The European-Security and Defence Union Issue 43 by The European-Security and Defence Union

Independent Review on European Security and Defence

Volume N°43

The European Union and its neighbours

Is the EU neighbourhood and enlargement policy truly human and fair?

How to help the EU’s eastern neighbours solve major challenges in peace and security

Putin’s war of aggression and its implications for European security and defence

Teresa Czerwińska, Vice-President, European Investment Bank (EIB), Luxembourg

Michael Gahler MEP, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

www.magazine-the-european.com

Edition 2/2022

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Editorial

ussia’s attack on Ukraine has undoubtedly strengthened the very foundations of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Solidarity has become a guide to action since 24th February 2022. Special attention was quickly focused on Germany after a historic speech by the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, on 28th February, in which he announced a turning point in relations between the west and Russia, which found great resonance. But rapidly, Germany’s reluctance to deliver heavy weapons to Ukraine, contradicting previous legislation to deliver weapons to crisis areas, came in for criticism. Germany had shown itself willing to provide financial aid to Ukraine, but most partners in the EU and NATO had little understanding of the Germans’ reluctance to support Ukraine with tanks and artillery and accused Berlin of being selfish and lacking in solidarity. Germany was also accused of not wanting to alienate Russia as an economic partner after the war. The Chancellor’s fear that the war could spill over to Germany and western Europe was received with scepticism. The European and American press quickly made the point that 75 years after the end of the Second World War, Germany could no longer hide behind Nazi crimes for its own benefit. The image of the ugly German came to the fore once again; willing to work hard and single-mindedly to create wealth but unwilling to take on responsibility for others. And that was only the start of it! These comments fail to recognise that the Germans cannot, and do not wish to, forget their history, so great were the crimes that Germany committed under Hitler. The anticipatory obedience of an entire people was not to be repeated, and western Germany’s European partners were very happy to have a docile neighbour for so long. The slogan “Make peace, not war” of the Peace Movement in the 1980s became widely accepted in a Germany turned towards pacifism and was probably one of the factors that led to the neglect of its armed forces after the country’s reunification. And then, just four days after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Olaf Scholz announced that he intends to spend €100bn to restore the badly neglected Bundeswehr. Received

with astonishment by its partners, some dismissed it as the usual German rhetoric. Others saw it as a bluff and were sure that the proposals would not pass Parliament, the “protector” of Germany’s armed forces. Parliament decides on all essentials concerning the Bundeswehr in Hartmut Bühl peacetime. This parliamentary oversight anchors the German armed forces at the heart of society. The representatives of the people therefore bear a great deal of responsibility, including for the equipment of forces. Unfortunately, it cannot be claimed that Parliament has discharged this duty in recent years and properly tackled the task of keeping the Bundeswehr operational and well-armed. On the contrary, the German political class has failed across the board. There was therefore widespread astonishment when the German Bundestag took only two months to react to the Chancellor’s proposal to rearm the Bundeswehr by changing the Constitution. Meanwhile, Germany has been delivering heavy weapons to Ukraine with the support of a majority of its population and the green light of the Bundestag. Putin’s war has wrought fundamental change – change that has had a far-reaching effect on the west but especially on Germany. The “peace dividend” has been buried once and for all and the conviction that the country must be able to defend itself has prevailed. Germany has shown that even a “parliamentary army”, that only knows the Federal Chancellor as commander-in-chief in the event of a crisis or a war, is able to take important decisions to defend peace and freedom together with its allies. Within the west, the roles are being redistributed. The USA has re-established its claim to leadership in NATO. It remains to be seen whether this is just a one-off or a permanent development. But politically, it is for sure a turning point for Germany: for the first time, German politicians seem ready to take over leadership in some fields of European defence matters!

photo: private, LISphoto.com

The Germans and the war

IMPRESSUM: The European − Security and Defence Union Headquarters: International Consulting 6, Rue du Château, F 28260 Berchères-sur-Vesgre (FR) E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Publisher and Editor in Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Berchères-sur-Vesgre (FR) Phone: +49/172 32 82 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris (FR) E-Mail: nannette.cazaubon@magazine-the-european.com

Editorial Assistant: Céline Angelov, Linz a. Rhein (GE) E-Mail: editorial.assistant.esdu@gmail.com Translator: Miriam Newman-Tancredi, Strasbourg (FR) and London (GB) Layout: Beate Dach, SpreeService, Berlin (GE) Advertisement & Sales: Hartmut Bühl, Berchères-sur-Vesgre (FR) Phone: +49/172 32 82 319 Print: Polyprint GmbH (GE) © 2022 by International Consulting, France

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION Vol. No. 43

Content 3 6

Editorial, Hartmut Bühl News, Nannette Cazaubon

17–28 MAIN TOPIC: The European Union and its neighbours

8–16 In the Spotlight

Is the EU neighbourhood and enlargement policy truly human and fair?

“Europe as a Task: Rethink, Rebuild, Repower”

Has the time for EU power come? The EU’s role regarding the war in Ukraine by Dr Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, Grenoble and Bastien Nivet, Paris La Défense

European enlargement, security and defence on the rise The EU must become a stronger security provider by David McAllister MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

“Brain dead” in 2019, NATO has revived in 2022 Commentary by Hartmut Bühl

European sovereignty Europeans will not weigh in isolation by Cyrille Schott, Strasbourg

There must be coherence between enlargement and Schengen policy Guest commentary by Prof Ioan Mircea Pașcu, Bucharest

How to help the EU’s eastern neighbours solve major challenges in peace and security Speed up progress and modernisation by Teresa Czerwińska, Luxembourg

European security and the management of simultaneous crises The Union must live up to its aspirations by Gesine Weber, Paris

Strategic leadership in the European Union Preparing future military leaders by Hartmut Bühl, Paris

photos Cover: © Wilko Dirks, stock.adobe.com; EIB (left); private (right)

Content

29–48 Security and defence Putin’s war and its implications for Europe

How to realise EU enlargement with the Balkans and Ukraine The way forward Interview with Gerald Knaus, Berlin The Union Civil Protection Mechanism The capacity to respond to CBRN threats by Dr Antonella Cavallo, Brussels

The European – Security and Defence Union is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence, and was awarded in 2019 the Jury’s Special Prize of the same competition.

Putin’s war of aggression and its implications for European security and defence We can no longer afford national reflexes by Michael Gahler MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

All that glitters is not gold Conference report on French-German relations by Hartmut Bühl, Paris

30 years of EUROCORPS A force for the EU and NATO Interview with Lt Gen Peter Devogelaere, Strasbourg

Creating strength by joint higher military education How to forge a common spirit Interview with Ilmar Tamm, Tartu

How to successfully prosecute CBRN crimes – from the crime scene to the courtroom EU-funded CBRN guidance handbooks by Talgat Toleubayev

China’s counter measures against US Theatre Missile Defence Strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific region by Debalina Ghoshal, Kolkata

Security steels for Europe Increasing demand for forces protection by Jörg Maffert, Dillingen

For a credible and efficient defence of Europe by Patrice Mompeyssin, Paris

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

EU Presidency

Russia – Ukraine

The Czech Republic takes over from France

Agreement to unblock Ukrainian cereals

(Ed/nc, Paris) On 1ST July, the Czech Republic took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union from France. Under the motto “Europe as a Task: Rethink, Rebuild, Repower”, the Czech Presidency will focus on five priority areas. 1. Ukraine: to assist Ukraine is a first priority, as well as Europe-

Charles bridge, Prague, Czech Republic

an cooperation and solidarity to

photo: © alexgres, stock.adobe.com

(Ed/hb, Paris) On 15th July 2022, under the aegis of Turkey and the United Nations (UN), Russia and Ukraine agreed on a text which relieves the world food markets. After two months of discussions, delegations from the Kremlin and Kyiv have signed – separately with Turkey and the UN – an agreement in Istanbul, which

achieve the long-term integration of refugees into the societies of the Union. The post-war reconstruction of Ukraine will be another important task. 2. Energy security: The Presidency will emphasise on the EU’s energy security issues and the importance of breaking the EU’s dependence on Russian gas, oil and coal. The focus will be put on implementing the RePowerEU package, which includes a faster transition to low-carbon and renewable energy sources, energy savings or more resilient, diversified sources. 3. Security and defence: given the growing global instability, reinforcing security and defence capabilities, in particular in partnership with NATO and the implementation of key topics

Cargo vessel loading grain in the port of

within the Strategic Compass are further priorities. At the same time, the Czech Presidency

Odessa, Ukraine

photo: © Elena Larina/shutterstock

will address cyber threats and the geopolitical context of new technologies and space. 4. Economy: strategic resilience of the European economy is another area the Presidency will focus on. Against the background of the fragility of global supply chains, the shock of inflation caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian aggression on Ukraine, the Czech Presidency wants to drastically reduce the EU’s dependence on hostile or unstable regimes and deepen free trade with democratic nations in the world. 5. Democracy: finally, the Presidency will focus on respecting and strengthening freedoms and European values in both offline and online environments. In the international context, it will implement the European Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, using relevant instruments, including potential sanction mechanisms. Web Czech Presidency https://bit.ly/3ODHIB4

guarantees corridors of secure navigation in the Black Sea and provide load control in Turkish ports. The contract is automatically renewable every four months. It is planned that 8 million tons of grain will be evacuated every month from the silos of the Ukrainian ports. This agreement, however, remains extremely fragile as it was illustrated by the Russian attack on the port of Odessa, only a few days after the signing.

EU Enlargement

Frustrations after EU-Western Balkans meeting

(Ed/nc, Paris) On 23rd June, the EU-Western

countries which had hoped for an ac-

Balkans leader’s meeting took place in Brussels.

celeration of the accession processes.

The leaders from Albania, Bosnia and Herzego-

This created frustration, especially

vina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and

for North Macedonia and Albania,

Serbia discussed with EU representatives the

because of the behaviour of Bulgaria

progress on EU integration and the challenges

which has been blocking North Mace-

Family picture of the participants in the EU-Western

stemming from Russia’s aggression against

donia’s EU accession over a years-long

Balkans leader’s meeting, Brussels, 23rd June 2022

Ukraine.

dispute relating to history and lan-

Charles Michel, President of the European Coun-

guage. Bulgaria finally lifted some of

cil, stated: “This is an important moment because

its postulates, which allowed the Union mid-July

process for the Western Balkans. Building on

there is a very strong political will to re-energise

to invite Albania and North Macedonia to start

the revised methodology, the European Council

the process with the Western Balkans, to send

the negotiations for accession.

invited the Commission, the High Representative

a very clear and strong message.”

The EU-Western Balkans leader’s meeting was

and the Council to further advance the gradual

Even though the EU leaders expressed their un-

followed by a European Council, where EU lead-

integration between the European Union and

ambiguous support for the integration of the

ers decided to grant EU candidate status to

the Western Balkan region already during the

Western Balkans in the EU, the results of the

Ukraine and to the Republic of Moldova. They

enlargement process itself in a reversible and

meeting didn’t meet the expectations of these

also called for the acceleration of the accession

merit-based manner.

photo: © EU, 2022/Dati Bendo

News

CBRN risks and threats

8th European CBRN Centres of Excellence meeting

European Defense Fund

MARSEUS project selected (Ed/hb, Paris) The European Commission made the selection decision for the MARSEUS (Modular Architecture Solutions for EU States) project, coordinated by MBDA. MARSEUS aims to consolidate, deepen and expand the capabilities of Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) in the field of land combat: radio communications will link personnel or systems too distant or too fully obscured by terrain for normal Line of Sight Communications (LOS). MARSEUS is one of the first European Defence Fund projects selected by the Commission following consultations with Member States. It is carried out in close cooperation with the French, Belgian, Cypriot and Swedish armed forces. The EU defence ministers approved the EU BLOS project on 19th November 2018 as part of the Per-

Natalie Pauwels, Head of Unit, FPI, European Commission, handing over a Certificate

manent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). It aims to

of Recognition to Mohamed Salami, Head of Regional Secretariat of the African Atlantic

develop a family of Man-on-the-Loop* BLOS missile

Façade (AAF), Brussels, 17 May 2022

system with back images. Human-in-the-loop is

photo: ©UNICRI/Freya Morales

a branch of Artificial Intelligence (AI) blending AI

After a three-year break due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the 8th annual meeting of the European Union CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) Initiative took place in Brussels from 17th to 19th May 2022. The Initiative was launched in 2010 by the European Union to increase national and regional CBRN cooperation worldwide. The annual meeting was attended by more than 100 participants from the 63 partner countries, and the four observer nations (Chile, Djibouti, Mauritius and Nigeria). Representatives from the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the United Nations International Crime and Justice Institute (UNICRI), the Joint Research Centre (JRC), as well as international experts also actively participated. All high-level speakers underlined that the difficult circumstances during the last two years, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, had not stopped the work of the CoE Initiative. Far from that, progress was made across a range of different areas and in the regions. The new format of the event offered a combination of thematic panel discussions, interregional sessions, and a well-appreciated walking meeting which offered the CBRN National Focal Points (NFP) and the other participants the opportunity to be informed in detail about the activities and projects implemented in the eight regions of the Initiative and to share experiences. In her closing remarks, Nathalie Pauwels, Head of Unit, Stability and Peace, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) at the European Commission, stated that the CoE Initiative is more than a network of experts, but a community of “people who know each other”. Francesco Marelli, Head of Programme, CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance Programme, UNICRI, highlighted the good practise during the three-day meeting which will “trigger and inspire future activities in the regions”. Funded and implemented by the EU through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, the CoE Initiative is led by the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), in close coordination with the EEAS and is supported by the JCR and UNICRI. Web https://bit.ly/3S5lrPh

with human intelligence. Man-on-the-Loop weapons means robots that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots’ actions. MBDA and its 13 partners from Belgium (Ecole Royale Militaire, John Cockerill Defense, FN Herstal, Xenics), Cyprus (Additess, SignalGenerix), France (Novadem, ATOS, ARQUUS, DELAIR) and Sweden (SAAB, BAE Hägglunds, Exensor), as well as their eight subcontractors from eight countries, are now entering a phase of negotiation of the grant agreement with the European Commission.

Publications

2022 Schuman Report on Europe The Robert Schuman Foundation published its Report on Europe, State of the Union 2022. The 13th edition provides a comprehensive view of the European Union at a time when it is facing the return of war to the continent. The Report, featuring original maps and anno tated statistics, is available in digital format Web www.robert-schuman.eu

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ European Union +++

Another look at the European Union’s role regarding the war in Ukraine

photo: ©natatravel 2020, stock.adobe.com

Has the time for EU power come?

by Dr Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, Associate Professor, University Grenoble Alpes, CESICE, Grenoble, and Bastien Nivet, Senior Lecturer, EMLV, Paris La Défense

he military invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has forced Europeans to take a new step in asserting a more ambitious international posture, which should anchor the notion of European strategic autonomy in the medium term. The Ukrainian war raises the question of the European Union’s power, which requires a look back at the dialectical relationship between the Union and power since the beginning of the European integration process, and to evaluate how the current situation renews this dialectic.

