EUREKA 'Eutopia' Spring 2009/2010

EUTOPIA REKA POLITICS & SOCIET Y|ARTS & CULTURE ISSUE 2|MARCH 2010

In Defence of Euroscepticism / Elliot Nichols / Split Identities / Omar El-Nahry / Benedict Blues / Antoine de Saint Phalle / Ohne Titel / Emily Katzenstein

editorial Any magazine that takes ‘Utopia’ as its topic runs the risk of losing itself in seemingly endless restatements of abstract idealism or empty dogmatism.

Fortunately, the authors of this EUREKA edition have been very careful in analysing the prospects and problems that the EU and its particular members face today. We hope that their critical reflection will help in understanding the challenges that lay ahead.

However, the pragmatic stance taken in thinking about Europe‘s realistic future, makes it also necessary to formulate in broad terms what still can be described as a utopian vision. Our authors discuss some of the most glaring difficulties in the current and future developments in the EU. Nevertheless, these should not only make us reflect on the possible particular solutions of political compromise, but most importantly on the grander, yes, utopian ends.

Thereby is not meant the project of the deepening and expansion of the EU - some interesting stances are taken on these on pages 10 to 15. What is meant is the continued belief in the emancipatory project, as captured by Immanuel Kant’s dictum: “Enlightenment is man‘s emergence

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from his self-imposed immaturity.”

Even in this truncated version, independent from the essay following it, the statement is prone to criticism by moral relativists, postmodernism, and psychology. Yet the objections raised both theoretically and empirically, have not diminished the attractiveness of the Enlightenment‘s basic premise: That man is able through reflection and the use of reason to free himself from oppression and gain autonomy.

Through argumentation and discourse we can arrive at the principles that do not just govern our own behaviour, but also realise the potential of society in in supporting individuals in pursuing their own conception of the good.

The means to achieve this end are contested. However, in the recent years we have grown too accustomed to pay lip-service to this ideal and be scared by the findings of the empirical sciences.

We see the economy and its inner workings today as natural phenomena, the political sciences ascertains our irrationality in voting, psychology tells us that we are selfish and neuroscience that autonomy is merely an illusion.

These ‚bad news‘, seem to have thrown us back into a state of defence and

preservation. No more experiments, let‘s conserve what we have already achieved and control the damages. In light of the crisis and the problems addressed in this issue, this cannot be the answer.

The emancipatory project‘s death letter is empty. Many viable projects have been neglected in our age of insecurity and much remains to be done: The question of cosmopolitan identity or a New Green Deal are addressed on pages 18 and 24 respectively. Further removed from the public view is the idea of a basic European income or a human right of migration. None of these projects are uncontroversial and need to be scrutinised both for normative validity and empirical feasibility. Yet, to find answers to our most pressing problems today, is always to keep in mind the place not yet reached: Utopia.

Your Editors Maria Holmblad Quirin Maderspacher Konrad Laker

EU Topia The Netherlands: A Multicultural Mess?/ Marta Zieba / The Future: An Ever-Encroaching Union? / Sarah Coughlan / Am I European? / Daniela Bädje

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CONTENTS FOCUS: EUTOPIA

Politics & SOCIETY

6 The Netherlands: A Multi-

cultral Mess?

Marta Zieba 10 In defence of

Euroscepticism

Elliot Nichols 12 The future: An Ever expanding union?

Ben Tufft 14 The future: An ever enchroaching union?

Sarah Coughlan 16 Broken Britain: The Moral

Malady

Tom Platt 18 Am I European?

Daniela Bädje 19 Split identities

Omar El-Nahry

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24

26

28

30

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Frau Europa Quirin Maderspacher The New Green Deal Emily Katzenstein Benedict blues Antoine de Saint-Phalle vive la liberté Louise Dewast Who are you?

