Given the nature of this crime, lengthy investigations must be conducted before arrests can

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take place, which implies personnel-intensive groundwork. It is crucial for such arrests to take place simultaneously, often in more than 20 countries; hence the human and technical resources needed to fight child pornography are huge.

Europol offers important know-how and expertise Cases like this show how important it is to have swift and decisive cooperation between law enforcement agencies. Of major importance for European police forces is the European Police Agency (Europol), which allows investigators to work in common surroundings with colleagues from all over Europe, enabling investigation findings and information to be exchanged without lengthy administrative procedures. Europol has built up extensive know-how and expertise in the area of cyber crime in particular: the decision to further strengthen the efforts to fight cyber crime by establishing the EU Cybercrime Centre (EC3) at Europol was therefore a judicious one.

The EC3 kick-off in January was an important step in the right direction. The EC3 has at its disposal excellent knowledge and leadership in the investigative and technical fields. However, judging by the resources of the centre, criminals would probably still choose the EU over, for example, the US. Europol’s budget was around € 90 million in 2011, but shrank in 2012 to € 85 million. In 2013 the Agency will again get only € 85 million whilst having to manage the new EC3 on top of its regular tasks, which include the fight against organised crime, e.g. trafficking in human beings.

In order to handle this new task (Europol) has had to restructure internally and to shift priorities. But shifting priorities means that requests from Member States for investigative support have to be turned down. For a relatively young agency – Europol has been up and running since 1999 – it is crucial to effectively perform its core duties in order to command respect and be viewed as a serious partner for the European police forces. This puts huge pressure on the Agency to fulfil its tasks in order to avoid being perceived as a mere PR campaign.

The EC3 needs political credibility Agencies are usually a subsidiary of the relevant Directorate General of the European Commission. Europol is accountable to DG Home and its Commissioner is Cecilia Malmström. DG Home has identified five main functions that the centre needs to fulfil in the coming year – data fusion, operations, strategy, R&D and training, and outreach – in order to become a force to be reckoned with. The timing is tight and regarded by many as

The EU Cyber Security Policy

hard to achieve since the necessary resources are lacking. As the supervisory authority, DG Home also bears the political responsibility for the EC3; hence any shortcomings on the part of the newly inaugurated agency would weigh heavily on the Commissioner’s record. One could of course argue that in the current difficult financial environment concessions are necessary; however, a closer look at the losses that could be prevented through broader support from Europol prove differently. Economic crimes like VAT or credit card fraud, smuggling or digital market losses cost more than € 100 billion per year – which is close to the EU’s overall budget – not to mention the risk of citizens and customers losing their trust in an open and secure Internet. A reduction of those figures would easily make up for the cost of an improved commitment to Europol and the EC3. If one conjures up, on the one hand, the picture of hundreds of field-agents scrutinising every acre of European farms to check whether subsidies are being paid correctly, one might be inclined to be sceptical about the Commission’s priorities when one knows, on the other hand, that the EU’s most important agency for internal security is short-staffed.

As a direct consequence of this lack of resources, Europol and the EC3 have to turn down requests from Member States. In most cases, the number of identified criminals is simply too high for all of them to be tracked down and arrested with the means available. Investigators literally have to choose between criminals in order to arrest those deemed to be the worst, with severe consequences in terms of rising crime statistics. Europe’s investigators and the public at large will only accept the EC3 as a fully-fledged partner if it is up to dealing with the threats facing Europe. Even though the EC3 team is composed of specialists and experts in the field, the sheer volume of work makes it extremely difficult to face up to this challenge.

Monika Hohlmeier MEP has been a Member of the European Parliament since July 2009. She is a Member of the Committee on Budgets and of the Special Committee on Organised Crime, Corruption and Money-Laundering. She is also a Substitute Member of the Committee on Budgetary Control and of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Furthermore she is a Member of the Delegation for relations with the People’s Republic of China, and a Substitute Member for the Delegation for relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council. Before becoming a MEP, she was Member of the Bavarian Parliament from 1990-2008, and has been State Secretary of the Bavarian State Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs (1992-1998), and Minister of State of the Bavarian State Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs (1998-2005). She is a Member of the Board of the regional CSU Upper Franconia since 2009.

cant number of computers by infecting them with malicious software through targeted cyber attacks in order to further launch, for example, a Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS). Information security is crucial for the EU’s economy, which could be harmed by the disruption of information and communication systems or other data networks and the loss or alteration of commercially important confidential information.

The European Parliament has obtained important clarifications and definitions in this directive. Furthermore the LIBE Committee fought successfully for the addition of important provisions on identity theft and on the reporting of threats of cyber attacks and the related vulnerability of information systems in a way that encourages Member States to facilitate legal detection and the reporting of security gaps, as well as to improve the protection of their own critical infrastructure.

The EP will scrutinise the Strategy A Directive to counter large-scale attacks But what other developments are to be expected? The first step will be to streamline the definition of a cyber attack and of the minimum penalties that should be applied by Member States for attacks on information systems, especially those with connections to organised crime. This is crucial in order to protect critical infrastructure in the EU and create a healthy environment for users and businesses; it will be achieved by means of the directive on attacks on information systems currently being negotiated and that is soon to be adopted by the European Parliament’s Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs.

The need for such a directive became apparent in light of the increased risk of large-scale attacks by highly sophisticated means such as botnets, which can endanger the proper provision of public and private security by the state. A botnet can be defined as the act of establishing remote control over a signifi-

In addition to this report, the Commission has presented the European Cybersecurity Strategy and a Directive on Network and Information Security on 7 February 2013. This joint report is expected to receive close attention from the Brussels policymakers. The EP will most certainly scrutinise the paper from various angles, for cyber security is without a doubt a multidisciplinary subject with major implications in terms not only of legal and internal affairs but also the internal market, trade, consumer protection and external relations. The EP will therefore most certainly continue its well-balanced approach to this issue.

View to numerous initiatives and proposals in the field of cyber security, the importance of an appropriate institutional response is evident. It remains to be seen whether all the players concerned, including the Commission, will make the necessary efforts to implement the initiatives in order to improve security in the EU’s cyberspace.

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The concern is the private sector

A plea for an EU Industry Cyber Defence Strategy

by Arne Schönbohm, President of the Cyber Security Council, German Munich/Berlin When examining the economic landscape in Europe one fact can hardly be denied: the economic situation could hardly be more diverse. Whilst Member States, such as Greece or Spain, are struggling with restructuring their economy due to the ongoing debt crisis, others like Germany seemed for a long time to remain unaffected by the economic turbulence. Alongside the persistent crisis there are other threats to the European economy.

Since the EU is one of the most innovative regions in the world it is also exposed to corporate espionage – nowadays mostly undertaken via the internet. Companies operate in their country but also across EU borders and on an international scale. Mutual interdependence is not only a gain, but also a threat to data security.

Arne Schönbohm has been Chief Executive Officer of BSS BuCET Shared Services AG since December 2008. He was born in 1969 in Hamburg, and studied “International Management” in Dortmund, London and Taipei. Before taking up his current post, he worked for EADS (19952008), lastly as Vice President of Commercial and Defense Solution. He is also an expert on security and consultant for various political decision makers at federal as well as state level. He is the president of the Cyber Security Council Germany and also author of numerous publications, such as of the book “Germany’s Security – Cyber Crime and Cyber War”, vol. 2 of the book series “Germany’s Security”.

Standards in cyber security are a must

Plea for an industry-aligned solution

Thus, in order to secure our innovative potential and to lay the foundation for future prosperity it is essential to implement minimum standards for cyber security in the area of prevention, resilience, reaction and international cooperation at EU level. Whereas various countries (such as the UK or Germany) have already adopted a cyber defence strategy, other Member States (MS) are still working on it. So how can an EU-wide policy be implemented if several states are still lagging behind while others are rushing ahead? In this regard it is a vital necessity to induce all MS to develop national cyber strategies. As a matter of fact, nowadays the EU can hardly react to online threats, since internal structures within the smaller MS are still insufficiently developed. It is becoming clear that in addition to the national cyber strategies, there is a need also for cyber strategies at the supranational and regional, as well as on the industrial levels.

I consider the second to be the more promising solution, especially if we look upon the EU as an economic union in which added value and prosperity depend on economic development. Since the EU can be considered as an information society, it is essential to secure information, ideas and as a consequence future prosperity. This is particularly true of small and medium-sized enterprises that are mostly lacking efficient and gapless IT security whilst being the centre of (cyber) attention. Given this plea for an EU industry cyber defence strategy it should be conceived rather as a form of assistance and no more. However, a general framework for an industry cyber security needs to be put into place.

Strategies for creating a common cyber defence This can be approached in two different ways. The first solution implies a top-down-approach, whereby regional industry cyber defence strategies are an aggregation of particular interests of MS, which are then again bundled at EU level into a common cyber defence strategy.

