The European Security and Defence Union Issue 2

ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on European Security & Defence Volume No 2/2009

What Europe can expect from the new US-Administration

ESDP − What we have achieved and next steps

Force Protection − the Model of the German Landforces

Karsten Voigt, Coordinator for the German-American Relations

Baroness Taylor of Bolton, Privy Counsellor, Minister for International Defence and Security

Hans-Otto Budde, Lieutenant General, Head of German Landforces

EDITORIAL

Editorial The new departure in Washington was clearly visible at the Munich security conference: there will be cooperation and consensus with joint action on security and defence matters.

The shift in political direction conveyed by the new US president Obama was also apparent from the hand held out to Moscow.

Whither NATO? The forthcoming NATO summit will mark the North Atlantic Alliance’s sixtieth birthday. President Obama will be attending for the first time and to give NATO a boost. In all likelihood NATO will reinforce the Washington treaty of 1949 with a declaration on the Alliance’s role in guaranteeing security, and it can also be expected that the summit will refer to the Alliance’s adoption of a new strategic concept. In fact, the direction the Alliance wishes to take in the future is fundamental. Does NATO want to be a global player on security issues and take over the role of world policeman? Or does the Organisation consider itself to be too closely identified with its military role and destined anyway to continue to play a significant part in transatlantic security and defence? At the same time, there is a need for a thoroughgoing transformation of the armed forces and the building of a cooperative relationship with the European Union as a new partner in the transatlantic security system.

Cooperation with Russia will loom large, particularly in connection with any plans to enlarge NATO, but will also be affected by the Alliance’s interest in developing its relationship with Japan and Australia.

The return of France The high point of the event in Strasbourg/Kehl will be the announcement by President Nicolas Sarkozy of France’s return to NATO’s integrated military structure. At the same time he will stress that there is nothing automatic about the subordination of French troops to NATO’s supreme command and that

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Brussels/Berlin.

Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B 1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135 Headquarter Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557412-0 Fax: +49/30/557412-33 Advertisement Office Berlin: Daniel Bou-Fadel Phone: +49/30/557412-14 Fax: +49/30/557412-15 Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970970 Fax: +49/228/97097-75

the independence of France’s nuclear deterrent will be guaranteed. In fact, France’s reasons for returning to the fold are akin to De Gaulle’s motives in pulling away. He did not want the political stature achieved by NATO to overshadow French sovereignty and autonomy. As one of today’s most solid Alliance members, France has lived up to its commitment to the Organisation and contributed troops, but so far without exerting direct influence on the planning of military operations. This will now change.

Hartmut Bühl

European Security Strategy The report on the implementation of the 2003 Security Strategy (ESS), endorsed by the European Council in December 2008 is little more than an extended list of EU foreign and security policy measures. There are some new initiatives (Iran, Russia) but there is no explanation of how to overcome the main deficiencies.

EU-NATO Future cooperation with NATO should resolve some of the inherent weaknesses of the last ten years. The problems to be tackled are more of a political than a military nature, such as the relationship between EU and NATO member and non-member countries and the conditions of the Berlin plus Agreement, to name but two.

I am confident that security and defence policy lines have started to move.

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll E-Mail: magazine@euro-defence.eu Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group, Organizer of the Congress on Security Defence (Berliner Sicherheitskonferenz), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management.

For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.euro-defence.eu Suscription: This magazine is published quarterly in Brussels and Berlin.

The copy price is 8 Euro; 4 copys for one year: 30 Euro. © 2009 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin

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THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Karsten Voigt, Coordinator of the German-American Relations,Berlin

Editorial

POLITICAL ISSUES What Europe can expect from the new US-Administration Interview with Karsten Voigt, Coordinator for the German-American Relations, Berlin ........ 8

SECURITY Maritime Security Maritime Safety and Security as a Central Piller of a comprehensive Security Strategy Dr. Markus Hellenthal, CEO Thales Germany, Stuttgart .................................. 23

ESDP − What we have achieved and next steps Baroness Taylor of Bolton, Privy Counsellor, Minister for International, Defence and Security, London ......................................... 11 The French and Europe … united in diversity General (ret.) Jacques Favin Lévêque, Vice President of PanEurope-France, Versailles................................................... 14 Towards a European Army Gerd Höfer MP, Berlin and Vice President of the ....

European Security and Defence Assembly, Paris ........................................................ 17

Adequate forces and equipment for the right strategy Tim Mahon, Journalist, London .................. 27 ATALANTA − Europes first naval Anti-Piracy-Operation as part of ESDP Dr. Michael Stehr, Barrister, Troisdorf ......... 29 Border Security: FRONTEX is operational and steadily improving Interview with Ilkka Laitinen, Director FRONTEX, Warsaw ............................ 31

A European White Paper on Security and Defence is not sufficient Adrian Taylor, EUSG, Berlin ........................... 19 EU-NATO Relations − grave deficiencies Hartmut Bühl, Brussels ............................... 21 Commentary NATO-Russia Relations: Press the Reset Button Harald Kujat, General ret., former Chairman MC NATO, Berlin ......................................... 22

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Security Network Innovation − Macedonian’s Contribution to the European Union Dr. Pande Lazarevski, Director Crisis Management Center, Skopje................... 35

CONTENT

INDUSTRIES A plea for organized cooperation between transatlantic industries for Security and Defence Interview with John Brooks, President Northrop Grumman International, Washington .............. 39 The Defence Package: An important step towards a better ESDP Alexander Graf Lambsdorff MEP, Brussels ........ 42

Harald Kujat, General ret.

Forces Protection − the soldier of the future

By Elvira Cortajarena Iturrioz MP, Madrid ..... 51 Eyes in the sky to protect forces Hartmut Bühl, Brussels ........................... 53

A European Defence Market − from vision to reality Andreas Hammer, EADS Vice-President and Key Account Manager Germany, Koblenz ......... 45

EUROPEAN DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES Protection on Operations − The Army's Protection Philosophy Hans-Otto Budde, Lieutenant General, Head of German Land Forces, Bonn ................. 47

INSTITUTIONS and ASSOCIATIONS The European Defence Agency (EDA) Alexander Weis, CEO EDA, Brussels ................. 54 The role of ASD in European Security and Defence François Gayet, Secretary General ASD, Brussels ................................................... 57

DEFENCE & SECURITY NEWS The Protection of the Soldier − Concepts and solutions Protecting our soldiers Bernd Wenzler, CEO Defence Electronics (EADS/DS ), Ulm .................................... 49

ESDP and NATO News European Union .................................... 59 NATO ................................................... 61

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What Europe can expect from the new US-Administration Interview of Hartmut Bühl with Karsten Voigt, Coordinator for the German-American Relations, Berlin The European: Mr. Voigt, are you happy to see that Barak Obama is the 44th President of the United States and are you looking forward to the political change ahead?

Karsten Voigt: Yes The European: Is that an unconditional yes? How well will Obama handle the change? It’s difficult to see a way out of the crisis the US is in. Its economy and finances are exhausted, militarily the country is overstretched, and the domestic consensus is fragile. Where will Obama make a start?

Karsten Voigt: The financial and economic crisis may have started in the USA, but it is now a worldwide phenomenon. The economy is the President’s main concern. He will have to deal with domestic policy issues first, but there are foreign policy aspects to consider straight away as well because the US cannot resolve the crisis in isolation. It must tackle the problems together with its European partners, in particular, but also with China and Japan and other nations.

The European: How do you think Congress will react?

Karsten Voigt: Foreign policy issues are not the foremost concern of most Congressmen, but the role of the USA, as the leading world power, means that in almost every international crisis the US president will have decisions to make. That is why as soon as he came into office he addressed the Islamic world through an interview on “Al Arabiya” and appointed two seasoned foreign policy hands, Holbrook und Mitchell, as his special envoys to focus on the crisis areas in and around Afghanistan and in the Middle East.

The European: So there has been a clear shift in US interests at the beginning of the 21st century. What does that mean for Europe?

Karsten Voigt: In the first half of the 20th century Germany was the cause of global conflicts and Europe was repeatedly shaken by war and crisis. In the second half of the 20th century Germany was at the centre of a global crisis and so demanded the attention of all those in the USA who dealt with crisis areas.

Today the crises lie outside Europe. They are either global or else regional and on the fringes of, or outside, Europe.

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Karsten Dietrich Voigt Coordinator for the German-American Relations

Karsten Voigt was born in Elmshorn on April 11, 1941.

1960-1069: Studies at the Universities Hamburg, Kopenhagen and Frankfurt: History; German and Scandinavian studies, 1969-1972: President of the youth organisation of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), 1976-1999: Member of the German Bundestag, 1983-1998: Speaker for Foreign Policy of the SPD since 1999 Coordinator of the German Government for the German-American Cooperation; Member of the Board of the “Atlantik Brücke“ and many other transatlantic organisations

The European: In that case, what role will Europe play?

Karsten Voigt: Europe does no longer import security but is needed as an exporter of security and stability. While the most important challenges faced by the USA lie outside Europe, her most reliable partners are still inside Europe. However, they will only exert their influence on US policy as partners if they are prepared to help resolve crises in conflict areas.

The European: Can President Obama make America attractive again, and restore the political and moral standing that has been so heavily damaged in the last eight years?

Karsten Voigt: In electing Obama the Americans have turned away from his predecessor’s politics and at the same time renewed their awareness of the power and the ideal that the US represents.

The incoming President and his Administration share this selfconfidence, this feeling that the power of the USA also stands for something that is good for other parts of the world as well as America. And Obama’s election has also changed the way Americans perceive their own nation; they feel that it can renew itself and is showing the world that it can overcome its own long-standing social problems such as racism. This means that it can also overcome economic and foreign policy difficulties.

The European: Are we experiencing the dawn of a new age?

POLITICAL ISSUES

Karsten Voigt: This self-confidence is rooted deep in American history and in that sense America is the land of permanent revolution. It is the process of constant renewal that gives Americans the self-confidence to step up as a world power and accept that they are indispensable in that role.

Karsten Voigt: It was a clear offer. It meant that we can have our say and exert our influence if we are prepared to join in with action as well as fine words.

The European: What is in store for Europe?

Karsten Voigt: The Americans are we Europeans’ most important The European: Are you therefore partner outside the EU. Although convinced that the US is willing and the USA and the EU are pretty well able to maintain its claim to leaderevenly matched in the areas of trade ship? and the economy, there is a clear imbalance of power when it comes Karsten Voigt: Of course the US to foreign and security policy. In the wants to keep its lead role and to latter areas the USA are much more renew and reinforce it. At the same Barack Obama, 44th President of the USA important to Europe and each time, it knows that it need partners individual European state than are and is looking towards Europe for the European states individually them. and collectively to the USA. For these individual states to gain more influence in Washington and have more scope for action, The European: How much “Messianism” should we read into they need to pool their capabilities, in other words we need a that? more effective EU foreign and security policy.

Karsten Voigt: America has always been a power and an ideal The European: Would you say the USA want to see a functioning at one and the same time. Obama represents a different idea Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a successful of America from Bush but he too is convinced that the idea of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)?

America should be strong enough to serve as an example to be admired and followed.

Karsten Voigt: The US no longer perceives that ability to take In that sense, there will always be aspects of American politics the lead as a threat to its own leadership but as a necessary that can be described, albeit imperfectly, as “Messianism“. adjunct to its own capabilities. That is a positive development.

However, Germans shouldn’t really find it so strange that the Americans stand for ideas, if you consider how enthusiastically The European: How will that affect relations between the EU and we ourselves advocate the protection of the environment and NATO? how convinced we are of its importance, not only for Germany and Europe, but also as a model for other parts of the world.

Karsten Voigt: On both sides of the Atlantic, a close relationship between the EU and NATO is seen to be indispensable.

The European: What challenges will Europe face in the future?

The fact this has not come about yet is no longer due to the Americans, and even less to the Germans, but to quarrels Karsten Voigt: We will have to expand our horizons both between Europeans and between EU member states and physically and mentally, for example in relation to Afghanistan Turkey. and the Near and Middle East where we must commit ourselves politically and economically above all, but also, on The European: You refer to Germany in that connection. To what occasions, militarily. extent have there been further changes in German policy?

The European: Perhaps you could develop that? President Karsten Voigt: We should first of all be happy to see that Obama sent his Vice-President Mr Biden to the Security ConferGerman soldiers are now part of the solution rather than part ence in Munich to announce that changes were coming. What of the problem. We have just raised the ceiling for the number do you think he meant?

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of troops to be sent to Afghanistan to 4500. In my opinion, this will remain the upper limit for the next three years at least and the Americans know that. They are therefore focusing on our increasing involvement in the training of policemen and soldiers and in developing political and economic activity in Afghanistan and where, as Germans working together with other Europeans, we can contribute to political and economic stabilisation in Pakistan, particularly in the critical border areas.

The European: Does that mean that an EU commitment at the side of the US in Afghanistan/Pakistan could positively counterbalance the increasing American presence there?

Karsten Voigt: I’m not thinking so much of acting as a counterweight but more of lending added weight; this is not something directed against the USA but rather a welcome supplement to their own action. It is too early to say what form it will take, but it is absolutely certain that greater involvement on the part of the EU and its member states is wanted.

The European: Is there a risk that the Europeans in NATO and the EU will be standing there empty-handed if Obama wants them to contribute more towards Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Karsten Voigt: The Europeans are not standing there emptyhanded... Take the environmental issues. We are in the vanguard in that area and can have every confidence in our ability to join with the Americans in debating and framing policy.

The European: I mean that the Europeans may be called on to make a greater military contribution to fighting terrorism.

Karsten Voigt: There is a clear change in progress in American thinking about Afghanistan: Obama and his Administration no longer talk about the fight against global terrorism. They are more specific and talk in terms of the fight against Al Quaida and other, specific terrorist groups. They know that various terrorist groups have come into existence in different political contexts, do not all pursue the same political ends, and consequently require individualised responses. This may in some cases have to be a military response, but, first and foremost it will be political, or involve policing or intelligence work, and, in the case of Afghanistan, economic measures.

The European: What of the fight against the causes of terrorism?

Karsten Voigt: Obama’s interview with Al Arabiya and his intention to make a speech soon in a Muslim country show that he and his administration have not lost sight of the causes. Secretary of State Clinton will be visiting the biggest

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Muslim country in the world, Indonesia, on her Asian tour.

The European: Is Obama trying to involve Iran in the fight against the causes of terrorism?

Karsten Voigt: I would not go so far as to say that Obama will try to involve Iran. He is prepared to discuss directly with Teheran but his goal is still the same. Iran must stop building and buying nuclear weapons and also stop supporting terrorist groups outside Iran. The Americans have changed their strategy but not their aims. If Iran fails to react positively the Americans will tighten sanctions even more resolutely than before and − as has always been the case in America’s history − other options would then be considered again.

The European: We should not forget the economic sphere. Is it reasonable to fear a resurgence of protectionism?

Karsten Voigt: The “Buy-America“ clause is a typical, if mistaken, reaction to the present economic crisis, and reflects an attitude that can be encountered outside America too, e.g. in Europe. It is in the common interest of American and Europe to fight protectionism. Individual States must respond to the economic and financial crisis at the appropriate level i.e. for the EU as a grouping of States. But their policies can only be successful if they are coordinated internationally. That is why the protectionist measures as found in the “Buy-America” clause and in some European countries are the wrong answer to real problems.

Obama spoke out clearly against the “Buy-America“ clause.

One can only hope that protectionism in the USA and Europe − and there have been protectionist demonstrations in Great Britain and France! − has been repelled and that we will continue to serve as an example of anti-protectionism.

The European: Do you have a wish list for the USA? Karsten Voigt: It is important for all of us to make breakthroughs in nuclear and conventional disarmament and Proactive, coordinated policy on climate change The European: What are Obama’s strengths?

Karsten Voigt: It is important for an American President to remember that it is not enough to have a majority in Congress − he also needs to keep the support of the people. Obama is extraordinarily gifted at expressing complicated matters in simple terms and at presenting them in a way that preserves a countrywide movement of support for him and his policy.

The European: Thank you for accepting this interview.

POLITICAL ISSUES

ESDP − What we have achieved and next steps

by Baroness Taylor of Bolton, Privy Counsellor, Minister for International Defence and Security, London The trans-Atlantic relationship may loom large in 2009 thanks to the arrival of the dynamic Obama administration in Washington and next month’s landmark NATO 60th anniversary summit. But while it is right for us to reflect on our enduring collective security alliance, 2009 is also a significant milestone for European Security and Defence Policy. Ten years ago this June, at the Cologne European Council, our leaders called for the Union to have: “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.” Against the backdrop of the December 1998 UK-France bilateral summit at Saint-Malo and the aftermath of the traumatic Kosovo crisis, Cologne’s historic declaration paved the way for the EU to become a serious actor in international crisis management. So now, nearly ten years on, we should take stock of the progress the EU has made, while also considering how we can − and must − improve in future.

Institutional arrangements In terms of institutional arrangements, the EU now has a set of structures − the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff − that are well suited to the task of responding to crises. The institutions supporting these structures are still developing and we welcome recent efforts to achieve a more integrated approach to planning at the strategic level. But we have broadly met our shared aim of having a permanent Brussels-based system for responsive decision-making, which allows Member States collectively to provide political control and strategic direction to EU-led operations, based on sound military advice.

Military operations The EU is now capable of launching and running multiple and varied operations across the globe. For instance we have launched military operations not just in the Balkans − but also in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Chad. And the UK is currently proud to be commanding from Northwood the EU’s first maritime mission to safeguard shipping and deter piracy off the coast of Somalia

Civilian missions And our civilian capabilities are developing too. The Aceh

Rt Hon Baroness Ann Taylor Privy Counsellor, Minister for International Defence and Security, London Ann Taylor was born in Scotland but brought up in Lancashire. Baroness Taylor is married with two children and shares the family passion for football.

On 13 May 2005 she was made a Life Peer, and confirmed as Baroness Taylor of Bolton, on 13 June 2005. The Rt Hon Baroness Ann Taylor PC was appointed as Minister for International Defence and Security on 5th October 2008. She was the Member for Bolton West from 1974 to 1983 and from 1987-2005 Member for Dewsbury. Between 2005 and 2007 she was a member of the Council of Europe and the Defence Committee of the Western European Union. She was appointed as Minister for Defence Equipment & Support in November 2007.

monitoring mission contributed to peace in Indonesia and the EU is running police reform missions in Bosnia, Palestine and the DRC. EULEX has recently taken over the UN’s work in Kosovo and the rapid deployment of civilian EU monitors to Georgia last September helped to de-escalate an international flashpoint. We have also seen a number of hybrid civ/mil activities such as support to the AU mission in Darfur and the EU security sector reform mission in the DRC. These varied operations illustrate the EU’s trademark ability as a crisis management actor to deploy a full ”tool box” of instruments. These range from economic, political and diplomatic pressure, through monitoring, policing, peacekeeping and rule-of-law missions, up to relatively high risk military interventions.

We have made some progress on plans to improve military capabilities too. But plans and processes are not sufficient, Europe needs to deliver more, and better quality capability against the agreed Capability Development Plan.

What we expect from the EDA We want to see the European Defence Agency (EDA) bring Member States together to maximise the value they get from their equipment budgets. The EDA’s helicopter tactics programme is welcome, but the Agency still needs to deliver the success that will bring it real credibility. And it needs to avoid the twin traps of excessive bureaucracy and unwarranted institutional growth that so often accompany multilateral

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activity. The battlegroups initiative is fully operational, with two battlegroups available at 5-10 days notice to move during each six month standby period. And the UK/French initiatives to improve helicopter availability and European carrier interoperability have sparked our imagination for de-institutionalised efforts to improve capabilities for EU, NATO or bilateral operations.

Development of ESDP Since Prime Minister Tony Blair helped lay the foundations of ESDP back in 1998, the UK has worked hard to ensure that the policy develops in such a way as to complement NATO, rather than to compete with it. This is common sense given the two organisations’ largely shared membership and the fact that each country has only a single set of forces.

Significantly, the change of leadership in France in May 2007 has seen President Sarkozy declare his intention to renew France’s relationship with NATO and to ensure complementarity between the two organisations. This contrasts with the traditional French mindset in which EU/NATO relations were often treated as a zero-sum game. This new attitude of pragmatism has relieved much of the “Atlanticist versus European” tension that characterised the last decade.

And Washington has come to recognise that Europe, NATO and the United States can all benefit from a strong European defence.

And it is equally important for the EU to work effectively with other national and multinational actors − such as the UN, NATO, the AU, the US, ASEAN. Collectively we are punching below our weight because we cannot agree on our priorities and a coordinated approach; whether in Afghanistan, the Balkans or Africa. So we need better coordination both politically between capitals and in Brussels, and then practically between actors on the ground. Difficulties persist in the EU/NATO relationship, largely as a result of the political differences between Turkey and Cyprus and so we continue to seek increased flexibility on the part of those concerned.

Secondly, we must redouble our efforts to meet the key capability shortfalls that were identified ten years ago but that remain unfilled today. Member States must be prepared to modernise their armed forces, focusing on the key themes of deployability, sustainability and interoperability, and be honest about their progress.

The EDA’s Capability Development Plan and collaborativeworking initiatives provide a useful framework. But where are the extra UAVs, logistics support or strategic lift that we know our frontline commanders need in order to do their jobs? We welcome the French Presidency’s recent initiatives aimed at improving capabilities, but there is no room for complacency.

We need to invest in denfence What are the next steps?

So ten years on from Saint-Malo and Cologne, ESDP is doing largely what we hoped it would do. But what are the “next steps” to rectify the current shortcomings and ensure that ESDP is ready to respond to the challenges of the next ten years?

I see two key areas on which to focus if we are to help the EU become a truly worthwhile and credible leader in its difficult but necessary work in global crisis management.

The first area can be broadly described as civil-military coordination, closely linked to the European Security Strategy’s commitment to effective multilateralism. We must support Javier Solana’s work to integrate better the planning and related activities of the Council Secretariat, the EU Military Staff and the Commission to allow the Union to use its different instruments more coherently

Internal and external coordination Increasingly we see military, police, justice, rule of law and development agencies working together in stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction phases of crises. Succeeding here depends upon effective internal coordination of the EU’s activities on the ground and integrated planning at the strategic and political levels in Brussels.

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We also need frank discussion on whether we can hope to match our levels of ambition at current low levels of spending. NATO has agreed a target of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence, which the UK honours. But most other countries in Europe have chosen to spend less. I know that we face the worst financial climate for decades, and electorates will always tend to support spending on schools or hospitals over ships or helicopters. But in an increasingly interdependent and insecure world, we need to invest in defence. Such investment is necessary not only to guarantee our own freedoms and security, but also to be able to act as a force for stability beyond our borders as responsible stakeholders in the international system.

EDA’s key role Of course defence spending is not just about quantity, but also quality. We need to spend our scarce funds more wisely by exploring collaborative projects. The EDA’s key role is to facilitate this by bringing interested partners together to pool their resources for R&T and development in order to maximise our efforts.