The European peace project in jeopardy European leaders have for many decades tended to define European integration as an influence-without-power, peace project. However, a peace project can be confronted with an international environment that is not peaceful, as the war in Ukraine currently shows. Thus the European Union (EU) has gradually developed a strategic discourse over the last two decades, aiming to position itself on the international security scene and tackling hybrid threats: a European Security Strategy in 2003; a Cyber Security Strategy in 2013 followed by a cyber toolbox and the possibility of imposing sanctions in the event of cyber-attacks (2018-2019); a Comprehensive EU Security Strategy in June 2016, and a Strategic Compass in March 2022. This evolution has been backed up at the opera-

tional level by the development of peace operations (in sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans in particular), naval operations to combat piracy, etc. These developments started to move the EU towards something other than civil and normative power.

What power attributes for the Union? The EU can draw upon important resources such as a large and prosperous internal market, strong trade and attractiveness, which help to set regulatory standards in these areas. For some, this is a key lever of EU power. However, it is important to look further and assess how far the EU has come in its ability to impose its views not only through civil and normative means, but also through military means in case of conflict. What is at stake today is the EU’s ability to make optimal use of its traditional tools of power, while at the same time adding to them a posture and tools that have eluded it until now. If the EU wants to build on its undisputed soft power and combine it with hard power to achieve a form of smart power, it has several assets to develop. Military capabilities are an important first step in moving from vision to action. On paper, the EU has developed military capabilities over the last two decades. The Strategic Compass approved by the European Council in March 2022 even foresees a rapid reaction capability of 5,000 troops by 2025, which could replace the European Battlegroups never deployed. Yet there is still a significant gap between capabilities and action. However, the EU has already deployed nearly ten military operations on different continents over the past two decades, which add to the civil missions also undertaken within the CFSP and CSDP framework.

+++ European Union +++

Delphine Deschaux-Dutard The second challenge that the EU has begun to address is the issue of its cyber power. In an increasingly connected world where cyberspace has become the fifth battlefield, the EU published a cybersecurity strategy in 2013, updated in 2020, and created an institutional architecture for cybersecurity. The EU recently (in May 2022) denounced Russian cyber-operations in Ukraine. The third is the full use of the classic attributes of European civil power, such as economics, norms, etc. The EU’s traditional use of international sanctions for pressure or unarmed international action shows that the EU is capable of a coercive use of its civil power, which could be seen as a strategic oxymoron. Sanctions indeed offer a good indicator of the fluctuations of the EU’s relationship to power. These assets give the EU valuable power resources, but they are not always put to their best use.

is an associate professor in political science at the University Grenoble Alpes (France) and the vice-dean for International Relation of the Faculty of Law at this university. Holding, a PhD from photo: private

Sciences Po Grenoble (2008), she is the author of several articles and books

on security and defence issues and holds a regular column in Défense et Sécurité Internationale (DSI).

Bastien Nivet is senior lecturer and head of undegraduate studies at the Paris based Business school EMLV (DeVinci Higher Education). He holds a master’s degree in international studies from the Uni-

Can the EU become powerful at last? The current situation between Russia and Ukraine has highlighted the recurring limitations that have so far plagued the notion of power at the European level. Since 2014, the EU has mixed mediation attempts with sanctions against Russia. The ambiguity of the relationship between the EU and Russia is based on the recurrent divergence of positions between Europeans on the subject of Russia. It was only the escalation of violence on the Russian side in February 2022 that finally gave impetus to collective European action. And yet in June 2022, France and Germany’s prudent attitudes towards Russia tended to provoke important misunderstandings with many other EU Member States, among which Poland or the Baltic States for instance. If faced with a very assertive power, the EU struggles to find harmony, it may be even more difficult with more subtle power-seekers. If the shock of the military invasion of Ukraine makes it difficult to envisage a “return to the past”, the length of the conflict starts reinvigorating divergences between EU Member States on how to deal with Russia in the future.

Need for a long-lasting common perception In the end, what is still largely lacking is a long-lasting common perception of European interests among Member States and a consistent EU foreign policy. The war in Ukraine is putting sudden and unprecedented pressure on Europeans to finally take up the issue. But the durability of this European harmonised response will depend very much on the political will of its Member States once the fog of war will start fading, and on whether or not the convergences observed in the early days of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are confirmed. We also need to bear in mind another dimension, linked to the internal politics of European states, which may have a limiting impact on the EU’s power. This is the rise of illiberal regimes within the EU. Once again, it took a very high threshold of

photo: private

versity of Leeds and a PhD in Politics from the Université Lille 2. His last

book: L’Europe et la puissance – mythes et Réalités (2019, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux”).

violence in Ukraine for Hungary to finally disassociate itself from Russia. The reason the EU could be seen as a champion of democracy in Europe in the 2000s, in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the enlargement to central and eastern Europe, was that the Member States shared a common perception of democracy. It is to this community of values that the Ukrainian claim for possible EU membership appeals. In this respect, if the governments of the Member States start to develop different visions of democracy and its functioning, this may affect the EU’s foreign policy, which is based on the presuppositions of liberal democracy and which is now being challenged by Russia in its armed conflict with Ukraine. If the war in Ukraine has started a ‘pause’ in intra-European tensions on that matter thanks to the important role played by Poland in relation to Ukraine, and a tempered pro-Russian stance on the part of Hungary in the face of the emotion generated by the military invasion of Ukraine, the continuation of this pause, which facilitates European unity, is uncertain. However, as the “time of Europe” and the European “strategic awakening” have already been announced on numerous occasions since the end of the Cold War, caution is called for with regard to statements announcing the birth of a European power in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. Only the evolution of European policies and commitments in the post-Ukrainian war period will allow, or not, a change in European posture. A more substantive version of this article has originally been published in French on 8th April 2022: https://bit.ly/3O2qHAi

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ NATO +++

COMMENTARY

“Brain dead” in 2019, NATO has revived in 2022 Commentary by Hartmut Bühl

he NATO summit in Madrid at the end of June 2022 was the most decisive summit of this century. The Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept and reassessed threats, with Russia named as the most significant and direct threat to the west. For the first time, China’s aggressive policy in the South-East Pacific and towards Euro-Atlantic security was seen as a systemic challenge. The invitation to Finland and Sweden to join NATO is an important geopolitical breakthrough on the northern flank of NATO, increasing the strength of the Alliance by two nations that are significant security providers.. On the eastern flank, the principle of capability tasks has changed, introducing deterrence by denial as one of the most important elements. In addition, European Member States will re-arm in the coming years and provide NATO with more combat-ready troops. NATO’s joint funding has been significantly increased. However, although much remains to be done, by far the most reassuring factor for Europe’s security is that the United States is back in Europe! If Vladimir Putin was hoping to have less NATO on his western flank after his unprovoked and criminal invasion of Ukraine, he has completely miscalculated: not only will he get more NATO, but also an alliance fiercely determined to defend its territory. The sentence pronounced by US President Joe Biden in Madrid, “Putin wanted the Finlandisation of Europe – he gets the Natoisation of Finland”, comes at a moment when Europe is doing everything possible to gather its forces to be a security and defence pillar within NATO. Even with the US back in Europe, the European Union should keep this goal in mind and, together with its North American partners, think about what the Europeanisation of NATO should look like.

What happened in Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 with the uncoordinated withdrawal of NATO must be avoided in the future. It was the Alliance’s greatest failure in its history. And the French President was arguably right in 2019 when he said that the Alliance was facing brain death, after Biden’s unpredictable predecessor cast doubt on whether it was still worthwhile for the US to honour its alliance commitments. Will Trump return or be succeeded by another maverick nationalist? Unpredictability is one reason for a strong Europe in NATO, contributing capabilities that can take over parts of the US’ defence capabilities when the US is occupied in other regions. The rebellion of Turkish President Erdogan against the admission of Finland and Sweden in order to force both countries to end their support for the banned Kurdish Workers’ Party shows that it will not be easy for NATO to bring all nations under one roof, but a concept against climate change shows that the Alliance is more than just a military alliance. NATO’s creation of emission targets can be considered as another very important summit outcome. NATO isn’t just satisfied with reducing its carbon footprint, it assesses new green tech as the best tech to give it a lead over its adversaries and better manage diverse crises. Jens Stoltenberg’s legacy as the “Green Secretary General” is being written in stone. The NATO summit in Madrid was undoubtedly a success and the crown jewel was NATO’s expansion to Sweden and Finland. In the Strategic Concept, the Alliance declares its willingness to return to talks with Russia after the end of the war in Ukraine, provided international law is fully respected. A high bar indeed!

+++ EU Presidency +++ Europeans will not weigh in isolation

European sovereignty by Cyrille Schott, honorary Prefect of region, member of the bureau of EuroDéfense-France, Strasbourg

he issue of European sovereignty has been highlighted by Russian aggression in Ukraine. Beyond the necessary debates, the EU was able to react in a coordinated manner by six sets of sanctions against Russia, signs of its economic power. It was united in welcoming refugees. It broke a taboo by financing arms deliveries with money from the common budget. The effort was increased from €0.5bn to €2bn, including the supply of heavy weapons to Ukraine. However, the United States forms the heart of the military reaction. It decided to increase aid to Ukraine to $40bn, including $10bn for direct military aid. The troops reinforcing the eastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance are mainly American. NATO appears to most Europeans as this “life insurance”, evoked in 2019 by Heiko Maas, the then German Foreign Minister. Finland and Sweden, so long attached to their status of neutrality, want to join it. The Europeans belong to the unity of the western camp, clearly identified around the United States, as highlighted by the conferences in Ramstein, an American military base in Germany where the nations supplying weapons to Ukraine were gathered. Nevertheless, this American military centrality shows European weakness. Although with military spending far exceeding Russia, Europeans alone would not be able to defend their integrity against an attack.

with NATO, as stated in October 2021 in Rome by Presidents Macron and Biden and as confirmed by the NATO new strategic concept adopted at the summit of Madrid in June 2022: “(...) NATO recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO.”

question of European sovereignty, which is “The not limited to defence, remains open.”

The objective of a European defence However, nothing says that NATO insurance will be valid regardless of the American president, the political situation in the US or the potential field of intervention. Russian aggression has saved Europeans years in the realisation that they need to build their own defence. If the Brexit crisis has allowed progress, this war has led to new steps. The mutual defence clause in Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union has been viewed with new interest, namely by Sweden and Finland. The Danes joined the European defence policy by referendum in June. In March, the European Council adopted the “Strategic Compass”, the first European White Paper on defence. The Member States expressed their will to increase their military budget. In continuation of the March EU Summit, the High Representative and the Commission presented an analysis of the defence investment gaps and measures to address them, such as the joint acquisition of defence equipment, with the help of Community money, and the creation of a joint purchasing centre. The objective of European defence seems to be progressing, especially since the agreement to build it in complementarity

The path towards a federal Europe advocated by the German governmental coalition contract and by the Italian President of the Council Draghi, the desire for a “sovereign, united, democratic Europe” expressed in the Sorbonne speech of President Macron, all go in the direction of European sovereignty.

Sovereignty remains a challenge However, this sovereignty remains a challenge, because if the Union brings together elements of sovereignty, both internal and external, the Member States remain fundamentally sovereign, and its progress ultimately depends on the will of these states to move forward. However, the Ukrainian crisis has highlighted the difference between the east and the west of Europe regarding the reaction to Russia; its neighbour countries, except for Hungary, being more in line with the Americans, followed by the British, than with the position of France and Germany. Will not the “new Europe”, which accompanied the United States in the Iraqi adventure, want to continue relying on only the American power for its defence while rearming, and prefer with also nations of “old Europe”, the purchase of American armaments to the creation of a real European defence industrial and technological base, an indispensable foundation of sovereignty? Will it not gain greater weight in the Union, to the detriment of the Franco-German couple, able to move Europe towards greater unity and sovereignty? The question of European sovereignty, which is not limited to defence, remains open. It is true that in the face of continental states that are asserting themselves on the planet, Europeans will not weigh in isolation, but will only be sovereign in union. This reality is likely to support them on their path to sovereignty. Cyrille Schott is one of the authors of the book «Souveraineté et solidarité, un défi européen», directed by Nathalie de Kaniv et Patrick Bellouard, éditions du Cerf, 2021

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ Security Crises +++

The Union must live up to its aspirations

by Gesine Weber, Research Analyst, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Paris

“W

hen your own house is on fire, you don’t send your entire fire brigade to fight a wildfire fifty kilometres from your village.” This metaphor describes brutally well the pressing need to reassess the priorities for European security since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022. Had the security policy priorities of the European Union (EU) previously been dominated mostly by the focus on the southern neighbourhood, Russia’s invasion forced the EU to rethink geopolitics on the European continent, and to readjust its action accordingly.

Remarkable deliveries of the EU Indeed, the EU has delivered: within days, the Member States adopted fierce packages of sanctions and activated the European Peace Facility – a tool originally conceptualised to support partner countries in the southern neighbourhood – to support Ukraine with lethal weapons. Furthermore, Member States have pledged to increase their individual defence budgets (as reflected in Germany’s “Zeitenwende”, the historic decision to invest €100bn in defence), stepped up their troop commitments to NATO’s eastern flank, and even approved EU candidate status for Ukraine. Source: https://bit.ly/3Otn06J Source: https://bit.ly/3b6h2Lt

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The EU’s quick and resolute reaction to Russia’s war on Ukraine is remarkable, given that its previous action in its neighbourhood has often been criticised for a lack of coherence, consistency, or just for being “too little, too late”. While Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has forged transatlantic unity and underlined the vital importance of US engagement in Europe for European security, it has also showcased that the EU itself can make a meaningful contribution to this – in other words, that the European fire brigade works if needed.

War in Ukraine – a geopolitical long game While supporting Ukraine against Russia must be the top priority for Europeans at the moment, the ramifications of the war have already become visible in other parts of the world relevant to European security, and are likely to exacerbate over the coming months, particularly in the Global South. With Ukraine and Russia supplying more than a quarter of the world’s wheat, the war has already led to an explosion of prices across the globe, but it is particularly likely to threaten food security in Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Lebanon, which in 2020 represented more than half of the wheat exports from Ukraine.1 Furthermore, the soaring prices for fuel and fertiliser risk further complicating food supply, so that the World Food Programme expects the war to drive food insecurity to a record high.2 The war in Ukraine thereby adds an additional dimension of insecurity to regions in Europe’s south, where the

+++ Security Crises +++

effects of the climate crisis are likely to become most palpable in the coming years. Hence, it reinforces the root causes of instability and catalyses state failure, terrorism, and irregular migration – core security challenges the EU aimed to address through its CSDP missions and broader security policies in its southern neighbourhood. To return to the metaphor used at the beginning, the fire caused by Russia in Ukraine and the subsequent reprioritisation of eastern Europe on the EU’s security agenda does not mean that the other “wildfires” the EU has been facing with regard to its security for in past years can be pushed to the background. In fact, they are all part of a geopolitical long game which is not only about the European security order per se, but more broadly about security for Europe.

