The European Security and Defence Union Issue 5 by The European-Security and Defence Union

ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on European Security & Defence

Volume No 5/2009

Main Topic

Maritime Secu rity

No 5/2009

The role of the European Parliament in the Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy

Nuclear Disarmament and Proliferation – a personal view on the need for realism

Russia’s security policy in new European structures – what is behind President Medvedev’s ideas

Gabriele Albertini MEP, Chairman,

Michael Rühle, Deputy Head of the Policy

Vladimir Chizhov, Ambassador, Permanent

Foreign Affairs Committee, European

Planning Unit in the Private Office of the

Representative of Russian Federation to

Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

NATO Secretary General, Brussels

the European Union, Brussels

EDITORIAL

Editorial A new team for Europe Following what have been at times entertaining, at times disenchanting hearings, and with the new Commission about to be approved by the European Parliament, the squabbling and bargaining for the Commission posts has come to an end. The newly appointed High Representative of the European Union has been widely criticised for lacking, thus far, the requisite skills and international experience. It would seem that the Heads of State and Governments prefer to have as President and “Foreign Minister” people able to bring nations and institutions together through compromise rather than popular and charismatic personalities. And given the fact that the EU, even post-Lisbon, is not yet a united entity at all, but remains a conglomerate of 27 nations with their own national interests that all too often take precedence over European ones, this might actually be the better strategy. There are some common interests after all and they need someone to defend them. The new team, instead of being criticised from the outset, should be given a real opportunity to develop their profiles. In a certain sense they have to be protected and “guided” in order to find their way. It is clear that the presidencies will retain their role of providing impetus. The EP and national parliaments, if given the right tools for forging and expressing their opinions, may also contribute to the further development of a truly common policy. The implementation of Lisbon is an ongoing process that will require stringent efforts on behalf of all the players to get it right. Europe has excellent tools and capabilities which promise a stable future. But the world around us is evolving: a new hierarchy between powers and groups of nations will emerge,

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Brussels/Berlin Headquarter Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049-1723 282 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Marco Saalbach Phone: +49/228/970 97-80 E-Mail: marco.saalbach@behoerdenspiegel.de

one in which Europe, with its 500 million inhabitants, must play its role. Let us take the recent case of Haiti. European Union nations deployed about 700 experts and equipment in Haiti. The Commission contributed a large sum of money and activated its EU Civil Protection Team which did a good job coordinating Europeans activities on the spot.

Hartmut Bühl

But there is really no point debating whether the “European Foreign Minister”, Lady Ashton, should have gone immediately to Port-au-Prince as did Hillary Clinton, the US Foreign Minister. The difference with Hillary Clinton is not only a geopolitical and a geostrategic one - Mrs Clinton had in her luggage 12 000 US troops, an aircraft carrier, and a large hospital ship. But big means do not necessarily lead to big results. Haiti needs a long-term strategy and long-term investment. As can be seen from the example of Somalia, the EU and its member states are in a good position to offer exactly that, combining different instruments where necessary. Haiti has to be rebuilt and the European Union has to act; Lady Ashton’s role consists in helping to bring about a coherent strategy. Of course, the United States will play the leading role in combination with the United Nations, but Europe has its own capabilities and experience and hence its own contribution to make.

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll E-Mail: magazine@euro-defence.eu Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berliner Sicherheitskonferenz), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management. For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.euro-defence.eu Suscription: This magazine is published quarterly in Brussels and Berlin. The copy price is 16 Euro: 4 copies for one year: 56 Euro (Euro EU Subscription). 4 copies for one year: 88 Euro (International subscription) Quarterly, including postage and dispatch (4 issues) © 2009 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin

THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Gabriele Albertini MEP, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg

POLITICS and POLICIES Editorial

The European Union The Lisbon treaty and its signitaries

Defence spending in the European Union versus the United States by Dr. Renaud Bellais, EADS/Astrium and Associate Professor in Economics, Ecole Spéciale Militaire, Saint Cyr 23

The European Union and Russia Russia’s Security Policy in new European Structures – what is behind President Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative on European Security Treaty? by H.E. Ambassador Vladimir CHIZHOV, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Union, Brussels 26

SECURITY European maritime surveillance A brief analysis of a report adopted by the European Security and Defence Assembly at its plenary session on 3 December 2009 15 „EU NAVFOR Somalia“ – ATALANTA – First Anniversary by Dr. Michael Stehr, Troisdorf

Security Research and Innovation for an EU 2020 Vision by Dr. Liviu Muresan, Executive President EURISC Foundation, ESRIF Member, Bucharest

The European Union, NATO and the USA Current developments in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by Michael Hancock MP, Vice-Chairman of the ESDA Political Committee, Portsmouth, Paris 18

Coordinating Europe’s Civil Protection – The way forward by Hans Das, European Commission, Acting Head of Civil Protection Unit, Brussels 30 Cyberwar & Cyber Defence by Bert Weingarten, CEO PAN AMP AG, Hamburg

CONTENT

MAIN TOPIC:

Maritime Security

Dr. Klaus Olshausen, Lieutenant General (ret.), President of the Clausewitz Gesellschaft, Hamburg

Steps forward to a EU Maritime Security Strategy by Christoph Raab, Managing Director COPURA GmbH, Brussels 37

DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES Maritime Strategy – a crucial geostrategic and geopolitical challenge in a globalized environment by Dr. Klaus Olshausen, Lieutenant General (ret.), President of the Clausewitz Gesellschaft, Hamburg 42

INDUSTRIES A Maritime Security Strategy for Europe – view from industries by Dr. Markus Hellenthal, CEO Thales Deutschland, Stuttgart 56 Security throughout the Mediterranean – a complex challenge by Michael Lenton, Group Business Development Director Selex Galileo, A Finmeccanica Group, Rome 58 Unmanned Air Systems and the NATO Maritime Forces – an industrial view by Michael Isherwood, Senior Analyst Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, Washington 61

Concepts for „regional” Maritime Security A regional maritime security concept for the Baltic Sea by Vice Admiral (ret.) Hans Frank, Bonn 45 Mediterranean Sea by Vice Admiral Xavier Magne, Deputy Chief of Staff, Maritime Operations, Paris 47 A regional concept for a Maritime Strategy for the Black Sea by Ioan Mircea Pascu MEP, Deputy Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament, Brussels / Strasbourg 51 NATO’s approach to Maritime Security: a bold vision by Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, Head of the Planning Section Operations Division, International Staff NATO, Brussels 53

Photo: Jason R. Zalasky/U.S. Navy

DEFENCE and SECURITY NEWS European Union

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

AUTHORS List of authors and articles published in former editions

POLITICS and POLICIES

The Lisbon treaty and its signitaries

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The role of the European Parliament in the Common Foreign and Security Policy by Gabriele Albertini MEP, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs European Parliament,Brussels We live in challenging times. Our world is in flux with growing complexity and interdependence. Individuals, countries, and international organisations are facing the need to provide adequate and rapid responses to increasing risks to security. They are exposed to traditional forms of threats as well as new global security challenges. Terrorism and extremism, financial turmoil, and natural and man-made disasters hit the headlines and make citizens feel vulnerable, insecure, even lost. At the same time, peoples around the world call for a greater say in determining their future. They want democracy, they want more and better rights, they want prosperity and peace, and they look to establishing closer and more stable relations with our countries.

Promoting peace and prosperity Our European foreign and security policy is rooted in the very nature of the European Union, in particular promoting prosperity and peace amongst people and thus enhancing security, which has a direct effect on citizens´ lives. And doing so is about defending specific values, enshrined in our Treaty. Foreign and security policy, however, is often viewed as a prerogative of the executive branch, a domain requiring a considerable degree of flexibility and secrecy, which allows only limited parliamentary involvement and democratic participation in scrutiny.

Gabriele Albertini Gabriele Albertini MEP was born in 1950 in Milan. Since 2009 he is Chairman of the committe of foreign affaires of the European Parliament. He graduated from law studies in 1974, started his industrial carreer in 1974 as a Manager at ‘Albertini Cesare Spa’and ended it as a Vice-Chairman of Assolombarda. 1996-1997, Chairman of Federmeccanica, the Italian metal and mechanical workers´ trade union federation. 1997-2006, Lord Mayor of Milan; 2004 Member of the European Parliament. MEP Albertini is a Member of the Conference of Committee Chairs and of the Delegation for relations with India, and a Substitute on the Committee on Transport and Tourism and on the Delegation for relations with Israel.

annual Council report on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, so far the Council has failed to engage in a real dialogue with us. We want a more forward-looking report, and encourage the Council to develop, with our support, a more strategic approach to CFSP, with clearer references to the budgetary needs and the financial impact of external actions.

The EP as the main arena for democratic control The European Parliament has its role to play I personally cannot endorse this view. Decisions affecting our citizens’ lives, such as sending military or civilian personnel to dangerous countries, have to be understood and supported by the public. This involves decision-making procedures, which are sufficiently public and transparent, and where both value and policy choices are considered one against the other. This is why national parliaments hold debates on issues such as their countries’ participation in international peacekeeping operations. When such decisions are taken collectively, at the EU level, which institution but the European Parliament would be able and willing to control the concerted EU actions having an effect on the well-being and security of EU citizens? The EP is legally entitled to be consulted and informed on foreign and security policy. According to the Treaty, the Council must consult Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP. This is why every year we adopt a resolution on the

The flow of information and inter-institutional contacts have been increasing over the years. An ever-growing number of Council and Commission representatives appear before my committee in order to keep Members informed and hear their views on specific issues. Representatives of the Presidency, the Council and the Commission, as well as the High Representative and EU Special Representatives have been holding regular exchanges of views with the Committee on Foreign Affairs. These public discussions usually cover the full range of current foreign policy activities, offer Members the possibility to express their positions and to question the policy and value choices of EU decisionmakers. By doing so, they serve as the main arena for democratic control. In the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Parliament also draws up reports and formulates recommendations to other EU Institutions and third countries stating its priorities on geographical areas and thematic issues.

POLITICS and POLICIES

The EP’s tools of influence The inter-institutional arrangements currently in place can only partially meet the information needs of Members.

constitutes an important tool for better understanding and shaping the world around us.

Lisbon enhances the influence of the EP Lisbon provides the opportunity for a consistent information flow Under a 2002 inter-institutional agreement concerning access to sensitive information, Parliament has access to confidential documents and briefings. However the scope and quality of the requested information remains unsatisfactory and the procedures are cumbersome and unwieldy. Therefore, seizing the opportunity offered by the new Treaty of Lisbon, my committee is calling for a review and extension of these arrangements. The EP’s role of budget control on CSDP expenditure Another tool at our disposal to influence the shaping of EU foreign policy is the budget. Parliament has the final say on CFSP-related expenditure. This is why the 2006 inter-institutional agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management provides that the members of the bureaus of the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Budgets can - in regular Joint Consultation Meetings with the Presidency of the Council - query and assess the financial implications of decisions and actions adopted by the Council in the framework of the CFSP. Naturally, our two committees are using these opportunities to address broader strategic issues with relevance to ongoing ESDP missions. These regular meetings are important for obtaining first-hand information on financial planning and spending in the area of CFSP − this, indeed, strengthens the foundation of the EP’s budgetary powers. Parliamentary Diplomacy for promoting EU priorities Inter-institutional consultations are useful means to enhance parliamentary accountability of CFSP actions and to influence policy-making in this domain. But Parliament is also a vehicle for consultation and negotiation with third countries. Parliamentary diplomacy is a sometimes underestimated tool for promoting EU priorities and, by doing so, shaping the Union’s foreign affairs. In the sixth parliamentary term, the Committee on Foreign Affairs was addressed close to 400 times by visiting speakers from both outside and within the EU, including prime ministers, leading government officials, as well as prominent representatives of international organisations and non-governmental bodies. The large number of visiting speakers from third countries attests to the high level of interest for exchanges with the Committee on Foreign Affairs; this of course is a reflection of the fact that over the years the European Parliament has become a respected and influential partner for debating geographical and thematic issues of common concern. In this regard, parliamentary diplomacy, including the activities of inter-parliamentary delegations and the numerous visits and meetings by the President, individual Members and political groups,

We expect the new Treaty of Lisbon to further enhance the transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s external actions. Although the new provisions offer only limited substantial changes, they form a good basis to extend parliamentary legitimacy and oversight in the further development of the CFSP. Its innovations should be exploited to their full extent. Endorsement of the High Representative/ Vice President of the Commission The main one consists in the double-hatting of the High Representative as Vice President of the Commission in charge of external relations. The European Parliament plays a formal role in endorsing the nomination of the Vice-President/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), since this person is subject to a collective vote of consent by the EP. Because of the double legitimacy (appointment by the Heads of State and Government and subject to a collective vote of confidence by the Parliament) the VP/HR will maintain much closer relations with Parliament and consequently be more cooperative and responsive to our needs. The VP/HR will be obliged under the new Treaty to regularly consult the European Parliament − at least twice a year − on CFSP/CSDP issues and to ensure that Parliament’s views are duly taken into account. The EP and the European External Action Service (EEAS)t In my opinion, this should lead to a substantive dialogue with Parliament with the aim of developing a more strategic approach to the CFSP, including the definition of the new structures and tools at the disposal of this policy. The European External Action Service (EEAS) is a case in point. In this context, we expect the Vice-President/High Representative to commit to consulting Parliament about appointments to senior posts in the EEAS and to agreeing to parliamentary hearings with selected candidates so as to ensure that appointments are based on merit and conducted with the required transparency.

The EP ready to enhance its influence The implications of the new treaty certainly go beyond our immediate expectations. There is still a long way to go in improving parliamentary scrutiny and oversight of foreign and security policy at the EU level. I am convinced, however, that this is the way we should go - the increasing complexity and interdependence of our globalized world calls on the EU to play an enhanced role. This only can happen with the full support of our citizens. It is up to us, parliamentarians, with our words and deeds, to ensure that the choices we make are sound and can be understood and supported by our people.

POLITICS and POLICIES

The Lisbon Treaty − a step forward to what by Dr. Peter Weilemann, Director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s European Office, Brussels

For many years it was a common complaint that in relation to its economic weight the European Union would not live up to its international responsibilities. With the Unions role in international politics growing, especially over the last decade, this perception has been changing gradually. But there are still deficits and complaints kept on: the Unions external competences were too narrowly defined, it hardly spoke with one voice and to act forcefully, it lacked capabilities in the field of security and defence. In sum: The European Union could not be considered a strategic actor in world politics.

The Lisbon Treaty – a new legal basis Its entering into force Since December 1st, after difficult debates and many ups and downs, signifies a new era in the European integration process. What will it mean for the EU´s role in international affairs? Regulations on the external action of the Eu They make up for one of the most innovative parts of the new Lisbon Treaty. As the preamble reads, the European Head of States decided to establish a European Union, “resolved to implement a common Foreign and Security Policy including the progressive framing of a common Defence Policy, […] thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world”. Foreign and Security Policy has become a shared responsibility of the member states and the Union. On the basis of unequivocally defined binding decisions, the Common Foreign and Security Policy can replace national policies in a way familiar to other areas of supranational policies. Its is more than labelling if the treaty instead of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) speaks of a “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFDP) “, which, step by step, should lead to a Common Defence Policy of the Union. Solidarity clause The Treaty calls for mutual assistance in case of an armed attack on the territories of one of the member states, without impinging on the neutral status of some of the member states. In addition, a solidarity clause obliges the EU to mobilise all means at its disposal, including military instruments, to deter terrorist attacks, protect institutions and civil society from such attacks, or – if requested – to support a member state being victim of an attack. The Treaty also broadens the so called Petersberg Tasks on humanitarian and peacekeeping missions to such areas as arms control, conflict prevention or post conflict stabilization.

Dr. Peter Weilemann Dr. Peter R. Weilemann was born in 1949 in Kaiserslautern. Since 2003 he is the Director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundations’s (KAS) European Office in Brussels. He received his Ph.D from the University of Cologne after studies in Mainz, Hamburg and Washington. 1979-1983 Assistant Professor at the Research Institute of Political Science and European Questions at the University of Cologne and West European Analyst with IRIS (International Report and Information Systems) in Arlington, Virginia. 1983 to 1992, Deputy Director at the Research Institute of the KAS. 1992 Head of Division on International Politics and Economics. 2000 Director for International Cooperation at the KAS and a.o. Member of the Commission on European Politics of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Germany.

The EU − a legal personality The European Union has become a legal personality, so it can join international conventions or treaties and become member of an international organization. The competences of the Union in international politics therefore have been substantially extended. What started as an economic community is today a true Political Union.

New institutional arrangements The new Treaty consequently had to address the question of ways and means to achieve the goals it spells out. The most prominent innovation is the introduction of a High Representative/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) responsible for external policies, supported by a European External Action Service. Those measures are complemented by other institutional arrangements to enhance common action or further cooperation in the field of CFDP and to improve the European industrial technological base for defence. The HR/ VP of the European Union The High Representative/Vice President shall represent the European Union abroad and chair the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council. Some would like to dub him the Foreign Minister of the EU, but is there not only strong opposition by some of the member states against such a labelling. The position still has to evolve. The HR/VP certainly will not be the only European voice in the international scene. President of the European Council The new Treaty sees for a permanent President of the European

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Council, whose main priority will be to prepare the meetings of the Heads of States and Governments and to work out the necessary compromises. He certainly will not abstain from presiding over international summits the EU is organizing in its bilateral or multilateral relations. There, he might have to share his presence with the President of the Commission as well as with the Prime Minister of the country in charge of the rotating presidency. In addition, the President of the European Parliament will raise its voice in international affairs. A new spirit of coordination So, the HR/VP is one voice out of four, at least. As High Representative she – the first office holder is a woman – will, however, chair the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, without a right to vote since the principle of unanimity still applies in this body. As Vice President of the Commission she will not be responsible for all dossiers: There will be a Commissioner for International Trade and for Development - a separation of portfolios also known to national governments. But there will also be Commissioners for Humanitarian Aid as well as for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. For that reason, much will depend on the ability of the HR/VP to integrate all those approaches into a coherent policy. European External Action Service (EEAS) In this respect, it should help that the HR/VP will be chief of a newly created European External Action Service (EEAS), which shall take up its work in spring 2010. The EEAS will give the Unions Foreign Policy more clout and allow it to exploit its resources more efficiently. It will be responsible for the CFSP and the ESDP. Under its roof not only the present Delegations of the Commission and the Special Representatives will be integrated, but also the operative units responsible for EU missions like the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civil Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) as well as the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA was already established in 2004. With a long term perspective it promotes closer cooperation to create a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). In this context, the European Union already removed existing barriers for a European Defence Market by narrowing formerly existing exemptions from internal market regulations adopting two new directives, one on defence procurement and the other on trade with defence goods inside the Union. “Permanent Structured Cooperation” New impulses can also be expected from the concept of a “Permanent Structured Cooperation”, which the Lisbon Treaty will promote. Member States, which fulfil more ambitious criteria with respect to military capabilities, commit themselves to improve their defence capacities by joining important armaments programs in our outside of the EDA. They agree on tar-

gets for their defence spending as well as concrete measures to improve interoperability and flexibility. All this will be done on the basis of a decision by the Council, taken by majority vote, and will be evaluated by the EDA. The same principles and mechanisms also apply for missions, where a group of member states can and will act on behalf of the whole EU.

Make the EU a true strategic actor in global politics The Lisbon Treaty certainly improves the foundations for the role the European Union can play in international politics. It defines, more precisely than most national constitutions, the goals and principles of a European Foreign and Security Policy and so provides the framework needed to bring together 27 or more different national strategic cultures. It describes the role the European Union or its member states should play and it does so in the perspective of common action. In order to achieve its goals in a better and more coherent way the new Treaty enhances decision making processes, improves existing institutions and institutional arrangements or creates new ones, where necessary. Taking all this together the Lisbon Treaty constitutes a big step forward in making the EU a true strategic actor in global politics. But this will only come true, if those responsible for making it work, will act in the spirit of the Constitutional Convention. It is too early to judge on this, but some indications signal that additional efforts are needed to stay on the right track. For many experts the nomination of the HR/VP was rather disappointing. They missed foreign affairs experience of the new office holder and detected a “serious lack of enthusiasm for European Defence”. This first impression might change and can be corrected rather easily.

We need a European Strategic Culture What will take more effort are changes in national attitudes towards security and defence in general and the evolution of a true European Strategic Culture. One will have to watch the future steps very closely. The final shape of the European External Action Service – closer to the concept of intergovernmental cooperation or to a true community institution – will be first indicator. The willingness of governments to turn in the aftermath of the financial crisis the squeeze of the defence budgets into an opportunity for joined efforts in procurement policy another one. The true test of CSDP indeed lies with the budgets that finance it – and here figures still point in the wrong direction. And the share of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Community Budget is rather small and should become focal point in the next financial review of the European Union. Last but not least, not only Commission and Council have to live up to their responsibilities but also the European Parliament. As one of the big winners of the new treaty it can and should be a catalyst for seizing the chances the Lisbon Treaty offers to render the European Union a leading actor in world politics.