Elena Georgantzis Extremism: At Home and away Joshua Davison

ARTS & CULTURE 34 FRISBEE SESSION IN 41 Think young

DORMANT NEW FOREST

Andrea Gerosa David Vajda 44 15 years eureka 35 QUALITY IS LOST IN TODAY‘S Michal Wojciech Zdzieborski

DIGITALISM David Vajda 37 An Extract: The diary of

an inconsistent man

Matthew Bremner 39 Ohne Titel

Emily Katzenstein

The Netherlands: A Multicultural Mess?

Years of neglect and denial on part of the Dutch and their immigrant population have lead to the development of a split society. The emergence of a de facto ethnic underclass, alienated and universally underprivileged, is increasingly seen as threatening to both native and ‘new’ Dutchmen

By Marta Zieba The processes of globalization and internationalization, increased mobility potential and greater accessibility are challenging regional identity within Europe and the European identity itself (if such exists) on a much grander scale than ever before. The Netherlands, often presented as the archetype of Western liberalism, like most countries of Western Europe has benefitted from this process and now faces resulting problems.

Alongside post-colonial immigration, it has also encouraged and welcomed large numbers of guest workers from less economically developed and developing countries until the mid-1970s. After this period, family reunification and an alluring, developed welfare system have lead to a substantial growth of ethnic

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minority groups, most notably in major Dutch cities. Despite their invaluable contribution to the Dutch economic success, the relatively rapid and overwhelming influx of immigrants has lead to the development of fears within the Dutch society. The focal points of concern remain the predominantly undereducated, non-Dutch speaking and Muslim immigrants. The social, cultural and economical consequences of their admittance have, until recently, been laboriously swept under the carpet.

These include anxieties concerning deprivation and social exclusion and, according to the Scientific Council for Governmental Policy, the fear of “disproportionate demands on the facilities of the welfare state, to which

[the immigrants] will be unable to contribute proportionately due to their lack of education, language skills and suitable work experience”. The greatest preoccupation, however, has long been the issue of a potential threat to Dutch values, traditions and cultural identity coming from Muslim migrants unwilling to compromise their own selfhood and tradition.

The absorption potential for immigration depends heavily on the inclusion of immigrants into the society. In the case of the Netherlands, the approach had long been that of an objectively failed attempt at integration; for how can existing alongside, but not with each other, be called inclusive? Nowadays, 10.04 per cent of the Dutch population

is classified as immigrant. With the Islamic community, predominantly of Turkish and Moroccan origin, amounting to 6 per cent of the Dutch population, the anxieties on both sides can no longer be bypassed. Borrowing from biological nomenclature describing externality of origin, every person with at least one non-Dutch parent is termed an ‘allochtoon’, already linguistically presupposing a certain ‘non-belonging’.

Paul Scheffer’s article, published before the shocking political murders of the past decade, depicts how long the resulting mounting problems had been politically ignored, and the time it took to publicly admit there even were any. Didn’t the discussion about the disadvantage of minorities and the de facto creation of an ethnic underclass come far too late?

To what extent is the Netherlands facing a “multicultural fiasco”?

Although immigration as a phenomenon has been notably present in the Netherlands since the sixteenth century, the roots of the present problems originate largely from post-Second World War developments in modern labour migration. Alongside postcolonial immigration, the industrial boom required acquisition of workforce who would be willing to compromise the burdens of harsh working conditions with a relatively low salary. By the 1960s, structural shortages on the labour market caused industrial firms to recruit foreign labour from countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain. Soon, however, as economic progress spread throughout Europe, these countries became immigrant destinations themselves, with many workers deciding to return to their homelands. By the mid-1960s, recruitment continued predominantly in Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. As more restrictive Dutch immigration laws were introduced in the mid-1970s with the realisation of the vast scale of the phenomenon, the predominant cause for immigration became family unification. This also meant a change in the perceived nature of immigration on