Bundling European security instruments Indeed, the southern neighbourhood – or the regions south of Europe, more broadly speaking – had been the focus of the EU’s efforts in international security before the eruption of the war in Ukraine: with the exception of EUAM (European Union Advisory Mission) Ukraine, all CSDP missions launched in the last ten years were deployed to the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa. While some missions were undoubtedly more successful than others, they all showcased that a de facto division of labour among Europeans and the US has emerged over the years, with the EU leading the efforts of crisis management in Africa and parts of the Middle East, whereas the US was increasingly focusing on its role in the security in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, these efforts, focused on stabilisation and crisis-management, were underpinned by the EU’s role as the largest humanitarian donor in the world. The EU had often faced the criticism of employing instruments over a strategy, but the use of several complementary instruments to tackle multi-layered crises has started to morph into a broader strategy to tackle security challenges over the years. An example of this is the EU’s Integrated Sahel Strategy, combining the EU’s support for stabilisation with instruments of development cooperation and for good governance. This approach is promising since it adds the dimension of human security to traditional military security solutions, preventing the root causes of instability and mitigating its security risks – and this is precisely the EU’s security interest in its neighbourhood. This is why it is crucial for the EU to keep track of this in the shadow of the war in Ukraine, particularly in light of rapidly changing security situations in the Sahel or the Gulf of Guinee.

defence by 2030, outlines the EU’s position as a regional security actor and concrete steps regarding crisis management, capability development, partnerships, and resilience. The creation of the EU Rapid Deployment Capability of 5,000 personnel, more flexible and modular CSDP missions, the use of the European Peace Facility, a stronger civilian CSDP, a Troop Rotation Cycle Register for CSDP military missions and operations, strengthening the Military Planning and Combat Capability – the list of measures proposed in the Strategic Compass is promising and has the potential to make the CSDP fit to respond to multi-facetted crises. When Member States now make promises to enhance their defence budgets, and when joint capability development is reprioritised in the EU, policymakers in Brussels and national capitals are well advised to address this question with an approach that responds to the nested nature of the crises Europeans are currently facing. It would be short-sighted to design all these next steps exclusively as a response to Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, as not all crises in the next years will come from the EU’s east. The flexibility the EU has proven with regard to the use of the European Peace Facility for Ukraine can constitute a blueprint and should encourage Europeans to keep instruments flexible and adaptive. Even the best fire brigade does not always know where the next fire evolves – but it can move quickly and mitigate the security risks, and the same should be said for the EU’s ambitions to tackle multi-facetted crises.

Gesine Weber is a Research Analyst at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Paris. She is also a PhD Candidate at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London and holds an M.A. in European Affairs from

The Strategic Compass – a promising guide

SciencesPo Paris and a M.A. in Political Science from

While the EU has levelled up its role as a geopolitical actor through concrete action in the last few months, it has also equipped itself with a powerful tool to navigate Europeans through times of multifacetted crises. The Strategic Compass, an action plan for strengthening European security and

Freie Universität Berlin. Her research focuses on European security and defence, including EU-UK relations, Franco-German relations, and the EU-US-China triangle in geopolitics.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

photo: © Nightman1965, stock.adobe.com

In the Spotlight

++++ Military Education +++

Preparing future military leaders

Strategic leadership in the European Union A conference report by Hartmut Bühl, Publisher, Paris

nder the patronage of the French EU Presidency, a two-day conference was held at the Ecole Militaire in Paris on 9th and 10th June 2022, bringing together directors of military education institutions and commanders of schools offering general staff courses from 23 EU Member States. Under the leadership of the Director of the Ecole de Guerre, Major General (AF) Jean-Marc Vigilant, the issue of “strategic leadership” was the main topic of the conference in all speeches, round tables and plenary discussions. The key question

was: how can the EU educate future military leaders to enable them to command multinational forces or take on the highest staff responsibilities in the EU and NATO? The joint reflections on the future of a European higher military education were overshadowed by the war in Ukraine and the fact that the global environment has changed as the return of strategic and power competition has serious consequences on European forces’ capabilities to achieve the Union’s objective of a certain degree of strategic military autonomy. To reach this objective on the personnel side, officers in senior military staff positions must be prepared to follow a new strategy and develop a common strategic culture. This will not be achievable in their offices but only by living, working and reflecting together.

Questions to Major General Jean-Marc Vigilant The European: General, at the end of the conference, in a closed meeting with your counterparts, you defined the way ahead: What can our readers expect? Jean-Marc Vigilant: Overall, the French initiative met with a unanimously positive response. We managed to achieve initial results and chart a path forward. A working group will be set up, which will first take stock of objectives, set milestones, and develop proposals for modular training and clearing obstacles that could block the process. The European: Congratulations, General! Which Member State will be leading the working group you mentioned? Do you have an idea of the objectives? Jean-Marc Vigilant: Firstly, the working group is a ‘club of members’ with equal rights. They will find the optimal solution. France initiated the process, does not claim leadership but is willing to assume such a role to keep up the momentum. Secondly, on the objectives, we are all convinced that such an education process needs to be all encompassing, taking into

account global challenges, capability development including industrial and economic aspects and operational planning. Current conflicts in the world and especially in and around Europe make this education in a European framework even more relevant. The European: Is there any idea where this course should take place and when do you think the EU will take its decision? Jean-Marc Vigilant: So far, the directors have agreed on the development of a short common European education module to be implemented in the different European command and staff colleges and on the principle of a more substantial programme under the auspices of the European Security and Defence College. For the time being, everything is open. It will be up to the Member States to decide on the scope and form of this future common European education and training programme. We have thrown a stone into the water and the waves are moving. I am very optimistic about the future of this project.

Special session of the Heads of Delegations reflecting on the future of European military education photo: © Lionel Monnier

Day 1: Europe in a changing strategic context The first day of the symposium was dedicated to reflections on the current geopolitical situation, with an introduction of the defence issues by Lieutenant General Luc de Rancourt de Mimerand from the French Ministry of Defence and Jonathan Lacôte, Deputy Director General of Political and Security Affairs of the French Foreign Ministry. Both came to the conclusion that NATO will remain the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security and the crucible of interoperability between allied partners.

The European: General, may I thank you for a most fruitful conference. Our magazine supports your efforts to create a strategic culture through common education.

The EU should become a strong and credible partner for the alliance to be able to share burdens within NATO. A panel with high ranking civil and military personalities discussed the EU Strategic Compass as a leading concept for common European efforts but underscored once again members’ ongoing need for American protection. Frédéric Mauro, lawyer at the Brussels bar, summed up: “The strategic compass is a useful document both at the level of symbols and concrete measures, because it marks Europeans’ awareness of the need to defend themselves”. The panel was united in the conviction that investing in future generations of political and military leaders with a European education is of the utmost importance. The practical side was represented by Vice Admiral (FR) Hervé Bléjean, Director General of the European Military Staff in Brussels and Major General Hermino Maio, (POR-A), Deputy Director, Military Planning and Conduct Capability in the European External Action Service (EEAS). They addressed military operations, missions and objectives of EU training missions and both expressed satisfaction with their experience of operational multinational contingents and emphasised the importance of training and cultural preparation for each mission. Colonel Georgio Kapoglannis, (HEL-A), the military training manager of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), argued along the same lines. Dr Thierry Tardy, Head of the Research Division of the NATO Defense College, showed how fruitful the staff course in Rome is for the development of a common attitude among senior NATO civil and military leaders.

Maj Gen Vigilant answering Hartmut Bühl’s questions in his office photo: © Lionel Monnier

→ Continued on page 14

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In the Spotlight

+++ Military Education +++

Maj Gen Vigilant introducing the French Chief of Defence, General Thierry Burkhard, who concluded the conference photo: © Lionel Monnier

Day 2: How to create a European strategic culture The second day focused on the modalities and the legacy of senior officers training in the Member States. It was introduced by Lieutenant General Benoît Durieux, (FRA-A), Director of Higher Military Education, analysing what military leaders can expect in modern warfare and how they must be prepared for new phenomena in combat.

about the war of “Thinking tomorrow also means thinking

about its social and economic determinants, so that armies are always in tune with the societies of our European countries. The future military leader must be trained to find the right combination between the fairly perennial demands of combat and the changing traits that run through our societies”. Benoît Durieux, Lt Gen (FRA-A)

He started by saying that war consists of the reciprocal use of physical violence to impose one’s will on the adversary and that it is a terrible ordeal for people and societies who are confronted with this experience. “It immerses military leaders in an environment dominated by fear, suffering, tension and uncertainty”, he said and added: “the new fields of conflict like space, cyber or the striving for information superiority will not spare military leader the test of physical violence, but they will contribute to making the environment even more chaotic”. On two panels, the commanders of General Staff Courses institutions presented their syllabuses, all of which include European security and defence aspects. Major General Vigilant noted: “I am convinced that our diversity is also our strength”, and added: “but I also see the drawbacks of not having a common general staff education for Member States’ senior General Staff officers”. He insisted that these future leaders must be able to interact rapidly, have a profound knowledge of Europe and its societies and respect their – often common – history and cultural ties.

Conclusion The French Chief of Defence (CHOD), General Thierry Burkhard, concluded the conference by expressing satisfaction that there is unanimous agreement on France’s proposal to launch an EU higher military education: “The EU’s ambition of exercising its sovereignty in changing times needs civil and military capabilities in all Member States adapted to that need. But there is also an urgent need for an EU strategic culture in practice, allowing future military leaders to get to know and understand each other better. This is valid for the EU and NATO” and he added “to oppose the EU and the US is sterile. We are partners in the same system, but we must acquire capabilities to be able to defend our interests by our own means, if necessary”.

MAIN TOPIC

The European Union and its neighbours

The European neighbourhood and enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans has come under pressure as a result of the war in Ukraine. The political gesture of offering Ukraine and Moldova candidate status for the accession to the EU has forced the Union to give new impetus to its enlargement policy, starting with accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

G7 Leaders discussing with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (on the screen) during their meeting in Schloss Elmau, Germany, 26th-28th June 2022.

photo: ©EC/DATI BENDO

The EU must become a stronger and more capable security provider

European enlargement, security and defence on the rise by David McAllister MEP, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), Brussels/Strasbourg

he Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the grave and wholesale violations of human rights and international law have made it all the more urgent for the EU to respond to new geopolitical dynamics. The historic decisions taken at the European Council on 23th-24th June and the NATO summit in Madrid a week later will profoundly shape the future of Europe. The G7 meeting in Elmau has also underlined the determination of western allies to maintain the strongest possible unity of the international community in condemning the Russian Federation, defending international law and upholding the rules-based international order. Ahead of the G20 meeting in Bali on 15th-16th November, we must step up our diplomatic efforts to convince as many countries as possible to align with the sanctions against Russia. The pressure on the Putin regime must be ramped up.

Striving for the EU’s strategic sovereignty The Kremlin has not yet achieved any of the goals it set out to achieve. Instead, Putin’s war has made NATO more united than it has been for a long time. Not only that, the transatlantic

alliance has been bolstered further. In a changed geopolitical environment, NATO members signed the accession protocols for Finland and Sweden on 5th July. I for one strongly welcome the fact that all of our allies have finally recognised that having these two Scandinavian countries in NATO will increase security in Europe. All over our continent, security and defence policy is gaining enormous importance. Germany will gradually increase its defence budget to match NATO’s 2% target and has launched a special fund of €100bn for its armed forces, the Bundeswehr. The people of Denmark have voted in a referendum to join the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These two examples demonstrate the far-reaching changes that have taken place in a very short period of time. The European Commission should seize this momentum and quickly take all the necessary steps to ensure the strategic sovereignty of the EU and pursue a genuine security and defence policy in close cooperation with NATO. Adopting the Strategic Compass for the EU on 21th March 2022 was a key milestone, as it provides the Union with a clear roadmap for our security and defence activities for the years to come. This compass is intended to serve as the EU’s first ever White Book on European defence, and I now call for its swift implementation. It must meet the highest level of ambition and priorities

MAIN TOPIC The European Union and its neighbours

David McAllister MEP is Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the European Parliament. Born in Berlin in 1971, his political career started in 1998 when he became a Member of the State Parliament of Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) – a position he held until 2014. He served as Prime Minister of Nieder photo: © European Union 2020, Source: EP

sachsen between 2010 and 2013. Since July 2014, he is a Member of the European Parliament and a Vice-President of the European People’s Party (EPP).

to develop the capabilities needed to tackle the serious deterioration in the European and international security order. We need to set out clear guidance with a realistic timetable for action across the security and defence fields in order to make the European Union a stronger and more capable security provider.

Reassessing the EU neighbourhood policy At the same time, the European enlargement policy must become more predictable, coherent and credible. Granting Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova EU candidate status has sent a clear political message that those countries have irrevocably chosen a European path. Georgia could be on track for the same status if it fulfils a number of requirements. Meanwhile, the six Western Balkan countries deserve a clearer EU prospect. I am therefore calling for the entire European neighbourhood policy to be reassessed. The Commission should thoroughly examine the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on cooperation with all countries that aspire to join the EU. The current situation requires us to strengthen our ties with these countries. This means ramping up sectoral cooperation, for example on the single market or on security. Enhancing reforms on democracy, human rights and the rule of law remains crucial. The Western Balkans The Commission and the Council should make full use of the revamped methodology to improve the credibility, transparency and accountability of the accession process. They have the tools available to do this. Metrics can be used to assess the performance of justice systems, while a lack of political will can be addressed with conditionality. The EU must live up to its commitments at a political level. The start of the accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia are a crucial step. We must also move forwards with granting visa liberalisation to Kosovo without further delay. Montenegro – often called the frontrunner – needs to make progress in meeting its benchmarks and closing negotiation chapters. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political leaders should return to the state institutions and press ahead with the EU-related reforms to

need to set out clear “Weguidance with a realistic

timetable for action across the security and defence fields in order to make the European Union a stronger and more capable security provider.”

demonstrate its EU perspective. And Serbia, as a candidate country, must show real commitment to EU values and align with the EU’s decisions and positions on foreign and security policy. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. Each country has to be assessed individually and on its merits. The southern neighbourhood In our southern neighbourhood, the accession process with Turkey will remain at a standstill while there is no clear and significant progress on fundamental rights and the rule of law. Nonetheless, the Commission should work to enhance dialogue and cooperation with Ankara on foreign policy and security issues in order to strive for closer mutual alignment in these areas, and should remain open to engagement with Turkish civil society. Furthermore, the EU should support the countries in the southern neighbourhood to help them recover from the Covid-19 pandemic and cushion the adverse effects of supply shocks and price increases following the war in Ukraine. It is regrettable that more than 25 years on since the start of the Barcelona Process, there is still some way to go if we are to achieve an area of shared prosperity, democracy, stability and freedom with the Mediterranean countries in the southern neighbourhood. It is essential that the initiatives outlined in the joint communication on the renewed partnership with the southern neighbourhood are implemented. This means taking all the necessary steps to facilitate Tunisia’s return to democracy, including technical support for inclusive and transparent efforts to make political and economic reforms, as well as engaging in talks with the two rival Libyan governments to resolve the political stalemate.

