The European-Security and Defence Union Issue 42

Independent Review on European Security and Defence

Volume N°42

War in Europe Rethinking European defence in a crumbling world order

www.magazine-the-european.com

Edition 1/2022

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Editorial

P

utin, Biden and Zelensky will go down in history!

Putin as the leader of the Russian forces attacking Ukraine with criminal brutality; Biden as an appeaser from a great power that couldn’t or wouldn’t make it clear to the Russians what the consequences of an attack on Ukraine might be; Zelensky as the President and leader of his brave people against a superior enemy whose main aim is to kill civilians. In just a few days all three have helped to shape a fundamental new understanding of security and defence in Europe that had not been achieved in the previous two decades.

The European Union (EU) has learnt the hard lesson that a policy of understanding based on mutual economic dependencies cannot create security against dictators, and that defence requires appropriate military resources.

And after Afghanistan it has had to realise once again that America, as the leading Western power, puts its own security interests first. Biden has urged Europe to take its security into its own hands and become a solid military pillar of NATO. There is no doubt that the EU and NATO, together with the USA, did the right thing after the outbreak of the war by not allowing themselves to be drawn directly into the conflict, however hard the Ukrainian President, with his convincing media appearances, urged them to do so.

In the meantime however, NATO and the EU have strengthened their common eastern flank militarily and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has encouraged Ukraine, on her trip to the war zone, by inviting the country to start negotiations to become a member of the Union.

In addition, something quite astonishing has happened in Berlin: Germany is abandoning its policy of peace through rapprochement and is seriously redesigning its inadequate defence capability at great expense. It will be an essential contribution to the defence of Europe.

Putin’s political intention of occupying Ukraine by means of a “Blitzkrieg” in order to pave the way for the territorial restoration of the Soviet Union as it was under Stalin has not worked out.

What exactly does Putin want? It is clear that he has seriously miscalculated, but does he still have an ace up his sleeve, or could he, in act of desperation, attempt to start a world war?

It is impossible to tell when there will be a ceasefire or whether Putin will escalate Hartmut Bühl the war territorially or with more fearful weapons. But an end to hostilities must be achieved as quickly as possible, since, in addition to the fight for Ukraine’s survival, a domino effect is to be feared. On the international market for foodstuffs for instance, especially in Africa, where grain shortages due to a lack of deliveries from Ukraine could trigger refugee movements.

Also on the energy market, especially if Russia were to stop delivering gas or the EU imposed a gas embargo which could severely affect the manufacturing industry and thus call into question the EU financing of Ukraine’s reconstruction, especially by Germany which is the most dependent on gas.

Once the war is over, Europe will need more than ever to restore peace and continue to care for millions of war refugees within its borders.

In the fog of this unexpected war, the path to a future completely shaped by the fight against climate change which seemed to stretch out so clearly before us, has turned into a nightmare scenario because we know too little about what is to come.

We cannot assess the potential for greater violence, we can only guess at the dangers of escalation. We have doubts about our own ideas of order, but also about the resilience of our societies. While we can only guess at the kind of world that will emerge from this diabolical war, we must nevertheless prepare to build a new world order.

photo: private, LISphoto.com

The reality has changed

IMPRESSUM: The European − Security and Defence Union Headquarters: International Consulting 6, Rue du Château, F 28260 Berchères-sur-Vesgre (FR) E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Publisher and Editor in Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Berchères-sur-Vesgre (FR) Phone: +49/172 32 82 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris (FR) E-Mail: nannette.cazaubon@magazine-the-european.com

Editorial Assistant: Céline Angelov, Linz a. Rhein (GE) E-Mail: editorial.assistant.esdu@gmail.com Translator: Miriam Newman-Tancredi, Strasbourg (FR) and London (GB) Layout: Beate Dach, SpreeService, Berlin (GE) Advertisement & Sales: Hartmut Bühl, Berchères-sur-Vesgre (FR) Phone: +49/172 32 82 319 Print: Polyprint GmbH (GE) © 2022 by International Consulting, France

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION Vol. No. 42

Content 3 6

Editorial, Hartmut Bühl News, Nannette Cazaubon

17–32 MAIN TOPIC:

War in Europe

8–16 In the Spotlight

Rethinking European defence in a crumbling world order

Defending European values

9

“Le droit des peuples” Guest Commentary

by Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Paris

10

The Ukrainian tragedy and the future of refugee protection An appeal for humanity

by Gerald Knaus, Berlin

12

14

16

Values that make us unique and strong in a multi-lateral geopolitical world Science, education, and innovation

by Mariya Gabriel, Brussels Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and North Africa?

Responding with a European approach

by Gerhard Arnold, Würzburg

European strategic autonomy and a reinvigorated Atlantic Alliance Reinforcing each other

by Jean-Paul Paloméros, Paris

20

Has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine created NATO’s “watershed moment”?

Maintaining the pressure on Russia

by Dr Klaus Wittmann, Berlin

22

EU-Japan security cooperation in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine Making the rules-based international order robust

by Prof Hideshi Tokuchi, Tokyo

24

Ukraine between the Atlantic and the Urals Gambling the future

by Jean Dufourcq, Paris

Assuring equivalent protection for European Union civil and military personnel in missions Helping the EU carry out its missions

by Fred Stoof, Borkheide/Berlin

photos: © EU/Christophe Licoppe (Cover)

4

18

page 4: ©shutterstock / Alexandros Michailidis

page 4-5: © shutterstock / Decha Photography

Content

33–44 Security and defence A cooperative approach will become the norm 27

Europe’s defence – collective responsibilities Creating European forces

by Hartmut Bühl, Paris

30

A military strategy for the European Union Missions, resources, and lines of interest

by Ricardo Dias da Costa, Lisbon

31

Hybrid warfare is a serious threat to European prosperity and security

by Ralph Thiele, Berlin An agile, flexible und comprehensive approach

34

How to harmonise defence, security and sustainability on a European scale Upholding our European values

by Dr Hans Christoph Atzpodien, Berlin

36

Success with cooperative EU-NATO defence acquisitions The MMF Programme is a reference

by Joachim Weidmann, Angel Saiz-Padilla and Dion Polman, Bonn/Brussels

39

A first glance at the EU Strategic Compass A guide for action

by Hartmut Bühl, Paris

41

Europe’s defence challenges in times of conflict Cooperation is the only way forward

by Jiří Šedivý and Jean-François Ripoche, Brussels

43

NATO and climate change Between political expectations and military needs

by Michael Rühle, Brussels

The European – Security and Defence Union is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence, and was awarded in 2019 the Jury’s Special Prize of the same competition. page 5: © Norwegian Air Force

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Ukraine

Covid-19

Successful fundraising campaign

Prepare for the next pandemic

On 9th April, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the raise of €9.1 billion by the “Stand up for Ukraine” fundraising campaign for people fleeing the Russian invasion. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) will provide an additional €1 billion in loan to help people displaced by the war.

The pledging event was held in Warsaw, with

Distribution of blanckets to Ukrainian refugees

the participation of Polish President Andrzej

photo: shutterstock / Halfpoint

Duda. It was the culminating point of a campaign launched on 26th March by President von der Leyen and Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, in partnership with Global Citizen, in response to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s call on the international community to support his country. All EU Member States have been invited to contribute, as well as G20 countries, with the exception of Russia, and other partner countries, including Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and the Gulf Cooperation Countries.

Out of the total of €10.1 billion in pledges from governments, institutions, artists, companies, individuals, and EBRD funding, €1.8 billion are intended for the 6.5 million internally displaced persons, including 2.5 million children, to provide them with vital humanitarian care. €8.3 billion are dedicated to the more than 5 million refugees in frontline EU Member States, and countries like Moldova and will be used for their short and medium-term needs, from food, housing and medical care to education and employment.

Companies can keep on making donations and are invited to contact the European Commission via email: ECHO-private-donations@ec.europa.eu Web www.forukraine.com

Presidential elections in France

European leaders relieved after Macron’s victory After the French presidential elections in France, European leaders rushed to congratulate the re-elected President, Emmanuel Macron (La République en Marche, LREM), who won the second election round against the far-right candidate Marine Le Pen (Rassemblement National, RN).

Macron received 58.54% of the vote share compared to 41.46% for Le Pen. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel wrote on Twitter: “In this turbulent period, we need a solid Europe and a France totally committed to a more sovereign and more strategic European Union.” photo: © shutterstock / ID-EasyDoor Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, wrote that she was happy to be able to continue “our excellent cooperation”.

One of the first national leaders to congratulate Macron was German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, stating that the election result “sent a strong commitment to Europe.”

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky also posted a message on Twitter to congratulate Macron who he described as a “true friend of Ukraine”. Even Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, sent a telegram to France wishing “good health” to the re-elected President. In his speech after the victory, in front of the lit-up Eiffel tower, Macron told the crowd that his re-election was also a triumph for Europe. “I want to thank all French people who in the first and then in the second round gave me their confidence to realise our project for a more independent France, for a stronger Europe,” he said.

Video of Macron’s speech: Video https://bit.ly/3y364Q6

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On 29th April, the European Commission proposed new action to manage the current Covid-19 pandemic but also to prepare for the next one. The Commission calls on the EU Member States to take actions before autumn to ensure vigilance and continued coordination of health preparedness and the Commission invites Member States to: • Step up vaccination and boosting, taking into account the simultaneous circulation of Covid-19 and seasonal influenza; • Set up integrated surveillance systems that are no longer based on the identification and reporting of all Covid-19 cases, but rather on obtaining reliable and representative estimates; • Continue targeted testing and sequencing of sufficient samples to accurately estimate variant circulation and detect new variants; • Invest in the recovery of healthcare systems and assess the wider health impacts of the pandemic, including on mental health and delays in treatments and care; • Apply EU coordinated rules to ensure free and safe travel, both within the EU and with international partners; • Support the development of the next generation of vaccines and therapeutics; • Intensify collaboration against mis- and disinformation on Covid-19 vaccines; • Continue to deploy global solidarity and improve global governance.

In addition, the Commission also announced actions aimed at ensuring e resilient supply chains throughout the pandemic, both for medical countermeasures and for critical products across all industrial ecosystems.

News

European Defence

Cybersecurity

High-ranking symposium in Strasbourg

Council and European Parliament agree on Digital Services Act

The symposium took place in the building of the “Grand Est” regional government

O

photo: © Lionel THENADEY/Eurocorps

n 9th March 2022, a high-ranking symposium took place in Strasbourg addressing the topic ”What defence for Europe – between national sovereignty and collective responsibility”. Gathering 150 participants, the event was organised by EuroDéfense-France, CIDAN and the “Club des Généraux d’Alsace” in collaboration with the “Grand Est” regional government.

The symposium was held under the shadow of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, and buzzwords such as “changing times ” and ”solidarity” sparked lively discussions in four expert panels that were headed by high-ranking members of the three organisers. There was a consensus that the Russian invasion in Ukraine has initiated an unexpected paradigm shift in Europe’s defence, as stated by General (ret) Jean-Paul Thonier, and that Europe needs robust and a well-funded common defence to ensure its security, as was highlighted by General (ret) Patrick de Rousiers. Germany’s ”spiritual turning point” from its peacetime policy of economic cooperation to the refocusing of its armed forces on defence capabilities is a significant boost for Europe’s defence, said Cyrille Schott, Préfet de région (h.). General (ret) Jean-Paul Paloméros, former Supreme Commander Transformation NATO, underlined that the Atlantic Alliance offers the framework for cooperation between the world power that is the US, and Europe, while Jean-Marc Edenwald (Nexter) stated that in-depth armaments cooperation that develops independent European capabilities in the long-term and promotes transatlantic cooperation must be politically and technologically consistent. OCCAR Director Matteo Bisceglia gave his view that European and NATO institutions such as the EDA, OCCAR and NATO’s NSPA enable targeted cooperation, proven by the MMF project (joint transport aircraft).

Technological innovation, funded by European programmes, is also of crucial importance, as was pointed out by General (armament, ret) Patrick Bellouard.

While Admiral (ret) Jean Dufourcq took the view that Europe can play an influential role in the geopolitical rivalry of world powers but must define appropriate strategies to do so, Hartmut Bühl, Publisher, underlined that Europe still needs the nuclear protective shield of the US, since France, as the only nuclear power in the EU, will not extend its nationally designed protective shield beyond its own territory. Commanding General of Eurocorps Peter Devogelaere, stressed the importance of European multinational units of different formats and capabilities that are among the pillars of European defence.

After this first Strasbourg symposium, rich in discussions and insights, a second is planned for 2023.

On 23rd April, the Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional political agreement on the Digital Services Act (DSA) aimed to better regulate the digital space, to protect it against the spread of illegal content, and to ensure the protection of users’ fundamental rights. It will apply to all online intermediaries providing services in the EU. The obligations introduced by the DSA are proportionate to the nature and the number of users of the services concerned.

This means that very large online platforms and very large online search engines (more than 45 million monthly active users in the European Union) will be subject to more stringent requirements. Smaller enterprises and start-ups will be exempt from certain new obligations.

The obligations introduced by the DSA include analysing the systemic risks they create and to carry out risk reduction analysis every year.

A new article has been added, considering the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the impact of the manipulation of online information. The article introduces a crisis response mechanism that will be activated by the Commission on the recommendation of the board of national Digital Services Coordinators.

Platforms that are accessible to minors are obliged to put special protection measures in place to ensure their safety online.

The DSA is part of a package, together with the Digital Markets Act on which a provisional political agreement was reached on 24th March.

Web https://bit.ly/3KuCFAC

News by Nannette Cazaubon, Paris

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

documentation

In the Spotlight

+++ War in Ukraine +++

“Your fight is our fight” (ed/nc,

Paris) On 8th April, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen together with the EU High Representative Josep Borrell travelled to Kyiv to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In a joint press conference, von der Leyen handed over an envelope containing a questionary on EU accession to the Ukrainian President.

Excerpts from von der Leyen's remarks: “(…) It was important to start my visit in Bucha today. Because in Bucha our humanity was shattered. And it is right and just that the world voted to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council. This war is a challenge for the entire international community. And this is a decisive moment.

Will heinous devastation win or humanity prevail? Will the right of might dominate or is it the rule of law? Will there be constant conflict and struggle or a future of common prosperity?