the part of the immigrants themselves and the government. Continuing low standards of living for unskilled and poorly educated workers in the immigrants’ home countries meant that the initially presumed temporary character of immigration transformed into a desire to remain in the wealthy Netherlands. The stage was set for an upcoming social, cultural and eventually economical fiasco. The initially assumed temporary character of immigration meant that the main aim of newcomers was maximisation of profit for use by families in home countries. This naturally assumes minimalisation of expenditure and its consequences, most notably substandard accommodation. Creation of islands of poverty was a matter of few years. Furthermore, the assumed temporary nature of immigration acted as a strong barrier against language learning and assimilation into society, as these seemed unnecessary. The subsequently created social, cultural and economical cleavage is still prominent as the long cultivated Dutch tradition of leaving assimilation into society to passing time takes its toll.

It seems there is a growing group expressing a sentiment of cultural siege within Western European nations, and the Netherlands serves as the prime example. Governments tend to counter the problem, which seems to have suddenly hit them, by focusing on restricting immigration and promoting the influx of more “economically desirable”, educated and trained individuals from affluent nations.

It is no mystery that vast numbers of immigrants into the Netherlands come from poorer countries and enter the Dutch society from a relatively underprivileged background.

The cultural cleavage between newcomers and Dutchmen as well as threats emerging from non-integration into the society, such as widespread lack of adequate education, crime and islands of poverty present in most large Dutch cities lead many to point to the extreme

costs and question the tradition of social openness throughout the years.

Studies show that on average, children with minority backgrounds face serious troubles with linguistic and educational development, which automatically strip them of the chance of qualifying for wellpaid employment. Research provides credible evidence that unemployment, poverty and crime, especially among youths, constitute the reality of an increasing number of ethnic minority circles. As Scheffer noted already ten years ago, “sixty percent of Turkish and Moroccan men above the age of forty are unemployed in a situation where there are serious shortages in the labour market”. Despite dramatic changes in economic realities since the time of the article’s publication, the social and economic challenges to the Dutch welfare state remain largely the same; and they will only continue mounting. Socio-cultural fears and presumptions have begun to outweigh perceived economical desirability of non-European immigration. Questions about Dutch national and cultural identity, and whether it provides space for coexistence and intertwining with the ever-expanding immigrant reality are being raised with growing passion.

“Neutrality and relativism have to end somewhere. More than that, tolerance must be defended against religious coercion” was Scheffer’s claim as early as 2000, suggesting an underlying concern for the preservation of Dutch identity.

The question remains to what extent this identity is now exclusively “Dutch” in composition.

Many researchers in their attempt to pinpoint the source of responsibility for this situation point to the ‘cosy’ nature of Holland’s long-standing tradition of centrist coalition governments. Many issues are said to be swept under the carpet for the sake of coalition preservation, often making policies comfortably safe.

It appears they are such only in the short term. Dutch elites long cherished the assumption that the extensive network

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of social care provisions meant that no external stimulus was necessary for immigrant assimilation, especially in the case of future generations, raised and educated in the Netherlands. The influence of being raised in an already undeprivileged background, strong - yet selective - identification with symbols, and values of parental homelands and the phenomenon of segregation into ‘black’ and ‘white’ schools seems to have been overlooked.

It appears to have been forgotten, however, that the society in which one has been raised and educated remains an implicit frame of reference for one’s lifelong choices and opinions. This is especially so when the individual in question has received little or poor quality education. The shortcoming is often associated with Mediterranean immigrants, whose origin has increasingly shifted from urban to impoverished rural areas together with economic changes in their home countries. Such migrants are likely to adapt structurally to life within their new society, but this is much less probable when it comes to norms and values, more often than not strongly rooted in religion. This is why Dutch research, long taken with the idea of assimilation, can be seen as misguided. The notion of the migrants’ origins playing an increasingly small role as a dominant social, cultural and economical characteristic with the advent of new generations has in recent years rightfully been challenged. It must be remembered that due to their underprivileged position in the Dutch society , social seclusion, and cohesion with their own community rather than with the broader Dutch world, vast numbers of immigrants possess a traditional, usually religion based system of values and cultural understanding.