The second solution requires a division into industrial branches in order to conduct a risk assessment, so as to identify highly vulnerable economic sectors or those with the most sensitive data (e.g. aerospace, high technology or nuclear energy). Once these branches have been identified it must be clarified which infrastructures it takes to secure them.

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Arne Schönbohm

Essential steps: raising awareness...

On the contrary: companies should not be forced to reveal their IT security incidents; instead the EU should backspace on its supportive function and conduct awareness-raising campaigns. The lack of awareness stands in contrast to the relevance of a cyber security strategy for service societies like Europe: we are not a workbench for industry: we are its source of inspiration. In order to organise knowledge and structure modes of production we need a secure communica- tions infrastructure – which is simply not enforceable without a common industry cyber defence strategy.

...and defining common standards Some progress can already be observed at EU level. Just recently, at the beginning of 2013, the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) was launched. Its task is to support the efforts of

The EU Cyber Security Policy

Member States in preventing and dismantling cyber crime. The centre is tasked with developing common standards for reporting cyber crime, since it is still ill defined who can be approached in the event of a cyber crime incident being detected – this applies especially to companies. For this purpose distinct regulations are needed. The newly created centre should therefore not only engage in investigation, but also be responsible for transnational relations and cooperation.

All stakeholders need to be involved In my opinion the approach should be conceived as a bottomup model. A shining example of such an approach is the Cyber Security Council Germany, a politically neutral association whose objective is to advise companies, authorities and political decision-makers in the field of cyber security. Its members are federal states as well as municipalities, representatives of big and medium-sized companies, operators of critical infrastructure, but also political decision-makers or experts on cyber security. By bringing these stakeholders together and giving them an opportunity for mutual exchanges of experience, the association lays the foundation for a network that will help in shaping the future German cyber strategy – and, by implication, an industry cyber defence strategy too. I am convinced that by approaching the issue from the bottom up, our work will yield fruit. And once national strategies are established they can be bundled on a broader EU level. Only if all stakeholders of a cyber security strategy get the possibility to work together and determine requirements, can the outline for cyber security be holistic.

Bring national strategies and legacy to the EU level The same should then be done at the EU level: since an EU industry cyber defence strategy concerns both policymakers and the industry, all stakeholders need to be included in the process of creating such a common policy. Since private companies provide public services such as transport, energy or health, without their technological know-how risks could not be identified adequately and solutions would not be sufficient.

Hence, their inclusion is crucial for public safety. An attempt to develop an EU-wide industry cyber defence strategy should thus be based on elaborated national strategies. The approach should be open, bottom-up and inclusive, and comprise national security, maintaining economic power and securing private propert. Hence the EU must provide the right basic conditions so that networks can prosper and connections can intensify. A purposeful EU-wide strategy for industry cyber defence cannot be created by bureaucrats; rather it calls for experts that can track the current developments, and it needs the cooperation of all parties involved. There can be neither economic prosperity nor personal freedom if we do not achieve security.

News: Global Cyber Security Conference On 30 January 2013 the European Security Round Table (ESRT) held its Global Cyber Security Conference, organised in cooperation with the Estonian Ministry of Defence. The Irish EU Presidency was associated with this event. The Global Cyber Security Conference is the third major event to be organised by the ESRT as part of its Cyber Security Cycle.

At the Residence Palace in Brussels, around 230 major stakeholders from the cyber space community discussed a wide range of topical issues facing the global cyber space sector. There were speakers and participants from over 40 countries, including the US, Japan, Korea and India.

In his opening keynote speech, Estonian Minister of Defence Urmas Reinsalu made a special plea for deeper cooperation between the EU and NATO in the field of cyber defence. European Commission Vice-President Neelie Kroes later gave an overview of the key issues to be addressed in the European Cyber Security Strategy, which she said would propose a “comprehensive approach plus cooperation between the countries of the EU and between the public and private sectors”.

Other keynote speakers were the Deputy Secretary General of the European External Action

Service, Maciej Popowski, and Craig Mundie from Microsoft, who provided, respectively, the foreign policy and the private sector perspectives.

The participants in the panel sessions, representing the EU institutions, international organisations, research organisations and the private sector, further discussed their different perceptions of cyber security worldwide and the measures for building trust among governments and institutions.

Smaller policy sessions addressed specific topics such as global governance Models for Cloud Security, the relationship between cyber crime and society, capacity building and the question of how far cyber security issues should be regulated or left to market solutions.

The following day, key experts from EU and Member State CERTs, NATO and the private sector met during a side workshop at the representation of Estonia to the EU to discuss ways and means of improving the crisis-management mechanisms among the EU institutions, NATO and the private sector for dealing with cyber security incidents.

www.security-round-table.eu

Vice-President, Neelie Kroes, speaking at the Global Cyber Security Conference Photo:ESRT

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Partnering for Cyber Resilience

Cyber Security Enables Resilience

by Maurice Cashman, Senior Security Architect, McAfee, Munich The Internet has created enormous possibilities as well as some unique challenges for governments. The explosion of cyber capability has established dependencies and interdependencies that are outside of the traditional control boundaries. Military operations are increasingly dependent on IT systems for command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Those systems are interconnected and could be vulnerable to cyber attack vectors. Military operations depend on how well those systems are protected against malicious cyber activity. This scenario is especially true for critical national infrastructure where interdependencies extend across national boundaries.

New dissemination of power Combined with easy access to cyber capability, the Internet has also caused an inversion of power, allowing extremist, criminal or activist forces to have a greater disruptive impact on government services and influence in regional conflicts with little or no traditional military forces. In cyber space, these adversaries have several advantages over conventional forces. They have freedom of movement without respect to international borders, the ability to strike without warning or possibility of detection, a mobile infrastructure that can be built up or torn down in minutes, and a global delivery platform in the Internet that provides anonymity and countless resources.

Maurice Cashman Director, Security Architecture and Strategy, EMEA Public Sector, Munich After eight years of US Army Signal Officer, he earned his Bachelors of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 1992 He has over 15 years of technical and managerial experience in Computer Network Defense and Information Assurance experience providing enterprise system and network security solutions for large central government customers. Notable assignments among others had been 2009-2012 Senior Architect for McAfee Global Public Sector. Before he served as a technical and strategic architect for integration of system security solutions across the US Department of Defense after having been a lead architect for a European Security Operations Center for the US Department of Defense.

system that prevents all attacks. It depends on an ecosystem of internal and external support to survive. Establishing resilience requires cyber security. It is an essential part to resilient and survivable systems. Any cyber security architecture framework must have the control to resist failure but more importantly enable the rapid adoption of new capabilities, the rapid integration of new support systems and equally important, rapid response to a new threat.

Gaining cyber information superiority Resilient services depend on cyber security In the face of these challenges, governments are charged with establishing resilience in the critical services of the nation and the military. Resilience is not about building an impenetrable wall of security. Resilience is about survivability. Government services and military operations require agility to both adopt new enabling technology or to rapidly add capability in response to a new threat. By definition, a resilient system is one that resists failure and withstands stress. It is not a perfect

Concerning resilience, speed is an essential ally. How fast can we find, contain and fix a security breach? How fast can we acquire and integrate new capability to maintain advantage?

Information superiority means having the relevant intelligence to anticipate an adversary’s action or understand friendly force situations. Speed of action directly impacts the survivability of the system or service. Operating at the speed of the network starts with the understanding that cyber security is a continuous process. The pace of cyber operations is 24/7. Consistent

News: Partnering for Cyber Resilience initiative (The E/Ak) Launched at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos in 2012, the Partnering for Cyber Resilience initiative seeks to aggregate a multi-industry and public-private community of companies and governments supporting a common set of principles to guide leaders in their duty to ensure the resilience of their organisations and with the

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public sector, for society as a whole. The ability to provide a trusted environment for individuals and business to interact online is a critical enabler for innovation and growth.

Therefore, and in response to the growing threats and risks in a digitally interconnected world, over 70 companies and government bodies across 15 sectors and 25 countries

have joined forces to create the Partnering for Cyber Resilience initiative. The leaders of these organisations have signed a set of Principles to demonstrate their commitment to an integrated, strategic approach to technology risks and opportunities, and to providing a resilient digital environment for all.

The EU Cyber Security Policy

monitoring is the new normal and requires automation and standardisation. Speed of decision requires intelligence and, what is more, the fusion of global, local and community of interest intelligence at the right point to decide at the speed of the network.

Knowledge of the attackers’ tactics, techniques and procedures is necessary in order to defend systems and disrupt attacker operations.

To ensure rapid reporting, it is essential that enterprise and national CERT stakeholders establish a connection through such efforts as regular preparedness exercises or governmentsponsored coordination meetings. To ensure consistent reporting and speed of decision, standards of information exchange must be established that utilise machine-to-machine collection capability.