Your fight is our fight. I am here with you in Kyiv today to tell you that Europe is on your

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen discussing with Ukrainian President

side. This is the message, dear Volodymyr, I

Volodymyr Zelensky, Kyiv, 8th April 2022

want to bring to the Ukrainian people today.

photo: European Union, 2022 – audiovisual service/Christophe Licoppe

We just discussed how to step it up Europe’s support. Let me be clear: We can never match the sacrifice of the Ukrainian

on €1 billion of support. This sum consists

medical care and work. The brave people

people. But we are mobilising our economic

of three different financial packages. As we

of Ukraine deserve nothing less. (…)

power to make Putin pay a heavy price. We

speak, we are transferring €120 million in

Finally, we are with you as you dream of

have imposed five waves of unprecedented

budget support. We will make available the

Europe. Dear Volodymyr, my message today

sanctions against Russia. And we are al-

€330 million from our emergency package

is clear: Ukraine belongs in the European

ready preparing the next wave. We are now

now. Both are grants. And we are accelerat-

family. We have heard your request, loud

moving into a system of rolling sanctions.

ing the second half of the macro-financial

and clear. And today, we are here to give

And these sanctions are biting hard. (…)

assistance package with €600 million.

dear Volodymyr, there is an important step

country. This is my second point. Ukrainian

towards EU membership. This question-

people are holding up the torch of freedom for all of us. The European Union is sending weapons to your country. We have allocated €1 billion from the European Peace Facility to support the Ukrainian

belongs “Ukraine in the European family.”

naire is the basis for our discussion in the coming months. This is where your path towards the European Union begins. (…)

On the first day of your mandate, dear Volodymyr, you said: ‘We have chosen Europe as our direction. But Europe, you said, ‘Europe

Armed Forces. And more will come. I am

8

you a first, positive answer. In this envelope,

We stand with you as you defend your

grateful the High Representative will now

Fourth, we are with Ukrainians as they seek

is not somewhere else. Europe is here in

propose another €500 million. In addition,

refuge within our borders. And I promise

our mind. And when Europe is in our mind,

EU Member States are delivering military

you: we will take good care of them until

then Europe will come to our country too.’

equipment on an unprecedented scale. (…)

it is safe to return home. Home to a free

Today, more than ever, Europe is here.

Third, we are strengthening our financial

and prosperous Ukraine. We make sure,

Europe is with you. Slava Ukraini.”

help for Ukraine. Today, we are delivering

that they have access to housing, schools,

source: European Commission

+++ War in Ukraine +++

GUEST COMMENTARY

“Le droit des peuples”*

by Jean-Dominique Giuliani, President of the Robert Schuman Foundation, Paris

I

n the West, where we were lucky enough to live on the right side of the Iron Curtain, we still reason in traditional terms, focusing on relations between states, regularly making mistakes, but ignoring a fundamental fact that explains everything: the people.

In Eastern Europe, those who suffered the most from the Soviet occupation and tyranny, from the liberticidal and mortifying communist dictatorship, unanimously wanted to join the Western family to avoid the return of the terror that haunts each family, so many of them having been decimated.

It was not an American or European plot that led to the enlargement of NATO, it was the repulsion and fear inspired by a Russia that has never been able to bring communism and its crimes to justice.

Nuremberg made it possible to judge an ideology and condemn the Nazi executioners, to allow Germany to return to the concert of nations.

Neither communism nor Stalin have been tried and condemned for the millions of deaths and sufferings they caused. Putin is only their grandson, the unlikely survivor of a security apparatus that has taken over the world’s largest country and plundered it.

The Russian people are being held hostage by a few rather pathetic oligarchs and thieves who have taken over their immense wealth.

The de-Stalinisation of Russia – right now the de-Putinisation – is much more necessary than the so-called denazification of Ukraine.

The history of Europe cannot be rewritten by Russian revisionist dictators. Nobody can ignore the feelings of

the people. They voted for democratic regimes, which may seem imperfect but which are real paradises compared to today’s Russia.

We must therefore recommend that only the Ukrainians decide their future.

And they will have strong and legitimate demands.

Neutrality, denuclearisation, non-membership of this or that alliance? The last time they accepted such conditions was in 1994 with the Budapest Memorandum, an international agreement signed by Russia, the United States, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, guaranteed by all members of the UN Security Council.

In return for recognition of its borders and a commitment to non-aggression, Ukraine agreed to part with the 1,900 Soviet nuclear warheads on its soil, which were repatriated and destroyed in Russia with US funding. We have seen what has happened to these “security assurances”, all of which were ignored by the signatories when Putin reneged on his word by attacking it militarily!

The Ukrainians will only agree to deal with the aggressor in the certainty that he will not return, such is the mark that Russia has left on the lands of Europe: blood, suffering and the horrors that Putin continues to spread.

So, they will resist to the end and they may well win because all their people are committed, they have the right to say what they want and what they do not want. In doing so, they are protecting a West that is very timid about having to do the same by assuming the risk of a conflict.

* The right of the people

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ Refugees Protection +++

APPEAL FOR HUMANITY

photo: ©2022 Ruslan Lytvyn/Shutterstock

The Ukrainian tragedy and the future of refugee protection

by Gerald Knaus, Founding Chairman of the European Stability Initiative (ESI), Berlin

T

he Russian invasion of Ukraine represents a turning point in European history. The leader of a nuclear power justifies the use of force and attacks a neighbouring democracy by arguing that the national identity of its people is artificial and deserves to be destroyed. Civilians in peaceful suburbs are executed. Hospitals and theatres are bombed. Mariupol, a city the size of Liverpool or Dresden, is destroyed within weeks. After only two months of war, an estimated 4 million Ukrainians have fled to the European Union alone. While a few are already returning to join husbands and fathers, following the failure of the first Russian offensive, many more remain at risk of further displacement as the next Russian offensive gets underway.

While the war continues, an even larger number is likely to reach the European Union in search of protection.

Stop violating the Geneva Refugee Convention This Ukrainian refugee crisis takes place against the backdrop of a deep crisis in international refugee protection. The 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention introduced a radical idea: states should give protection to anyone, regardless of nationality, who has “a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons

10

of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” And yet, for many years, even democratic governments around the world, from Australia to the USA, from Greece and Croatia to Poland at its border with Belarus, have been violating the non-refoulement (no pushback) principle enshrined in the 1951 Convention.

All governments are entitled to control their borders. They are also allowed to return people who have no right to stay.

However, democracies decided decades ago that they would only do so by following legal procedures. Thus, democracies need humane ways of controlling borders without breaching fundamental rights; ways to reduce irregular migration without pushbacks and human-rights breaches; and ways to admit legally those in need of protection.

This requires a positive vision of global refugee protection in the 21st century. Discouraging irregular migration through agreements with third countries can be legitimate if it respects the Refugee Convention. But protection must also be offered.

Democracies should commit to resettling more refugees and they should keep borders open for those who can find no other place of safety. And they should cooperate in doing so.

The response to Ukrainian refugees in Europe today matters hugely. All European countries, except the United Kingdom, already allow Ukrainians to enter visa free. The EU’s reaction to

+++ Refugees Protection +++

response to Putin’s war in 2022 “Aishumane not only to help his victims but also to

their plight was historic: with the activation of the EU Temporary Protection Directive all those fleeing from Ukraine have the right to reside, work and receive support anywhere in the EU. There is no need for smugglers, no dangerous irregular crossings, no long wait for slow asylum procedures. The reception of (so far mainly) women and children from Ukraine creates an opportunity to show how a humane European asylum policy might work even with unusually large numbers.

documentation

make a powerful statement about the value of human dignity in the face of a historic tragedy.”

Gerald Knaus

MEPs call for better protection of children fleeing war in Ukraine (ed/nc, Paris) On 7th April, the European Parliament adopted, with a large majority, a resolution recalling various measures necessary to protect children and young people fleeing war in Ukraine from the risk of trafficking, illegal adoption or other types of abuse.

Provide better information to refugees

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, more than 5.5 mil-

However, such a system requires more than empathy. It requires organisation. Throughout Europe, from Norway to Moldova, many have shown a willingness to welcome Ukrainians.

Everywhere there are cities and citizens willing to help. This makes it possible to mount an unprecedented effort to relocate Ukrainian refugees. An EU-wide special fund that can unbureaucratically and directly compensate local authorities for each registered Ukrainian, The Facility for Ukrainian Refugees in Europe has been established. There is a similar programme in the UK. But refugees are not parcels to be distributed against their will. Support must be offered to those who arrive in Poland and Slovakia, including information about how to get to, and conditions in, Finland or Ireland, France or Portugal.

Without information few refugees will cross the continent and will remain in (some) border states, where cities are at risk of being overwhelmed. More Ukrainians have applied for temporary protection in the Czech Republic than in France, Spain and Italy put together. Warsaw hosts ten times more refugees than the UK has admitted.

lion people (see https://bit.ly/3ODDBG9) have left their homes and seek refuge, mostly in EU neighbouring countries.

According to UNICEF, almost half of those fleeing are minors running the risk of falling victim to trafficking and exploitation.

“Every child has the right to be protected from violence, exploitation and abuse”, MEPs state in their resolution, recalling that the EU and all Member States have ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and are therefore obliged to respect, protect and fulfil the rights laid down in the Convention.

The Parliament recommends that child protection officers and other critical services should be present at the borders to be able to swiftly identify vulnerable children and record their identity and nationality. They should be referred to the adequate services within the national child protection systems, including psychosocial support, maternal health support, protection against gender-based violence, family tracing and support for family reunification.

MEPs call on the Commission “to help neighbouring countries to set up adequate and safe childfriendly spaces with child

Send a powerful message

protection officers immediately after the border, such as

If Europeans welcome millions of Ukrainian refugees, while restoring respect for the Refugee Convention at their external borders, they send a powerful message: democracies can respond in a humanitarian way to autocratic pressure, as the allies did during the Berlin airlift of 1948, faced with Stalin’s blockade and blackmail. A humane response to Putin’s war in 2022 is not only to help his victims but also to make a powerful statement about the value of human dignity in the face of a historic tragedy.

the Blue Dot hubs being set up by UNICEF and the UNHCR.” The Parliament also insists that host countries should “ensure the same access to education and health services as other children in the host countries”.

Web Adopted resolution: https://bit.ly/38ogY8i

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ Research and Innovation +++

Science, education and innovation carry intrinsic, unnegotiable European beliefs

Values that make us unique and strong in a multi-lateral geopolitical world

by Mariya Gabriel, Commissioner for Research, Innovation, Culture, Education and Youth, European Commission, Brussels

T

he provoked war in Ukraine is the most recent signal of the need to defend our democratic values and freedoms. An urgent need that Europe addresses with strong resolve and unity. We prepared swift responses to tackle the humanitarian urgencies and strong sanctions against the aggressors, targeting their financial and economic activities. Regarding the research, innovation and education programmes (Horizon Europe, Erasmus+ and Euratom), we also took a clear position, suspending our scientific cooperation with Russia and supporting Ukrainian researchers, and foreign scientists and academics working in Ukraine.

Europe needs to tackle its dependencies The war in Ukraine obliges us to accelerate the processes to transform our societies and our economies towards more resilience, more sustainability, and more strategic autonomy.

We need to tackle our dependencies, especially from unreliable partners, on critical sectors and infrastructures such as our energy or food supply, cybersecurity, the next generation of secure communications, artificial intelligence and new materials.

Let me stress the need to include educational infrastructures in the list of socio-economic critical infrastructures, as it became evident during the pandemic and now with the surge of numbers of children displaced from the war. Such a proactive path requires a holistic approach of anticipation, deterrence, resilience and leadership. I believe it must necessarily include research, innovation and education.

Let me highlight three dimensions that require our attention to reinforce our European strategic autonomy: 1) research and innovation through key industrial R&I partnerships; 2) highly skilled competences in deep tech, and 3) deepening our R&I global approach at programme-level to foster cooperation with trusted allies.

Research and innovation Starting with research and innovation, Europe needs to strengthen the synergies between programmes in order to develop the security and defence union, increasing the capacity

12

of EU Member States, authorities and institutions to align investments.

Horizon Europe provides important instruments through its partnerships in critical areas for Europe’s strategic autonomy such as clean hydrogen or advanced manufacturing capacity, including on advanced chips and new materials. These partnerships, involving Member States and industry, are very good instruments to foster joint R&I agendas with a critical mass of investments and stakeholder support to maximise the impact of their investments.

war in Ukraine obliges us to “The accelerate the processes to

transform our societies and our economies towards more resilience, more sustainability, and more strategic autonomy.”

Partnerships are mainly funded through the second pillar of Horizon Europe with an envelope in the order of €25bn.

Being a mechanism with a double purpose – align and add – Europe must foster synergies with actions that reinforce our autonomy and our competitiveness. We can account for an additional €50bn co-invested by Member States and industry. Additional resources can be raised to strengthen our ability to align regional, national and European investments to be at the forefront of innovation across the EU territory.

For example, with the recently proposed Chips Act, we plan to allocate more than €1bn of Horizon Europe funding to strengthen Europe’s semiconductor and new materials ecosystem, from research to production and a resilient supply chain.

The partnerships on clean hydrogen – also worth €1bn of Horizon Europe – is positioned to accelerate the adoption of alternative energy sources and energy storage technology and infrastructures, developing at the same time a European

+++ Research and Innovation +++

Mariya Gabriel is the European Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth. Under her

photo: European Commission/Jennifer Jacquemart

leadership, the new Horizon Europe, Erasmus+, and

network of innovation ecosystems promoting the whole value chain, from production, distribution infrastructure to the next generation mobility and transport systems. What Europe needs is to transform the EU “knowledge fabric”, recognised as a long-standing scientific powerhouse, into a lead innovator shortening the path from research outputs to marketable products, including technologies that are essential to address complex combinations of threats. I am committed to this objective and I work to support the emergence and scaling of such companies, through the various European Innovation Council funding instruments.

We acknowledge that the security of our citizens and the defence of our societal values and economic assets depend on our ability to embed new knowledge through education, research and innovation, including the aspects of security and defence.

Skills and competences Regarding skills and competences, Europe needs to call for new talents in critical areas – from artificial intelligence systems to the design of new aircraft engines or new quantum materials with completely new properties. To achieve this, we need to be leaders in deep tech education.

Another example where education plays a key role is the nature of cyber threats that potentially affect different critical infrastructures. It is important to incorporate the most advanced knowledge on artificial intelligence and deep learning technologies. Through the Horizon Europe programme, we aim to support the development of technological products and services that comply with the highest data protection. We have launched funding totalling €135m through calls for projects related to preventing digital disruption, notably those caused by malicious cyber activities.