There has been some progress: most participating Member States now subscribe to the EDA’s Code of Conduct and electronic Bulletin Board. These procedural steps are not

POLITICAL ISSUES

Baroness Taylor inspecting an Infantry Regiment.

glamorous but they are helping to open up the European Defence Equipment Market to competition, which promises improved value for money for taxpayers.

The UK’s approach The UK’s Defence Industrial Strategy recognises that we cannot, and do not wish to, retain the capacity to develop and manufacture all our equipment capability domestically. We recognise that we must draw upon the wider international defence industrial and technological base to deliver our equipment needs more efficiently and effectively. I encourage other EU Member States to follow our lead.

And we should explore harmonising our requirements and collaborating on projects of mutual interest in order to avoid wasteful duplication, where this makes sense within the constraints of maintaining appropriate operational sovereignty. To do this we need a strengthened partnership with industry and to identify and break-down the commercial and legislative barriers that distort the Single Market in defence.

The way to effective multilateralism So, ESDP has come a long way since 1998. EU Member States have established in Brussels the basic intergovernmental decision-making structures that the Union needs to plan, launch and run crisis management operations. But we should support Secretary General Solana’s efforts to improve internal

Photo: MOD

civ-mil coherence, and to find solutions to the political and ideological barriers to effective multilateralism.

On capabilities, we need to redouble our efforts, working with the EDA and with industry, to deliver genuine improvements.

This will not happen overnight: it requires partners’ sustained political commitment to increase defence budgets and to spend them better on the capabilities the EU needs to match our agreed level of ambition.

None of this lends itself to another “big bang” such as occurred at St-Malo. Rather it calls all of us to deliver on the undertakings given in the multitude of political declarations signed up to since then.

The UK and France led the way in 1998, although differing political visions led to some friction between London and Paris on the politics and the methodology of ESDP in subsequent years. But the declared aims of President Sarkozy, coupled with the UK’s commitment to improving the workings of multilateral organisations, have heralded a more constructive approach to an agenda that is largely shared by both countries. This rapprochement benefits not only the UK and France, but our EU and NATO partners as a whole. And it benefits also all of those who stand to gain from a strong, capable Europe meeting its commitments and obligations in the world.

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THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The French and Europe united in diversity

by General (ret.) Jacques Favin Lévêque, Vice President of PanEurope, France

France takes pride in being the home of Descartes and occasionally succumbs to the temptation of giving lessons in Cartesianism to the rest of the world. To be fair, the insights French diplomats contribute to major geopolitical issues often demonstrate true analytical prowess and point the way to reasonable and balanced solutions. This is where France’s reputation for “arrogance” has come from, so often decried by our partners who find the attitude of our politicians and diplomats in international Organisations irksome if not downright irritating.

A love − hate relationship towards Europe However, in spite of her ambition to see reason triumph, France exhibits a sorry spectacle of totally irrational behaviour in the organisation of her own society and executes U-turns in her foreign policy that are as astonishing as they are unexpected. Should this be blamed on the fickle nature of individuals, or on a total lack of consistency in the politics of the nation? Or should a distinction be drawn between the country and its people, and allowances made for a nation that is enlightened as a whole, but whose citizens, taken individually, have the gene of rebellion in them? Whichever way one looks at it, it must be difficult for foreigners to understand the catalogue of contradictions to which our country seems to give expression every day.

Not really hate, but at least scepticism One of the most blatant examples indeed is the inconsistent behaviour of our fellow citizens in matters European and their

Jacques Favin Lévêque General (ret.)

Jacques Favin Lévêque was born on June 10, 1938.

General (res.) Jacques Favin Lévêque graduated from France’s élite engineering schools, the École Polytechnique and the National College of Civil Engineering. He opted for a military career in 1961 and served for the most part with the French Forces in Germany where he rose to command the 13th Engineer Regiment of the 1st Armoured Division. In 1985 he was assigned to France’s Defence Procurement Agency, the DGA, where he would hold the posts of Director of Communications and then Deputy Director for International Relations. On leaving the Army in 1993, he was appointed Chief Executive Officer of the French Land Defence Manufacturers Association (GICAT) where he stayed until 2003.

Jacques Favin Lévêque is Vice-President of PanEurope-France and a member of EuroDéfense, France. Author of “De la France de toujours á l’Europe de demain”, Paris 2008 188P., ISBN 2-911436-35-0

love-hate relationship towards Europe … Love is definitely a component.

From the very beginning, the French played a major role in building Europe. In the early fifties, when Europe’s “founding fathers”, most notably Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, gave voice to the ambition of a political Europe that would end centuries of fratricidal conflict forever, they had the approval of the vast majority of French people. Reconciliation between France and Germany, however painful for families who had suffered in the century or more of conflicts between these two nations, was the foundation on which the European project rested. And for more than 50 years now, apart from a tiny minority of nationalists, the French have remained true to the original intent. They want a Europe that can make its voice heard in the world, and, especially in the current context of globalisation, protect them and guarantee them a secure and prosperous future. Love then certainly, although hate is perhaps too strong a term for the flip side.

European Utopia built on French dreams?

Eugène Delacroix : La liberté guidant le peuple (1830)

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Strong opposition is maybe a more appropriate description, born of a distrust of European institutions perceived as faceless and bureaucratic, whose faults are trumpeted and advantages downplayed, and which, it is claimed, are not truly democratic. The Frenchman dreams of a “social Europe”, a mixture of egalitarian utopia and universal brotherhood, with a benign tax system to redistribute wealth. Ever ready to

POLITICAL ISSUES

sermonize, the French would like to model Europe along the lines of their own social system, although the latter can hardly be said to boast impressive results! For many in France, public service is a dogma so well entrenched that no other forms of social organisation are even considered. And as is only to be expected in this land of paradox, the home of human rights and a paragon of freedom, the liberalism that has successfully prevailed in the European Union for decades is looked upon as original sin to be strongly contested if the ideal Europe they long for is ever to be born.

The French want a “different Europe” That may seem to unfairly caricature the views of some of our fellow citizens and oversimplify their attitude to the process of European construction that started half a century ago. Yet their vote against the Constitutional treaty in 2005 was based on instinctive, irrational and contradictory reactions that have their roots in these various tendencies. As has often been highlighted, they were not opposed to European construction as such, but rejected what they perceived Europe to have become and the direction in which it was heading. The French want a “different Europe” the ideal Europe of their imagination where they can remain the sons of Asterix and Obelix yet live according to the device of their Republic: Freedom, Equality and Brotherhood.

This is probably not so much arrogance as the expression of a yearning for a more humane, balanced and egalitarian world, that nonetheless respects the individual as well as national, regional and local idiosyncrasies.

A Europe built on the wisdom of history And, when all is said and done, even without the support of all her citizens France will certainly continue to be a driving force in the construction of the Europe she helped to found. Her idea of Europe is clearly one of a political entity, of an independent power taking its own political decisions, and yet a generous one, counselling the world with the wisdom acquired through several centuries of fratricidal warfare. France has no intention of dissolving the specific characteristics of nations into an overweening federation that would flout the sovereignty of individual States. Nor does she seek a solely mercantile Europe with no ambition beyond the creation of a vast common marketplace and zone of economic prosperity.

France’s vision of Europe is for our continent to play the role on the world stage to which it is entitled through its millenium of culture, the talent of its inhabitants, its technological and economic achievements, and, even more so, its vision of human rights and search for understanding between peoples.

That is why France and the French want Europe to play a major role in geopolitics and the world balance of power and have made the proud device of the European Union their own: “United in diversity”.

Documentation Editor’s Observations to France and Europe “France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.”

Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, 1948-1952

“We need an united Europe because I don’t want an American one .“ Charles de Gaulle, President 1959 -1969

“Europe was born of Greek mythology: its mystery and fascination remain. However, it should also inspire reason.

We shall not build Europe if we are unrealistic.”

Valérie Giscard d'Estaing, President 1974-1981

“When, in May 1948, just three years after the war, the European idea took shape at the congress in the Hague, I was there and I believed in it.(...) And today, when we have to rid Europe of the Ten of its differences and lead it resolutely along the path to the future, I can still say that I am here and I believe in it.”

François Mitterrand, President 1981- 1995

“50 years ago, the Treaty of Rome signalled a decisive break with a war-torn past, one of oppression; it signalled the victory of humanism over barbarity, the beginning of one of the key undertakings in our continent's history.(...) The continent's reunification, i.e. the successive enlargements, which France has always been in favour of and argued for.”

Jacques Chirac, President 1995-2007

“Europe cannot just be a machine, an administrative machine, a legal machine, a machine for issuing rules, regulations, directives, and a machine for manufacturing constraints, rules and procedures (...) When France is doing well, the whole of Europe benefits. When France is doing well, Europe also does better.”

Nicolas Sarkozy, President since 2007

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POLITICAL ISSUES

Towards a European army

by Gerd Höfer MP, Berlin and Vice President of the European Security and Defence Assembly, Paris

Since 11 September 2001, if not before, it has also been necessary to see and address the issue of public security in the EU Member States in the Community context. The attacks in New York and Washington, as well as those in Madrid and London, have shown that no Member State of the EU can guarantee its security alone. This one thought raises the question as to the security that the EU actually provides through its common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European security and defence policy (ESDP).

European capability gaps If we consider the hardware rather than the politics, we see that the 27 Member States have a total of some two million troops, on which they spend about two hundred billion euros − truly a massive force. On closer inspection, it turns out to be a waste of money. If we assume that manpower will remain at its present level, although we cannot say that for sure, money is being wasted on defence materiel, on its maintenance and on training, because the 27 Member States do not have standardised hardware and therefore have neither common logistics nor the same training in the use of materiel. Moreover, national forces are still largely armed in accordance with the criteria of the Cold War and the confrontation between two power blocs.

This even applies to multinational formations. Accordingly, NATO − and the EU too − have identified, in the light of the new threat scenario and their experience in war zones, capability gaps that must be closed in the medium term.

Gerd Höfer MP Member of the German Bundestag Gerd Höfer was born in Aschersleben, Germany on February 23, 1943.

Member of the German Bundestag (Social Democratic Party), Member of the Defence Committee and of the subcommittee “Development of Innere Führung”, Member of the Parliamentarian Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA/WEU), Vice President of the ESDA and head of the German delegation, Reserve officer (Major) and Deputy President of the association “Reservists of the German Bundeswehr“, Member of the board of the “German-Atlantic Association“, the Europaunion, and the German Parliamentarian Association for Foreign Policy (DGAP) Gerd Höfer, Author of “Europäische Armee − Vision oder Utopie?”, Hamburg 2009, 192 S., ISBN 978-3-939519-34-8

and oversee a tendering procedure. The impact on the arms industry, it must be said, would be profound. If it were merged into one European industry, only a few manufacturers of specific systems with their core areas of competence would remain intact, and national companies would, in some cases, become superfluous. One way to avoid this situation would be cooperative ventures, and branch factories are conceivable. In any event, there would be a better chance of competing with the strong U.S. arms industry.

Cooperation on material − for more efficiency As it is now common knowledge that the Member States lack armoured personnel carriers, protective equipment for troops, communication, command and control facilities, strategic air and sea transport, helicopters and other things, it seems obvious that these gaps should be filled jointly with the same types of equipment − one make of armoured personnel carrier for everyone, for example. The advantages would be larger production runs, lower unit costs and unified logistics, training and deployment criteria. The potential savings are considerable. The pressure to modernise offers a unique opportunity to establish the precursor to a European army for reasons of cost and to shape the harmonisation process within the European pillar of NATO. Or is the Berlin Plus Agreement worth no more than the paper on which it is written?

The Euro Corps in Strasbourg, comprising troops from all the participating nations, could become a model that would provide the core of a future European army. The European Defence Agency (EDA) could draw up the armaments plan and organise

The opportunities of a doctrine The same equipment means the same training, at least as far as practical training with the equipment is concerned. This would be the first building block in the creation of an operational doctrine for units and formations and the first steps towards a common training structure, in other words training establishments, for officers and NCOs. Initial moves have already been made in this direction: throughout NATO: officers attend the military academies of allied countries, and qualifications are mutually recognised. Cooperation is practised in multinational command structures and has generally proved successful.

Whether a culture of joint command will serve to foster the growth of a European military identity remains to be seen.

Military traditions in some European countries have developed in the course of centuries, but in some cases they have had to be reestablished, especially in the countries of Eastern Europe.

The first task is to identify what we have in common and nurture it, rather than cultivating the elements that divide us.

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Ideas such as the German concept of Innere Führung, combining leadership development with civic education and based on the ideal of the “citizen in uniform”, are not easily transferable to other countries. The role of the military enshrined in the legal systems of the various European countries is too diverse to be interchangeable.

The harmonization of legislation Not all Member States give their parliaments the power to veto the deployment of their troops, and in some cases the armed forces are under the direct command of the President of a nation, in which case the national parliament and its defence committee play a subsidiary role. The institution of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, in the form in which it exists in Germany, does not feature in any other country’s system of government. The rules governing the working hours of servicemen and servicewomen vary widely, as do disciplinary codes and leave entitlements. In some countries freedom of association and the right of military personnel to vote and/or stand for parliament are considered undesirable. In some cases, codetermination rights in official matters and participatory rights are unwanted or unknown. Harmonising the ways in which the law binds military personnel is one of the most difficult problems associated with common armed forces.

At the time when moves were afoot to form a European Defence Community, which ultimately came to naught, some preliminary studies were done on harmonisation of the rights of military personnel, and perhaps these can be revisited along with the report on the human rights of members of the armed forces which was adopted by the Council of Europe (Dec C 10861 at www.assembly.coe.int).

The European Pillar in NATO Although the 27 Member States of the EU accept NATO’s analysis of the present threat, they do not take joint decisions. Part of the reason for this is that not all of them are NATO members, just as not all NATO Allies are Member States of the Union.

Their membership of other organisations, such as the OSCE, WEU and the Council of Europe, highlights the existence of a web of bodies that consider themselves bound by diverse objectives, and so conflicting policies and duplication of effort cannot be discounted. Does NATO have a European pillar that would intervene if NATO as a whole were unwilling or unable to act in other words, can it act in the framework of the Berlin Plus Agreement? What about structured cooperation among the Europeans after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which has not yet been ratified? Shall we then have the sort of two-speed Europe in the realm of the ESDP that exists between the countries inside and outside the eurozone? Should Europe establish its own military headquarters, thereby duplicating

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command structures. Are the European battle groups and the NATO response force in competition? What is the EU position on Russia, particularly in the wake of recent events in Georgia?

Where does the NATO-Russia Council go from here?

Some Eastern European Member States of the EU attach greater importance to membership of NATO than to a ESDP, because they feel safer under NATO’s nuclear umbrella than in the EU structures. The Baltic States exemplify this attitude, but it is also shared by Poland. I believe these problems are surmountable, mainly because a strong Europe is in the interests of the United States, giving the latter more room for manoeuvre in the field of foreign affairs. In the same way, a strong Europe can wield its influence more effectively in the world and in trouble spots in its own neighbourhood.

How to compensate the loss of souvereignty?

It seems to me, however, that the main barrier to the establishment of a European army is the Member States’ fear of a loss of sovereignty. If we apply strict this very logic, Europe ought to have a Defence Minister, and political control should be entrusted to the European Parliament. Although the European Parliament has now set up a Subcommittee on Defence, which reports to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, it pays scant heed to military matters. Why should it do otherwise, indeed, when the Member States of the EU determine troop strengths and pay for their equipment? How are we supposed to have a European Defence Minister when the plan to create a European Foreign Minister has been dropped?

The fact is that we need not have everything at once. If the Member States, taking their cue from NATO, managed to agree on the capabilities that their armed forces should collectively possess, that would create an important basis; it would be a key task for the EDA. Every Member State would then know which capabilities it was to contribute and how much it would have to pay. The European Parliament can continue to collaborate on the CFSP and the ESDP, but the nations should also have a forum through which they can play their part. The European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of WEU would be a highly suitable forum for this purpose. It forms an important link between the European Parliament and national parliaments for exchanging information and gauging feelings and for shaping and implementing the ESDP. European armed forces can only grow from the bottom up.

Many crystallisation points are already there, and they should be utilised. I am convinced that economic pressure and the realisation that individual nations can no longer organise and pay for their own security will make the seeds grow. It will no doubt take a generation before the vision of a European army becomes a reality.

POLITICAL ISSUES

A European White Paper on Security and Defence is not sufficient

by Adrian Taylor, European School of Governance (EUSG), Berlin

Since the publication of the French White Paper on Security and Defence in June 2008 and its explicit support for an EU equivalent, the notion of such a European White Paper has gained wider currency. But would such a White Paper move forward the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)?

Whilst something needs to be done to jump-start a new round of integration, any such step must be thoroughly prepared in order to avoid provoking certain Member States from blocking the entire ESDP agenda. Moreover, it must not become an excuse to defer necessary changes that can be achieved immediately, without such a White Paper.

The current situation On the one hand, it can be argued that integration in security and defence has been surprisingly rapid: • following the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, some 22 EU/ESDP missions have been deployed around the globe. In addition, two “battle groups” (each of 1,500 men) are now available for rapid deployment; • there is an increasing recognition that security is not just about “tanks and bombs”, that internal security issues are linked to external ones, and that other EU activities, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, also play an role in enhancing security; • a number of “bottom-up” initiatives have started on joint procurement of equipment and joint training of troops, either on the intergovernmental level between Member States or involving EU institutions such as the European Defence Agency (EDA).

However, we should be perfectly honest in stating that the defence part of the ESDP is not impressive: • there is a difference of ambition between Member States who see the EU as a global player, and those who do not, and between those who see the ESDP as the start of a European army, and those who see it as a means to conduct a few peace keeping operations; • nine of the European missions since 2003 involved fewer than 100 people, and only five involved more than a thousand. Cynics ask, if these missions had not taken place, would the world really have noticed?; • the “battle groups” have not been called upon for any missions, and it seems unlikely that in current circumstances they ever will be − the rules of engagement are unclear, and in any case no country will allow “their” troops in a battle

Adrian Taylor Consultant Adrian Taylor was born in London, UK on March 1, 1966.

He is a self-employed consultant working on “4SING”: FORESight and Strategy for Security and Sustainability IN Governance. He assists public and private sector clients. Short-Service Limited Commission in the British Army (1985), Lobbyist on EU matters (1989-1992), Scenario planner in a joint venture with Global Business Network (1992-1995), Desk Officer for India at the EU Commission (1995-1999). Since 2001 he helped to develop and use a software package, most recently with the European School of Governance in Berlin. Adrian Taylor is Founding President of the European Open Source Intelligence Forum (ASBL) in Brussels (2006-2008).

group to be committed to a mission which they do not support, and given that the battle groups are multi-national, this means all the countries concerned must agree, and accept that their troops take the brunt of the risk whilst others not in the battle group do not contribute at all; • quite independently of the ESDP, the capabilities of European armies remain poor. Of the 64 strategic capabilities identified by the European Council as needing urgent attention, only 12 of the gaps listed have actually been plugged.

Moreover, over 50% of Europe’s defence budgets go on its soldiers, whereas only 20% of the US budget does, reflecting over-manning of duplicated functions and underinvestment in material and training.

What a White Paper could address In these circumstances, it is clear that considerably more effort is needed to make the ESDP credible, and specifically to allow the EU to fulfil the lofty ambitions expressed in the ESS. After all, the ESS echoes the tones of the USA’s security strategy, listing everything from combating non-proliferation to preventatively stopping states from failing, whilst not addressing the fact that the EU (as the EU) lacks most of the means to address these issues. It is unsurprising therefore that some people call for an EU White Paper to match means with ends.

Indeed, the symbolic value of an EU White Paper would clearly be powerful. For supporters, it would be a sign that the EU is acting just like any nation state when organising its defence and security policy, and hence it would be seen as an affirma-

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tion of serious intent. However, precisely for that reason, some “neutral” Member States, plus Denmark (with its defence “opt out”) and the UK may object fundamentally to such a White Paper being prepared, regardless of what it actually contains.

Looking into the contents more a White Paper could put a number of issues on the table, notably the: • aims and ends of the ESDP: At the very least this could imply putting the existing ESS into the context of existing relationships (e.g. with the USA and NATO), and for it could even involve staking out a claim to a much wider range of tasks up to and including territorial defence; • organisational and institutional architectures needed to meet the aims and ends listed: possibly shifting mandates of existing structures (e.g. creating a permanent EU HQ, reinforcing the European Security and Defence College), articulating the linkage of the ESDP to the European External Action Service (assuming the Lisbon Treaty is finally ratified), reinforcing the European Defence Agency, or establishing some additional agencies (e.g. a European Opens Source Intelligence Centre); • industrial, technological and human gaps to be bridged to meet the aims and ends listed: probably the area where most could be achieved, for the first time establishing the concept of a European industrial base for defence, setting objectives for greater coordination of security research and procurement, and anchoring joint training, the creation joint units and even commonly owned strategic assets (e.g. a European strategic airlift capability) into a strategic context rather than leaving them as “one-off” (mostly bi-lateral) initiatives.

Naturally any White Paper would only kick-off a debate, but not close it, and hence could be a useful catalyst for encouraging new thinking, and for formalising some existing practices.

However, the risk of it engendering an antagonistic fight should not be underestimated, especially not in a situation where economic slow-down may well exacerbate nationalist feelings in some Member States.

Lay the groundwork before the White Paper is published Hence, given the sensitivities involved, it is important to ensure that key political constituencies are first won over before the White Paper is published, so as there is a chance to discuss its contents without the whole exercise being overshadowed by controversy.

The key constituencies include: • NGOs and the academic/Think Tank community, as these actors are essential in communicating the importance of a change in security policy to decision makers and citizens.

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They will only be convinced of the need for change if the EU is ready to admit how radically the aims of the ESS are at variance with the capabilities of the Member States to deliver on these aims. This implies a much more wide-ranging review of the ESS than has been undertaken in 2008, as such an exercise would contrast the high flying aims of the ESS with the focus on Petersberg tasks and on the limited capability to execute any type of mission; • Industry, as large corporations have often been the most powerful lobbying block on change in the defence and security sector. They will only be won over to change if they can see how they will benefit from European integration in the security and defence sectors. A series of multi-stakeholder process across European frontiers would be necessary to prepare the way for this; • Ministries of Finance and of Defence as well as the armed forces, as these will be key actors in driving for (or resisting) change. They need to see that the “bang for each buck” is significantly higher if greater European integration takes place. To achieve this, the EU should nominate a trusted figure in the security community to conduct the equivalent of the “Ceccini Report” for defence, hence identifying the “Costs of Non-Europe”: in other words showing what we are losing by not integrating more radically, be it in terms of spending (for finance), or in terms of force efficiency and capability (for defence).

Keep on working Once the necessary political constituencies have been primed in this way, it should be possible for a White Paper to be the catalyst for useful change, just as Lord Cockfield’s White Paper on necessary measures to be undertaken to create a single European market once kick-started a stagnant EEC, especially with its creation of a deadline (1992), and then created an institutional dynamic which brought treaty change in the shape of the Single European Act. In no case should the possible future apparition of a Defence and Security White Paper be allowed to overshadow plans for concrete action on the ground now. Initiatives ranging from joint aircraft carriers through to the “military ERASMUS” programme should be encouraged to flourish, and under no condition should the arguments that will precede any White Paper be allowed to get in the way of such practical moves to improve Europe’s capability. With some luck, the current economic crisis may help in this, as it will sharpen the need for efficient spending in the defence sector, which should help pragmatic integration overcome purely ideological objections.