The EU must become a stronger security provider In rising to the challenges of these geopolitical changes, the EU must become a stronger and more capable security provider for the good of its citizens and for international security, peace and stability. This triptych of values must guide our actions. All the EU institutions must work together to enhance the European neighbourhood and enlargement, security and defence policies.

MAIN TOPIC The European Union and its neighbours

GUEST COMMENTARY

There must be coherence between enlargement and Schengen policy by Professor Ioan Mircea Pașcu, former Vice-President of the European Parliament, Bukarest

“Enlargement” and the “Schengen regime” were conceived as somehow complementary: once fulfilling the “acquis”, a new member was automatically included in the Schengen Agreement, allowing its citizens access to the fourth freedom, namely the free movement of people, conceived to make the EU single market function properly. While the political criteria were considered fulfilled upon admission, the inclusion into the Schengen Agreement was considered rather a technical step, complementing the admission. This logic has been abandoned at the admission of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU on 1st January 2007, when the two new members were not automatically admitted to the Schengen Agreement (they are not even today, 16 years after obtaining EU membership!), in spite of their functioning as de facto members of it with respect to their obligations. Moreover, this break from the initial pattern, was accompanied by a marked shift of emphasis from a straight technical to a rather imprecise political conditionality for admission into the Schengen regime. This exception from the rule, which was applied to Romania and Bulgaria (later to Croatia until recently) signified that the two – enlargement and Schengen – have since engaged on rather separate paths, with the latter either seriously punctuated by the refugee crises of 2015-2017 or even suspended during the pandemic of 2020-2022. With the exception of Croatia, admitted in 2013, there were no subsequent admissions, motivated by the so-called enlargement fatigue installed afterwards.

The recent invasion of Ukraine by Russia has re-opened the debate for enlargement, with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia renewing their quest for admission. In turn, this raises the problem of even-handedess, compared with all previous admissions, an issue motivated by the marked deterioration of security in the area, following Russia’s military action against Ukraine On the other hand, the war in Ukraine confronted the EU with almost five million refugees, many more than in 2015-2017, primarily absorbed by the neighbouring states. Notably, unlike then, this wave of refugees did not compel the EU to shut down the Schengen system, indicating the resilience of the latter, particularly after the challenge of the recent pandemic. In conclusion, there is compelling evidence that the two – the Schengen regime and enlargement – should be brought again in sync, allowing the single market to function properly and, thus, the EU to play its desired international role. This is, with certainty, an imperative today, given the geo-political realities which the EU is forced to recognise and adjust to, making the politicisation of the admission to Schengen even more artificial.

Web European neighbourhood policy and enlargement negotiations: https://bit.ly/3PhbdcU

What is the Schengen Area? Schengen Area signifies a zone where 26

atia, Cyprus, Ireland and Romania. However,

in one Schengen country while working in

European countries abolished their internal

Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania are currently

another. Every day around 3.5 million peo-

borders, for the free and unrestricted move-

in the process of joining the Schengen Area

ple cross internal Schengen-area borders.

ment of people, in harmony with common

and already applying the Schengen acquis

Economic benefits: since the establishment

rules for controlling external borders and

to a large extent. Additionally, also the non-

of Schengen, intra-European trade has in-

fighting criminality by strengthening the com-

EU States Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and

creased over time, facilitating the growth of

mon judicial system and police cooperation.

Liechtenstein have joined the Schengen Area.

European businesses

Today, the Schengen Area encompasses

The Schengen Area includes 420 million

most EU countries, except for Bulgaria, Cro-

people. Almost 1.7 million people reside

Web Schengen Area: https://bit.ly/3PkMuEv

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Speed up progress and help countries modernise

How to help the EU’s eastern neighbours solve major challenges in peace and security

by Teresa Czerwińska, Vice-President, European Investment Bank (EIB), Luxembourg

or the European Union (EU) and the European Investment Bank (EIB), the countries to our east are important partners and friends. Some of them are busy changing their societies and economies in hopes of joining the EU. As these countries carry out a lot of work to integrate and cooperate, they face major challenges related to security and peace in the region.

Threats to democracy and peace The Russian invasion of Ukraine continues to threaten democracy and drive millions of people from their homes. It has created a large humanitarian and geopolitical crisis. The many new problems related to rising energy prices and fewer food supplies came as many economies around the world were beginning to recover from the Covid-19 pandemic. In Belarus, there is also a bitter democratic struggle that has been intensifying since a disputed election in 2020 led to large demonstrations and violent tactics by the police and security forces. Europe’s message when there are threats to democracy or peace is simple - we will always support people in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia who want to help us build a better world based on cooperation, mutual respect, fairness, democracy and human rights.

humbled especially by the people of Ukraine, who are paying the ultimate price right now to defend their right to live in peace and freedom. The war in Ukraine has highlighted how important it is to protect energy and food security, as well as human rights in the EU and the eastern neighbourhood. The core mission of the EIB is to support the goals and policies of the EU. This includes strengthening economies and supporting reforms that help neighbouring countries meet EU standards. We do this by financing projects that create sustainable societies and build economic growth. Russia’s brutal invasion is a test of European unity and solidarity. Unanimous support for sanctions and less reliance on Russian fuel are a necessity. This could hurt our economies, but we must work together to counter the new threat to some EU members and neighbouring states. The six neighbouring countries are similar to each other when it comes to challenges from their past. They were part of the Soviet Union just 30 years ago and had planned economies, where production

Teresa Czerwińska was appointed Vice President of the European Investment Bank in March 2020. Alongside looking after the constituency countries (Poland, Hungary, Croatia) she is

The EIB’s support to European policies

responsible for Eastern Partnership countries as well as

The key aims of the EU are peace, freedom, security and the well-being of its citizens. The EIB is proud to follow these goals in each country around the world where it does business. Every investment we make must meet strict social and environmental guidelines that ensure that everyone is treated fairly. There are many people in all six countries of the EU Eastern Neighbourhood who share these same values. We are amazed and

for Central Asia, China and Mongolia. She also oversees science, education, innovation, digital economy, and the InvestEU programme. Prior to becoming EIB Vice-President, Mrs Czerwińska was a member of the management board of the National Bank of Poland, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Poland, when she was also a Governor of the European Investment Bank.

MAIN TOPIC The European Union and its neighbours

photo: EIB

following a well-defined “Weandareserious effort to help eastern countries meet their goals and develop new ones.”

and investment were subject to centralised control. They have come a long way in three decades, modernising their markets and improving their governments. We need to support more change for socio-economic development and better living standards. The European Investment Bank is here to offer expertise, loans and other financial help to society and the economy.

The Eastern Partnership initiative Over the past several years, the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative has followed an ambitious agenda, focusing on key priorities: more economic growth, stronger connectivity of people and places, better institutions and governance, and a more mobile and educated society. Recently, we added new priorities to cover Covid-19 recovery, building resilience to climate change, and responding to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, including challenges from the big refugee problem or global food crises. EIB’s support to small businesses The EIB has been active in many of these priority areas, but we especially support the small businesses that form the backbone of economies. We have provided loans and loan guarantees to small businesses worth several hundred million euros in the region since 2009. To increase our work on the ground in areas outside the European Union, we created a development branch within the EIB Group called EIB Global. This new arm increases the impact of development finance and will mobilise billions each year from private investors. It will bring the bank closer to people, companies and institutions beyond the EU that need the most help. Different types of tools and advisory initiatives Our work in neighbouring countries spans a wide range of sectors and uses many types of investment tools and advisory initiatives. In Georgia, for example, our lending and advisory services helped improve the large east-west highway that connects the country to other parts of Europe. In Armenia, we provided €7m to renovate dozens of nursery schools in the capital. Most recently in Moldova, we helped develop a national healthcare plan and build two regional hospitals. In Belarus, the EIB stopped all activities, but we fully stand by

the democratic forces that are fighting the dictatorship of Alexander Lukashenko. The opposition members and pro-democracy activists deserve our highest recognition while fighting for a free Belarus. The EIB, being a sponsor of the Charlemagne Prize that honours work done to foster European unity, therefore strongly supported that this year the prize was awarded to a group of opposition members and pro-democracy activists in Belarus - Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Veronica Tsepkalo and Maria Kalesnikava. Rebuilding Ukraine Ukraine has received the most EIB support in the eastern neighbourhood, accounting for more than 60% of bank lending. Our support after the Russian invasion has been broad and quick. Within weeks, we provided €668m for urgent needs like food, medicine, fuel. We plan to play a big role in the reconstruction after the war. The EIB has approved a €4bn credit line to help EU countries give shelter and protection to Ukrainian refugees. There must be no delay in rebuilding Ukraine as soon as we can go back. And we will go back! The EIB helped build many projects after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the fighting in the Donbass, and we have seen much of this destroyed in the past few months. It will be important to revitalize Kyiv and other heavily destroyed cities. We also have to quickly repair equipment and infrastructure needed to export grain and other goods.

Counting on the EIB’s large experience The EIB has a lot of experience working in developing countries, including many that are suffering from conflict or political problems. We have been helping countries inside and outside Europe for more than 60 years. Nearly 25% of our finance outside the EU, or €1.7bn, went to fragile or conflict regions in 2021. We are following a well-defined and serious effort to help eastern countries meet their goals and develop new ones, especially in areas such as economic recovery after the pandemic, war reconstruction, climate adaptation, the green transition, digital innovation. This support will involve hundreds of millions in finance. Our aim is to speed up progress and help modernise countries that need help the most. This reduces conflicts, improves economies and ensures that everyone has better lives.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

There is a way forward that addresses the concerns of all Member States

How to realise EU enlargement with the Balkans and Ukraine

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen receiving (from left to right): Petr Fiala, Czech Prime Minister, Edi Rama, Albanian Prime Minister, and Dimitar Kovačevski, Prime Minister of North Macedonia, Brussels, 19th July 2022

Interview with Gerald Knaus, Founding Chairman, European Stability Initiative (ESI), Berlin

The European: Gerald Knaus, we meet at a historic moment for the European project, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. You have worked on EU enlargement for decades, proposing ideas, from promoting visa-free travel for the Balkans and Moldova to including countries in the European Single Market. Now, on 17th June, the European Commission offered candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and a membership perspective to Georgia. On 23rd June, EU and Western Balkan leaders met to discuss EU integration. On 24th June, the European Council granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status. In mid-July, Albania and North Macedonia began accession negotiations in Brussels. Are things moving in the right direction? Gerald Knaus: I wish they were. It was very important to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. Not doing so would have sent a terrible message of EU indifference to Kyiv and Moscow. It was also high time to start accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia. But look closer, and you see that the key question, how to strengthen European democracies which are not yet members of the EU through integration, has not been addressed. Much of what we see resembles the villages Grigory Potemkin created for his mistress, the Russian Czar, on her trip to Ukraine: facades, with nothing behind them.

photo: European Union, 2022; EC – Audiovisual Service/ Christophe Licoppe

The European: This is harsh. Do you indeed suggest that the EU’s response to Ukraine and Moldova is not embedded in a strategic vision, but is only an ad-hoc response? And that opening accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia is not enough to revive the Balkan enlargement process? Gerald Knaus: Tough times call for realism, not wishful thinking. Realists know that some EU countries agreed to offer Ukraine candidate status because they only see it as a symbol. They do not see Ukraine as a member of the EU. And the accession process with all six Balkan countries suffers from a similar, fatal flaw: it is not leading to any new members joining, now or in the future, because there is no agreement within the EU on admitting new members. We see that the accession process is a holding operation, feeding cynicism. We need something more realistic. The European: What is the essence of your “we need something more realistic”? What is the ESI proposal on the way forward that you published some weeks ago? Gerald Knaus: The EU has a vital interest in the stability and transformation of these democracies. Accession is the right vision for this. But in the short term it suffers from a fatal flaw: it is not supported by leaders and public opinion across the EU. The French president is open on this. In his view, the EU cannot accept many new members without deep internal reform.

MAIN TOPIC The European Union and its neighbours

promise of integration “The must be credible”

War and Peace in post-1990 Europe Slovenia: 1991 Croatia: 1991-1995 (with ceasefire in between) Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1992-1995

The European: But what should happen until such a reform takes place, if ever? Gerald Knaus: We suggest returning to the vision of The Treaty of Rome in 1957, that created the European Economic Community, of “removing barriers” among European democracies. And to offer all democracies access to the single market and to the four freedoms: freedom of movement for goods, people, services and capital – if they meet the necessary criteria, including respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Kosovo: 1998-1999 Serbia: 1999 North Macedonia: 2001 Turkey-PKK: 1990s Turkey-PKK: 2015-present South Ossetia: 1991-1992 Transnistria: 1992 Abkhazia: 1992-1993 Armenia-Azerbaijan: 1992-1994

The European: What would this allow? Gerald Knaus: This would allow Ukraine, Albania and North Macedonia to soon enjoy the same rights that citizens of Norway, Iceland and Northern Ireland enjoy. It creates an incentive for deep reforms to get there. And it is also politically realistic within the EU.

Chechen war: 1994-1996 Chechen war: 1999-2000 Russia-Georgia: 2008 East Ukraine: 2014-present Armenia-Azerbaijan: 2020 Russia-Ukraine: 2022 Video: https://bit.ly/3Punj2q

The European: This offer should be made to whom? Which will be the way ahead? Gerald Knaus: We have an ongoing accession process in which countries move from being candidates to opening and closing 35 chapters. We also have in-depth assessments of how prepared countries are to join the EU, produced annually by the European Commission. Based on these, the EU can hold out an attractive interim goal of access to the four freedoms once countries are found to be prepared. This is based on merit. It does not first require EU internal reform. The European: Are you suggesting that the instruments to achieve these ends already exist? Gerald Knaus: Yes. Every year the European Commission already publishes reports on how far each Western Balkan candidate has progressed in meeting EU standards and requirements for the single market – from environmental to competition policy – and on the rule of law. It should do the same for Ukraine and Moldova. The European: What happens when the Commission finds that countries are well prepared to meet the conditions of joining the single market? Gerald Knaus: The Council could declare now that once the Commission confirms that a candidate has met these conditions, it would gain access to the four freedoms. The EU has already done this in smaller sectors, for example in the EU-Western Balkans Transport Community Treaty of 2017. It could propose a treaty to extend this to all areas of the single market. This is better than the status quo for both candidates and the EU. It is win-win.

The European: In your above-mentioned ESI paper, you write that this could be a second Treaty of Rome… Gerald Knaus: ...yes, it could set up a second European Economic Community (EECII). What matters is the substance. The four freedoms matter to people. They matter to investors. Northern Ireland benefits a lot from remaining in the single market. So does Norway, which pays for this access. It would help countries catch up economically, as the Baltic States or Poland have done. It allows for borders to become invisible, as on the island of Ireland or between Germany and Poland. The European: You further wrote in this recent ESI report that “Turning bold visions into concrete technical steps has been the secret behind European integration. It was realist politicians like Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer, inspired by strategists like Jean Monnet, who turned lofty language about a European family into solid institutions”. However, in 1957 there were only six nations who needed to agree. And there was peace in Europe. Today we face a war in Ukraine. Is this not a big difference? Gerald Knaus: This makes it more urgent. In fact, when the first Treaty of Rome was negotiated in 1957, there was not only the Cold War but also a bitter and bloody war be→ Continued on page 26

ing waged by France in what was then French Algeria. The battle of Algiers took place at the very time the Treaty of

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

photo: private

should now respond to the shock of a major war in Ukraine with a similarly bold vision. For this, the promise of integration must be credible. Montenegro has been negotiating accession for more than ten years now. It has been a loyal NATO member for many years. The EU should now state that if Montenegro meets all the conditions, it could be a full EU member by 2026. In addition, the EU could guarantee as of now that its citizens would then enjoy the four freedoms. The same prospect should be held out now to Albanians, Kosovars, Bosnians and Serbs.