This investment builds upon the existing success of our

the cultural strand of Creative Europe programmes are being implemented. Between 2017 and 2019, Mariya Gabriel was Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society. She was elected as Member of the European Parliament in 2009, 2014 and 2019. Mariya Gabriel is First Vice-President of the European People’s Party (EPP), and, since 2012, Vice-President of EPP Women.

previous programme, Horizon 2020, where we invested over €680m in more than 130 cybersecurity research projects.

The Union’s global approach to R&I Finally, a word on how important it is for Europe to have defined criteria and processes to select collaborations with our international allies, in the context of our global approach to R&I. We have established clear guidance highlighting the importance to maintain the openness of our R&I programmes while endowing us with the tools to safeguard European strategic interests. This is a new provision of Horizon Europe regulation that we have used in the work programme 2020-21, in full coordination with Member States. We can proudly say that this powerful process allows the EU to keep its programme the most open to international collaborations while ensuring reciprocity and a careful analysis of the sensitive parts where the EU carefully chooses with whom to collaborate.

The way ahead I conclude by underlining that the recent developments oblige all of us, European policymakers and citizens, to take nothing for granted. We must stay on high alert to defend our democracies and freedom of expression while being able to ensure “business continuity” in key areas from health, energy, transport, to education, professional activities and governmental institutions.

In a changing world, Europe has to affirm a leading role.

Europe has the capacity to accelerate the pace addressing the threats of climate change, using science and innovation to make decisive progress on energy supply and reduce the dependencies from unreliable international partners.

Science, education and innovation are key in this journey. They carry intrinsic, unnegotiable European values that make us unique and strong in a multi-lateral geopolitical world.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ Nuclear Proliferation +++

Responding with a coordinated European approach

Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and North Africa?

by Gerhard Arnold, Theologian and Publisher, Middle East correspondent of this magazine, Würzburg

A

mong experts, it is disputed whether the Iranian leadership is aiming to possess nuclear weapons at the earliest possible opportunity or just lay the groundwork to be able to produce them at short notice. It is also unclear whether Iran is serious about returning to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 14th July 2015, better known as the Iran nuclear deal.

Regardless of the outcome of the ongoing Vienna negotiations, Iran could in any case only be prevented from producing highly enriched uranium for a limited period of about eight years. Like North Korea, it could then withdraw from the Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT) and become a latent nuclear power.

This circumstance, plus its aggressive foreign policy of sponsoring Shiite terrorist groups, make Iran a high-problem country for its Gulf neighbours. But are there also signs that states in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) are interested in, or actually seeking to produce, nuclear weapons?

Nuclear power plants are prestige projects Last year, the United Arab Emirates commissioned the first of four neighbouring nuclear reactors to generate electricity. From a Western perspective, nuclear power generation by states on the Arabian Peninsula is totally unreasonable because sunlight and land for photovoltaics and wind turbines are almost unlimited. The enormous costs, plus the problems of disposing of nuclear waste, fly in the face of every economic and environmental calculation. But the ruling houses in the Arab world do not always think so rationally. For wealthy Arab states, the use of nuclear energy is first and foremost a question of prestige and not in itself an indication of aggressive intentions. They want to show the world that they have enough money to build nuclear power plants and are capable of catching up technologically with the West. But they also want to stop using their own fossil fuels (natural gas and oil) for power generation and sell them at high prices instead. It must also be pointed out in all honesty, that companies from all over the world, including Russia, are pressing Arab states to build nuclear power plants.

Unproblematic states…

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has so far credibly demonstrated that it does not seek nuclear weapons and has therefore

14

submitted to the strictest standards of monitoring of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through an additional protocol. International observers therefore do not view the UAE as a suspect state.

Egypt’s nuclear policy under various leaders, until President Morsi came to power in late 2012, gave rise to some concerns.

The Muslim Brotherhood publicly called for nuclear weapons because of the perceived Israeli threat but has not been a political force since 2013. But Egypt, unlike the UAE, has not agreed to a tighter IAEA inspection regime of its two research reactors. The current head of state, al-Sissi, has emphasised the exclusively civilian use of his nuclear facilities. This looks plausible for now. After coming to power, he took his time before signing a contract with the Russian atomic energy agency ROSATOM in 2015 to build a four-unit nuclear power plant, but the project has experienced delays. Here too, prestige and a secure power supply are at stake in the face of growing demand. Experts believe however that the notoriously stretched state finances make independent research into uranium enrichment unlikely.

…and problematic states Turkey’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, told supporters of his AKP party in a speech on 4th September 2019, that it was unacceptable to want to ban Turkey from possessing nuclear weapons. All developed states have them, he said. Moreover, Turkey has nuclear armed Israel in its neighbourhood - a source of serious concern for other states in the region.

This stance is surprising because Turkey joined the NPT in 1980. The country has its own uranium reserves and operates a research reactor. Technically, the path to enriched uranium would be open by reprocessing uranium waste. Also troubling are the intensive military ties that Erdogan has cultivated with Pakistan, which has already provided nuclear know-how to other countries, such as North Korea and Libya.

Agreements have been reached with Russia to build a number of nuclear power plants on the Mediterranean coast. A great many Turkish students have been sent to Russia to study nuclear science. This creates expertise for a conceivable push towards its own uranium enrichment.

US-nuclear expert John Spacapan recommended that NATO and the US should try to dissuade Turkey from possessing nuclear weapons by showing it the benefits of NATO military protection.

Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the struggle for political hegem-

+++ Nuclear Proliferation +++

a Western perspective, nuclear power generation by states on “From the Arabian Peninsula is totally unreasonable because sunlight and land for photovoltaics and wind turbines are almost unlimited.”

Wind turbines in the desert

ony in the Persian Gulf is mixed with the age old religious-political enmity between Shiites and Sunnis. Iranian research activities to prepare nuclear weapons have long worried the Saudi royal family.

On 15th March 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in a television interview, “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire a nuclear bomb, but if Iran develops a nuclear bomb, we will undoubtedly follow suit as soon as possible.”

Preparations have already begun, even though the country joined the NPT in 1988. In 2005, it was able to sign a supplemental agreement with the IAEA, according to which its nuclear projects are exempt from inspections if it produces very small amounts of nuclear material.

The Saudi energy minister told at an energy conference in Dubai in September 2019 that his country wants to develop a nuclear programme that includes uranium enrichment, but only for civilian purposes. The kingdom is pursuing a very ambitious programme and aims to have 16 nuclear power plants operational by 2040. Two are already in the planning stage. In addition, a research reactor, built by Argentina, is nearing completion. There will be no IAEA inspections until commissioning.

In Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia, a plant is currently being built with Chinese help to produce a uranium concentrate from uranium ore.

photo: © Eviart, shutterstock

intention of obtaining at least the option to build nuclear weapons.” The study therefore advises the German government to respond to this development with a coordinated European approach “to prevent the operation of uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing facilities in the country.”

The proliferation risks in the Near and Middle Eastern region are currently manageable, but with Saudi Arabia and Turkey as problem states, this could change quickly if political and military conflicts, especially if they are initiated by Iran, continue to intensify.

Gerhard Arnold is a German protestant theologian. Born in 1948, he studied Theology in Neuendettelsau, Heidelberg and Erlangen from 1967 to 1973. He served as minister in the Lutheran Church of Bavaria and was teacher of religion at a High School in photo: private

Kitzingen from 1982 to 2009. Mr Arnold published numerous monographs and essays in the field of

contemporary church history on the themes/issues of ethics of peace

An EU approach to prevent proliferation?

and international security policy. Since 2012, the focus of his studies

A detailed study by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) wrote in December 2021: “It is clearly discernible, however, that the current build-up of technological capabilities is linked to the

has been on the conflicts in the Near and Middle East region, including the aspect of climate change with its consequences of internal migration and social tensions.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ Missions +++

Helping the EU carry out its missions

Assuring equivalent protection for European Union civil and military personnel in missions

by Fred Stoof, owner of Stoof International GmbH, Borkheide/Berlin

E

uropean Union operations and missions are deployed within the framework of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In 2003, the EU launched its first military operation to monitor the peace agreement in Macedonia and the operation EUFOR/Althea to oversee the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since then, 22 civilian, 11 military and one mixed missions have been launched. Currently, there are seven ongoing military missions or operations and 11 civilian missions; about 5,000 people are deployed. EU missions operate in the framework of a comprehensive approach and in close coordination with EU delegations in the region. Decisions to deploy a mission are taken by the Foreign Affairs Council.

Adapting vehicles to the need on the ground These missions and operations often take place in a less permissive environment. Therefore, the personal protection of military and civilian personnel is of utmost importance. Driving on heavy terrain, in an often-unfamiliar environment requires civilian vehicles which, thanks to their inconspicuous appearance and high material protection factor, allow EU personnel to carry out their mission with a maximum of personal protection and safety.

In multi-stage production steps, the basic vehicles of high-quality manufacturers, in this case Toyota Land Cruiser 300, are armoured and extensively modified technically. The original appearance and surface of the vehicles is retained as before. photo: © Stoof

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the challenges “Weof EUunderstand missions and operations

and stand by our responsibility for the protection and safety of each and every participant.”

Stoof International GmbH is one of the world’s leading companies, which has gained a great reputation through the production of civil armoured vehicles. Having established cooperation with the EU for years, numerous vehicles have been produced for the special requirements of EU personnel participating in challenging missions and operations. The Land Cruiser LC 300 has recently become available as the successor to the Land Cruiser LC 200. The material used for armour, steel, aramid and glass has been tested by independent German authorities. A specially developed chassis ensures reliability and safety on any terrain. The vehicles are certified according to VR7, VR9 and NATO STANAG. Maintenance is supported in the best possible way by a worldwide service network.

We understand the challenges of EU missions and operations and stand by our responsibility for the protection and safety of each and every participant.

MAIN TOPIC: War in Europe

photo: © 2022 bgrocker/Shutterstock.

Within only a few days, the invasion of Russia into Ukraine has helped to shape a new understanding of security and defence in the European Union. All Member States learned the lesson that a policy of understanding and mutual economic dependencies does not protect against aggressive dictators and that defence requires appropriate military resources.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

How NATO and the EU can reinforce each other

European strategic autonomy and a reinvigorated Atlantic Alliance

by Jean-Paul Paloméros, General (ret), former Supreme Commander Transformation NATO (Norfolk), Paris

N

ot so long ago, discussing European strategic autonomy was considered by many as a non-starter. First and foremost because there was no consensus between EU members and therefore, they softened the language and, beating around the bush, used a more consensual approach by speaking diplomatically of EU sovereignty, without really defining what it meant. To paraphrase Albert Camus’ famous quote, today more than ever “to misname things is to add to the misfortunes of Europe”. Therefore, on the contrary, in the context of the recent Covid-19 pandemic and an even more major conflict in Ukraine, it’s time for the EU to set without delay its strategic autonomy as a common, crucial, and existential objective, whether to face Russia’s challenges in the present or shape Europe’s future security.

Autonomy doesn’t mean autarky To make it clear, there mustn’t be any misunderstanding: autonomy doesn’t mean autarky. It is for Europe to choose the dependency level it is prepared to accept in different key domains and to select reliable allies and partners ready to build this enduring strategic interdependency together. As far as European strategic autonomy is concerned, whatever perimeter one could consider to define it, it obviously involves defence and security almost as a prerequisite, at least as a major component, however certainly not the only one. To name the other main pillars of this strategic autonomy intimately linked with defence and security, energy comes at once, alongside digital transformation and cybersecurity, space, critical raw materials, omnipresent microprocessors, health, research, technology and innovation, industry, not forgetting skilled human resources. Consequently, the two main questions to be answered by EU Member States concern first and foremost their common will and ability to reach a suitable degree of strategic autonomy in those domains, and secondly the level of dependency they

18

accept with selected allies and partners. In terms of defence and security, for more than seven decades, NATO has been the masterpiece of the European security architecture, able to stop Stalin’s USSR push to the west in the early fifties, to prevent the resurgence of major conflict with the USSR, then Russia, and to provide a stable and secure environment for EU development and prosperity. Today among NATO’s 30 members, 21 belong to the EU and see NATO as the ultimate watchkeeper of their collective defence. Therefore, at least in the medium term, any future European strategic autonomy should be coherent with the Atlantic Alliance’s commitment.

Besides, as written in article 2 of the enduring North Atlantic 1949 treaty, member states “will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them”. It proves that the forward-looking founding fathers of NATO had perfectly understood that it was not possible to dissociate economy, defence and security. This is perfectly in line with

Jean-Paul Paloméros, Gen (ret) is a retired French Air Force General who qualified as a fighter pilot in 1976 and graduated from the UK Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell, in 1993. He acquired experience both as a fighter photo: private

pilot and commander in operations.

General Paloméros led the French Air

Force’s Plans and Programme Division and served as Head of the Air Force from 2009 to 2012, before he was appointed by NATO as its Supreme Allied Commander Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, where he served until 2015.

MAIN TOPIC: War in Europe

extending the umbrella of French nuclear deterrence to other EU members will be raised in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, according to article 42.7 of the Lisbon treaty, “if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power”, which could be interpreted as the EU version of NATO’s article 5.

However, though Russian aggression against Ukraine comes with the potential risk of affecting eastern European nations, we have not heard any voice invoke the possibility of putting into force the Lisbon treaty article 42.7 if EU/non-NATO nations such as Finland or Sweden were to be threatened.

(left), and NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, Brussels, 7th April 2022

photo: © NATO

Towards a new security framework for Europe Foreign Affairs Minister of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba

the building of European strategic autonomy in full concert with other NATO allies, including the US.

“One for all, all for one” Article 5 Today, in light of Russian aggression against an independent European country on EU and NATO borders, most of our attention is focused for good reasons on the crucial NATO treaty article 5, which defines the Alliance collective defence commitment, the famous mousquetaire clause “one for all, all for one”. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the current situation. First, as was the case through the whole cold war, US contribution to NATO’s credible collective defence is still overwhelming. Obviously, the US military forces are second to none on the planet, they bring with them unique operational capability such as Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBM), global Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, multiple types of drones, and a unique joint fire power. In addition, the US gives NATO its nuclear dimension. Under a special double key agreement, the US provides B61 gravity nuclear bombs to a few NATO members who commit dual role fighter aircraft to carry out NATO’s nuclear deterrence.