POLITICS and POLICIES

Documentation The European External Action Service (EEAS) With the adoption, on 22 October 2009, of the Resolution on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service the European Parliament took a first step towards developing its views on the future institutional structure of the EEAS. European Parliament resolution of 22 October 2009 on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service (excerpts) The European Parliament (…) 3. Calls on the Commission, the Council, the Member States and the future HR/VP to clearly commit themselves to reaching an agreement, with the involvement of Parliament, on a comprehensive, ambitious and consensual plan for the setting-up of the EEAS; 4. Recommends that the approach with regard to the EEAS, which will be established in accordance with Articles 18, 27 and 40 of the Treaty on European Union in the version thereof resulting from the Treaty of Lisbon, should evolve in the light of experience; considers that a body such as the EEAS cannot be completely circumscribed or predetermined in advance, but must be put in place based on mutual trust and a growing fund of expertise and shared experience; 5. Recalls that the EEAS must guarantee full application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in all aspects of the Union’s external action in accordance with the spirit and purpose of the Lisbon Treaty; underlines the responsibility of the EEAS to guarantee the consistency between its external action and its other policies in accordance with Article 21(3) of the Treaty on European Union in the version thereof resulting from the Lisbon Treaty; (…) 6. Affirms the following principles and urges the Commission, when making future proposals, to insist on compliance with those principles, in accordance with the spirit and purpose of the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon and the spirit of the deliberations of the Convention: (…) d) the military and civilian crisis management units must be placed under the VP/HR's authority, while the command and organisational structure may have to differ from that for civilian personnel; the sharing of the intelligence analysis of players within the EEAS is of vital importance in order to assist the VP/HR in fulfilling his/her mandate of conducting a coherent, consistent and efficient external Union policy; e) Commission delegations in third countries and the Council liaison offices, as well as offices of the EU Special Representatives where possible, should be merged to form "Union embassies", headed by EEAS staff, who would be answerable to the VP/HR; specialist advisers from Commission Directorates-General should not be prevented from being seconded to work in that framework; f) the EEAS must ensure that the European Parliament has contact persons in the EU delegations that guarantee cooperation with the European Parliament (for example in order to foster parliamentary contacts in third countries); 9. Considers that: a) the EEAS should be headed by a Director-General answerable to the VP/HR, that Director-General being able to represent the VP/HR in certain cases; b) the EEAS should be divided into a number of directorates, each of which would be responsible for a geostrategically important

field of the Union’s external relations, and further directorates for security and defence policy issues, civilian crisis management, multilateral and horizontal affairs including human rights and administrative matters; c) the EEAS should structure the cooperation of country units in Brussels with the delegations (embassies) of the Union in third countries in the context of each directorate; d) there should be no duplication of external services in the Council or in the European Council; (…) 10. Notes that, while the EU delegations in third countries will complement existing diplomatic representations of the Member States, there will be possibilities for long-term gains in efficiency, as the future EU delegation could in many cases take over consular services and deal with Schengen visa issues; 11. Believes that the decision establishing the organisation and operation of the EEAS should also stipulate that Union embassies in third countries must whenever necessary, according to the resources at their disposal, provide logistical and administrative support to the members of all Union institutions; (…) 12. while the European Union delegations will be an integral part of the EEAS, and while they should take their instructions from and be subject to the supervision of the VP/HR and should administratively belong to the Commission, requests the future VP/HR to commit him/herself to informing Parliament's Committees on Foreign Affairs and Development about his/her appointments to senior posts in the EEAS and to agreeing to the committees conducting hearings with the nominees, if the committees so decide; also requests that the future VP/HR commit him/herself to renegotiating the current Framework Agreement(8) with the European Parliament, in particular on access to sensitive information and other issues relevant for smooth interinstitutional cooperation; 13. Proposes that enquiries be made to determine the extent to which Union embassy staff on secondment from national consular services, beyond performing their political and economic tasks, could gradually assume responsibility, where necessary, for consular tasks in relation to nationals of non-member countries and for tasks related to diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries, as already provided for by Article 20 of the EC Treaty; proposes, furthermore, that consideration be given to possibilities for cooperation between Parliament officials and the EEAS; 14. Considers that it is necessary to take further steps as regards providing Union officials with external relations training; suggests setting up a European diplomatic college which, in close cooperation with appropriate bodies in the Member States, would provide Union officials and officials of the Member States who are to work in external relations functions with training based on uniformly harmonised curricula including appropriate training in consular and legation procedures, diplomacy and international relations, together with knowledge of the history and workings of the European Union;

POLITICS and POLICIES

European maritime surveillance A brief analysis of a report adopted by the European Security and Defence Assembly at its plenary session on 3 December 2009 The European Security and Defence Assembly adopted a report on European maritime surveillance submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by three Rapporteurs, Kurt BODEWIG (Germany, Socialist Group), Tarmo KÕUTS (Estonia, Federated Group) and Konstantinos VRETTOS (Greece, Socialist Group). The report focuses in particular on European efforts in the area of maritime surveillance and the fight against piracy. It adopts a pragmatic approach, arguing that it is not necessary to create new institutions but more importantly to improve cooperation at the European level by pooling resources and information and coordinating zonal action. Europe’s maritime borders have become strategic zones in terms of security and safety. The coastal regions of the European Union account for over 40% of Europe’s GDP, with roughly 90 % of European trade now taking sea routes. Maritime trade is constantly under threat from various types of risk, which may be political, economic, ecological or military in nature and include terrorism, piracy and organised crime. Recent events and in particular the security threats stemming from trafficking (drugs, arms), illegal immigration and maritime terrorism as well as the serious pollution caused by hydrocarbons have brought home the importance of increased surveillance of Europe’s maritime approaches. The various EU agencies (European Maritime Safety Agency, Frontex and the European Defence Agency) are all designed to support the action taken by the relevant national government departments and coordinate measures at the European level. In addition to encouraging such coordination among its member states, the EU is also endeavouring to promote civil and military cooperation as the effective means of action, whether in coastal waters or on the high seas where the various maritime threats abound.

EU NAVFOR ATALANTA To that end the European Union launched Operation EU NAVFOR ATALANTA in November 2008 in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden region. The mission objectives are to protect the World Food Programme (WFP) ships, in particular by placing armed military personnel on board to protect merchant shipping in the waters of the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia and to arrest, detain or transfer persons having committed acts of piracy in order to bring them to justice. Some 10 member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) announced a contribution at the start of the operation. Seven of them – France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom – are providing a permanent operational contribution. Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands have also been involved in the operation since summer 2009. Croatia and Luxembourg are in the process of finalising their contributions. In the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters, thanks to EU NAVFOR and international action in general, there has been a marked decrease in the number of night-time attacks and a sizeable reduction in the number of successful attacks.

Baltic Sea cooperation a good example The Baltic coastal states have stepped up cooperation in the field of maritime surveillance and shipping controls and organised inter-agency (coastguards, traffic control systems, sea and air-based rescue coordination centres, police, customs, port authorities and shipping brokers) and international cooperation. As part of this regional cooperation, the SUCBAS (Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea) initiative is now up and running and involves cooperation among six Baltic Sea countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania and Sweden) with a view to strengthening maritime surveillance by providing the countries concerned with a real-time integrated image of maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea and its approaches. Other similar initiatives are on the agenda, in particular the pilot maritime surveillance project “BlueMassMed” in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the resurgence of pirate activities threatening European trade has made it necessary to set up counter-piracy surveillance systems at considerable distances from the Union’s maritime approaches.

ESDA recommends • supporting the efforts of the European Commission and its agencies and those of the Council to coordinate maritime surveillance operations in Europe’s maritime approaches and counter-piracy operations; • continuing efforts to organise sound cooperation with the countries on the southern Mediterranean rim and Atlantic coast of Africa in order to combat effectively all forms of trafficking, in particular drug trafficking and illegal immigration; • pursuing the maritime counter-piracy operations being conducted in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia; • supporting the advice and assistance initiative organised by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the European Commission for the training of coastguards and legal aid in the region of Yemen, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and the Seychelles and playing an active part in the reconciliation process in Somalia in order to re-establish the rule of law there.

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„EU NAVFOR Somalia“ – ATALANTA – First Anniversary by Dr. Michael Stehr, Troisdorf

The European Council’s decision No. 2008/851 from 10 November 2008 is the basis for European Union´s mandate to escort vessels, repel pirate attacks and pursue suspects at the Horn of Africa. On 8 December 2008, the Council of the European Union adopted the decision on the launch of its military operation. With “EU NAVFOR Somalia“, the EU for the first time carries out the safeguarding of security interests in a global maritime context, far away from Europe’s peripheral seas. Since 8 December 2008 up to six naval vessels and up to five Maritime Patrol Aircraft conduct service under the rules of “EU NAVFOR Somalia”, named “Operation ATALANTA”. On 8 December 2009, the Council of the EU decided to extend the mandate of the military operation to help deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia until 12 December 2010.

Successful Work of the Navies – Pirates Still Going Strong Warships from EU Member States do not operate at the Horn of Africa alone. Many navies are engaged in repressing piracy (USA, China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Malaysia, …). How do the naval forces with their some 20-30 vessels operate? • Patrol the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden (IRTC); • Escort convoys within the IRTC; • Escort ships carrying goods for the UN´s World Food Program (UN-WFP) to bring supplies to the Somali people; • Repel attacks and track and arrest raiders or suspects with the use of deadly force. The navies’ greatest achievement was to give security to the choke point of the Gulf of Aden. All ships transiting the Gulf of Aden are advised to register with Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa) before transiting, and some transits are escorted by warships. There was no hijack of a registered merchant vessel travelling in the IRTC and taking security measures according to the best-management-practice guidelines of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the first year of EUNAVFOR-Somalia. Success of the operation... As the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs stated in the middle of December 2009, about 190 pirate attacks were repelled by the navies altogether, 40 of these attacks by naval units of “EU

Dr. Michael Stehr Barrister Dr. Michael Stehr was born in Hannover, Germany, on September 13, 1966. He is a lawyer with experience as staff member of the scientific branch of the administration of the German Bundestag. Dr. Stehr is editor of Law of the Sea for the German periodical MARINE FORUM since February 2000, dealing with piracy and seaborne terrorism, European Security and Defence Policy, International Law and Law of the Sea. Dr. Michael Stehr is a board member of Euro Defense Germany. He is the naval correspondent to the European-Security and Defence Union.

NAVFOR Somalia”. Naval units operating under the flag of ATALANTA handed over 75 suspects to authorities in Kenya. The US Navy and units from Britain, France, Spain and Russia took another 80 suspects into custody. Naval units under the flag of ATALANTA escorted all 69 UNWFP transits into the port of Mogadishu, supplying nearly 300,000 tons of food to 3 million Somali people. Yet UNWFP´s problem is not situated at sea but inland Somalia: in the first days of 2010, WFP stopped distribution of provisions in southern parts of Somalia due to sustained fighting. ... but pirates` activities doubled In spite of the navies’ efforts, the number of pirate attacks nearly doubled from 111 in 2008 to 217 in 2009 (according to the International Maritime Bureau Annual Piracy Report). The number of hijacks was 42 (with 815 crew taken hostage) in 2008 and 47 (with 869 crew taken hostage) in 2009. The number of unregistered pirate attacks could be up to 3 times higher according to the experience of previous years – the bulk of attacks still target small coastal vessels and small fishing boats – their crews usually do not inform any authority. Pirate gangs enlarged their hunting ground from the Gulf of Aden and Somali coastline to the Indian Ocean southwards to 7° S and eastward to 64° E. Captured dhows and trawlers were used as motherships for up to four weeks before being abandoned. There are currently more motherships operating than ever before, and they change in intervals shorter than ever before practiced. Some pirate gangs are meanwhile habitually operating up to 1,300 nautical miles (NM) from their home

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ports with their “Pirate-Attack-Groups”, usually comprising of one mothership and two skiffs.

Evolution of Naval Forces´ Strategy The pirates proved to be very adaptive to the naval forces’ strategy of securing the Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) in the Gulf of Aden. The EU reacted by the extension of its operational area to 5.4 mil. km2, now reaching to 11° S and 60° E. Even if the deploying nations were to double or triple naval forces in the Somali basin, they still would have to keep too much water under watch. Pirates need only 15-30 minutes to attack and hijack a ship. In the same time, a frigate may travel 7,5-15 NM , a helicopter 25-50 NM. Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are much more effective when surveillance of vast sea areas is needed. The strategy aims to detect Pirate-AttackGroups in common sea traffic. Since MPAs or UAVs cannot take any suspect into custody, their reconnaissance data are used to guide naval units to the suspected vessels to board them. There is one alternative to mention, which is politically undesirable: MPAs and UAVs could use their weaponry to destroy suspected vessels, but then one would have to accept to kill people on board. Some other options coming into focus are not politically desirable either. Only France and Iran secure some civilian ships under their national flag by military detachments. German frigates carry “vessel protection detachments but have made no use of them as of January 2010. National discussions usually focus on legal objections. Only some states provided legal provisions for deploying groups of military personnel on civilian vessels. The option of deploying civilian armed security personnel poses the question of rules of engagement under international and national law and the question of costs.

the risk of these weapons being sold to parties in a civil war. UNSC Resolution 1897 from November 2009 renewed this item in its paragraph 7. But as of today, no serious attempt has taken place to fight pirates in their home bases. The problem is above all possible collateral damage; a clear distinction between pirates and the civilian population is difficult to find on land. Short-term expeditions or air strikes only temporarily suppress the pirates: because they hardly need any material infrastructure, and buildings not at all, and killed or arrested pirates can be quickly replaced since an immense number of young Somali men want to become pirates. There are thousands of skiffs and small dhows at the Somali coast - one cannot destroy them all. What about a new UN intervention to end the war in Somalia? After “Blackhawk Down”, which nation will want to risk the lives of its soldiers? At least one crucial condition should be guaranteed to start a new UN peacekeeping operation: the willingness of the civil war parties to sign a ceasefire and to accept foreign military forces in Somalia. But that is still unforeseeable.

Conclusions If one would not give up the struggle against piracy, there still remains finding a way to maximize the risk of the criminals being imprisoned, injured or killed. If pirates get apprehended while committing a criminal act they have nothing to fear, at worst they will be disarmed. They will only lose some days while returning to the Somali coast to receive new equipment . They only need a few minutes for the very short phase of carrying out an act of piracy and can be quite sure not to be detected and disturbed by any warship in the wide expanse of the Indian Ocean. The reward for a successful act of piracy is almost assured given the incalculable risks involved in using force to liberate hostages. Better self-protection of the civilian ships is therefore urgent.

Peace in Somalia – a prerequsite It is absolutely necessary to increase the pirates’ risk of being imprisoned, injured or killed. To take small groups of them into custody from time to time is not sufficient to fight the gangs comprising some 1,200 people. A Somali Coast Guard has yet to be formed. Pirates should be fought and prosecuted by Somali police and prosecution agencies. But the Somali Federal Government’s control is restricted to the presidential residence, airport and port of Mogadishu, and to some quarters in the vicinity. The autonomous provinces of Puntland and Somaliland in the north of Somalia are not officially recognized by Western nations, so most states have to observe arms export limitations when it comes to the decision if and how to support these regional “governments”. But without vessels and weaponry from abroad, the buildup of a Somali Coast Guard or Somali law enforcement forces seems impossible. Delivery of weapons may cause additional problems related to

Documentation UNSC Resolution 1851 from December 2008, in its paragraph 6, states: “In response to the letter from the TFG of 9 December 2008, encourages Member States to continue to cooperate with the TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea, notes the primary role of the TFG in rooting out piracy and armed robbery at sea, and decides that for a period of twelve months from the date of adoption of resolution 1846, States and regional organizations cooperating in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General may undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, pursuant to the request of the TFG, …”

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Current developments in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by Michael Hancock MP, Vice-Chairman of the ESDA Political Committee*, Portsmouth

In the current climate of the ongoing negotiations on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and with the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) about to come under the spotlight in a few months time, a serious and constructive debate is required on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and the challenges posed by state and network proliferators in order to re-evaluate the significance and current status of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The US and Russia need substantive agreements

Michael Hancock CBE MP He was born 1946 in Portsmouth Since 1971 he is a Member of the House of Commons and the longest serving member of the Defence Select Committee of the House of Commons. 1997 Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe since 1997 and Member of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) / Assembly of WEU (AWEU) in Paris. His current function in the ESDA is Vice-Chairman of the Political Committee. He is also the leader of the Liberal Group in the ESDA. Mike Hancock has been Rapporteur for the ESDA Political Committee for seven reports since 2000, mainly on defence policy, non-proliferation and transatlantic security, and he is Rapporteur for the report on “Frozen conflicts and Europe’s security.”

It is vitally important for the US and Russia, the two major nuclear powers, to reach a substantive agreement on deeper cuts in their respective arsenals to follow on from the constructive work done in the framework of START I which expired on 5 December 2009. Indeed, the failure to date to reach such an agreement is proving to be a significant setback for President Obama’s arms control agenda both at home, where a sigMeanwhile the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) nificant number of senators are likely to block the negotiations awaits ratification by the remaining nine (of 44) countries in should nuclear warhead modernisation not be implemented, order to enter into force. These include the United States, and abroad, where the new US administration’s hopes of prowhose current administration jecting a positive influence in is working to secure the nuclear proliferation issues necessary US Senate apare rapidly receding. The NPT It is vitally important for the US and Russia, provals. Failure on its part to is due to be overhauled at the the two major nuclear powers, to reach a persuade the Senate to reconMay 2010 Review Conference sider its earlier (1999) rejection which will address its institusubstantive agreement on deeper cuts in of the treaty will not only hold tional weaknesses, strengthen their respective arsenals to follow on from up its entry into force but also some of its fundamental prothe constructive work done in START I undermine the US’s internavisions on non-compliance, tional credibility with respect verification and withdrawal Michael Hancock MP to disarmament and non-proand move forward the discusliferation, which the Obama sions on multilateralising the administration has made foreign policy priorities. US approval nuclear fuel cycle through the creation of a “fuel bank” under of the treaty would send a positive signal to the international the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). community and more specifically to those countries that have yet to ratify it (China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, EU and the US need a non-proliferation strategy North Korea and Pakistan). While numerous countries support Constructive participation by the EU and a comprehensive EUthe negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) in US non-proliferation strategy are crucial to the success of the the framework of the United Nations Conference on DisarmaNPT Review Conference. ment, others continue to produce fissile material for military purposes. Nuclear safeguards This makes it difficult to cap the size of existing arsenals and In this context the IAEA must be provided with all the necesincreases the risk of nuclear materials falling into the hands of sary means and authority to continue its valuable work in the terrorist groups. The launch of new negotiations on a universal field of nuclear safeguards, safety and security. However, treaty, with appropriate monitoring and verification provisions financial constraints are tending to limit its effectiveness.

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and – in the meantime – maintaining moratoriums on fissile material production are therefore necessary. Missile proliferation Regarding missile proliferation, the Obama administration’s recent shelving of the plans for installing missile defence system components in eastern Europe has not only allayed tensions between the US and Russia but also strengthened the case for cooperation between them in this area. At the same time, however, the continued progress and testing of Iranian and North Korean missile capabilities are giving rise to serious concerns and increasing the perceived threat of nuclear-capable missile strikes. The absence of an EU missile defence concept constitutes a serious gap in this area. Discussions with both NATO and Russia on the content of such a concept and burden-sharing should be launched as soon as possible in order to enhance European security.

Provocations by Iran and North Korea versus cooperation The nuclear programmes being conducted by Iran and North Korea in total disregard of the international non-proliferation regime give rise to major concerns for the international community’s non-proliferation efforts. The stance of the two countries oscillates between cooperation and, more often, deception, making it difficult for the international community to decide whether to opt for dialogue or sanctions. In 2009, for example, both countries launched a large number

One of Iran’s nuclear plants for enrichment of uranium Photo: iranwatch.org

Iran still does not seem to understand how important it is at this time to prove the civilian credentials of its nuclear programme. Its secretive policy, coupled with its increased missile activity sets alarm bells ringing about its true intentions. It is vital not only to continue but also to deepen the dialogue with the two countries in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons threat while guaranteeing their right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. A firmer stance on the part of the international community and more stringent sanctions are inevitable should Iran and North Korea turn their backs on cooperation and negotiations. Defiance of the international community inevitably carries consequences.

India and Pakistan – Nuclear Powers in an instable region The international community must also pay attention to the significance of the nuclear build-up by India and Pakistan in a context of regional instability and of the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear installations, with the Pakistan Army now fighting Taliban forces near Islamabad and the terrorist attacks in the country continuing.

Yearly affected by famine but able to keep the world busy with its nuclear ambitions Photo: bellum.stanfordreview.org

of short and medium-range missiles and North Korea also tested a nuclear device underground. Iran disclosed the location of a new uranium enrichment plant in the city of Qom, made public its plans to build ten more plants in the very near future and has been ambivalent in its response to the offer of an agreement for the enrichment abroad of its uranium for medical purposes, as this would have reduced the country’s chances of developing nuclear energy for military purposes.

The role of the European Union The EU should bring more pressure to bear on the Pakistan Government to implement socio-economic development policies in order to tackle the root causes of terrorism while at the same time supporting Pakistan’s efforts to combat the Taliban and safeguard its nuclear arsenals.

*The report: “Current developments in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” adopted by the European Security and Defence Assembly’s Political Committee at its plenary session on 2 December 2009, examines the most important treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), and takes stock of the latest developments and main challenges in this area.

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Nuclear Disarmament and Proliferation – a personal view on the need for realism by Michael Rühle, Deputy Head of the Policy Planning Unit in the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, Brussels In his now famous Prague speech on April 5, 2009, US President Barack Obama endorsed the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Obama sent a strong political signal: if repairing the fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime required a credible disarmament effort by the Nuclear Weapons States, the United States was willing to lead by example.

The US commitment to arms control The US agenda includes the signing of a new treaty with Russia to further reduce strategic nuclear weapons; the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the Senate; the securing of the world’s fissile material within a few years; and a major international conference on nuclear security in spring 2010. These steps are supposed to demonstrate America’s unflinching commitment to arms control and disarmament – a commitment, it is hoped, that will generate an atmosphere conducive for a successful outcome of the next Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), scheduled for May. Such a success would help foster a new consensus between the Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons States about adopting more far-reaching non-proliferation measures.

Michael Rühle Michael Rühle is Deputy Head of the Policy Planning Unit in the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General. He was born 1959 in Stuttgart. After graduating in political science at the University of Bonn he startet his professional career in 1988 as a researcher at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Augustin. In 1991 he joined NATO HQ in Brussels. He has published widely on international security issues. His essay “Good and Bad Nuclear Weapons” was published in March 2009 in both German and English by the Edition Koerber-Stiftung, Hamburg, in March 2009 (ISBN 978-3-89684-137-7).

task of refashioning a new global non-proliferation order is not. President Obama himself has been quick to caution that achieving a world free of nuclear weapons would be a longterm project („perhaps not in my lifetime“), and a brief look at the challenges ahead makes it clear why the US President had every reason to be cautious.

The major challenges A key security challenge The return of disarmament and non-proliferation as a major theme in international security is no accident. According to many experts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the prospect of terrorists obtaining them, is becoming a key security challenge of the 21st century. Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of the use of such weapons, averting their spread becomes a matter of global survival. Hence, the argument has gained salience that the Nuclear Weapons States should unequivocally embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. This would allow them to counter charges of pursuing a policy of “double standards”, and to regain the credibility that is essential for restoring the non-proliferation regime.

Refashioning the global order of non-proliferation is crucial As compelling as such arguments might appear, they cannot hide the fact that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons will remain far more difficult than some non-proliferation enthusiasts suggest. While obtaining a new US-Russian accord on strategic nuclear arms will be relatively easy, the broader

The solution of four crucial issues will determine the future success or the decline of the global non-proliferation regime. Setting a credible example The first challenge is a conceptual one. Simply put, the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation is not as clear-cut as the new arms control narrative suggests. The farreaching nuclear cuts that were agreed between the US and Russia at the end of the Cold War had no discernible impact on the nuclear ambitions of other countries. Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea pursued their nuclear programs for their very own reasons, just as South Africa, Sweden or Switzerland pursued their nuclear programs in previous decades. In other words, each proliferation case is a case of its own. The assumption that one’s own example may compel others to follow is thus at least arguable. This does not change the need for a credible disarmament gesture by the established nuclear powers, yet the impact on others may be less significant than the current debate suggests. Broadening the nuclear disarmament process This leads to the second challenge: to broaden the nuclear

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Documentation The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. A total of 187 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclearweapon States. Text of the Treaty (excerpts): Article I Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Article II Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agencyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclearweapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude

agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. (â&#x20AC;Ś) Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Article V Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

The provisions of the Treaty envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference decided that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely. The next Review Conference will take place from 3 to 28 May 2010 in New York.