“

The European model of gradual, peaceful integration is the opposite to Putin’s imperial vision.”

Rome was being negotiated. But the European Economic Community which was created at that time lasted longer than both the French Fourth Republic and all the European colonial empires. It survived Franco’s and Salazar’s dictatorships, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Its vision of a Europe where democracies remove barriers to be more prosperous and to make conflicts between members unthinkable worked beyond all expectations. In fact, it became so attractive that other democracies wanted to join. All Europeans owe a huge debt to Monnet, Adenauer, the Belgian leader Paul-Henri Spaak and all those who created it. The European: What is the relationship between this, initially economic, European integration and the story of war and peace in Europe since then? Gerald Knaus: Since the end of the Cold war in 1990, Europe has witnessed many armed conflicts. However, other than the Troubles in Northern Ireland, which ended in 1998, none took place in the European Union. In the past, Immanuel Kant and Victor Hugo had dreams of democratic peace across the continent. In Zurich in 1946, Winston Churchill spoke about integration on the Swiss model as key to the future of a peaceful European family. But it was Monnet and his generation of pragmatists who turned an abstract vision of European peace into a strategy of step-by-step integration. Removing barriers was key to this. Now the Europeans should build on this in the Balkans and with Ukraine. Then and now, deterrence was also needed, of course, today against an aggressive Russia. And Ukraine must be helped to win this war. A combination of deterrence and integration can consolidate European peace for the next generations. The European: But is this not what the EU already hopes to achieve with the promise of accession to the Balkans? Gerald Knaus: Yes. EU leaders took the step to open accession talks with 12 countries at their summit in Helsinki in December 1999 because of the shock of the war with Serbia. EU leaders

The European: The invitation to Ukraine and Moldova owes a lot to Russia’s attack. This created a sense of unity. But you suggest there is no common EU view on Ukrainian membership? Gerald Knaus: On this, EU members remain divided. Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states are urging the EU to be open to Ukraine. A second group stresses that the Balkans must be a priority. A third group, led by France, worry about rendering the EU dysfunctional by enlarging too much. EU policy must address all these concerns, not wish them away. The European: How would the ESI proposal of a new European Economic Community address these divergent concerns? Gerald Knaus: The EU should hold out the option of full membership to all European democracies who are interested. This applies to Ukraine and to the Balkans. But it should offer a two-step process, where countries can first integrate into the single market. This allows the EU more time to reform itself, without prolonging a frustrating process of talks designed to lead nowhere. The integration into the single market is good for all European democrats. The model of gradual and peaceful integration is a chance for each nation to achieve membership. The European: Let me turn once more to the war in Ukraine, where we see a radically different political vision. Official Russia under Putin has long praised the foreign policy successes of its great 20th century Empire builder, Joseph Stalin, in movies, museums and history textbooks. The narrative of imperial reconquest has also recently inspired Putin to compare himself to Peter the Great, bringing Ukraine back into the empire. Gerald Knaus: You are right, and this is a big difference: the European model of gradual, peaceful integration is the opposite of Putin’s imperial vision. It strengthens all countries without subordinating them to each other. Putin sees only one option, which is for Russia’s neighbours to “return” to the status of vassal states. If they are fortunate, they might end up like today’s Armenia. If they are less fortunate, they might look like the Belarus of Lukashenko. And if they resist imperial control, they will see their cities suffer the fate of Grozny or Mariupol. The EU offers a model of integration without creating a new imperial centre. This is another reason why Putin both fears and fails to understand the success of the EU. The European: Thank you, Gerald Knaus, for this interview. Web www.esiweb.org

MAIN TOPIC The European Union and its neighbours

The Hon. Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, addresses delegates of the European Civil Protection Forum at the presence of Janez Lenarčič, EU Commissioner for Crisis Management; Krista Mikkonen, Finland's Minister of Interior and Janez Potočnik, Co-chair, United Nations International Resource Panel, in a session facilitated by Sean Klein. photo: © European Commission

Building the EU’s capacity to respond to CBRN threats

The Union Civil Protection Mechanism by Dr Antonella Cavallo, rescEU CBRN Lead, DG ECHO, European Commission, Brussels

n a heartfelt address at the European Civil Protection Forum on 28th June, Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, thanked EU Commissioner for Crisis Management Janez Lenarčič for standing by Ukraine since the very beginning. To this day, the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) has mobilised over 45,000 tonnes of Member States and Participating State’s in-kind assistance and supplies from the rescEU strategic stockpiles, transport and warehousing services, medical evacuation capabilities as well as donations from private sector, thanks to the collaboration with all 27 EU Member States and 3 of the Participating States (Norway, Turkey and North Macedonia).

Far-reaching assistance to Ukraine The assistance requested by Ukraine reflected the widest range of needs ever recorded in the history of the Union: from medical to agricultural needs, from medevac to energy-related requests to equipment to respond to chemical, biological and radio-nuclear (CBRN) threats. CBRN assistance provided to Ukraine so far included medical countermeasures such as antidotes, potassium iodide tablets, therapeutics and response equipment such as detectors, decontaminants, radiometers, dosimeters, spectrometers,

personal protective equipment. Moreover, the deployment included significant quantities of medical equipment to treat patients exposed to Toxic Industrial Chemicals such as ammonia or chlorine. When EU Member States could not directly match high-priority requests from Ukraine with offers, the ERCC mobilised these resources from the rescEU emergency reserves in collaboration with the countries managing the relevant stockpiles. These already contained critical medical equipment. In addition, they were reinforced with CBRN countermeasures and response equipment based on Ukraine’s current and projected needs. The overall financial value of the assistance provided to Ukraine and neighbouring states via the Union Civil Protection Mechanism amounts so far to over €400 million. Beyond the monetary significance of the assistance, the ERCC has acted as a coordination hub for the EU Member States and Participating States as well as for a wide array of international stakeholders. In so doing, the ERCC helped prioritise needs over a number of requests for assistance, which were circulated simultaneously to several institutions and organisations in the EU and beyond. In relation to the CBRN assistance, the ERCC secured a channel of communication with key contacts in international organisations, which were active in the delivery of C, B or RN equipment or medical countermeasures to Ukraine. These organisations included e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), US AID (which has been tracking CBRN assistance from several US government departments), NATO, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red → Continued on page 28

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responds “rescEU to Member States’ photo: Jerick Moral

needs by offering an EU reserve of capabilities.”

Dr Antonella Cavallo is the Lead for rescEU CBRN capabilities within the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations at the European Commission. She coordinates the procurement and mobilisation of rescEU CBRN equipment and medical countermeasures to Ukraine. Prior, Dr Cavallo worked in private and public sectors in Italy, France, Germany, the US and Australia.

Crescent Societies (IFRC). Liaison officers from IFRC and the USAID were hosted in the ERCC. This coordination allowed to proactively deconflict any offers of assistance and ensure a better overall coverage of the needs expressed by Ukraine.

Which CBRN capabilities can the EU count on? The European Civil Protection Pool When a CBRN disaster occurs, the affected country is primarily responsible to organise the disaster response including by deploying relevant resources and specialist teams. Should there be a need for surge capacity, the affected country can request assistance to the ERCC. After a rapid analysis of the request, the ERCC considers whether the capabilities requested coincide with those available in the European Civil Protection Pool, which currently hosts CBRN detection and sampling and CBRN urban search and rescue capabilities including specialised teams and equipment. These are existing capabilities that France, Denmark, Portugal, Germany, Romania, Greece and Italy have pre-committed and are either already certified by the European Commission or are in the process of being certified. The Commission reimburses up to 75% of the deployment costs inside or outside the EU and supports the upgrade or repair of the capabilities to ensure their readiness and fitness to be promptly deployed in case of activation. rescEU – a valuable reserve of capabilities The 2019 “Member States Preparedness for CBRN Threats” report of the European Parliament found that EU Member States do not generally maintain stockpiles of CBRN medical countermeasures, and that preparedness could be improved1. It reported that while some countries have their own reserves, 1 2

these would be sufficient to cover only a part of the potentially affected population. Indeed, disrupted supply chains and long procurement times may present a structural weakness in the response to large-scale CBRN emergencies. In other words, there was a need for an additional layer of protection beyond national and pool capabilities. rescEU responds to this need by offering an EU reserve of capabilities that serve as surge capacity in case of natural or human-induced disasters, including health crises. Primarily intended to support EU Member States2, rescEU capabilities are 100% funded by the European Union. So, if national and European Civil Protection Pool capabilities are insufficient or do not match the request of the affected country in terms of quantity or technical specifications, the ERCC may activate the rescEU strategic reserves. In CBRN, three streams of capabilities (progressively operational from 2023 onwards) are under development comprising decontamination, detection and CBRN strategic reserves for several hundreds of millions of euros. 1. rescEU decontamination capabilities will be developed by Croatia, Germany and Spain and will boost the capacity of the Union to decontaminate infrastructure, vehicles, buildings, critical equipment and affected people (mass decontamination). Teams of experts will be responsible for the development of these capabilities and the readiness of specialist teams and equipment, which will also be able to be pre-deployed ahead of high-visibility events or major public events such as the Olympic Games. 2. rescEU CBRN stockpiles will focus on medical countermeasures and response equipment that can be used to quickly replenish national stocks after a sudden incident or that can be prepositioned in case of sudden and temporary heightened risk. The war in Ukraine has de facto accelerated the implementation of these capabilities as selected medical countermeasures and equipment were included in the existing rescEU medical stockpiles and consequently mobilised to ensure prompt relief in the context of the war. 3. Similarly to decontamination, rescEU detection capabilities will count on teams of experts and equipment that will be able to be pre-positioned temporarily ahead of major public events or deployed after an incident. They will cover detection, identification and monitoring with the ambition of relying on innovative technologies and integrated communication systems. While individual countries are responsible for the development of each rescEU CBRN capability, the Commission regularly brings together CBRN experts from across the Union to ensure the interoperability of the capabilities and maximise the operational learnings across the European Union. This is key to sustain a resilient EU response mechanism that is able to withstand identified and unidentified threats based on the adaptability and fitness of its systems.

European Parliament, ‘Member States’ Preparedness for CBRN Threats’, 2019, p. 30: https://bit.ly/3PBW8lW rescEU can still be deployed outside the Union “if a disaster outside the Union could significantly affect one or more Member States or their citizens”, according to Art. 12 of Decision 1313/2013/EU.

Security and Defence

photo: @Eurocorps

The European Union needs more and better coordinated defence capabilities. Being a pillar in NATO is not enough: Europe must be able to defend itself if necessary! Multinationalism is a valuable means to create multifaceted and efficient deployable forces, as proven by the now 30-years-old Eurocorps in Strasbourg.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Meeting between Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv, 1st April 2022

photo: @European Union 2022, Source: EP

We can no longer afford national reflexes

Putin’s war of aggression and its implications for European security and defence by Michael Gahler MEP, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

most notably China. Furthermore, Putin’s war aims at a Ukraine that decided to pursue the European path, the path of freedom and democracy that threatens Putin’s increasingly totalitarian system. Accordingly, the community of liberal democracies is called upon to defend our values and to deny Putin a victory by any means necessary short of direct military confrontation.

February this year marks a turning point in European as well as global security. With its illegal and unprovoked attack against Ukraine, Russia’s dictator Putin did not The west was not prepared… only bring war – including tremendous human suffering – back At the same time, Russia’s readiness to pursue its goal by to Europe, but he also endangered the rules-based internameans of force raises for us Europeans the question of our tional order. 77 years after the end of the second world war, preparedness to defend ourselves against possible further Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seems like a dark shadow of a aggressions. We might not always be as lucky as to have an time we all believed had been American president on our side overcome, thus jeopardising who is as committed to defendthe core principle of the internaing Ukraine as the current one. Michael Gahler MEP tional system: the prohibition of This war on our eastern border has been a Member of the Europethe use of force in international therefore once again illustrates an Parliament since April 1999. relations. To prevent an erosion the urgent need to concretely Born in 1960 in Frankfurt/Main, he of this principle is why Russia work for a real European Defence is currently a member of the Foreign must not be allowed to win this Union! In order to achieve it, we Affairs Committee, serves as the war or achieve any gain from it. need to combine the political will EPP Group Coordinator in the Subphoto: private Even partial success of such an of the Member States as already committee on Security and Deact of aggression could encourage expressed in multifold initiatives fence, and is a substitute member of the Transport and Putin to go further and would set with a financial commitment Tourism Committee. a dangerous precedent for others, to such a common European th

Security and Defence

defence. If we look at these financial commitments, we can observe that 2014, the year of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, marked a turning point in EU Member States’ defence spending, reversing the trend of declining defence budgets. At that time, NATO members agreed to the well-known 2% goal which also functions as an informal benchmark for the EU. In 2021, only 10 of the 27 EU Member States spent 2% on defence with the major European military players, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, still falling short. While there has been an increase in defence spending since 2014, we have witnessed at the same time that defence investments were mostly done at national level, thus only achieving limited added value to the overall European defence and barely any cost-efficient solutions. According to recent data of the European Defence Agency (EDA) on 11 EU Member States, only 11% of defence investments in 2020 were done in common projects while the agreed benchmark is 35%. Also, at the end of 2020, when the multiannual financial framework was adopted, the EU Member States decided to substantially reduce the envisaged budget lines for EU defence initiatives, most visibly in the project on Military Mobility that aims at improving the deployability of forces throughout Europe and was cut by 74% to €1.5bn.

…but finally reacted Putin’s attack on Ukraine and the threat to Europe led EU Member States to new financial pledges to increase their defence with the German Chancellor’s announcement of a special fund for the German Bundeswehr of €100bn three days after the attack being the most prominent one. In total, the additional budget commitments for defence of EU Member States amounts to about €200bn over the coming years. The decisive question is how that money is going to be spent. Looking at Germany, the discussion on purchasing the Israeli air defence Arrow 3 quickly illustrated that national reflexes remain, as this system would not contribute to an overall European air defence but would even create zones of different security, especially at the eastern flank. Against this backdrop, the recent proposals of the European Commission to close the gap between the EU’s research and development activities within the European Defence Fund (EDF) and procurement aim in the right direction. However, doubts remain as to what extent co-financing joint procurement will be possible under the current treaty. Therefore, a new European convention following the results of the Conference on the Future of Europe is absolutely necessary to revise the existing treaty in order to allow for EU financing of joint procurement. In the meantime, the existing budget lines for Military Mobility and the EDF need to be increased and the EU Member States need to entirely fulfil their commitments within PESCO as well as to include the results of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence in their national defence planning. Regarding the translation of financial commitments into effective action, the Strategic Compass provides an important step forward. However, its core element, the Rapid Deployment

can no longer primarily “Weorganise our defence along national lines.”