Creating confidence internationally Preparedness is the key to a resilience strategy Cyber readiness requires having the information, the relationships and the communication channels established, so when a breach occurs you are able to quickly comprehend the extent and contain the damage. In a crisis situation, the ability to rapidly and accurately assess the situation is the key to decisive action. In a cyber crisis or incident, it is no different.

Ensuring rapid response to a breach of cyber security is the final pillar of the resilience strategy. Government organisations must have the visibility and procedures to detect malicious cyber activity. Once identified and confirmed, pre-planned reporting and tailored response actions should go into effect.

The cyber landscape is changing quickly. Building resilience in our own systems provides confidence in government systems and services. But today we operate across borders in the economic, military, law-enforcement and so many other sectors that we have to build that trust internationally. Cyber security is essential to building resilient services but we can’t afford to operate in a vacuum nor to operate at the speed of paper. Our interdependency – from energy, to commerce to military – requires cyber security to be a top priority in the command centre, in the boardroom and in the legislature. As an international community, we must demonstrate unity of effort.

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Cyber age capabilities

Secure information superiority

by Volker Smid, General Manager and Vice-President, Hewlett Packard, Böblingen Information Superiority is critical for mission success, in business as well as in security and defence. The topic is universal by nature, with implications for all of us. Securing better information is a strategic issue and consequently requires strategic partnerships with the IT industry.

Effective decision-making Achieving superiority in terms of the secure information needed for effective decision-making is a key challenge. In the security and defence sector and in all organisations, the driving factors for ensuring the security of information and secure access to whatever data are needed are cost, massive data pools and limited utilisation. All this must be managed in a dynamic environment involving different mobile devices, split locations, inconsistent command and control elements and the need for synchronisation in order to create a single picture of the truth.

In most organisations there are still organisational factors that stand in the way of achieving the required information superiority: siloed structures in IT, low levels of interoperability and information exchange, a lack of discipline or governance. The present ROI is low and the cost of maintaining the status quo is still cutting deep into innovation – freeing up funds for the necessary investment is one of the hardest decisions facing management. The requirements that constitute the biggest challenges for achieving secure information around the globe are not only near real-time decision support and integration of knowledge islands, but also the ability for joint action beyond core activities alone.

That leads to a set of capabilities that the industry must provide: information management & analytics, secure infrastructure, cyber defence and situational awareness.

The data explosion Today the explosion in the volume of data from new sources is challenging the traditional methods for analysing and using information. Human information – in the form, for example, of emails, audio, video, social networks and blogs – accounts for about 85% of all data and is increasing at a rate of more than 60% per year. Moreover these are all “unstructured data”! Only the remaining 15% of information is contained in structured databases. The following examples show possible solutions. 1.

Pharmaceutical research is a very time-consuming, complex and costly process. HP’s “Meaning Based Computing” protects this business through an analysis of the digital world around it: it considers not only who is working on a given active ingredient and/or formula, also everything that has been published on

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the subject, the ongoing discussions within the scientific community and the links with other subject areas. By applying “Meaning Based Computing“ via the HP Platform “IDOL” (Intelligent Data Operation Layer), both structured and unstructured data can be automated and integrated.

2. In the public sector it is clearly necessary to deliver the best possible information to the right person at the right time.

Information Superiority for right decisions These capabilities are available with the HP “Crisis Fusion Operations Centre”, providing decision-makers within governments and national security agencies with the right information: the US Department of Justice employs much the same technology to help fuse and integrate numerous data sources in order to better understand the totality of collected data. One of the contemporary additions to the HP “Crisis Fusion Technology” is the HP “Social Media Analysis and Lawful Monitoring” system, based on world-leading fixed, mobile and cloud solutions used both at home and abroad by national security organisations under stringent security conditions.

The US Army employs transportable secure cloud technology in Performance Optimized Data centres (PODS) to allow fast and scalable deployments of military information systems for all military and/or civil contingencies. “PODs” are also used by big enterprises for high-performance computing; at Airbus Industries, for example, they are used to speed up the design and construction engineering processes for new aircraft.

Cyber threats are a reality Achieving secure information superiority is a strategic challenge that requires strategic partnerships, bearing in mind that information superiority is in a state of constant evolution and that it is closely interlinked with the overall security concept.

By making use of proven industrial solutions and collaborating with a trusted partner within the IT industry, government authorities and security and defence organisations can meet their requirements faster – and more securely.

Volker Smid President Hewlett-Packard, Germany. Born in 1960, he joined HP in 2009 .

He was before the CEO of Prompt Medical Systems. Later he joined Parametric Technology corporation (PTC) where became president of Novell for the EMEA Region. Volker Smid is Vice President of the executive committee at BITKOM.

The EU Cyber Security Policy

The need for a free and open, but also safe, internet

The EUROPEAN CYBERCRIME CENTRE (EC3)

by Troels Oerting, Head of the EC3, The Hague The world is going online. In the EU we are 72% wired, compared to a global average of 34%. We spend a lot of time online. We engage in social networks, blogs and discussion groups; we buy increasingly more commodities and services online; we communicate with our municipality online; we visit the library and conduct bank business online, and we store our most sensitive and personal information – like diaries, agendas, mails, letters, photos, copies of contracts – online: in fact, we live our lives online.

The world is going online Business, academia and industry – the “engine” for economic recovery and growth in the EU – also depend to a high degree on cyberspace. This crucial engine uses cyberspace to invent, brand, innovate, optimise and drive new economic possibilities. We have adapted to this new cyber world faster than most other regions in our global village. And we haven’t seen anything yet: the developments in cyberspace will surprise most of us. The rapid speed of development is often beyond imagination and we will be even more connected in the future. Our homes, cars, boats and pacemakers will soon be online and interact with us through cyberspace. Mobile banking via smart phones will replace credit cards and the Cloud will replace your normal C-drive. We have been fighting our wars on land, at sea, and later in the air and in space – now the next battles and covert actions will take place in cyberspace: we have already seen the preparations. As always, good inventions and progress will eventually be misused by criminals operating as individuals, in groups, in loose networks, or in the form of organised criminal entities.

The threat is real …

Criminals have already explored and exploited cyberspace for their illegal operations and will continue to do so, either in the form of “real” cybercrime, or of crimes for which the Internet is a facilitator – for example, the sexual exploitation of children.

The latter involves the rape of innocent infants and children offline, but the criminals use the Internet to share these aggravated crimes. And the latest “invention” in this field is the Internet-streamed online rape of children to anyone who will pay! But the risk also of being a victim of identity theft in cyberspace is imminent. Imagine that you are accused of something you never did. Or that someone is acting in your name: committing crime, or emptying your credit card, bank or Paypal account. We see a lot of dedicated malware attacks that block and encrypt innocent people's computers, and where you might – but only might – be released again after paying a

Troels Oerting is Assistant Director, Head of European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and Head of Counter Terrorist and Financial Intelligence Centre (CTFC). Before joining Europol, he was amongst others Commander of the Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) in Denmark and Assistant Commissioner of the Danish Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Prior to his current position, Mr. Oerting was Assistant Director of the Operations Department at Europol. In addition, he is external lecturer and assessor on Danish higher police management education for senior police officers and prosecutors.

“ransom fee”. The powerful new smart phones have more computer power than the computer used by NASA to land a man on the Moon: we will use them more and more to interact with our friends, social networks, payment systems and even our doctors. Soon we will at all times, in some form, be online.

… but cyberspace offers new possibilities The risk of losing control of all this vital information presents a “clear and present danger” to our whole existence, either as individuals or as businesses/NGOs. For criminal groups it is much easier to steal, rob, intimidate and blackmail individuals, companies or governments through cyberspace than in the physical world. The criminal “value-chain” is much shorter than in offline crime. And nobody should believe that developments in cyberspace are going to slow down. The magnificent new possibilities are also, in most respects, good for our democracies, for our knowledge-based economy and for global transparency. But the threat to all of us – either as individuals or as part of a public or private business – is unfortunately very real.

We still have severe crime in the offline world, but in addition to “normal” crimes, law enforcement agencies at EU and global level will now have to add cybercrime to their portfolio. On top of everything else – the fight against organised crime, terror, drugs, trafficking in human beings, financial crime and illegal immigration – they will have to engage in crime fighting in a cyber world, a fight for which most law enforcement and prosecution authorities are rather unprepared.

What makes the real difference Is cybercrime different from “normal” crime, and if so, why?

Firstly, it is indeed different, for the following reasons: there is no geographic link between the perpetrator and the crime. In “normal” crime, criminals have in some form or other to be

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physically present to conduct a homicide, robbery, theft or rape, but not in cyberspace. Criminals can perpetrate their crime from a basement in any country against, for example, a person, company or government in their own or any other country, or even in many countries at the same time! Secondly, it is very easy to hide in cyberspace. The technical possibilities in terms of the advanced software developed to hide or blur identities are numerous and easily available, often for free. The Cloud will eliminate the possibility of law enforcement authorities seizing evidence on hard drives and locally stored servers for forensic examination and criminals will use Cloud providers located in weak or failed states, or in states not easy to cooperate with; the bigger criminal networks will establish their own “bullet-proof” Cloud services with no governance, and no trace.