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disarmament process beyond the bilateral US-Russia relationship. This would include a commitment not only by the other recognised powers, i.e. the United Kingdom, France and China, but also by those countries that remained outside the NPT, i.e. India, Pakistan and Israel. All these countries are paying lip service to nuclear disarmament, yet it remains to be seen whether all of them are willing to subject their arsenals to staged reductions. Moreover, a more reliable global non-proliferation system will require all nations to agree on a host of supporting mechanism, e.g. internationalising uranium enrichment, developing tighter verification rules, and enhancing the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Yet the international community is nowhere near agreement on these questions. Dealing with proliferators A third challenge is dealing with proliferators. As long as the international community lacks a convincing strategy for dealing with North Korea and Iran, hopes for a new, more robust non-proliferation regime will be dashed. In the case of Iran, the UN Security Council has assumed an unprecedented leadership role, yet the impact of this policy has thus far been marginal. Moreover, the continuing differences among the members of the Security Council, notably geopolitical rivalries and the competition for energy, will continue to prevent that body from playing its role as the ultimate arbiter of security. Should Iran become a nuclear power, however, the nuclear domino-effect in the Middle East might well spell the end of the global non-proliferation regime. Maintaining and extending US nuclear deterrence This leads directly to the final challenge: to maintain US extended deterrence for allies. Today, more than 30 nations rely on the so-called US “nuclear umbrella”, including the members of NATO, South Korea and Japan. In addition, several other nations without formal defence agreements are also believed to be benefactors of US extended deterrence, e.g. Australia and Taiwan. These extended deterrence commitments are not just a means to project security to allies and friends, but also a major non-proliferation tool. American protection satisfies the security interests of allies and thus dampens any temptations to develop nuclear weapons of their own. Developments in the Middle East and Asia reveal that this double role of extended deterrence has not changed. With Iran and North Korea challenging the political and military status quo in their respective regions, US security guarantees remain key to nuclear non-proliferation. Indeed, should Iran become a nuclear power, the United States is likely to respond by extending its nuclear security commitments to some of Iran’s neighbours. This would be the simplest and most effective

way to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East – even if this would mean a reaffirmation of nuclear deterrence that some would consider incompatible with the aspirations for a nuclear-free world.

The dilemma for US nuclear policy US nuclear policy thus faces a dilemma. In order to pursue long-term non-proliferation goals, the United States and the other Nuclear Weapons States need to make a credible commitment to nuclear disarmament; yet the current nuclear reality requires the US to credibly uphold – and possibly even expand – its extended deterrence commitments. Predictably, some non-proliferation enthusiasts have argued that by clinging to its extended deterrence commitments the US could never truly disarm, and that ending these commitments was the only way forward. However, if the US were to downplay its extended deterrence commitments for the sake of disarmament, this might trigger the greatest proliferation wave since the dawn of the nuclear age. No US government – and certainly no US Congress – will go down this path. That is why the US needs to exert great care in phasing prospective nuclear reductions in such as way as to not cast doubt about its willingness and ability to keep the nuclear umbrella open.

NATO needs to strengthen its profile on nuclear issues As the place where US extended deterrence commitments are institutionalised more thoroughly than anywhere else, notably by its nuclear sharing arrangements, NATO will inevitably be affected by the new disarmament and non-proliferation debate. In particular, NATO needs to strengthen its profile on non-proliferation and arms control while at the same time studying the security implications of nuclear proliferation for allied security. As work on a new Strategic Concept is now underway, some have argued that withdrawing US sub-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe could send a powerful political signal that the US and its NATO allies were giving nonproliferation precedence over outdated nuclear dogmatism. Yet whether NATO will endorse this logic of pitting extended deterrence and nuclear sharing against disarmament and nonproliferation remains to be seen. While the salience of nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy is much reduced, extended deterrence continues to play an indispensable role in maintaining Europe’s political order. The desire of some allies to obtain bilateral security assurances from the US in addition to those of NATO is just the most recent indication that even in a Europe that is largely pacified, the need for the “American Pacifier” (Josef Joffe) has not diminished. As the United States sets out to take the lead in building a new non-proliferation regime, it will have to keep this fundamental truth in mind.

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Defence spending in the European Union versus the United States by Renaud Bellais, EADS/Astrium and Associate Professor in Economics, Ecole Spéciale Militaire, Saint Cyr Mark Twain once wrote that there are three kinds of lies: lies, big lies and statistics. One should keep in mind this idea when comparing defence efforts on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, there are significant differences in defining defence and looking at raw data can lead to misunderstandings (Bellais and Foucault, 2007). Analysing true trends and the meaning of defence efforts thus requires carefully reevaluating data. This precaution is even more necessary when we compare defence expenditures between the United States and its European allies. Here we enter into an emotional debate about the “burden sharing” within NATO. Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defence, once asked European nations to increase their defence effort to 2% of GDP; there is no doubt that the European side of NATO has drifted more and more from such a target since then. Nevertheless, it is necessary to analyse statistics with caution before entering into this debate, especially due to the fluctuations of exchange rates that can skew comparisons. Based on such elements, it clearly appears that the transatlantic gap has been widening since 2000. One must also go beyond statistics and analyse the effectiveness of defence efforts to discover the true nature of such a gap related to equipment spending. Thus appears the question of the deepening of European defence, especially with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.

A widening transatlantic gap in defence spending It is not easy to compare defence spending on both sides of the Atlantic, since the dollar exchange rate has strongly fluctuated since the launching of the euro. It is therefore necessary to use purchasing power parity (PPP) data to avoid this bias, otherwise the fall of the dollar against the euro would counterbalance the increase in American spending. Using such data (EuroDefense, 2009), it becomes clear that the United States invests much more than its European allies in defence. European countries dedicated 178 billion Euro for their defence in

Table 1. Defence spending in billion PPP Euro United States European Union US/EU ratio

2006 444 163 2.72

2007 456 172 2.65

2008 508 178 2.85 Source: EuroDefense

Renaud Bellais Renaud Bellais was born in 1972 in Caen, France. He graduated from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Lille (1994) and completed a PhD thesis in economics titled Public investment, technology and innovation: the case of arms production at the Université du Littoral (1998). 1998-2000, lecturer in economics at the Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale. 2000-2004, worked in the DGA, the procurement agency of the French Ministry of Defence, conducting economic studies in the Department of Strategic Studies. 2004-2008, head of economic studies and defence issues at the Political Affairs Department of EADS Group, Paris. Since July 2008, Mr. Bellais is in charge of defence and security topics related to the EU and NATO within the institutional relations team of Astrium. He is also an associate professor of economics at the French Army Academy, and since 2005 has chaired the Defense Commission of the Fondation Concorde (Paris).

2008 while the US allocated 508 billion Euro, its highest ever level since World War II, one may add (Table 1). Moreover, 2008 was characterised by a deepening of the transatlantic difference. While American spending levels increased in both value and share of GDP (reaching almost 4%), defence is receiving a smaller and smaller share of European wealth. Only the United Kingdom still spends up to 2% of GDP. Since the beginning of the decade, defence spending among major European countries has been decreasing towards 1% of GDP, France being an exception with its defence spending ranging between 1.6 and 1.8%. Nevertheless, in absolute values, global defence expenditures reached their highest level since 1945. According to SIPRI, 1464 billion dollars were spent in 2008 for defence needs worldwide; however one can perceive clear regional differences. The share of Western Europe has decreased from 30.8% in 1996 to only 22.6% in 2008. Here, again, France is the only country that has significantly increased its spending over several years. Estimates for 2009 show a new contraction of these expenditures. It is therefore not surprising that European countries only spend 359 Euro per inhabitant for their defence, while the United States allocates 1670 Euro. If the cost of the global war on terrorism inflates American spending, this only represents part of the gap. It is clear that social spending is crowding out

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

security efforts in many European countries, with possible stowaway behaviour vis-à-vis NATO. Nevertheless, we need to look deeper for understanding the consequences of such low investment.

most advanced research: in 2008 the United States and European countries invested 7.3 Euro and 2.5 billion Euro in defence R&T, respectively (EDA, 2009).

Divided we stand High-tech American forces versus overstretched European troops The decreasing investment in defence has consequences in absolute terms. While the transatlantic gap has been decreasing or at least stabilizing for the past two years, it seems to be deepening again – especially concerning procurement. There the gap even reaches a ratio of 1 to 3 when looking at capital spending (procurement and R&D), toward which all European countries only invest 51 billion Euro. Here too, trends are significant: between 2006 and 2008, these expenditures (in current euros) increased by 8.5% for European countries, just balancing years of stagnation, while the American investment rose by 21.6%. Besides this, while the United States gave 499 Euro per inhabitant for equipping its armed forces in 2008, Europeans only allocated 102 Euro. This explains a huge difference in terms of equipment per soldier: an American soldier receives over 150,000 Euro while European countries provide only 30,000 Euro. The United Kingdom and France nevertheless constitute exceptions, having spent 112,000 Euro and 72,000 Euro,

Table 2. Capital spending per inhabitant in PPP Euro United States European Union US/EU ratio

2006 419 95 4.39

2007 462 100 4.60

2008 499 102 4.91 Source: EuroDefense

respectively, in 2008. Procurement thus remains under-funded in Europe even though defence efforts have been stable since the beginning of the decade. While France and the United Kingdom earmark more or less half of their defence effort to procurement, other large European countries only allocate (at best) a third of available resources. According to the EDA, in 2008 personnel spending represented 53.1% of defence spending in Europe but only 19.9% in the United States. This results partly from very large forces in Europe, reaching 1.8m military personnel, while the Pentagon has 1.4m boots. Such large forces absorb too many resources at the detriment of equipping forces. Capital expenditures only represent 51 billion Euro in Europe, compared to 152 billion invested by the United States (EuroDefense, 2009). This leads Europe to favour today’s needs over the development of tomorrow’s systems. Indeed, defence R&D only represents 4.3% of defence efforts in European countries, twice less that the American effort (10%). Such a gap is even wider when looking at the

The transatlantic gap is made worse by the lack of spending coordination within the EU. Common procurement projects only represent a fifth of European procurement, and there is no true progress towards a mutualisation of efforts in recent years as the split between national, European and collaborative programmes barely changed. There are too many competing programmes throughout Europe. Alexander Weis recently noted that in naval programmes, Europe still affords 11 different frigates and 7 different diesel submarines; there are currently 25 naval prime contractors across Europe, many of them encompassing more than one shipyard. The situation is quite similar for other systems. Without shared efforts, it is truly difficult to reach economies of scale and therefore affordable systems. Defence efforts are bound to lead to low investment returns so long as European nations are not able to gather their needs and resources. Such a situation makes it difficult to keep armed forces equipped with state-of-the-art systems. European cooperation projects represented more than 16.5% of total R&T spending in 2008, up from 9% in 2005. This remains a small share of expenditures which are truly critical for equipping tomorrow’s forces. Even with such a positive trend, European countries share a more limited part of their R&T effort than of their procurement. This is truly problematic, for it is here that they can conceive common or at least shared systems to avoid competing programmes and develop synergies as well as economies. Moreover, preparing the future together is a good means to promote the integration of national industrial and technological bases to create a true European defence industrial base,

Table 3. Equipment procurement by EDA member states* National European collaborative Other collaborative Total

Billion Euro 25.19 7.07 1.00 33.3

Percentage 75.8 % 21.2 % 3.0 % 100.0 %

* The European Defence Agency includes all EU countries except Denmark. Source: EDA

which is the sine qua non condition for preserving autonomous sourcing in Europe. The lack of synergies and commonality in defence efforts in Europe explains why the European Union faces such difficulties in deploying troops outside Europe – even the limited commitment of 60,000 pairs of boots defined in the Helsinki Goals. The EDA (2009) underlines that in spite of 1.8m soldiers

POLITICS and POLICIES

Table 4. R&T spending by EDA member states National European collaborative Other collaborative Total

Billion Euro 2.030 0.409 0.040 2.479

Percentage 81.9 % 16.5 % 1.6 % 100.0 %

* The European Defence Agency includes all EU countries except Denmark. Source: EDA

throughout the European Union, there are only 464,574 deployable (land) troops and only 125,237 sustainable ones. Consequently, European countries have only 80,177 deployed soldiers (4.5%), 2.5 times less than the United States (209,700).

Hope for progress Paradoxically, today’s economic crisis and its consequences on public finances represent an opportunity to boost the deepening of European defence. Indeed, on one hand, European nations cannot fund all their defence equipment spend-

ing; on the other, there is a true need for procuring new systems and upgrading existing capabilities, especially when operating through international coalitions. One could then hope that budgetary constraints will foster the construction of a European defence, saving taxpayers’ money while improving armed forces’ access to the best available solutions.

Bibliography Bellais R., Foucault M., Statistiques et Défense : précautions d’usage, Défense et Sécurité Internationale, n°7, September 2005 Bellais R., Breton A., Politique industrielle de défense : Quelles pistes pour une refondation, Fondation Concorde, Paris, May 2007 EuroDefense, Defence Efforts Attempt of international comparison, Paris, September 2009 European Defence Agency, Defence data 2008, Brussels, November 2009 European Defence Agency, European-United States defence expenditure in 2008, Brussels, December 2009 Weis A., Speaking Notes, Sixth Meeting of Naval Defence “Europe a Naval Power“, Paris, 9 December 2009

Defence Expenditures of EU Member States (2008) State Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdom

Total (mil. Euro) Rank Amount 11 2,557 9 4,252 19 797 23 301 14 2,133 24 294 13 2,462 1 45,362 3 31,735 7 6,192 16 1,286 17 1,077 4 22,630 21 370 22 363 25 158 26 28 6 8,488 8 5,973 12 2,535 15 2,055 18 994 20 566 5 12,755 10 4,025 2 42,004

Percent of GDP Rank Amount 23 0.91% 19 1.23% 2 2.34% 7 1.78% 4 1.44% 6 1.85% 16 1.32% 5 2.32% 5 2.32% 1 2.55% 20 1.22% 24 0.58% 14 1.44% 9 1.60% 22 1.12% 26 0.43% 25 0.50% 15 1.43% 8 1.66% 11 1.53% 17 1.24% 11 1.53% 12 1.48% 21 1.16% 19 1.23% 5 2.32%

Procurement (mil. Euro) Rank Amount 11 352 12 348 16 170 25 18 17 161 21 65 10 655 2 6,258 3 5,323 6 2,129 15 192 19 94 4 3,050 23 55 20 66 22 63 26 0 7 ,408 9 844 14 340 13 343 18 143 24 42 5 2,536 8 901 1 7,710 Source: EDA

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Russia’s Security Policy in new European Structures – what is behind President Dmitry Medvedev’s initiative on European Security Treaty? by H.E. Ambassador Vladimir CHIZHOV, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Union, Brussels

I hope that this article will contribute to a serious and honest discussion concerning the roots of present problems in EuroAtlantic security – a discussion which we really need today.

Global problems need coordinated response Why am I so assertive in this statement? The reason is obvious. What we are currently witnessing on the international scene is blatant disregard for basic principles of international law. At the same time there is an ever-growing desire to resolve specific issues on the basis of political considerations and expediency of the moment. This is a very dangerous phenomenon. As a result no one feels safe. It is a universally recognized fact that present-day challenges to security are increasingly acquiring a global dimension. And they certainly dictate a coordinated response from the international community. But all multinational structures designed to provide security – with the notable exception of the United Nations – proved ill-equipped to fulfill that function by virtue of their limited membership or outdated mandates – or both. This has inevitably resulted in both on a worldwide and regional levels.

Vladimir Chizow Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Born Dec.3, 1953. Graduated with honours from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, 1976. Joined diplomatic service in 1976. 1996 Deputy High Representative for Bosnia Peace Implementation, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; 1997 Director, 3rd European Dept., MFA, Moscow; 1999 Director, European Multilateral Cooperation Dept., MFA, Moscow; 2002 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moscow; 2005 Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Communities, Brussels. He has conducted analytical research work on European security, OSCE, Russia-EU and Russia-NATO relations, Mediterranean, Balkans, problems of Cyprus and Northern Ireland and UN peacekeeping. Russian Special Representative for Cyprus (1997-2000), for the Balkans (2000-2002).

Fragmentation of security Unfortunately, Europe cannot claim to be an exception. Having boasted its unique role as a beacon of peace and security for the rest of the world throughout decades following World War II, it can no longer claim that position. For all the deficiencies of the bipolar Cold War security pattern, its demise at the turn of the 1990’s did not lead to fulfillment of the aspirations of all Europeans for a more secure future for their continent. A chain of bloody conflicts in the Balkans, a proliferation of so-called frozen conflicts across Europe, followed by last year’s criminal aggressive adventure by Georgia – all this coupled with physical expansion of a military alliance created in the middle of last century and desperately seeking to prove its relevance in a totally different world – all have tarnished Europe’s romantic image.

Well- phrased political declaration versus legallybinding obligations The Russian President is convinced that the European Security Treaty should extend to the United States Photo: macleans.files.wordpress.com

This is not to say that no attempts were made to rectify the situation. Creating the OSCE, its founding fathers hoped that a balanced, comprehensive approach to security in the wider

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Euro-Atlantic space would ultimately do the job. But, alas, the OSCE was prevented by some of its participating states – one, to be exact – from becoming a genuine international organization, complete with a proper legal status in terms of international law. Moreover, the carefully designed and balanced three-dimensional structure started tilting towards one of the three baskets, leaving the other two insufficiently filled or simply ignored. In recent years there has been no lack of well-phrased political declarations adopted with Russian active participation at various fora, including the OSCE, Russia-EU political dialogue (the 2000 Paris Declaration on cooperation in the field of ESDP, to name just one), the Russia-NATO Council (starting with the 1997 Founding Act and followed up with the 2002 Rome Declaration). But all efforts to translate those abundant political commitments into legally-binding obligations invariably met with stiff resistance. NATO, for one, explicitly indicated that it opposes extending the level of security envisaged for its members – for all it is worth – to other European countries who should make a “historic” choice between applying to join or remaining content with second-class security status.

Hence, fragmentation of the Euro-Atlantic security space This gives a certain background for the initiative of President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation to conclude a Treaty, which would ensure a truly universal system of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area. President Medvedev sent the Russian Draft European Security Treaty (EST) to leaders of foreign states and international organizations active in the Euro-Atlantic space, namely NATO, EU, CIS, CSTO and the OSCE.

Unjustified fears of Medvedev’s proposal on a European Security Treaty Some commentators, especially from NATO countries, insist that Russia’s proposal on the European Security Treaty would give Russia a veto over the policy of the Alliance, including its enlargement. Let me be open about our opposition to NATO enlargement. The Russian negative position on the issue is well known. But the Russian draft on European Security Treaty has no hidden meaning. It makes no attempt to veto NATO’s activities. At the same time we have the right to express our views on the enlargement, on NATO’s military infrastructure being moved closer to our borders. We have common obligations not to strengthen our security at others’ expense. There is an obligation not to station any substantial combat forces on the territories of new members of NATO.

Away with mutual suspicions This commitment has not yet been deciphered, so one still wonders whether the bases being set up in Romania and

Documentation Dmitri Medvedev on the adaption and extension of the European security framework, April 20, 2009, Helsinki (…) European security is still far from perfect. And we need to deal seriously with the architecture of European security. For these reasons I believe that such solutions can be developed through multi-faceted cooperation between the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United States of America. This sort of solution can be realised only through confidence-building in Europe. It was with this in mind that we formulated the idea of a largescale European treaty on security, which in our view should not be just a set of declarations but a legally binding document, based on the equality and mutual respect of all the signatories. It should be based on a range of principles from international law, but perhaps most importantly on the recognition that the security of the European continent is indivisible, that it cannot be dealt with in piecemeal fashion. This is because whatever alliances we form, whatever agreements we make, in the final analysis they alone will not insure against a variety of problems. We need a new, international forum to resolve such problems. (…) I think that holding a forum at the very highest level, a summit with all Euro-Atlantic states, international organisations – including of course the European Union, NATO, the OSCE, CSTO, CIS – regional organisations and, of course, all the countries that belong to these organisations, is one way to launch talks on a treaty on European security. In that way we could identify the best platform for further negotiations and agree on an agenda.

Bulgaria are substantial combat forces or not. We believe they are. The Americans say no. Such understatements hinder the work and give rise to unnecessary mutual suspicions and threats. Therefore, the proposed draft Treaty clearly states that its participants will include all relevant organizations, acting in the security field, including NATO. It states clearly that the work of the Treaty mechanism will be based on consensus; thus, NATO will have its own voice in this Treaty. So I consider the fears of the commentators totally unjustified.

To bring the principles of Indivisible Security for the Euro-Atlantic area to a Security Treaty As to the circulated Draft Treaty, it is focused on one particular task: to ensure in a legally binding manner the principle according to which no nation in the Euro-Atlantic area would reinforce its security at the expense of others. We are convinced that the principle of indivisibility of security, which was the subject of a number of political declarations adopted in the 1990s should be strengthened. So far it has not quite worked, to put it mildly. We want to see this principle become legally binding, and that is why we need the Treaty. The Russian President has sent the Draft Treaty personally to his counterparts, and he expects from them a personal, preferably constructive and rapid response.

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Security Research and Innovation for an EU 2020 Vision by Dr. Liviu Muresan, Executive President EURISC Foundation, ESRIF Member, Bucharest

In the upcoming period, the European Commission will present a proposal for the EU 2020 Strategy, a document which replaces the Lisbon Agenda launched a decade ago. It is accepted that the goal of Lisbon Agenda to transform the European Union into the “most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy” in the world failed. Not only Brussels, but also most of the EU member states have a deficit of strategic thinking and so is the label of “a modest superpower” for our European Union is understandable Living in interesting times, in a challenging international security environment, the leadership is under pressure to manage, on a daily basis, all kind of crisis. Critics coming from the national capitals only for the Commission are not justified.

A grand vision A grand vision for our European Union is difficult to draw when most of its Member States do not have a robust strategic culture to deal, at least, with their national agendas. “We cannot solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them …” said Albert Einstein. A “reloaded” Lisbon Agenda needs not only a collective effort in the next period but also a change of mindsets among of a lot of politicians to promote a good governance, dealing with tangibles and intangibles to meet the proposed targets. Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council and Jose Manuel Barosso, the President of the European Commission dealing with EU 2020 will discover that in a period of recovery from the economic crisis, not only money but also time are limited resources. In this context the Final Report of the European Security Research and Innovation Forum launched in Brussels last December could be also a contribution to the EU 2020 vision. For more than two years, 600 experts from 32 countries worked on this joint initiative of the European Commission and the 27 EU Member States. Official as well as independent representatives from industry, the public and private sector, research institutes and academia, non-governmental organisations and EU bodies contributed to this ESRIF Final Report as the only large scale and high level initiative of its kind in Europe. An European Security Research and Innovation Agenda (ESRIA) was proposed for the next 20 years. Deemed to enhance the security of the citizens, ESRIF was tasked to address: • Mid-term and long-term security perspectives (up to 20 years)

Dr. Ec. Liviu Muresan Dr. Liviu MURESAN was born in 1946 in Sibiu, Romania. He is 1995 the founder and then since the Executive President of the Foundation “European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management (EURISC)”. 1978 Ph.D. in Economics at the Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest. 1990-1991 Member of the Romania Parliament, leader of the Majority and held several positions in the governmental structures: Senior Adviser to the Prime Minister, to the Romanian Government, and to the Minister of Interior. He was also the High Representative of the Romanian Government of the AntiCorruption Initiative of the Pact of Stability (SPAI) and of the Combating Organized Crime Initiative (SPOC). 1993-1994 Deputy Director of the National Defence College. Since 2007 Chairman of WG 11 Human and Societal Dynamics of Security, in the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF), Brussels and Executive President, EURODEFENCE Romania.