Capacity (RDC), a brigade-size highly deployable force, remains short of what is needed for a capable European Defence Union in light of the current circumstances. Derived from the EU’s experience of incapability and helplessness during the evacuation in Afghanistan in 2021 and drawing on the (less successful) concept of the EU Battlegroups with rotating decentralised troop provision, the RDC does not meet the requirements of our changed security environment. The current threat calls for a much more ambitious approach by designing this force as a permanent structure with the soldiers being stationed and trained together while the provision of the necessary high-end equipment for such a force is ensured. For such an approach, the existing treaty even offers some space to manoeuvre. Article 41 (3) of the Treaty on European Union offers the possibility to EU Member States to set up a start-up fund for preparatory activities related to EU crisis management. Lacking a clear definition, the term “preparatory” could be interpreted in a broader sense allowing for the financing of such a force. This approach could draw on the PESCO Project EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core that aims at creating a full spectrum force package. The participating Member States; Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain could move forward in setting up that fund with other EU Member States gradually joining. Finally, in the course of a treaty revision, this fund should be integrated in the EU budget and its scope should also be extended to cover collective defence as laid out in Article 42 (7) of the treaty.

Towards a real European Defence Union Such an approach would provide a significant progress towards a real European Defence Union in a two-fold way: on the one hand and even without a treaty revision, it would ensure the long-term provision of such a force by the EU Member States committing to it through the permanent allocation of financial means and personnel. On the other hand, such a structure could be further extended by adding additional brigades, thus in the end reaching the long-proclaimed capability goal of 60,000 deployable soldiers. In light of the most threatening crisis we have faced in Europe since 1945, we are required to take bold steps forward. We can no longer primarily organise our defence along national lines. Only by working closely together within a real European Defence Union will we be able to defend ourselves. And some day we might even be forced to do that without the United States.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Observations on a Franco-German conference on the transatlantic security architecture

All that glitters is not gold by Hartmut Bühl, Publisher, Paris

n early June 2022, the French “Forum de Défense et de Stratégie” (FDS) in cooperation with the French Embassy in Berlin and with the support of the President of EuroDefense- Germany, Ralph Thiele, organised a high-level meeting on transatlantic security architecture with the participation of senior officials from different ministries, leading military personalities from both countries and experts from think tanks. In her opening remarks, Ambassador of France Anne-Marie Descôtes underlined the importance of Franco-German relations for Europe and the transatlantic security architecture in a time of war and turmoil. Can the Paris-Berlin duo continue to play its leading role in Europe? What are the next steps on bilateral and European armaments projects? Laurent Borzillo, President of FDS, asked the participants to discuss all issues with a great degree of openness, even those which are normally avoided. “Only openness can bring us forward”, he said.

Some essential points from the two days The conference aimed to shed light on Euro-Atlantic defence structures. It was noteworthy that the representatives of France in particular underlined their unwavering support for NATO. 1. The answers to the issue of Europeanisation of French nuclear weapons remained vague, but it became clear that President Macron, like his predecessors, remains true to the credo that deterrence is not divisible. A consensus emerged around the formulation of one participant that French nuclear weapons have a deterrent effect in favour of Europe simply by their presence. There was no doubt about the value of US nuclear potential in Europe. 2. There was widespread agreement on the topic of the use of space, not only because of its outstanding strategic military importance, but also for climate research, agriculture and many other areas. Participants agreed that France and Germany should therefore pursue common goals in their European space activities. 3. The exchange of ideas on cyber security led to consensus around the idea that disruptive technologies have a Catalytic effect on hybrid methods and tools. Nearly 20 new technologies have proved relevant for expanding the arsenal of hybrid actors and enlarging the scope of their activities. Cyber is a key component of all these technologies. The role Europe should play in the fight for cybersecurity however was somewhat ambiguous. 4. In various discussions on armaments cooperation it was clear to all that further confidence-building is needed to overcome current obstacles. Negotiations at industry level were characterised by distrust due to bad experiences in the

From left to right: R. Thiele, President EuroDefense-Germany; T. Bellmann, Political Director, Auswärtiges Amt, S. Thillaye, President European Affairs Committee, Assemblée Nationale; G. Ollagnier, Director Europe and North America, MoD Paris; Lt General M. Laubenthal, Deputy CHOD, Berlin

photo: ESDU/H. Bühl

past. The Germans were accused of egoism and ‘stubbornness’, while the French were accused of a ‘lack of willingness’ to compromise on technology exchange. In addition, there are conceptual differences on use and exports. It became very clear that France’s vertical system of decision taking does not always sit easily with the German process in which the Bundestag is the master of decisions over the Bundeswehr in peacetime.

Two partners so far apart and yet so close “The conference was a significant event and undoubtedly a driver for Franco-German relations. Both countries have tasks ahead of them to further the cohesion of European nations on matters of security and defence. Together with other Europeans, both will be able to make a decisive contribution to Europe becoming a strong and reliable pillar in NATO”, said Laurent Borzillo in his concluding remarks. For me it became clear during the conference that both countries need to take the lead on European defence and security by reinforcing NATO which is now vigorously awake only four years after Macron’s remarks that the alliance was “brain dead” for lack of ideas and idealism. Today, NATO is more alive than at any time since the fall of the Berlin wall. This change of paradigm must not be at the expense of Europe’s defence capability. Europe must be able to defend itself in an emergency. In Franco-German relations all that glitters is not gold. The two nations have different societies, rooted in their own and often mutually harmful history. Both can further progress through their differences, as we all know that differences are the drivers of progress and that progress is what the Union needs.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

A Force for the European Union and NATO

Interview with Lieutenant General Peter Devogelaere, Commander EUROCORPS, Strasbourg

The European: General, you have been the Commanding General of EUROCORPS for almost a year now. During that time, you have been living through the aftermath of the withdrawal of allied forces from Afghanistan, and since 24th February of this year, the security of Europe has been severely tested by the war between Russia and Ukraine. What is the impact on your multinational Headquarters? Peter Devogelaere: Since assuming command of EUROCORPS in September 2021, I haven’t been idle for a minute. The measures against the Covid-19 pandemic were still in place at the time. The unilateral withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, that also triggered the subsequent repatriation of allied troops and pre-vetted Afghan civilians, was the main topic of conversation. As if this were not enough the Russian aggression on Ukraine on 24th February has had an impact on the international rules-based order. Such use of force and coercion has no place in the 21st century. The European: What might be Putin’s target concerning Europe’s security? Peter Devogelaere: What President Putin is doing is a grave violation of international law. The target is not only Ukraine, but the security of Europe and the whole international rules-based order, based on the UN system and international law. His aggression is taking innocent lives, crushing people’s wish to live in peace. Civilian targets are being struck. During a visit to Warsaw, end of March, I had the opportunity to talk to Ukraine refugees, mostly women and children. I witnessed their hardships on the spot. Fortunately, the EU and NATO are united in offering strong support to Ukraine and its people.

photo: © Lionel THENADEY/Eurocorps

30 years of EUROCORPS

The European: And what is in the current situation the mission of EUROCORPS? Peter Devogelaere: As EUROCORPS is deployable to both the EU and NATO, it is closely monitoring the Russo-Ukraine war. On request, EUROCORPS supports other commands in contingency planning. Mean whilst, we capture and analyse lessons identified from the ongoing war. But EUROCORPS’ core mission is currently the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM). EUROCORPS is providing a contingent of 40 military personnel that forms the nucleus of the staff at the EUTM Headquarters in Bangui. In parallel EUROCORPS is preparing for and adapting to its future role as NATO Joint Task Force Headquarters; to become standby during 2024. In 2025, EUROCORPS will take the lead of the European Battle Group, most probably in its new form and consisting of around 5000 soldiers in accordance with the EU Strategic Compass. Beyond 2025, EUROCORPS will adapt to a “Warfighting Corps”. The European: Warfighting Corps, does this mean “fighting power”? Can you comment on this synonym? Peter Devogelaere: Indeed, fighting power is the optimal development and combination of intellectual, physical and moral aspects of war. The intellectual component is all about knowledge and its application of warfare, tactics, logistics and command and control. It includes amongst others, organisational concepts, building a learning culture and adaptation. The physical component is a military organisations’ capabilities, such as equipment, infrastructure, weapons, ammunitions, sensors, communications, etc., and functional effects. The moral component is all about culture, values and legitimacy. It includes leadership, purpose and the will to fight of individuals and teams. The European: To avoid what the Russian army is currently living in Ukraine?

Security and Defence

Staff of EUROCORPS could “The play a greater role within the

security structure of the EU, including with a view to changing the structure of rapid intervention forces, by relying on our expertise and exercises in the NATO context.”

Lt Gen Devogelaere (left) and Hartmut Bühl in Strasbourg

Peter Devogelaere: We observe that the Russian combination of intellectual, physical and moral aspects has been sub-optimal. As an example given, Russian air and logistic problems seems to be systemic (structural) problems and take time to fix. On the other hand, we observe that the Russian Army is adapting its way of fighting and is using indiscriminate massed fires in a war of attrition. Russians employ concentrated artillery in East Ukraine to substitute infantry and airpower. At the same time, the aggressor has continued strategic operations to strike targets across Ukraine. The European: EUROCORPS, being one of the most deployed Corps, gained great experiences from its past deployments and commitments. Peter Devogelaere: Yes! With these experiences we are able to develop each of these fighting power’s components and adapt them based on experience and learning, and combine them in optimal ways in order to succeed. Preparing for whatever future role takes intensive training of individuals in exercises that build the capabilities of inter-professional teams, the understanding of complex equipment and doctrine, and great leadership. The European: NATO is more strongly united than ever, but at the same time the EU continues to call for a European Defense. What role could EUROCORPS as a multinational Headquarters, play herein? Peter Devogelaere: The duality is in EUROCORPS’ DNA. We work for the benefit of both the EU and NATO. It is important to point out right away that the defense policies and capabilities of NATO and the European Union are complementary. The member states of the European Union and NATO form a group of more than 30 nations that present a united front against existing or emerging threats. Military deployments beyond our borders provide a good demonstration of this multinational shared approach. Thus, there should be no distinction between an Atlantic and a European axis. Whether EUROCORPS is deployed on behalf of one or the other, as decided by the CHODs of the 6 Framework Nations, it always demonstrates

photo: © Lionel THENADEY/Eurocorps

professionalism and the skills of the soldiers who are part of it. The Staff of EUROCORPS could play a greater role within the security structure of the EU, including with a view to changing the structure of rapid intervention forces, by relying on our expertise and exercises in the NATO context. The European: General, I myself see that political and cultural environment of the two organizations differs from time to time corresponding to the issue and the transatlantic interests. Peter Devogelaere: This is right, but the defense policies of the European Union and NATO are complementary. It seems clear to me that autonomy at the European level in the field of defense, and more generally in the field of security, does not conflict with transatlantic security objectives. In this regard, EUROCORPS will continue to work resolutely for successful multinational cooperation. And, please remember that our military is trained to plan and execute operations within diverse structures according to approaches that converge in content but may differ in form. This was the case, for example, in Afghanistan (according to NATO procedures) or in Mali (according to procedures specific to the European Union), and it will happen again in the near future. In 2023, EUROCORPS will be certified by NATO as the Staff of a joint force (Joint Force Headquarters) in charge of very different tasks. During the training to obtain the certificate, a contingent is deployed in the Central African Republic under the flag of the European Union. However, a successful transition between different missions is largely based on a strong organization, a stable and experienced workforce, available capabilities (both in terms of quantity and quality), committed leadership and a true operational culture. All of these are part of the aspects of “Fighting Power” to which I referred earlier. In fact, from EUROCORPS’ current mission to the mid and long term roles, one can notice the “Fighting Power” goes up steadily. The European: Let me come back to EUROCORPS future tasks. What is behind this? → Continued on page 36

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Peter Devogelaere: The multi-domain (CADO – Comprehensive All Domains Operations) approach points the way. Tomorrow’s conflict will be characterised by the widening of the battle space, the fusion of dimensions and the rise of borderless warfare. But, an alliance needs to pay extra attention to the ways of achieving politically dictated ends with the allocated means. The warfighting corps should be capable of conducting territorial defence for NATO with up to five divisions and 120,000 troops. The Commanding General of LANDCOM (Allied Land Command) US Army Lieutenant General Roger Cloutier once said, “We must be in the position to work together as an alliance when we are asked to, from crisis reaction to larger combat deployments.” Thus, a warfighting corps is particularly required for NATO Article 5 operations, enabling the Alliance’s collective defense. The European: In January 2022, Poland became the sixth Framework Nation to join EUROCORPS. What concrete impact does this have on EUROCORPS and could this accession, in particular in the context of the current security situation in EUROPE, be a start for other European nations’ contribution to EUROCORPS? Peter Devogelaere: The Polish Minister of Defense stated during the accession ceremony that “The dual nature of EUROCORPS – its availability for both NATO and EU missions and operations – makes EUROCORPS particularly attractive. This feature of EUROCORPS has been one of the main arguments motivating Poland to fully embark on the accession project and to provide a significant contribution to it.” Poland will share in the growth and development of EUROCORPS, as the Headquarters is permanently adapting to new demands. This accession will therefore lead to an increase in contributions and will only strengthen EUROCORPS. A game changer for EUROCORPS. During different meetings and contacts with military authorities, mostly related to updates about the Russo-Ukraine War, I was delighted to learn that Sweden and the Czech Republic have been showing interest in EUROCORPS. The European: What is the added value of a large number of Framework Nations in a single Army Corps? Is there not a risk of overloading the coordination or of losing time in the decision- making process? Peter Devogelaere: A large number of participating nations has several advantages, not only for EUROCORPS, but also for the nations themselves. If the nations decide together to deploy EUROCORPS, we have very strong legitimacy. We already have a significant part of the EU united behind us. If other nations join us, for example from the northern part of Europe, our mandate will be even stronger. In addition to legitimacy, there is also material and workforce support for EUROCORPS. This is burden-sharing at its best, as it also gives smaller nations a chance to contribute. And, each nation introduces new knowhow. Thus, multinationality strengthens EUROCORPS. Upon accession, a new candidate accepts the operating modalities as described in the Strasbourg Treaty. An important rule is that

decisions are taken unanimously among the Framework Nations. Common decisions give us a planning horizon that many national Commanders envy. I cannot see that EUROCORPS is in danger of becoming unmanageable in the event of unlimited expansion. In the security domain, it is not so difficult to get everyone on the same page. Security, and especially the protection of the citizen, is in the interest of all and is the concern of all. We are stronger and safer when we work together. The European: What is the Commander’s biggest concern at this moment? Peter Devogelaere: There are two fields. The first is related to the Russo-Ukraine War: Russia’s military operations in Ukraine pose a new set of security challenges in Europe and beyond. The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on their eastern and south-eastern borders. The second is related to EUROCORPS itself: The shortage of staff. In the context of developing our know-how, it should be noted that the turnover of personnel – on average one third per year – is not a facilitating factor, but we take it into account in our training programmes. As I consider human resources to be one of the three necessary factors in bringing change within the Headquarters, I continue to take actions at national level to augment the workforce. Hence, staffing the organisation is a national responsibility. And, I am convinced all Framework Nations take their responsibilities in the human resources domain as well. The European: Can you give our readers an example how nations are acting to increasing workforce? Peter Devogelaere: I will give you an example of such a campaign in Belgium, but similar campaigns are launched in other Framework Nations as well. The Belgian Minister of Defense, Ludivine Dedonder, strives for the reconstruction of Defence. For this, the Minister counts on the personnel, the driving force of the Department. She is implementing this strategy by means of the POP (People Our priority) plan, which finally gives the personnel the recognition and prospectives they have been waiting for. An increased recruitment was essential to begin the consolidation of the Defense Department, and will continue. Moreover, the Defence reconstruction continues with the STAR plan (Security, Technology, Ambition, Resilience). The European: This all is in the hands of our politicians! Peter Devogelaere: It is good and necessary that politicians have and execute a long-term vision, because success in the development of defense capabilities can only contribute to a stronger and more resilient Europe, in which nations cooperate closely together on security matters in NATO and the EU. The European: To mark EUROCORP’S 30th anniversary, a number of events are being organised in Strasbourg on 8th/ 9th September. We will continue to report on EUROCORPS and we wish you all success.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