Thirdly, the growth of cybercrime will continue rapidly. When regions like Africa, South America and Asia go more “online”, rising above the present Internet penetration rate of 13 %, (Africa), Europe and other “rich” regions will become victims of massive cybercrime from criminal groups established in these regions. And as described above, the criminals do not need to leave their home country in these regions to commit crime.

They can do it all over the world from their “bedrooms” covered by VPN, Cloud, proxies and Onion routers.

Broad support from inside and outside In response to the above threat the EU Commission recently proposed to establish a European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) in Europol, a decision later approved by both the European Parliament and Council. EC3 formally opened its doors on 11 January 2013; it will reach cruising speed and be delivering its services in all fields in two years’ time. The start is modest, with around 50 experts, with all support functions being delivered by the Europol staff consisting of more than 800 experts. EU Member States’ law enforcement communities have reacted very positively to EC3. The willingness to cooperate, to provide live information, to engage in joint investigations and to second experts have been beyond our expectations. The same positive approach applies when it comes to support and assistance from our skilled colleagues in ENISA, Eurojust and Cepol. They have contributed to the establishment of EC3, provided insight and advice and will continue to do so. And from day one of the establishment of EC3 we have been in close contact with our friends and colleagues at Interpol, who are in the process of building a global cyber centre in Singapore. We have agreed to include our respective managements in the two Centre’s advisory bodies in order to complement, coordinate and share – not compete. The interest in assisting EC3 has not been limited to official agencies. There has been a huge amount of interest from industry, academia and NGOs and the road towards a close and transparent private-public partnership has been mapped out. This partnership needs to be developed in an open way that benefits both sides. EC3 will become an important EU platform for awareness, prevention, protection and disruption. It is the first entity on the globe of

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its kind, including coordination of all relevant cyber initiatives covering the broader cyber security aspects and the EU strategy in this field. EC3 will help place the focus back on the perpetrators, the criminals. We cannot just “tech” or “protect” our way out of cybercrime. Neither do we wish to live in a cyber world where normal law-abiding citizens are prevented from using cyberspace for security reasons, and the only ones with unlimited freedom to act and move are the criminals. Like in the physical world we do not want a society where we have to stay locked inside our homes after dark to avoid being robbed, raped or killed. EC3 cannot solve this huge task alone. We will be very inclusive in our approach, embracing all good initiatives and aligning them to maximise the outcome and impact of the limited resources. EC3 will help Member States and other important stakeholders to fight cyber criminals and prevent their unwelcome impact on individuals, businesses and societies by: • Creating public awareness and advice on new threats and developments and maintaining a comprehensive overview of cybercrime in the EU; • Assisting with operational, analytical and/or forensic support for live cases in Member States and beyond, primarily for investigations on the use of the Internet by criminals to steal information, identity or money, or to sexually exploit children – or pose a threat to critical infrastructure; • Developing a substantial outreach capacity to private and public partners and presenting high quality operational and strategic assessments on the development and impact of cybercrime; • Investing in capacity building, training and R&D in order to advise on the best use of EU funding to develop the necessary know-how and investigative/forensic software.

• Developing a high-level forensic support capability for Member States’ law enforcement agencies.

A huge task facing Europe The European Cybercrime Centre will also be able – if requested – to provide qualitative and quantitative professional input to EU Member States, the European Parliament and the EU Commission on developments in cybercrime as inspiration for new political initiatives and legislation. The task in front of us is huge and the stakes are high. We need to get it right on the first try. Software developers move rapidly and the criminal masterminds are fast followers. I am positive about our ability to provide real added value to our stakeholders and optimistic about the future development of EC3 and the important and necessary services this Centre can provide in this borderless cyber world where there is no geographic link between the crime and perpetrator and where crimes are easy to hide. And if the positive support from the law enforcement communities, the European Parliament and the EU Commission continues, we will also overcome this new and emerging threat. But it will require all our skills, as well as appropriate and adequate resources.

Photo: Ministry of the Interior, North Rhine-Westfalia

Organised Crime Organised crime operates at an international level and criminal organisations are increasingly working together. That rise in cooperation has forced law enforcement agencies to strengthen their own coordination.

The partnership between Interpol and the European institutions is therefore logical and of the utmost importance for the European Union’s internal and external security.

Contribution to the Union’s internal and external security

The role of INTERPOL in European Security Interview with Pierre Reuland, Special Representative of INTERPOL to the EU, Brussels and Ralph Markert, Assistant Director INTERPOL, Lyon

The European: The International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) with its 190 member countries on every continent aims to support daily cooperation between law enforcement agencies to achieve a safer world. What is Interpol?

Ralph Markert: INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organisation. Our headquarter is in Lyon, France, and we have regional offices in Africa, Asia, Central and South America.

Police use our global communications system to instantly share information with their colleagues anywhere in the world.

The European: One of your official partners in the fight against crime is the European Union. How important is the partnership with the EU? Mr Reuland, I suppose, this is your sector.

Pierre Reuland: Our partnership with the EU is of the utmost importance. This has been recognised with the creation of the post of Special Representative of INTERPOL to the EU in June 2008 and the opening of our offices in Brussels in September 2009. The partnership between the EU and INTERPOL has been highlighted in the Stockholm Programme saying that this strategy has a two-dimensional approach: internal security, where the EU stressed the need to step up collaboration and avoid duplication with INTERPOL; and external security, where the EU sees us as an important partner.

The European: How does this partnership work in practice?

Pierre Reuland: Through the Special Representative, close cooperation is fostered with each EU Council presidency and a six-month programme of joint activities from strategic to operational is discussed in detail. Then, in close cooperation with the General Secretariat of the Council, we elaborate further the role INTERPOL will play in each activity, for instance along the eight crime priorities established by the Standing Commit-

tee on Internal Security (COSI): Cybercrime, organised crime groups, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking etc.

The European: In external security, are you looking for projects of common interest with the EU External Action Service (EEAS)?

Pierre Reuland: Yes. A current examples include the extension of INTERPOL’s I-24/7 global police network to regions outside Europe through our programme for combating maritime piracy and support for INTERPOL’s global databases of stolen weapons, missing persons and unidentified bodies as well as child sexual abuse images. Another project is the Common Position from the EU Council adopted in January 2005 urging EU Member States to provide INTERPOL with information related to stolen or lost travel documents. Today, the 27 EU members provide their information into our Stolen and Lost Travel Document (SLTD) database, enabling nearly a billion searches a year of the 35 million records it contains.

The European: INTERPOL’s cooperation with the EU. How can the two organisations’ respective areas of responsibility be defined without creating double structures?

Pierre Reuland: In 2001, a cooperation agreement was signed by both organisations and since then, cooperative action and

Pierre Reuland is the Special Representative of INTERPOL to the EU, to link the EU security architecture to INTERPOL’s tools. He started his career in 1981 holding several positions in the Luxembourg Police forces. Mr. Reuland holds a master degree in Criminology of the University of Liège.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Ralph Markert is Assistant Director of the International Partnerships and Development Directorate and was appointed General Project Manager of the INTERPOL Travel Document initiative in 2011. He has been an officer with Germany’s Bundeskriminalamt for more than 25 years and joined INTERPOL in 2006.

mutual support have continued to grow in order to avoid duplicating our efforts. One clear example is the presence of liaison officers from INTERPOL at Europol and vice versa. In addition, an operational success is clearly our Maritime Piracy Task Force, with involvement of both organisations.

The European: EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström stated that INTERPOL plays an important role in European security and in the implementation of the EU´s Internal Security Strategy (ISS).

In which strategic areas is Interpol involved?

Pierre Reuland: The areas of cooperation vary enormously and are focused on the main issues highlighted in the EU’s ISS where INTERPOL brings significant added value, such as in integrated border management with tools as the SLTD database and its access by frontline officers at border control points. The INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation, currently under development in Singapore and due to open its doors in 2014, will have a Digital Crime Centre focusing on cybercrime.

The European: With which other EU institutions and agencies are you cooperating the most?

Pierre Reuland: INTERPOL has cooperation agreements which have already resulted in concrete actions and results with Europol, CEPOL and Frontex. Others are currently under development with Eurojust and the EEAS. The European: How does the communication between INTERPOL and the EU institutions work? Are there agreed regulations or “rules of engagement” for INTERPOL and EU officials?

Pierre Reuland: INTERPOL and the EU institutions communicate on three levels: strategic, tactical and in operations.

Strategic levels: INTERPOL’s strategy for the European region also embodies cooperation and communication with EU institutions. Every semester under the EU Presidency a high level meeting takes place with all major INTERPOL and EU stakeholders. INTERPOL invites EU to participate in different forums and regional conferences.