• European, national and regional perspectives, building on previous efforts (notably the 2004 and 2007 reports of the EU’s Group of Personalities and the European Security Research Advisory Board, respectively) • Enhanced co-ordination with other institutions involved in security research and innovation • Societal and technological aspects of security research • Promotion of innovation as the foundation for a European security market that exploits economies of scale at the European level • Guidance for all stakeholders who prepare security-relevant research programmes in Europe Living in a complex, interdependent world with a dynamic and challenging security environment, EU and its Member States must be able “to reinvent” the Lisbon Agenda and finalise in the next months the EU 2020 strategy. The messages proposed by the ESRIF Final Report re refer to key topics of interest for the EU 2020 Strategy. Societal security European security is linked to the social, cultural and political values that distinguish European life in all its diversity and so

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security research and innovation must address the long-term vulnerability of these values. Societal resilience Unpredictable man-made and natural threats are obliging security research and innovation to focus on strengthening Europe’s inherent resilience and ability to recover from desaster. Trust Security implies trust between authorities and citizens, as well as among people, institutions and technologies. Trust plays a decisive role between citizens and governments, social services and institutions, information agencies, ICT and other technological systems, and local and global markets. Interoperability Security organisations have to consider technical, operational and human interoperability issues at their geographical and organisational borders. A vigorous political will to share assets and standards across Europe is needed, to jointly hand the security issues posed by a progressively more interlinked world. A systematic approach to capability development Complexity of security demands increasing sophistication in strategic foresight and risk assessment, modular generic capabilities and solutions at the system-of-systems level. Industrial policy European industry can be a global leader in the security network, making our society’s best security solutions available to the world. For this we need political will and a persuasive European industrial policy. Innovation Based on the experience and potential of the old as well as new Member States, Europe must have strong scientific, technological and industrial competences for its security needs. It must capitalise on this knowledge and maximize synergy between demand and supply to answer the real operational needs. Security by design Europe needs a systemic approach to security and this security must be treated as an integral part of any given system. Education and training for awareness raising “Security culture” is a common responsibility of all stakeholders, especially policymakers, regulators and citizens.

No more separation of Security and Defence Security Research and Innovation must support the forging of a European Security and Defense Policy and in a broader picture the EU 2020 Vision. Security and Defense can no more be separated and have to use the strength of each and the synergies of a joint approach. In the same line a civil approach can not be completely separated from the military one, based on the same or similar industrial bases, research and development and a growing security and defense market.

Documentation From the ESRIF Final Report: “ESRIF strongly recommends that the EU and its Member States launch new measures to enhance the security of its citizens. These should also aim to create amenable conditions for European excellence in research and innovation, and thus advance Europe’s security. COMMON EUROPEAN CAPABILITIES: The EU must draw on its collective strengths and knowledge by developing common capability via enhanced transnational cooperation. NEW POLICY INITIATIVES: The above should be supported by stronger articulation of demand, and delivery of the most appropriate solutions by the supply side. INTEGRATED APPROACH TO SECURITY: Effective civil security must embrace interoperability, standardisation, certification, validation, communication with the public, education & training, exchange of best practices, consultations on privacy issues and other factors that cut across public and private spheres and provide synergies between civil security and defence research fields. THE GLOBAL DIMENSION: The EU’s civil security is a collective responsibility touching government, societal organisations, industry and individual citizens. It cannot stand in isolation from the world.”

Initiatives like EOS (European Organisation for Security) or a future EUNOS (European Network of National Organisations for Security) could bring a stronger support for the European Security and Defense community. By mobilising the potential of national and European R&D in security research and innovation ESRIF can be materialised into an agency or can enforce an existing one (like EDA transformed in an ESDA) and play a role of “control-tower” for this issues into the perspective of an EU 2020 Vision. The cluster of public-private entities in the field of security and defense production, research and innovation in Eastern Member States like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria can use the model of the Western Member States cooperating in different air and space programs a.o. and a dialogue between the EU and NATO from the perspective of EU 2020 and NATO 2020 can discover new topics of future cooperation, dialogue which is now proposed on the agenda of both entities. The Annual Security Research Conference (SRC) and the back to back event organised in Stockholm and last year by the Swedish Presidency have proven the potential of a closer Trans-Atlantic Cooperation in this domain.

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Coordinating Europe’s Civil Protection – The way forward by Dr. Hans Das, European Commission, Acting Head of Civil Protection Unit, Brussels The number of disasters that threaten lives, livelihoods and the environment has increased in recent years. Whether it is natural disasters, whose frequency and ferocity is on the rise as a result of climate change, or man-made disasters, such as terrorism, Europe has to face these new trends. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism is a key disaster response tool at the EU-level.

The EU-Mechanism EU Member States established the Mechanism in 2001 to facilitate cooperation in civil protection. The decision to establish such a mechanism at the EU-level reflected the new threat situation, but also a growing consciousness that disasters can overwhelm national response capacities and often have a cross-border impact. The Mechanism can be activated in response to natural and man-made disasters anywhere in the world. Through the Mechanism, the 31 participating states (EU 27 plus Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) can pool their resources. By coordinating and supporting response interventions, the Mechanism increases the efficiency of civil protection assistance. Solidarity is paramount The assistance provided through the Civil Protection Mechanism is based on participating states’ resources. In other words, solidarity is paramount. The speed and specialisation of the civil protection response makes an important contribution to overall disaster relief operations. Civil protection support generally takes the form of expertise or in-kind assistance, depending on the needs of the affected country. Examples of civil protection assistance include the deployment of technical experts, water purification, medical support and evacuation, search and rescue, and shelter. Civil protection response may also involve sophisticated technical assistance such as fire fighting aircraft, high-capacity flood water pumps and decontamination equipment (in the event of chemical, biological or nuclear incidents). The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) A number of tools have been developed to facilitate civil protection cooperation at the European level. The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), based at the European Commission in Brussels, is the Mechanism’s organisational heart. Operational round the clock, it actively monitors the emergency situation across the world, supports preparedness

Dr. Hans Das Dr. Hans Das is the Acting Head of the Civil Protection – Disaster Response Unit at the European Commission. He was born 1971 in Mol, Belgium. 1995-1997 Researcher at the department of international law of Leuven University. 1997-1999 Head of Legal Department in the international Commission for Real Property Claims (CRPC). 1999-2000 Legal Officer at the United Nations Housing and Property Directorate in Kosovo. 2000-2001 Foreign affairs department of the Ministry of the Flemish Community of Belgium. In October 2004, he finalised a doctoral thesis on procedures and evidence in international mass claims resolution and obtained a Ph.D. degree in Law at Leuven University. In the same year he joined the European Commission in Brussels.

measures in Member States and, during emergencies, is responsible for the coordination of assistance. Participating states are linked via the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS). The MIC uses CECIS to enter requests for assistance from third countries and provide situation updates. Participating states can enter their own requests or offers of assistance directly into the system. The system gives all participating countries access to the same updated information, instantly. Deployment onsite If it is decided to deploy a European assessment and coordination team on site during an emergency, the MIC selects the experts for the mission and organises their travel. This is frequently the case where a disaster has taken place in a third country and more information is required to assess needs. In that case the European team works closely with the UNDAC (UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination) system to avoid duplication and ensure that the European contribution is part of the global response. European civil protection teams also cooperate closely with the Commission departments responsible for humanitarian aid and external relations to integrate the disaster response intervention into the overall EU effort in the affected country. The Community Mechanism is highly regarded by participating states, the UN and third countries as a partner in the

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EU civil protection assistance in Haiti 2010 13. January: The EU has been a major contributor to the international relief effort in Haiti, reacting immediately to news of the devastating earthquake near Port-au-Prince on 12 January. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism was activated that same night, and on 13 January the first European search and rescue teams left for the island. An EU assessment and coordination team composed of six Member State experts and one liaison officer was dispatched by the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) and arrived in Haiti on 14 January to carry out needs assessment, coordinate incoming European assistance and assist in the international coordination of the emergency.

The EU Team arriving at Haiti Airport

Photo: EU/DG Environment

response to disasters. This can be demonstrated by some figures. In 2002, the first year of its operation, there were three activations of the Mechanism, all from within the EU. By 2009 that figure had risen to 28 activations, with 18 or twothirds of activations originating outside the EU. Past operations have included hurricane Katrina in the US in 2005, tropical cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in May 2008, and the 2009 forest fire near Athens in Greece.

The future of the Mechanism Europe is facing an increasing number of climate-related disasters and remains alert about the threat of terrorism. Member States want to coordinate their disaster response more closely and the European Parliament has called on the Commission to strengthen Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s response capacity. The European Commission is already working on a number of measures to do this. For example, since 2008, a preparatory action for an EU Rapid Response Capability has been under way. With an additional budget voted by the European Parliament, the Commission finances projects that test new arrangements to keep key assets on standby in the Member States for EU civil protection operations or to develop additional EU-level capacities to fill gaps in existing assistance. Examples of projects include adapting equipment to work in cold conditions, a European Forest Fire Tactical Reserve (consisting of 2 Canadairs available to assist Member States during the forest fire season), and a European aerial medical evacuation team. During its lifetime, each project is tested at least once in a real-life emergency or a simulation exercise.

18.January: For the first time, the European Commission deployed directly two modules co-financed by the EU, a water purification unit and an advanced medical post with surgery. These two projects are part of the EU Rapid Response Capability pilot project. The water purification unit, run by France, is operational in Port-au-Prince, providing water for 20,000 people. The advanced medical post with surgery, run by Italy, has been set up at a paediatric hospital in the Ville area of Port-au-Prince. In the first two days it successfully treated 200 people, mostly for broken arms and legs. The medical staff is also helping out at the paediatric hospital. 21 January: The EU Civil Protection Mechanism had mobilised twelve search and rescue teams, two field hospitals, six advanced medical posts, 30 medical teams with doctors and four water sanitation units. 23 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK) are providing assistance to Haiti through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The assistance includes USAR teams, medical teams and supplies, and shelter and water sanitation units. Twelve search and rescue teams, composed of around 400 staff plus rescue dogs, worked alongside teams from other countries to extract 121 persons alive from the rubble. The MIC approved more than 1.7 million Euro in co-financing transport of assistance through the Civil Protection Financial Instrument, thus facilitating six cargo flights bringing aid into the disaster-stricken country. Requests for co-financing eight additional cargo flights were still pending at the time of writing. Given the scale of this emergency and the particular vulnerability of the Haitian population, civil protection was not the only EU response. The EU also committed 30 million Euro for urgent humanitarian work as part of an overall EU funding package of 422 million Euro for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Haiti. The overall EU response is under the responsibility of Commission Vice-President Catherine Ashton, the first time the new role of Vice-President is being put to the test in an international emergency of this scale.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The Haiti disaster – an unimaginable calamity

Photos: swamppolitics.com/dailymail.co.uk

Emphasis also on prevention Alongside strengthening response capacities, the Commission is putting more and more emphasis on prevention. While not all disasters can be avoided, risks to people, livelihoods, property and the environment can be reduced. Investment in prevention is more cost-effective than disaster response, but it is also more complex, involving a variety of policy areas and relying on a common risk perception. A common approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters is being developed. In addition, the EU also supports measures for disaster risk reduction in developing countries.

protection. This will allow the Commission to propose new measures, which will then be debated by Council and Parliament as co-legislators. The Parliament has taken a strong interest in the area of civil protection in the past and its involvement offers an opportunity to bring EU citizens closer to what is happening in civil protection at the European level.

Disaster Management − the high priority for the Commission In future, the cooperation between the Community Civil Protection Mechanism and humanitarian aid at the Community level will be further strengthened. The two areas often respond to the same disasters in developing countries and their tools – be it for response or recovery – are complementary. In the next European Commission, expected to take up office in February 2010, there will for the first time be a Commissioner for humanitarian aid and crisis response. The Commission President has declared that disaster management will be an immediate priority for the new Commission.

The Union will face many challenges in the area of disaster response in the years to come. But by building on our work in response and preparedness and strengthening prevention, we will be better placed to tackle these challenges head on. On the international scene, the European Union is already a strong partner in disaster management. In the future, closer cooperation with related fields like humanitarian aid and the implementation of the solidarity clause will further strengthen its role. That is why the next five years will see more development in European civil protection.

Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty includes a ‘solidarity clause’ introducing an obligation for Member States to come to each other’s assistance during disasters. The Mechanism is the best-placed instrument for realising this obligation.

The Lisbon Treaty and civil protection The Lisbon Treaty creates a specific legal basis for civil

More information: ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/index.htm

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Cyberwar & Cyber Defence by Bert Weingarten, CEO PAN AMP AG, Hamburg

It was at the request of Dr Karl von Wogau, who presided the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (2009), that I began to prepare my lecture on “Cyberwar and Defence” for the 8th Congress on European Security and Defence held in Berlin on 08 and 09 December 2009. I started by researching definitions of the term “Cyberwar” in the USA, Asia and Europe and found 840 different, and at times quite contradictory, opinions, assessments and texts. I organised print-outs of the information I had harvested into a wall display comprising three groups. The first set contained information about Cybercrime and related to the view that a cyberattack was equivalent to cyberwar. The second set reflected the opinion that individuals could conduct cyberwar, while the third mixed virtual and physical forms of attack. In fact, none of the existing assessments and opinions in any of the three sets of information was suitable. Moreover, no ranking had so far been established with regard to the seriousness of a cyberwar.

How to define Cyberwar? Before defining the term “Cyberwar”, it is useful to determine the things it definitely does not cover, for example cybercrime activities directed against civilian users or companies. Cybercrime technologies have multiplied since 1990 and made an evolutionary leap in 2010 with the spread of virtual systems that make it easier to participate in cybercriminal networks. Physical attacks, such as the destruction and sabotage of hardware (e.g. cables, antennas, and satellite connections) are not part of a cyberwar either, insofar as assets are physically

Bert Weingarten Bert Weingarten, CEO of PAN AMP, Hamburg. Born 1970 in Lübeck, Bert Weingarten graduated from the Max-Planck-Institute, in information and communications technology. He created the first “internet project house” in Germany and developed and managed concepts for using internet access in the public sphere. He operated the first public internet focal points in Germany, and thus had a decisive role in the enlargement of the internet in Germany. With the foundation of PAN AMP in 1998, Weingarten was responsible for the development of internet electron filters and security technologies as well as automatic internet analysis and forensic processes. Weingarten supports the security scene of Europe through keynotes to Ministers of the Interior, Police Presidents and Directors of State Offices of Criminal Investigation. Furthermore he is as a specialist and a solicited lecturer in the audiences of the offices of the German Federal States and the Federal Government, where he optimises the skills of internet agents. With those activities Weingarten could contribute early in an essential way to the preventive calculation of dangerous situations in Europe.

destroyed or sabotaged e.g. through the elimination of a hardware unit, a rocket attack on a telephone exchange, or the shooting down of a communications satellite. A fair number of scientists assumed that the 1999 Kosovo conflict could be defined as the first cyberwar between nations because both sides had recourse to this type of weapon. Yet although extensive command and control of war operations using orbiting reconnaissance systems was a decisive factor on NATO’s part, it cannot be seen as an element of cyber warfare, for the satellites were primarily used to gather intelligence rather than to manipulate or take over enemy weapon systems.

The Estonian case Close study of analyses of the events in Estonia in 2007, and of comprehensive data on individual incidents and interpretations, for which I must thank Vice-Admiral Tarmo Kouts, MoP, (Head of the Estonian delegation to the ESDA/WEU Assembly), Tallinn, led me to conclude that they constituted an example of a successful cyberattack designed to achieve “denial of service” by targeting

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government and administrative centres and preventing online access to Estonia’s main bank. In spite of the fact that hospitals, power supply systems and emergency services were also targeted in the Estonian attacks, these remain a manifestation of cybercrime. It has not been proven that any State carried out the attacks and, if a State was involved, it was only to the extent of countenancing the actions of hackers motivated by misguided patriotism. Cyberwar is conducted between States, and/or asymmetric threats, and gives cybersoldiers the opportunity to attack processors, computers, systems or networks.

Different levels The first level in such a war is the tracing and demarcation of the resources targeted which might entail the deployment, for example, of automated sniffers, scans and denial-of-service attacks devised to suppress or disrupt enemy services. The second level is the infiltration and manipulation of data and data connections through, for example, hijacking sessions, or the use of trojans, worms and botnets to gain useful information by penetrating the adversary’s computer networks. The third level involves ‘virtual’ manipulation to bring

about the physical destruction of the resources and units targeted. Previously manipulated hard- and software can be taken over or destroyed; critical power, water and IT infrastructures may similarly be taken under control or eliminated; the remote manipulation of IFF signals can produce “friendly fire” incidents; or specific technologies and weapons may be manipulated from a distance in order to take over, or take out, enemy units.

So far – so good The world has not experienced a cyberwar. However, a considerable number of events between 2007 and 2009 indicate that weapons have been, and are being, developed on the way to “Advanced Cyberwar Weapons”. The “Information Warfare and Strategy” department in the USA began fundamental research on cyber weapons in 1994 and a number of nations have been working on digital warfare since the nineties. The successful build-up and further development of “Advanced Cyberwar Weapons” in China and the USA since 2007 could be called the beginning of the “Cold Cyberwar”. It may be assumed that 60% of all nations will have attained a basic level weapon for cyberwar operations by

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2014. This makes the prospect of a future cyberwar a serious threat to Europe because in today’s world, the systems needed to conduct cyberattacks can soon be obtained by States and “Asymmetric threats” alike. Estimated at between 50 000 and 100 000 euros, the low cost of developing basic weapons for online attacks means that asymmetric clashes on the web are inevitable and, indeed, already occur between Al-Qaida’s terrorist conspiracy and the nations of the West.

A strong risk: the internet There is, in particular, a strong risk that the internet will be hijacked for a cyber attack as any target system connected to the internet can be hit at lightning speed. It is estimated that there would be less than 2 seconds’ warning of such an attack. In all probability, in an age when daily online access is a taken for granted, and the use of eCommerce, online-banking and social networks is a routine affair, only after an attack has occurred will we realize just how valuable the data, information and fully functioning networks are, and just how much we depend on them. If a cyberwar were to break out, i.e. a war between nations through the internet, it would affect all the other interconnected States and wreak serious political and economic damage. An international agreement on the limitation of cyberwar weapons is needed today and should be taken up by the United Nations as a matter of urgency. As computer systems in the USA and Europe are connected through ‘backbone’ networks, internet connections in the US and Europe are like a “town with over 500 gates”. If all of these come under attack, they must all be defended and, in

the case of a cyberwar, as more and more infrastructure is damaged, the attacks will regroup and deploy to put any intact subnet resources under strain. If a cyberwar were to be launched against the USA , it is only to be expected that European subnets would be affected. Under extreme pressure, it is possible that encrypted links such as exist on the internet between military installations, for example, might collapse. Saudi Arabia, however, is ready to face a cyberwar. It has organised the net in a way that, to coin a military phrase, makes it a position that can be properly defended. Unlike most other countries, the Saudis can administer the internet backbone in their land directly, and partially or fully restrict capacity. The same applies for various subnets in Saudi Arabia. The government there has an effective instrument to limit damage in the event of a cyberwar and the national subnets would only be slightly affected.

Be prepared for Cyberwar Given the possibility of a future cyberwar, it is logical and urgent to devise a European or NATO strategy for the military defence of the virtual space of the Member States. Each of the latter should, moreover, prepare for the coming cyberwar by organising an institutionalised national defence, with access to the resources needed to prepare for a war via the internet. The development of stand-alone, military infrastructures and the safeguarding of national subnets should be completed if an effective defence is to be ensured in the event of a cyberwar. Any future war will begin with an attack from Cyberspace. Only countries who have prepared for cyberwar will be able to deploy effective countermeasures.

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Steps forward to a EU Maritime Security Strategy by Christoph Raab, Managing Director COPURA GmbH, Brussels

The Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Commission is a successful and dynamic policy area. But the idea behind it, to develop a coherent and comprehensive policy approach for maritime affairs, is undermined by Member States that don’t want the Commission to get involved in security-related matters. Integrated Maritime Policy is a strategic issue for the EU.

The importance of the seas for Europe It is an astonishing fact: The maritime spaces under the jurisdiction of EU Member States are larger than their terrestrial territory. The EU is the leading maritime power in the world with regard to shipping, shipbuilding technology, coastal tourism, and offshore energy. 90% of the EU’s external trade and over 40% of its internal trade is transported by sea. 350 million passengers and about 3.5 billion tons of cargo per year pass through European seaports, and approximately 350.000 people work in ports and related services. And yet, until very recently, policy-making at the European level has been strangely underdeveloped with regards to maritime issues.

Early Days – Green Paper and Blue Book In 2006, the Commission published a Green Paper on a future maritime policy and launched a consultation and analysis of how Europe relates to the sea. The contributors pointed out the main problems in the maritime domain: decision-making was slow, potential synergies were not exploited and no one had clear authority to resolve conflicts across sectors or to look at the wider picture. The Consultation confirmed how complex Europe’s sea-based activities are. It concluded that a European Maritime Policy must build on the existing distribution of competences within the EU. The European Union’s role was seen as a facilitator rather than as an integrator per se. Next move: In 2007, the Commission put forward the main elements of a European Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) in a so-called Blue Book and an accompanying action plan. The objective of the IMP is to tackle in an overarching way all economic and sustainable development aspects of the oceans and seas, including the marine environment – an initiative in an area where a European framework makes utmost sense given the lack of coordination even among Member States! Two years later, in October 2009, the Commission presented a Progress Report which outlined the achievements of the IMP during the last two years and gave an outlook into the future.

Christoph Raab Christoph Raab was born on 18 April 1974 in Karlsruhe. He obtained his degree in Economics at the University of Trier. He holds a Master’s degree from the College of Europe (Natolin) and is a trained journalist. From 2002-2005, Mr Raab was Personal Assistant to Karl von Wogau MEP in the European Parliament. In November 2005, he founded COPURA, an event management, consulting and communications company that specialises in European affairs with a focus on issues of security, defence and research policy. In 2009, he transformed the European Security Round Table (ESRT) into a full-fledged, neutral event platform on EU security and defence issues. Since then, it has established itself as a key Brussels discussion forum for current and future topics in the field of European security and defence policies. He is a regular contributor on EU-Institutions issues for “The European − Security and Defence Union”.

The IMP Progress Report 2009 This Report, which was requested by the European Council of December 2007, sets out the achievements of the IMP since its creation. It points out that cross-sectoral tools such as maritime spatial planning, integrated surveillance or marine knowledge have registered progress and that EU sectoral policies have taken steps in the right direction. First actions to implement the IMP on a regional basis have been undertaken. The Report also highlights how joined-up policy-making towards seas, maritime sectors and coastal areas can contribute to addressing challenges posed by the current economic crisis and in the long-term to take action against climate change and environmental degradation. It has to be noted that support for maritime policy in the European Parliament has been widespread even though maritime policy issues are being dealt with separately by a number of committees and structures. Next to the Progress report, the Commission published two further documents in October 2009, a Communication on the integration of maritime surveillance, and a strategic document on the international dimension of Europe’s maritime policy.