This makes certain embedded norms of the Dutch society non-negotiable in terms of assimilation.

Many immigrants experience a psychological process whereby their

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country of origin becomes idealised, and the preservation of traditional norms, values and conduct becomes a primary concern and major community building behaviour. It becomes strengthened as immigrants face hostility and increasingly feel victimised, or when, given the assumed temporary nature of migration, they do not feel it necessary to learn Dutch or make initial attempts to integrate into the society. Coupled with the long-time practice of leaving immigrants’ assimilation to supposed natural development by Dutch officials in the past, a vast separate world of immigrants has developed alongside, but largely not within, Dutch society.

“Being ethno-culturally different, or being considered to be so, remains linked with a systemically inferior social position”, as noted by Jan Lucassen and Rinus Penninx in 1997.

What caused the eruption of the long awaited debate on immigration? The first stimulus came as politician Pim Fortuyn began gaining popularity through advocating what seemed to be the covert anxiety of many Dutchmen: immigrants should be integrated into the society. His bold claims about Islam’s incompatibility with fundamental Dutch liberal norms and traditions (Fortuyn himself supported legalisation of drugs, gay rights and prostitution), even if not shared by all, caused a great stir and debate in the politically correct society. So did his murder in March 2002. The subsequent shooting of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a Dutch-born Moroccan Islamist extremist, after the release of his film Submission about the discrimination of women in Islam, heated the atmosphere.

It empowered voices advocating the existence of a substantial threat from unassimilated Muslims to democratic Dutch values. On this social wave, Immigration Minister Rita Verdonk argued the Netherlands could no longer support immigrants unwilling to integrate into the society, introducing a

strict visa system. Would-be immigrants are obliged to undergo a ‘civicintegration examination’ as well as a linguistic test. The film includes a movie portraying homosexuals kissing and a nudist beach among symbols for Dutch openness and liberal values. Taking the exam, however, requires a fee of 350 Euros, non-refundable upon failure, and is not required of citizens of many wealthy countries such as the United States or Japan. Critics point out how the new policy is aimed predominantly at keeping poor, Muslim immigrants out, especially ending the ‘import of wives’ by immigrants already living in the country. They, it is noted, are the most likely to be unable to fund linguistic education in their homelands as well as the examination itself, and will most probably of all find the instructive film irreconciliable with their culture, values and religion. Criticism is pointed at the fact that the policy is aimed at limiting immigration rather than promoting integration, which is an equally pressing problem. Anti-immigrational extremism, such as that demonstrated

by Dutch MP Geert Wilders, advocating policies such as stripping immigrants unwilling to learn Dutch of citizenship and subsequent deportation, is another trap it is essential to not fall into. A sober, balanced analysis focusing on means of encouraging both sides to take action seems a reasonable solution for the future. The cultural dimension of the problem, especially when perceived through a prism of extremism on the part of either side, cannot obscure the rational pathway of action.

It would seem the solution to the problem cannot be ‘assimilation’, has usually failed to be ‘integration’, and is moving in the direction of ‘control’.

Perhaps the most efficient strategy for the future should be ‘inclusion’. This could diminish the fear of pressure for rethinking laws and norms embedded in the society by its changing ethnic composition. It would rather encourage

participation through raised awareness and promotion of merits of equal opportunities. It is crucial to realise – and this increasingly seems to be the case – that the target for policies should be the education of next immigrant generations, particularly in the fields of language and history. This could fuel their own motivation for embracing what Dutch tradition has to offer without compromising their heritage.

