Security and Defence
How to narrow the gap between aspiration and action
photo: © 2019 Triff/Shutterstock.
A first glance at the EU Strategic Compass
by Hartmut Bühl, Publisher, Paris
A
fter intense negotiations, the European Union (EU) has finally adopted its so-called Strategic Compass, a forty-page paper published on 21st March 2022. Comprising a common vision for the Union’s role in security and defence, the document was announced as a major piece of EU policy by the incoming von der Leyen Commission in late 2019.
The long way to realise this paper The Strategic Compass is not the EU’s first geopolitical paper. Rather, it is a follow up of other strategy papers intending to identify the Union’s priorities in security and defence. The first ideas for an EU strategy were laid down in the documents of the Cologne summit (1999), then more elaborated in the famous Solana doctrine (2003), followed by the Lisbon Treaty (2007) entering in force in 2009, and finally the Comprehensive Strategy in 2016, which enabled progress in different fields of defence cooperation within the Union. However, none of these documents have managed to solve the problem of the diverging views of Member States on their existential geopolitical and geostrategic problems. Too great were the differences from the Baltic states to Portugal and from Cyprus to Norway to find an identity.
What the Compass does not offer Before the publication of the Strategic Compass, which intends to be a guide for action, providing concrete proposals and timelines for the coming years, Russia invaded Ukraine militar-
ily. Even though it was too late to completely remodel the document, Russia is pointed out as the actual threat and a menace for Europe. EU High Representative Josep Borrell stated: “When I presented the Compass last November, I said Europe was in danger. Now, it is blatantly obvious. This unprovoked and unjustified invasion marks a ‘tectonic shift’. Our reaction to the war has demonstrated that we, as the EU, can act firmly and quickly when we are united. Today’s adoption of the Compass confirms this.” But what about Russia after Putin? What about China and its aggressive policy in the Indo-Pacific when it goes together with Russia as an ally? Against whom? And what about India, as a growing power? The document does not and can even not answer such questions. The text is an interesting collection of facts and of analyses in nearly all policy fields. But the compass wisely does not answer the crucial question of what the Union will do with its defence sector. What will be the role of military forces in the process of a deeper integration of the EU? Will there also be an integration process of forces, or will they remain nationally sovereign and only contribute to common structures which already exist as cooperation projects? It seems that the Union has not yet found congruent policies in this field, as there were not enough discussions between Member States to clarify their interests. So, the questions on the future of European defence remain: will the current construct of European forces remain, being a NATO junior partner receiving → Continued on page 40
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