Building on this pragmatic cooperation, combining this with the groundwork listed, a White Paper would then bring considerable benefits.

POLITICAL ISSUES

EU-NATO Relations − grave deficiencies

by Hartmut Bühl, Brussels

Although the EU and NATO are still on speaking terms, their relationship has clearly seen better days. One of several major stumbling blocks seems to be the incompatibility between NATO and EU membership. The Turkish-Cypriot dispute, in particular, is a serious impediment to the development of EUNATO cooperation.

On 19 February 2009 the EU Parliament voted a resolution on EU-NATO relations for the first time and with a slender majority of only 10 votes after lengthy deliberation.

“The role of NATO in the security architecture of the EU” This is the title of a resolution adopted by the EU Parliament based on a report of the Foreign Affairs Committee and drafted

by Ari Vatanen, MEP reffered to.

The new security situation requires a closer partnership between the EU and NATO and closer cooperation in the fields of planning, technology, equipment and training. The security issues to be tackled include international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, organized crime, cyber threats and the deterioration of the environment. The main problems addressed in the resolution are: • The inefficient use of military capabilities affecting the functioning of both ESDP operations and NATO; • Disputes between NATO and EU members relating to the participation of Cyprus in EU-NATO meetings and the cooperation of Turkey in EU-NATO operations; • The EU’s limitations with regard to the setting up a crisis management mission due to its lack of a permanent planning and command structure (Operational Headquarter/OHQ); • Finally, the role of Russia for the EU

NATO − the core of military security • The resolution recognises the important role of NATO, in the past as well as today and that the future collective defence of the EU should, as far as possible, be organized in cooperation with NATO. “NATO forms the core of European military security” and the EU has sufficient potential to support its activities.

• The EU is described as a crucial NATO partner because of its specific combination of available, especially civil, instruments.

EU and NATO strategy should converge “The EU’s ability to build peace depends on the development of the right security strategy or security policy”. The two security strategies of NATO and EU should involve a partnership that

would be “complementary, but also convergent, each giving due weight to the potential of the other.” The EU and NATO should ensure effective cooperation by putting an end to institutional bickering. MEPs seek “more flexible, goal-oriented and pragmatic implementation of the EU-NATO partnership”.

Operational Headquarters The EP supports the establishment of a permanent EU Operational Headquarters, under the authority of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative “having, as part of its mandate, the planning and conduct of military ESDP operations”. The EU possesses expertise in planning and conducting civilian, military and civilian-military operations which no other global actor is currently able to conduct successfully.

Berlin Plus Agreement − a crutch The “Berlin Plus” arrangements allow the EU to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, and vice-versa. MEPs consider that EU-NATO cooperation within this framework needs to be improved “in order to allow the two organisations to intervene and effectively deliver relief in current crises which demand a multi-task civilian-military response”. Cooperation under “Berlin Plus” has not been working satisfactorily up to now, because of unresolved problems connected with the fact that some countries are members of NATO but not of the EU.

Against discrimination The resolution emphasises the need for compatibility between non-membership of one of the two institutions and membership of the other. All EU Member States must be present at joint NATO-EU meetings, without discrimination, and any NATO allies who are candidates for EU accession should be more closely involved in the work of the ESDP and the European Defence Agency (EDA).

The Turkish-Cypriot dispute is a waste of time Furthermore, the resolution deplores the fact that the TurkishCypriot dispute continues to seriously impair development of EU-NATO cooperation. It requests Turkey to “cease hindering the cooperation between the EU and NATO”.

The need for a broad dialogue with Russia The resolution calls for open discussion between the EU and Russia. Their dialogue should embrace “human rights and the rule of law, regional security, energy, missile defence, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the limitation of armed forces and space policy.”

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Commentary

NATO-Russia Relations: Press the Reset Button

by Harald Kujat, General ret.* missile defense provided the technology is proven and cost-efOn 28 May 2002 the Heads of States and Governments of the fective. He added that the US would do so in consultation with Alliance and the Russian President Putin signed the Rome NATO allies and Russia. As a consequence the fate of the Declaration, “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality”, that project is less certain with the new administration. The inteformally established the NATO-Russia Council, providing “a gration of the US systems into an anti-ballistic missile system mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, under NATO control and based joint decision, and joint action on NATO Rules of Engagement for the member states of NATO NATO-Russian relations a classical could be a solution to the and Russia on a wide specproblem if closely co-coorditrum of security issues in the crisis escalation pattern nated with Russia. Another Euro-Atlantic region”. The important signal is the US NATO-Russia Council would preparedness to negotiate a replacement for the START I “work on the basis of continuous political dialogue on security strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty, which expires at the issues among its members with a view to early identification of end of this year. And there is still the issue of the amended emerging problems, determination of optimal common apversion of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) arms proaches and the conduct of joint actions, as appropriate”. control treaty which needs a good will approach from both NATO and Russia to be resolved.

What is the outcome?

A few years later NATO-Russian relations could be seen as an excellent example of a classical crisis escalation pattern and a Positive signals from Russia demonstration of crisis management failure.

At the same time there are positive signals from Russia for a Russia opposes the deployment of US anti-ballistic missiles in return to business with NATO. The railway traffic light has been northern Poland with a linked radar site in the Czech Republic turned green for the US to support their forces in Afghanistan to protect against missile strikes from rogue states. Despite US across Russian territory. Russia could also be ready to halt the assurances that the missiles would not target their territory installation of their missiles next to Poland as a goodwill Russia describes the missile system as a threat to Russia’s gesture to the new US administration. And Russia seems to be nuclear deterrent. Russia responded by announcing plans to prepared to cooperate on a European theatre ballistic missile place Iskander nuclear missiles in the Russian Kaliningrad defense system under NATO control that includes US systems. exclave close to Polish territory.

After the Russian invasion of South Ossetia meetings of the Remaining contentions shouldn’t hinder to reset button NATO-Russia Council, the basis of “continuous” dialogue, NATO enlargement will, however, remain a contentious issue. have been suspended. Poland asked for US Patriot air defense Specifically the prospect of Georgian and Ukrainian NATO missiles and Russia and Belarus are planning a bilateral membership is interpreted by Russia as moving NATO closer to system to monitor and defend their airspace. their borders and perceived as a direct threat.

Although NATO meanwhile said they would re-activate the Given all the misunderstandings and the escalation of actions NATO-Russia Council things in the troubled Caucasus region and counteractions, it is time for a new beginning and revitalare not going well. Kyrgyzstan just recently announced that a ization of the spirit of Pratica di Mare, the Italian Air Force Kyrgyz airbase, used by the US as an important hub for the Base where the Rome Declaration was signed seven years ago. logistic support of their forces in Afghanistan, would no longer This may well have been on the mind of US Vice President be available. And Russia plans to establish an airbase and a Biden at the Munich Conference when he said that the last few naval base in Abkhazia and a military base in South Ossetia. years have seen a dangerous rift in relations between Russia and the members of the Alliance and that “ it is time to press the reset button”.

Encouraging signals from the USA There are indications that President Obama is determined to * Harald Kujat, born 1942, was Head of the German Forces from change that pattern and come to terms with Russia. US Vice 2000-2002 before having been elected Chairman NATO Military President Biden pointed out at the Munich Security Conference early February this year that the US will continue to develop Committee (2002-2005)

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SECURITY

Maritime Security Maritime Safety and Security as a central pillar of a comprehensive Security Strategy

by Dr. Markus Hellenthal, CEO Thales Germany, Stuttgart

Today, the world is displaying a single, global reality, which is − regarding security issues − manifesting itself in disguise of internationally operating ruthless, murderous terrorists and organised criminals. Their persistent attacks affect the entire international community and cause previously unknown damages and casualties.

Global dimension of new threats These threats are no longer isolated, stand-alone incidents, which can be tackled separately and consecutively. Countries and companies are on the contrary challenged with potentially tremendous damage and loss, which can grow out of patterns of interdependence. They neither stop at borders of nations nor of traditional organizational charts of security organizations. These threats have globally changed the perception and the understanding of security and the importance of resilience of modern societies at large as well as of companies and even individuals. In order to support our common endeavour to defend the shared values of our countries from terror and other criminals, societies must guarantee the availability and integrity of their security capabilities, and adapt their legal framework if need be.

A question of capabilities Improving our resilience against such diverse threats also means that public and private security providers need to continuously advance their capabilities, designed in a seamless and comprehensive way to permit taking necessary and appropriate actions. Security providers include law-enforcement authorities, fire brigades, civil defence organizations, search & rescue organisations, as well as military resources if need be, in particular with regard to logistical support, heavy vehicles or construction, engineering, decontamination and similar capabilities, which are otherwise attached and attributed to the military. Security providers are also private security companies or operators of critical infrastructures like harbours and associated industrial sites.

The terroristic dimension This is the interdependency, or rather integration with global-

Dr. Markus Hellenthal CEO Thales Germany Dr. Markus Hellenthal was born in Düsseldorf, Germany, on October 9, 1957.

He has studied law, socology and, as post graduade, public admnistration. He is Chief Executive Officer of Thales Germany and Senior Vice President of Thales. Prior to this, he held executive positions in the private and public sectors. As Senior Vice President, he was responsible for EADS business development for civil security solutions, worked as Partner with Accenture, a consultancy, and held various executive police functions in the German Ministry of the Interior. Dr. Hellenthal has been representing German industry as chairman of the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) and in other international bodies.

ization, of terrorists and other organized criminals. An example for this growing phenomenon is the prominent involvement of terrorist organizations in the production and distribution of drugs and their correlation with all kinds of enabling criminal activities and shadow facilitators, like money-launderers, weapon and alien smugglers, counterfeiters, etc. This also means that terror organizations get more and more independent from state support or subsidies and become businesses of their own, following their own agendas, which makes them even more dangerous for the community of free and democratic countries. And they use regular transportation means like container and ships.

In essence, our capability to respond depends essentially upon our ability to take the necessary actions, in particular towards ‘unplanned disruptive challenges’, such as: • To protect people and territories from terrorist and other criminal attacks as well as from man made or natural disasters as much as possible • To detect, deter, and pursue terrorists and other criminals and their supporters • To prepare for the consequences of an attack • To take the necessary decisions in case of alarms and emergencies

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casualties and inflicting catastrophic economic harm.

While the variety of actors threatening the maritime domain continues to grow in number and ability, they can be broadly grouped in 4 categories:

Harbour Security − a challenge.

Photo: Thales

• To respond adequately in case of attacks or other disruptive events It is essential that such actions have to rely upon adequate risk management procedures and techniques to anticipate, detect, identify, analyze, and mitigate relevant threats appropriately, decisively and effectively.

Understanding Maritime Security Along these lines, Maritime Security is not limited to Coastal Surveillance. The oceans, most of which are global commons under no state’s jurisdiction, offer all nations, even landlocked states, a network of waterways that are of enormous importance to their security and prosperity, connecting them to the world economy. They are likewise a source of food, mineral resources, and recreation, and they facilitate commerce among the international community.

Being aware of the importance It comes as no surprise that in today’s economy the maritime domain is of paramount importance, allowing all nations to participate in the global marketplace: More than 80 % of the world’s trade travels by water and forges a global maritime link. About half the world’s trade by value and 90 % of the general cargo are transported in naval containers. Yet 75 % of the world’s entire maritime trade and half its daily oil consumption pass through only a handful of international straits and canals.

Consequently, complexity and ambiguity are hallmarks of the Maritime Security environment Terrorism has come in as a non-military, trans-national, and asymmetric threat throughout the maritime domain that legitimate users of maritime resources persistently are confronted with. The maritime domain in particular represents not only a medium by which threats can move, but offers a broad array of potential targets that comply with the terrorists’ operational objectives of achieving mass

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1 st Category: Threats arising from international terrorism Terrorist groups have in the past repeatedly used shipping as a means of conveyance for positioning their agents, logistical support, and generating revenue. They have also taken advantage of criminal smuggling networks to circumvent border security measures.

Terrorists are able to develop effective attack capabilities relatively quickly, using a variety of platforms, including: - Explosives-laden suicide boats or light aircrafts, or - Merchant and cruise ships as kinetic weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility, or offshore platform, or - Commercial vessels as launch platforms for missile attacks, or - Underwater swimmers to infiltrate ports, or - Unmanned underwater explosive delivery vehicles, or - A vessel’s legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied natural gas, as the explosive component of an attack.

- Furthermore, mines have also become a powerful terrorist weapon because they are low-cost, readily available, easily deployed, difficult to counter and require minimal training.

2nd Category: Threats arising from trans-national, organized crime and piracy The continued growth in legitimate international commerce has been accompanied by an increase in the use of the maritime domain for criminal purposes. The smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, as well as piracy and armed robbery against vessels, pose an ever growing threat to Maritime Security.

Piracy and incidents of maritime crime tend to occur in areas of heavy commercial activity, especially where there is significant political and economic instability, or in regions with little or no maritime law enforcement capacity. The capabilities to board and commandeer large underway vessels can also be employed to facilitate illicit acts. Somalia is just one synonym for this phenomenon.

Just as the world’s oceans facilitate a nation’s overseas commerce; they also enable the import or export of illegal commodities. Maritime drug trafficking generates vast amounts of money for international organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations.

3rd Category: Threats arising from illegal seaborne immigration International migration, caused by a decline of social well-being or internal political unrest, has become common. It is a major challenge to regional stability, and it will be one of the most crucial aspects affecting Maritime Security throughout

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the next years. In some countries the collapse of political and social order prompts maritime mass migrations, such as the ones Europe is continuously experiencing from northern Africa.

As security in our ports of entry, at land-border crossings, and at airports continues to tighten, illegal traffickers consider our coastlines to be less risky alternatives for unlawful entry into our countries.

4th Category: Threats arising from environmental destruction Acts that result in environmental disasters can have far-reaching, negative effects on the economic viability and political stability of a region. Additionally, in recent years, competition for marine resources has resulted in a number of violent confrontations. These incidents underscore the high stakes for the entire world as diminishing resources, such as fish stocks, put increasing pressure on maritime nations to undertake more aggressive actions. Similarly, massive pollution of the oceans results in significant damage to ecosystems and undermines the national and economic security of the nations that depend on them.

The HMS Illustrious: part of the right mix.

Photo: Royal Navy

people and contraband are possible when using the seeming anonymity of containers. But the security of a port is not guaranteed by restricting measures only to the port itself.

Therefore the ISPS code and the Container Security Initiative require controlling cargo traffic not only between ports, but end-to-end: from the producer to the customer and from the initial point of departure to the ultimate place of delivery.

Counter acting on maritime threats In essence, the effective counter-management of these threats and crisis potentials is a highly complex task. The complexity and challenge stems from the need to simultaneously and collaboratively manage the “marine area of vulnerability”.

The objective of Maritime Security is therefore effectively policing maritime resources: from traditional coastal surveillance to providing comprehensive security not only in the immediate coastal regions but as far as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and even beyond. This includes critical marine facilities like harbours, but also refineries, offshore oil- and gas-platforms and pipelines within the sea and adjacent harbours, container facilities in harbours, etc., but also shipping routes as well as environmental and fishery control.

How to secure marine traffic and ports?

The criticality stems from the fact that the rules of maritime navigation are not as strict as those of air traffic. It is essentially free: except for straits, there are no channels through which cargo ships are required to pass, and where they could be inspected.

The challenging complexity of policing marine traffic significantly exceeds that of protecting ports alone. The security of ports, inasmuch as it is a confined area, can be managed like any other critical infrastructure, of course taking into account the specificities of high-speed movements of goods and in particular containers. The tremendous number of containers, growing annually at a rate of 6 to 7 %, is a source of tremendous uncertainty in terms of their content. Smuggling of drugs, weapons, or even weapons of mass destruction, but also of

Inter-governmental cooperation will be inevitable Inter-governmental cooperation will become a determining factor of global maritime security. The combination of extended surveillance capabilities, intelligence, coordination, and seamless collaboration is the main stake for the upcoming years. Finally, changes in legal provisions may eventually lead to the proper management of maritime traffic, similar to current air traffic control, thus improving identification of ships and cargo as well as preventively tracking their itineraries.

Our persistent vulnerability towards these interlinked, transnational threats vividly illustrates the fact that we can simply not afford not to invest in Maritime Security, since the price for un-preparedness and insufficient capabilities is not only much higher, but simply too high all together.

In Maritime Security, as is basically the case in all security domains, the addressee varies from country to country, depending on political and administrative organisation for the specific security requirements involved: from political representatives, like governmental officials and decision-makers, to military and civil forces, such as police, coast guard, or navy, and from industrial stakeholders, such as oil and petrol companies, to search & rescue organizations.

The area of maritime vulnerability Regarding the outlined ‘area of maritime vulnerability’ we can thus differentiate 4 strategic objectives: 1. Detect, deter, interdict and defeat terrorist attacks as well as criminal or hostile acts.

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2. Protect critical industrial infrastructure, key resources, transportation systems, borders, harbours, ports and particularly in the aspiring Arabic context, oil fields, oil refineries and other related infrastructures, but also tourist and recreation facilities.

3. Minimize damage and accelerate recovery from attacks or accidents through secured command, control and communication capabilities as well as a relevant Common Operational Picture or, short, Maritime Picture.

Transformation towards capabilities Faced with increased traffic and the impossibility of extensive maritime control, the combination of extended surveillance capabilities, intelligence, coordination, and seamless collaboration is the main stake for the upcoming years.

Countries should transfer this approach to the new civil security requirements, knowing that this is a more difficult undertaking since sensitive sovereignty rights, which lie at the foundation of the state-citizen relationship, are affected. In addition, in most if not all countries, the number of public and private security organizations, often including military organisations involved in civil security, is diverse and fragmented.

Therefore, based on the identified areas of vulnerability, a capability-related approach has to be implemented in accordance with the described persistent, manifold vulnerabilities of the maritime area. This means implementing a coherent and fully-integrated security architecture at least on European level, embedding at least the three segments: coastline, territorial waters (12-miles-zone) and Economic Exclusive Zones (200-miles-zone). This could eventually lead to the proper management of maritime traffic, similar to current air traffic control. By such means, identification of ships and cargo as well as preventively tracking their itineraries would improve significantly safety and security at sea.

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customers to provide long-range, lasting protection those segments.

Technological as well as operational expertise are both inevitable prerequisite to any advanced security systems, nevertheless it merely constitutes a vantage point. The true complexity rests upon the development and implementation of comprehensive solutions, integrating the variety of individual security components into one coherent system.

Such an undertaking requires a comprehensive transformation program, which in itself needs a significant and pro-active change management approach. This is not only valid for the people inside the security organisations, being involved in the transformation process, but also within the societies at large.

The security capability enabler Such a comprehensive transformation program should be supported by a capable “Security Capability Enabler”. He needs to master the relevant technologies and understand their functionalities and specifications as well as their respective interdependencies among each other as with the skills required on the end user side to tackle them; this includes processes and human skills.

In addition, the “Security Capability Enabler” needs to have strong skills in the domains of system architecture, system integration, program and project management, sourcing and vendor management, financial controlling, and, last but not least, quality control and assurance.

But most importantly, the “Security Capability Enabler” needs to be fully aware (“live, breath, feel and think end user”) of the end user’s operational or functional needs as well as the relevant hard and soft facts from an operational point of view and to be able to translate between these and systems requirements in order to match both to the satisfaction of the end users.

How to make it happen

A plea for a comprehensive approach

How can such security architecture be made successful? To make it happen, relevant state-of-the-art, innovative, and inter-operable supporting technologies are necessary in order to enable improved capabilities and resilience. This includes making existing systems of the various countries already in place to speak with each other. But the true complexity lies with the design and implementation of a comprehensive solution, integrating the variety of individual security components into one coherent system of system.

Thales maritime security solutions are aiming at exactly these sophisticated challenges of comprehensive blue border protection and security at sea, embedding the three relevant segments: coastline, territorial waters (12-miles-zone) and Economic Exclusive Zone (200-miles-zone) into one coherent, fully integrated security architecture. Thus we enable our

Just implementing an individual port security project does not enhance Maritime Security. What is needed is an overarching political and operational approach to enforce a global comprehensive security system, taking into account the various requirements of the many different stakeholders involved. This is not only true on the level of Nations (in Germany we still entertain a model case for fragmentation for policing land and sea), but also on European and global levels. We see many individual initiatives in the framework of EU, NATO, ASEAN, and others, but not a comprehensive approach, like we have for example in the airspace domain with global air traffic management regulations.

By this we might be able to enhance resilience of our societies with regard to Maritime Security through appropriate processes, technologies and innovation.

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Adequate forces and equipment for the right strategy

by Tim Mahon, Journalist, London

To answer the question “what forces are adequate” we should first look at the issue of the maritime threat and the strategies that are evolving to cope with it.

The means of Maritime Security The first point to make is that maritime security is no longer simply about major surface or submarine combatants battling it out on or under the high seas − if, indeed, it ever was.

Modern maritime security is a component of a renewed concern for overall national and infrastructure security that has become more important than ever since 9/11. Maritime security consists of the necessities to protect infrastructure, to defend national territory, to enable political power projection, to contribute to joint operations and expeditionary warfare and to provide maritime interdiction as well as to defeat hostile naval forces.

It is arguable that today the spectrum of maritime security missions is wider than ever before. There are increasing demands to contribute to an overarching security strategy designed to counter asymmetric threats from terrorist, criminal or other non-state actors.

This threat comes in many forms. Traditional ‘force-on-force’ naval operations are, perhaps, likely to be less common in the future than they have been to date, though they will still be inevitable. Much more attention will be focused on threats within the littoral area − whether the result of a need to combat incursions of a defending nation’s own territory or the result of operations in support of expeditionary warfare. The days of so-called ‘gunboat diplomacy’ may in theory be over − but a sensible maritime security strategy has to take into

Tim Mahon Jounalist Tim Mahon was born on March 27, 1957.

Journalist and business consultant specialising in defence and aerospace issues. European Correspondent for Training & Simulation Journal, he also writes for Defense News, C4ISR Journal and Armed Forces Journal. He has been published in a wide variety of other journals and magazines on subjects ranging from training development through international defence procurement and arms control. Tim Mahon has been engaged on consultative projects by companies representing all tiers of the industry and is also a member of the board of MRVI, LLC, a Florida-based manufacturer of unmanned surface vessels that specialises in COTS-based logistics for its manufacturing and service activities.

account the potential threat emanating from such a policy adopted by others.

Infrastructure security Infrastructure security has also become increasingly important − the protection of bridges, harbours, power stations, oil rigs and refineries, to name a few. Counter-terrorism and anti-narcotics operations have moved up the priority chain. Surveillance operations in support of the border security and immigration control agencies have also become more important in recent years. Finally, as asymmetric threats against targets of economic importance emerge, the necessity for a maritime strategy to contribute to overall economic and environmental security is also growing apace.