Additionale initiatives On the side of the Member States, additional initiatives towards the integration of maritime policy and sharing of best practices in integrated maritime policy approaches had been undertaken between the launch of the Green Book procedure

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Documentation Integrated Maritime Policy General Affairs and External Relations Council conclusions, 16-17 November 2009 (excerpts) “The Council - Welcomes the strong commitment towards integrated maritime governance in Member States; Invites Member States and the Commission to continue to implement and to elaborate further a comprehensive strategy for growth, jobs and sustainability for the oceans, seas and European coastal regions, with due respect to subsidiarity and proportionality and on the basis of a continued strong involvement of stakeholders; (…) - Invites the Commission to report on the outcomes of the discussion on the Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP) Roadmap and to come forward with initiatives aimed at encouraging the development and use of MSP that is based on an ecosystem approach during early 2010, and which, in the light of increased economic activities at sea, help coordinate and balance sectoral interests to contribute to a sustainable use and development of the European maritime areas; (…) - Welcomes the continued implementation of the EU Strategy for Marine and Maritime Research aimed at providing the knowledge base for the implementation of the IMP. The strategy should support policy-making in relation to the MSFD and the work on MSP; (…)

- Welcomes the idea of establishing an integrated approach to maritime surveillance, through a common information sharing environment; (…) - Welcomes the IMP approach presented for the Mediterranean and calls for further dialogue and co-operation in order to improve the governance of the marine space and coastal areas in the Mediterranean area, taking into account its sub-regions; (…) - Encourages further dialogue in order to strengthen the Black Sea Synergy-based cooperation and its relevance for the IMP; (…) - Welcomes the presentation of the Commission’s Communication “Developing the International Dimension of the Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Union”; (…) - Notes its guidance for a next step towards an EU policy on Arctic issues that is provided in relation to the Commission’s Communication “The EU and the Arctic region”; (…) - Invites the Commission to present the necessary proposals for the financing of integrated maritime policy actions within the existing Financial Perspective, with a view to entry into force by 2011; - Calls upon the Commission to present a progress report on the implementation of the IMP in good time for the European Council at the end of 2012.”

Joe Borg, Commissioner for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs: “The Council’s continued support for an integrated approach to maritime affairs is a fitting way in which to bring the first phase of the Integrated Maritime Policy to a close. Now we can set about taking this ambitious policy to a new level. In response to the Council’s requests, we will now open the IMP out still further, in order to address the medium- and long-term challenges for Europe’s seas and coasts and focus on economic growth, quality jobs, environmental protection, safety and security, and citizens’ well-being.” November 2009

Relevant European Commission documents for a European Integrated Maritime Policy 2006: • Green Paper – “Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European vision for the oceans and seas”, 7.6.2006; 2007: • Blue Book – Commission Communication “An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union”, 10.10.2007; • Action Plan - Commission staff working document accompanying the Communication “An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union”, 10.10.2007: 2008: • Commission Communication – “Roadmap for Maritime Spatial Planning: achieving common principles in the EU”, 25.11.2008;

2009: • Commission staff working document –“Building a European marine knowledge infrastructure: Roadmap for a European Marine Observation and Data Network”, 7.4.2009; • Commission Communication – “Towards an Integrated Maritime Policy for better governance in the Mediterranean, 11.9.2009”; • “Progress Report on the EU integrated maritime policy”, 15.10.2009; • Commission Communication “Towards the integration of maritime surveillance: A common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain”, 15.10. 2009 • Commission Communication “Developing the international dimension of the Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Union”, 15.10.2009

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and the Progress Report. Examples are the Dutch “National Waterplan”, the German “Entwicklungsplan Meer”, the French “Grenelle de la Mer”, the Swedish bill on a coherent maritime policy, and the UK Marine Bill or the Polish interdepartmental maritime policy plan. And in the Council, Member States have on several occasions encouraged the Commission to continue and deepen its activities. The coastal regions have given support to the IMP since the very start. The Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) that brings together some 160 European regions holds regular work at the meeting of the Aquamarina working group, set up to promote IMP actions at regional level. All in all, it is fair to say that there has been a lively and positive reaction to the idea of an Integrated Maritime Policy.

Policy Tools of the IMP Now, what has the Commission concretely proposed and developed? There is a multitude of activities that the Commission started, but three key activity areas stand out: • Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP): MSP is considered to be a key instrument to balance sectoral interests and achieve sustainable use of marine resources with the ecosystem approach as the underpinning principle. The objective of integrating maritime surveillance is to assure more efficient operations at sea and reduce operating costs. The Commission is currently starting two Preparatory Actions in this area. • Common information sharing: The Commission has completed a study on the legal and regulatory aspects of the integration of maritime surveillance and carried out a stock-taking exercise together with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EU Military Staff in response to a request from the Ministers of Defence. The Commission Communication “Towards the integration of maritime surveillance in the European Union” of October 2009 is based on this work and sets out guiding principles for the establishment of a common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain, based on existing and new surveillance capacities including preoperational Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) services. These principles have now to be translated into policy which requires extensive consultation between the Commission and the Member States. It is interesting to notice how strongly the Member States support the Commission in developing such an information sharing framework from which they hope to benefit among others in the area of CSDP. • Maritime surveillance: In December 2009, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) and the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA), have concluded an agreement to cooperate in the field of maritime surveillance. The cooperation should result in an improve-

World markets need secured sea lines of communication. Photo: er-ship.com

ment of the control of external maritime borders of the EU (competence of Frontex), an increase in maritime safety (competence of EMSA) and an enhancement of the coordination of fisheries control and inspection activities by the Member States (competence of CFCA). Arguably the key project in this area is the European Border Surveillance System EUROSUR.

Future Prospects of the IMP The General Affairs and External Relations Council has called on the Commission to maintain the momentum behind the Integrated Maritime Policy and pinpointed a number of future avenues for the IMP, including defining a strategy for growth, jobs and pursuing maritime spatial planning initiatives, coming up with proposals on governance in marine and maritime research to enhance the role of scientific knowledge in decision-making, and making further progress in maritime surveillance. Furthermore, the Council called on the European Parliament, Commission, Member States and future Council Presidencies to keep the integration of maritime surveillance a top priority – a request which the Spanish EU Presidency will certainly pursue. Also based on a request from the Council, the Commission will draw up a roadmap by the end of 2010, listing the necessary steps towards the integrated approach. This roadmap should be updated in 2011 to reflect the results of relevant projects and the lessons learned from CSDP operations. Where does all of this leave us? The Member States have clearly recognized the need for a policy framework at the EU level for an Integrated Maritime Policy and the Commission is successfully working down a long and complex agenda in this area. So, one could be forgiven to think that all is fine in EU maritime affairs. But that is only half the truth, because as soon as security aspects are concerned, the Commission does not enjoy the same political backing by the Council. Unfortunately, it is difficult to systematically separate civil or commercial matters from their securityrelated dimensions. So, the great potential to develop a true European framework for an Integrated Maritime Policy in all its dimensions is only half-unleashed. And this will tremendously limit the effectiveness of such a policy over the coming years.

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Maritime Strategy − a crucial geostrategic and geopolitical challenge in a globalized environment by Dr. Klaus Olshausen, Lieutenant General (ret.), President of the Clausewitz Gesellschaft, Hamburg Management of the maritime environment provides an opportunity for productive international cooperation. There is abundant literature that tackles important aspects of the seas. While often the analysis focuses on specific elements, reflections on a maritime strategy as a basis for coherent maritime policies have to start with an understanding of the multidimensional, multifunctional and multinational/international character of this huge area exposed to partially competing interests. In addition, one has to sharpen awareness not only for the present but just as intensively for likely and/or potential natural developments as well as political and economic trends.

The planet Earth Before any discussion of maritime initiatives takes place one is well advised to consider the wider implications. It is important to understand the purpose(s) of such a strategy in order to analyze its full value. Take the elements of Planet Earth: land above sea level, the sea itself and the air in the atmosphere. The combination of these elements has produced an environment in which life can develop and thrive. Yet these conditions are also the very characteristics that produce constraints on the existence of life on

Dr. Klaus Olshausen was born in Eisenberg on April 25, 1945. On graduation from high school he joined the Bundeswehr. 1967-1972 studies of history and political sciences and PhD at the Albert-Ludwigs-University, Freiburg. 1978 completion of general staff officer training. 1979-1985 G2 12th (GE) Armoured Division; attendee of the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS, USA and Foreign and security policy directorate at the Federal Chancellery, Bonn and Commander of Engineer Battalion 2. 1985: Planning Staff of MoD. 1987 Military Attaché in Washington, DC, USA. 1990 Commander (GE) Infantry Brigade 31. 1994 as a Brigadier General Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Army Support Command. 1996 Deputy Commanding General EUROCORPS in Strasbourg. 1998 Deputy Commander HQ IV. Corps (Deputy Commander GE KFOR (KOSOVO). 2000-2006 German Military Representative to the MC/NATO, WEU and EU on 1 October 2000 with the rank of Lieutenant General Lieutenant.

er with the sun and the winds create the climate for the existence and development of all forms of life from plants to humans.

Keep the planet in healthy condition

“The measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion the boldest are the safest.” Admiral Horatio Nelson

the planet as we know it and for mankind in particular. This fundamental but self-evident statement draws attention to the fact that any focus on one of the elements in our environment cannot lose sight of the interdependence of all three for the development of human destiny, if it is to be coherent. Pure statistics tell us that 71% of the earth’s surface is under water and that the expanding human population is going to produce ever greater pressure on the habitable land surface of the planet. Additionally, most of the maritime activities on and under the sea are for the direct benefit of the human population. Swivel a globe slowly and before you can identify any form of human activity your eyes will rest on the oceans which togeth-

The international need to ensure the continued healthy condition of our planet is clearly recognized. However, it is in the maritime environment that the scope for national, international and multinational initiatives can be most effectively expressed. I would like to mention just a few of the more visible opportunities: • International shipping for transport of goods and raw materials including fossil fuels. International support for the expansion of globalised trade in new and developing markets by using sea lines of communication. • The need for international (and multinational) cooperation and development in managing the natural wealth of marine life and necessarily extending the use of it (exploitation) for the benefit of mankind. • The seas can be used to produce electricity, drinking water and sea salt with innovative environmentally friendly technologies. • Harmonization of procedures for fossil fuel extraction with a view to limiting the environmental impact of the industry.

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The oceans have provided a context for international cooperation since the beginning of time; individuals and companies as well as national and international organizations have needed to broker agreements. Today the legal framework of maritime law addressing geographical rights and responsibilities on and under the sea is negotiated between nation states and the international community, frequently under the auspices of the United Nations. This sound foundation has the potential for broader and closer international multidimensional global activity for the benefit of the environment and mankind. The United Nations (U.N.), other international and/or regional organizations, the still critical nation states, enterprises and nongovernmental organisations build the basis for many fora from bilateral to global - that deal with the cooperative approach to strategic as well as practical marine issues.

Challenges, risks and dangers Many of the risks and dangers that have been described and analyzed as being relevant for the foreseeable future impact the maritime domain. Any instable or even failed coastal state carries the risk of giving room to terrorism and organized crime. These can and will use this opportunity to interfere with the sea traffic to extort ransom money or to plunder cargo. In addition, terrorists can take ships hostage in an attempt to use them as weapons at sea or from sea to coast, in particular in harbor areas, with disastrous effects. LNG tankers made to explode close to populated areas or ships as platforms from which to shoot rockets, or even as “dirty bombs”, are not fictitious. That those attacks have not yet happened is no proof that this cannot or will not become a brutal reality. But concentration on the threat of non-state actors should not make us forget that the preferred co-operative solutions between nation states and regional alliances or organizations should not be taken for granted. Especially the chase for exploitation of the resources under the seas or the control of particular chokepoints are examples that can lead to non-cooperative developments potentially leading to political, economic and military confrontation or even conflict. The foreseeable development in the “High North” – to just mention this obvious example – requires early measures by the coastal states and the international community to reach solutions that avoid or at least mitigate the potential for confrontation.

An integrated security strategy for the maritime domain Any integrated maritime policy of the EU will have to include maritime security as an essential component. The reality of the three pillars in the EU should not continue to widely lead to separate approaches. Any analyses of the threats we face (or

may face) in the maritime domain strengthen the evidence that the longstanding differentiation between internal and external security does not allow us to build optimum solutions with existing and future capabilities of the EU Member States and the EU proper to protect our populations by deterring or preventing terrorist attacks. Three years ago, the European Commission started a process for a “Maritime Policy for the Union” by publishing a “Green Paper”. Very specifically, it discusses the improvement of life in coastal regions, EU leadership in sustainable maritime development and maritime governance. It was followed in 2007 by an Action Plan for an Integrated Maritime Policy (“Blue Book”). In early November 2009 the Commission presented a Progress Report outlining the achievements of the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) over the past two years and looking out into its future. Alongside this, the Commission has tabled concrete proposals on two major IMP issues – the integration across sectors and countries of maritime surveillance and the international dimension of Europe’s maritime policy. Taken together, these three documents provide compelling evidence of how the IMP can unlock the economic potential of Europe’s vast maritime and coastal areas, while making its seas safer and more secure through streamlined new governance and by exploiting synergies across the full range of sea-related policies. But the important issue not covered and tackled properly is maritime security, since this is excluded from the competences of the Commission. The intergovernmental European Security Strategy (2003 and amended 2008) is the basis for positioning and directing the EU in the broad area of foreign and security policy including the ten-year-old ESDP. As it sets the EU as a global player, maritime issues deserve prominent considerations. Those are not explicitly addressed in the document. If the European Union and its Member states are to take on the task to develop a maritime strategy with security as the centerpiece, they will have to decide whether it is to comprise of all functional areas or whether they want to limit it to one or several of the economic uses described above. They need also to clarify to which extent safety on the seas as well as in the territorial waters of the EU member states (EU MS) should or must be part of the document.

Guarantee for uninterrupted functioning The starting point of this strategy can be described as ensuring methods and measures for the undisturbed, uninterrupted execution of the economic function under existing laws and regulation and protection against identified risks, dangers and threats using passive and active, defensive and offensive measures. If one views for the purpose of reflection the ESS as a kind of equivalent to the U.S. National Security Strategy, one

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subscribe to the element of seapower that has been and still is a largely national category.

The consequences

could recognize that the U.S. Strategy is the highest-ranking document in that sphere and is followed by the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy and – as relates to our topic – the National Strategy for Maritime Security. It is under the guidance of the aims and objectives in those documents that the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard for the first time in history developed and published last year “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”.

Both issues need reflection on the common purpose, analysis of the set of objectives and assessment of the already available assets and capabilities as well as newly required ones. This requires an incrementally integrated work by representatives from all three pillars of the EU, two of them heavily dependent on the engagement and will of the nation even in the starting phase. This approach may – and should – gain momentum with the Lisbon treaty in force since the 1st of December 2009. The newly selected “EU Foreign Minister” ( in treaty language: ‘High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ ) and the European diplomatic service will lead to increased connectivity between the Commission and the General Secretariat. The new formulations and perspectives regarding EU defence combined with enhanced competencies of the European Parliament and Justice and Home Affairs and more discussions regarding issues of CFSP & ESDP have the potential for framing the common political purposes, goals and objectives also in the area of a concise maritime security strategy.

Case-by-case considerations in the EU

Efficiency through cooperation

Accepting that any direct analogy to the EU situation is not appropriate, nevertheless the EU has had for the last six years the ESS as her “highest ranking” document. But the follow-up documents like the Crisis Management Concept, the Headline Goal 2010 (military & civil) or Civil-Military Cooperation, to mention a few, are rather limited - while setting an EU “level of ambition” - to the more practical questions of the decisionmaking processes, the capability development procedures and the ways to execute any Crisis Management Operation (CMO), rather than dealing with the more specified common interests and objectives which might lead to CMOs of different efforts and magnitude. The EU of 27 Member States (MS) leaves that to a case-by-case consideration, recognizing early on that hypothetical, or specific regional or functional scenarios for CMOs, will hardly find consensus before a specific development or negative event triggers activities.

Beyond those steps – if undertaken – it will be important to proceed on the notion that any maritime security strategy of the EU will be all the more effective if it successfully reaches out to partners, the most vital ones being the U.S. and NATO. Any common, but limited, EU seapower assets can be employed all the more effectively as part of a close transatlantic framework. This EU capability can become a catalyst for a “Western Compact for Comprehensive Security”. From such a solid basis the outreach to other states and organisations has the chance to create even stronger and more coherent cooperation dealing with the challenges of the maritime domain. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has initiated a bottom-up and functionally limited approach in pushing the project of common solutions for maritime surveillance beyond the points addressed in the Commission’s Action Plan, surely a crucial part of any maritime security strategy. The interim report of the team of “wise men” signals a promising beginning as it describes and analyses the complexities of the maritime domain before addressing the requirements of a common EU maritime surveillance that uses all available present means and capabilities of all MS as a beginning for reaching optimum synergies in future multinational developments. With this optimistic outlook one can start the long-distance sail toward a geostrategically sound, multinationally anchored maritime security strategy that leads to improved prevention and protection against any hazards and threats in the marine domain surrounding the EU.

Aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulles in the Mediterranean Sea Photo:marine nationale

Two major concerns But there are many issues and areas of concern that could be brought forward. Two initial issues require a decision: • first, to what extent the “homeland defense” of the territorial waters and the supporting infrastructure ashore can be organized in an increasingly common EU approach, including all available means and capabilities, and • second, whether and to what extent the EU as a widely maritime entity and a self-declared global player can and will

DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES

A regional maritime security concept for the Baltic Sea by Vice Admiral (ret.) Hans Frank, Meckenheim

In the Cold War era, the approaches to the Baltic were one of the key positions in the NATO defence system, with a separate “Baltic Approaches” command. A breach of this key position would not only have split the front between Central and Northern Europe but made the European defence area vulnerable to attack from the rear. Rapid-deployment minefields and a combination of German and Danish FPBs and navy fighterbombers were to stop the Warsaw Pact (WP) amphibious forces. The existence of such Warsaw Pact intentions was subsequently revealed when operations plans were brought to light. Fortunately, such an attack never occurred; the population of the Soviet Union’s satellite states opted for a life of freedom and democracy and the eastern dictatorships and the WP were dissolved.

Vice Admiral (ret.) Hans Frank Born 1939 in Delmenhorst. Following high school he was trained as a naval officer in the German Naval Force. Assignments to Fast Patrol Boats as officer of the watch and commander, 1974-76 Admiralty staff training in Hamburg, 1978-1987 Command and staff assignments, including MOD/Armed Forces Staff, Commander FPB Squadron, NATO HQ Brussels and SHAPE, Mons. 1987-1989 Commander FPB Flotilla of the Bundesmarine, 1989 -1994 MOD Bonn: Staff for Military Policy and Operations and Chief of Armed Forces Staff. 1994-1999 Deputy CHOD German Armed Forces and Head of the Central Military Agencies of the Bundeswehr. 1999 / 2004 President of the Federal College for Security Studies, Bonn/Berlin. 2004 – April 2009, Chairman of the German Association for Defence Technology, Bonn.

The Baltic – a Sea of Peace During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its allies declared the Baltic to be a “Sea of Peace” in an attempt to allow only the coastal states of the central and eastern Baltic to use it. This contravened the principle of freedom of the seas and was unacceptable to the West. Thereafter, military exercises including the United States of America (US-BALTOPS) were conducted in this maritime area to demonstrate the free world’s interest in the unimpeded use of the entire Baltic Sea and its determination to enforce it. During these exercises the American battleship Iowa memorably fired its guns off Bornholm in 1985. Now that the Baltic seems to have indeed become a Sea of Peace, are there security issues that must be addressed in and for this region? If security is taken to mean defence in the strict sense of the term, the answer is doubtless no. All the Baltic coastal states with the exception of Russia are members of the European Nation and the majority of these states again with the exception of Russia are also members of NATO. Notwith-

standing widespread anxiety in the Baltic States with regard to their powerful neighbour, conflict with Russia it is not in Europe’s interest. Long-term security in and for Europe can only be achieved with Russia, not against her. The goal must therefore

We can’t leave it at that chemical weapons from WWI on the floor of the Baltic Sea are a permanent challenge. Source: Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commision, Helsinki

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be to bring Russia closer to the European Union and NATO. In the past, a battleship armed with nine 16” guns, designed as a deterrent within the NATO strategy, could be deployed in the Baltic as a demonstration of force. Today, this would no longer be acceptable. The Partnership for Peace programme is the better way - the right way - forward. Joint military exercises, held a number of times with Russian participation, are a welcome contribution to reducing tensions.

Security transcends defence Security is more than defence. It encompasses a wide range of endeavours that contribute to stability and thus to lasting long-term security. The European Security Strategy rightly refers to bringing military and civilian resources to bear to respond to crises and to strengthen stability. What does this mean in practice? The war on terror The war on terror is one of the crucial security issues of our time. So far the European states have been relatively unaffected by the scourge but this may not always remain the case. The Baltic has some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. More than 55,000 ships pass through the Cadet Channel between Germany and Denmark every year. Similar choke points exist in the Strait of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca, which also have heavy shipping traffic. At these choke points, unsophisticated weapons, such as mines placed by freighters, would be sufficient to bring an entire segment of the economy to its knees. Critical port and estuary infrastructure throughout the Baltic Sea area is also a potential target for terrorist attack. To prevent such attacks, ongoing surveillance of the maritime area and coordinated defence are required. The latter must cover all types of possible attacks and must plan, prepare and of course practice joint action. Initial cooperation between Finland and Sweden has since been broadened to include other coastal states in the “Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic States” (SUCBAS). Russia has not yet been brought in as a participant and many countries have reservations about the goal of technically pooling the relevant data. Nevertheless this is a step in the right direction. A broad cooperation to cover the whole spectrum of menace The cooperation that has been begun must be strengthened and broadened to cover organised crime, drug trafficking and potential acts of piracy. The Arctic Star affair of September 2009 showed that the Baltic is not a Sea of Peace, at least in this respect, and is not likely to become one in the foreseeable future. Protection of the environnement still underdeveloped In addition, environmental considerations are an ever-greater focus of attention. Oil spills, overfishing and ordnance left

over from the Second World War are current problems. Here, too, countries should coordinate their activities. The search for chemical weapons dumped at the end of the Second World War must be stepped up and those that are located must be recovered and neutralised before they cause an environmental disaster. A regional security concept for the Baltic therefore almost inevitably calls for the establishment of a centre to pool information, plan action and manage its implementation. Such a centre should be staffed by personnel from all the Baltic coastal states acting jointly and managing action taken at the national level, and it should serve as a contact point for supraregional organisations such as EUROPOL. A real “EU Task Force” would be the right answer to the current dangers A further word about the military sphere. The Baltic is an ideal training area in which a wide variety of exercises are held. Nearly all the nations bordering on the Baltic now participate in such training operations as BALTOPS and NORTHERN COAST. This is a good thing in itself but it would be even better if Russia were to actively participate. The Baltic States have worked together in noteworthy fashion to set up, as part of BALTRON, a minehunting squadron tasked with clearing the legacy of mines left in their waters by the two world wars. This basic formation should be expanded into a standing EU Baltic minesweeping task force. Minesweepers are called for because the Baltic States do not have larger vessels and because minesweepers do not represent a threat and instead demonstrate defence preparedness and capability. In addition to locating and removing the mines left over from the two world wars in the area between Gotland and St. Petersburg, the task force would foster integration by bringing young people together to carry out the joint mission. And over and above these operational and training duties, the task force should call in the ports of the Baltic nations.