Tactical levels: INTERPOL and the EU plan strategic and operational matters through standing committees such as Working Groups on EU crime priorities (COSI) and the Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP) or EU Parliament on invitation.

Operations: INTERPOL and the EU routinely cooperate to hold joint police and customs operations against vehicle trafficking (DANUBE), trafficking in illicit goods, human smuggling etc.

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The European: Do you receive the same encouragement from the Member States and the European Parliament for joint actions between INTERPOL and the EU? Pierre Reuland: Daily communication and cooperation take place through me by direct and permanent contact with the national officials in the Permanent Representations of the 27 Member States. Regarding the Parliament, INTERPOL is regularly invited to share its expertise in fighting organised crime. The cooperation between the two organisations has already led to the development of a system to ease the identification of stolen works of art, called PYSCHE, financed by the EU. The European: Mr Markert another priority of INTERPOL is the support of law enforcement agencies.How you are organised?

Ralph Markert: In each of our 190 member countries, an INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) is fully staffed and operates on a national level which acts as the single point of contact between law enforcement in the member country and the INTERPOL General Secretariat. Each member country is connected to it and to the other member countries via INTERPOL’s secure global police communications network I-24/7 enabling instant information sharing. In addition there is access to INTERPOL’s range of global databases, e.g. those for Stolen and Lost Travel Documents, Stolen Motor Vehicles, wanted persons, fingerprints etc which can be instantly queried by the member country. Also, INTERPOL’s 24-hour Command and Coordination Centre (CCC) at the General Secretariat HQ assists international police cooperation in real time.

The European: What about notices and threat alerts?

Ralph Markert: A key activity of the CCC is the issuing of INTERPOL notices and threat alerts to allow police to share critical crime-related information with other member countries, such as information on wanted or missing persons, or potential threats.

In 2011, the CCC published more than ten thousands notices, whose majority were “Red Notices” seeking the arrest of wanted persons around the world.

The European: Let us then come to the INTERPOL Travel Document initiative. Do you have strong political support?

Ralph Markert: The INTERPOL Travel Document initiative was endorsed in late 2010. At this moment, 48 INTERPOL member countries from around the world had already officially recognised the document, granting holders a special visa status such as a visa waiver or a visa upon arrival. A further 122 INTERPOL member countries are currently in the process of recognising it.

The European: Bearing in mind that the recognition process requires coordination between numerous institutions, these figures demonstrate INTERPOL member countries’ strong support. Are there regional differences?

Organised Crime

The Travel Document Initiative Considering Recognition 56 Recognising Countries Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Armenia, Belarus, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Grenada, Guinea, Jordan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sint Maarten, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Uruguay, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

56 recognising countries, more than 90 considering recognition Photo: Interpol, Lyon

Ralph Markert: Support for the Travel Document is particularly strong across the African region, with half of the recognising member countries. Member countries in the Middle East and Asia are also very active, as most of them have either recognised or initiated the recognition process. This support will certainly grow with the establishment of the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) in Singapore in 2014.

The European: Apparently the Travel Document is not very popular within the EU? Ralph Markert: So far only France and Latvia have recognised the document. The recognition process is even more complex in the European region, as member countries also have to take into consideration EU and Schengen regulations. The recognition of international travel documents remains the prerogative of each individual member country; however, border control remains a crucial issue for the European region as a whole. We work closely with the relevant EU entities. In 2011, the EU Working Party on Frontiers/False Documents ruled that INTERPOL Travel Documents pass the stringent technical specifications outlined by the EU. Finally, the initiative was presented to the EU Travel Document Expert Group, which confirmed that only EU Member States are legally competent to both recognise travel documents and grant a special visa status to their holders, as the Schengen common visa policy is not applicable to diplomatic, official or service passport holders. Therefore, the recognition of the INTERPOL Travel Document would not only be a great opportunity for EU Member States to strengthen their security policy. The objectives of the documents are perfectly aligned with the Stockholm Programme and the Schengen rules. It is also a chance to demonstrate once again Europe’s commitment and influence in global security.

The European: The Travel Document serves INTERPOL officials carrying out official duties. Can you picture Europol officers or staff from other EU agencies one day being eligible?

Ralph Markert: Limited to INTERPOL has created the Travel Document to facilitate the international travel of ‘officials carrying out duties on INTERPOL-related matters.’ The list of eligible officials has been strictly defined to ensure the security of the document and its management; it is not strictly officials.

The European: If the Travel Document Initiative proves to be successful and gains a lot of international support, what implications could this have for INTERPOL’s work in general?

Ralph Markert: Officials carrying out duties on INTERPOL-related matters are already travelling with the documents. Officials of member countries holding the document can now attend meetings, conferences and trainings at the INTERPOL HQ in Lyon. As all crimes, such as cybercrime, drug trafficking and terrorism, have a transnational dimension and require a global response, the police today cannot afford to be one step behind. The INTERPOL Travel Document enables police to keep pace with criminals, and to be wherever and whenever they are needed. When you look at the number of INTERPOL Major Events Support Teams and Incident Response Teams, to provide assistance within the context of a disaster, a terrorist attack or an international event, it is undeniable that delays due to red tape and visa procedures – which can take up to 30 days – dramatically, impair the global police response.

The European: What are your expectations?

Ralph Markert: The development of the document in the next months and years will not only show that police and INTERPOL continue to develop innovative tools to fight transnational crime, but also that international police cooperation goes beyond political and diplomatic issues in order to protect the security of each country’s citizens and a safer world.

The European: Thank you both for this exchange of views The interview was held by Hartmut Bühl and Alexa Keinert

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Crisis management calls for the joint involvement of the civil and military sectors. This is what the Lisbon Treaty calls the “comprehensive approach”. Leaders need to be trained to cooperate in the new context. For the military, close cooperation with the civilian sector does not mean any reduction of effort in such areas as protection, mobility, firepower and sustainability. Protection of the protector is there the most critical issue.

Towards the end of the uniform

Comprehensive approach to basic officer training

by Sylvain Paile, Senior Research Fellow, European Studies Unit – University of Liège, Liège Inspired by the German principle of Innere Führung, the European Union military academies that train future military elites with a view to their first posting educate them to become “citizens in uniform”. In view of the European Union’s integrated civil-military approach to security and defence, one may well ask whether they should not also be trained to become “soldiers in suits”.

Education and training for the leaders Education and training are among the main vectors of a culture. In the security and defence area, the European Union undoubtedly promotes the comprehensive approach as a key component of its culture. However, in terms of the education and training of the young military officers who are the main CSDP players of tomorrow, the process of learning to work together at European level would appear to be at its very beginning.

During the preparation of the European initiative for the exchange of young officers – inspired by Erasmus and often referred to in the media as the “military Erasmus” – it was observed that military students were rarely familiarised with the CSDP as part of their basic curriculum. The initiative thus promoted a coordinated approach to training in this particular area and allowed the creation of a common CSDP module designed to supplement the training offered by the national institutes. The module was organised for the first time by the Portuguese Army, Navy and Air Force Academies in 2009.

Building on that success, this thematic module was again organised by Spain and Greece and now takes place on a yearly basis at the Austrian Military Academy, as an integral part of the curriculum for Austrian officers. During these one-

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week modules, cadets from different European academies and service branches experience interoperability through living and learning CSDP. The content of the CSDP module is modelled on the CSDP Orientation Course of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), which ensures the coordination of the initiative at European level. It touches upon the CSDP institutions and history, certain topical CSDP issues, partnerships and future prospects; more particularly it focuses on the study and reporting of EU missions and operations, given that participants may be called upon to take part in international deployments soon after their commissioning. For all these themes, the civilian dimension is referred to and explained: the Feira Council conclusions, the “civilian” institutions of the CSDP and the decision-making process, examples of civilian achievements in such areas as gender balance, the importance and aims of CSDP missions, civilian-military coordination on the ground, etc.

However, learning about the the civilian dimension is neither a

Sylvain Paile is a research fellow at the European Studies Unit of the University of Liege, specialised in the basic education and training of military officers in the European Union. He collaborated with the European Security and Defence College and the member states for the creation and implementation of the European initiative for the exchange of young officers, inspired by Erasmus (“military Erasmus”) and, in this framework, audits CSDP training for young European officers.

Photo: Bienert/Bundeswehr, CC by-ND 2.0, flickr

Crisis management

Crisis management

priority nor of fundamental interest for these young future officers who – more or less legitimately – consider themselves far removed from the strategic concerns of the military profession. Furthermore, their study of the comprehensive approach lacks a practical dimension in that, although they learn it, they do not “live” it: the module, in principle, is not open to civilian participation and the few civilians who have attended it had no experience of the civilian aspect of the CSDP to share with their military counterparts.