Having established the nature of the threat, perhaps we should examine briefly its possible dimensions.

The world boasts over a half million kilometres of coastline and thirteen of the world’s fifteen largest cities sit on or close to the coast. With increasing concentration of people in urban areas, it is already the case that over half the world’s population lives within 100 kilometres of the coast.

Dimensions of threat are unforeseeable

Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) part of the right mix of forces.

Photo: 5G Marine Systems

It is also worth mentioning an internal dimension to the threat. There is an old adage that a military force is too often prepared to refight the previous conflict, and that the recognition of new and innovative

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threat regimes is often low − especially in public opinion, which is an increasingly important part of the strategic decision-making process in our democratic European societies. Add to this the issues of conflicting priorities and the increasing austerity of defence and security budgets, and you have an internal threat to the evolution of a cohesive maritime security strategy that will continue to cause headaches for planners and force commanders.

At sea, the threat continues to evolve also. With increasing world trade and a considerable growth in passenger traffic on cruise liners and ferries, the risk of terrorist or criminal activities focused on vessels in transit has grown significantly. Although the incidence of piracy on the high seas has fallen recently − a total of 276 incidents worldwide in 2005 compared with 329 the previous year − the number of crew kidnapped or taken hostage rose to 440, the highest number since records began in 1992. Admittedly, the hot spots for these activities are outside European waters − but there must nevertheless be concerns regarding potential proliferation in the future.

Security definitions Security, of course, means different things to different people.

Some cultures react to security concerns by arming or equipping themselves aggressively, in the spirit of “offence is the best defence.” Increasingly, however, this has become an unacceptable escalation in the eyes of the general public and an alternative solution is in demand. The stark reality is that there is not a single, overarching solution that will address adequately the wide range of emerging threats. In addition, increased public scrutiny and concern over asymmetric threats in particular has resulted in the emergence of new sectors of the community that have a voice in the formulation of strategy.

Such a strategy needs to be multi-faceted, adaptable and flexible and − probably, given current resource limitations − modular in nature.

What might be an adequate force mix ?

There are as many answers, of course, as there are people asking the question. For some nations, a maritime strategy may well centre on the building of new capital ships. Great Britain is engaged in a project to build the future Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier − a vessel around which much of the Royal Navy’s future strategy will revolve. France’s recently published defence white paper allocates several million Euros to examining the prospects for a second aircraft carrier. China is reputed to be heavily invested in a project to develop an indigenous aircraft carrier for ‘offshore defence.’

But not every nation has the resources − or, indeed, the necessity or desire − to build large capital ships of this nature.

Leaving aside the issue of international collaboration within frameworks such as NATO and the European Union, individual

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nations may come up with alternative responses to tackle specific aspects of the threat. The US Navy’s Unmanned Combat Air System UCAS-D, currently in development under a 638 million dollar contract awarded to Northrop Grumman, is a prime example of such an alternative response.

Whether a 2 billion euro aircraft carrier or an unmanned aircraft costing several tens of millions is the right answer depends on the question being asked − and the threat level being addressed. There is no single “correct response” − no “staff solution.” There will be different force mixes required to counter differing levels of threat. One innovative response, for example, is the Unmanned Surface Vessel, or USV. The Interceptor and Eclipse USVs, developed by 5G Marine Systems in Florida, is designed specifically for harbour surveillance and asset protection. An innovative handling system gives this vessel potential to be deployed from vessels under way, thus expanding its potential role beyond the littoral.

The question of what is the right mix of forces is a complex one, deserving far deeper debate than is possible in such a brief paper. Not only are there the obvious operational considerations, but there are also the pragmatic issues of manpower availability, adequate budget and other resources and the issue of what the force is to be used for − does every nation need global reach? Does every nation have ambitions or a necessity for power projection?

A more flexible strategy New threats demand new solutions and the current situation − admittedly still an evolving one − demands a paradigm shift in strategic thinking. Operational experience shows that flexibility is perhaps the key military asset in greatest demand by operational commanders − and that flexibility becomes increasingly difficult to achieve when resources and facilities are under pressure from other areas of government. As in all aspects of modern military planning, maritime strategists have to tackle the problem of doing more with less − fulfilling a wider variety of demanding operational roles with increasingly scarce equipment assets and resources. It is also worth reflecting on the fact that practically all operations are now ‘joint’ − with consequent demands on interoperability, standardisation and harmonisation of operational characteristics, tactics and procedures. But there is an absolute imperative for action. Something clearly needs to be done, however, otherwise policy options might become severely limited. “Adequate forces and equipment for the right strategy” depends on the development of a cohesive and all-embracing strategy − an issue that we should not underestimate the difficulty of. It is completely appropriate that a forum such as this should devote part of its efforts to debating the complex issues surrounding the evolution of a European maritime strategy. But debate is only the first step: on the right way.

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ATALANTA − Europes first naval Anti-Piracy-Operation as part of ESDP

by Dr. Michael Stehr, Barrister, Troisdorf

Since 1991 Somalia is torn by inner conflicts between tribes, clans, warlords, political parties and religious militias. The year 2000 marks the beginning of significant activity of pirate gangs based at the coastlines of Somalia. The advance of ICU (Islamic Court Union), a religious militia relying on Koran and Sharia with origins in Puntland led to a sudden decline in pirate activities.

Piracy at the Horn of Africa Ethiopian army squeezed out ICU from the southern and central parts of Somalia and attacked them in their homelands. Pirate gangs regained territory again. 2007 and 2008 saw an unprecedented growth in pirate organization and activity. In 2006 only ten attacks were registered by International Maritime Bureau. The outcome of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the waters from southern coast of Somalia and the Seychelles is disastrous: 111 are registered, 42 Ships with 815 crew were kidnapped. December 31st still saw 13 ships with 242 crew in captivity as hostage. In 2008 41 ships of german shipping companies were attacked and 3 kidnapped by somalian pirates. Piracy at the Horn of Africa took on dimensions resembling the threat to sea lines of communication in the Mediterranean posed by barbary corsairs from 17th to 19th century.

Modern piracy has it’s roots in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines ). Somalia marks the signal for a new and threatening development. Somalian piracy is clearly a product of the inner conflicts and of a rotten economy. Militia men, clans and warlords began to use their fighting experience combined with the nautical skills of the somali people. The successes since 2007 led to a growth in numbers of involved persons from roundabout 100 in 2007 to 1.200 at the end of 2008 and a development of sophisticated criminal organizations. There’s evidence terrorist networks and shady sponsors started to support the pirate gangs with money and logistics necessary to buy weapons and equipment for their raids.

There’s a certain risk in this development not limited to Somalia. Shady investors may search for other coastlines were conflict, failing states and extreme poverty provide for lots of men who have not much to loose − their lifes only − but have much to win.

Dr. Michael Stehr Barrister Dr. Michael Stehr was born in Hannover, Germany, on September 13, 1966.

He is a lawyer with experiences as staff member of the scientific branch of the administration of German Bundestag.

Dr. Stehr is editor Law of the Sea for the German periodical MARINE FORUM since February 2000, www.marineforum.info ), dealing with Piracy and seaborne terrorisme, European Security and Defence Policy, International Law and Law of the Sea. Dr. Michael Stehr is board member of Euro Defense Germany.

Heads of State and Government during the European Council in Thessaloniki, Summer 2003, points out the necessity of an active security policy against threats posed by failed states, terrorism and organized crime. In a globalized world there are many restrictions to security policy actions by law, but almost no geographical limits for the various threats. The Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) connecting Europe and Asia are vitally important for Asia’s and Europe’s industrialized nations. One figure may illustrate the importance of maritime commerce: Suez Canal is passed by container carriers with a deadweight of 180 million tons every year in any direction.

European Councils decision No. 2008/851 from 10th of November 2008 is the mandate to escort vessels, repel pirate attacks and pursue suspects.

With “EU NAVFOR Somalia“ EU for the first time carries out the safeguarding of security interests in a global maritime context, far away from Europe’s peripheral seas.

“EU NAVFOR Somalia”/Operation ATALANTA “Secure Europe in a better world” the fundamental document presented by CFSP High Representative Javier Solana to the EU

The Tender ELBE was part of the German contribution during the first ATALANTA-Mission.

Photo: Behörden Spiegel

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Since 8th of December 2008 six naval vessels and some Maritime Patrol Aircraft conduct service under the rules of “EU NAVFOR Somalia“. German frigate KARLSRUHE was assigned to the operation following german parliaments decision of 19th December to support the action until it ends at 7th of December 2009. In February the ship was relieved by german frigate RHEINLAND-PFALZ.

How to fight the Pirate Gangs?

Intensified patrolling by the roundabout 20 vessels of the international naval force led to more aggressive actions of the pirate gangs. But they were not able anymore to conduct as many successful kidnappings as in the time from August to December 2008. To put it into figures: There were 17 assaults but only 3 successful kidnappings until January 30th. A german forces spokesman identified some new tactics of the pirate gangs well organized support structures.

Presumably, he said, somalian hackers successfully hacked EU’s Internet Anti Piracy Information System (which can be called by ships in distress) to throw the international naval forces off the scent.

How do the international naval forces with their roundabout 20 vessels work?

• Escort convois within the Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden; • Escort ships carrying goods for World Food Program of UN to bring supply to roundabout 2.5 million somali people; • Repel attacks, track and arrest raiders under use of deadly force.

It’s absolutely necessary to increase the pirate’s risks to be injured, killed or imprisoned. Until the end of 2008 they faced no real risk by the defenders of ships. But there’s another simple way to spoil the “piracy business” by: • patrolling the littoral waters of Somalia; • searching any dhow, trawler, skiff that can be grasped for weapons and other suspicious equipment, take the equipment away, sink the vessels and send the crews back to Somalia, unless there’s evidence they committed criminal acts (carrying arms at the high seas is not an offence). If roundabout 15 to 20 vessels would be employed in such an operation, the pirates will face real odds in conducting their plans.

ATALANTA − EU’s answer to an asymmetric threat Asymmetric threats pose a main challenge to EU’s security policy in 21st century. Two main non-state actors rise to fight nations and international community: terrorist networks and organized crime, regardless whether they earn their profits by smuggling drugs, people or arms, by blackmailing people or by kidnapping ships and crew. Nations all over the world have

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to deal increasingly with these challenges − and they are strongly advised to coordinate their activities globally. ATALANTA is an answer to one of these challenges and Europe’s first right step on the right way.

Documents Article 2 (Mandate) Under the conditions set by the relevant international law and by UNSC Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008), Atalanta shall, as far as available capabilities allow: (a) provide protection to vessels chartered by the WFP, including by means of the presence on board those vessels of armed units of Atalanta, in particular when cruising in Somali territorial waters; (b) provide protection, based on a case-by-case evaluation of needs, to merchant vessels cruising in the areas where it is deployed; (c) keep watch over areas off the Somali coast, including Somalia’s territorial waters, in which there are dangers to maritime activities, in particular to maritime traffic; (d) take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is present; (e) in view of prosecutions potentially being brought by the relevant States under the conditions in Article 12, arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery in the areas where it is present and seize the vessels of the pirates or armed robbers or the vessels caught following an act of piracy or an armed robbery and which are in the hands of the pirates, as well as the goods on board; (f) liaise with organizations and entities, as well as States, working in the region to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in particular the ‘Combined Task Force 150’ maritime force which operates within the frame work of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’.

On 8 December 2008, the Council of the European Union adopted the decision on the launch of its military operation: “in order to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast: This military operation, called EU NAVFOR Somalia-operation “Atalanta”, is launched in support of Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008), 1838 (2008) and 1846 (2008) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in order to contribute to: • the protection of vessels of the WFP (World Food Programme) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia; • the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.

This operation, which is the first EU maritime operation, is conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).”

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Border Security: FRONTEX is operational and steadily improving Interview with Ilkka Laitinen, Director FRONTEX, Warsaw

The European: Mr Laitinen you are the first Director of the European Agency for Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, called FRONTEX. What is behind this title and which are your responsibilities and your main tasks? Could you please describe the core FRONTEX tasks.

Ilkka Laitinen: Here you are FRONTEX in a nutshell: FRONTEX’s remit is to assist in all cross-border cooperation which national border guard authorities wish to carry out. FRONTEX carries out risk analysis, gathers, instructs and deploys experts as well as launches joint operations. The agency has a considerable role to play in risk analysis and in operational co-ordination of the national border guards.

Tasks of the agency can be divided into six main areas.

1. At the heart of all activities of the agency is carrying out risk analysis. Doing so we have to balance and prioritise the resources against risks so that it can ensure the right amount of protection for Member States without under-protecting, but also without overprotecting.

2. Coordination of operational cooperation between Member States in the field of the external borders management.

Using simple words: we coordinate Member States’ actions in the implementation of Community measures by introducing solutions allowing better allocation of national resources.

3. Assistance to Member States in the training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards. The Common Core Curriculum developed

by FRONTEX forms the basis of this system.

4. Next task is following up the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external border.

By carrying out this task, FRONTEX strengthens border control capabilities of the Member States through informing them of modern technologies and products available, as well as ensuring that specific interests of border guard authorities are properly taken into account in security research.

5. Assistance to Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance. In order to support Member States in exceptional and urgent situations rapid intervention packages were created in 2007, so called RABITs, the Rapid Border Intervention Teams. These corps are composed of national Border Guards having the right to act on the territory of other Member States.

6. Providing Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations. The role of the agency in

BrigGen Ilkka Laitinen Executive Director FRONTEX, Warsaw Ilkka Laitinen was born in Nurmes, Finland, on August 22, 1962. He is married, with two children.

He became promoted Brigardier General Boarder Guard in 2006.

Deputy Head of Division, Frontier Guard HQ (Director of International Affairs) 2002-2005; Counsellor (Justice and Home Affairs), Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union 2000-2002; Coordinator of the Frontier Guard Headquarters on Schengen and EU affairs 1998-2000; National representative at the Council WP Schengen Evaluation 1999-2005; Director of the EU Risk Analysis Centre (RAC) 2003-2005

joint returns is rather limited and concentrated on assistance to Member States. Besides, FRONTEX, together with the national experts, is identifying best practices on the acquisition of travel documents and the removal of illegal third country nationals.

The European: Everything you have mentioned is organized from your staff in Warsaw or do you have advanced parties? What about the material (airplanes, helicopters, vessels)?

Ilkka Laitinen: FRONTEX itself doesn’t possess a single piece of equipment that might be used for the border surveillance.

There is a tool helping us to plan our joint operations called CRATE. CRATE stands for Centralised Record of Available Technical Equipment which the Member States make available for the needs of a joint operation upon a request of FRONTEX or a Member State for a limited period of time. That the fact of putting a piece of equipment on the list doesn’t mean that the real deployment will take place. Every time we ask for a vessel or an aircraft the Member State has a right to refuse.

The European: But it is more than virtual. Could you speak a little about, how does this works in action. You did first experiences of European Patrols Network in May 2007 when your “Fleet” showed up in the Canaries Islands.

Ilkka Laitinen: Joint operations are planned in advance and are based on risk analysis provided by the FRONTEX Risk Analysis Unit. They can be of strategic nature like our flagship Annual

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operation. When there is a need for a joint exercise, FRONTEX manages Member States’ assets, supports communications, command and control as well as provides with tactical risk analysis during the operation. Also, FRONTEX covers as well up to 80% of costs. That would be all about the operational line of command.

The European: I think also about the institutional one.

Border surveillance.

Photo: FRONTEX

Risk Assessment or tailored assessments on specific phenomena or modus operandi. When the need for a joint operation is pointed out, an operational plan is devised.

The plan defines such elements as rules of engagement, the number of experts to be deployed as well as the type of their expertise. Furthermore, we have the number and type of the technical equipment necessary to perform border control, command and control model and so on. After having analysed this element we need to find Member States willing to send their means to a specific border section for a specific period.

The European: When everything is agreed and a schedule is ready, the real operational work starts. How is it looking like?

Ilkka Laitinen: It looks like regular border control activities enhanced by participation of experts and equipment from other Member States and Schengen Associated Countries. Sometimes the results of this cooperation are very tangible, like the operation “Hera” where the flow of illegal migration decreased by 60-70%, sometimes they are less visible.

The European: If I understand right, you are organizing the actions of member states. Which is your reporting line?

Ilkka Laitinen: Reporting line is clear, the hosting Member State is the leading one, while FRONTEX coordinates and covers the costs.

The European: Could you picture me the operational cooperation and division of roles between Member States and FRONTEX. I would divide this issue into two: performance and coordination.

Ilkka Laitinen: The performance part belongs to the Member States. They decide on participation in a joint operation, they provide operational assets, supply intelligence and co-finance up to 20% of expenses. Additionally, the hosting Member State takes responsibility for Command and Control. The other part − coordination belongs to FRONTEX. The agency decides independently on whether or not there is a need to start a joint

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Ilkka Laitinen: I am accountable to the Management Board, which is like “FRONTEX Parliament”. They decide about programmes of work, estimate budget or number of employees in FRONTEX. The Management Board is composed of heads of Border Guard authorities of the Member States and Schengen Associated Countries.

The European: What about relations to the EU institutions?

Ilkka Laitinen: Indeed, another important actors that FRONTEX stays in touch with are the Council and the European Parliament. These bodies are not directly involved in FRONTEX life but they decide about FRONTEX budget, they issue political guidelines and finally, from time to time, they task FRONTEX with specific assignments. FRONTEX keeps close contact with the Council and the European Parliament participating regularly in Council working groups and presenting its activities to the European Parliament committees. With whom we work on a daily basis in different areas of our activities is the European Commission.

The European: Another activity you mentioned within your responsibilities is your obligation to support member states in situations where an inflow of immigrants is appearing to the borders and if those member states don’t have own means to protect their borders. The famous RABIT (Rapid Border Intervention team) is helping?

Ilkka Laitinen: There are over 600 highly specialised border guards from Member States and Schengen Associated Countries who are available for deployment in case of urgent and exceptional situations. We keep them in good shape. They undergo consistent training and participate in regular exercises based on realistic scenarios. We keep them fit to stand ready to respond to a possible crisis.

The European: How does it work?

Ilkka Laitinen: FRONTEX receives a request from a Member State to deploy RABITs. Then we analyse if the situation is indeed urgent and unforeseeable, Risk Analysis Unit prepares a situational picture together with recommendations. With this information at hand I decide whether the deployment should

SECURITY

take place or not. If the decision is positive FRONTEX, together with a requesting Member State, drafts the operational plan, defines profiles of experts that will be deployed and informs selected RABITs about details. They must be in place in few days. In that time the requesting country deploys national reserves in order to guarantee the continuity of performance of border control.

The European: Another mission is the training of policemen for border guarding. Is the training centralized, which technical help do you use to achieve which objective?

Ilkka Laitinen: Training of border guards is one of our priorities; this is second biggest position in our budget just after joint operations. A well-functioning Integrated Border Management model and participation in joint operations coordinated by FRONTEX require that all border guards in Europe “speak the same language”. They need to share the same professional knowledge and best practices. They face the same challenges in all EU countries: illegal migration, human trafficking, use of forged documents or night aerial patrolling. This is the reason to create common training curricula and specialised training tools for all EU border guards.

The European: Do you use simulation devices?

Ilkka Laitinen: FRONTEX aims at improving the professionalism of Member States’ border guards by encouraging them to use similar methods, applying the same standards and undergoing common training. On the way to a functioning interoperability FRONTEX develops common curricula, such as Common Core Curriculum. This is like a training constitution, fundamental skills for each and every border guard. Apart from basics, there are also specific needs and specific training tools such as Air Crew, Dog Handlers or Documents Examination training. All those tools and curricula are developed with national experts and support of 11 FRONTEX Partnership Academies. Training provided by FRONTEX is the “training for trainers” type but there are certain courses provided directly to national border guards.

The European: May I come to migration: You are charged to do risk studies concerning migrants. Which are the results of those analyses. Whith whom do you share theme? Are you collaborating with Europol?

Ilkka Laitinen: Yes. I will focus maybe on the big picture, the EU as a whole. I can say that there are four broad zones where FRONTEX currently focuses its joint activities. These are the eastern land borders, the south-eastern land and maritime borders, so called Balkan route, the Mediterranean and West Atlantic maritime routes and the international airports of the

FRONTEX Headquarters in Warsaw.

Photo: FRONTEX

Member States. In respect of the first, the eastern land borders, we see an overall decrease in the numbers of detected illegal migrants although the pressure from illegal migration flows still remains.

The European: And how about the Balkan route and the Mediterranean access. Are there increases?

Ilkka Laitinen: The Balkan route is located at one of the key nexus points Turkey to Greece and in particular Albania to Greece. We have observed an increase in numbers of detected illegal migrants during 2008.

The central Mediterranean maritime route has also seen drastic increases in 2008, with more small and unseaworthy boats reaching Lampedusa from Libya. This is possibly a negative result of the success in stemming the illegal flows to the Canary Islands. Without the cooperation of the Libyan authorities, it is proving difficult to prevent these flows or, once the migrants are detected, to return them.

The European: Which are the grey zones?

Ilkka Laitinen: Yes, the fourth zone I have mentioned was the EU international airports. Here we enter indeed into a grey zone as we cannot make high probability assessment… Probably, this is the biggest entry point for persons illegally staying in the EU. How is it possible? They simply enter legally and overstay their visas.

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The European: You are supposed to get more and more important for Europe. Will the Agency change into an EU-organisation?

All terrain mobility in border surveillance.

Photo: FRONTEX

The European: Do the nations send insufficient data?

Ilkka Laitinen: We are constantly working on improvement of analytical methods in order to create accurate, reliable picture of the external borders. We receive eight categories of data from Member States covering illegal border crossings, facilitators apprehended or number of forged documents detected.

But this is the tip of the iceberg. Apart from this solid data, analytics need to study national legislation, political situation in transit countries and countries of origin and many, many other factors. The big question for the analytical community is how to assess dark figures? Anyway, even with those unanswered questions the agency has a considerable role to play in risk analysis field. There are certain issues that cannot be sufficiently satisfied by the Member States and can be better approached by FRONTEX at the Community level. Strategic risk analysis is one of them.

The European: Mr Laitinen, with the creation of FRONTEX the EU Member States have found an excellent balance between governments and community responsibilities for the border security. This allows you to organise together with the member states a rather perfect control of borders concerned, and EU is running any political risk?

Ilkka Laitinen: Perfect control of the external borders is a concept to which we are heading, that’s for sure. We are neither close to that model nor far from it. We are on the way. FRONTEX is a European facilitator and coordinator, an agency that helps law enforcement authorities from all EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries to work together. Member States are, of course, still responsible for the control of the external borders. FRONTEX is not, by any means, to replace them.

We can enhance and complement the national efforts of Member States. As you are aware Member States are not legally obliged to participate in the cooperation coordinated by FRONTEX. This is one of the main challenges for us, to attract them.

You asked about political risk. I would approach this issue from a different angle. In order to keep away from any risks we should keep on increasing cooperation between Member States coordinated by FRONTEX.