Deepening the European idea through cooperation A task force flying the flag of the European Union would signal cooperation and anchor the European idea in the minds of the population. Until such time as the final structure of Europe is clarified - be it as the Europe of fatherlands called for by Mitterrand and Adenauer or as a United States of Europe similar to the USA - there will in all likelihood be no European armed forces and therefore no European navy. This is why it is so important to further meld national elements and strengthen and deepen the European idea among Europe’s citizens. A task force of this type would foster the idea and subsequent calls in the ports of the northern flank and/or the Mediterranean would further signal regional cooperation.

DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES

Mediterranean Sea by Vice Admiral Xavier Magne, Deputy Chief of Staff, Maritime Operations, Paris

From the Serenissima Republic of Venice, to the “Sublime Porte” of Istanbul, Alexandria, Rome, Athens, Grenada…From Gibraltar to the Dardanelles, the Mare Nostrum, the Central Sea gave birth to our civilisation, has been the witness of human activities, of tribes and nations willing to build their Empires, establish their commercial counters and spread their cultures. For thousand years it has been crossed by the Phonicians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines, Carthaginian, Ostrogoths, the Arabs , the Europeans… and the centre of political games and conflicts to gain power and influence all over the region

The Mediterranean See – a strategic area Over that glorious history, the Mediterranean Sea is still nowadays a strategic area for our trade and economic development, our security and our stability: 25 % of the maritime trade goes through and 30 % of the oil traffic; more than 23 000 ships are in transit each year… Common to 22 countries and shared by 400 000 million inhabitants, it is a crossroad between Europe, Africa, and Asia. The globalization of trade has not only driven up the volume of Mediterranean seaborne transport but changed its nature. It is no longer primarily regional or even European; it is an integral part of a transnational global maritime system. No need for reminder that improving global security and safety of the MEDSEA is a key element for economic development of the MED countries. Indeed no sustain-

Vice Admiral Xavier Magne Born in 1956 at Malestroit, Morbihan, Vice Admiral Magne is DCOS Aeronaval Operations in the French Fleet Headquarters. 1975 French Naval Academy with graduation in 1977. 1981 pilot of “Etendard IV P”, embarking in both CVs “Clemenceau” and “Foch”; 1989-1991 squadron commander and Naval war college in Paris. 1992 ALFAN HQ in Toulon, involved in operations in the Ex-Yugoslavia; 1994 CV Air group and chairman in the NATO study “Maritime Operations 2015”. 1996 Chief of Staff to the Admiral in command of embarked naval aviation. 1999 CVN “Charles de Gaulle” as executive officer; After studies in the Centre for Higher Military Studies (CHEM) and the Institute for High Defence Studies (IHEDN) he assumed command of CVN “Charles de Gaulle”. 2006, COMFRMARFOR, in Toulon

able and efficient development can be envisaged if partners are not assured that the use of the sea is safe, representing a common good and a priority in cooperation.

High vulnerability The growing flow of shipping reinforces the vulnerability of this sea − and our own vulnerability − too many risks and threats as pollution, shipping accidents, arms proliferation, piracy, terrorism: illegal migration and human trafficking, drug trafficking and other uncertainties are jeopardizing the regional stability. Those threats are largely transnational and the central challenge is not in locating and destroying the enemy naval forces but in maintaining good order at sea. The task is to ensure access to the maritime commons by all lawful actors and to inhibit the activities of illegal and hostile ones. It requires a range of activities extending from law enforcement at sea to defense posture. However improving maritime security and safety on the Mediterranean Sea is not only about dealing with maritime risks and threats, it is also about reinforcing partnerships Photo: wikimedia.org and prosperity of the region,

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consolidating political stability and social cohesion, and avoiding cultural misunderstandings that sometimes hide our common interests. It will lead to a change in international relations and facilitate the way towards peace. Strong efforts have been made in the last years to promote development and relationships with European-Mediterranean countries. For example, NATO through the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul cooperation initiative and the EU through the Barcelona process and now the Union for the Mediterranean Sea, have covered different dimensions − economy, democratisation process, anti-proliferation and antiterrorism aims… − and have tried to take advantage of bilateral cooperations to propose activities of common interest. I shall not forget to mention the 5+5 dialogue or the OSCE Mediterranean initiative and also some sub-regional integration attempt as the Arab-Maghreb Union or the Agadir process which contribute to feed a dynamic dialogue.

Spanish Aircraft Carrier “Principe de Asturias. Photo: Marine National, Paris

But, due to different reasons − the political difficulties of the region, the existing conflicts, the delayed economic development of some countries, bureaucratic slowness and complex processes − they have produced very limited results. The first thing is to understand exactly why. In a very simple view, we can say that Northern states take a cooperative security approach creating a web of institutions and for a that are generally distrusted by Southern States, which tend to go alone or with like- minded states.

How a regional strategy can be developed From experience, the Marine Nationale’s strategic approach for enhancing maritime security and safety is based on the bilateral and sub-regional cooperation. Our main cooperation lines cover a wide spectrum, including information exchange, common complex naval exercises, scheduled combined law

DEFENCE and ARMED FORCES

enforcement patrols or search and rescue interventions. French navy frequently cooperates with Italy or Spain, to fight drug trafficking or illegal immigration. In the area of drug trafficking, a new initiative has been launched with the MAOCN (Maritime Analysis Operation Center – Narcotics) in which 7 states (FR, EI, SP, PORT, NL, IT, UK) are involved. Its vocation is to facilitate information exchanges between nations but also between different agencies like the police services. We regularly participate in the Italian operations “Constant Vigilancy” in the strait of Sicilia ; through FRONTEX, several initiatives have also been set up to fight illegal immigration. We have also common exercises with Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.

Extend Partnership Our aim is to extend these kind of partnerships and the numerous bilateral cooperations towards a regional one or 2 sub-regional. The 5+5 MEDOC is a useful platform to build trust and allow an almost permanent dialogue. The same should be done for the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. This would contribute also to achieving a normalisation of regional relations between the countries of this area on the basis of concrete and common concerns – proliferation, pollution and environmental protection, drug trafficking, immigration… As a framework for negotiations and actions, the regional, or sub-regional, scale seems to be very well adapted: each coastal area has its own problems and this framework is a privileged one to establish relationships on common matters and concerns. It is wide enough to encompass ambitious views and restricted enough to propose concrete, flexible and applicable solutions. The goal should be to consolidate a discussion process among us: there is first a need to define common lines within the European Union − and there is a start through the integrated maritime policy − but a European vision cannot be dissociated from the North African countries issues and more generally from the global African issues − (water, energy, political stability, development of democracy, conflict resolution…). Issues not be ignored First: Some States are more concerned by an issue than others (drug, environment, prosperity, immigration…) It will of course influence the way we see maritime security and our priorities: whether to counter different threats, find a way to boost exchanges and development by stabilisation of the region; combat any illegal traffic, protect the sea resources and deal with environmental issues, facilitate coordination between the states, promote the States’ responsibilities and help them to assume it… Second: Our methods, tools and means are different: behind those differences, we have cultures, organisations, histories, legal frameworks and policies that are also different and this should not be ignored.

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Sovereignity Most of the questions regarding maritime security affect our ideas on sovereignty and most of them are primary political issues. There are not only technical questions like interoperability or communication systems. Political understanding and legal authorizations need to be in place at the international, regional and national levels. Operationally, this means military and civilian forces must be free to cooperate across jurisdictions without constant requests for permission. Even, within the framework of the EU, which is already more integrated, things are not simple. Due to the European organisation but also to those questions of Member States sovereignty and backgrounds (for example the navies’ implication is different whether it is security or safety...), maritime security policies have been developed through sectoral approaches. Cooepration ans consolidation Although we are conscious of these difficulties, some common major points can be defined: - The importance and the efficiency of naval cooperation in the Med, in maritime surveillance and security; - A first step is to develop further coordination efforts by the exchange of data regarding maritime security traffic; sharing information and knowledge are necessary to enhance our capabilities to anticipate and act instead of to endure and react. We support and lead the Blue Mass Med Pilot project that should be consolidated first among the EU MS than enlarged to the Southern Med countries. - Surveillance is one step, action and coordination of our interventions is another step. - An interagency approach to maritime security is one of the critical elements for regional stability. Security at sea will be reinforced only by the implication of the States and their sensitivity to the question. We, navies, have to promote this and to create the conditions for our administrations and policy-makers to define a common maritime security policy. - Even if there is cooperation, it should not be a pretext and keep a government away from its responsibilities: efficient actions are at the national level. And we should not forget this.

The way ahead Through the different fora, we somehow have reached significant results by developing a mutual trust and a mutual understanding at a sub-regional scale. An already fructuous cooperation has been set up with some countries. We now have to face considerable challenges to improve our cooperation (establishing basic techniques to exchange information, adopting and implementing relevant laws, monitoring mechanisms) and enhance maritime surveillance towards comprehensive a maritime security for the whole Mediterranean Sea.

Documentation Inaugural speech of French President Nicolas Sarkozy at the Paris summit of the Union for the Mediterranean held at the Grand Palais in Paris, 13 July 2008 (excerpts): (…) If we are gathered here, it is because we no longer want to be merely neighbours, we want to be partners. In 1995, Europe took the initiative of launching the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in Barcelona, which raised so many hopes among all those who love the Mediterranean and that it will one day cease to be the theatre of so many dangers and so many tragedies and will become a melting pot of civilisation again. (…) Yet the time has come for the awareness of our common destiny to prompt us to find the way to take action together, to together resume control of our common future, together write our common history. Huge challenges lie ahead, and they can only be taken up together. (…) We will only manage to build a better future by sharing power, in true solidarity, with respect for one another. This is the basis of the political choice, the moral choice, the fundamental historical choice of the Union for the Mediterranean: Parity, Equality and Shared Decision-Making Power. (…) It is in the Mediterranean that the first fraternal civilisation was born, built on the idea of diversity. It is for all the peoples of the Mediterranean to again impart this lesson to all humankind by reviving this diversity that in the past enabled all the peoples and all the faiths of Cordoba, Tangiers and Constantine, Tunis, Alexandria, Beirut and so many other cities to live in pace, with mutual respect and in the knowledge that beneath their differences lay the same sense of humanity, the same love for life and the same need for justice that united them all. (…) It is in the Mediterranean that the religions of the Book were born. It is around the Mediterranean and nowhere else that they must be reconciled. (…) Together, we can build a major alliance between Africa, the Middle East and Europe out of the Mediterranean. We can make it the cleanest sea in the world, but also the world’s largest co-development laboratory. (…) And by giving everyone access to water, food, energy and healthcare, by sharing knowledge, knowhow and education with everyone, by building shared universities, shared laboratories, by together creating the conditions for all young people to move freely between shores, by pooling our resources to safeguard people’s security as best we can, we will show al of humankind what the beautiful word civilisation can still mean. (…) And we will teach our children how peoples who have lashed so often, but who still recall Antigone’s cry - “I have come to share love, not to share hate”- and who remember that all their prayers speak of love, can once again understand and love one another. (…)

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A regional concept for a Maritime Strategy for the Black Sea by Ioan Mircea Pascu MEP, Deputy Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee, European Parliament, Brussels / Strasbourg In 2006, as Dr Olshausen points out (“Maritime Strategy – a crucial geostrategic and geopolitical challenge in a globalized environment”), the EU Commission initiated an effort to elaborate an “Integrated Maritime Policy for the Union” (IMP) in which maritime environment and surveillance are key components.

The state of the EU Integrated Maritime Policy In its 2009 Report on the implementation of the IMP, stressing the need for a regional approach, the Commission notes the results obtained so far in this direction: pilot projects on maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean and the North Sea basins, cohesion fund money for the Greek islands and the Baltic Sea (2007-2013), a Communication on the “EU and the Arctic Region” and a proposal for an “EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region” (approved by the European Council on 30 October 2009). Two things are missing so far, one substantive, the other regional. The substantive one refers to the security dimension of the IMP, which is absent as such, given the fact that such responsibility does not belong to the Commission, but to the members. The regional one is the Black Sea Area.

The political complexities of the Black Sea Area Indeed, as things stand now, this area seems marginal to the attention of the Union; while for other areas, like the North, the Baltic and the Mediterranean Seas, the EU has developed concrete strategies, for the Black Sea the Commission has come up with only a “Synergy”, as if trying only to discretely fill a gap within the general picture of the EU’s interest in the larger Euro-Asian context. This is due not to a lack of importance or interest towards the Black Sea Area, but rather to its political, military and economic complexities. It is exactly in the Black Sea that the EU, physically present since Romania

Ioan Mircea Pascu Professor Dr. Ioan Mircea Pascu was born 1949 in Satu Mare, Romania. 1980 Ph.D. in Political Science from the Institute of Political Science; 1989-1992 Member of Provisional Council for National Unity and Presidential Councillor as Head of the Foreign Policy Direction; 1993 States Secretary MOD Bukarest; 1996 MP and Chairman of the Defence and Home Affaires Committee; 2000 Minister of Defence; 2005 Observer to the European Parliament; 2007 Member of the European Parliament and Vice President of the Foreign Affaires Committee and Member of the Strategic Advisory Board of the US Atlantic Committee. His last book: “Battle for NATO − a personal account”, Bukarest 2007, 326 p.

and Bulgaria became members in 2007, is getting into direct contact with Russia and Ukraine, two of its “strategic partners”; Turkey, a major candidate; Georgia and Moldova, both riddled with major conflicts in which Russia is a key factor; not to mention the presence in the area of other actors, like NATO and the US. The defining characteristic of the area – “closed” up until the end of the Cold War to the outside powers – is exactly the fact that it is opening to such actors. Its increased value as a major route for oil and gas transportation, the exploitation of its own resources, the ecological problems and the strategic opening towards the Middle East and Central Asia have inevitably attracted outside attention, which could only trigger the reaction of particularly Russia and Turkey, namely the main “beneficiaries” of its inaccessibility during the Cold War era.

Components of an effective Black Sea strategy Given these complexities, what are the benchmarks of, and obstacles to, a potential region-

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protection against identified risks, dangers and threats” (Olshausen) in the Black Sea.

The role of Turkey

Vadu beach − landing excercise

Photo: MOD Bucharest?

al maritime strategy for the Black Sea? First, it should be mentioned that some of the ingredients of the EU IMP are to be applied anyway, given the obligation of both Romania and Bulgaria as EU members to implement them. I am referring primarily to the requirements for maritime environmental policy (Directive 2008/56/EC) and maritime surveillance. These are important aspects given, on the one hand, the current ecological problems of the Black Sea, with only one narrow opening towards the Mediterranean, and the increasing potential for a natural disaster from an oil and/or gas spill; and, on the other hand, the illegal immigration, smuggling and other organized crime activities at this gate of the European continent. However, these ingredients are not sufficient to address the other problems of the area, primarily political and military in nature, which are more important and complex at the same time. Therefore any Black Sea maritime strategy would inevitably have a political and military dimension, which, given the “weight” of the actors involved, would immediately place it in the context of the current “grand politics” (interaction between the major world powers).

In this context, apart from Russia, EU relations with Turkey are crucial. We need to admit the strategic position of this candidate country, whose relevance goes beyond the Black Sea, and make up our mind with regard to its membership. Maintaining the existing ambivalence − slow progress in membership talks combined with negative statements − is not productive. For instance, there are signs that Turkey would be ready to change its current intransigent position towards the Montreux Convention arrangements regulating the naval military activity in the Black Sea − which could open the way for a regime supportive of the main aim of the regional maritime strategy − provided that membership becomes achievable. Naturally, any such maritime strategy would need to build upon the existing economic and military collaboration and cooperation between all the riparian states, like the “Black Sea Economic Cooperation” (BSEC), the “Blackseafor” and the “Black Sea Harmony” respectively. The only question is if the current “Black Sea Synergy” would be the right catalyst.

The Danube And, in the end, one word about another indispensable component of a potential Black Sea maritime strategy: the Danube river. Leaving aside the aspect that the Danube is a maritime artery up to the port of Braila and is linked to the North Sea through the Mainz-Rhine Channel, it has been opened up for commercial traffic by the gradual elimination of the blockage relating to the situation of Serbia. The fact that the Danube is the main river artery of the continent and is almost completely under EU control and jurisdiction entitles it special attention in the context of any Black Sea regional maritime strategy.

Conclusion Moreover, any EU Regional Maritime Strategy for the Black Sea should be equally general and detailed at the same time. For instance, if the EU wants to contribute to the general stabilization of the Black Sea Area, then it would have to be more engaged in solving the conflicts in the South Caucasus and Transnistria. This means, on the one hand, special attention to both Georgia and Moldova, and, on the other hand, less ambivalence towards Russia, the key factor in any solution. True, cooperation with Russia is indispensable, but so is clarity in what is tolerable and what is not. In general, the EU cannot conceive a regional maritime strategy towards the area unless it “tailors” its general policies, like the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, to meeting the requirements of achieving the aim of such a strategy, namely “the undisturbed, uninterrupted execution of the economic function under existing laws and regulation and

The future might bring some improvements for bringing defense and security closer to the IMP framework. The guidelines established by the General Affairs and External Relations Council in November 2009 envisage a more ambitious integration of maritime surveillance, including “bringing together the appropriate civilian and military aspects”. By the end of 2010, the Commission will draw a Roadmap for the integrated approach, to be updated in 2011 with lessons learned from ESDP operations. At the same time, the Commission’s vision for maritime policy underlines the importance of sea-basin strategies for the future implementation of the IMP. As important as they may be, these steps will not represent more than tactical advances. The decision for a Black Sea regional maritime strategy must be political and taken at the grand strategic level. For the time being, it seems that the Union is rather shy in acknowledging its role as a Black Sea power.

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NATO’s approach to Maritime Security: a bold vision by Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, Head of the Planning Section Operations Division, International Staff NATO, Brussels Next November, NATO’s Heads of State and Government will approve a new Strategic Concept at a summit meeting in Lisbon. This Concept will address the evolving security environment, set out the Alliance’s core functions and identify their implications for NATO’s further transformation, against the background of emerging risks, demanding operational engagements and constrained resources. The Concept is also expected to formulate guidance on the complementarities, in terms of commitments and capabilities, between the enduring core task of collective defence and the missions contributing to crisis prevention and conflict resolution. Such guidance will be important in helping better define the roles of NATO structures and Alliance forces in underpinning shared security interests among the Allies in relation to new risks and concerns, such as homeland security, energy security and maritime security. These are interests that straddle the boundary between defence and security, whose protection falls, traditionally, under the jurisdiction of individual nations, but whose successful pursuit would greatly benefit from a more determined collective approach in the framework of NATO, in concert with other actors. The range of NATO roles in this category extends from contributing to improved homeland security preparedness and the protection of critical energy infrastructure to the promotion of enhanced maritime security.

The changing maritime dimension of security The statistics are compelling – water covers 71 percent of the Earth’s surface and over 90 percent of the world’s trade is seaborne. For decades after World War Two, the world’s oceans and seas were a secure space for commerce and travel, ruled by the universal principle of freedom of navigation. NATO maritime forces contributed successfully from the sea to deterrence of general war. However, since the 1990s, as a result of the growing impact on the maritime commons of globalisation, technological innovation, and events on land such as mass migration flows, the security and safety of the maritime domain can no longer be assumed with the same level of confidence. Unrelenting illegal immigration across the Mediterranean Sea, recurrent acts of piracy against merchant shipping off the coast of Somalia, and occasional but devastating terrorist attacks at sea, such as those conducted against the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole in 2000 and the French-flagged tanker MV Limburg two years later, are just some of the most telling indicators of this negative pattern. Ubiquitous criminal activities of one sort

Diego Ruiz Palmer Head of the Planning Section in the Operations Division of NATO’s International Staff, Brussels, where he is concerned with maritime security matters. In the 1980s, he was associated with the office of the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, in the U.S. Department of Defense. In the 1990s, on an earlier tour on NATO’s International Staff, he served in the Defence Support Division as Head of Armaments Planning. He has also been Vice-President, European Region, Northrop Grumman International, Inc.

or another, from arms smuggling to the illegal narcotics trade, often occur at sea “below the radar screen”, suspected but undetected. Far more dangerous maritime risks, associated with mass terrorism and with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lurk beyond the horizon. Left unchecked, these trends would, in time, affect adversely most nations, irrespective of size, wealth and location, and undermine global security and prosperity. Fortunately, the international community has many legal instruments and civil and military capabilities at its disposal to stem the tide. The challenge is how best to tie them together while respecting national sovereignty and customary law, and the competencies of various actors and institutions, to help preserve a secure and safe, as well as ecologically-friendly, maritime environment. From a policy standpoint, the often-cited Comprehensive Approach finds immediate resonance and applicability in the maritime domain; here merchant shipping and naval forces share the same space and maritime commands and civil agencies operate alongside each other.

Measures to enhance maritime security There is a widespread recognition that bolstering maritime security requires a multi-layered approach. Such an approach would combine, on a national as well as an international basis, enhanced legal and regulatory regimes, improved surveillance and information-exchange, and expanded cooperation between law-enforcement and military authorities, both to help extend the rule of law outward from home waters to the high seas and to protect coastal areas and harbours from blue water seaborne

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others. These NATO operations are backed-up by a robust command, control, communications and surveillance infrastructure ashore, centred on the naval headquarters at Naples, Italy, and Northwood, United Kingdom, extending eastwards and westwards from Europe; a combination of four standing surface groups and five on-call, highreadiness blue water task forces, which together provide an unrivaled multinational rapid response capability; standard operating procedures; and a high degree of interoperability in all forms of maritime operations.

NATO boarding party boarding a merchant ship during Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea Photo: ESDU/NATO

risks. This can only happen if there is greater resolve, from all actors concerned, to overcome institutional and cultural barriers to consultation and cooperation, notably regarding the routine and timely release of information, while maintaining the principle of originator control. Whereas civilian law-enforcement agencies will continue to lead maritime-oriented law-enforcement efforts, nationally as well as multilaterally, navies can contribute ocean-going surveillance, tracking and interdiction capabilities, both on a routine and contingency basis. Such contributions can help extend the surveillance space inwards towards land masses and outwards towards the high seas, filling blind spots in coastal waters as well as gaps in wide-area oceanic coverage, particularly along well-travelled but vulnerable shipping lanes.