The question of nuclear deterrence It is to be noticed that among the 30 NATO members, none has signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which came into force at the beginning of 2021. This is not the case of the EU, where 3 countries – Austria, Ireland and Malta – have ratified the TPNW, meaning that no consensus can be reached within the EU on the potential role of nuclear deterrence as part of a future EU strategic autonomy. Considering the current geostrategic context, this is a clear limitation to the EU’s strategic ambitions. After Brexit, France remains the only EU nuclear power and there is no sign that the question of

This is not to say the EU’s strategic autonomy is a non-starter, but rather that it should be thought through in deep cooperation with NATO. The 21 common EU/NATO members can be the leaders of an ambitious NATO/EU cooperation, if they act together. That initiative could cover a wide range of domains which are crucial in the current context. For instance, the true information battle which is raging on a day-to-day basis about the Ukrainian conflict should be fought in common by the two organisations, to bring tangible evidence to a wider public and to diffuse the most sophisticated disinformation campaigns.

Cyberdefence is another field of choice for this cooperation.

NATO and the EU can reinforce each other by developing a common cyber threat assessment, by working together on cyber resilience, by offering joint cyber expert teams to their members, by jointly attributing main cyber-attacks. Space is another great example of potential enhanced cooperation.

For the last two decades, the architecture for peace and security in Europe has eroded and many treaties and agreements put in place in the wake of the 1975 Helsinki accords have been trampled by Putin’s aggressiveness. The war against Ukraine can be considered as the last step in that direction. For EU and NATO member states, rebuilding a new security framework in Europe will need to show collective commitment and solidarity.

EU countries will need to first assume their full responsibility in NATO collective defence and regain a suitable level of autonomy to reduce their dependency in strategic domains such as energy, digital transformation, health, R&T and innovation.

Only a strong and ambitious Europe will be able to reclaim the keys to its destiny. It is the price to pay to build a peaceful future for new generations and to pass on this wonderful legacy built with blood and tears by our ancestors, our freedom.

a strong and ambitious “Only Europe will be able to reclaim the keys to its destiny.”

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Maintain and intensify the pressure on Russia

photo: © Drop of Light, shutterstock

Has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine created NATO’s “watershed moment”?

by Dr Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (ret), Lecturer in contemporary history at Potsdam University, Berlin

C

ertainly, the invasion on 24th February 2022, long prepared by the ever tighter military encirclement of Ukraine, marked the culmination of the gradually deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West. But this development had several “watershed moments”. Despite the view that Putin was pushed into a corner by NATO enlargement, by US condescension, etc., the West has not done everything wrong; it has made manifold offers for cooperative security.

Putin’s concept of Russia’s security It is true that since 1991 the systematic debate about Russia’s place in the European security architecture was missed and that successful development of the NATO-Russia Council was botched. But what President Putin calls security “interests” vis-à-vis a genuinely defensive Western alliance are at best political-psychological sensitivities: a humiliation complex as loser in the Cold War, “imperial phantom pain” (dissolution of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 21st century”) and frustration at not being recognised as a great power – unmindful of the fact that respect is earned, not enforced.

Putin’s Russia has thus become an international spoiler state whose only real “interest” seems to be keeping democratic developments – as a threat to his power system – away from Russia’s borders. After all, repression in Russia tightened after the 2011 demonstrations against the fraudulent presidential

20

elections. That “interest” is increasingly superimposed by Putin’s flawed interpretation of the history of Ukraine as part of Greater Russia with no right to its own statehood.

In retrospect, some claim that an opportunity was missed when, in 2001, as new Russian President, Putin made a forthcoming speech to the German Bundestag, speaking in German and appearing very civil and mannerly. However, Western offers of inclusion and cooperation followed, and NATO enlargement was “cushioned” with the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (1997), in which both sides declared not to be adversaries anymore.

However, biographical evidence suggests that with his background in the KGB, the way he rose to power and in light of his bitterness at witnessing, in Dresden, the fall of communist East Germany without Soviet military intervention, Putin has been on his revisionist “path of revenge” since 1989. Sergei Karaganov sees Russia in the same situation as Germany after the Versailles Treaty. Absurd but indicative.

Watershed moments Some “watershed moments” must be seen in this light: the Kremlin’s wrath at NATO’s Kosovo air campaign in 1999 (at whose origin stood Russia’s refusal in the UN Security Council to compellingly warn Serbia’s President Milosevic to stop violent “ethnic cleansing”). Russia left the NATO-Russia Council, for which it was harshly criticized by NATO, who made the same mistake though during Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008.

This was preceded by Putin’s angry “We are not taken account of” speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, to which one should have listened more carefully. And

MAIN TOPIC: War in Europe

Dr Klaus Wittmann, Brig Gen (ret) level meetings, hope for the “small-scale” option, one can indeed see in the full-blown invasion of Ukraine the “real” watershed moment. Now even history at Potsdam University. In 2008 he ended a 42 the slowest and most naïve “heard the shot”, years career in the German Bundeswehr service that and even Germany, in the end almost isolated, included troop command, academic phases (university accepted the disconnection from SWIFT, “susstudies in history and political science as well as a year at photo: private pended the certification” of Nord Stream 2, made the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), a U-turn regarding weapons deliveries to Ukraine political-military work in the German Ministry of Defence and at NATO Headand pledged the necessary wherewithal for the quarters, and positions in higher military education. His last assignment was hollowed-out Bundeswehr, including meeting Director Academic Planning and Policy at the NATO Defence College, Rome.

NATO’s 2 % goal for its defence budget. Sweeping NATO decisions followed with a view to further reinforcing the Eastern flank, not least by additional US troops. In spite of its increased focus on China, the US is Putin’s irritation about NATO’s Bucharest Summit Declaration, once again a “European power”. offering Ukraine and Georgia the prospect of membership, was not taken seriously.

A genuine “watershed” came with Ukraine’s “revolution of Putin’s errors dignity” in March 2014. In Putin’s eyes it was a “fascist coup”, Apparently, the Russian President, isolated in the Kremlin, unawhich served as a pretext for the subsequent steps: Shortly ware of Ukraine’s development over the past 30 years, giving afterwards, Crimea was occupied and annexed in violation of orders to his top generals across a distance of 10 meters, has international law, and with Russian active military support, badly miscalculated: about the unity of NATO, the EU and the criminal “separatists” started a war in the Eastern provinces of G 7; about condemnation by large parts of the international Luhansk and Donetsk, turning them into autonomous “repubcommunity (141 votes in the UN General Assembly); about the lics”. The distribution of Russian passports greatly increased severity of financial, economic and individual sanctions. And the number of Russian citizens which Putin says he is obliged above all about Ukraine’s military capabilities, preparations to “defend”. and determined resistance. So, the original plan for a “subjugation blitzkrieg” failed, logistics were not put in place for such long distances over such an extended period, reconnaissance NATO’s guilelessness and tactics were poor, and Russian soldiers’ morale is pitiable.

It is clear now that NATO did not react vigorously enough The charismatic President Zelensky has become the face of at the time to show Russia’s leader clear limits. But even freedom, while Putin appears as the incarnation of the “folly of without taking military action in support of Ukraine, it was tyrants”. resolved to effectively protect all Allies – particularly those in In his frustration, the Russian President has moved to the the East whose latent security concerns became manifest. At Grozny and Aleppo type war against cities, terrorising the civilits summit meeting in Wales (September 2014) the Alliance ian population and heaping war crime on war crime. But even took far-reaching decisions regarding readiness, air policing, if he has already lost the war as it was envisaged, he can still military presence, exercises and defence spending. Most specinflict immense damage and suffering, dismember the country, tacularly, the 2016 summit in Warsaw initiated the “Enhanced send in Syrian, Chechen and Wagner militia fighters and hunt Forward Presence” with multinational battle groups in Estonia, down the Ukrainian leadership. But Ukraine will not capitulate Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – a visible expression of article 5 – between self-assertion on the one hand and neutrality with of the Washington Treaty which states that a military attack on demilitarisation on Putin’s terms on the other, a diplomatic one or more allies is considered an attack on them all. compromise is unimaginable.

But the West should have been aware that 2014 was not the For the West this means continuing military support to Ukraine end of Russia’s aggressive behaviour, and should have tailored with all the necessary weapons, maintaining and even inwarnings, sanctions and “naming and shaming” accordingly. tensifying the pressure on Russia, sustaining its own coheIn spite of warnings from Eastern Allies and in contrast to its sion, organising cooperation between NATO and the EU and declaratory policy, “business as usual” continued in many increasing the credibility of its deterrence posture as well as respects. As late as 2015, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline defence preparations. The protection of all Allies must be unproject between Germany and Russia was started – as a questionable. Furthermore, Allies should stop being deterred “purely economic” endeavour, but for Russia with very definite (and proclaiming this all the time) by Putin’s tempers, bullying geopolitical overtones. and threats for fear of “provoking” him. For his long-planned With so much guilelessness, tolerance in view of the conwar against the “brother nation” he did not need any “provocacentration of Russian troops on Ukraine’s borders over many tion” in the first place! months, credulity towards the Russian leader’s lies in high-­ was born in Lübeck in 1946. He is Senior Fellow at the

Aspen Institute Germany and teaches contemporary

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Making the rules-based international order robust

photo: © 2020 shigemi okano/Shutterstock

EU-Japan security cooperation in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

by Professor Hideshi Tokuchi, President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) and Indo-Pacific correspondent of this magazine, Tokyo

R

ussia’s invasion of Ukraine is a blatant violation of established international law, swaying the rules-based international order. As it is an outright challenge to the global order, it will affect the stability and security of the entire world including the Indo-Pacific.

World security is indivisible In the same way that European security is indivisible, as clearly described in the EU’s Strategic Compass, world security is indivisible. In his address to the Japanese National Diet, Ukrainian President Zelensky said that he did not see any distance between Kyiv and Tokyo. He is absolutely right, because today’s world is so connected that there is no such thing as security only for Europe or only for the Indo-Pacific.

In fact, Russia is a resident power of the Indo-Pacific, too. The Russian navy has been operating more actively in northeast Asia these days. Russia continues to illegally occupy Japan’s Northern Territories and said recently that it would suspend peace treaty talks with Japan in response to the latter’s sanctions on Russia. China and Russia are colluding with each other, saying in the recent Joint Statement that their relations are superior to cold war alliances and that their friendship has no limits.

In the same Joint Statement, Russia reaffirmed its support for China’s position on Taiwan. The Taiwanese are more concerned about their future, saying that today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s Taiwan. Indo-Pacific regional countries are carefully watching if and how the situation in Europe will affect China’s options toward Taiwan.

Meanwhile, North Korea will never abandon its nuclear

22

ambition, probably believing that Russia’s nuclear blackmail makes the US and NATO hesitate in direct military involvement in Ukraine. In the past, North Korea said that Iraq and Libya collapsed due to their lack of nuclear weapons. It is highly possible that North Korea believes that if Ukraine had not abandoned nuclear weapons, Russia could not have invaded.

ICBM-capable North Korea is not a regional threat, but a global one.

Japan, neighbouring Russia, China and North Korea, is more vigilant than ever. The Japanese are also concerned about the possibility of China’s use of force against Taiwan, likening the Ukrainian situation to Taiwan. Even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the expression that a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency was becoming popular in Japan, particularly because of the geographical proximity of Japan to Taiwan and because of the strong partnership and friendship between Taiwan and Japan. According to a Japanese opinion poll conducted in March, more than three quarters of the respondents were concerned about the possibility that the Russian invasion of Ukraine would affect the situation involving Taiwan. According to another poll, nearly 80% of the Japanese respondents believe that Japan’s own national security has been threatened by the Russian act.

Allies must cooperate in the Indo-Pacific The situation involving Ukraine clearly shows that no single country can achieve its national security all by itself. Partnership of like-minded countries has proven to be indispensable in the past several weeks.

The role of the United States...

Moreover, after the Russian invasion, the international community has proved that US leadership is highly expected. In his address to the US Congress, Zelensky wished for US President Biden to be the leader of the world, but he did not say the same to the leaders of any other countries. The US leadership

MAIN TOPIC: War in Europe

Japanese are concerned about the possibility “ofTheChina’s use of force against Taiwan, likening the Ukrainian situation to Taiwan.”

role remains important, but what the US can do on its own is more limited than before as internal division of American society holds back its power for international security. Therefore, US allies must help the US to stay engaged in world affairs. NATO will continue to do so in the Euro-Atlantic context in close cooperation with the EU. Japan and other US allies in the Indo-Pacific will do so in the Indo-Pacific. US allies in both areas must work together, helping the US, in order to counter the formidable adversaries: Russia, China and North Korea.

Japan as a positive sign of the European engagement to the region. Even without such a visible sign of security engagement, the EU and Japan will be able to work together to enhance the rule of law and the rules-based international order. The EU’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific will contribute to European security and enhance the national interests of the Europeans in this globalised world.

Foster a rules-based international order

The EU and Japan established a comprehensive framework for partnership in 2018: EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement. Capitalising on the momentum generated by this wide-ranging agreement, the EU and Japan should work together in a variety of security-related areas including in crisis management, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of … and of the European Union mass destruction, the International Criminal Court, reform of The war in Ukraine will be protracted. The economic sanctions the United Nations, maritime affairs and cyber issues. will continue to be imposed for a long time, and accordingly, The EU and Japan should cooperate to create a more robust Russia will decline. Instead, China will continue to rise and the and effective rules-based international order as both have US-China competition will be intensified, affecting every corbeen benefiting from the stability generated by it. It is wrong to ner of the globe, even including the Arctic. Meanwhile, India say that international law is useless. Though the power of interwill remain autonomous and is not on the same page as the national law to enforce is limited, the time of international law west in countering Russia, while remaining tough on China. has not passed yet. The international sanctions to put heavy The Indo-Pacific, northeast Asia in particular, will be a focal pressure on Russia and the prompt ruling of the International point and the frontline of the great power rivalry.

Court of Justice to indicate the provisional measures in order to Therefore, the EU’s decision in the Indo-Pacific Strategy to protect the right of Ukraine are clear evidence of international step up its strategic engagement with the region will not lose law being alive. It is of particular importance to restore the its relevance, and the intention principle of the rule of law in of the EU’s Strategic Compass the international community. to promote an open and rulesFor this purpose, the United based Indo-Pacific regional Nations should be reformed. In Professor Hideshi Tokuchi, architecture through the Indo-Paparticular, as Zelensky insisted joined the Defense Agency (the predecific Strategy shows consistency in his addresses to the Japacessor of the Ministry of Defense) of of the two important strategic nese and before the UN Security Japan in 1979 and served as Japan’s documents.