A lack of civilian-military training experience As far as basic education is concerned, a certain culture of separation prevails in the member states between civilians and military officers. Indeed, it is rare for European basic training institutions to allow civilian students to follow their curricula. Some cases exist, however. In the Bundeswehr universities in Germany, for example, civilian students and military cadets can follow the same curricula and obtain the same diploma. At the Bulgarian National Military University, civilian students may follow specifically designed curricula that are different from those of the military students. However, the title of “university” does not necessarily imply openness to civilians, since this is not true of every defence university, while there are some military academies (such as the Austrian one) and defence colleges (such as the Swedish one) that have opened their doors to civilian students. Also, military vocational training continues to be exclusive.

Furthermore there is very limited experience of co-diplomas.

The studies of certain specialised officers, such as medical officers or psychologists, may be divided between civilian and military institutions because of the availability of sufficient civilian expertise in these areas and the costs that a separate training capacity would entail. Civilian higher education institutions, in general, play a more or less important role in the academic education of an officer. Member states and their armed forces may “delegate” parts of that education to civilian institutions, for example in France, where Bachelor studies are provided through civilian curricula. Generally speaking, however, this cooperation does not properly train the cadets in the comprehensive approach to security and defence.

The EU Security and Defence colleges role In research and doctoral studies, cooperation with civilian institutions is deemed necessary in order to connect up expertise from different scientific horizons and because of the need for peer reviews. Although they may not necessarily take place in the area of security studies, these kinds of cooperation always foster an integrated approach to security and defence topics as a collateral effect. An advanced level of education, generally speaking, lends itself better to learning about comprehensiveness. In the European Union, doctoral studies form part of an officer’s advanced education, taking place after he or she has been posted and has acquired a

Documentation Speech by the German Federal Minister of Defense, Dr. Thomas de Maizière, 49th Munich Security Conference, 1 February 2013 (excerpt) “Europe’s creative power in security policy will in future depend on two factors: our capability (and I am referring to military and civilian capabilities) and our political will to shape the world together. Concerning both aspects we still need to do our homework. (…) When it comes to military capabilities, however, it is not new visions we Europeans need, but a strategy of resolute pragmatism. We should first of all prudently and quickly implement the decisions which we have already taken. (…)We do not need the vision of a joint European army on top of that, a vision which puts many people off anyway.”

certain level of professional experience, and in some cases, some experience of international operations. At the European level, such training may be provided through the courses of the ESDC, which bring together senior civilian and military experts. In the member states there are many courses on security and defence at a strategic level that also offer them the possibility to meet, exchange experiences and discuss the degree of integration of civilian and military aspects.

The current efforts at European and national level to train future military elites in this approach appear at first sight to be insufficient. However, the separation between the civilian and military worlds that still exists at strategic level is even more blatant at operational level. Although integration is not a reality in the field, it is not considered to be a priority for the training of the leader of a small and exclusively military unit.

The primary aim of the basic education and training of an officer is to transform him or her from a citizen into a military leader. Teaching him or her how to think in civilian dress is an ongoing and much-needed development.

News:

New Chairman of Dassault Aviation Since 9 January 2013, Eric Trappier is the new Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Dassault Aviation, assisted by Loïk Segalen, who became Chief Operating Officer. Mr Trappier, who previously was Executive VicePresident International, succeeded to Charles Edelstenne, who remains director of the company and joined the Audit Committee.

Eric Trappier, new Chairman and CEO of Dassault Aviation photo: © Dassault Aviation - A. Février

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The protection of crisis-management forces is essential

Protection for the protectors…

by Pietro Borgo, Member of the Executive Board of Rheinmetall Defence and Chairman of the Executive Board of Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles (RMMV), Düsseldorf and Munich It would not be inaccurate to say that the armed forces of the countries participating in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were inadequately prepared for the threat posed by the Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that quickly emerged as the weapon of choice for local insurgent forces.

The approach to a solution The initial “off-the-cuff” military reaction here was to seek a solution along one of two lines. The first option was to provide additional protection for in-service designs; the second (and later) approach was to develop an essentially new class of protected vehicle, the MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected).

Adding IED protection to in-service designs turned out to be more difficult than it sounded, these vehicles not having originally been designed to counter IED-type blasts. Providing the required additional IED protection often proved difficult, expensive and frequently technically impossible. Yet if one accepts that in asymmetric warfare there is no frontline as such, all vehicles become valid targets for insurgents, including logistic/support vehicles or even ambulances. The complexities of protecting these designs, designs that are traditionally unprotected, are even greater.

The US Marine Corps-led $45 billion MRAP programme certainly offered the best theatre-specific solution for the IED problem. The MRAP offered a definite compromise capability for asymmetric environments, however, the heavy armour required for the necessary levels of IED protection caused significant mobility issues for this type of vehicle. Suspension upgrades have been carried out on the bulk of the fleet to improve overall mobility; however, the key failings of the base overall configuration still remain.

Finding the right fleet composition It is highly probable that for the foreseeable future, for asymmetric environment operations the emphasis will continue to be placed on protection, while for successful conventional (symmetric) operations the focus on both strategic and tactical mobility will need to be retained. Finding the right fleet composition to allow for effective operations in both of these environments will doubtless be the highest profile task for individual NATO-grade armies in the near-term. The current global financial situation and the associated impact on defence-related spending will only exaggerate the difficulties of this task, especially for Europe.

I believe that the answer to the fleet composition conundrum

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Pietro Borgo has been Chairman of the Executive Board of Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles GmbH and Member of the Management Board of Rheinmetall Defence since 1 February 2012. He was born in June 1950 in Bozen, Italy. He graduated in Electrical Engineering from the University of Padua, Italy, and started his professional career in 1976 at IVECO, in Bozen, Italy. He later became Head of Automation for the central technical services of IVECO (from 1983) before being appointed Project Manager for the reorganisation and restructuring of the plant for the production of military vehicles and Plant Manager of IVECO Defence Vehicles (1985). From 1998 to 2000 he worked for Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik, Ulm (Germany), where he became Managing Director of Eurofire (Firefighting) for Germany, Italy, France and Austria in 2004. In 2006 he became General Manager and Member of the Executive Board of IVECO Magirus AG.

lies in having a truly flexible, truly multi-role/multi-capability vehicle fleet. Such a fleet would include a reasonable number of vehicles fully developed for asymmetric warfare (particularly in the light and medium-weight segments), with the bulk of the fleet geared to the more conventional (symmetric) threat.

Heavier vehicles will always designed far more easily for both environments than their lighter counterparts, the laws of physics ensuring these lighter vehicle types with high levels of protection and mobility are considerably more difficult and expensive to develop as vehicles that can truly operate effectively in both asymmetric and symmetric environment.

Ultimately, the right vehicle solutions and right fleet compositions will be dictated by individual user doctrines. However, it should be noted that if it is possible to build in some commonality between the symmetric/asymmetric fleets, even at supplier level, so much the better, as cost and associated benefits would follow.

In keeping with this philosophy, RMMV has kept a respectable distance from the MRAP concept as such, preferring to focus its efforts on the development of genuine asymmetric solutions from within its current multi-role and armoured/combat vehicle portfolios. The overarching company development aim here was twofold, however. These vehicles, while capable of meeting asymmetric threats, needed to remain as capable as ever of operating in any future conventional (symmetric) environment.

Crisis management

Since July 11 the German Army´s ISAF contingent has deployed suitably modified BOXER variants in Afghanistan. The type is performing admirably, with some of the design´s key features helping to ensure successful adaption to the very specific challenges of the ISAF role.

Photo: Carl Schulze

Examples…

Armoured Multi-Purpose Vehicles (AMPV) An excellent example of RMMV’s multi-role vehicle development focus can be seen in the Armoured Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). The days of unarmoured Jeep-type vehicles being used in asymmetric environments are over, with demands for near-MRAP levels of protection on vehicles weighing a third of such designs now being commonplace. The purpose-designed AMPV 4x4 is RMMV’s solution to these demands, the AMPV being a 9-tonne genuinely multi-role light protected vehicle.

Developed in partnership with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), AMPV offers everything (and more…) required of a vehicle of this type; operating alongside a larger correctly mixed fleet of commercially-sourced far less capable light vehicles it enables any armed force to strike that all-important affordable cost/capability and operating environment balance.

Armoured Combat Vehicles An excellent example of RMMV’s armoured combat vehicle development focus can be seen in the 6x6 Fuchs armoured

Armoured Personnel Carrier Fuchs operated by the German ISAF contingent in Afghanistan Photo: Carl Schulze

transport vehicle. Originally developed for the German Army of the cold war era more than 30 years ago as a relatively rare compact three-axle design, Fuchs has proven more adaptable to current needs than all of its contemporaries, be they smaller or larger. In its latest 1A8 configuration, Fuchs has successfully evolved to provide MRAP levels of protection without sacrificing the excellent off-road mobility and combat capability of the base design.

Earlier Fuchs variants are scheduled to serve the symmetric warfare-focused component of the German Army for many years to come, while the current 1A8 variant is a vehicle of choice for Germany’s asymmetric-focused ISAF troops. An added bonus here is Fuchs’ unique-for-class windscreen (as opposed to hatch) configuration, providing an added situational awareness tool for crews in asymmetric environments.