This is not to say that the older ranks within minorities have been ‘lost’; they have certainly been politically neglected and left to their own, limited devices. The attempt to learn from that mistake through attention to their children increases the probability that whole families will gain entrepreneurial spirit, greater affluence and increased social inclusion. The crucial aspect is increasing the efficiency of institutions aimed at ensuring inclusion into Dutch

society, thus increasing the control and coordination of schemes at local levels where most of the immigrant-related decision-making takes place. Another step is mutual recognition of religion as falling within a personal, private sphere which should be intimately retained but not publicly enforced, particularly in a society strongly identifying itself with secularisation.

Scheffer emphasises “education in language, history and laws” and an end to the “lazy multicultural” facet hiding an “aloof, indifferent” Dutch society as a way of strengthening the meaning of “Dutchness”. This would serve as a strong, active means of preservation of Dutch identity from within. At the same time, Zohra Acherrat-Stitou, a Moroccan psychiatrist cited by Scheffer, urges the next generations of immigrants to tone down their anger at the perceived exploitation of their parents. “They need

to get away from the role of victim in order to find an identity”, she asserts.

The most obvious way to achive this is through education. Before this happens, however, it is crucial for both sides to realise that pinpointing the problem is not aimed at accusation; it rather serves as an overview, a sobering analysis, a precaution, and a roadmap for the future.

For an elaboration of the historical and conceptual content of the article refer to Paul Scheffer’s article “The Multicultural Fiasco” (“Het multiculturele drama”) published in NRC Handelsblad on January 29th, 2000, and J. Lucassen’s and R. Penninx’s monograph on Dutch immigration “Newcomers: Immigrants and their Descendants in the Netherlands 1550-1995”.

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In Defence of Euroscepticism

Why Europe needs more, not less, Euroscepticism

by Elliot Nichols It is increasingly common, particularly amongst those working in or near to the heart of the project, to regard ‘eurosceptic’ as synonymous with ‘extremist’. Hans Gert Pottering (until July 2009 the President of the European Parliament) summarised this sentiment with his call to “freeze eurosceptics out of decisions” and his further demand that “anti-European voices not be heard” on policy matters. This attitude is both dangerous and indicative of a wider culture problem which threatens to undermine everything that has been achieved to date. If ‘Europe’ is to have a future, this approach, and the contemptuous manner in which it treats both perceived minority opinions and democratic values, must be halted.

Euroscepticism encompasses a wide range of viewpoints and is, like most things, a question of degree.

Unfortunately, it is frequently only identified by its radical extremes; advocates of nationalism on the one hand and unreformed communists on the other. This dramatic oversimplification has two results: firstly, that moderate Eurosceptics are driven away from the middle ground towards more polarised positions, and secondly, that serious wrongs are allowed not just to continue, but rather are actively defended. In the first case, moderate critics seeking to challenge the fundamental assumptions of the EU (assumptions such as: should the commission have such power? Or, if we are to have a President should he/she not be an elected representative? etc.) are demonised as marginal nationalists trying to derail the entire process. For instance, the formation of the European Conservative and Reformist Group – which, as the name implies, is desirous

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of reform and not of withdrawal - was met with repeated cries of nationalism and even of anti-Semitism. In the second case, the continued existence of an unelected bureaucracy in which much power is invested remains largely unaccountable, and goes virtually unchallenged.

Nuanced debate surrounding the democratic validity of such a state of affairs (where 75 to 84 per cent of legislation is initiated by unelected officials) is lost in arguments regarding the character of those who raise the issue. It is in stark contrast to the picture commonly presented by pro-Europeans of most Eurosceptics; they are not right wing demagogues or unrepentant Stalinists, instead they are generally localist by instinct and inclined to favour civil society over the state as a means to solve problems.

Of course there are exceptions to this rule, but for the most part they can be variously centre-left or centre-right depending on their wider outlook.