Council, the latter should be first-ever Vice-Minister of Defense for The EU’s continuous engagereformed in order to equip interInternational Affairs from 2014 to ment with the Indo-Pacific has national law with teeth. Though 2015 after completing several senior photo: private tremendous significance for it is a challenging task as the assignments including Director-GenJapan as the latter directly faces privilege of the permanent eral of the Defense Policy Bureau. He is the President the military threats of the three members is involved, the EU of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) authoritarian powers. Last year, and Japan must keep standing and teaches international security studies as a visiting Germany sent a navy frigate together to prevent flagrant professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy to the Indo-Pacific, and it was power politics from returning, Studies (GRIPS). highlighted and well received in no matter what.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Russia and Europe are gambling their future

photo: ©2022 Ruslan Lytvyn/Shutterstock

Ukraine between the Atlantic and the Urals

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by Jean Dufourcq, Counter Admiral (ret), co-founder of Vigie, synthèse stratégique, Paris

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he Russian aggression in Ukraine, a human tragedy of a bygone era, harks back to the European wars of the 20th century. It bears all the marks of Russian brutality, strategic frustration and a radical political project that has ended badly.

Russia is gambling its respectability and its future and Europe its reunification for the next decades.

The dialogue of the deaf between Washington and Moscow since the summer of 2021 under the Biden presidency ended up triggering a strategic vicious circle that culminated in the Russian invasion of 24th February. The 27 Member States of the European Union (EU), amazed and anxious, have hastened to try and unblock a European defence project that lacks strategic coherence. France, as president of the Council of the EU, has desperately attempted to maintain contact with the Kremlin and initiate a de-escalation. But once again in Europe, weapons have spoken louder than words and civilian populations are the victims. A new era begins with this disturbing flashback.

it with diplomatic pressure. The full-scale invasion that started on 24th February was therefore a surprise and caused hesitation among traditional allies, initially anxious to avoid any appearance of belligerence in support of the attacked Ukraine.

The radical firmness of the former members of the Warsaw Pact and collective fear at the Kremlin’s nuclear posturing also came into play. Many were quick to conclude that it was a war against the West or even the premise of a third world war. And the idea of the NATO defence alliance, that had lost its raison d’être, was quickly reactivated.

Some strategists have argued that Russia’s war against Ukraine was perhaps not so much intended as a military challenge to the West than the consequence of a refusal to provide formal security guarantees to Russia as it continued to denounce the continuous progression of NATO towards

Jean Dufourcq is a French Admiral (ret.) and cofounder, with Olivier Kempf, of “Vigie, synthèse stratégique” in 2014.

He holds a doctorate in political science and is

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The West was alarmed…

a former commander a.o. of the attack subma-

This brutal assault has taken experts and diplomats by surprise, except in Washington, which hastily moved its embassy from Kyiv to Lviv on 13th February as a Russian invasion became imminent. However, the Russians had already attempted to gain some degree of political legitimacy by invoking the need for action to protect the Russian-speaking populations of the Donbass, who had been exposed since 2014 to the non-application, assumed by Kyiv, of the Minsk agreements of 2015. This enabled Russia to justify its actions and underpin

rine Ouessant. Admiral Dufourcq also served at the photo: private

Centre for Analysis and Forecasting of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, at the Perma-

nent Representation of France to the EU in Brussels and at the NATO Defense College in Rome. From 2007-2012, he was director of studies at the École Militaire in Paris (Irsem) and from 2009-2014 he served as editor-in-chief of Revue Défense Nationale. Since 2010, he has been an associate member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.

MAIN TOPIC: War in Europe

its borders. After all, German reunification in 1990 had been acknowledged in return for a pledge to stop NATO’s expansion.

After the breakdown of talks in 1994, further tensions in 2004, and a coup in Kyiv, unfavourable to its interests, Russia seized the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, after denouncing the lease to Ukraine.

…but let it happen The international community was duly alarmed by these events but did little to stop them, only agreements signed in the Normandy format (without the US and the UK) and a sanctions regime. By then however, the EU was not too concerned about the stalling of the process and President Trump, who was not interested in NATO, took little notice of the tensions around Ukraine. His successor, Joe Biden, a veteran of the Cold War, brutally brought it to boiling point once again in 2021, to make his allies forget the evacuation from Afghanistan without consultation. To restore his leadership, he did not hesitate to challenge Russia and remobilise NATO. History will no doubt identify as an aggravating or even triggering factor the intransigent strategic partnership signed on 10th November 2021 between President Biden and the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs in the midst of a round of Russian-American strategic negotiations opened in Geneva in June 20212: it was stated therein that the two signatories had no intention of applying the 2015 Minsk agreements, even though they had been endorsed by the UN. And it will be noted that a month later, President Putin ostensibly convened his extended Council and announced that “we simply can no longer back down, that is the whole question”. The Kremlin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), which has a very long strategic memory, undoubtedly at that point started planning a global operation, with several options, to neutralise Ukraine.

How to react?

Are we dealing here with a very serious family dispute, a tragic intra-state conflict linked to the last gasp of de-sovietisation in the region that started in the mid-1990s? If so, it can be solved, despite the extent of death and destruction that will require reparations and criminal proceedings. It will then follow that the measures to stiffen NATO’s spine and the massive rearmament of Europe to protect the Euro-Atlantic world from a new cold war will remain once-off emergency measures, a rhetorical precaution without long-term significance, a simple collective reflex. And we shall hopefully be able eventually to reunite Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU), even if a continental heartland associating Germany and Russia remains a nightmare for the distant maritime powers, Great Britain and the United States, according to Mackinder’s thesis (1904,

the European continent is “Today held hostage by the American-

Chinese rivalry and a residual American-Russian tension, while Moscow is striving to restore its viability on the international stage.”

1943). The current war will however disqualify the leaders in the Kremlin who have committed an irreparable political blunder, even if it can be explained by the botched dislocation of the Soviet empire and subsequently that of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. But once the 190 million Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians can live side by side in Eastern Europe, reunification can take place.

Or alternatively, are we looking at a Kremlin-led strategic and military offensive to consolidate a West facing wall around Russia and rebuild a frontier around Transnistria, Ukraine and Belarus to isolate the southern flank of Russia from NATO countries? It was this alarmist analysis that prevailed from the outset in Europe. And in this reading, Ukraine is just a convenient pretext for Moscow to settle its scores with the United States for the casual way it ended the Cold War, eager as it was to turn its attention to its rivalry with Beijing, its real competitor.

Or is it rather the tsarist dream of a potentate rewriting history and a desire to repair a Western assault on a great imperial civilisation which has conquered major regions of Eurasia?

The United States does not hesitate to see it as the return of the Red Army’s radical challenge to the free world in 1945 and denounces an evil regime which threatens Central Europe and must be destroyed at all costs.

From a French point of view, we would prefer to see the first alternative prevail. In this way, the still necessary reunification (ATTU) of Europe could be prepared, the only appropriate way of establishing a real European centre of gravity that the EU is struggling to embody. But today the European continent is held hostage by the American-Chinese rivalry and a residual American-Russian tension, while Moscow is striving to restore its viability on the world stage.

Is the war in Ukraine the last tragic jolt of half a century of a cold war that ended badly in the 1990s? Or is it the first manifestation of a strategic reordering which will bring the centuries old supremacy of the Western world to an end but will perhaps allow the emergence of the European continent as an autonomous player in a multipolar world? In which case, the question of the “East of the West” will no longer be relevant3.

This reflection concludes a study entitled “A French view on NATO in 2022” to be published in the Italian review Limes.

“The way out of the crisis is in the United States”, Letter from Léosthène, March 19, 2022, n° 1638/2022, www.leosthene.fr 3 “Multisme”, LV 61, 2017; “East of the West”, LV 187 2022 www.lettrevigie.com 1 2

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MAIN TOPIC: War in Europe

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Europe’s defence – collective responsibilities Respect for nations in creating European forces

by Hartmut Bühl, Publisher, Paris

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ladimir Putin has achieved the impossible: in a few days, his war against Ukraine has made the European Union (EU) politically move further than it has done in more than seven decades of peaceful economic and financial development. In those few days, a true “spirit of defence” has been created.

The war has come as a great shock to all those who believed that peace in Europe was eternal.

We Europeans must stop advocating utopias that we hide behind while doing nothing! We must conduct Realpolitik, based on geopolitics, geostrategic ambitions and a militarily feasible defence strategy based on our values and political objectives.

A surprising U-turn in Germany Germany is currently experiencing a fourth paradigm shift in the post-war history of its defence and armed forces: The first paradigm shift was the rearmament of 1954, and entry into NATO and the WEU, with limited sovereignty, after the failure of the European project of the European Defence Community (EDC).

The second paradigm shift was reunification: finally, the people saw themselves freed from the substantial burden of spending for their heavy front-line defence and could invest the money “usefully” in the process of reunification.

The third paradigm shift came shortly afterwards in the Balkans in 1994, the first deployment of German soldiers and their involvement in combat operations since the second world war. And on a Sunday, 27th February 2022, in an exceptional plenary session of the Bundestag in Berlin, observing with shame and horror Russian war crimes in Ukraine, Germany experienced its fourth paradigm shift by burying its complexes

of the previous seven decades towards everything military. In just a few minutes, a cultural revolution took place, a farewell to the dreams of “eternal peace” and a return to a cruel reality.

Two days after the Russian invasion into Ukraine, the young German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, very skilfully attacked President Putin and his Foreign Affairs Minister Sergueï Lavrov personally, calling them liars, and on Sunday 27th February, the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz – known for his Hamburg equanimity – revealed himself in direct combat, with Russia and Putin’s war by accusing him personally. In a move unprecedented since 1956, and in order to “counter the threat of Putin”, Olaf Scholz announced the complete modernisation of the German Bundeswehr, with a “single special fund”, included in the constitution, of €100bn on top of the annual federal defence budget of €50bn: a quantum leap in European defence.

Europe and its defence For six decades, the United States was the “security provider” of the Atlantic Alliance and the Europeans the “security consumers”. When President Trump reflected on “the end of NATO” in 2018 and withdrew thousands of his troops from Europe, he created some disarray among Alliance members but after the pointed remarks of the French President in 2019, qualifying the Alliance as “brain dead”, a new sense of solidarity emerged among members. The war in Ukraine has seen a strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, in a unity of spirit rarely observed in the past, but Europe is no longer the centre of our American friends’ interests and concerns, as they boost their commitment to the Indo-Pacific! The actual solidarity with Europe could quickly change. And what should Europe do so → Continued on page 28

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

that the world does not go down the drain? EU Member States see their defence as a pillar of NATO’s collective defence. This “coexistence” is reflected in Article TEU 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, in which the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was built on the principles of not breaking ties with the Atlantic Alliance Treaty. At the same time, the Union ensured that it could take advantage of the “Berlin Plus” system by falling back on the NATO command structure for high-density military engagement and, in case of need, the support of NATO assets and capabilities.

Would France be able to guarantee the protection of the Union with its voluntarily very limited means of deterrence?

President Macron, like his predecessors, remains faithful to Charles de Gaulle’s doctrine of deterrence. In his conference of 7th February 2019 at the Ecole Militaire in Paris – the same place where the General first expounded his philosophy of French deterrence on 3rd November 1959 – Macron spoke out for a strong and autonomous European defence in which France must assume its responsibilities and play its role.

The President reached out to his European partners, inviting them to participate in an in-depth strategic dialogue and joint exercises on deterrence, but he was also categorical that French nuclear weapons cannot be shared.

The credibility of nuclear weapons is indeed based on an immediate and strategic response capability to a detected attack. Could an extension of French deterrence to the territory of the Union respect this principle of immediacy and trigger, if necessary, an act of reprisal? My view is that it could not; I cannot envisage, as in NATO, any Nuclear Planning Committee in the EU in Brussels, a kind of college that discusses a nuclear response, especially the first engagement, given that decisions are made unanimously.

On the one hand, the nuclear capacity of France as a member of the Union is already a deterrent and as such it protects the Union by its mere existence. This is already a kind of unspoken extension. On the other hand, an official and written extension could actually diminish the credibility of French deterrence.

Consequently: Europe needs a nuclear dimension, the ultimate guarantee of its security. The American umbrella is still valid, French deterrence is complementary.

nuclear capacity of France as a member “The of the Union is already a deterrent and as such it protects the Union by its mere existence.”

The 2016 EU Communication on the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy advanced European defence cooperation. The European Defence Fund (EDF) was created, and cooperation was initiated within the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The Annual Review to Coordinate Defence Capabilities (CARD) enables EU Member States to better identify and close capability gaps.

Is this what is needed for the future? It is certainly a step forward but it is not yet enough.

A European sovereignty In 2019, the von der Leyen Commission clearly demanded that Europe take greater responsibility for its own defence and there was even talk of strategic autonomy in security and defence. However, the concept proved to be too ambitious and quickly gave way to “European sovereignty”.

From this perspective, the current trends in European defence may seem paradoxical: alongside new institutional initiatives, the landscape of European defence cooperation is characterised by the emergence of several ad hoc formats, often called “coalitions of the willing”, such as Macron’s European Intervention Initiative (EI2), the French Takuba task force in Mali supported by some European nations, or European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH).

These formats have been criticised as an obstacle to the longterm integration of defence across institutions, but they have proven able to crucially strengthen European defence cooperation, in particular in the context of post-Brexit Europe, where they are seen as a promising path to circumvent the politics of Brexit. And they are a complement with focus on one single aspect of European defence, not a replacement.

The nuclear protection of Europe Since 31st January 2021, only one EU nation, France, has nuclear capabilities and is a member of the UN Security Council.

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A “Europe of defence” The expression “Europe of defence” could encompass multiple configurations of the European Union. Let’s look at only two of them: A more developed political Union The first is a more developed Union, where the Member States increasingly share their sovereignty, let’s say a sort of federation. The Union becomes a federal state with a constitution, a presidency, ministers, common legislation, and a common army with a commander-in-chief who commands his forces on the basis of a single set of regulations. A beautiful vision, but it does not strengthen the capacities that we need now nor in the next five or six decades. Does it make sense to combine national armies and create huge cross-cultural problems? How could such a “European army” manifest itself as a security provider in the current political circumstances? Let us therefore remain realistic and rather try to build a European defence between the member countries, taking into account of their respective capacities. It is high time for the European Union to become fully operational – to show that strategic sovereignty is not simply a paper tiger. So, why don’t we just talk about “Eu-

MAIN TOPIC: War in Europe

ropean forces” or the defence of Europe, the construction of which is already underway at both political and military levels?

A Union with more developed European forces The second configuration is a Union developing multinational forces. Immediately after the reunification of Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed with President François Mitterrand on the need to find solutions for German armed forces to be integrated into multinational units to avoid any suspicion of what Germany might do if it acted alone.