NATO’s contributions to enhanced maritime security NATO has an established record of conducting multinational maritime operations of variable scale, rooted in the proud seafaring traditions and extensive naval capabilities of many Allies and in the planning and exercising practices inherited from the Cold War. Today, NATO’s navies continue to play essential roles in deterrence and defence and, through military outreach and cooperation, in projecting stability across the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. These are essential contributions of Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), which was launched in 2001 following the terrorist attacks on the United States to enhance security in the Mediterranean Sea. While initiated under the aegis of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, OAE has benefited from the contributions of a diverse set of NATO partners, such as Russia, Ukraine, Morocco and Israel. Off the coast of Somalia, Operation Ocean Shield constitutes NATO’s enduring participation in international anti-piracy efforts alongside the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, and warships from China, India, Japan, Russia and

Compelling policy guidance – the basis for future contributions

In recognition of the ever expanding contributions of NATO’s maritime forces to security and stability, in addition to deterrence and defence, NATO’s governing body, the North Atlantic Council, directed last year the NATO Military Authorities − the Military Committee and the Supreme Allied Commanders, Europe (SACEUR) and Transformation (SACT) − to formulate a broad-based Alliance Maritime Strategy, as well as a supporting concept for Maritime Security Operations. Both will complement earlier work to develop a Maritime Situational Awareness capability. The Council’s intent is to ensure that NATO’s maritime-oriented operations, force structures and capability development benefit from clear and compelling policy guidance, while at the same time orienting NATO’s future contributions to enhanced maritime security. Accordingly, the Maritime Strategy has the ambition to set out, comprehensively, the roles and contributions of maritime forces, in a joint and combined context, to the Alliance’s wider security functions across the defence-security continuum. There is an expectation that this Strategy may also help define the maritime dimension of Alliance security in the new Strategic Concept. In turn, the Maritime Security Operations concept aims to provide operationally-applicable guidance on the range of Alliance contributions to non-military maritime missions. The envisaged contributions include surveillance; information-exchange; concerted planning and action, where applicable, with national and international lawenforcement organisations; and assistance to maritime security sector reform and capacity-building. A particular aspect of this endeavour will encompass seeking pragmatic ways of enhancing consultation and cooperation with the European Union and its maritime bodies. The maritime domain stands at the cross-roads of new risks and NATO’s ambition to contribute to their mitigation. Together with a maturing Maritime Situational Awareness capability, the Alliance’s Maritime Strategy and Maritime Security Operations Concept will reflect this bold vision for a new strategic age.

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A Maritime Security Strategy for Europe â&#x20AC;&#x201C; view from industries by Dr. Markus Hellenthal, CEO Thales Deutschland, Stuttgart

The European Union plays a leading role in global maritime commerce. Europeans own or control forty percent of the world's merchant fleet. Ninety percent of Europe's foreign trade and forty percent of its domestic trade is shipped by sea. Twothirds of all Europeans live on or near the 68,000-kilometer coastline. Europe's coastal regions generate forty percent of the EU's GDP. Merchant shipping and port operation account for one-third of these totals. About twenty-five percent of Germany's exports leave the country by sea. Germany's harbors handle 265 million tonnes of freight annually. Globally, about eighty percent of world trade is shipped on sea-going vessels.

Maritime Security is the basis for prosperity Maritime security keeps the world's seas free and safe, offers freedom for shipping and trade, enables economic growth, prosperity and political stability, and last but not least, protects the ocean's natural resources. A common interest for all nations is to achieve two complementary goals: enable maritime commerce to flourish and thereby strengthen economic stability, and to protect it from terrorism on the seas, hostile and criminal invasions, as well as natural and environmental catastrophes. Given this generally accepted premise, the objective is to effectively and continuously protect the seas' vulnerabilities from illegal exploitation and negligence or deliberate harm. This includes: 1. maritime industrial infrastructures (particularly oil and gas fields, refineries and loading & offloading stations), transportation systems, port facilities, national borders, tourist and recreational areas, as well as 2. the oceans and their resources. In the context of this discussion, we are talking not only about protecting vulnerable marine areas from terrorist, criminal or hostile attacks or invasions, but also about minimizing the impact of harmful incidents that arise in spite of our best efforts, and restoring the normal, desirable conditions as soon as possible. This all requires a concerted and integrated way of controlling the resources relevant to the oceans' waters, infrastructure, transportation means and activities, including law enforcement, preventive and regenerative efforts, and effective emergency and catastrophe management systems.

Suitable steps Suitable steps must be taken to avoid the aforementioned dangers as much as possible, or at least minimize them. This

Dr. Markus Hellenthal CEO Thales Germany Dr. Markus Hellenthal was born in DĂźsseldorf, Germany, on October 9, 1957. He has studied law, socology and, as a post graduade, public admnistration. He is Chief Executive Officer of Thales Germany and Senior Vice President of Thales. Prior to this, he held executive positions in the private and public sectors. As Senior Vice President, he was responsible for EADS business development for civil security solutions. He worked as Partner with Accenture, a consultancy, and held various executive police functions in the German Ministry of the Interior. Dr. Hellenthal has been representing German industry as chairman of the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) and in other international bodies.

starts with risk prevention, being continuously on guard for emerging risks and implementing effective deterrents. Continuous combat to exclude recurring risks may be required. To be successful, we need secure command, control and communications capabilities, as well as an appropriate common operational procedure. In short: quite literally, we need a maritime picture and must continuously manage the lessons learned. It should be clear that the seas, similar to the airspace, are in principle geographically unprotected other than in relatively small sovereign territories. This makes cooperation between governments combined with public/private sector collaboration a decisive factor when it comes to guaranteeing global maritime security. However, at the present time, responsibilities for maritime security, as for most security issues, vary from country to country. The respective security requirements depend on the political and administrative organization, and often also vary within the countries themselves.

Military versus civil activities Countries have been able to align themselves militarily, at least to a certain extent, against the challenges in the world of defense against conventional outside threats, which are increasingly defined by what is currently summarized under the heading "asymmetric threats". Countries adapted to this new situation relatively quickly by reorienting their defense capabilities and their military alliances toward the new challenges. In many cases, this required modifying their organizational structures. Countries should now use this approach to address new civilian security requirements, especially since this new type of

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threat does not really distinguish between “internal” and “external”. It is nevertheless also clear that a transformation in the civilian sphere is even more difficult than in the military given the special nature of the state/citizen relationship in a democracy governed by the rule of law. Furthermore, in most if not all countries, the myriad public and private security organizations, some of which are often military organizations that are legally or factually tied into ensuring civilian safety, are sometimes even splintered.

The tools necessary Here too, a performance-based solution oriented toward the aforementioned diverse vulnerabilities of the seas should be implemented within a coherent security organization. The first step should be to establish a coherent and fully integrated security organization, at least at the European level, which should encompass at least the following three segments: coastline, territorial waters (12-mile zones) and an exclusive economic zone (200-mile zone). Ultimately, this would allow the introduction of a proper maritime traffic management system that would correspond to the current airspace control methods, and a comprehensive European maritime security risk management process. This would greatly improve maritime security. However, network, centric security requires that all stakeholders have access to and react to a common and comprehensive relevant situational status. Quick access to and mutual exchange of information are the basis of an efficient process that improves response capabilities and thereby mission success. Modern, innovative and compatible support tech-nology is therefore required to guarantee optimum resource availability and improved loading capacity. This includes bringing the existing systems in the various countries to a state where those at the working and decisionmaking levels are able to interpretatively and seamlessly communicate and cooperate with one another. At the present time, this is really not the case, even though the stakeholders' authorities - at least in Europe - regularly claim that the joint systems are already functioning. At best, these are currently conventional paper- or telephone-based exchanges of information, which are unable to provide a common picture of the maritime situation in real time.

The implementation of a comprehensive solution is a prerequisite But shared real-time situation analysis would be a key prerequisite for putting an effective networked security concept into practice. On the other hand, a good number of the necessary technologies are already in place, even though many are not yet interoperabe. At the same time, a great number of stakeholders and security components must be integrated and

political decision-making processes taken into consideration. Implementing a comprehensive solution is therefore a very complex undertaking, which is why the EU Commission is rightly promoting pilot projects to be implemented as part of the seventh EU security framework program. Thales is one of the key expert contributors to this program.

The difficult contributions of the nations: the example of Germany Contributions from individual member states are essential to an international security architecture. In Germany too, increased risks and vulnerabilities must be met with improved

High Technology for surveillance on sea: two French first class frigates type „Horizon“ Photo: Marine National, Paris

networked cooperation and the use of modern technology. An end-to-end coast and sea monitoring system can and should therefore be based upon existing infrastructures and be expanded beyond national and organizational boundaries. From a first principles perspective, a good example is the maritime security center in Cuxhaven, where all official maritime responsibilities and activities of nearly twenty participating German federal and state authorities and organizations are coordinated. This joint federal/state center, which started operations on January 1, 2007, collects data in the conventional manner described above. In addition, it processes information gathered from a network of sensors in the coastal regions and in the air and data received from participating and neighboring German and foreign authorities and organizations or from ships and shipping companies. This information is then processed to provide a situation report. However, the center is not a joint integrated situation and central command center, but continues to be only a coordination facility. The almost twenty participating German federal and state authorities and or-ganizations each continue to have unrestricted independent jurisdiction over marine security. The participants also acknowledge that it cannot yet be considered a seamless and interoperative coop-

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Security throughout the M erative entity. The nice images of the alleged German Coast Guard as seen on television for many years is unfortunately still an illusion. On the other hand, a joint maritime situation and command center would not necessarily conflict with German federalism, provided existing mandates are not withdrawn, but merely effectively bundled so that employees are dependent upon cooperation and obliged to work toward a common goal. This would enable Germany to make a decisive contribution toward improving maritime security.

Maritime security solutions by industries A network, centric security matrix incorporating both horizontal and vertical levels creates an extensive security infrastructure. It provides a uniform, situation-appropriate status report along a type of security management bus and at the same time, gives integrated users the ability to act autonomously in a coordinated manner, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of their responses.

by Michael Lenton, Group Business Development Dire

The Mediterranean presents a new range of highly complex safety and security challenges stemming from its strategic location, importance to the economies of three continents and broad cultural mix. These challenges need to be met both to assure continued economic growth and to prevent the region from becoming overwhelmed by the transition from “soft” issues such as political, social and economic concerns to “hard” issues including the consequences of crime, illegal immigration and fundamentalist terrorism. A collective approach is needed and should be implemented. This paper explores some of the considerations and an industrial viewpoint for a possible collaborative model for regional safety and security.

Mare Nostrum The maritime security solutions offered by Thales precisely address these challenging demands: comprehensive protection of the blue border and security at sea. They incorporate the three relevant segments − coastline (including harbors and industrial plants), territorial waters (12-mile zones) and exclusive economic zone (200-mile zone) into a coherent, fully integrated security architecture. We use it to support our customers and enable them to expand or maintain their capabilities, providing wide-ranging and sustainable security for the coastline, the adjoining seas, the seabed and coastal zones.

The world needs an integrative approach .However, in spite of all this, it should be clear that implementing a single project to secure a harbor does not effectively and permanently improve maritime security. What is needed instead is an overarching political and operative approach that will bring about a security system with a global reach that takes into consideration the various needs of the great number of stakeholders. This not only applies for Germany, but also for Europe and the world. The world's countries and Europe would be best served by an integrated approach, because it would provide greater and more effective security for us all. Accordingly, Thales expressly supports European efforts to coordinate and ultimately integrate the maritime surveillance systems of the EU member states. This will also enable the necessary synergies between military and civilian capabilities and widely networked multi-user systems to be established, thereby improving their effectiveness and efficiency from both a cost and operational perspective. Ultimately, implementing professional processes and technologies and being innovative will greatly improve our societies' resistance capabilities in the area of marine security.

There can be few areas in the world where so many differing cultures, interests and aspirations meet than the Mediterranean. Its historical importance to the trade and security of ancient empires is mirrored today as the renewed strategic importance of the region both economically and politically is recognised globally and is driving the debate about how to ensure its security. It should be remembered moreover that as the attention of the world begins to move to other regions, Asia, Central Africa for whatever reasons, time may be running out for the kind of broad based consensus solutions that in the past would have seen the US engaged to the extent that Europeans have seen it throughout the past century. The challenges in providing safety and security stem from its diversity. The region is at the confluence of Europe, the Middle East, Africa and former Soviet satellite countries and is a primary conduit for trade. This diversity has throughout the ages begotten the richness of the Mediterranean as a cultural melting pot but it has recurrently also been the cause of major conflict.

The real threats As the European nations seek to promote initiatives favouring stability and security one wonders whether the models for dialogue and détente that have worked for the last 60 years for Europe (EU, NATO etc.) will be effective in allaying the real threats to a peaceful future for the region. Tensions that need reconciling are rapidly evolving, so the steps needed to manage those tensions must show similar dynamism. The new soft challenges The Mediterranean is a virtually closed sea with millions of

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Mediterranean – a complex challenge

ector Selex Galileo, A Finmeccanica Group, Rome

shoreline inhabitants and numerous tributaries carrying the run off from countless inland cities and industries. It is also a major shipping lane fundamental to the economic well being of the region and far beyond through trade. New fossil fuel pipelines are converging across the Mediterranean as alternative sources of supply are established and as new links are formed - so is greater economic interdependence and economic stability. The increasing public awareness of the fragility of this ecosystem needs to be balanced against the right to thoroughfare, trade, continued energy supply and commercial exploitation. Rising national and regional pride The all-engulfing drift towards global consumer values must be balanced against the rising national and regional pride and will to safeguard the multifaceted cultural identity of the Mediterranean peoples. In its moderate expression, this will increases the region’s already immeasurable cultural heritage. In the extreme this will threatens regional and global security in the form of political and religious radicalism of all kinds. Alas, the examples are numerous and unprecedented in recent times. • A growing throng of 350 million persons of the have-nots faces onto a narrow strip of water separating them from the exceedingly wealthy. • Organised crime feeds on the economic disparity and the strong drive to cross the deep to perceived prosperity. As the deeds of criminal organisations reach beyond narcotics and contraband to people trafficking and on towards weapons of mass destruction, so the available technological resources adopted by criminals has begun seriously challenging the traditional crime fighting methods used by regional law enforcement agencies, typical of the asymmetry of modern conflicts.

New tools are needed: political, legislative and hardware. The European nations have no shortage of models for political dialogue. As controversial as any innovative political proposal may be, the ongoing establishment of the Mediterranean Union, by building on the long standing Barcelona process, moves the European Union closer to the Southern Mediterranean nations. In seeking the consensus of the non EU Member nations of the Mediterranean, the political process must enhance the attractiveness of the solution in real long lasting political and

Michael Lenton Michael Richard Lenton, is the Selex Galileo S.p.A. (A Finmeccanica Company) Rome – Group Business Development Director. He was born in 1959 in Sidney, Australia and is of Australian nationality. Degree in Law (1983 Macquarie University, Sydney) and Degree in Arts (1981 Macquarie University, Sydney). The most important stations his career: 2003 Finmeccanica SpA, Roma – Vice President, Aeronautical Products 1991 Sky Helicopteros S.A., Mallorca, Spain – General Manager 1987 Helijet Pty. Ltd., Brisbane, Australia – Base Manager 1984 Agusta SpA, Milano – Civil Helicopter Sales Manager, S.E. Asia & Pacific Region

economic terms and not just in form; for if the Mediterranean Union is, as some claim, a means, inter alia, of engaging with Turkey in view of its aspirations to full membership in the EU, it must go a long way to satisfying Turkey’s expectations for participation, economic interaction and security. The Mediterranean Union will be a testing ground for the intensity and quality of dialogue and cooperation short of EU membership – it’s effectiveness will be scrutinised by all, particularly the Southern neighbours. Common legislation for matters of mutual concern Moving from softer to harder issues, the legislative forum around the Mediterranean must ensure the necessary degree of certainty in implementation of the rule of law that all the Mediterranean neighbours have come to expect, particularly in matters of mutual concern and responsibility such as fighting the narcotics and people trafficking across the Mediterranean Sea. These matters normally raise major jurisdictional and procedural issues and all too often result in a failure to bring the perpetrators to justice because of questions of, say, attainment and admissibility of evidence. Regrettably, the message to the trans-national criminal organisations is clear, while casting the victims back into the darkness and uncertainty they sought to escape from.

How to overcome the threats for security Given the broad availability of processes in place for Europe to draft common legislation on matters of mutual interest, it appears all the more crucial that an acceptable and effective forum for common or shared legislation involving also the Mediterranean’s Southern neighbours be found.

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Make hardware available The best political intentions will fail if the hardware to implement a policy is not available. The constraining effects of the current financial crisis on government acquisition, the surge in demand for equipment for out of area operations and the growing technological capability of the criminal organisations impose that efficient models for asset availability be implemented. Creation of win to win solutions FRONTEX, the EU agency mandated with coordinating intelligence driven operational cooperation at EU level to strengthen security at external borders ran a series of successful studies and exercises. They consisted in the pooling of EU member state assets such as maritime patrol aircraft and vessels for surveillance and rescue activities in the Mediterranean and off the North African Atlantic coast. The supply of the assets to FRONTEX on a commercial basis by multiple national border control and law enforcement agencies turned the exercise into an effective win-win solution for all increasing certainty of asset availability, containing costs, improving the relationship between Member States and external partners within a model of integrated border management. Creating European tangible capabilities The attractiveness of the commercially inspired service provision model for the supply of otherwise essential assets is further evidenced in the European Air Transport Fleet initiative recently launched by the European Defence Ministers to be effected by the European Defence Agency. The concept envisages the pooling of national assets, equipment, crews, logistics and training. It is submitted that this model, although somewhat of a novelty within the defence and law enforcement arenas has the potential to ensure the availability of necessary capabilities with the requisite technological levels and timing at better conditions than under traditional acquisition models. Interaction between agencies The other benefits lie in the intense operational interaction between agencies, the multiplicity of national suppliers, the interoperability and standardisation of the service and the overall enhanced security. Most importantly, it is evidence of the translation of political intentions into concrete proposals creating tangible European capabilities and improving the capacity for crisis management operations.

Industry’s important role for regional security Industry has an important role to play in contributing to regional security. Real time awareness of developments in a particular area of interest on the ground, or on the sea such as

movement of persons or military assets can provide the decision makers the time and tactical advantage to adopt political measures to avoid a rapid escalation of events into a regional tension or conflict. Seamless surveillance and anticipatory decision making is the drive behind a complex industrial programme like NATO-Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). Departing from their base in Sicily the AGS unmanned air vehicles will monitor the Mediterranean basin providing unprecedented awareness and enhanced security and safety. Finmeccanica is one of the founding industrial partners of NATO’s AGS programme providing highly advanced equipment and expertise in defence electronics, radars, lasers, communications, surveillance mission systems, manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft, and sea and ground based assets. Finmeccanica’s strength lies in its ability to integrate information gathering sensors and classification subsystems into highly complex security management systems for national and partnered solutions. Although a global company, Finmeccanica’s presence throughout all the Mediterranean neighbouring countries ensures that sensitivity and fosters the trust needed to move the issues of security from a national to regional endeavour in preventing conflict and in the forewarning of any threat to the wellbeing and prosperity of the whole Mediterranean.

Conclusion The laying out of a blueprint of solutions is not easy. It is not only the number of challenges but their diversity that makes the task so overwhelming. Certainly clarification through dialogue within the multiple political fora – including the EU, the Mediterranean Union, NATO and bilaterally – are indispensable, but action is also required. This paper calls for greater legislative clarity and commonality, novel business models to ensure asset availability and a highly relevant industrial partnership solution. These actions will unlikely do away with the tensions at the root of the challenges but we must make every effort to balance those tensions. In deed it is undesirable that the diversity that so enriches the Mediterranean region disappear in the interest of a controlled and predictable yet potentially unsympathetic notion of security. Failure to understand the dynamics of the tensions will make balancing them impossible and rather than reducing the regional conflicts the Mediterranean risks facing more.

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Unmanned Air Systems and the NATO Maritime Forces – an industrial view by Michael Isherwood, Senior Analyst Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, Washington Two successful NATO Operations The NATO maritime operations from September 2001 to nowadays had been successful, but lesons had to be learned. NATO intercept operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR NATO maritime forces have been in high demand during the past decade. They have provided an effective tool for the Alliance’s political leadership to exert influence and promote peace within NATO and in Out of Area operations. These forces are often out of sight to those on shore, but a force to be reckoned with for those threatening stability on the high seas. Given the importance of the maritime domain to European interests, NATO’s reliance on maritime forces is natural. Immediately following the attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, NATO launched Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR – its maritime intercept operations to deter extremist groups from using the Mediterranean Sea as a line of communication. Since that time, NATO vessels have boarded 155 suspected ships as part of its presence and deterrence posture. Those vessels declining boarding are reported to law enforcement officials who take action when the ship enters a port. In the process, NATO’s presence has maintained a deterrent posture in the region. Soon after starting Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, NATO naval vessels joined CTF-152 with operations in the Arabian Gulf in order to promote maritime security in this area as well. Most recently, NATO responded to the United Nations request for escort and protection of World Food Program ships off Somalia’s eastern coast. These operations have evolved over the past two years with Operation OCEAN SHIELD now in place. OCEAN SHIELD provides ten NATO ships in two Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMG). The SNMG mission is deterring piracy while also conducting training for maritime forces of regional nations’ seeking to improve their anti-piracy capabilities. NATO Counterterrorist network operation OCEAN SHIELD OCEAN SHIELD is the newest and in some ways, the most dynamic operation. It is charged with countering violent extremists and terror networks and working with regional and coalition partners to improve overall maritime security. The maritime forces commander has been given a mission in a very broad geographic area of responsibility. To fulfill its mandate, OCEAN SHIELD vessels must deter and prevent piracy in a vast area – the Gulf of Aden and waters east of Somalia encompass more than 480,000 square miles (1,243,200 square kilometers).

Michael Isherwood Michael Isherwood is a Senior Analyst in Northrop Grumman’s Analysis Center where he provides indepth analysis of military, political, and technological developments affecting national security. Prior to joining Northrop Grumman, Mike served for 24 years in the Air Force, retiring at the grade of Colonel. He is a command pilot with combat tours over Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. He commanded at the squadron through wing level. His staff assignments included serving as a Special Assistance the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Staff, USAF plus serving as the deputy Air Component Command Element in Afghanistan. Mike was a distinguished graduate (with honors) from the US Air Force Academy, the US Air Force Weapons School and the National War College. His recent publications include: “Aerospace Forces for Hybrid Warfare”, Air Force Magazine, September 2009; “Strike Now: The Next Generation Long Range Strike System provides strategic options”, Armed Forces Journal, February 2009; “Over The Next Hill: The New Generation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and the Marine Corps,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 2008. “Five Years After Operation ANACONDA: Challenges and Opportunities,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Fall 2007

Experience in Operations While charged with unique missions, these three NATO maritime operations highlight a common and urgent requirement — the need for effective and interoperable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) forces. Demand on Naval ISR Forces The nature of the maritime environment places unique demands on naval ISR forces. Activities at sea occur around the clock and over extraordinary distances. As a result, naval commanders value ISR capabilities that offer significant persistence where their sensors can collect, classify and distinguish a wide variety of data – allowing Sailors to develop a robust awareness throughout this area. The various ships throughout the flotilla must be able to see and exploit the ISR information, regardless of their nationality or language. NATO leaders understand that no single ISR platform can provide all the requisite information. That is why NATO has invested in a range of capabilities – from space-based sensors to manned fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft and surface vessels – all operating in concert. Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) offer the newest tool to provide a sustained High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) ISR capability.