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Ilkka Laitinen: Is it a camouflaged question on European Border Guard corps? As a former border guard with more than 20 years of professional experience I can say that we are on the right path. On the one hand we have Member States performing their border control duties, on the other hand we have cooperation at the European level. Cooperation is being shaped in order to increase efficiency and interoperability. There are certain solutions of systemic, permanent character like the European Patrols Network or Focal Point Offices. Both projects enable the synchronization of national measures of the Member States and their integration to joint European activities.

The European: Could you reflect the most essential principles?

Ilkka Laitinen: To put it briefly: What is needed at the European level is done at the European level, what can be dealt at the national level is dealt there. We can say that the border management thinking in the EU reflects basic Community principles on subsidiary and proportionality.

The European: What was the reason for manipulation against FRONTEX in 2006. Human rights questions or the reproach of antiracism?

Ilkka Laitinen: Human rights questions are present always where law enforcement authorities are involved. In order to avoid any misconduct, proper rules need to be introduced and people need to be trained. This is what we do everyday in our operational plans and training curricula. We also cooperate with different Government Organisation like UNHCR, IOM or EU Fundamental Rights Agency in this respect. I don’t feel that people accusing FRONTEX of human rights’ violations are really aiming at FRONTEX. They protest against the European migration policy, asylum policy or violations of human rights committed by people in different Member States. It is much easier to find one entity that could be blamed for everything. Attacking all law enforcement authorities in all Member States would not be so simple; therefore FRONTEX is an easy target. FRONTEX always takes seriously all allegations of human rights’ violations committed during FRONTEX-coordinated operations.

Every possible effort is always made during our activities to ensure that the fundamental rights are respected at all times by all national border services participating. However, it is worth to remember that FRONTEX powers are limited as the agency is neither a regulatory body nor an investigative one.

The European: Mr. Laitinen, my congratulations for your spirit of endeavor combined with success. My sincere gratitude for this interview.

SECURITY

Security Network Innovation − Macedonian’s contribution to the European Union

by Dr. Pande Lazarevski, Director Crisis Management Center of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje

The Crisis Management Center (CMC) of the Republic of Macedonia, a civilian governmental authority, plays a central role in the Crisis Management System (CMS) and is responsible for prevention, early warning, management, and mitigation of the consequences associated with natural and man-made accidents and disasters affecting citizens and critical Infrastructure, as well as for securing timely and quality risk assessment.

Reforming the Crisis Management System Presently, CMS is scheduled to undergo legal and structural reform to improve the system, avoid unnecessary duplication of its resources, and to achieve greater cohesiveness with EU standards and practices. The CMS is, de facto, the third pillar within the architecture of what might be visioned as the national security system of the Republic of Macedonia (in addition to the ministries of defense and the interior, in charge for the military treats and the public order and fight against org. crime and terrorism, respectfully), thus completing the Macedonian security triangle.

The Principle of Functional Interconnection Facing limited resources, no single institution can effectively meet these challenges on its own. CMC recognizes the immense potential of specialized multi-sectoral crisis management networks in efficiently utilizing the restricted assets.

Each network, incorporating various governmental and non-

The geopolitical situation of Macedonia.

Dr. Pande Lazarevski Director of the Crisis Management Center of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia Dr. Pande Lazarevski was born in Bitola on September 13, 1960.

In his career he was among others Professor of Public Policy, Politicy Analysis and Research Methodology, Skopje and he was Director of the Institute for Sociological, Political and Legal Research, Skopje. Pande Lazarevski did further political studies in Pittsburgh and Ohio, USA and was Advisor to the President of the Republic of Macedonia (2001) and is acting Advisor of the Prime Minister since 2005. He was decorated with ”Chevalier dans l’Ordre des Palmes Academiques”, France 2002.

governmental entities from local and national levels (NGOs, academic community, as well as both private companies and public enterprises), covers a specific set of risks and disasters.

As a result, instead of seeking costly new capacities, CMC introduced an innovative system that interconnects and modernizes the existing resources.

The Various Networks Committed to greater reach and efficiency, CMC established networks with most of the ministries and public agencies; all eighty-four municipalities and the City of Skopje (country capital); seven state and private universities in the country; and, over forty relevant NGO federations, thus putting high on its agenda the engagement of volunteer groups and strong presence of NGO sector. Furthermore, all CMS network entities will take part in the activities, depending on the nature of the risks and threats, thus boosting institutional and operational synergy among the constituting stakeholders.

The Coordination among CMS network entities primarily aims to link governmental and non-governmental institutions on both local and national levels that are responsible for response.

As a prerequisite for effective and efficient response, CMC network entities are in the process of developing join approach in preparing plans for institutional capacity building relevant to crisis management, including the development of internal standardized operational procedures (SOPs), inter-op-

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CMC is developing a concept for a virtual Crisis Management Academy (CMA), employing the existing educational facilities nationwide.

Further more, we are open to the idea of an enhanced CMA by upgrading it with a modeling and simulation system that can provide standardized crisis management training of all directly involved participants, especially in the field of performance, command and control system. Having in mind that training through continuous simulation should reflect the level and the need of CMS participants, CMC is looking forward to expand the knowledge and skills of all those Coordination among different CMS entities will be established that will undergo the crisis manregarding the following potential disaster areas: agement training. erability tools and join approach in public relations. The overall CMC approach is primarily based on civilian resources, with legal possibility to engage the military in a case of formally declared state of emergency/crisis.

Since good government exists for the well-being of its citizens, CMS networks leans on the concept of mutual responsibility, supported by effective governance, responsible citizenship and public-private partnership. In the same direction are the steps towards establishing common institutional and legal

Epidemics

Epizootic Epyphytotic Forest fires

Enviromental hazards related to the pollution of water, soil, air

Natural disasters: earthquackes; floods; blizzards, strong wids; landslides; drought; extremly high temperatures; freezing temperatures

CBRN contamination due to: • Industrial accidents • accidents caused by transport of hazardous materials • acts of terrorism

Disfunction & destruction of telecom & IT infrastructure

Simulation and modeling

Also, we expect that a modeling and simulation system could be efficiently applied in the domain of developing disaster management plans, decision support systems (DSS), risk scenarios, as well as post-disaster forensics.

Disfunction of the critical Protection of Major accidents and disasters in the domain of the traffic infrastructure infrastructure in the cultural and and the transport of passengers and goods Furthermore, a modeling and domain of: historical simulation system would support • Water supply heritage Road traffic Railway traffic Air traffic the establishment of a national • Sewage Consequently, CMS network entities will be engaged in developing: • Electrical power crisis management coordination • Risk analysis & assessment methodology • Disaster management plans, staffing, • Waste management platform. Finally, it will provide • Hazard mapping & risk assessment training, drills and equipping • Risk scenarios interoperability with the relevant institutional EU and NATO settings additionally to extanding coordination efforts and mutial support with the neighboring ground for the Crisis Management Center and the Rescue and countries based on high-tech solutions.

Protection Directorate, both governmental institutions that Prevention begins with knowledge. CMC is building a network share different aspects of the same area of responsibility. to promote the culture of safety and resilience by developing CMC coordinates its actions on all administrative levels. To an active campaign for raising public awareness. It is closely further this end, a municipal network is started, aimed at collaborating with local and national media by planning a developing and strengthening cooperation towards effective prevention, early warning, crisis management, protection and year-around focus based TV debates on crisis management rescue of people and goods, and mitigation on the local level. issues.

For this end, it will be necessary to bring all activities as close as possible to the people and their immediate surrounding.

Technical Resource Networks CMC is establishing a National Laboratory Network (NLN) through a functional interconnection of the professional and Human Resource Networks technical potential of forty laboratories (at the Academy of CMC acknowledges importance of adequate human resources to run an effective CMS. As a result, setting up a national crisis Science, universities, state institutions and private compamanagement educational and training network is in progress, nies), their infrastructural capacities, equipment, and expertincluding universities, vocational schools, and other educaise. The result will be a powerful laboratory network that can tional institutions, such as the Military Academy and police provide reliable data and expertise, support prevention, assist training facilities by planning to interpolate crisis management mitigation, as well as provide a variety of forensics. modules in their existing curriculums. Therefore, instead of Furthermore, together with the academic community, CMC dissipating money on a new, but costly training institution, took the initiative to start a National Disaster Management

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THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Center of Excellence (DMCoE) with nineteen focal areas concentrating on expertise and research projects as well as educational programs, providing robust expert support.

Consequently, we expect these innovations consisting of the (virtual) Crisis Management Academy, National Laboratory Network and DMCoE, in addition to the overall networking approach, to become regional and European crisis management benchmarks.

E-112 in 2010 The crisis management center is making an important step towards fulfilling EU standards by introducing the universal European emergency number 112, thereby implementing the Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications, networks, and services.

By the end of 2010, E-112 is supposed to be completed.

Supportive to E-112 is the concept of using media (TV and radio) and mobile phone operators by sending pre-fabricated messages providing pre-disaster warning, post-disaster announcement and messages containing information and guidelines for the citizens in the affected areas.

Overall, CMS, and the activities explained before, contribute to strengthening the institutions themselves. Finally, recognizing inspection as a strong instrument for prevention while having in mind the multi-disciplinary nature of potential accidents and catastrophes, CMC has initiated the establishment of national disaster management inspectoral network, aiming to provide coordination and joint approach across inter-ministerial lines.

8th Congress on European Security and Defence Berliner Sicherheitskonferenz

A new Spirit for the EU Security Strategy – starting into a realistic dimension 8 - 9 December 2009, Berlin Congress Center (bcc)

Widen the scope to the region Creating new resources and capacities often implies duplicating them. Since the Republic of Macedonia possesses limited assets, the economical and systematic utilization of these resources is imperative. The functional interlinking of the existing capacities is an efficient and financially sustainable solution. Thus, the networks and networking are the first and last idea underlining this approach and endeavor. All it takes is adopting a holistic approach, thus creating a new quality that surpasses the simple sum of the constituent elements.

Since none of these problems recognize national borders, we believe that the networking should continue to the regional and wider scope, connecting with existing NATO and EU structures. We consider that this is the best way for the Crisis Management Center and the Crisis Management System to fulfill the mission.

* Greece is accepting the Republic of Macedonia under the UNmembership registration of “Former Yugoslavian Republik of Macedonia” (FYROM)

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Main Topics • Strengthening Europe's Security and Defence Capabilities • The use of Space for Europe's Security • EU Civil Operations – more challenges than solutions • Masterplan for the Balkans • EU and NATO – harmonization of responsibilities for Security and Defence • Transatlantic Armament Cooperation • The European Defence and Technology Industry Base (EDTIB) • Russia − a reliable Partner for Security? www.euro-defence.eu

INDUSTRIES

A Plea for organized cooperation between transatlantic industries for Security and Defence An exchange of views between Hartmut Bühl and John Brooks, President Northrop Grumman International, Washington

The European: We meet today to continue our exchange of views on transatlantic cooperation we had immediately after your speech held on the 7th Berlin Congress on Security and Defence on 10 November 2008, where more than a thousand participants gave you standing ovations for your extraordinary speech combining history, political reality and let me say emotion.

John Brooks: Indeed, the Berlin Congress was an inspiring event for me, but Berlin is a good ground for all of us who care about history. And maybe I profited from the spirit resulting from the election of our new president some days before.

All over the 20th century the United States had been a decisive factor for making peace, for saving peace and for the democratic development. The main geopolitical, security and economical interest of US policy was Europe and the interests on both sides of the Atlantic had been converging.

John Brooks President, Northrop Grumman International, Inc. Joined Northrop Grumman in September of 2000 and most recently served as Business Development deputy responsible for the Washington D.C. office and director for Air Force and Air National Guard programs.

Before joining Northrop Grumman, John spent 28 years in the U.S. Air Force, retiring as major general and special assistant to the chief staff Air Force. Prior he has commanded two airlift wings, an airlift operations group, as well as the Air Command and Staff College and Squadron Officer School. He has also commanded one joint task force. He was a command pilot with approximately 3,500 hours in strategic and tactical airlift aircraft. Among his awards and decorations is the Legion of Merit.

The US − Europe partnership was decisive

The European: And in doing so, they changed the world.

The European: I support this analysis. The US had been vital in the second half of the century for the western democracies and a hope for those which had been under the yoke of communist regimes. Liberty prevailed. Now the vital interests have changed on both sides of the Atlantic and the enlarged Europe “under construction”– has become more united and self confident.

John Brooks: It is accurate to say that the last century was largely focused − politically and economically − on the “western world”, that means Western Europe and the United States. While those areas remain important, both politically and economically, other areas − for example, the Gulf, Asia and the Pacific − demand greater attention than in years past.

John Brooks: I do believe the decisive factor in the 20th century for making peace, saving peace and for democratic development was the partnership of the US and Europeans.

The US certainly played a very significant role. But it was the partnership that was decisive. In the first half of the last century, it was the alliances that endured and succeeded in each of two horrific world wars. In the second half, it was NATO which endured and succeeded in the Cold War. I think, more important strategically − was the Berlin Airlift as you say “Die Berliner Luftbrücke”. In that crisis, recent adversaries came together to stand for peace and democracy. They stopped the seemingly inexorable march of Soviet occupation across Europe.

The European: Yes, certainly, there is continuous development of identity in Europe, a real success story, but Europe is still too much depending on the United States especially in the sector of security and defence. Europe had too long been aligned to the US as the “unique leader” in defence through NATO. When you are looking to one of the decisive players the security and defence industries European Union Defence Industries yet is still far away to be a genuine competitor in the single US market.

Successful in the US John Brooks: That diversification I mentioned has for sure implications for the defence and security industry. While US

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industry remains fully engaged with traditional allies in Europe, we are building relationships with newer allies to meet emerging security requirements in other regions as well.

Nations all over the world now face a range of daunting threats and need help in successfully deterring those threats.

But it is not just a diversification for US industry. We see European industry active − and successful − in many relatively new markets, and we see European industry very active and successful in the US market.

The European: John, don’t believe that diversification is the sole reason.

John Brooks: There have been changes in recent years, including consolidation and technological advances in European industry which have increased their competitiveness worldwide. With that has come greater success in the US market.

Sometimes that success comes in partnership with US companies, for example in the case of Northrop Grumman and EADS teaming for the USAF tanker program. Sometimes it comes with European companies standing on their own, for example in the case of the EADS Light Utility Helicopter. Companies like EADS and BAE Systems, Finmeccanica and others have proven they can win programs in the US when they bring market-leading capabilities. As we look ahead, I believe there is both constant and change. The change is the diversity of threats and of areas of concern. The constant is that to meet the threats, transatlantic partnership and cooperation is essential. No company − and no country − have a monopoly on leading edge capabilities.

The European: You mentioned the rather successful NGC-teaming with EADS. Looking ahead it would be interesting to know better the background of the policy design of your company.

I imagine that there is a secret behind this co-operation beyond the commercial.

John Brooks: We believe in partnering whenever and wherever it makes sense and we believe in transatlantic cooperation. As you suggest, we have worked together with EADS on a number of programs on both sides of the Atlantic. I believe there are several reasons why just this relationship has been effective.

First, the two companies complement each other well. Each has world-leading capabilities which can be brought together in synergistic ways. One example is Northrop Grumman’s proven ability to militarize commercial aircraft and EADS/Airbus’s state of the art commercial airliners combined to produce a superior tanker offering.

Another is NG’s unique unmanned aircraft capabilities and EADS’s ability to integrate sensors and information into Eu-

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ropean systems which will pay off in a variety of ways. But beyond the complementary capabilities are underlying relationships. The two companies know each other. Years of partnership on a variety of programs have produced a level of communications and trust that allow us to work through difficult issues. And there will always be issues with collaboration. But we have proven that we can surmount those issues and succeed.

The European: That very specific relationship might be exemplary. Normally the added value for our societies of a more intense cooperation between the security and defence industries on both sides of the Atlantic is not always visible. Europeans normally reproach a protective attitude to the US and vice-versa the US industries are reproaching protectionism .

Economic crisis’ impact John Brooks: As we look across the transatlantic community, there are powerful technologies and capabilities both in Europe and in the US. It always makes sense to pursue ways to bring together these market leading capabilities and optimize them for individual customers, while ensuring they are interoperable with the Alliance and key coalitions.

But in the challenging economic times that we will face for some years to come, it is more than just useful − it is essential. Otherwise we will waste vast sums in quixotic efforts to invent things that already exist. And the price paid for that will be huge − in money wasted, but more important in forces that do not get the tools they need to effectively protect our security The European: Thus, you are confident but you are feeling that this question still is to be answered.

John Brooks: For sure, there will likely be some market contraction − though the effects of that may be uneven. Whether European companies will commit more aggressively to the US market, or take a more conservative approach remains to be seen. I suspect that companies − whether US or European − will be focused on managing risk.

The European: To be honest, I believe that we are running the risk of the protection of national industries.

John Brooks: I also believe that there will likely be some who use the economic crisis to advocate protectionism − economic nationalism. That would be exactly the wrong answer! In difficult economic times it is more important than ever to capitalize on collaboration. When funds are particularly dear, they cannot be wasted researching capabilities that an ally has

INDUSTRIES

time and effort. But it is possible. The recent C-17 agreement proves that − and we certainly hope AGS soon follows. Common funded or joint funded procurement has never been the norm for the Alliance − it has been the exception. But it is a necessary exception. There are some capabilities which are difficult or impossible for many of the NATO nations to field independently, but which can be achieved by members of the Alliance coming together. AWACS and AGS are two great examples.

Berlin Airlift “Die Berliner Luftbrücke” 1948

already developed. Economists agree − economic nationalism is a recipe for economic problems. Hopefully, political leaders will not be seduced by protectionist rhetoric. No doubt, they are “well intentioned”. And economic concerns may cause some to think that protectionism is an effective response. It is not. Political leaders will always factor in such things as jobs and economic impact and they will advocate the interests of their constituents.

But national protectionism leads to global protectionism. It denies our militaries the best capabilities. And it ultimately denies our industries opportunities and growth − and thus puts at risk jobs − by diverting energy and funds into secondrate efforts instead of pursuing areas in which they can lead. In those areas where someone else has a clear lead, their efforts should be more focused on how to tailor and optimize those capabilities for their nation and environment.

Is NATO’s able in settling big transatlantic cooperative projects?

The European: Over long decades NATO was the place to settle cooperative products. The success story of AWACS is well known, but this was in the 70th with a programme to which the Europeans could join. On the other hand we know also the never ending story of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) where NATO over nearly two decades was not able to handle an important project Integrating 23 volunteer nations. I don’t believe that NATO will be in the future an essential driver for common innovative products over the Atlantic?

John Brooks: I believe NATO remains the foundation of transatlantic cooperation and that it is, as it has been, the most important strategic alliance in the world − the most important strategic alliance in history. NATO procurements are not easy.

Achieving consensus among the nations takes considerable

The European: You might be right, that NATO continues to be the great integrator if there is a product (AWACS and C17), but I fear the structures of NATO are not adapted and have to be changed in the field of procurement for launching a project from the scratch as the former AGS Mixed fleet concept.

John Brooks: So we diverge, but please keep in mind: NATO procurement is not the only way the Alliance drives common products − or even the primary way. NATO standards play a vital role in standardizing interfaces and interoperability.

New impetus for transatlantic cooperation by the Obama administration ?

The European: The United States have a new administration working since the end of January. What are your wishes in the field of transatlantic industry cooperation on Security and Defence?

John Brooks: President Obama has just taken office − and his national security and diplomatic team is still taking shape. It appears to be an experienced team that understands the importance of transatlantic cooperation very well. President Obama underlined the need to work effectively with allies − which would suggest greater focus on communication, cooperation, and collaboration.

The European: And in terms of industry cooperation?

John Brooks: Our wish is that those bureaucratic barriers that sometimes add needless complications to cooperation would be examined and streamlined where appropriate. In particular, we’d like to see the Administration take a hard look at the export control process. We need a more coherent and timely process to make the determination of which technologies need protection. Beyond that, we look forward to increased focus on cooperation − which can benefit our forces and our economies on both sides of the Atlantic. Final agreement on fielding AGS would be a good start!

The European: Thanks John, we will take stock in one year.

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The defence package: An important step towards a better ESDP

by Alexander Graf Lambsdorff MEP, Brussels

There are currently thirteen EU-operations across the globe − civilian, police and military − in which forces of our Member States cooperate to help delivering peace, stability and security. Nine missions have already been successfully completed.

This makes the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) somewhat successful. Nonetheless, the multitude of crises around the world upon which the EU is widely expected to act and help is constantly growing.

Without interoperable high-quality equipment, Europe arguably lacks the capacity for meeting these demands. Yet, the market and industrial base in Europe that could provide for such equipment is thus far highly fragmented − 27 Ministries of Defence work on 89 different (often similar) R&D programmes, compared to a mere 29 in the USA.

Alexander Graf Lambsdorff Member of the European Parliament Count Alexander Lambsdorff was born in Cologne on November 5, 1966.

Studied history, constitutional law and international relations in Bonn and Georgtown Joined the German Foreign Service (1995) and served among others at the German Embassy in Washington D.C. (2000-2003), Member of the national executive board of the FDP (1987-2000), Member of the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party’s Congress and Council (ELDR, among others he serves as Deputy Chairman of the Committee for the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence. Has been the rapporteur for the new Defence Procurement Directive.

Inefficiency of national defence markets Not only is there too little cooperation across Member States in R&D for defence and security, Member States also largely procure their goods and services without looking for possibly better offers elsewhere in the EU. In the past years, Members States only published on average 13% of their contracts on an EU-wide basis. There is no doubt that in many cases the application of national rules − rather than EU rules − in the name of national security is perfectly warranted. However, in other cases the reason is protectionism of the national defence industry − resulting in a patchwork of national markets with too little innovation, competitiveness and efficiency. This weakens ESDP considerably. Paradoxically, the original intent of ensuring national security undermines the EU’s security overall, since defence resources are spent inefficiently. This effect cannot be in the national interest of any Member State.

When the cost of complex defence modules rise, while defence budgets stagnate or even decrease, only a common market with a more efficient use of resources can attain what we need when facing today’s security challenges: a strong European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB).

cases, many Member States have made the exception the rule and apply only national rules to virtually all defence and security related purchases.

What worsens this “national approach” is the anachronistic situation that, despite the very close cooperation between Member States through CFSP/ESDP, there still exists a wide variety of national export control regimes for the trade of defence goods within the EU. It is anachronistic because, notwithstanding an agreement to defend each other’s territory militarily in the case of war, in peacetime, the trade of goods upon which the Member States’ coalition builds, is highly restricted and entails overwhelming bureaucratic burden.

Although Member State concerns regarding control of final recipients of military equipment, protection of information and supplies are legitimate, we need a less bureaucratic and transparent system that allows for more competition. Such a system can help set the ground for an effective ESDP.