This body of opinion must start to be taken seriously. The European Union today faces a number of critical challenges, but two stand out as being the most serious; namely, a weakness of legitimacy, and an inability to make rapid decisions. In the case of the former it is the growing democratic deficit and a chronic lack of accountability which are the basis for an ever growing sense of remoteness felt by EU citizens from the decision-making process. In the latter the blame lies with the way decisions are made. Taken behind closed doors, without the rigour or urgency that genuine scrutiny necessitates, decisions at a European level often come too late and are normally representative of the least bad, rather than the best available,

choice.

Such a state of affairs should be deeply worrying to any EU citizen; irrespective of their ideological inclinations. Post Lisbon, the EU has gained a bewildering array of new powers, ranging from the positive (the increased, albeit still limited, role of the Parliament), to those of questionable merit (the expansion of EU competence to nearly 40 new areas) and ultimately to those with overtly negative potential (such as the move towards an all powerful European Public Prosecutor, the ability of the Commission to take control of a member state’s economy without recourse to any other body, or worst of all, the treaties ability to be ‘selfamending’ with no further public debate). With such powers it is high time that the European project matured to the point where criticism is no longer ignored or marginalised, but rather welcomed. Calls for increased openness and genuine accountability must move from being chastised to being taken seriously. It is a sign of insecurity, of a clear lack of legitimacy, that all but the most effuse praise is regarded as extreme opposition.

It is absolutely vital for the future of the European project that ‘Eurosceptic’ stops being regarded as synonymous with ‘rejectionist’ and instead has the arguments and concerns of its advocates taken seriously. The EU has many flaws, flaws which will only be solved if they are subjected to open scrutiny, a scrutiny that successive treaties have singularly failed to produce. Eurosceptics most often raise the difficult issues surrounding accountability, are often the loudest critics of a budget which devotes half its funds to agricultural

policy and are the first to act as a break on some of the less well thought through aspects of integration (is it really necessary to mandate that women stay home for six weeks after giving birth? etc.). If the EU is to become a genuinely significant actor then it needs to respond with something other than contempt to such concerns.

Moreover, it is increasingly clear that there is a growing number of citizens (perhaps even an overall majority) who share these concerns. Yet the response to the voicing of such an opinion (to the French, Dutch and Irish ‘no’ votes) is uniformly one of annoyance rather than acceptance. Such disregard for the democratic process is in itself a matter of grave concern; yet worse still it represents a missed opportunity of monumental proportions. These ‘no’ votes could have caused serious questions to be asked as to why the result had come in that way and what kind of Europe people actually desired. However, instead of seizing this chance for a radical dialogue the results were ignored in a manner that not only eroded support for the union as a whole, but also seriously undermined the credibility of moderates on both sides of the argument – with potentially catastrophic implications for the future. To ensure that Europe remains competitive, economically, socially and geo-politically, it needs to have the tough questions raised and the fundamental assumptions challenged; without this it risks decline, followed by a swift descent into irrelevance.

It is time to let go of the past and to focus on the future. The union has now reached a stage where it is dangerous to continue with an attitude based on the premise that opposition to an ‘ever closer union’ is opposition to peace in Europe. Such a viewpoint is without doubt anachronistic and worse still has a debilitating effect on legitimate debate of crucial issues. For instance, were the Labour party to redirect £1.5 million worth of public funds into their election campaign the response would almost certainly have been one

of outrage. Yet when the European Commission redirects €1.8million into the ‘Yes’ campaign for the second Irish referendum, all attempts to protest where stifled by cries of extremism, nationalism or both. This fundamentally fails to grasp the motivations behind such protests. Opposition to such an action is not necessarily based on hostility to EU membership or even to the treaty itself, but rather on the principle that it is wrong to allow vested interests to use public funds in an election. If this had occurred in a UK general election it is likely that the Electoral Commission would have ruled the result invalid.

Alarm bells must surely be sounded when such dual standards are applied in the name of democracy and yet, due to the highly polarised nature of proEuropean lobby, they are not.

The answer to this quandary? Europe needs more Eurosceptics. And urgently.