After an initial commitment to integrate a German division into an army corps under NATO command (ARRC), Germany and France took charge of the project to create a Franco-German army corps, following the positive experience of the Franco-German Brigade, created in 1988 as part of the cooperation between Bonn and Paris.

The Franco-German Corps Treaty was signed in La Rochelle on 21st May 1992 after five months of negotiation. It came into being in a spirit of compromise by joining two different cultures with different traditions, different command methods, training, daily working and many other obstacles. The Franco-German corps very quickly developed into a Eurocorps with today six framework nations and five associated members.

The La Rochelle treaty subsequently became the basis for the constitution of all other multinational units in Europe. Multinationalism in force building gained ground all over Europe on land, at sea and in the air. What was missing was an EU Headquarters to coordinate the actions of EU forces, but for nearly two decades London was opposed to such a military-civil instrument, claiming that it would duplicate NATO structures.

The British are now gone and European nations are progressing on this matter!

All the created multinational units – all with the link to NATO – have become militarily and socially successful and each unit has its operational excellences. And there is a distinct advan-

tage in these different formats in that missions can select the one that is the most appropriate. This is now a reality!

So, let’s drop the chimera of a “European army”, but remember it as a vision, as a dream for another political world. Let us focus on building a realistic and feasible European defence. Let us come together in investing in multinationalism with respect for different cultures and traditions and thus create a European spirit of defence.

An appeal to European leaders

Putin’s war in Ukraine will force the European Union to review many of its policies, like strategic trade and energy relations with third parties, as well as its agricultural policy, in order to avert industrial and food crises. The EU must also use this opportunity to take the next step in implementing its defence policy, in line with the Lisbon Treaty but still considering European defence as a pillar of NATO- and beyond!

The hard truth is that the Kremlin’s brutal deployment of its forces against a brother country and its population is a wake-up call for the EU to act and for its leaders to take all the necessary measures to protect the peoples and societies of its Member States.

But Europe must also recognise that we Europeans have always been an object of America’s geopolitical interest. And although we have been very grateful for this at times when the United States was focused almost entirely on European security, we must not forget that it was also in the American national interest to do so. And although we were always loyal allies, we were never in fact “real allies” in decision making, because we Europeans – a collection of individual nations - only had a marginal influence on those decisions.

The time has therefore come for us Europeans to change our way of thinking, however hard it may be, reflect profoundly on our future security and close our ranks. In this sense, the Ukrainian catastrophe is an opportunity for Europe not only to reshape its post war relations towards Ukraine and Russia but also to change the Union’s governance on defence and security and establish its own military capabilities.

There is no doubt that we will have to choose between our fundamental values ​​ and our short-term interests, between the long term and the comfort of the moment and we must, after seven decades of the European Union, finally overcome our mistrust of armed forces – civil and military – which ensure our defence and security. This is why I call on all Member States to no longer oppose the appointment of a Commissioner for Security and Defence and ask the President of the Commission to start this process without delay. I also call on the President of the European Parliament to upgrade the Subcommittee on Security and Defence to a Soldiers of the Eurocorps at a change of command ceremony, April 2018 fully-fledged Committee!

photo: Bastian Koob, Eurocorps

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Combining the dimensions of missions, resources and lines of action

A military strategy for the European Union

by Ricardo Dias da Costa, Professor of Strategy and Military Operations at the Portuguese Military University Institute (IUM), Lisbon

T

he use of expressions such as the “sovereignty” or “strategic autonomy” of Europe is relatively recurrent among politicians and academics, although it is not consensual.

Nevertheless, with the approval of the “Strategic Compass” and for Europe’s sovereignty or autonomy to be effective, it will have to be accompanied by the adoption of a military strategy, enabling the European Union to act in a credible manner in the field of security and defence. Thus, a military strategy will have to combine three dimensions: missions, resources, lines of action.

The purpose of a military strategy The military purposes of a future military strategy should fulfil the Petersberg tasks foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty and be embedded in an EU integrated approach to conflict resolution.

However, the ability to carry out more demanding missions when the vital interests of the EU are at stake must be ensured. These may be conducted autonomously or with other international organisations, in particular NATO. For this, the EU must have its own military capabilities, not least because autonomous action may be the only option.

On military resources, in addition to the EU’s existing political and military institutions, such as the Military Committee and the Military Staff, the military strategy should provide for the existence of a permanent strategic military HQ, which would allow autonomous action in military operations of relatively reduced size and complexity, as well as command and control of non-executive military missions. The existence of this structure on a permanent basis would also strengthen the integrated approach, as it would facilitate the structured development of synergies between the military and civilian dimensions of crisis management.

In this context, it is crucial that the EU assume the development of military capabilities within its framework. The European Defence Agency plays a key role in delivering capabilities, with defence cooperation between Member States having to become the norm rather than the exception. National defence planning should be more aligned to facilitate cooperation in the acquisition and maintenance of capabilities, with impacts on the improvement of interoperability. A military strategy should ensure this is accompanied by the development of

actions that align and deepen the common strategic culture of defence among Member States, always subject to a clear line limiting the type of military operations that can be conducted in the framework of the EU or NATO.

The military capability to act in the future As regards the use of the military instrument, an EU military strategy should emphasise the continuation of support to the training of local forces or advisory activities under the integrated approach. However, it should also consider the likely use in military operations where forces may have to carry out a range of stabilisation activities and, at the same time, conduct offensive and defensive operations, notably against irregular forces, although in relatively small-scale operations (up to a brigade or division, with the corresponding naval and air forces). It will also be essential to assume the need for closer links with NATO, which will enable the EU to conduct medium-scale military operations. For conventional war, or in the context of collective defence, the EU should clearly state that it does not intend to conduct military operations with NATO being the only framework.

The military strategy should also provide a system for financing military operations, an obstacle to the use of the military by the EU, since this is the responsibility of the participating countries. Funding should be fully supported by a common governance tool and the European Peace Facility could provide an opportunity for this.

It will also be essential to make the political decision-making process regarding the use of the military instrument more flexible, another obstacle to the use of the resources already available.

All the above would allow the EU to ensure a military capability to act autonomously in the spectrum of conflict in which it is most likely to become involved in the future, while safeguarding the possibility of participating in more demanding and complex operations. It also avoids excessive duplication with NATO, large expenditure, as well as sharpening internal and external political differences.

will also be essential to make the “Itpolitical decision-making process regarding the use of the military instrument more flexible.”

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Ricardo Dias da Costa is the Professor of Strategy and Military Operations at the Portuguese Military University Institute (IUM). He holds a PhD from the University of Coimbra and is Lieutenant-Colonel in the Portuguese army.

MAIN TOPIC: War in Europe

Hybrid warfare is a serious threat to European prosperity and security

by Ralph Thiele, President of EuroDefense Germany and Chairman of the Political-Military Society, Berlin

T

he world is in the midst of a tectonic shift. Global competition for security architectures, trade and investment regimes and leadership in new technologies is gathering pace.

Strategic goals are also being pursued through the threat and use of open military force. The Russian incursions into Ukraine and the Chinese threats against Taiwan speak a clear language. This is alarming. The European Union must ask itself how well it is positioned to deal with this aggressive dynamic and develop a sense of urgency for innovation and change.

Hybrid warfare – what is it about?

Hybrid warfare is an age-old phenomenon. Yet, new technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber, quantum and space technologies and many other more have a catalytic effect on hybrid warfare. They improve the initial conditions for hybrid actions, expand the arsenal of hybrid actors and thus contribute to increasing the scope of their activities as well as their chances of success. Hybrid aggressors, for example, combine industrial age techniques with cyber operations. They use a system of selected visible and clandestine actions, including social engineering, where the attackers are almost invisible and the target is precisely defined. The particularly vulnerable networks and servers of manufacturers, professional and private users are only the tip of the iceberg.

Spyware in national parliaments and security agencies, in critical infrastructures and weapons systems offer attackers enormous opportunities in economic and political disputes.

Moreover, not only do state and state-sponsored actors cavort in the networks, but also businessmen, criminal offenders and

photo: © 2018 PabloLagarto/Shutterstock

Countermeasures are to be driven by an agile, flexible and comprehensive approach

terrorists. Any of them might explore, steal, forge, coerce and blackmail to gain access to research, trade and state secrets, databases and private accounts.

China and Russia strive for technological leadership China and Russia have narrowed their technological gap over the past two decades, in some cases by turning to commercially available technologies more quickly and effectively than their Western competitors and by accelerating their own innovation in the armed forces. In particular, China has undertaken impressive steps towards technological leadership. It already has a head start on artificial intelligence and 5G and is well under way to dominating other technologies such as microelectronics and quantum computing.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military interventions in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and Syria since 2015 prove how military force can be used to achieve political goals.

No other head of state in the world has such an impressive track record of using military power. Russia is reloaded. Its rearmament over the last decade and a half has been widely ignored by the West. Now Russia finds itself encouraged to use its armed forces as an instrument of power. As a result of its security policy negligence, the West has to stand idly by. It has become vulnerable to coercion and blackmailing.

Russia’s particular strength lies in hybrid aggression – including cyber warfare, information warfare, covert and intelligence operations, influencing the domestic politics of other countries, etc – in combination with military power. This very approach has provided Putin with a wide bouquet of options to push through his political goals. What we have seen in → Continued on page 32

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Colonel (ret) Ralph Thiele has been the Chairman of the Berlin based Political-Military

Ukraine is an evolution of previous hybrid approaches combined with the most significant ground, joint and multi-domain warfare Russian forces have been involved in since 1945.

Society since 1997. He is the President of EuroDefense Germany since 2017 and the Managing Director of Germany’s StratByrd Consulting since 2013. He advises the German Employers Association in his capacity as board member. During his military photo: private

career, Mr Thiele commanded a battalion and later developed concepts and capability requirements in the Defence Ministry

Misuse of internet platforms

in Berlin. As Commander of the Bundeswehr’s Transformation Command, he shaped

The use of online services such as social the path of German Forces towards network enabled capabilities. media, messenger services or cryptocurrencies has been an integral part of Russian hybrid campaigns and has also finally reaps the hybrid seeds and secures complete control been used to fund activists. The focus here is on the misuse of over the targeted state. internet platforms for communication purposes, dissemination of propaganda, recruitment and knowledge transfer. Social networks and media have been manipulated for hybrid purWhich approach for countermeasures? poses – from electoral behaviour to terrorist mobilisation. The Fortunately, new technological developments provide options tools used by Russia include state-controlled media at home to better detect, understand, defend against and counter and abroad. Social media in particular is susceptible to fake hybrid attacks. As the technological revolution is unfolding at news designed to undermine the trust of western societies in an unprecedented speed, it is therefore crucial to develop a our own institutions and political elites. synchronised comprehensive understanding of their implicit Consequently, hybrid scenarios below the threshold of war dimension. Political, civilian and military leaders and decihave gained enormous importance. While hybrid threats used sion-makers, as well as industry and academia, need to come to be the weapon of the weak, the up with a common and comprehensive catalytic effect of new technologies and understanding of the implications of new their disruptive potential have made technologies in the context of hybrid such attacks an effective, previously threats. Countermeasures should be low-risk instrument of power that will driven by a continuous effort, an agile, foreseeably become the gold standard flexible and comprehensive approach in geopolitical confrontation. with full involvement of government, No one has described hybrid warfare as state and society. aptly as General Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s Chief of Defence Currently, Russia is the grandmaster of hybrid warfare. China Staff, who described it in 2013 as “a clever combination has established itself as the upcoming world champion in the of economic, intelligence and many other non-military and midst of a number of emerging players such as Turkey, Iran, military means [that] can turn a prosperous country into a North Korea and further governmental and nongovernmental chaotic torso in a short time”. When Russia first went to war actors. As these are making skilful use of inexpensive, comagainst Ukraine in 2014 after the Maidan uprising, it employed mercially available, emerging technologies to further their own “green men” without insignia on their uniforms. Support for ambitions and power objectives, great powers are not the only the pro-Russian separatists was accompanied by information ones challenged; everyone is – larger and small states, busioperations to conceal truth. Since then, the concept has been nesses, societies and the ordinary citizen. Peace and freedom, further developed. The recent attack on Ukraine is hybrid a rules-based order and democracy, prosperity and a self-deagain. But there is much less ambiguity about Russia’s mastermined way of life are at stake. Against this backdrop, the sive troops, artillery, missiles and air power. The message to EU and its Member States have been challenged to develop Ukraine is: no way to run. No way to hide. The message to the robust, cross-cutting tools and capabilities in order to withwest: stay out. stand hybrid stress and shock and to operate successfully in Already back in 2015, Russian General Andrei Kartapolev outhybrid campaigns, outmanoeuvring capable opponents while lined a multi-stage approach to modern conflict that obviously preventing escalation to a major armed conflict. has been the blueprint of the 2022 attack on Ukraine. Stage one begins by wearing down the opponent politically, economically and through information warfare, spreading discontent Ralph Thiele’s last book: Hybrid Warfare. Future and and radicalising and arming opposition. Stepped up diploTechnologies. Springer (2021); ISBN 978-3-658-35108-3 matic pressure precedes a comprehensive military strike that

Russia is the “Currently, grandmaster of hybrid warfare.”

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Security and Defence

photo: © LaCozza, stock.adobe.com

Today, European nations are confronted with unpredictable geopolitical and strategic situations requiring new security and defence capabilities.

To acquire them, EU Member States must plan and invest together from joint priority setting to the development, procurement, and deployment of cutting-edge capabilities. For most European countries, the cooperative approach is likely to become the norm in the future, rather than an exception.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Preservation of security and defence in Europe is essential for upholding our values

How to harmonise defence, security and sustainability on a European scale

by Dr Hans Christoph Atzpodien, Managing Director of the Federation of German Security and Defence Industries e.V. (BDSV), Berlin

I

n the current European debate, our security requirements and need to defend ourselves are not commonly acknowledged as indispensable prerequisites for sustainability. Part of the reason for this is that, among the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals, Goal no.16 is understood as our obligation to export our values to developing countries. However, it is not perceived as addressing our own security needs. Although the UN Resolution 70/1 of 25th September 2015 rightly points out that, “there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development”, the task of maintaining peace and security in Europe has not yet been properly reflected in the 17 sustainability goals, neither at the level of the EU nor in the German Sustainability Strategy of 2021.

The Green Deal does not focus on security

companies are supplying equipment to armed forces or other security agencies in EU or NATO countries. Furthermore, banks are refusing normal services (such as guarantees and loans) to these companies. There are widespread examples of this kind of refusal, especially to SMEs. Finally, the assets of security and defence companies are frequently excluded from sustainability funds which means that the value of security-related corporate assets has been constantly deteriorating.