Steps taken Competition instead of protectionism However, such industrial base requires a sound regulatory framework, which the EU currently clearly lacks. Although the current EU-procurement directive also applies to defence and security, Member States can avoid EU-wide competition, by claiming national security to be at stake. While the ECJ has declared that invoking the relevant EC Treaty Article (Art. 296 EC) to circumvent EU legislation is only valid in exceptional

42

In order to overcome the market divisions and to facilitate the development of a European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM), in 2005 the European Parliament requested the European Commission to propose a new regulatory framework. In 2007, the Commission published the so-called “defence package” entailing a communication, a draft directive on intra-community transfers (ICT) and a draft directive on defence and security procurement. The fact that only a year later,

INDUSTRIES

tive. Although the division between defence and security both directives have been ratified in a first-reading agreement becomes increasingly blurry, esp. in the case of terrorism and between the Council and the European Parliament demonmany companies produce similar products for both sectors, strates the political will of all political stakeholders to reach an many Member States had severe objections to include securiagreement. President Sarkozy explicitly declared the reform of ty. Nonetheless, the scope is the defence market to be a not “all-encompassing”: if priority of the French Presiessential security interests are dency. Such political will It is clear that without providing our at stake or if forces are deshould by no means be taken ‘men and women on the ground’ with the ployed outside the EU, confor granted given the uniquetracts can be excluded from ness of the task − strengthenbest gear available, we cannot expect this directive. ing ESDP is traditionally an them to cope with an unprecedented A further crucial accomplishissue solely decided by Memrange of challenges, let alone take on ment for the Parliament was ber States without any input the introduction of legal by the European Parliament. further missions. remedies. Member States are In this case, for the first time obliged to establish a system the EP negotiated with the of effective review procedures Council about an internal of contracts awarded. Such market instrument to enhance appeal-mechanism − similar to the mechanisms in civil proESDP curement − will create far more legal certainty and transparency for all market players.

The new ICT-directive The two directives, albeit functioning independently of each The new “ICT”-directive establishes a simpler and more coherother, are intertwined, in strengthening ESDP. With fewer ent EU scheme of transfer licenses for defence products by administrative burdens for cross-border trade, manufacturers harmonising a patchwork of 27 different national schemes. can more plausibly guarantee security of supply to another Instead of granting individual licenses for single transfers − Member State at competitive. currently the norm in many Member States − a system of general and global licences is created. A general license, for instance, shall be granted to a supplier if either the armed The next steps forces of another Member State are the recipient or if a prodWhile we certainly should not expect drastic changes in the uct is only shipped for repair or demonstration purposes. A market place overnight, the agreed directives are a considerglobal license, on the other hand, allows an individual compaable achievement in light of the status quo. The best-case ny to ship a pre-determined range of product repeatedly over a scenario would bring ESDP an even larger step forward: Upon period of three years before having to re-apply for a license. the implementation by 2011, all players in the European The European Parliament, inter alia, succeeded in introducing defence and security industry will be able to compete on a transparency obligations and requirements for penalties for single market worth well above 100 bn euro. Smarter spending infringements of export limitations by companies. The capaciof defence-budgets by the Member States, more effective R&D ties upon which ESDP is based benefit: it will be much easier through cooperation and more competition will deliver a for Member States to exchange equipment and test interoperstrong, globally competitive EDTIB. The interoperability of ability when preparing for joint operations abroad. equipment and thereby the capacity for cooperation will increase, ease the burden-sharing for joint EU operations abroad and allow our forces and eventually an EU force to The new directive on defence and security benefit from the best equipment. procurment The new directive on defence and security procurement is about creating a tool for more EU-wide competition while respecting Member States’ concerns of security of supply and see also articles: information. In particular, this entails various commitments • Gerd Höfer MdB, page 17 competitors have to fulfil in order to obtain a contract. A major • Andreas Hammer, page 45 success for the European Parliament in the negotiations was • Alexander Weis, page 54 to maintain both defence and security in scope of the direc• François Gayet, page 56

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THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Documentation The European Commission’s initiatives for the creation of a European Defence Equipment Market 1996 and 1997: The European Commission produced two Communications [COM(96)10 and COM (97)583] on defence-related industries to encourage restructuring and the setting up of an efficient European defence equipment market. But regarding the most essential reforms, Member states considered action on the European level premature.

April 2002: After a period of considerable change in the industrial armaments sector and in the institutional framework of the EU, including developments in ESDP, the European Parliament, in a Resolution of 10 April 2002, invited the Commission to address the issue of armaments in a new Communication.

Autumn 2002: The Convention on the Future of Europe set up a working group on defence chaired by the European Commissioner, Michel Barnier. The working party’s report stressed that the credibility of European defence policy depends on the existence and development of a European capacity and a strengthening of the industrial and technological base of the defence sector.

March 2003: The European Commission adopted the Communication “European Defence Industrial Market Issues - Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy” [COM (2003)113] This Communication launched seven initiatives aimed at establishing a European Defence Equipment Market.

“Cost efficiency of defence spending, the maintenance of a competitive defence and technological industrial base, better access for EU manufactured goods to third markets, ethics and fairness in the arms trade, security of supply, and also the need to respect Member States prerogatives in this sensitive area are all important considerations when defining an EU armaments policy.”

(European Commission’s Communication “European Defence Industrial Market Issues - Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy, 2003)

September 2004: The Commission’s initiatives led to the publication of a Green Paper on Defence procurement.

On 23 September the Commission launched a public consultation to gain a clearer idea of stakeholder’s interes and concerns. The Commission invited all interested parties to send their observations on the Green Paper.

During the six-month consultation period, the Commissions explained in a series of bilateral meetings, seminars and working group meetings its initiative. The Consultation confirmed in particular a widespread misuse of Article 296 of the EC Treaty, which allows Member States to exempt defence contracts from EU procurement rules if this is necessary for the protection of their essential security interests.

December 2005: The Commission announced two further initiatives based on the findings of the Consultation (COM (2005)626): - An Interpretative Communication [COM(2006)779], which clarifies the conditions for the use of Article 296. This Communication, adopted in December 2006, gives guidance to national awarding authorities for their assessment of whether procurement contracts can be exempted from Community rules or not. The aim of this Communication is to enhance legal certainty and to limit possible misuse of the exemption.

- A proposal for a new procurement directive [COM(2007)766], adopted in December 2007 as part of the Commission’s so called “Defence package”, which includes also a proposal for a directive on intra-community transfers [COM(2007)765], aimed to facilitate the circulation of defence-related products within the EU-internal market, as same as a Communication on the competitiveness of European defence industries [COM(2007)764].

Both Directives have been adopted in December 2008 and January 2009 with a large majority by the European Parliament.

The European − Security and Defence Union THE MAGAZINE FOR EUROPE’S SECURITY AND DEFENCE COMMUNITY Please send your Subscription order to Re-Fax: +49(0)30 55 74 12 33 Daniel Bou-Fadel · Advertisment Manager · Phone: +49(0)30 55 74 12 14, E-Mail: daniel.bou-fadel@euro-defence.eu

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INDUSTRIES

“A European Defence Market − from vision to reality”

by Andreas Hammer, Head of EADS DS Key Account Germany

As the financial crisis unfolds, cries to protect Europe’s national industries become louder − and they are increasingly answered by our heads of states. Within only a few months, the list of government takeovers and bail-outs has grown substantially: Northern Rock, Fortis, Hypo Real Estate, Kaupthing, Opel, Commerzbank to name just a few of the more prominent ones.

In the meantime, Germany has halted privatization of the Deutsche Bahn and French President Nicolas Sarkozy claims that Europe will turn into an “industrial wasteland” if it does not prop up its manufacturers − using this as an excuse to massively subsidize the French car industry. As the conviction, that the nation state is the best guardian of its people’s fortunes, slowly spreads across Europe and the world, it is as important as ever to point out that the nation state should not be seen as the universal remedy to all our problems. Indeed, the field, which touches most upon our well-being − our physical safety − cannot be guaranteed on a national basis alone.

Yet, among all policy areas it is still one of the most protected ones − maybe even the most protected one. Therefore, instead of giving in to the new spirit of the age, in Europe − today, more than ever before − we need to pool our resources in order to meet today’s and tomorrow’s challenges to our peace and security − and there is still a long way ahead of us.

Why is procurement on a purely national basis outdated?

However, a lot of people still do not seem to understand why defence can and should be multinational. After all, why should we make our own security dependent on other countries with other national interests? The answer is simple: We just can’t do it on our own. While this has always been more or less the case for all European countries, the trends, which deny such a national solution, have been accelerating over the last years: • To sufficiently procure armaments on a national basis alone is over After the end of the Cold War we need entirely new technologies to encounter the challenges we are facing. Instead of tanks and other heavy equipment, strategic transport and C4ISR are the buzz words of the day. And these capabilities need to come quick and plenty. The number of missions that we in Europe are involved in is constantly on the rise. From a de-facto absence of a single German soldier on foreign soil less than 20 years ago, today there are 7.300 German troops stationed around the world, partly in such far away places as the Sudan, Lebanon and

Andreas Hammer Head of EADS DS Key Account Germany Andreas Hammer was born in Mannheim, Germany, on September 16, 1965 1985: joined the German Armed Forces as officer candidate of the German Army Signals 1992: graduated as aerospace engineer from the University of the German Armed Forces, Munich 2002: left the armed forces as Lieutenant Colonel (General Staff) and joined the private sector as an IT Management Consultant, 2005: joined EADS as Director for EU Defence Policy and NATO. In this capacity, he was the deputy head of the EADS office in Brussels as well as the Key Account Leader NATO-EU for the EADS Defence & Security DivisionHe was thus in charge of all defence and security matters in NATO and the EU, serving as an interface between the customer in Brussels and the respective EADS divisions and business units. Since January, 2008: Andreas Hammer heads the EADS office in Koblenz and is responsible for the German Key Account for the Defence & Security Division

not least in Afghanistan. To make things worse, the unit production cost of military weapons is constantly on the rise − an average 5 to 10 % per year since 1989. If we combine these two trends − more defence needs at a higher price − with stagnating and even declining defence budgets in Europe − it is clear that our ability to properly equip our armed forces in the future is seriously at risk.

• National defence industries in Europe under pressure Budgetary deficiencies threaten the national defence industries in Europe. Let’s not forget that the defence market is by nature not always led by business rationale and efficiency calculations.

Furthermore, with a state budget that is limited, parliament needs to balance our security needs against other needs of society. And let’s not fool ourselves, where kindergartens, hospitals, and unemployment benefits directly compete with something as abstract as security, one does not need to be a sociologist to guess where most people would put their card in the ballot box. If one then considers the trends towards an ever higher level of self-funding for R&D projects and fixed-price contracts in most European countries, we should not be surprised, if European defence companies are less and less prone to engage in new technology developments − after all, despite their special features, defence companies are not exempt from the business realities of a globalized world, where the prospect

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THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

for financial growth rules. In the case of defence companies this prospect faces additional pressure, as civilian companies are increasingly moving in the armaments sector with their dual-use products.

• Cooperation is always best among equal partners Yet, what would the result be if our national defence industries can no longer equip our soldiers? There are two alternatives − if we take it to the extreme. The first would be that we forego more and more capabilities and neglect the needs of our armed forces. Only very few would accept this as an option. The second alternative would be to import from other countries, i.e. − considering the political and market realities − to ‘buy American’. Yet, a one-sided dependency on our American friends harbours unnecessary risks. If we want to make sure that we can understand the mechanics of the equipment rather than dealing with so-called “black-boxes”, and that we can repair and maintain our equipment when needed, we should refrain from making the ‘buy American’ option the central element of our procurement policy. Yet, the emphasis here must be on ‘central’. Right now European countries import 48 % of their defence equipment from the other side of the Atlantic, a total of 12.6 billion euro! The amount makes clear that we won’t be able to change this in the near future. And neither should we want to. However, in order to reduce our one-sided dependency on the Americans, we need to reach ‘level playing field’ with them.

And this is also the preferred option in Washington: to have a strong European partner.

The benefits of a European defence market The development of a common European defence market − if designed correctly − could counter all of these three trends and thus ensure that our troops will be properly equipped in the future to preserve our peace and security. Taken together, our defence budgets would be enough to satisfy our capability needs. A greater total budget, cost benefits from economies of scale, and the prevention of duplications would make sufficient and adequate military procurement possible.

Large cooperative programs, in which we pool resources, concentrate on our respective strengths and have more potential buyers, will make our defence industry robust and competitive.

A strong defence industrial base in Europe would put us on level-playing field with the U.S. and other global players such as China or Russia and guarantee a fairer global defence trade environment.

The European defence market − which stage?

Especially during the last ten years European defence cooperation has progressed significantly. Today, we can not help but notice that all of our major arms export successes − be it helicopters for the U.S. army, tankers for Australia or radar technol-

46

ogy for the Middle East are joint European programs, not national ones. In addition, both the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Commission have been gaining more and more competences to promote security and defence cooperation on a European level. Just at the beginning of the year, the European Parliament ratified another Directive to enlarge the scope of European tenders for armaments projects.

As long as we do not have identical security interests, we will not be able to have a complete integration of our capabilities.

The pooling of defence resources always implies a loss of control and thereby the need to trust our partner nations.

Unfortunately, mistrust and political differences have not yet entirely disappeared from the European continent.

How should we design the European defence market?

In this context, two practices stand out: offsets and the concept of ‘juste retour’. Both are classical examples of market inefficiencies. Where offsets are used, buyer nations often will not purchase the best and cheapest equipment − as normal business rationale would command. Instead they are tempted to buy whatever promises the greatest compensation. “Juste retour” on the other hand, encourages governments not to produce where the technological skills and resources are best, but according to correspondent work- and cost-shares of a project. Therefore, the long-term goal should be the creation of an effective EDTIB, a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. This EDTIB should no longer be a sum of national DTIBs but a unified sourcing region, composed of a collection of different ‘Centres of Excellence’, which will each concentrate on specific capabilities. The benefit is clear: we would have a single sourcing economy of scale. By itself, this system would guarantee that programs would become cheaper and better, while increased industrial competition would even accelerate this trend.

Furthermore, if we simply harmonized our procurement cycles and regulations, we would have laid the groundwork for further integration. Common capability definitions, an early identification of cooperative opportunities and the like would follow automatically from there.

As much as these proposals are baby steps when we consider the magnitude of the ultimate objective, we must realize that “Europe can be built only through practical achievements which will first of all create real solidarity”. This notion has been inscribed in the Preamble to the Treaty that established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 − the cradle of the European Union. Just as then hardly anyone imagined that we would − less than 60 years later − use the same currency, cross each other’s borders without passports and freely work in each other’s countries, few today believe in the possibility to a have unified European defence market. Great changes need time.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND ARMED FORCES

Protection on Operations − The Army’s Protection Philosophy

by Hans-Otto Budde, Lieutenant General, Head of German Land Forces, Bonn

Regardless of where and when military operations are started and how they are conducted, both high-intensity combat and stability operations will always reach a point at which territory, especially densely populated areas and urban centres, must be controlled and secured. Success on operations and in the subsequent time-consuming nation building efforts can ultimately be ensured only with “boots on the ground”. This is why land forces play a significant role in current and possible future operations they only have the needed capabilities.

For the Army, as the core of the land forces and the pillar bone of land operations, this challenge has become a reality and everyday routine. Precision reconnaissance, superior command and control as well as rapid and precision effects, combined with sustainability and mobility as well as effective active and passive protection are the capabilities required for operational success. Protection provides the foundation for this. Ensuring an optimum level of protection also underscores a society’s determination and willingness to support its soldiers in fulfilling their dangerous tasks.

Balancing Act between Threat − Protection − Mission Accomplishment Because of their complexity, the dangers encountered on operations are neither fully calculable nor predictable. Army soldiers, particularly on stability operations, are in direct contact with the local people and are moving among them − even on foot − as they accomplish their mission. There is often no safe distance to a potential enemy. Over “the last hundred yards”, an Army soldier will always have to fend for himself.

They are also permanently exposed to asymmetric threats.

Adaptive opponents permanently refining their capabilities

Hans-Otto Budde Lieutenant General, Head of German Land Forces Hans-Otto Budde was born in Kirchohsen on March 6, 1948. He is married, with two children.

04.10.1966: Joining the Bundeswehr 1978-1983: General Staff courses at the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg and at the Combined General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, USA, 1995-1997: Brigadier General and Commander of the German-French Brigade, 1997: Commander Multinationale Brigade Centre (SFOR) in Sarajewo, Bosnien-Herzegowina, 2001-2002: Major General and Commander of the GE Special Operations Division, 2002-2004: Chief of Staff of the Landforces HQ of MOD Bonn/Berlin Since 2004: Lieutenant General and Head of the German Landforces

deliberately take aim at the strategic Achilles heel of the deployed forces − casualties. The morale of our soldiers is to be undermined and the political and societal support in their home countries to be weakened.

Given this new kind of threat, there is always a conflict between mission accomplishment and protection. Only a balance between them can provide the necessary credibility on operations. Direct contact with the local population enables soldiers to build trust and gives a face to the mission. Yet at the same time it increases the individual soldier’s vulnerability considerably. Protection forms the basis for successful mission accomplishment. Nevertheless, the acceptance of greater risks and dangers in order to accomplish the mission as best as possible remains an essential characteristic of the military profession.

Protection without mission accomplishment can lead to paralysis, and mission accomplishment without protection is irresponsible.

The Protection Concept of the Army

Operational Reality

Photos: The European/Archiv

With a package of active and passive measures, the Army ensures effective protection, in order to strengthen the initiative and the ability to act of its own forces and assets and to prevent or at least hamper hostile reconnaissance, target acquisition and effects. Army equipment planning places high priority on protection. It is focused on enhanced soldier survivability, a coordinated system of protected vehicles, camp and convoy protection projects and identification capability.

The holistic protection concept of the Army also encompasses

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THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

a solid foundation of values, an effective operational doctrine, mission-oriented training and care and welfare measures. Only this comprehensive approach enables us to deploy better trained, better equipped, better protected, better motivated and, hence, superior personnel on operations who are capable of accomplishing their mission with confidence.

Protection fields of activity

Lt General H.-O. Budde with Forces in Afghanistan.

The integrated system of C2 − reconnaissance − effects contributes substantially to protection. Availability of better information, the ability to identify threats and take decisions faster, and the timely, proportionate employment of stand-off capable precision engagement assets are crucial.

The Army C2 Information System, as a first step towards network-enabled operations, modern ground-based and unmanned airborne reconnaissance systems such as FENNEK, LUNA, ALADIN or KZO, and new weapon systems such as the PUMA Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle or the TIGER helicopter, are prime examples. High-quality individual protection systems such as the “Future Infantryman” and “Soldier on Deployment” increase soldier survivability. This includes the introduction of a new generation of personal weapons. Army soldiers have a wide range of vehicles with different protection levels at their disposal to accomplish their mission. It is continuously being expanded and adapted to operational needs to meet the specific requirements of the mission or terrain. In mine attacks against German soldiers, the enhanced protection provided by the DINGO 2 vehicle has proved life-saving.

The EAGLE IV vehicle will soon be fielded and will constitute a further step towards improved protected tactical mobility of our forces.

The growing threat from rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM) attacks requires enhanced protection of our camps. In addition to structural measures, a marked improvement will be

Photos: The European/Archiv

achieved through a new sky shield weapon system.

Concerning Counter-IED, the equipment of troops with jammers will be improved, and training will be adapted to the changing threat situation, to counter the threats posed by explosive devices or improvised charges.

Identification of friendly forces Particularly in an asymmetric threat environment, positive identification of friendly forces is vital. The capability to distinguish friendly from hostile forces with a high degree of reliability will markedly improve force protection and the effectiveness of the assets employed. A coordinated operational doctrine, sound training, the existing equipment and future armament projects are further contributing factors.

Mission-oriented training for all soldiers at all command levels conveys the knowledge and skills they need to act responsibly and with confidence on worldwide missions in very diverse geographic and cultural environments. This is part of the “Army’s code of conduct” which serves as our soldiers’ moral compass. Robotics which holds great potential for the future also plays a significant role in the comprehensive force protection concept of the Army. Unmanned systems can effectively be used to perform so-called “3-D” (dirty, dull and dangerous) tasks, in order to save friendly forces and avoid casualties.

Conclusion

Individual Protection.

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Comprehensive force protection remains a top priority for the Army and is being further developed, as part of the transformation process, on a joint basis and through continuous analysis of the lessons learned on operations.

Given the highly complex and multi-faceted threat spectrum, every Army soldier knows that there is no such thing as absolute protection and that missions are and will always be dangerous.

However, in order to keep the risk within reasonable limits, it is our aim to equip soldiers deployed on operations with the best a modern industrial society like Germany can provide.

This is what our responsibility for the welfare of the deployed soldiers and the people they protect in the theatres of operation demands.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND ARMED FORCES

The Protection of the Soldier − concepts and solutions Protecting our soldiers

by Bernd Wenzler, CEO Defence Electronics (EADS/DS ), Ulm In the light of a growing number of missions abroad, protecting soldiers is becoming more and more important. It is not just the armed forces that are on the line here, but, generally, all those supporting and accompanying these missions, including industry. Today, it is increasingly difficult to segregate the concepts of internal and external security. Due to this growing need for comprehensive security solutions, security and protection are gaining ever more importance as an area of business for EADS Defence & Security (DS).

Comprehensive security solutions The armed forces’ changing roles are requiring industry to provide new concepts and solutions in order to reduce potential dangers for soldiers to an absolute minimum. It is therefore one of our declared objectives to draw up protection concepts and to develop corresponding solutions for the troops. Of course, it is not possible to ensure protection against all conceivable threats. We can, however, contribute our many years of technological experience based on close and trusting cooperation with our customers as well as our relevant expertise and technical implementation skills towards the welfare of soldiers deployed abroad. Suppliers of commercial system components are quite naturally more focused on different market demands than suppliers of comprehensive security solutions, which need to meet even the highest military requirements. We combine both capabilities and see ourselves as technology leaders in this segment.

We consider security to be the protection of people, of individual platforms such as vehicles or aircraft, and of complete infrastructures. For this reason, we should also refer to protection systems for ground-based, sea-based and airborne weapon systems in this connection. Our large range of electronic warfare and self-defence systems for all types of platforms allows the latest technologies to be employed for ensuring the highest possible degree of protection for operational units.

In addition to supporting soldiers with the capabilities of EADS Defence & Security, for example in the areas of tactical UAVs, communications systems and advanced personal equipment for soldiers, DS’ Defence Electronics business unit has spe-

Bernd Wenzler Chief Executive Officer, Defence Electronics, EADS, Defence and Security Bernd Wenzler was born in Berlin on July 1960. studied Buiseness Management at the University of Passau; Consultant Management Partner, Stuttgart (1987); Central Procurement, DASA (1995); Head of Stratgic Procurement Management for Non-Production Material, Daimler Benz & Coordinator Military Offset Business, Daimler-Benz (1997); Initiator of EADS business activities for national Public Private Partnership programmes (2001)

cialised in electronic components and mobile systems designed to protect troops. Basically, the main emphasis is on quickly recognising and combating threats. For this, we are constantly pursuing technological progress to develop new possibilities and to implement them in a manner that conforms to real-life practice. There is already a wide range of capabilities available to the armed forces for this purpose.