With the final ratification of Lisbon the EU institutions are, if not more powerful than member states, then they are certainly their equal. Yet the organisation remains riddled with flaws unthinkable to any democrat.

Unresponsive to public pressure, unaccountable to elected scrutiny and, for all the good it does, increasingly alien

to its citizens. How Europe matures in the face of rising Euroscepticism will play a large role in the making or breaking of the body as an actor of significance. But time is not on its side. After decades of writing off all opposition as nationalistic rejectionists who endanger the peace of a continent, the pro-European movement increasingly finds itself defending the indefensible. Seemingly indifferent to legitimate objection, the EU is in danger of giving undue credence to its more polarised opposition (Sweden’s ‘Left Party’ or the British ‘UKIP’) at the expense of moderate reformists.

The steps required to reverse this state of affairs will require a complete reevaluation of the way in which the EU handles criticism and how it sees itself - no longer as the martyred saviour, instead it must see every facet of the flawed reality - and ultimately how it conducts business. The acceptance of opposition to integration will not be an easy journey, it is however a vital one if ever the EU is to gain widespread legitimacy and support beyond its usual proponents.

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The Future: An Ever Expanding Union?

Why the EU needs to abandon its drive for ever-closer integration in favour of expansion.

By Ben Tufft

As a suspicious citizen of the European Union and its ever-expanding list of initiatives, directives, and growing competences, I feel I should not be writing this article; yet I feel compelled to extol the now oft forgotten virtues of this undervalued and underappreciated organisation. The process of enlargement has not been easy or swift – it took sixteen years before the first round occurred when the UK, Ireland and Denmark were admitted – but what has been achieved is miraculous.

Growing from six members in 1957 to twenty-seven today, the EU is the world’s first, largest and ultimately most successful confederation of democratic and peaceful states.

The EU’s successes are immense, however it is seeking to restrict them on the basis of geographical and cultural criteria. The EU most desperately needs to find a common identity that does not conflict with national values but rather complement them.

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Although technically secular, the union is underpinned by Christian beliefs and core values, as are almost all the member states. This obviously excludes those on the fringes of the European continent – most noticeably Turkey – that do not share such a common heritage. The 2004 enlargement that consisted of mostly ex-Soviet states was a major breakthrough, not just for the EU but also for the countries themselves. It represented a break from the traditional Western, Catholic and Protestant orientated grouping to a diverse organisation encompassing the newly emerging economies with different cultural and religious backgrounds. The choice the EU made to accept these nations into the fold was the right one; it sent out a positive message of hope and reconciliation.

That message is one I believe the union should now be sending to countries that traditionally would have seen themselves as ineligible to join because

of their locale or spiritual leanings.

The lure of membership to the ‘exclusive’ club of twenty-seven is one of the most important leverages of soft power the European Union has and it has proved to be remarkably effective in changing states’ behaviour and policies. The Copenhagen Criteria, adopted in December 1993, stated the requirements of candidate countries before they could accede to the union; each country must have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law and human rights; a functioning market economy and the ability to assume the political and economic obligations of membership.

These prerequisites for association with the EU can transform individual states, as is clear to see in the 2004 cohort of new members. Central European countries such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic aspiring to membership adopted wide ranging reforms to ensure they met the stringent

conditions.

In 2007 there was widespread concern over the admittance of Romania and Bulgaria to the union. Nevertheless, as Professor Alina Mungiu Pippidi, founder of the Romanian Academic Society notes, the invitation to join, agreed at the 1999 Helsinki Conference transformed the domestic scene.

Economic restructuring coupled with a drive against corruption has led to visible improvements in the political transparency and wealth of the country.

The strength of the EU has been embraced while the process of reform is still ongoing; and institutions such as the European Court of Justice and the Commission are able to ensure that the newly acceded members stick to the mandatory requirements and do not ‘backslide’. In Romania this was underscored when politicians trying to fire anti-corruption prosecutors failed because of a public outcry instigated by those imbued with the principles of the EU. Although criticised by some, the ‘carrot approach’ adopted for accession has mainly achieved what was intended: to incorporate Eastern European states into the union by ensuring their economic and civil values complemented those of Western Europe.