Disregarding soldiers by creating taboos As the criteria for measuring sustainability remain unclear and inconsistent, a strong influence is exerted on banks, insurance companies and their professional advisors by the fashionable view, widespread in European societies, that weapons, even for defence purposes, are unethical. Another example of this trend are so-called “civil clauses” as practised in several German universities, resulting in a ban on dealing with military and armament topics. Even in the case of the first German Federal “green” Bond issued in September 2020, the prospectus published by the Federal Government explicitly excluded from

Consequently, the EU Commission’s “Green Deal” does not focus on peace and security either. Triggered by the “Green Deal”, the EU Directive 2019/2088 on sustainability-related disclosure requirements in the financial Dr Hans Christoph Atzpodien services sector came into force in March has been the General Manager of the Federation of German 2021. However, there are no widely acknowlSecurity and Defence Industries (BDSV) in Berlin since 2017. edged sustainability criteria in place. Instead, He was born in 1955 and holds a Doctorate in Law from Bonn actors in the private financial sector, such University (1982). After being part of Otto Wolff AG's legal deas private banks and insurance companies, partment in Cologne (1982-1990), he joined Thyssen Industrie have been devising their own sustainability AG in Essen, where he held leading positions until 2017: among photo: private assessments, which – understandably – are others, CEO of the Transrapid Planning Process (1997-2001), driven more by reputational aspects and profChairman of the Executive Board of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (2009-2012) , itability goals than by public interest. Banks and prior to his current position he was the Chairman of ThyssenKrupp Industrial have also been quick to start terminating Solutions' Executive Board. their business relationships with security and defence-related companies, even if these

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Security and Defence

photo: © Mircea Moira/Shutterstock

is imperative that all “Iteconomic activities

the use of the bonds’ funds, “armament, defence, tobacco, alcohol and gambling”, in precisely this order! Considering armaments and defence on a par with tobacco, alcohol and gambling also indicates a disregard for all the soldiers of our armed forces, who – just like police officers – are committed to safeguarding our constitutional values for which they risk their lives when discharging their duties.

This makes the so-called “EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities”, which is currently being drafted and which is based on the three key concepts of “Environment, Social and Governance” (ESG) all the more important as a guide and potential “crash protection” for our industries. Environmental taxonomy criteria have already been established by EU Regulation 2020/852 and are comparatively easy to understand. “Social” taxonomy criteria, on the other hand, are, by their very nature, more difficult to define. Nevertheless, the “Green Deal” will require a taxonomy for all three chapters of the ESG with the focus on armaments and weapons residing in the “social” sustainability domain.

Socially harmful activities…

Once the measuring system for the three ESG chapters is implemented, the taxonomy classification of industrial activities will only allow for three outcomes: industrial activities will be rated as positively sustainable, as negatively counter-sustainable or as sustainability-neutral. An advisory group set up by the EU Commission for the taxonomy area “Social/Governance” – chaired by a representative of the German protestant church – started its work in 2021 with the remark that it would lean towards classifying the production of weapons as a “socially harmful activity” (assuming that peace is possible without weapons). However, since then apparently, only “controversial weapons” would be regarded as unsustainable, which would still leave all other equipment for armed forces in EU and NATO countries assigned, at best, to the neutral area of the “social taxonomy”.

designed to equip armed forces and security forces in the EU and NATO, are classified as positively sustainable within the framework of the taxonomy.”

For banks and insurance companies, this would be another signal to continue to view European security and defence companies as they did before, i.e. to consider them as unsustainable and exclude them from their business, because they are urged by the EU to favour only positively sustainable activities.

Instead of adopting this “neutral” stance however, the EU taxonomy should, on the contrary, acknowledge that weapons, in the hands of armed forces and security forces of EU and NATO countries, should not become the victim of a social fad. Peace and security are typical “public goods” for which the EU and governments of its Member States have to take responsibility, rather than leaving them to the discretion of private market players. The recent categorisation of nuclear energy as “environmentally sustainable” demonstrates how the taxonomy mechanism needs to be framed in order to have a significant impact on the private banking sector.

…or positively sustainable activities?

Since the preservation of security and defence in Europe is in fact an indispensable prerequisite for all other sustainability values, it is imperative that all economic activities designed to equip armed forces and security forces in the EU and NATO, are classified as positively sustainable within the framework of the taxonomy. Alternatively, solutions could be found outside the taxonomy regime. As pointed out in a recently published document (entitled “Commission contribution to European defence”) it is of overall importance “to ensure that other horizontal policies, such as initiatives on sustainable finance, remain consistent with the European Union’s efforts to facilitate sufficient access by the European defence industry to finance and investment.” This sentence in a key document on defence issued by the EU Commission at least triggers some hope that the harmonisation of defence, security and sustainability will be achieved before markets have destroyed the capabilities of our security and defence industries, in Germany and elsewhere in Europe.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Success with cooperative EU-NATO defence acquisitions photo: © MMU

The MMF Programme is a reference for future defence armament cooperation

by Joachim Weidmann, OCCAR-EA, MMF Programme Manager and Coordinator; Angel Saiz-Padilla, NSPA, MMF Principal Coordinator Officer, and Dion Polman, EDA, Project Officer Aviation, Bonn/Brussels

E

uropean Nations face since long an unpredictable strategic situation. New scenarios require new capabilities in growing numbers, whilst the cost of individual weapons systems is increasing exponentially, stretching to the maximum the funds allocated for defence investments. The multinational organisations devoted to European Defence and Security reacted in support of their Member States launching concepts and initiatives such as “Pooling & Sharing” within the European Union (EU) in 2010, or “Smart Defence” solutions of NATO in 2011 with the intent to optimise the available resources. The Multinational Multi-Role Tanker and Transport Fleet (MMF) serves as a first example.

The genesis of the MMF With the support of NATO, at its 2012 Summit, the European Defence Agency (EDA) took the lead of an initiative to address the shortfall in Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) and strategic capacity in Europe. A Letter of Intent (LoI) signed by 10 European Nations became the genesis of today’s Multinational MRTT Fleet (MMF). This was possible thanks to an excellent management.

This management structure of the MMF Programme, involves three international organisations: the European Defence Agency (EDA), the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) and the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR).

The role of EDA: The political acknowledgement of the shortfall was crucial for the successful launching of the MMF project.

The responsibility of NSPA: MMF Nations entrusted NSPA with the responsibility of the ownership, together with its future

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operation and in-service support for the duration of the life cycle of the system.

The task for OCCAR: to launch the MMF initiative. NSPA delegated into OCCAR the responsibility for managing the complex contract processes associated with the acquisition of the fleet, the production oversight, its acceptance and the Initial In-Service Support.

The MMF represents the best example of a successful answer to cover cost-effective military capability gaps. The response to those urgent calls recommends to join efforts and reach a flexible solution that mitigates the most critical European capability shortages.

Factors of success Being now close to the delivery of the seventh MMF aircraft of the nine currently on contract until 2024, it is of special interest to analyse the main success factors of the MMF Programme that may have applicability in future similar initiatives. The Netherlands decided to step forward in 2016 and assumed the role of lead Nation of the Strategic Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) Initiative. With Luxembourg, both Nations combined their requirements for Air to Air refuelling (AAR) and Strategic Transport in a Pooling & Sharing initiative to jointly procure a fleet of MRTT aircraft. The Hague decided to launch the MMF initiative, despite all the uncertainties linked with the management of a new cooperative multi-agency Programme. Germany and Norway joined in 2017, followed by Belgium in 2018 and the Czech Republic in 2019. The six European Allies signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MRTT-MoU) and became members of the MMF Support Partnership with equal membership rights, regardless of their level of participation and funding contribution. The MMF Nations will share the use of a fleet of Airbus A330 MRTTs, as well as their sustainment and operation.

Security and Defence

Lessons learned from the MMF project The first lesson learned and probably most important one from the early stages is to acknowledge the fact that a multinational pooling and sharing initiative comes full of uncertainties that cannot be identified and planned to the detail from the very beginning. It is necessary to dare launching a Programme, with a clear vision of the desired outcome and a committed group of Stakeholders to make it a success.

The second lesson learned is that a strong lead Nation is essential to the success of a multinational cooperative Programme. In MMF, the Netherlands have played a crucial role as the driving force by providing key personnel, by chairing the Programme management bodies (Steering Group/ Support Partnership Committee) and the MMF Executive Board, providing essential Host Nation Support etc.

The third lesson learned is to make creative, fair and transparent cost share arrangements by calculating the financial contribution per Nation based on an annual Flight Hour (FH) factor that defines the National participation in the Programme.

Nations benefit from economies of scale of this multinational cost share arrangement.

The fourth lesson learned is linked with the framework of the MMF initiative: the legal construct of the MRTT-MoU allows for broader participation across institutional limits.

The fifth lesson learned is interconnected with the above.

An important aspect to consider in future initiatives is the fact that the Programme management structures should be clear, unique and established at the beginning. This was the reason behind establishing a virtual MMF System Management Office (SMO), tying all elements needed for the success of the Programme under the single direction of the NSPA System Manager.

The sixth lesson learned is that it would have been more effective if OCCAR and NSPA had clearly identified a lead Agency, created one Programme office, appointed one Programme Manager, and created a single Integrated Programme Team from the beginning, even using personnel from both organisations if necessary.

The platform selected to satisfy the AAR and strategic airlift capability was the Airbus Defence & Space (Airbus DS) A330-200 MRTT aircraft, a military Off-The-Shelf solution with a mature design, already in service for several users around the globe, which limited the design and development efforts. The final assembly of the A330-200 basic airliner platform is performed

in Toulouse. The civil aircraft then converts into an MRTT in the Airbus DS’ factory in Getafe, Madrid. This military conversion adds the ability to perform AAR, strategic transport of personnel and cargo, as well as Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations and limited VIP transport. All roles can be performed simultaneously if necessary.

The seventh lesson learned is linked with the weapons system itself. Having a single lead industry (prime) allows for an effective programme management. Airbus DS acts as industrial prime for the MMF, taking responsibility for the production and a large majority of the entry into service of the aircraft. This allows for a simpler supervision from the SMO. Exceptions are the Directional Infrared Counter Measures system (DIRCM), the MEDEVAC equipment and some of the military components (radios, crypto etc.), provided through NSPA by MMF Nations to Airbus DS as Government Furnished Facility (GFX).

The eighth lesson learned is that no industrial compensation (just return) was expected by the MMF Nations. This might seem an unprecedented example of generosity but it is a mandatory characteristic of any Programme managed by OCCAR. The ninth lesson learned relates to the commonality in configuration throughout the entire fleet. The MMF requirements were harmonised upfront and during the initiation of the project, EDA was facilitating the harmonisation of the operational requirements of interested partner Nations. This allowed a smooth take-over by NSPA and OCCAR to further develop the Programme and engage with Industry with stable contractual requirements. Any nation joining the Programme has to accept the single configuration.

The tenth lesson learned, is that the inclusion of the Initial In-Service Support for a limited number of years in the acquisition contract assures smooth entry into service.

Do not reinvent the wheel The success of the MMF initiative is a unique example of effective procurement of military capabilities through a multinational cooperation, in a pooling & sharing arrangement. For most nations the cooperative approach will most likely become the norm in the immediate future, rather than the exception.

Industrial partners, nations and agencies are now encouraged to not reinvent the wheel and make the most out of the lessons learned by MMF, when shaping the new multinational, cooperative, multi-agency, pooling & sharing initiatives.

MMF represents the best “The example of a successful answer to cover cost-effective military capability gaps.”

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Security and Defence

How to narrow the gap between aspiration and action

photo: © 2019 Triff/Shutterstock.

A first glance at the EU Strategic Compass

by Hartmut Bühl, Publisher, Paris

A

fter intense negotiations, the European Union (EU) has finally adopted its so-called Strategic Compass, a forty-page paper published on 21st March 2022. Comprising a common vision for the Union’s role in security and defence, the document was announced as a major piece of EU policy by the incoming von der Leyen Commission in late 2019.

The long way to realise this paper The Strategic Compass is not the EU’s first geopolitical paper.

Rather, it is a follow up of other strategy papers intending to identify the Union’s priorities in security and defence. The first ideas for an EU strategy were laid down in the documents of the Cologne summit (1999), then more elaborated in the famous Solana doctrine (2003), followed by the Lisbon Treaty (2007) entering in force in 2009, and finally the Comprehensive Strategy in 2016, which enabled progress in different fields of defence cooperation within the Union. However, none of these documents have managed to solve the problem of the diverging views of Member States on their existential geopolitical and geostrategic problems. Too great were the differences from the Baltic states to Portugal and from Cyprus to Norway to find an identity.

What the Compass does not offer Before the publication of the Strategic Compass, which intends to be a guide for action, providing concrete proposals and timelines for the coming years, Russia invaded Ukraine militar-

ily. Even though it was too late to completely remodel the document, Russia is pointed out as the actual threat and a menace for Europe. EU High Representative Josep Borrell stated: “When I presented the Compass last November, I said Europe was in danger. Now, it is blatantly obvious. This unprovoked and unjustified invasion marks a ‘tectonic shift’. Our reaction to the war has demonstrated that we, as the EU, can act firmly and quickly when we are united. Today’s adoption of the Compass confirms this.”

But what about Russia after Putin? What about China and its aggressive policy in the Indo-Pacific when it goes together with Russia as an ally? Against whom? And what about India, as a growing power? The document does not and can even not answer such questions.

The text is an interesting collection of facts and of analyses in nearly all policy fields. But the compass wisely does not answer the crucial question of what the Union will do with its defence sector. What will be the role of military forces in the process of a deeper integration of the EU? Will there also be an integration process of forces, or will they remain nationally sovereign and only contribute to common structures which already exist as cooperation projects?

It seems that the Union has not yet found congruent policies in this field, as there were not enough discussions between Member States to clarify their interests. So, the questions on the future of European defence remain: will the current construct of European forces remain, being a NATO junior partner receiving → Continued on page 40

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

threats are rising and the cost of inaction is clear. The Strategic “The Compass is a guide for action. It sets out an ambitious way forward for

our security and defence policy for the next decade. It will help us face our security responsibilities, in front of our citizens and the rest of the world. If not now, then when?”

HR/VP Josep Borrell

help through military assets from the Alliance in case of a major EU engagement? Or is the Union striving to become a real military power? What will happen if NATO fails, as it could have happened under the US presidency of Donald Trump? These questions remain to be answered and the Strategic Compass is likely to further develop during the next two years.

against disinformation, and hybrid threats.