A more recent example of RMMV’s future-proofing expertise that is so prevalent in the design of Fuchs can be found in the Boxer, which is also developed jointly with KMW. Boxer entered service in the German Army in 2009 and since July 2011 the Army’s ISAF contingent has deployed suitably modified Boxer variants in Afghanistan. The type is performing admirably, with some of the design’s key features that early programme participants objected to helping to ensure successful adaptation to the very specific challenges of the ISAF role. And while Boxer’s overarching design concept would not support a full width windscreen of the Fuchs-type, its uniquely designed moveable driver’s hatch allows for unparalleled (within class) situational awareness for the driver when operating in asymmetric environments.

HX Tacticle Trucks A further RMMV product that helps armed forces balance affordability with capability, and protection when required, is the latest development of the HX tactical truck range. RMMV’s HX range is probably the most mission-focused truck range currently available…

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

RMMV’s HX range are “military off the shelf” (MOTS) designs; the base vehicle is designed around MAN TGS Worldwide components, but crucially these are combined with a unique selection of military-role developments that include a militaryspecific cab, a behind-cab cooling pack, an 11-tonne rated front drive axle option, and single wheel/tyre specific rear drive axles.

The HX range can, of course, be protected to class-leading standards. Two protection options are available, MAC and IAC. MAC (Modular Armour Cabin) is an add-on kit solution. The IAC (Integrated Armour Cabin) is a replacement cab solution that offers genuine class-leading levels of protection. Both solutions are in service with various armies around the world.

RMMV’s HX range forms the backbone of many armed forces’ logistic vehicle fleet Photo:Carl Schulze

Summary…

Logistic vehicles are usually either militarised commercial designs or military-specific designs. Both types present drawbacks. A militarised commercial vehicle is difficult to protect, lacks genuine off-road mobility and deep fording capability and is hardly likely to survive the rigours of prolonged frontline duty. A military-specific design will come with procurement and potential through-life cost implications.

The current global economic and security trends look set to continue and will ensure a continuing need for deployed peace enforcement/crisis management type operations, which perhaps more than ever will find themselves under the funding microscope. In such environments quality over quantity for the all-important military vehicle fleet is a paramount factor, and it is here with its ever-expanding range of world-leading purpose-designed and adapted wheeled vehicles that RMMV will remain a provider of choice for Europe’s armed forces.

News: European industries – Eurocopter Eurocopter to get in touch with 7 Bn € turnover in 2013 (The E/Hb) A strong expansion of services and the 475 rotorcraft delivered led to growth of 6.3 Bn € in 2012, some 15% more than in 2011. Civil and military helicopter deliveries represented 49% while services played an increasing role by accounting for 42% of the total. The order intake in 2012 totalled 469 net bookings representing 5.4 Bn € .

Eurocopter – a European global player with subsidiaries and participations in 21 countries, confirmed its position as world’s N° 1 helicopter manufacturer with 33% market share of the worldwide civil and parapublic fleet.

In the military sector the deliveries continue with NH90 helicopters in the different “national” versions, some of them having already proven their reliability in Afghanistan.

The CEO of the company with headquarters in Maringnan, France and Donauwörth, Germany, employing more than 22.000

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Eurocopter EC 135 (civil helicopter)

people, Lutz Bertling, underlined in a press conference in Paris early 2013 that Eurocopter has transitioned “from being a

Photo: © EC, Charles_Abarr

helicopter manufacturer to a true vertical-lift mission provider” with a global footprint and is heading towards future growth.

Photo: Laudan/Bundeswehr, cc by ND-2.0, flickr

Maritime Security The Horn of Africa continues to be a focus of attention for the international community because a stable region is of paramount importance for the global economy. The extension of the EU Strategy to land operations and training has been so far successful. The military intervention against pirates’ land bases in Somalia was a decisive turning point. But only political coordination can lead to stable systems.

Piracy off Somalia in 2012

Gamechanger ATALANTA and PCAST

by Dr Michael Stehr, German Maritime Institute, Bonn IMB statistics show a significant drop in pirate activity in 2012 compared to 2011: 75 attacks (237 in 2011) resulting in 14 hijacks (28 in 2011). The numbers are even more impressive if 2012 is divided into its two halves: 60 attacks and 12 hijacks in the first six months and only 15 attacks and 2 hijacks in the second half of the year. But it is still too early for the all-clear signal. At least some pirate gangs are highly professional and remain determined to get their catch.

Gamechanger EU-NavFor ATALANTA Two factors combined make for new conditions: these are EUNavFor ATALANTA and Privately Contracted Armed Security Teams (PCAST) on board merchant ships. The decrease in the number of attacks proves the efficiency of the new strategy implemented by EU-NavFor ATALANTA since May 2012. In spring 2012, the EU decided to amend the ATALANTA mandate to include the fight against pirate logistics and equipment on land. Since May 2012 EU-NavFor ATALANTA has been destroying skiffs and dhows equipped with pirate paraphernalia when they are on the beach and about to put out to sea. German naval assets, mandated by the German Federal Parliament, have taken part in this operation. Until 2011 “investments” in pirate operations guaranteed extremely high revenues. But with the destruction of boats and equipment, most investments were lost, preventing “investors” from spending any more money. So naval action has proved more efficient than the hunt for the money transfers made by pirates after receiving their million-dollar ransoms. This deterrence by close-inblockade even convinces pirates not to spend a portion of their last ransoms on new pirate operations.

heroes. In late 2012 there were some first hints that pirate gangs were beginning to lose their backing, even in such pirate strongholds as Garacad, where Puntland security forces freed the hijacked MV ICEBERG I in December 2012.

EU-NavFor ATALANTA’s switch in strategy has proven effective for suppressing pirate activities. It is much more efficient than only using the limited naval and air assets for sea surveillance in the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean.

More and more ship-owners are relying on PCAST. And even if there are some objections from the soldier or lawyer’s point of view, PCAST has proven to be very helpful. Experience shows that IMO’s Best Management Practices (BMP) provide a certain level of defence against pirate attack, but that these measures have limited effects and can be overwhelmed by determined attackers. No ship guarded by PCAST was ever boarded by pirates.

Improved situational awareness on the part of skippers and an intensified exchange of information about attacks and suspicious sightings prevent pirates from using the effect of surprise to get a catch. Information exchange also helps in hunting down pirates.

Developments and new hope in Somalia

Gamechanger PCAST

Piracy can be fought at sea, but it can only be ended on land.

After AMISOM military forces and the Kenyan Army hunted down Al-Shabaab and freed parts of Somalia around Mogadishu and south of it up to the Kenyan border, there has been new hope of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia being able to establish control even in central parts of Somalia with their well-known pirate strongholds of Hobyo, Harardhere, Garacad and Eyl. Until that day comes, naval forces will continue having to suppress pirate activity at sea.

Since pirates boosted the local economy with their ransom dollars they were not only respected, but also viewed as

* Dr Michael Stehr is the maritime correspondent of “The European – Security and Defence Union”

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Fuel saving in shipping

Greener, leaner, cleaner

by Dr Olaf Mager, Senior Vice President, Group Communications, Press Spokesperson, Germanischer Lloyd, Hamburg There is no doubt that the last few years represent a radical shift in how we view many forms of technology. Increasingly we now look at technology to minimise, to use less fuel, produce less pollution, and provide more efficiency. In the maritime industry we can see this shift writ large, spurred by regulatory, political and consumer demand.

New advanced ship design Computing technology allows designers the option of running many thousands of variants through modelling software to select the best traits for a particular purpose. Reference designs can be modelled and then modified to bring out the preferred traits, whether speed, cargo capacity, or energy efficiency. It is a question of weighting the desired traits correctly to obtain the best variant for the task at hand. New more advanced ship designs will benefit from these techniques – giving a better “breeding” stock for designs to come.

Increasing computing power means that ship design is more and more a virtual activity; 3D models in software environments take the place of replicas in tanks. Integrated software suites allow various factors to be weighted in building designs, with the resulting ship evolving from the selection and re-selection of those factors. In the GL Best-Plus Aframax tanker design concept some 17,000 variants were assessed using software models until an optimal combination of speed, cargo capacity and safety was found. The resulting design increased speed and cargo capacity and reduced the risk of potential oil outflows through hull optimisation.

The role of decision support systems Reducing drag and increasing aerodynamic properties have long been standard practice in the aerospace and automotive industries. The complexity of the interactions in shipping, however, has meant that the efficiency gains promised by these techniques are only now starting to be realised. The ability to build complex models and include them in transferable systems has already had a significant impact on ship

Dr Olaf Mager has been Senior Vice President, Group Communications and Press Spokesperson of the GL Group since 2004. Born in 1959 in Offenburg. He completed a PhD in Defence Studies at the University of Konstanz in 1989. Press Spokesperson, Ministry of Interior of Saxony, Press Spokesperson for the German Association of Aerospace Industries (BDLI), Director of Communication at VIDAIR Avionics AG, Mönchengladbach, and before taking on his most recent role, was the Press Spokesperson for the Hamburg Port and Warehouse Company (HHLA).

operations and is most likely to produce even greater benefits.