Radar surveillance Radar surveillance is already a key component in achieving information superiority, and thus protecting our soldiers. New developments are allowing us to significantly improve the protection of people and materials. For example, the airborne MiSAR miniaturised SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) system, installed on board a small tactical reconnaissance UAV, is capable of providing real-time pictures taken at any time of the day or night and in all weather conditions. This can be a crucial factor for troops in unknown hostile environment or security forces guarding borders or critical infrastructures. We are also developing a variety of ground surveillance radars that can detect people, cars or small aircraft intruding sensitive areas.

Different facets of protection Applying civilian capabilities to the field of military security is part of Defence Electronics’ approach. For instance, besides

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THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

containers can be operated autonomously with the help of mobile water and energy supply equipment.

This means that the units are mobile and easily relocatable and therefore provide the troops with medical care of the highest European standard even in far-flung regions of operation.

Mobile bunkers In this context, I would like to mention a further element of ensuring the safety of deployed persons, which is protection against attacks with light weapons or bombs during transport. Here, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) represent an increasing threat to the troops in the field. The challenge of industry in this respect is not only to ensure actual protection but also to develop an economically viable solution for this. Although traditional armoured vehicles are capable of providing an adequate level of protection, their relationship of material and personnel costs per transported person is, however, extremely unfavourable. Therefore, Defence Electronics, in cooperation with the Federal Office of Defence Technology and Procurement (BWB) and the Munich-based company Krauss-MaffeiWegmann, has developed the “TransProtec” system offering optimal protection against sniper fire, shrapnel, mines as well as IED and NBC attacks.

It was purchased and successfully tested by the German Armed Forces under the name “MuConPers” (multi-capable container for transporting individuals). The protective container offers space for up to 18 persons including their equipment. A modified version of the TransProtec system will be capable of transporting a large number of casualties and nursing staff together with the necessary facilities.

The future soldier concept “Warrior 21” for more protection and efficiency.

being deployed in the German Federal Police and Civil Defence helicopters, the laser obstacle warning system for helicopters (HELLAS) has also been signed up for the NH90. It detects low observable obstacels such as thin wires and thus enables pilots to fly evasive manoeuvers in safe distance.This is a good example of the multiple dimensions of the concept of “protection”. State-of-the-art sensor technologies contribute to the safety of the crews and thereby to the fulfilment of their missions. We also support the Armed Forces by providing protected rescue stations for international peace missions in crisis areas around the world. These air-conditioned medical

50

Photo EADS

A personal notion

EADS Defence & Security is characterised by its ability to develop holistic approaches and comprehensive solutions based on networked, robust and redundant high-tech systems. The EADS defence sector can draw on both a broad base of knowledge and experience in developing complex solutions and also on a comprehensive range of products. Our guiding principle is, in a dialogue with the customers, to develop attractive solutions that stand the test in emergencies.

see also article: Elvira Cortajarena Iturrioz, page 51

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND ARMED FORCES

Forces Protection − the soldier of the future

by Elvira Cortajarena Iturrioz MP, Madrid

The huge armies of the 19th centuries have become a thing of the past in Europe. For all sorts of reasons − demographic, economic or to do with operational effectiveness and defence priorities (expeditionary forces and territorial defence, professional armies and compulsory military service for all) − the European armed forces have embarked on a joint effort to scale down personnel and restructure and moderise operational capabilities.

Interoperability as a basic prerequisite The fact that a number of different initiatives exist side by side has the positive effect of stimulating defence research and technological development and the European defence equipment market through competition. Nevertheless, it is important to innovate together to solve interoperability issues upstream rather than looking for solutions further down the line by means of software patches or more or less successful adjustments to original programme. The armed forces of the European countries are always going to have work together, in coalition or under NATO and EU auspices, in order to offset the effects of their relatively reduced size. It is therefore of the utmost urgency − wich in practice means over the next three to five years − to ensure the highest possible degree of interoperability as system in the research or development and assessment phase begin to come on stream.

Evolving programmes Most European member states of NATO and the EU have programmes underway for enhancing their infantries’ capabilities. The experience gathered recently in Afghanistan and Iraq hast brought home the need to protect soldiers, with the result that efforts in this area have been stepped up. The process had already begun during the cold war when forces had to be geared to combat in urban and CBRN environments. During the conflicts of the late 20th century, in the former Yugoslavia in particular, foot soldiers had already proven themselves indispensable for guaranteeing the end of hostilities and a lasting peace on the ground.

Elvira Cortajarena Iturrioz Member of the Spanish Parliament Elvira Cortajarena Iturrioz was born in PasajesAncho.

She has been a Member of Parliament (Spain, Socialist Group) in the Congreso de los diputados since 1996. She sits on the Executive Committee of the Spanish Socialist party and has served on a number of parliamentary committees covering a wide range of policies. Before entering Parliament, she studied public law and social science and subsequently held a number of local authority posts. She has been a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Security and Defence Assembly since 2004.

still equip the infantry of the 21st century. The two fundamental objectives of these systems − protection and lethality − have not changed.

It has always been necessary to adapt the role and equipment of infantrymen to advance in military technology and weapon’s systems. However, the situation we have today is the result of a veritable revolution prompted by the need to develop the capacity for combat in chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological (CBRN) environments (both in urban and open areas) and by a network-enabled approach to military operations.

Future soldier programmes: operational, technological and industrial challenges Future soldier programmes are a logical extension of the process of armed forces transformation to include human beings. At the end of the 20th century, the United States launched the movement towares adapting the country’s defence apparatus to deal with the new threats it faced in the future, in the light of worldwide technological developments and the advent of the concept of network-enabled warfare. It became a vast programme for modernising the concepts, doctrines and technologies of the American armed forces.

Protection and lethality The term “soldier of the future“ has a modern ring to it but it is part of a continuous process fo enhancing a foot soldier’s capabilities that dates back to prehistoric times when the first systems to proctect warriors made their appearance. Shields, armour, swords and other weaponry, as well as viewing, navigation and positioning systems (telescopes and compasses) have evolved over the centuries and in their modern form

European concepts The movement spread, via NATO, to Europe. Since the European countries’ armed forces are also made available to the EU, the latter’s political, military and R&T bodies have also become involved in the definition and development of a possible European concept for network-transformation effort, in particular through the acitivities of ist Allied Command

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ers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) architectures, wireless and over-the-horizon communication networks already form part of national inventories.

Much remains to be done in order to effectively integrate existing and future systems and sub-systems into the armed forces, not just for the individual services but also in a joint services context, or, even more difficult, in a multinational environment.

The future soldier − a human being

The future soldier is able to defend day and night and in each environnement.

Photo: EADS

Transformation in Norfolk, the US, which was set up in 2002.

However, NATO longer has a monopoly of those activities. The Euopean Union is in the process of developing and reinforcing its own military capabilities, under the cover of its civil and military crisis-management activities, but also with a view to giving it the possibility for global intervention, if necessary independently of the Atlantic Alliance. A major protagonist in the development of European military capabilities is the European Defence Agency. The EDA was set up at the end of 2004 and is now in charge of managing an ambitious European forces protection programme. The programme is funded by the participating states and is directly linked with existing and future soldier of the future programmes. The national programmes will of course continue to develop at their own pace, but cooperation among the European countries will develop synergy and points of convergence which will have a major positive impact on European forces’ interoperability.

Added operational value What remains to be clarified is the added operational value offered by future soldier programmes. Today’s soldiers already benefit from the latest advance in the civilian, defence and security sectors. Battlefield digitisation, advanced communications and information systems supported by satellites and UAVs, C4ISTAR (command, control, communications, comput-

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The future soldier is a system in its own right, and this is what is new about it. It is a single node within a vast network, and acts both as a sensor or a communications node, as well as the dicision-making agent on the ground. It is a sub-system within a system which itself is part of a bigger “system of systems“.

The soldier can see better and further, can communicate at all times and in real time, has almost direct access to support systems such as UAVs and in certain circumstances can even coordinate and direct air strikes. He has sophisticated weapons systems with enhanced reliability and precision. His permanent integration within a network, whether at squad, platoon or company level, enables him to stay in contact and more easily identify allies, friends or “neutral“ parties, helping to reduce losses and cyborg, but remains a human being and as such able to adapt and modify the systems with which he is equipped. That process in turn will determine future technological developments.

The future soldier − a transformation product It is true that there are as many future soldier programmes as there are states with large or medium-size capacities in this area, and there will be client countries that will buy equipment adapted to their needs. Eventually, however, through bilateral cooperation projects, NATO and the European Defence Agency will define the contours of a European future soldier harmonised and interoperable with his American and Canadian counterparts.

It is not just operational effectiveness and future prowess in combat that are at stake with future soldier programmes but also the opportunity to demonstrate Europe’s national technological capacities. The future soldier programme is just one aspect of the process for transformation of the armed forces in general and the infantry in particular, and will evolve in line with needs on the ground, adapting to different missions − combat, security and stability operations − and the changing composition of the armed forces which include more and more women.

The soldier of the future is thus a source of technological innovation and a stimulus for scientific research.

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND ARMED FORCES

Eyes in the sky to protect forces

by Hartmut Bühl*, Brussels

Real-time information is the key for early response in a crisis. A timely situation assessment allows decision makers to employ the appropriate solution out of the whole spectrum of assets available with a maximum flexibility to tailor the response.

Precise information helps to minimize or even prevent human losses during military intervention or natural disasters. After two unsuccessful projects NATO is prepared for another project of an Airborne Ground Surveillance System (AGS).

data and employing the same operational techniques, it is much easier to come to a common understanding of political situations and arrive at consensus decisions so vital to the Alliance day to day business. In matters of strategic and operational intelligence, this common view is even more valuable. A NATO owned and operated ground surveillance system will go far to remove doubts concerning nations’ equality of access to the best information upon which to base political and military decisions.

Objective of a system Seventeen NATO Allies, having agreed the outlines of a high altitude unmanned ground surveillance system, are now in the final process of formal agreement to the memorandum of understanding to implement the program, owned by NATO. The system will be continuously under NATO command, ensuring a rapid response to any crisis, and 24-7 support to forces in the field and NATO political authorities, keeping all Allies equally up to date on developments of political interest.

Acquisition of this system will amount to nothing less than a new frontier of intelligence and surveillance capability, for the benefit of the safety of our forces and security of the nations.

Experiences After the Rome Summit in 1981 NATO saw the need to have better information on asymmetric threats and especially to give military leaders information superiority to command their engaged forces better and thus protect the soldiers. At the end of the 90th the AGS-project No 1 had been abandoned because differing views of member states could not be harmonised. The NATO Summit 1992 promoted a Transatlantic Industrial Proposed Solution (TIPS) for a mixed fleet AGS (manned and unmanned aircraft) with 23 member states participating with their industries in this project. In 2007 this project n0. 2 of a volume of more than 3 bn Euro was abandoned shortly after a negotiated contract had been ready for signature. Two important member states opted for “financial problems”.

From their experience working together on a NATO n0. 3 owned and operated AGS have shared the savings, and learned the value of multinational development, ownership, and operational experience. Costs are distributed among nations according to their ability to pay, a practice which allows smaller nations to participate in the operation of systems otherwise unaffordable to their defence budgets. Constant training and operations among multinational crews build habits of cooperation, common operating procedures, and most important, a level of trust among the military professionals of the participating nations. When nations know they are looking at the same

The system NATO’s AGS will consist of eight US Global Hawk high altitude, long endurance (HALE) unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), each equipped with a newly developed ground surveillance radar and the communications necessary to link the aircraft to a European developed system for analysis and distribution of all data throughout the alliance and to deployed forces.

The instruments The Global Hawk’s extraordinary endurance, more than 33 hours, will enable an extended reach from NATO territory to any area of interest to military or political authorities.

Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging is a process of compiling radar returns gathered over a period of several seconds, then constructing from this data the equivalent of a visual image, useful for decision making. Moving target indication (MTI) is process of recording the Doppler frequency shift within the radar energy returned from an area of interest. Doppler shift indicates motion. The radar can analyze the radar return data to spot and track all the moving objects in a very large area of regard. This data can be invaluable in assessing the situation in an area of combat operations, along borders, or in areas of interest owing to natural disasters or humanitarian problems.

The future NATO’s soldiers in the field will have the new benefit of a continuous electronic watch ahead, behind, and on their flanks, giving advance warning of suspicious movements. This new wide area of view will yield a new level of safety for solders as they move about areas in support of defensive, peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. Thus the Alliance and Europe are getting eyes in the sky not only for their own needs but also for the security in the world. * The author was the Team Lead Communications of TIPS and the Joint venture company AGS Industries from 2002-2007, correspondent of the german newspaper Behörden Spiegel.

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The European Defence Agency (EDA)

by Alexander Weis, CEO EDA, Brussels

The European Defence Agency’ mission is to improve European military capabilities. While the European Security and Defence Policy itself is celebrating its 10th anniversary this year, the Agency’s history is even shorter. EDA was born in 2004 and started to operate in January 2005. What are the functions of the Agency, how does it operate, what are its agendas and what about results?

A unique agency Four essential functions are needed for capability improvement: (i) military requirements or ‘what do the users − that is the military − need?’; (ii) Research & Technology, required to produce tomorrow’s equipment; (iii) Armaments Cooperation to construct collaborative acquisition programmes between various countries; (iv) defence industries or the supply-side of defence products. For the first time ever these four functions have been brought into one European organisation: EDA. Predecessors to EDA, such as the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) were one-dimensional: they operated in a vacuum, too far away from the capability planners and, therefore, sometimes focussing on hobby-horses rather than on real capability needs. On the other hand, military planners have often been unaware of potential contributions of R&T and industries to their needs. Light but strong materials, nanotechnologies and other new scientific developments will have far-reaching consequences for future equipment and, thus, can have an impact on requirements.

Cooperation on the basis of common requirements The Agency’s next feature is the integrated approach. Military capability planners, research and technology experts, armament cooperation programmers and industries can no longer operate in their own ‘stove-pipes’ − they have to work closely together from the beginning. In other words: demand and supply have to be at the same table from the initial phase of requirement setting to the production phase. In the past international armaments cooperation has often been the sum of national requirements instead of truly common requirements.

Also, additional national demands were often added during the development phase. The result: longer production cycles and rising costs. The Eurofighter and the NH-90 helicopter are good examples. We can no longer afford this ‘old way of doing international defence business’. Financially, the European countries cannot afford this any more. Operationally, the development and production cycles have to be shortened as the world is changing more quickly than in the rather static Cold War period.

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Alexander Weis Chief Executive Officer of the European Defence Agency Alexander Weis was born in Elschbach, Germany, on Octobre 4, 1959. He is married, with two children.

Basic military service, law studies at the universities of Saarbrücken and Treves, 1994-1998 Deputy Armaments Attaché German Embassy in Paris, 2001-2004 Head of the Office of the State Secretary, Berlin, 20042007 Chief of Staff in the Directorate General for Armaments, MOD, Bonn, 2007 Chief Executive Officer of the European Defence Agency, Brussels

Four strategies To guide the EDA activities four strategies are in place, reflecting the four functions. They define the destinations and set the course of how to get there: - the Capability Development Plan (CDP), defining the future capability needs − the overall strategic tool, the ‘driver’ for R&T investment, for armaments cooperation and for the defence industries; - the European Defence Research & Technology (EDRT) strategy, defining in which technologies to invest and how to do this more efficiently; - the European Armaments Cooperation (EAC) strategy, spelling out the process how to get from harmonised military requirements to timely and cost-effective armaments cooperative programmes; and - the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) strategy, describing the future European defence industrial landscape, based on three Cs − capability-driven, competent and competitive.

The Capability Development Plan The Agency is capability-driven. The CDP is the ‘overall strategic tool’, driving R&T, Armaments and Industry. It is not a ‘plan’ in the traditional sense, prescribing the number of tanks, aircraft and ships the Member States should have. Rather it describes the future challenges and threats European Armed Forces will have to face and how these impact on the military requirements for crisis management operations. It concludes, for example, that knowledge-based operations will become even more important, increasing the need for capabilities to gather, analyse, fuse and distribute information. It also underlines the importance of the human factor, a trend which is already today visible in multi-faceted operations.

INSTITUTIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Based on the CDP twelve initial priorities have been selected for improving European military capabilities. Most of these priorities are not surprising as they are related to existing shortfalls i.e. helicopters, counter-improvised explosives devices, network enabled capability, logistics. Others result from longer-term analysis, such as defence against shoulderfired missiles (counter-man portable air defence systems), as the threat of such weapons against deployed forces is very likely to increase in the future. Action will be required now to be able to deal with such future threats.

Results of projects and initiatives Concrete projects and initiatives are at the heart of EDA’s agendas. Some of these were already underway before the CDP was endorsed. Others have been activated more recently. An overview of the most important projects and initiatives: • Helicopters. There are about 1700 helicopters in the military inventories in Europe, but many of these are not available for crisis management operations for two reasons: crews are not trained to fly in different environments, such as deserts or mountainous terrain; and helicopters are technically not equipped for these environments. EDA is tackling both elements. Immediate measures have been taken to produce some training capacity in 2009. Czech helicopter crews are trained to fly later this year in Afghanistan. A good example of how capability improvement in EDA is also beneficial for NATO! In 2010 a Helicopter Tactics Training Programme will start for training crews at the European level in a structured manner.

For the medium term the Agency is working on options for upgrading helicopters. These will have to be developed in close cooperation with European helicopter industries. Finally, there is the long-term track. France and Germany have announced to bring their bilateral initiative for a Future Transport Helicopter (2020+) to EDA, thus opening up the project to other interested Member States.

• Air Transport. Defence Ministers of Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain signed a Declaration of Intent on 10 November to launch EDA work on establishing a European Air Transport Fleet (EATF). The EATF aims at reducing European air transport shortfalls by pooling aircraft such as the A400M and C130. Different forms of pooling will be considered: additional procurement; making existing or ordered aircraft available; using flight hours; training, logistics and maintenance. An Operational Model has been developed. Signature of a Letter of Intent is planned for mid-2009 and EATF operational status is foreseen for the timeframe 2014-2017.

• Maritime. The CDP points to increasing future risks and challenges at sea, in particular in littoral waters. Ten Member States − Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Nether-

lands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Sweden plus Norway − have decided to combine their efforts under EDA’s roof for the replacement of the existing generation of Maritime Mine Counter-Measures (as of 2018). Another group of seven Member States (Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) will begin preparations for the development of a Future Unmanned Aerial System, able to take off and land on a ship’s deck, to increase the capability of wide area surveillance. Work is underway for creating MarSur networks, starting at the regional level, set in a wider context of military and civilian users.

• Space-based Earth Surveillance. Space-based observation satellites are indispensable for information-gathering. Six Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain) have brought the MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imaging System) project to the Agency. The MUSIS project focuses on the next generation of space-based (military) earth observation satellites, from 2015 onwards. The project is now open to participation of other Member States. EDA’s role will be, in particular, to look at synergies between the MUSIS project and the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programme of the European Commission, setting up imagery-based services for civilian users.

• Unmanned Air Vehicles. UAVs are getting bigger and wider.

Increasingly, they will have to fly by themselves to operational areas. Currently, this is only possible once specific slots have been granted by the European Air Traffic Control Authorities. In some cases this can take weeks − not quite in line with the needs of crisis management. The ambitious challenge EDA has set itself is to have UAVs flying in normal airspace by 2015.

This will require coordinated efforts of many actors, including the Commission and specialised air traffic and air safety organisations to change existing rules and regulations. But it also requires new technologies (so-called “Sense and Avoid” technologies), which enable a UAV to look around (and spot other aircraft) rather than only looking down and spot what is going on the ground. Under EDA’s roof a group of Member States has launched the so-called MIDCAS (MIDair Collision Avoidance System) project, dedicated to developing these technologies. Another important aspect of EDA work is (military) frequency management.

• Joint Investment Programmes. To address the issue of slow and low R&T collaboration in Europe the Agency has designed the new formula of Joint Investment Programmes or JIPs. These work as a fund: Member States commit money after a programme objective has been defined. Projects are launched within the overall programme. This increases not only the amount of money spent together on Defence R&T − it also enlarges the scope of the research as the JIPs encompass several projects. Two JIPs are ‘up and running’, one focussing

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on new Force Protection technologies with 20 contributing Member States and another one on Innovative Concepts and Emerging Technologies with 11 contributing Member States.

The aim is to launch more JIPs in the future, in particular to contribute to capability priorities, stemming from the CDP. All these and other activities are proving that the Agency is making the difference with the past: to produce clear results in solving capability gaps and to deliver the output required for a credible and effective European Security and Defence Policy.

The European Defence Market Finally, the Agency has important agendas related to the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). As recognised in the EDTIB strategy European defence industries will need to be competitive. That means competitive on a global scale, but also in Europe itself. However, traditionally the defence market in Europe has been characterised by lack of transparency and lack of competition, as Member States in general have relied on the ‘national security’ clause in Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. In essence Art. 296 has allowed Member States to make the bulk of their defence purchases on a national basis.

The intergovernmental regime on defence procurement To create openness on defence contract opportunities and to allow for cross-border bidding the EDA launched the Intergovernmental Regime on Defence Procurement. Though voluntary and politically binding, 25 Member States plus Norway have subscribed to the Code, covering the territory where the overwhelming majority of European defence industries are located.

The Code covers defence equipment purchases (with a value over 1m) where the provision of Art. 296 of the EC Treaty are applicable. The contracts are placed on the Agency’s Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB), accessible to any visitor at EDA’s website (www.eda.europa.eu). Implementation of the Code started on 1 July 2006. As of March 2009 nearly 400 contracts with an estimated value of approximately 10 bln have been placed on the EBB and around 180 of them have been awarded representing 2.7 bln. By now, 40 contracts have been awarded across national borders, representing about 22 % of the total amount of awarded contracts so far.

The Code of Best Practice in the supply chain The future will tell if this %age will increase − it is yet too early to conclude. In any case, the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement is a breakthrough. It has opened up a hidden segment of the market, the last bastion of national economic protection.

In May 2006 a Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain was

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approved. This Code extends the benefits of greater competition through the supply chain, in particular to lower tier companies and Small & Medium-sized Enterprises. The CoBPSC is supported by an Electronic Bulletin Board − Industry Contracts.

This tool was launched on 27 March 2007, providing an electronic platform for advertising sub-contract opportunities by prime contractors and commercial buyers.

The Code of Conduct on Offsets Lastly, the Steering Board agreed a Code of Conduct on Offsets in October 2008. This newest Code will apply to all compensation practices required as a condition of purchase or resulting from a purchase of defence goods or defence services. Offsets can be regarded as distorting the market but probably they will remain a fact of life as long as the European Defence Equipment Market itself is far from perfect. The new Code will not stop the use of offsets. However, it will make the use of offsets transparent and it will limit their use to not exceed the value of the procurement contract (the 100 % limit). The Code on Offsets will take effect as of 1st July 2009.

Making the difference The successes of ESDP − about 20 military and civil operations − may not distract the Member States from the fact that serious capability shortfalls remain. The European Defence Agency has filled an important gap: the Member States now have an instrument to address military capability improvement in an integrated way. EDA has already made the difference: • with setting up the four strategies, with the CDP as the ‘driver’, Europe now has a framework for its defence agendas; • with concrete projects and activities shortfalls are addressed, from urgent operational needs such as helicopter availability to long-term requirements to deal with future challenges; • with the Defence R&T Joint Investment Programmes a stepchange has been made to invest more together in future technologies, serving military needs of tomorrow; • with the Code of Conduct on Defence breakthrough we have opening up the European Defence Equipment for Market.