How to forge a common spirit to defend European values

Creating strength by joint higher military education Interview with Ilmar Tamm, Brigadier General, Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, Tartu

The European: General, you are the current Commandant of the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia. Your institution was founded in 1998 by the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, years before these Baltic nations, until 1992 part of the Soviet Union, became members of NATO and later of the EU. What were the political and military objectives behind this foundation? Ilmar Tamm: Among the multiple political motivations, perhaps the essence of it was perfectly stated by former Estonian President Lennart Meri during the College’s inaugural ceremony on 25th February 1999: “Security is precious, and there is never too much of it”. The first Commandant of the College, Danish Brigadier General Michael Clemensen persuaded the Baltic States’ military and political leaders to step forward and invest in officers’ education along the lines of western military doctrine and thinking. And from a pragmatic point of view, a joint staff college for all three Baltic states in Estonia was cost effective and made it easier to attract support from allies and partners able to deploy instructors with proper knowledge and experience to dispense education to senior officers and civil servants. The European: What were the aspirations then in the first courses? Baltic or European or NATO? Ilmar Tamm: There was indeed a strong aspiration to become members of NATO (and the EU). The decision to conduct education in English and according to western standards helped to pave the way. The good news is that in 2022 there is still substantial international interest in the courses at the Baltic Defence College. The European: How many nations are you bringing together for the Joint Command and General Staff Course (JCGSC)? Ilmar Tamm: The JCGSC is designed for senior officers and civil servants. Breakdown by nationality varies annually, but on average, we have slightly more than 60 students from 14 or 15 nations, roughly divided between 75% of officers from the Baltic nations and 25% from other countries. The course aims to provide readiness to cope with command and staff officer’s assignments at operational and joint level. The course lasts

from mid-August to mid-June of the following year and is made up of 12 modules. The European: Could you expand a little on its curriculum? Ilmar Tamm: The course commences with the principles of leadership and command. With mentoring and guidance by faculty, the students will gradually improve their skills, gain confidence and have opportunities to apply and practice leadership in different circumstances. The course offers deeper insights into regional security and defence, but also security matters relating to migration, non-state actors, cyber, technology and innovation etc. The overriding aim of the curriculum is to prepare officers to comprehend operational level planning and allow them to practice the planning process at Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters level. The European: What is the highlight of such a course in which each individual student has to show profile and skills? Ilmar Tamm: The course culminates every year in May in the three-week exercise “Joint Resolve” in cooperation with the Polish War Studies University. This is where students have the opportunity to demonstrate their leadership and/or planning skills. The exercise is based on an artificial but rather realistic scenario that triggers the activation of an Article V operation in the Baltic Sea region. Students have assignments within Joint Operation Planning Groups (JOPGs) and are guided by retired flag officers as senior mentors, who play the role of JTF level commanders. As the exercise does not seek a prescriptive school solution, students are required to be creative and reflect reality while applying operational level planning processes.

is an indivisible wealth, “Security and it must be cultivated in the

spirit of close regional concord.” Lennart Meri, former President of Estonia

photo: Baltic Defence College

Security and Defence

The European: I understand that this course is at university level. Can students obtain a university degree in cooperation with Baltic or other universities in Europe? Ilmar Tamm: Our JCGSC students can earn a Master’s degree in Military Leadership and Security with the Latvian National Defence Academy (LNDA). It is an 18-month accredited programme, which requires students to take additional seminars, as well as to write and defend an MA thesis. Enrolment is optional. The European: You mentioned a study trip programme. Is there any sort of ‘geopolitical strategy’ behind these travels? Ilmar Tamm: Study trips are meant to facilitate the learning of regional security and defence policy aspects, and how these are turned into military objectives and capabilities at national and organisational level. The first priority is to understand the regional security and defence policy and the second to comprehend either the wider Baltic Sea area or Europe and NATO/EU institutions and units. Destinations in Europe change every year, but to maintain a systematic approach, the planning cycle of destinations repeats after three years. The European: And how do the trips fit in to the overriding objectives of the course? Ilmar Tamm: Two main study trips are scheduled in the programme, one to the Baltic States’ capitals and military installations in the first semester and a second one either to allied or partner countries before the end of the academic year. For the study trips, students are divided into two or three groups depending on the number of destinations. Groups have to prepare themselves prior to the trip, for instance by analysing the relevant national security and defence policy and military instrument of power. During the trip students gain insights and ask clarifications from the experts at Ministry of Defence and Headquarters level. To foster public awareness about ongoing trip activities, students help to compile short daily news posts for the College Facebook page and after the trip, groups have to prepare and

present their main conclusions to the other groups. The European: Learning “Allied Joint Operations” is one of the objectives, but what more are you giving? Ilmar Tamm: In principle, all students are educated in operational level planning, but we give more than that. We want graduates to maintain critical thinking and the ability to adapt to new environments in all functions they will occupy. Gaining experience and constant professional self-development is a life-long process that takes more than 11 months. The European: How do you handle education about the European Union and create a better understanding of Europe and a feeling of solidarity? Ilmar Tamm: The role of EU institutions, including security and defence matters, is part of the Security and Strategy module and is partially tackled in the module on Managing of Contemporary Crises. Students have an additional option they can select on Cyber Defence Policy at National and International Levels, which is a one-week specialised EU certified course delivered in cooperation with the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). Considering the main aim of the course, this is a balanced approach to EU matters. The European: This magazine is promoting a centralised higher military and civil education. Some weeks ago, both of us participated at a conference in Paris on higher European General Staff Education, where France was proposing a concept (see page …). Ilmar Tamm: More work still needs to be done to identify the learning objectives for a common course, to avoid duplication on topics and subjects that nations are already covering. It could kick off as a working group of higher military education institutions of interested EU members, led by the ESDC in Brussels. This is one of the recommendations of the Paris symposium. From the Baltic Defence College’s perspective, we are willing to contribute to the working group effort. The European: General, I am grateful for this interview, and wish you every success in your continuing endeavours.

Brig Gen Ilmar Tamm (left) with Hartmut Bühl at the Symposium on a European Higher Military Education, Paris

photo: Baltic Defence College

How to successfully prosecute CBRN crimes – from the crime scene to the courtroom A series of guidance handbooks funded by the EU

by Talgat Toleubayev, UNICRI’s Regional Coordinator of the CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance Programme

he development of a series of CBRN Guides is funded by the European Union (EU) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE) Initiative. This activity is coordinated by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in close cooperation with relevant international organisations and partners.

Killing or harming is rather cheap Committing a murder through deliberate use of chemical and biological agents is much cheaper than killing someone with a radiological or nuclear material. According to the CBRN experts, it ranges from $1 to $1000 to kill someone with a biological or chemical weapon respectively.1 However, building up the CBRN forensics and investigative capabilities in any country, including prosecution and eventual indictment in court, requires considerable financial resources and substantial efforts from governments, especially from law enforcement authorities. In order to enhance and strengthen the CBRN forensics capabilities of its partner countries, the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative successfully implemented two projects addressing crime scene forensics investigators of CBRN incidents: • Project 57 “Strengthening crime scene forensics capabilities in investigating CBRN incidents in the South East and Eastern Europe (SEEE) Region”. • Project 58 “CBRN Forensics equipment for the SEEE Region”.

The beneficiaries involved in forensic investigation of CBRN incidents, mainly consisting of police, investigators and forensics experts, requested that additional international guidance documents be produced, developed with relevant CBRN subject matter experts with a focus on the CBRN crime scene and from the crime scene to the courtroom.

Managing the CBRN crime scene The deliberate use of chemical and biological agents is not always related to killing or physically harming someone, but instead may lead to negative consequences in terms of environmental contamination and pollution. Illicit trafficking and dumping of chemical waste and other hazardous and dangerous toxic materials have now changed the traditional crime scene which has expanded to encompass the nature and specific environments. The investigative process and the subsequent prosecution are becoming even more challenging, especially if the crime scene is contaminated with CBRN materials. Forensics experts need to treat the CBRN crime scene with additional precautionary measures by respecting all relevant procedures in order to operate safely in the contaminated environment while preserving the evidence intact. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and different national rules, policies and regulations help the forensics and law enforcement officers to properly carry out their duties in a CBRN contaminated environment. Therefore, complementary guidance tools in the field of crime scene management were issued by relevant international organisations. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Nuclear Security Series No. 22G, Implementing Guidance on Radiological Crime Scene Management, outlines

SCOTT P. LAYNE and TONY J. BEUGELSDIJK. High-Throughput Laboratories for Homeland and National Security, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 123 n.2 (2003)

photo: UNICRI

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

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the process used to ensure safe, secure, effective and efficient operations at a crime scene contaminated with nuclear or other radioactive materials. This document was developed by IAEA and jointly sponsored by UNICRI and INTERPOL. A similar handbook, a guide on chemical and biological crime scene management will be developed by UNICRI in close cooperation with relevant international organisations such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other regional entities, including law enforcement organisations.

Talgat Toleubayev is UNICRI’s Regional Coordinator of the CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance Programme. He coordinates activities for 10 countries of photo: UNICRI

the South East and Eastern Europe within the framework

of the European Union’s CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative. Prior to assuming this position in 2019, he had been working at the

From the crime scene to the court room

headquarters of the International Criminal Police

As a complementary effort to guide prosecutors, investigators and judges, it was recommended that a prosecutor’s guide to CBRN crimes be developed. The first substantial result to fill this gap was the publication of the Prosecutor’s Guide to Chemical and Biological Crimes in May 2022. The Guide was developed by UNICRI in close cooperation with the Oranisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Association of Prosecutors. It includes high-level insights, theoretical and practical considerations and case examples related to the deliberate use or misuse of chemical and biological agents and toxins. The Guide provides a basic overview of chemical and biological agents, their transmissibility, interactions and impact, transportation methods, equipment and security measures, and the challenges of coordinating a response considering rapid technological advancements and dual-use challenges. One of the strengths of the Guide are the real-life case examples it includes to demonstrate the importance of multi-agency cooperation, intelligence and information sharing. The outline of the cases summary, key points of evidence, prosecutorial priorities, primary investigative focus, investigative intelligence, challenges encountered, and outcomes of those cases represent a useful reference for prosecutors. Important components of the Guide are a detailed discussion on the key elements of a chemical and biological crime, providing insight into the type of triggers and indicators, evidence and intelligence that may be acquired along each stage.

Organization (INTERPOL) for more than 16 years.

Building a CBRN case for prosecution The ultimate success in the prosecution of criminal cases depends on how relevant investigative and law enforcement authorities construct all relevant facts and present them intact to the court. For this particular purpose, the Guide represents a valuable summary of key components to building a successful case for prosecution including investigative avenues, evidence preservation and integrity, and the importance of case reviews as key elements of a success strategy. The technological advancements that offer innovative options during the investigative process yet require a thorough understanding of their limitations and a legal standing. An outline of the investigative types of technology in use for crime scene

teams is presented. The Guide also contains a basic description to differentiate the role of prosecutors in the civil and common law systems. In some instances, in order to complete the entire process of constructing the case for prosecution, investigators and law enforcement officers require assistance from other countries and international organisations. An easily accessible list of relevant international conventions with the provision of summary tables providing short summaries of international organisations and supporting agencies is part of the Guide. The Guide is completed with an extensive glossary developed by the European Union’s Joint Research Centre, that compiles useful and relevant terms often encountered during the investigation and prosecution of chemical and biological crimes.

Implementation and integration A series of action-oriented guidance manuals is not meant to be produced only to end up on the user’s library or bookshelf. The ultimate objective is to integrate them in the standard toolkit of prosecutors and investigators in the performance of their professional duties. Based on the content, a series of curricula will be developed by UNICRI that will provide training for a targeted audience of prosecutors and investigators from law enforcement agencies including practical workshops. E-learning modules and educational videos will complement the Guide, providing a deeper understanding of the theoretical components.

Web Read the Guidebook https://unicri.it/index.php/Publication/ Prosecutor-Guide-Chemical-Biological-Crimes Disclaimer: The opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views and positions of the United Nations and UNICRI, or any other national, regional or international entity involved.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Strategic challenges in the Indo Pacific Region

China’s counter measures against US Theatre Missile Defence by Debalina Ghoshal, Non Resident Fellow, Council on International Policy; Indian Correspondent of this magazine, Kolkata

ualitative improvements in China’s nuclear forces are a result of its nuclear doctrine of ‘no first use’, coupled with a posture of ‘limited deterrence.’ The Russia-Ukraine war poses new security challenges to the global order making nuclear deterrence most vulnerable. In 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, China took advantage of the international crisis that took two superpowers to the verge of nuclear brinkmanship. One of the major causes of the 1962 Indo-Chinese war was China’s confidence that the two superpowers, embroiled in a global crisis with potentially cataclysmic consequences, would not interfere.

India’s neutral stance towards Moscow India will therefore take developments in Ukraine very seriously and plan its defence modernisation programme accordingly. Missile defence modernisation will be an important step for India’s forces, which received their initial delivery of the Russian S-400 air and missile defence system in December 2021. Western countries have criticised New Delhi for maintaining a neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, but India has always been clear that it is unwilling to follow any sanctions other than those imposed by the United Nations. India observes that countries like Japan and Taiwan are also modernising their offensive and defensive capabilities. In 2022, Japan aspires to develop counter-strike capabilities.

Its missile defence system together with its advanced radar, like the ‘Aegis missile defence’, will be a concern for China as such radars will be capable of tracking China’s long range missile systems. Taiwan too is developing missiles that can reportedly attack enemy air bases and bring down cruise missiles.