The daily operation of vessels and fleets will be impacted by an ever-increasing use of decision-support systems. There are a number of operational systems that aid efficiency and reduce environmental impacts already in use today including: trim optimisation, engine system performance optimisation, weather routing, voyage execution and performance monitoring.

Greater integration of these systems into full support systems will result in the general optimisation of vessels and across entire fleets. These operational support systems will develop as they become more widely used; databases of specific ship types and models will become more sophisticated resulting in ongoing efficiency gains.

In tough times there is a tendency in all of us to take a step back, to tighten the belt and think – “If we can just get through this year, then we’ll be all right.” History shows us though that the firms that profit from such times are those that take the opportunity to develop, that don’t shrink from the challenge and that push themselves out of their comfort zones. Those that seize the advantages offered by new technologies and work together with like-minded partners to advance and promote them will surely find themselves in a stronger position when the market comes out of its doldrums.

The GL BEST-Plus Aframax oil tanker design concept was created using an advanced optimisation framework .

Picture: GL Group, Hamburg

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List of authors

List of authors and articles in 2012 Author/Title

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Author/Title

ESDU N°

Page

Arnould, Claude-France.................................................. N°14 ....... 24 The European Defence Agency – taking stock

Fiori, Lorenzo .................................................................N°12..........52 Cross-sector collaboration on Cyber Security & Defence

Balis, Christina .............................................................. N°14 ....... 39 Transatlantic defence cooperation – Leaderless Europe

Frank, Dorothee .............................................................N°14..........59 A new corvette for multiple types of engagement

Beer, Andreas ................................................................ N°14 ....... 56 FFG’s new PMMC G5

Gahler, Michael..............................................................N° 12.........20 Democratic elections in Tunisia - first milestone on the long way to stability

Boger, Sven and Richard................................................ N°14 ....... 62 Closing the gap of unexploited reconaissance capabilities Bornemann, Jürgen and Van Osch, Ton .......................... N°13 ....... 41 Forces Development - synergy in EU and NATO Brengelmann, Dirk ......................................................... N°14 ......... 7 NATO after Chicago – implementing the Strategic Concept Brok, Elmar .................................................................... N°14 ......... 9 The EEAS – a critical review Bruzek, Oliver ................................................................ N°14 ........ 11 From confrontation to realistic cooperation Bühl, Hartmut ................................................................ N°13 ....... 54 CBRN - The stockpiling of antidotes Buskhe, Håkan............................................................... N°14 ....... 50 Air power for forces protection

Grinin, Vladimir M..........................................................N°14 ..........18 Missile defence - is a political decision feasable?

Gruber, Jennifer .............................................................N°12..........48 Early detection enabling the effective protection of coastlines Herteman, Jean-Paul ......................................................N° 12.........28 The European defence industry – Europe should spend more wisely Hexels, Gerd ..................................................................N°13..........50 Police forces: personal protection during crisis management operations Hohnen, Hans-Jürgen.....................................................N°12..........58 New challenges in a new security environment Homberg, Thomas .........................................................N°14..........28 Plea for a common European industry strategy Hude, Henri-Paul ...........................................................N° 12 .........12 A politico-philosophical analysis of NATO

Bütikofer, Reinhard ....................................................... N°14 ....... 34 Last exit cooperation – is Europe missing out on the pooling and sharing project?

Iklódy, Gábor .................................................................N°13..........25 Crisis management - coping with asymmetric threats

Caballero, Corine ........................................................... N° 12 ...... 38 Interparliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP - avenues for the future

Jentzsch, Rainer .............................................................N°14..........60 I-MAST: a revolution in naval vessel construction

Chizhov, Vladimir........................................................... N°14 ....... 12 Time to enhance the security and economic pillars

Kafurke, Markus and Stone, Nicholas and Tillier, Louis..N° 12 .........18 Send for the Great BlueFleet - EU Naval Diplomacy

Coll Bucher, Fulgencio ................................................... N°13 ....... 47 Protection in operations – an integrative approach

Kampmann, Lutz ............................................................N°14..........53 A post-Afghanistan strategy for armoured vehicles

Danjean, Arnaud ............................................................ N° 12 ...... 26 The future of common European security and defence policy-time for change The Lisbon Comprehensive Approach and ...................... N°14 ........ 21 the consequences for CSDP

Koppa, Maria Eleni.........................................................N°13..........56 “Yes” to a robust EU counter-piracy strategy

Delsaux, Pierre .............................................................. N° 12 ....... 31 Commission Task Force on Defence Industry and Market

Kozakou-Marcoullis, Erato .............................................N°14............6 A stable Mediterranean Region is a prerequisite for Europe’s welfare

Deschaux Beaume, Delphine.......................................... N°13 ........ 18 Scrutiny of CSDP operations in France and Germany

Kujat, Harald..................................................................N°13..........29 The credibility of NATO’s strategy for Afghanistan’s future

de Péchy, Arnaud........................................................... N°13 ....... 52 The future of versatile platforms

Landau, Emily ................................................................N° 12.........22 Facing Iran: Stepped-up pressure just might work

Dopp, Stefan and Otten, Ralf and Janzen-Wolf, ChristinaN°13..........37 Serco goes green and mobile – Reduce the dependency of fossil fuel need

Manservisi, Stefano .......................................................N°14..........40 The development of the Schengen area

Eberhardt, Michael ........................................................N°13..........34 IT-Security is more than technology

Missoweit, Merle ...........................................................N°13 ..........31 Long-term strategic partnerships in defence

Favin-Lévêque, Jacques .................................................N°14 ..........31 Lancaster House - against the spirit of European integration?

Najder, Zdzsilaw ............................................................N° 12...........8 The uniqueness of Europe - Credibility has replaced power

Koumoutsakos, Georgis .................................................N° 12.........40 The EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy - steps forward

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Author/Title

ESDU N° Page

Author/Title

Nick, Christoph ..............................................................N°13..........22 The lack of will to be a greater power

ESDU N°

Page

Stehr, Michael ...............................................................N°12..........42 ATALANTA: an operational success in figures ..................N°13..........57 Piracy off the Horn of Africa – 2012

Olshausen, Klaus...........................................................N°14 ..........16 The NATO-Russia Council and the Missile Defence project

Stoussavljewitsch, Martin ..............................................N°13..........39 Renewable energy and military - More than a vision

Ovilius, Magnus.............................................................N°12..........46 Protecting global trade in transit - an industry perspective

Swoboda, Hannes .........................................................N°14 ..........14 Objectives of the EU’s Russia policy

Pauwels, Stefan .............................................................N°14..........47 High performance visualisation for control and command superiority

Tannock, Charles ...........................................................N°14..........57 An EU strategy for the Horn of Africa

Perruche, Jean-Paul .......................................................N°14..........36 No Europe without defence, no defence without Europe!

Treche, Klaus-Peter .......................................................N°14..........42 AFCEA Europe - The organisation to head industry’s

Popowski, Maciej...........................................................N°13 ..........10 A view from the inside – EEAS

contribution to user requirement Valéry, Daniel ................................................................N° 12 .........11 Reflections on the defence of Europe

Pusić, Vesna ..................................................................N°13............8 28th Member State of the European Union-Croatia

Van Orden, Geoffrey.......................................................N°13..........23 The EU’s CSDP is a misguided irrelevance

Raab, Christoph .............................................................N°13 ..........14 EEAS: Between a rock and a hard place?

Verhellen, Gert...............................................................N° 12 .........16 NATO’s new Strategic Concept and its use

Reynaud de Sousa, Bruno..............................................N°12..........44 Piracy: a phenomenon or a strategy?

Verret, Denis..................................................................N°14..........27 The failed merger between EADS and British Aerospace (BAE)

Rosenberger, Manfred ...................................................N° 12.........34 Die for Europe or intervene for strictly national interests?

Walter, Robert................................................................N°13 ..........16 European Defence Policy on a post Sarkozy-continent

Schreiber, Anne-Cathrin.................................................N°12..........50 CBRNe Defence: an obligation to protect Europe’s citizen

Wittmann, Klaus ............................................................N°13..........20 “Pooling and Sharing” must be pragmatic and conceptual

Schuchmann, Horst........................................................N°14..........55 “Bespoke Suit” made from steel

Zakrecki, Janusz .............................................................N°13..........44 Helicopters in Crisis Management

Smid, Volker ..................................................................N°12..........56 Providing Information Security is an ethical obligation Søvndal, Villy ................................................................N°13............7 The EU’s conflict prevention and crisis response

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