The fourth chapter (“Invest”), addresses the issue of joint investment in military capabilities, recalling that the EU has new tools to promote them, but that it is important now to spend more and better. The Member States’ military planning should become more efficient and be coordinated at EU level.

What is the Strategic Compass suggesting?

The last chapter (“Partner”) deals with the EU’s strategic partnerships with NATO and the United Nations, but also between the EU and other regional organisations and at a tailored bilateral level.

The Strategic Compass comprises an executive summary, an introduction and five chapters as well as a short conclusion.

The Executive Summary lines out that • the Russian aggression and other major geopolitical shifts are challenges for the European visions and the defence of interests; • the Union is committed to defending European societies; • the hostile security environment requires from the Union a quantum leap forward to increase the EU’s capacity and willingness to act, strengthen resilience and ensure solidarity and mutual assistance.

The introduction sets out a shared understanding of the complex threats facing the European security order in which interdependencies remain important and soft powers are increasingly weaponised.

The first chapter (“The world we face”) is an analysis of the geopolitical and strategic environment of a Union surrounded by instability and conflicts, facing wars at its borders.

The second chapter (“Act”) requests that the Union and the Member States become more capable and effective in their ability to decide and to act by strengthening their capacities for action, notably by creating a multinational rapid reaction force of 5,000 men and strengthening command and control capabilities.

The third chapter (“Secure”) targets the Union’s secured access to strategic domains through strengthening its cooperation in areas such as intelligence, cyber, space, the fight

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The conclusion encounters reality by intending to convene an EU security and defence review conference every two years.

My own conclusion The Strategic Compass is a realistic approach to European security and defence highlighting the solidarity as it is listed in Article 42(7) of the Lisbon Treaty. Its force is to be ambitious and open to responding to further developments in the world concerning Europe.

I am satisfied that the expression “European army”, this chimera, doesn’t appear in the paper and thus cannot block future solutions.

For the moment, the criminal invasion of Russia into Ukraine is forging Member States together. They will hopefully keep on closing the ranks when Europe must continue taking care of Ukrainian refugees and help to reconstruct Ukraine, that has to be protected by treaties and security guarantees. The access to the European Union will not only be a helpful tool for economic stabilisation of the country but might also be a psychologic support for the population and incite refugees to return to their country.

Web https://bit.ly/3MACZ2w

Security and Defence

Cooperation is the only way forward

by Jiří Šedivý, Chief Executive, and Jean-François Ripoche, Director of Research, Technology and Innovation of the European Defence Agency (EDA), Brussels

A

fter the appalling and totally unjustifiable Russian aggression against Ukraine and with a fully-fledged war now raging at the European Union’s doorstep, there is today a common understanding – probably stronger than ever before that Europe needs to do more for its own security and defence.

Even the US has started to acknowledge this, provided it does not undermine NATO, which, needless to say, remains more than ever the cornerstone of Europe’s security and defence.

But what is required for Europe to take on more responsibility in defence and even – let’s be ambitious – become a security provider on a regional and global scale? I see two main prerequisites for that to happen, both of which are true challenges intrinsically linked to the European Defence Agency’s core mission and activities: cooperation and innovation.

Deeper cooperation, more and better spending Cooperation is the only way forward to make Europe a global player, especially in the security and defence realm, as none of its countries has the resources or capabilities to ensure stability and security on its own – not for itself and even less so for the whole of Europe. Hence the need to join forces and invest more, and better, in defence. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the end of February, things have already started to move as several European countries – Germany for instance – have pledged to review and increase their defence expenditure considerably. This is a long overdue step in the right

photo: © ITA, MoD

Europe’s defence challenges in times of conflict

direction, no doubt about that. But more spending does not automatically guarantee more resilience, efficiency or interoperability. To achieve that, Europeans must plan and invest better through cooperation: from joint priority setting to the development, procurement, and deployment of cutting-edge capabilities. Over recent years, EU Member States have put a defence planning framework in place at the European level with the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

This is an achievement. But having cooperation tools in place is not enough; they must also be systematically used to make EU defence cooperation the norm. And even then, the proof of the pudding is in the eating: cooperation must lead to concrete projects which must produce outcomes, ie usable defence capabilities. Several cooperation platforms are available to do that, including the EDA which has gained robust expertise and a track record in initiating and managing collaborative capability programmes. PESCO is another framework for cooperation for the 25 EU member states that participate in it. Finally, the EDF must serve as a financial incentive and co-finance such collaborative projects.

Systematic defence cooperation is thus the first box Europe must tick if it wants to shoulder more responsibilities in defence and become a security provider.

Defence innovation or defence irrelevance Secondly, the EU must also be able to master cutting-edge technologies and their integration into defence products.

To do that, it must be at the forefront of defence innovation. → Continued on page 42

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Jiří Šedivý,

Jean-François Ripoche,

Chief Executive of the European

Director of Research, Technology

Defence Agency, Brussels

and Innovation of the European Defence Agency, Brussels

photos: EDA/David Plas photography

Right now, unfortunately, this is not the case: Europe still lags behind in terms of researching, developing and applying hightech for defence purposes, and it is even further losing ground in relation to the US, China and other powers who heavily invest in it. With the rapid development of new and often disruptive technologies in the civilian world and their fast weaponisation – Artificial Intelligence (AI), big data, robotisation, autonomous systems, nanotechnology, digitisation, human-machine teaming, biotechnology and hypersonic technologies to name only a few – today, more than ever before, innovation has become a geostrategic factor that shapes the international security environment and, eventually, global balance of power. Therefore, the vital choice for Europe is clear: defence innovation or defence irrelevance!

To fully embrace defence innovation, the EU and its Member States need to do much more. And we must do it together, because joint innovation activities, done in collaboration, guarantee better value for money than today’s fragmented efforts.

The good news is that our member states have understood this – and they are ready to act.

solely into a European defence innovation agency, because this would be neither relevant nor realistic in the short term.

Rather, the EDA should complement and support national bodies by bringing Member States’ defence innovation bodies together, by serving as a network of all existing national innovation centres around Europe and promoting synergies with the industrial sector. Because Europe’s problem is not so much that there is no or little technological potential, on the contrary.

Some of our Member States have very efficient research communities in many technological sectors, but the whole innovation effort is very fragmented, and this is a problem. So, it’s all about connecting the dots and creating synergies. That’s why the EDA, as the European platform for defence cooperation, is the right place to host the innovation hub and enable those synergies.

All this will, of course, be done in close coordination with the European Commission or future NATO innovation structures.

In parallel, the EDA continues of course to initiate and manage collaborative defence research and technology (R&T) projects as we have been doing since 2004. Right now, numerous agency projects deal with the impact of disruptive technologies on the future battlefield. Take AI, for example, that can be used to support the decision-making of commanders, control swarms of drones or to simulate an opponent in training. Other projects are related to hypersonic systems, the use of concentrated energy and lasers for the military, new materials or 3D printing to produce spare parts at the site of operations, to name only a few.

To conclude, Europe will only become a relevant and credible security and defence player if Member States join their forces to innovate, plan, develop, produce and use together the top notch defence capabilities they will need in the future. Cooperation and innovation must go hand in hand – and both are at the heart of the EDA’s work.

defence cooperation “Systematic is the first box Europe must tick if it wants to shoulder more responsibilities in defence and become a security provider.”

Hub for European Defence Innovation The EDA is set to play a key role in that ambition. Indeed, in May 2021, the EU foreign ministers called for a reinforcement of the agency’s role in fostering defence innovation, including disruptive technologies. Then, in November, defence ministers debated this topic where the idea of setting up a hub for European defence innovation within the EDA was discussed.

Since then, this proposal has gained traction and support from more and more Member States, and we hope that a political decision in favour of such a hub can be made in the coming months. Let’s be clear: we are not talking here about creating an EU type of ‘DARPA’ (the US super-agency) or turning the EDA

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photo: © Jens Hertel, stock.adobe.com

Security and Defence

NATO and climate change Between political expectations and military needs

by Michael Rühle, Head Climate and Energy Security Section, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO, Brussels

C

limate change has become humanity’s greatest challenge.

The effects of global warming – melting polar ice caps, rising sea levels and, above all, an increase in extreme weather events – can now be felt worldwide. Accordingly, many states have declared climate change a national security issue of high priority. In a study by the Davos World Economic Forum, “extreme weather” and “climate failure” are at the top of the risk scale - far ahead of cyber-attacks and weapons of mass destruction.

security as well as climate “Military security are of truly existential importance. They must not be pitted against each other.”

This should not come as a surprise. The security consequences of global warming, which will only become fully apparent in the coming years, are dramatic. These include natural disasters triggered by an increase in extreme weather events, such as floods, endangering the political and economic stability of poorer states in particular. The decline of arable land as well as droughts and shifts in growing seasons can lead to crop failures and a dramatic increase in food prices. Rising sea levels and the simultaneous desertification of large areas of land

could trigger migration flows, and disputes over habitable land or drinking water could erupt into military conflict. The melting ice caps at the North Pole create new sea routes, thus opening up new economic perspectives, but also turning the area into one of renewed geo-military competition. In short, climate change will dramatically exacerbate already existing tensions in international relations.

The climate dimension in NATO activities However, climate change is not only a “threat multiplier”. It will also determine where and how NATO forces will have to operate in the future. A strategic environment that is altered by climate change is already posing significant military-operational challenges for the armed forces. For example, the changing salinity of the water in the Gulf of Aden has led to the failure of frigate turbines. NATO forces in Afghanistan have had to contend with high temperatures for years, resulting in a significant loss of aircraft take-off power and payload. The increase in sandstorms makes the planning and execution of military flights difficult. Soldiers stationed in Iraq have to endure temperatures of 50C and more – temperatures for which their equipment is not designed. Rising sea levels are endangering numerous naval bases, while damage to military inland installations caused by extreme weather events is steadily increasing.

For NATO, which has set itself the goal of adapting to climate change, these developments result in some straightforward requirements. First, the Alliance needs a comprehensive assessment of the impact of global warming on its strategic environment as well as on its operations and the supply of → Continued on page 44

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reinforcements. Most importantly however, NATO needs to integrate the climate dimension into the full range of its activities.

This includes, for example, defence planning, civil emergency planning, standardisation, military exercises and disaster relief. In the future, allies’ procurement policies must also reflect military requirements for operations in an altered climate. The allies have set out these and other steps in the “NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan”, which was adopted at the 2021 Brussels Summit and is now being implemented.

The most ambitious dimension of NATO’s new role in climate security is the goal of contributing to climate change mitigation. To this end, NATO will first develop the analytical basis for measuring greenhouse gas emissions of military activities and facilities. This would enable a comparison of national military emissions, which in turn should help allies formulate targets to reduce emissions voluntarily. At the same time, the collection of comparable data on military energy consumption could have a positive impact on future national innovation and investment decisions with a view to developing more energy-efficient armed forces.

Maintaining NATO's military competence Reducing the greenhouse gas emissions of NATO countries’ armed forces inevitably raises the question of feasibility.

Clearly, maintaining NATO’s military competence must always remain a priority. Therefore, a reduction in emissions, eg by gradually phasing out fossil fuels, only makes sense if it does not impair or – better still – increases the operational effectiveness of the military. In fact, experiments conducted in the armed forces of several NATO countries show that reducing emissions and increasing military effectiveness are not necessarily at odds with one another. Just as today’s cars are cleaner, yet more powerful than previous models, military equipment can also become “greener” without sacrificing combat effectiveness.

For example, the Italian and United States’ navies have jointly tested biofuels, the production of which no longer requires food produce (eg rapeseed). New marine turbines use less fuel and are cleaner. The armies and air forces of some NATO countries are also experimenting with biofuel additives, hydrogen fuel cells, electric vehicles and improvements in aerodynamics.

NATO is supporting a project to reduce diesel consumption at remote military bases by offloading traditional diesel generators through the computerised use of wind and solar power.

Many of these experiments were initiated because of the need to save expensive fuel or to reduce the logistical burden on the armed forces. However, since these technological innovations will ultimately also lead to a noticeable reduction in CO2 emissions, they are not only important militarily, but also politically.

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change is one of the “Climate defining challenges of our

times. It is a threat multiplier that impacts Allied security, both in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the Alliance’s broader neighbourhood. Climate change puts our resilience and civil preparedness to the test, affects our planning and the resilience of our military installations and critical infrastructure, and may create harsher conditions for our operations.”

NATO summit declaration, Brussels, 14 June 2021 th

the reduction of military emissions. Military equipment requires many years of development before entering into service, and it remains in use for several decades. New, energy-saving and “clean” technologies are no exception. They need to be developed and acquired, integrated into existing national forces and made interoperable with other allies’ equipment. This is a tall order, which does not lend itself to quick fixes.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine has shown once again that NATO’s main job remains to secure peace and stability. Global warming may change the way NATO goes about implementing this task, but it does not change its fundamental importance.

Consequently, preserving NATO’s military competence remains paramount and must not be jeopardised for the sake of creating a “greener” image. For a considerable time to come, NATO’s armed forces will continue to consume large quantities of fossil fuel. Stigmatising them as contributors to climate change while ignoring their existential importance for national and collective defence would be grossly negligent. Military security as well as climate security are of truly existential importance. They must not be pitted against each other.

The idea of sustainability is gaining traction

Michael Rühle heads the Climate and Energy Security

These developments show that the idea of sustainability is gaining traction also in the military. However, one needs to temper overly euphoric expectations, notably with regard to

Section in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division. The views expressed are his own.

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About us and our magazine

O

ur politically independent quarterly magazine The European – Security and Defence Union was launched in 2008 and has become a broad platform for discussion on European and international geopolitics, security and defence issues, as well as on global topics such as migration and refugee policy, climate change and energy, digitalisation, data protection and cyber security…

The publication is circulated worldwide but especially in Europe. It is largely distributed to selected personalities of the European Parliament, the EU Commission and other EU institutions, NATO HQs as well as the 27 national parliaments of EU Member States, universities, think tanks and armed forces. It is supplied to governments worldwide through their embassies in Berlin.

The distribution of the magazine currently comprises 2000 hard copies and a broad digital reach.

Awards: In 2011, the magazine received the first CIDAN European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence under the patronage of the President of the European Council.

In 2019, the editorial team of the ma­ ga­zine was awarded with the ­CIDAN Jury Special Prize for outstanding journalism, enabling European citizens to better understand the European

Furthermore, each edition is available to read and download on our website: www.magazine-the-european.com.

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Union. On this occasion, the team also received a medal from the French President Emmanuel Macron.