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HALE ISR UAV − a lead element for deployment of Naval-Forces

The tools for naval ISR HALE UAS forces are unique. By removing the pilot from the air vehicle and placing them on the earth’s surface, NATO military forces can take advantage of persistence gained from long range, long endurance technology. In addition, HALE UAS operate well above 45,000 feet mean sea level. Flight operations at these altitudes have the advantage of being clear of adverse weather, to include jet streams that can reduce the air vehicle’s speed to close rapidly to a point of interest. Performance High altitude also improves sensor performance. At 60,000 feet, the HALE vehicle’s radar horizon is one-third farther than an aircraft operating at 30,000 feet – 301 nm compared to 212 nm. This allows the HALE UAS signals intelligence sensor to instantaneously monitor more than 284,000 square miles (7,335,500 square kilometers) in a wide area surveillance mode, more than double what an aircraft at half the altitude can monitor. In addition to the signal and radar sensors ranging to the horizon, a HALE UAS can operate multiple sensors, such as Automatic Information System (AIS), which tracks cooperating ships. The HALE UAS can also provide a moving target intelligence sensor. If the HALE UAS has an electro-optical and infrared sensor, much like the NATO AGS platform, naval commanders will be able to obtain a visual image of ships operating throughout the area that are detected from the other wide area surveillance modes. Thus, the HALE UAS can provide a diverse payload of sensors which can provide a wide range of information. Operational Advantages The HALE ISR platform also offers a variety of additional advantages to the combined task force. NATO’s two SNMFG could

Photo: Northrup Grumman

simultaneously monitor an area of approximately 78,000 square miles (202,020 square kilometers) if all 10 ships deployed their SH-60 to expand the ship’s surface monitoring capability. The SH-60, however, could maintain an operating radius of 50 miles for 3 hours before returning to the ship to refuel, creating gaps in coverage. Flying the SH-60s to provide continuous, 24 hour coverage would be problematic, if not impossible. Cost effevtivness As mentioned, a single HALE UAS orbit could monitor 284,000 square miles – over a three-fold increase to the ship-rotary-wing combination. Just as important, the HALE UAS could remain on station for 24 hours at a quarter of the cost of the rotary wing costs. With its speed, it could close on a suspect vessel for visual identification within 20-30 minutes of detection. Once there, it can monitor the ship an pass detailed coordinates to a NATO ship or aircraft, allowing them to pick up the tracking responsibilities. In addition, if an attack does occur from a vessel that was not previously determined to be suspect, the HALE ISR data files can be reviewed to determine the attacking ship’s point of origin.

HALE ISR UAV- Lead element for deployment of NATO Forces Thus, the HALE ISR UAS can complement the NATO fleet with an efficient, effective and flexible asset that increases the commander’s situational awareness across a significant area. Maritime ISR requirements have always been a daunting challenge with NATO turning to its naval forces as a lead element to deploy into this environment. Past experience has reinforced the need for flexible, versatile and capable forces. Unmanned ISR forces can provide robust systems to support the deployed commanders’ needs.

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European Union European Parliament Hearing of Catherine Ashton, the EU High-Representative Vice President of the Commission designate for foreign policy On 11 January, Baroness Catherine Ashton, the High Representative and Vice President of the Commission-designate was questioned by the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee about the EU diplomatic service, her dual role working for both Council and Commission, and foreign policy issues ranging from energy security to Afghanistan during her three-hour confirmation hearing at Parliament. European External Action Service (EEAS): In her opening statement, she told MEPs the European External Action Service (EEAS) “will be a top priority and not just a bureaucratic exercise”, adding that it was a “once in a generation opportunity to build something that brings together all the elements of our engagement – political, economic and military – to implement one coherent strategy” in foreign policy. She added that the new body “would be subject to full scrutiny by Parliament”. Afghanistan, Middle-East, Iran: “Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East, Somalia and Yemen are clearly among some of the top priorities”, she said, adding that she intended “to travel to Washington soon, to discuss with Hillary Clinton and other top US officials how we can pull together our strategies and actions on the global issues”. On Iran, she said it was “regrettable that Tehran did not accept the agreement under the IAEA”. Energy and EU-Russia relations: “We need to have a strong relationship with Russia”, stated Lady Ashton. On energy, she advocated “diversification of sources of supply” as well as a strategy to avoid relying on energy coming solely from Russia. She told MEPs she had on her “a map of the pipelines”. Relationship with NATO: Lady Ashton stressed that the European Defence Agency should be developed, as should research and development across the Member States. She was also in favour of “working pragmatically for a very effective EUNATO partnership”. Information on Lady Ashton’s hearing and the hearings of all Commissioners-designate can be found at the European Parliament’s Hearings website: www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/

European Commission Roadmap for maritime surveillance Following the Communication on the integration of maritime surveillance presented in October 2009 and endorsed by the Council in December, a new roadmap for the maritime common information sharing environment is currently being produced by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for maritime affairs. The roadmap, which could change the nature of future EU-level information sharing in the maritime sector, will be released soon for comment from Member States and other parts of the European Commission involved in maritime questions.

European Council Stockholm Programme adopted The Stockholm Programme is the EU’s next five-year plan for the area of freedom, security and justice (2010-2014) and replaces the Hague Programme from 2004. The new programme, which was adopted by the Heads of state and government at their summit of 10/11 December 2009, specifies the frameworks for EU police and customs cooperation, rescue services cooperation, criminal and civil law cooperation, and asylum, migration and visa policy. It gives a new priority to the citizen and tries to strike a balance between measures to ensure the EU’s common security and measures that ensure the rule of law and the rights of the individual. The European Council invited the Commission to present an Action Plan on the Stockholm Programme in the first six months of 2010 in order to translate the aims and priorities of the Stockholm Programme into concrete actions with a timetable for adoption and implementation. A mid-term review on the implementation of the programme should be submitted by the Commission before June 2012.

General Council Joint EU-US declaration on aviation security The Home Affairs Ministers of the EU Member States, together with the Vice President of the European Commission and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security of the United States of America, met informally in Toledo (Spain). They discussed current terrorist threats, in particular the attempted attack on an aircraft approaching Detroit on 25th December 2009, ways to strengthen international security measures and standards for aviation security, and an upcoming global dialogue on securing international travel. A joint declaration

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expressed the will to continue the “excellent cooperation between the EU and the United States on aviation security issues based on the EU-U.S. Air Transport Agreement”, to intensify regular discussion on transport security by way of the EU-U.S. Transport Security Working Group, and to exchange research results, technical expertise, and practical experiences, including concerning explosives.

European Agencies EDA’s view on the naval DTIB During a speech at a Conference titled “Europe a naval power” in December in Paris, the EDA’s Chief Executive, Alexander Weis, the expressed the EDA’s views on the naval European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, underlining the efforts needed in this domain. Weis also announced that the EDA has proposed to all maritime EU Member States to cooperate on Future Naval Logistics Shipping. Mr Weis said that he could imagine a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) related to naval capabilities. But he underlined that the implementation of a PSC in the area of a European Naval DTIB will largely depend on the political and the military will for cooperation. He explained that the naval sector represents roughly 25% of the DTIB in Europe, while aerospace represents 54% and land systems 21%. He said that the current European Naval DTIB offers in many aspects very sophisticated products, but he explained that innovation clearly does not come from the export but from the domestic market. For Mr Weiss the current Naval DTIB is characterised by overcapacities, fragmentation and redundant structures.

EU Missions The fight against corruption On the occasion of the International Anti-Corruption Day in December 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) with the support of EUPOL Afghanistan re-launched its media campaign to fight corruption. On billboards and in newspapers the campaign asks the Afghan people to stop corruption and to report cases of bribery and corruption to the emergency phone number 119. Kai Vittrup, Head of Mission of EUPOL Afghanistan, welcomed the campaign as an important step forward to raise awareness among the Afghan citizens and to highlight the efforts of the MoI together with EUPOL to bring back respect to the Afghan National Police (ANP). He said: “I am proud that Minister Atmar has invited EUPOL to support this campaign. We will do our best to make it a success and sustainable. Without the involvement of the ordinary people of Afghanistan we will not be able to root out corruption. ”

Chairman of the European Union Military Committee visits EU NAVFOR - Atalanta On 18 January, General Håkan Syren, the chairman of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), visited EU NAVFOR’s Headquarters in Northwood. The General was received by Rear Admiral Peter Hudson, Operational Commander of EUNAVFOR Somalia − Atalanta. His visit included a presentation on the operation and EUNAVFOR’s part in the fight against piracy, and also a visit to the Joint Operations Centre which includes the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA). He had discussions with several of the international staff who work in the OHQ. General Syren also visited the site of the newly built OHQ due to be opened in early February.

A stronger mandate for Europol On 1 January 2010 Europol acquired a stronger mandate and new capabilities to fight international serious crime and terrorism. Under a reform of its legal framework, which establishes Europol as a formal EU Agency for the first time in its 15-year history, Europol now benefits from increased powers to collect criminal information and a wider field of competence in supporting investigations of serious offences. Under the new Lisbon Treaty, Europol‘s accountability arrangements have also been strengthened, with a bigger role established for the European Parliament in scrutinising activities and setting the Agency‘s annual budget.

EU Agencies agreeds on cooperation in Maritime Surveillance In December 2009 three EU agencies signed a cooperation agreement in Maritime Surveillance. The European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) based in Lisbon, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) based in Warsaw and the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA), based in Vigo, Spain, concluded an agreement to cooperate, in accordance with their respective mandates, in the field of maritime surveillance. The Cooperation Agreement will allow for the exchange of information and expertise, as well as for the exploration of possible joint use of assets. The cooperation should result in an improvement of the control of external maritime borders of the EU, an increase in maritime safety and an enhancement of the coordination of fisheries control and inspection activities by the Member States.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Appointments New Head of Mission of EUPOL COPPS On 1 January, Henrik Malmquist, from Sweden, took office as the new Head of Mission of the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, EUPOL COPPS. He succeeds Paul Robert Kernaghan from the United Kingdom. Henrik Malmquist Date of birth: 1962 Masters of Law (LLM), Diploma in International Studies. Since January 2010 Head of Mission, EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS); 2009 Assigned by the Government as chairmanof the Europol Ad Hoc Working Group for implementation of the Europol Council Decision during the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU; 2004 − 2009 Director, Head of Regional CID; 2003 − 2004 Liaison Officer and Head of the Swedish Desk at Europol, the Hague; 2004 Trainer for the Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Chinese Prosecutors Academy, Beijing; 1999 Trainer for the Council of Europe, Police in Montenegro

Mission Fact and Figures Theatre: Palestinian Territories Headquarters: Ramallah Starting Date: 1 January 2006 Head of Mission: Henrik Malmquist Mission strength: 41 EU staff and 25 local staff Mission budget: EUR 6.3 million (1.1.-31.12.2009) Contributing states: 17 EU Member States; Norway and Canada

Colonel Francisco Díaz Alcantud Date of birth: 1957 Degree on Police Studies; Degree on Military and Police Studies; Masters degree in Artificial Intelligence; Masters degree in Computing; Since January 2010 Head of Mission, European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX; August - December 2009 General Staff of Spanish Guardia Civil Main HQ; June 2005 − August 2009 Chief of the Operations Branch − European Gendarmerie Force Permanent HQ, Italy; June 2001 − June 2005 Senior Police Officer - Police Unit, Council of the EU; September 1998 − June 2001 International Co-operation Secretariat of the Guardia Civil Main HQ; January 2000 Participation in Working Group on Contingent Owned; Equipment − Phase V, New York (under the aegis of UN); 1999 Participation in several Assessment Teams in Albania and Kosovo; September 1992 - August 1998 Chief of Staff − Training Directorate, Guardia Civil Main HQ; July 1997 − July 1998 Chief of Staff - ATPRM Project, Technical Assistance Mission for Police Restructuration in Mozambique; April − May 1996 Participation in Assessment Team in Guatemala, with the aim to define Police Restructuration Project

Mission Fact and Figures Theatre: EU member states Headquarters: Brussels Starting Date: 1 July 2005 Head of Mission: Francisco Díaz Alcantud Mission strength: 53 EU staff Mission budget: Estimated total EUR 40 million Contributing states: EU member states

New Head of mission of EUJUST LEX Francisco Diaz Alcantud, a colonel in the Spanish Guardia Civil, took office as Head of Mission of (Iraq) on 1 January this year. He succeeds Stephen White from the United Kingdom. The High Representative Catherine Ashton congratulated the General: “His excellent background, his management skills and the extensive experience he acquired both in Spain and in international positions make him most suitable for taking on the challenges facing the mission.“

WEU/ESDA European military helicopter capability On 21 January, a Subcommittee of the Defence Committee of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) carried out a parliamentary fact-finding mission at the helicopter flight training centre in Bückeburg near Hanover, Germany. The Defence Subcommittee was briefed by the commanding officer at the simulator training centre, General Reinhard Wolski. Gener-

DEFENCE and SECURITY NEWS

al Wolski said that helicopter pilots could carry out half of their operational training time on the simulators. Simulation training can thus play a key part in strengthening the European military helicopter capability. The fact-finding mission was undertaken in preparation for the report “European cooperation on military helicopters” which will be submitted to the Assembly on behalf of the Defence Committee by Rapporteur Claire CURTIS-THOMAS MP (United Kingdom, Socialist Group) at the 58th plenary session of the ESDA in Paris in June 2010.

SPACE On 13 January, ESA’s Galileo team celebrated the fourth anniversary of the transmission of the first Galileo signal from space. Over the last four years, the GIOVE-A satellite has been securing the frequencies for the Galileo signals and validating the necessary technologies, such as atomic clocks. In 2008, GIOVE-A was joined by GIOVE-B, which is also performing these tasks. Built and operated by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd, GIOVE-A was launched from Baikonur Cosmodrome on 28 December 2005 with a planned lifetime of two years. The satellite is equipped with a triple-redundant payload and transmits Galileo signals in two separate frequency bands.

Given the good performance still available at the end of its expected life, the mission was extended. More than four years after launch, GIOVE-A is still operating and transmitting Galileo navigation signals.

Think Tanks European Security Roundtable discusses Electronic Identity Management On November 27th, the European Security Round Table (ESRT www.security-round-table.eu) in cooperation with the European Commission, DG Information Society and Media organized a roundtable on: “Privacy Respecting Electronic Identity Management and Forensics”. The discussion was the first of a series. It dealt with complex and unresolved security issues to make eID work, such as claims providers, the need for access for forensic purposes and the complex relation between system security and forensic success. A key finding was that the principle of minimal disclosure will help to resolve a number of these issues. The ESRT will continue this series in 2010.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO Strategic Concepts NATO partnerships discussed at Strategic Concept Seminar in Norway The third key seminar on NATO’s new Strategic Concept concluded in Oslo on 14 January. The event, entitled “NATO’s Partnerships and Beyond”, brought together members of the Group of Experts, government and military officials, representatives of international organisations and NGOs, independent experts and journalists. Most significantly, apart from 28 NATO Allies, there was a high level of participation from NATO partner and contact countries – members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, NATO-Russia Council and other cooperation fora. In his opening remarks. Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store said: “NATO’s partnerships are now more important than ever to the Alliance, cooperation with partners has been a success and has increased tremendously in depth and scope. But this success also defines our current challenges. We need your inputs on how to reenergise our partnerships. A number of suggestions were made on ways to improve both the political consultation and practical cooperation dimensions of different partnerships. The next and final key seminar will take place in Washington D.C. at the end of February.

AFGHANISTAN Czech Republic plans to step up its ISAF contingent On 17 January, the Czech Defence Minister, Marin Bartak, announced that the Czech Republic plans to bolster its ISAF contingent in Afghanistan by about 100 personnel. At the beginning of this year, the Czech Parliament agreed that the Ministry would deploy up to 535 military (currently 370). This could be to the detriment of the contingent deployed in Kosovo as part of KFOR.

More personnel for the Afghan security force On 20 January, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) of Afghanistan decided to augment the maximum numbers making up the Afghan security force. By October 2010, the Afghan National Police (ANA) should be 109 000 strong and one year later it should be 134 000 strong. For the Afghan National Army (ANA), the current limit of 134 000 will increase to 171,600 by October 2011.

New NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan appointed On 26 January, the NATO Secretary General, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, announced the appointment of the new NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. The new appointee Mark Sedwill, until then British Ambassador to Afghanistan, succeeds Ambassador Fernando Gentilini, who served as NATO’s fourth Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan from May 2008 to January 2010. The Senior Civilian Representative is responsible for carrying forward the political-military aspects of the Alliance’s assistance to the Afghan Government. He will work closely with the Afghan Government, ISAF, the United Nations and other key stakeholders in Afghanistan.

United Kingdom Foreign Secretary visits NATO On 25 January, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, David Miliband, met with the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in Brussels. The meeting took place in the run up to the 28 January London conference on Afghanistan, where the Afghan Government will present a number of initiatives including fighting corruption, reaching out to ordinary Afghans who have fought with the enemies of Afghanistan, and developing the Afghan Security Forces. Mr. Fogh Rasmussen stressed his hope to see, in London, an agreement on a way forward for transition to Afghan lead security responsibility, adding that this process should begin this year: “This mission can and will succeed, and 2010 will be a critical year in making that happen. In that context, the London conference is of crucial importance”. Mr. Miliband said: “I think it is clear that we are at a decisive moment in the Afghan campaign. A new Afghan Government is being formed, a new military strategy put into practice and the International Community is being rallied on the civilian as well as the military front for a further attempt to establish a degree of stability and security in Afghanistan.”

Statement by the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on the Kabul attacks, 18 January 2010 On behalf of NATO, I strongly condemn the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Kabul today. Those who committed them made it clear, in their choice of targets, that their aim is to reverse the progress that Afghans are making in building better lives and a better future; they also illustrated their total disregard for the lives of Afghan citizens. I commend the Afghan security forces for the role they have played in defending against these attacks and restoring order in the city.

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Baroness Taylor of Bolton ESDP − What we have achieved and next steps Bayer, Tomur The Role of Turkey for European Security Beer, Angelika MEP Interview: Is Energy a Factor of Instability for Europe ? Brok, Elmar MEP The European Parliament’s real influence on the CFSP Prof. Dr. Biscop, Sven The US needs a strong Europe – the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable Brok, Elmar MEP The European Parliament’s real influence on the CFSP Brook, John Interview: A plea for organized cooperation between transatlantic industries for Security and Defence Bruzek, Oliver European Industry is ready to close EU’s Capability Short falls − Example Transport Helicopters Budde, Hans-Otto Protection on Operations − The Army’s Protection Philosophy Bühl, Hartmut EU-NATO Relations − grave deficiencies Eyes in the sky to protect forces NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) – The multi-national solution for a transformational capability for NATO Cameron, Alastaire Testing Times for European Crisis Management Chizhov, Vladimir Russia and the European Security van Eekelen, Willem Europe after the Irish referendum – more coherent, more decisive, more democratic Dr. Enders, Thomas Interview: Airbus strives for open competition Favin Lévêque, Jacques, General (ret.) The French and Europe united in diversity D. F. Froh, Richard NATO Ballistic Missile Defence – a Capability for the Alliance and Protection for Europe Gayet, François The role of ASD in European Security and Defence Prof. Dr. Jiuliani, Jean-Dominique Europe, a real heavyweight in international policy Dr. von Goetze, Clemens The future of ESDP – Ways to improve European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Gray, Andrew Addressing helicopter shortage: EDA’s role Guillou, Hérvé Interview: A Natural Marriage – Conversation of the Civil and Military Security Market Hammer, Andreas A European Defence Market − from vision to reality Dr. Hellenthal, Markus Maritime Safety and Security as a Central Piller of a comprehensive Security Strategy Herteman, Jean-Paul Interview: A strong Base in Europe for Global Ambitions Höfer, Gerd MP Towards a European Army de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap NATO at 60 – Work ahead Iturrioz, Elvira Cortajarena MP Forces Protection − the soldier of the future Juraske, Ingo The role of industries in the provision of Secure Information Infrastructures for NATO and the EU Keohane, Daniel Half full or half empty? Comparing EU military capabilities in 1999 and 2009

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de Kerchove, Gilles The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy Dr. Kõuts, Tarmo MP, Vice Admiral Cyber defence – the Estonian experience and how Europe can protect its societies Kujat, Harald NATO-Russia Relations: Press the Reset Button Hostalier, Françoise MEP and Koucheida, Jean Pierre MEP 2009- A crucial year for Afghanistan Laitinen, Ilkka Interview: Border Security: FRONTEX is operational and steadily improving Lambsdorff, Alexander Graf MEP The Defence Package: An important step towards a better ESDP Dr. Lazarevski, Pande Security Network Innovation − Macedonian’s Contribution to the European Union Leakey, David, Lt. General EU Military Staff and ESDP – a work in progress Dr. Lutz, Reinhold Galileo – on Giant Leap for Europe Mahon, Tim Journalist Adequate forces and equipment for the right strategy Dr. Margaras, Vasilis Working together, thinking differently? The cooperation amongst EU officials in ESDP missions Masseret, Jean-Pierre European Defence: Where do we go from here? Merrit, Giles Burying the hatchet in the EU-NATO turf war Milososki, Antonio The role and contribution of Macedonia in stabilizing the Balkans Nash, Patrick EUFOR Chad/RCA – Progress and Ongoing Success Ortega, Manuel Medina MEP Russia and the Defence of Europe Pack, Doris MEP What the European Union should do for the stability in the Balkans – the human factor Piebalgs, Andris A European energy policy for the 21st century Pirlet, André The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) Pitarch, Pedro What Legitimacy for the EUROCORPS? Raab, Christoph The Politico- Military Organization of the European Union The European Parliament’s role in the EU decision-making process The European Parliament and ESDP? Rebuffi, Luigi The European Organization for Security (EOS) – Strategy ahead Dr. Rühl, Lothar What strategy for Afghanistan after eight years of war Dr. Schnaubelt, Christopher M. Building Afghan Security Forces: the solution to the security situation Sedivý, Jirí Improving NATO’s Expeditionary Capabilities Solana, Javier European Security and Climate Change Dr. Solaya, Milos Russia in the Balkans – traditional influence versus western interests Dr. Stehr, Michael ATALANTA − Europes first naval Anti-Piracy-Operation as part of ESDP Taylor, Adrian EUSG A European White Paper on Security and Defence is not sufficient

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Tejera, Arcadio Diaz, Sen. Towards a new European security architecture − what is Russia’s place in Europe? de Vasconcelos, Álvaro The European Union’s Think Tank Verheugen, Günter Internal market for the EU’s defence and security industries by 2012 Voigt, Karsten Interview: What Europe can expect from the new US-Administration Wainwright, Robert Anti-terrorism – the role of Europol in the international process Walter, Robert MP Realistic Structured Cooperation Procedures in the Field of Security and Defence The ESDA, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Lisbon Treaty Weingarten, Bert Cyberwar – NATO’s exposed flank

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Dr. Paul Weissenberg The Role of the EU Security Research Weis, Alexander The European Defence Agency (EDA) Wenzler, Bernd Protecting our soldiers Wittmann, Barbara and Migdal, Mike Interview: IT International and the economic crisis in Europe Dr. Wittmann, Klaus, Brig. Gen. (ret.) NATO’s new Strategic Concept should be more than a “Shopping List” van de Winckel, Luc Can industries take the lead in filling the gap between defence and governments’ security? Dr. von Wogau, Karl MEP The Role of the European Parliament for Security and Defence The way towards a European White Book on Security and Defence

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