Tussle for power in the Indo-Pacific region All these developments increase the scope for a power struggle in the Indo-Pacific region. This, coupled with the US Theatre Missile Defence (TMD), is major concern for China, which has time and again raised concerns over the US TMD, justifying its annoyance on the grounds that TMD jeopardises nuclear deterrence in the region. Unsurprisingly, China is therefore making efforts to modernise its nuclear forces to evade enemy defence systems, thereby enhancing the possibility of inflicting unacceptable damage on adversaries. In November 2021, the Pentagon reported that China “aims to modernise, diversify and expand its nuclear forces” in the next decade and further noted that China is “investing in, and expanding, the number of its land, sea and air-based nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this major expansion of its nuclear forces.” Thus, the modernisation of China’s nuclear forces to counter US ‘defence by denial’ is worth analysing, especially as it is a major component of China’s ‘Assassin’s Mace Strategy.’ The same Pentagon report suggests that China, despite its

defence “Missile modernisation will be an important step for India’s forces.”

Security and Defence

is observing “India with attention China’s

photo: Jon anders wiken, stock.adobe.com

nuclear forces counter-measures against enemy missile defence systems.”

‘limited deterrence’ policy, could increase its nuclear warheads to one thousand in the next decade. It could also focus on building a robust nuclear triad to strengthen its posture of ‘limited deterrence’, build missile silos for greater survivability of land-based liquid fuelled missiles, modernise road and rail mobile missiles, modernise nuclear delivery aerial platforms and equip them with cruise missiles for greater stand-off capability and focus on a robust sea-based nuclear delivery platform with greater command and control efficacy.

Debalina Ghoshal is a non-resident fellow with the Council on International Policy. Prior to this, she has worked with the Centre for Air Power Studies and the Delhi Policy Group. Her photo: private

areas of specialissation include nuclear issues, missile de-

fence and strategic issues. She has completed her master’s degree in International Studies from Stella Maris College, Chennai and also holds a post-graduate di-

China’s nuclear forces counter-measures

ploma in international humanitarian law from the

India is observing with attention China’s nuclear forces counter-measures against enemy missile defence systems. These include multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on land and submarine based ballistic missiles, manoeuvring re-entry vehicles (MaRVs), lasers to blind US surveillance and tracking systems, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) mounted atop ballistic missiles like the DF-17, dual capable missiles being deployed to confuse adversaries, and construction of dummy silos for liquid fuelled missiles. In addition, China is developing a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System on its nuclear capable HGVs that will enhance its ability to inflict greater damage on adversaries. India is also aware of China’s use of decoys and the fielding of liquid fuelled DF-5 ICBMs for greater thrust, range and payload capacity, despite the ‘use them or lose them’ dilemma of these missiles. China has also built a new hot air balloon base in the north-eastern port of city of Dalian as a component of an early warning missile attack system to monitor the Korean Penin-

National Academy of Legal Sciences and Research in Hyderabad.

sula and US military installations. Missile detection systems can reportedly be deployed on helium filled balloons such as those reported to be located near the Spratly archipelago.

Towards a deterrence by punishment strategy? All these efforts are being made to increase the robustness and survivability of China’s nuclear forces, making it possible to put in place a ‘deterrence by punishment’ strategy. On a positive note, these developments would enable China to strengthen its ‘no-first use’ doctrine. However, as they can also enable its forces to nullify adversaries’ missile defence systems, they might result in China being less fearful about maintaining stability in regions where its ‘no first use’ doctrine does not apply. This is the strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The increasing demand for forces protection

Security steels for Europe

by Jörg Maffert, Marketing and Technical Support Manager, Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG, Dillingen

he increasingly unstable geopolitical security situation, with war in Europe and terrorist attacks especially in the Sahel in Africa, is making the number of military and civil-military missions rise. The deployment of NATO forces to the eastern flank of the Alliance simultaneously with the European Union’s civil-military engagements outside of Europe increase the demand for ballistic protected vehicles and structures. Highly specific steel solutions are needed for mission-oriented protection of civil and military personnel against a whole range of threats. Rare are the producers of such protection. In Germany, Dillinger’s broad portfolio of grades of security steel can assure maximum safety for example for civil and military vehicles as well as buildings.

Protection of personnel and systems Whether in conflict prevention, crisis management or military engagements: the operational environment of missions confronts multinational civil-military and armed forces and the systems they use with complex challenges. The precondition for successful mission accomplishment is the uncompromising protection of personnel and systems against every one of a diverse range of threat scenarios. The armed forces rely in this situation on the leading competence of European system suppliers and on the performance of the protective equipment systems developed by them. System designers, however, are repeatedly faced with new challenges, in view of increasing demands generated by ever-changing threat situations. Dillinger, Europe’s leading producer of heavy plate, domiciled

in Dillingen, in Germany’s Saarland, has for decades supplied the security industry with special steels that meet the ultra-demanding standards for the safety and security of civilian vehicles and buildings and started a decade ago supplying armament industries. This new step was accompanied by the development of the extensive range of DIFENDER security steels. The methodical use of ultra-modern artificial intelligence (AI) applications and highly sophisticated production processes thus enabled the company to energetically pursue the development of new products and the refinement of existing ones. Profound knowledge incorporated in metallurgical models and the unique depth of know-how resulting from more than three centuries of organically grown production competence in heavy plates proved to be a guarantee of success.

Jörg Maffert is a Marketing and Technical Support Manager of Dillinger Hüttenwerke AG. He studied mechanical engineering at the universities of Saarbrücken and Metz (19881993), and continued his studies photo: © Dillinger

at the German Welding Institute

(SLV) in Saarbrücken. Since 1994, Mr Maffert has held different positions at the Abel Fauvet Rail group; welding supervisor followed by General Manager at TÜV Cie Saarland/France. He is a board member of AFIAP.

Security and Defence

Technical information

The product family of Dillinger special

used and most frequently evaluated of

ballistic specifications. In the form of

steels currently features the high-strength

Dillinger’s security steels and is available

adaptive composite armour, it performs

grades DIFENDER 400, 450, 500 and,

on the market up to the unparalleled

a projectile-breaking function. This steel

the newest 600. In addition, DIFENDER

thickness of 150 millimetres.

can be supplied from a thickness of 6

250, 300, 350, 550 and 650 are under

DIFENDER 500 in a thickness of 13.5

millimetres in widths of up to 2.5 metres

development

millimetres is qualified by both customers

– naturally with assured adherence to

Security steels are available from 6 mil-

and the relevant authorities for use in

maximum flatness standards.

limetres’ thickness in widths up to 2.5

ballistic protected buildings in fixed and

DIFENDER security steels conform to the

meters, and lengths of up to 8 metres

mobile military facilities, for example.

German Army TL 2350-00 specifications

as standard products – and, in special

The largest possible plate width – with

for armoured steel. In addition, they have

cases, even wider and longer.

no welds – is also a vital safety provision

also been validated under relevant stand-

Dillinger supplies its DIFENDER 400, 450

for the storey-height armouring of such

ards such as EN 1522 / 1523, VPAM /

and 500 steels in widths of 3 metres with

infrastructural features.

PM 2007, STANAG 4569 AEP 55 and NF

simultaneous meeting of the most strin-

In DIFENDER 600, Dillinger supplies an

A 36800-2 / NF A 36800-3.

gent flatness requirements, for example.

ultra-high strength alloyed quenched and

DIFENDER 500 is the most frequently

tempered steel with uncompromising

High-strength DIFENDER security steels are now among the safest and most dependable available on the market, and also answer changing market needs and threats. Germany and other NATO members put their trust in the outstanding protective properties of alloyed quenched and tempered (Q+T) steels for example in their armoured military vehicles and buildings. DIFENDER combines special resistance to ballistic attack, exposure to blast and the effects of fragmentation with high hardness, mechanical strength, toughness and low weight. The largest possible plate dimensions are selected, in particular for wheeled and tracked military vehicles to assure optimum design for floor armour to protect against mines.

Top-class workability properties All DIFENDER security steels are notable for special ballistic resistance properties. In many cases, they can be selected and demonstrably use several tenths of a millimetre thinner than the other relevant products on the market, with no sacrifices in hardness and ballistic-protection performance. This significantly thinner minimum thickness permits weight-optimised design of all-round protected and armoured vehicles, improving mobility in rough and enemy-occupied terrain and reducing fuel consumption. This lower weight per unit of area for protection solutions is combined in DIFENDER with ultra-tight construction tolerances. For this reason, designers and manufacturers are with certainty on the safe side with the workability properties of these security steels: series of tests performed by independent laboratories confirm DIFENDER steels’ excellent property data for cutting, bending and welding operations. These steels permit minimum radii for cold bending that are among the best on the market. And, as far as weldability is concerned, DIFENDER steel is, in fact, the best in its class. This combination of

precondition for successful “The mission accomplishment is the

uncompromising protection of personnel and systems against every one of a diverse range of threat scenarios.”

enhanced hardness for improved ballistic protection with best data for the two most important working processes of bending and welding expands the limits of what has up to now been possible for designers.

Security made in Germany With two qualified production locations, Dillinger also assures a further decisive benefit in safety for strategic purchasers: more capacity and thus greater flexibility mean even more assuredness of supply. The high availability of DIFENDER security steels assures access to top-performance steel solutions of a constant optimum quality by Dillinger, which for more than 330 years has lived out its unique passion for steel. The company has up to today dedicated itself to a literally “weighty” mission: the production of heavy plate – from the ore up to and including the tailor-made plate and the readyto-install component. Dillinger’s structural steel, mechanical engineering, offshore, offshore wind, line pipe, earthmoving machinery, mining, pressure-vessel construction and hydropower engineering divisions are the preferred partners for the best practitioners in their industries.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Annual meeting of the EURODEFENSE network

For a credible and efficient defence of Europe by Patrice Mompeyssin, Brigadier General (ret), Secretary General of the EURODEFENSE network, Paris

he 2022 annual meeting of the EURODEFENSE1 network, with representatives from 15 countries2, took place in Paris from 19th-21st May. It was held in the shadow of Russia’s criminal invasion of Ukraine and was a very insightful event in these changing times. The annual meetings are the culmination of a year’s work where results are presented, but they are also a social event. Participants speak of “our club”. The 2022 meeting started in the afternoon of 19th May with a visit to the “Musée Carnavalet”, presenting the history of Paris, followed by a reception of the presidents of the network associations at the Quai d’Orsay by Alexandre Vulic, Deputy Director, Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament at the French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs. The morning of the next day was dedicated to a visit of the AIRBUS facility at Elancourt near Paris with a focus on cyber security, secure communications and preparation of combat cloud, massive intelligence and spacecraft electronics. In the afternoon, the meeting of the Council of presidents was held at the Ecole Militaire, followed by an official dinner for all participants at the Cercle National des Armées, Place Saint Augustin, in Paris. On the Saturday morning, EuroDéfense-France organised a successful public conference on the topic, “Solidarity and Efficiency” at the Ecole Militaire in Paris. Speakers were: Sylvie Bermann, Ambassadrice de France; Hanna Ojanen, President

of EuroDéfense-Finland and Research Director at Tampere University; Robert Walter, President of EuroDéfense-United Kingdom and of the European Security and Defence Association (ESDA); Alain Richard, Senator for the Val d’Oise department and former French Minister of Defence; Philippe Coq, Director of Public Affairs, Airbus, France. The annual meeting was a success, bringing forward new ideas for the EURODEFENSE network. Work will continue in the established working groups and observatories and results will be presented at the 2023 annual meeting in one of the 15 capitals.

The objectives of our network The objective of the EURODEFENSE network is to contribute to a credible and efficient defence of Europe, relying on solidarity. EuroDefénse national chapters are independent and non-profit NGOs. They bring together motivated individuals and legal entities wishing to participate in the association’s work, research and actions. Individuals come from military, political, diplomatic, economic, academic and social backgrounds. The network is placed under the authority of the EURODEFENSE Council, which includes the presidents of the national associations, with a rotating presidency and the support of a secretary general. All decisions are taken by consensus. The record of its conclusions, approved by the presidents, is drafted in French and English by the secretary general. The national association assuming the presidency organises the network’s international meeting, chairs the Council meetings and presents the reports approved by the presidents to the European authorities. The secretary general supports the network actions, monitors the European working groups and drafts their agenda. The working groups are currently focusing on the following issues: • climate change, energy, security and defenc, • recommendations for EU Defence, • commissioning new equipment in the framework of CSDP; • Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs). There are also observatories on: the Russian Federation, cyber, space, the fight against terrorism, migration, China and the Indo-Pacific region, EU-NATO relations, the Mediterranean Basin, and disruptive technologies. EURODEFENSE organises regular webinars and podcasts and

Family picture of the participants in the annual EURODEFENCE network meeting, Paris photo: EuroDéfense-France

1 2

publishes a quarterly newsletter. All reports and activities can be found on the website: www.eurodefense.eu

EURODEFENSE is the spelling of the network organisation. The national associations’ spelling is EuroDefénse-country, e.g. EuroDefénse-France. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, United-Kingdom.

The leading magazine for Europe’s security and defence community Independent Review on European Security and Defence

Volume N°42

War in Europe Rethinking European defence in a crumbling world order

www.magazine-the-european.com

Edition 1/2022

Independent Review on European Security and Defence

Volume N° 38

Climate and Security Protecting our planet and its people

Facing the Covid-19 crisis in conflict zones worldwide

The green deal in the Asia Pacific Region

Hilde Hardeman, Director, EU Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, Brussels

Olzod Boum-Yalagch, Chairman of the Mongolian Green Party, Ulaan-Baatar

www.magazine-the-european.com

Edition 1/2021

The magazine is the first winner of the CIDAN European Award for “Citizenship, Security and Defence”, organised in 2011 under the patronage of Mr Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, in order to reward outstanding efforts towards promoting European citizenship and European security and defence awareness. On 26 November 2019, the magazine was awarded from the same organisation with the CIDAN Special Jury Prize for its outstanding quality and efforts in promoting European citizenship, security and defence.

MEDIA AND CONTENT SALES / SUBSCRIPTION FOR DIGITAL AND HARD COPIES Hartmut Bühl •Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Phone: +49(0)172 32 82 319

E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr

For further information: www.magazine-the-european.com

The magazine holds the CiDAN “European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence” and was awarded the Special Jury Prize in 2019 by the same association for excellent journalism promoting Europe.

The European-Security and Defence Union Issue 43

Articles inside

China’s counter measures against US Theatre Missile Defence

Security steels for Europe

How to successfully prosecute CBRN crimes

30 years of EUROCORPS

Creating strength by joint higher military education

All that glitters is not gold

How to help the EU’s eastern neighbours solve major challenges in peace and security

Putin’s war of aggression and its implications for European security and defence

The Union Civil Protection Mechanism

How to realise EU enlargement with the Balkans and Ukraine

There must be coherence between enlargement and Schengen policy

Editorial, Hartmut Bühl

European enlargement, security and defence

Strategic leadership in the European Union

News, Nannette Cazaubon

European sovereignty

European security and the management of simultaneous crises

“Brain dead” in 2019, NATO has revived in 2022

Has the time for EU power come?