The crisis calls for increasing collaboration Naturally, this is only the beginning. Huge tasks lie ahead, also taking into account that the financial-economic crisis will have an impact on defence budgets in the years ahead. This sheer fact should reinforce the Agency’s call for increasing collaboration between the military planners, researchers, armaments programme constructors and defence industries in Europe. As in the wider economic world: national solutions can no longer solve international problems. European cooperation has to be the answer, also in defence.

INSTITUTIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

The role of ASD in European Security and Defence

by François Gayet, Secretary General ASD, Brussels

After several years of stagnation − or frustratingly slow progress −, the European Security and Defence Policy has again started to gather momentum. The re-launch of the ESDP, owing largely to the efforts of the French Presidency of the European Union during the second half of 2008, has now brought about some concrete results, which should lead to a strengthening of Europe’s military capabilities.

Efforts of the French Presidency Important agreements were signed under the French Presidency, concerning in particular the creation of a European air transport fleet, the launch of a European initiative in the area of naval interoperability and the realisation of a future programme of space-based observation (MUSIS). EU Defence ministers also decided to reinforce the role of the European Defence Agency, which they entrusted with the task of preparing two equipment programmes − one in the area of maritime mine clearance and the other in the domain of Unmanned Surveillance Air Vehicles −, as well as a research programme on military technologies of the future. Such initiatives are truly encouraging. By accepting to bring together some of their military resources, the Member States involved have payed the way for a thorough rationalisation of Europe’s defence capabilities. By giving a more important role to the European Defence Agency, the EU at last seems willing to fully exploit the potential of a body aimed at coordinating military equipment programmes in Europe.

A mark of recognition of the role played by ASD during the French Presidency came with an invitation for our association to feature among the key stakeholders represented at a highlevel conference on European defence capabilities organised by the French presidency in Marseille, on 31st October 2008.

The role of ASD in cooperation with EU-Institutions ASD, the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, welcomes these evolutions and is committed to playing a key, positive role in the process ahead, in particular to promote the creation and development of a genuinely European defence and security market.

Alongside aeronautics and space, ASD represents the defence and security industries of Europe in all matters of common interest, with the objective of promoting and supporting the competitive development of these sectors. ASD pursues joint industry actions which have to be dealt with on a European

François Gayet Secretary General, ASD. François Gayet was born in 1945.

Master of science degree, Stanford University, California, USA, Commission as Ingénieur en Chef de l’Armement in the French Defense Procurement Agency (DGA); 1975 Joined Thales; 1982 to 1997 Director Divisions Electronic System; Telecommunications; Security; Missile Systems.

1997 Chairman of Thales North America (TNA) and Chairman and CEO of Thales Inc.; 2001-2004 Senior Vice President Thales, France Defence; Naval Systems; Marketing & Sails.

Was elected Secretary General of ASD based in Brussels in 2005

level, and represents the European industry to promote its interests and ensure a high priority for issues affecting it in European public policy. In the areas of defence (including the land and naval sectors, as well as military aeronautics) and security, ASD represents a sector which generates a turnover close to 65 billion Euro.

A key dimension of ASD’s work is to engage in a continuous and thorough dialogue with the EU institutions, to make sure that the concerns and specificities of our industry are properly taken into account by EU lawmakers. In this rapidly changing environment, ASD is pleased to have been regularly consulted by the European Commission during the drafting of the directives, and by the European Parliament where the Association’s President spoke to a hearing in June 2008.

Pushing the Defence Package In the area of defence, an issue that has required our close attention and mobilised all our energies has been the socalled “EU Defence Package” of two directives (one the intra EU-transfer of defence products, the other on defence and security procurement). The original texts proposed by the European Commission in December 2007 have now been reviewed and amended by the Member States in the European Council and by the European Parliament. Texts will be transposed into national law by 2011/12. For governments and an industry accustomed to believe that the final authority in all defence equipment matters lies in national capitals, these directives represent something of a revolution ASD’s determination to positively contribute to the debate

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around the EU Defence Package paid off: in its final shape, the Defence Package is definitely a step in the right direction. This is particularly true for the Intra-EU Transfers Directive, which will contribute a great deal to the emergence of a genuine European defence equipment market (EDEM), and to a further consolidation of the European defence industry. It will establish the basis for simplified national processes for the licensing of transfers of defence goods, services and information. Once transposed into national law, it should greatly facilitate crossborder movements of sensitive goods and technologies to governments and certified companies within the European Union, therefore allowing the defence supply chain to operate more easily across national borders.

The Defence and Security Procurement Directive - A “mixed blessing” ASD is less satisfied with the final contents of the Defence and Security Procurement Directive, which for industry appears as a “mixed blessing”. Indeed the text does not meet all its intended objectives − while it will encourage cross-border competition and trade, and improve transparency in the important EU public sector markets of defence and security, it unfortunately applies the logic of EU internal market rules which rigidly divide R&D and production phases. It can reasonably be feared that such rules will reduce the incentives for defence capability investment by both the public and private sectors. The overall picture, however, is definitely positive.

Furthermore, no one should doubt that the two texts, which will be transposed into national law within two and three years respectively, each herald in their different ways a revolution in Europe’s defence and security markets. The rapid transformational effect of EU legislation in other sectors is well known. It is now industry’s task to work closely with public authorities to help ensure that these directives are successfully implemented in the Member States and that the benefits they offer are realised.

Funding opportunities Apart from this role of political interface between industry and EU institutions, another important function of ASD is to raise awareness of industry about funding opportunities existing at EU level. A concrete example of such funding opportunities is the European Security Research Programme, which allocates 1.4 billion Euro for research programmes over the period 20072013. To help companies in the sector fully exploit this opportunity, ASD set up “SMIGs” (“Security Mission Industry Groups”), a network of experts from public and private organisations seeking to collaborate in Security Research. This initiative resulted in more than 250 entries being introduced in the ASD ad-hoc database, originating from large companies, SMEs, research and technology organisations and think-tanks

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from across the EU-27. As a result, a majority of successful bids for funding presented under the European Security Research Programme were first presented in SMIGs.

Effective competition for the European security market • ASD is active in the specific area of security, which has become an increasingly important area for Europe - and for our industries. The current European security market is characterized by a situation in which many purchasing authorities coexist and act in limited coordination. ASD believes this situation should be improved through the creation of a wider and coordinated EU critical mass to increase competitiveness and reduce market fragmentation. We support the consistent development and implementation of Europe-wide accepted security initiatives, to create the conditions for the harmonious growth of an integrated European security market.

• ASD advocates increased financial support and improved administrative procedures for research and development activities on European-level security systems, services and procedures. We have been asking for the allocation of a overall annual budget of more than 1 billion Euro to security research activities, and for the development of coordinated actions between national governments and those DirectorateGenerals of the European Commission that deal with security issues. An incentive should be granted to Member States to develop activities consistent with European guidelines.

Major European security programmes • ASD calls for the development of major European security programmes, to be carried out in public − private cooperation.

These programmes could cover the following areas: EU Borders Surveillance and Management; EU Civil Protection; and the Protection of Critical Infrastructures (including cyber protection; air transport security …).

To promote these views, ASD has been actively engaged in fostering dialogue on security issues. We were closely involved in the creation of EOS, the European Organisation for Security, which has now been recognised by EU institutions as a positive initiative of ours to widen the dialogue on civilian security issues. EOS now has 31 members from 12 European countries, representing relevant actors in the security market.

• ASD works in close cooperation with ESRIF, the “European Security Research and Innovation Forum”. ESRIF is a European strategy group in the civil security research domain that was established in September 2007. Its main objective is to develop a mid and long term strategy for civil security research and innovation through public private dialogue.

See also articles: • Count Lambsdorff, page 42 • Andreas Hammer, page 45

DEFENCE AND SECURITY NEWS

+++ ESDP and NATO NEWS +++ EUROPEAN UNION EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Debates ESDP and EU-NATO relations In February the European Parliament (EP), in presence of the EU High Representative Javier Solana, debated in a plenary session (19.2.) on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) adopted a series of reports on the subject of CFSP and ESDP as well as on EU-NATO relations. (see also page 21)

Saryusz-Wolski Report on CFSP Polish MEP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (EPP-ED) in charge of the annual report on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) lists the Western Balkans (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina) as the primary security concern for the EU, ahead of Georgia, Russia and the Middle East. The report calls on EU Member States to consider all means that could be used in support of a lasting peace in the Middle East, including the deployment of a mission mandated under the European Security and Defence Policy. MEPs expressed their believe that the coming month will provide a unique opportunity for the EU to work out a new transatlantic agenda with the US administration covering issues as a new more effective global governance.

Wogau Report on ESS • Synchronised Armed Forces By adopting the report on the European Security Strategy (ESS) and ESDP, drafted by the chairman of the Security and Defence Sub-Committee, German MEP Karl von Wogau (EPPED), the European Parliament takes the view that cooperation between national armed forces should increasingly be synchronized and called “SAFE” − Synchronised Armed Forces Europe. This initiative has been proposed last year by European Parliament’s President Hans-Gert Pöttering on the 7th Berlin Congress for Security and Defence.

• Relative Lack of progress The report regrets the “relative lack of progress since 2003 in strengthening EU cooperation in defence” and MEPs call for an “integrated European Armed Force” equipped with “common weapon systems” and wants to see the creation of an autonomous and permanent EU operational Headquarters with the capacity to undertake strategic planning and to conduct ESDP operations and missions. The European Parliament strongly requests that the EU and its Member States focus their efforts on common capabilities which can be used for both defence and security purposes. They consider satellitebased intelligence, surveillance and warning equipment, unmanned air vehicles, helicopters and telecommunication equipment and air and sea transport to be crucial.

• Strategic autonomy The report points out that the EU needs to develop its strategic autonomy and implicitly criticized the High Representative Javier Solana for his report on the implementation of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which has been presented last December. “The revision of the ESS has resulted not in a new strategic orientation, but merely in a report expressing day-to-day policy concerns as they arise”, said Mr. von Wogau’s report.

Millán Mon Report on EU-US relations On 25 February the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a report on the EU-US relationship, drafted by Spanish MEP Francisco José Millán Mon (EPP-ED). A new transatlantic partnership is needed to strengthen ties between the EU and America now that Barack Obama has taken office, says the report. The “new transatlantic agenda” dating from 1995 should be replaced by a new transatlantic partnership agreement based on a new institutional architecture. MEPs propose the creation of a Transatlantic Political Council as “a body for systematic high-level consultation and coordination in respect of foreign and security policy.” This Council would meet at least every three month and would be shared by the High representative/Vice President of the Commission on the EU-side and by the Secretary of State on the US side. The current Transatlantic legislator’s dialogue should be replaced by a joint parliamentary committee compromised of Members of the European Parliament and the US Congress, and meet twice yearly.

EP-ESDA During his first visits in Brussels on 12 February, the new President of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA), Robert Walter, MP (United Kingdom, Federal Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats) discussed with the President ESDA President Robert Walter MP meets of the European Parliament, with EP President Dr. H. G. Pöttering.

Photo: ESDA Hans-Gert Pöttering, ESDP issues. Subjects were the implications for Europe of the ratification/or not of the Lisbon Treaty and the need to reinforce parliamentary scrutiny of

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Europe's foreign, security and defence policy, where the European Parliament and national Parliaments have distinctive but complementary responsibilities.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION EU ENLARGEMENT After the official visit of Turkish Minister R.T. Erdogan to Brussels in February 2009 to relaunche the negotiations between EU and Turkey, showing the importance of Turkey for Europe, the leader of the main Turkish opposition and socialdemocratic party, the CHP, paid a visit to the EU Commission for outlining his policies in favor of Turkey’s membership of the EU. The visit to Brussels and the office call to the President of the EU-Commission as well as a meeting with EU EnThe President of the EU-Commission largement Commissionar Olli recieves Mister Baykal, President of the Turkish Social Democratic Party (CHP).

Rehn, took place at the Photo: ESDA occasion of the opening ceremony of CHP’s Brussels representation office. Baykal held a Lucheon speech on his social democratic vision for EU membership of Turkey at the EPC. Baykal said: “We recently renewed our programme to better define our main target which is a fair economic order based on European standards and a globally competitive economy. The objectives of the EU’s Lisbon strategy are taken into account in reforming the economy and boosting the growth.“ “A special attention will be given to the national interests rejecting any alternative to the status of full-membership to the EU.( …) We believe that Turkey’s model of secular democracy deserves a fair and visionary treatment by the European Union. In this respect an essential factor of integration is Turkey’s participation to the CFSP and EDA”.

EUROPEAN COUNCIL SECURITY AND DEFENCE European Defence Agency (EDA) The European Defence Agency (EDA) welcomed the adoption by the European Parliament of the new Directive on Defence and Security Procurement (14.1.), which is taking account of the specificities of the sensitive defence and security market.

The EDA notes that the initiative is complementary to the EDA’s Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, which was launched in July 2006 and covers contracts placed outside EU internal market directives on the basis of article 296 of the EC

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Treaty. EDA operates the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) portal on which contracting opportunities are advertised. Around 400 contract opportunities based on open competition (worth more than 10 billion euro) have so far been published by governments. (see also page 54-56)

Armed Forces • German battalion to be based in Strasbourg region For the first time since the end of the Second World War, German troops will be permanently stationed on French soil.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced during the Munich Security Conference (6-8 February) the forthcoming installation of a German battalion in Alsace. Some 600 German troops will be reinforcing the Franco-German Brigade in Strasbourg-Illkirch. In return the French troops that belong to the Franco-German brigade will remain in Germany. Originally, France intended to withdraw more than 3000 troops from the Franco-German Brigade, currently stationed in Saarburg, Donaueschingen and Immendingen, in the course of the reform of the French armed forces.

The headquarters of the 5000 strong Brigade are in Müllheim (Baden-Würtemberg). The German Chancellor, Mrs. Angela Merkel declared that the installation of the German battalion in France is “a major political message”.

• The “Weimar” battlegroup End of January 2009, Poland, Germany and France began discussions on forming the “Weimar” Battlegroup that should be operational during the first half of the year 2013 and will be under Polish command. Delegations were chaired by Vice Admiral Eric Chapelet (France), General Werner Wiermann (Germany) and General Anatol Wojtan (Poland). Poland will ensure, during the first half of 2010 the command of another battlegroup composed of German, Latvian, Lithuanian and Slovak troops.

• Belgium started first interallied exercise From 1 July on, Belgium will head a battlegroup placed on standby (with French and Luxembourg elements) with a headquarters established in France (Mont-Valérien). With a view to certifying the battlegroup, the Belgium armed forces began their first inter-allied exercise on 6 February. The battlegroup with Belgian military (1.450), a French contribution (750 military and engineering means) and a Luxembourg unit (10) for water Purification will be under the command of Colonel Jean-Paul Deconick. The battlegroup, which will be intelligence-driven and built around an infantry battalion, will focus on conflict prevention missions and on separation on warring parties by force, while the Czech-Slovakian battlegroup, placed on standby in parallel, is more oriented towards evacuation missions and assistance for humanitarian operations.

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

EU-MISSIONS • Solana met EU Heads of civilian ESDP missions On 15 January EU High Representative Javier Solana met the EU Heads of mission (HoMs) of the civilian ESDP missions for a working lunch. Solana and the nine HoMs reviewed the areas in which the ESDP missions are engaged and the challenges facing the EU in 2009 in the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Georgia and the Balkans. Since the last meeting in October 2007 ESDP has five new HoMs: Kai Vittrup for EUPOL Afghanistan, Stefan Feller for EUPM BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Paul Kernaghan for EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories), Hansjörg Haber for EUMM Georgia and Alain Faugeras for EUBAM Rafah.

• EUFOR Tchad/RCA will end on 15 March 2009 On 14 January 2009 the UN Security Council voted resolution 1861 confirming that the United Nations will takeover the European forces of operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA on 15 March.

One day before, a Memorandum of understanding (MoU) had Force Strength by Nations in AOO: 3314 been signed between the UN and the Government of Chad on • ALBANIA : 63 the transfer of infrastructure and • AUSTRIA : 157 assets to facilitate the transition • BELGIUM : 66 and deployment of MINURCAT. • BULGARIA : 2 • CROATIA : 15 The EU is now working in very • CYPRUS : 2 close cooperation with the UN to • CZECH REPUBLIC : 2 enable MINURCAT to take over • EUROPEAN UNION : 1 in the best conditions. MINUR• FINLAND : 64 CAT will benefit from EUFOR • FRANCE : 1676 installations and logistic assets.

• GERMANY : 4 • HELLENE : 4 High Representative Javier • HUNGARY : 3 Solana met with Victor da Silva • IRELAND : 473 Angelo, UN Secretary General's • ITALY : 99 Special Representative for Chad, • LITHUANIA : 2 to assess progress towards • LUXEMBOURG : 2 • NETHERLANDS : 70 transition from EUFOR • POLAND : 392 Tchad/RCA to MINURCAT. After • PORTUGAL : 2 the meeting on 16 January • ROMANIA : 2 Solana said: “With EUFOR, the • SLOVAKIA : 1 European Union decisively • SLOVENIA : 15 contributed to increased securi• SPAIN : 86 • SWEDEN : 8 ty for the civilian populations • UNITED KINGDOM : 5 and humanitarian workers in the • RUSSIA : 98 region. Now that this operation is coming to an end soon, it is essential to ensure seamless transition and we are working very closely with the UN to make this happen.”

In practice, the United Nations have still problems to get enough troops together to make up the 4900 strong MINURCAT-Force. To fill the security gap after the end of the Euro-

pean force’s mandate, maintaining parts of the forces deployed under EUFOR will be the solution.

NATO Secretary General Preparing NATO-Summit Speech at SDA-meeting During a speech delivered at a meeting organised by the Security Defence Agenda (SDA) end of January in Brussels, NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that the hope the world places in Barack Obama must be accompanied by a greater European commitment for facing up to today's challenges. “You cannot only say we want more leadership, we want more transparency, we want more in Afghanistan, we want more here, we want more there, Guantamo, Kyoto, what have you, but we Europeans we stay in our own cocoon and will not deliver”, the Secretary General said.

NATO and OCCAR sign agreement on security of information On 5 February, NATO Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer met with Patrick Bellouard, Director of the OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d'Armement) at the Alliance’s headquarters to sign an agreement on security of information. The international procurement agency for managing of armament programmes is formed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom (other NATO countries like Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Turkey are also participating in certain OCCAR programmes without being members of the organisation.) The signed agreement ensures the protection of classified NATO information released to OCCAR in order to meet the Alliance's requirements and ensure conformity with NATO standardisation agreements (STANAGS). NATO currently takes part in three programmes managed by OCCAR − the COBRA Target Locating Radar, the A400M Military Transport Aircraft and the Tiger helicopter programmes.

INFORMAL KRAKOW-MINISTERIALS Six weeks before the NATO's 60th anniversary summit in Kehl and Strasbourg NATO Defence Ministers held an informal meeting in Krakow, Poland (19./20.2.).

• Afghanistan: Defence Ministers discussed in Krakow with their ISAF partners the key challenges in Afghanistan and stressed their commitment to support the upcoming elections. In a press conference after the first day's meeting, NATO Secretary General Jaap de de Hoop Scheffer said that not only more forces are needed,

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but “we need an equal civilian surge which means more development, more support for government and more institution building.” The Secretary General was clear: “more forces is not only leaning back and waiting for our American friends to bring in more forces. It's very much for the other Allies to live up to their commitments”, Mr. Scheffer said. Little inclined to step up their troop numbers in Afghanistan, Allies did not make any clear and final commitments, but after the meeting the US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, said that about 20 Allies promised to step up their civilian or military contribution.

• New American Aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan The Ministers had been informed that 37 American C-12 aircraft will be sent to Afghanistan and Iraq under the name Project Liberty. The first 31 of these aircraft, which are equipped with ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems, are expected to be deployed in April 2009. The aim is to improve intelligence during missions, mainly through the use of video images directly committed to the command.

• Piracy: Allied ministers also discussed the role the Alliance should play in future with regard to fighting piracy. They welcomed the fact that another Standing NATO Maritime Group will contribute in the coming months to the overall international effort off the Somalia Cost.

• The project of an Allied Solidarity Force: On the second day of the informal meeting in Krakow, NATO Defence Ministers gave their go-ahead to a project set out by British Secretary of State for Defence John Hutton, which aims to ensure the Allie’s territorial defence while safeguarding the expeditionary nature of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NATO Military Committee has been task to develop the concept of an Allied Solidarity Force in liaison with the NRF of which it could be part. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said to the press that “discussion is far from finished” and explained that the Military Committee will develop ideas on NRF in liaison with this force, probably for the formal meeting of Defence ministers in June, in Brussels.

FRANCE AND NATO NATO’s Secretary General in Paris On 12 February NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer went to Paris to meet with French President Nicolas Sarkozy and discuss the preparations for the upcoming NATO summit in Strasbourg/Kehl where France is supposed to confirm its reintegration in the Alliance's military structure. “A NATO which is changing, a France which is evolving. These two movements are converging, and it seems to me they could

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reinforce each other even more if France choose to complete the renovation of its relationship with NATO − which is its own sovereign decision” Speculations are running that after its reintegration into the NATO military structure, France could hold two of the command posts within the Alliance, the command of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) division in Northfolk, Virginia (USA) as well as one of the regional commands in Lisbon.

Sarkozy appoints Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Nicolas Sarkozy chose French deputy Pierre Lellouche (UMP) to take on the role of France’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Furthermore a team will be formed under the head of the Foreign Ministry bringing together all the specialists of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mr. Lellouche’s designation came after similar appointments by the Unites States (Richard Holbrooke), Great Britain (Sherard Cowper-Coles, Ambassador to Kabul), and Germany (Bernd Mützelburg, Ambassador to New Delhi). Defence specialist Pierre Lellouche is a political “heavyweight” in the UMP camp and had even been in discussion to be Sarkozy’s Defence Minister.

PROCUREMENT France In January the French Defence Ministry announced that France has ordered further 22 NH90 helicopters (around 600 million euro) additional to the 12 helicopters ordered end 2007.

Germany Germany will acquire 173 Eagle IV light armoured reconnaissance vehicles from Mowag (105.7 million euro) which should be delivered by end 2010.

A400M − deliveries not before 2012 In January 2009 EADS announced that deliveries for the A400M military transport aircraft produced by Airbus would not be possible until 2012. Britain’s Defence Secretary John Hutton, speaking before the House, said that Great Britain cannot accept a three or four year delay in deliveries, because this will cause unacceptable and pointless tensions on air equipments.

He added that they would have to reflect very deeply together with all their partner countries on the appropriate response to be given to the problem. On 26 February a committee of the British parliament called on the government to contemplate giving up the programme. According to the German news magazine Der Spiegel (28. February), citing sources within the ministry, also Germany may consider canceling their order for the A400M aircraft, unless Airbus finds a way to resolve the problems in the near future.