The Balkans, a notoriously volatile region, is now being tempted by the offer of EU membership. Croatia as an official candidate country has implemented virtually all that has been asked of it and it is easy to argue that Croatia should already have acceded to the union, as both economically and politically it is more developed than some current member states. The other Western Balkan states – Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo – are still potential candidates and are in the formative stages of membership agreements. The dark history that still troubles the region has hampered quicker enlargement here, but finally it seems as though

progress is being made. The most difficult relations have proved to be between Serbia and Kosovo, the latter only declaring independence from the former in 2008. The EU has been quick to assure both countries through assistance and agreements that they will in due course become members, and this has done much to promote peace in the area. The relative stability of the wider region can also be attributed to the desire of states to become full EU members who have renounced aggression in favour of mediation and reconciliation.

The subject of Turkey’s entry into the European Union has always been controversial; since 1963 when the country achieved associate membership of the EEC, to 1987 when it applied for full membership, to as recently as 2005 when formal membership negotiations began, Turkey has been waiting for a reluctant EU to acquiesce to full membership. The principle reason for this long wait has been France and Germany’s opposition. Turkey’s large population of approximately 70 million would alter the balance of power in the European Parliament and the influx would be unpopular to current EU voters, especially Germany who already feel swamped by Turkish immigrants. Many immediately dismiss Turkey’s suitability by stating that it has a Muslim tradition; indeed in 2004 Herman van Rompuy, the current European Council President, declared that the fundamental Christian values on which the EU is based would “lose vigour” with the entry of Turkey. Yet these ‘arguments’ fail to recognise what the EU is about and the effect it can have. Forgetting that Turkey is a secular, democratic, modern country and a member of NATO, the OECD and the G-20 group of rich economies there are many reasons why Turkey should have already joined the EU. As a regional power Turkey could be of immense strategic value to the union, it

has the second largest military force in NATO and its ties with east and west enable Turkey to be a bridge between the EU and the Asian and Islamic world. Moreover, it sends a powerful signal to that collection of states that the EU is ready to engage, rather than marginalise at the frontiers of the continent of Europe.

Leaders such as Sarkozy worry that Turkey’s entry could lead to countries such as Morocco applying for entry; but why is this so bad? If in the course of time Morocco or another North African country meets the conditions of membership they should be admitted.

Of course I am not proposing that far flung countries like Argentina, Zambia or Bangladesh apply, instead that the EU be more flexible in its approach to enlargement and recognise the transformative nature the union has on states wishing to join.

Membership of the European Union is sought after, so the process of enlargement gives the organisation a very unique power to exploit. So far it has been wisely and productively used.

In time the offer of membership should be extended to those traditionally considered outside the scope of the union, giving the EU the ability to shape and influence countries further from the heart of Europe.

‘Europeanisation’ should not be confined to the eponymous continent; it is a collective notion of democracy, human rights and peace, which should be spread. Membership should be defined in terms of these liberal values, not geographical positions and religious histories; then the EU can continue to promote a progressive outlook, rather than narrowly trying to define physical borders.

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The Future: The Ever-Enchroaching Union?

EU intergration has over the years had one rule: an ‘ever closer union’. But perhaps its time to honour an even older tradition- that rules are made to be broken.

By Sarah Coughlan There is no doubt about it; the people of Europe have entered into a new stage of interdependency and unity.

Albeit, they entered into this new era less dragged kicking and screaming, but rather apathetic and resentful. Behold, the Lisbon Treaty - a document almost openly acknowledged as illegible to all but the most talented techno-babble lawyers. The document that is almost identical to the European Constitution rejected by France and the Netherlands and forced through, despite promises to the contrary, without a referendum in Britain. We are edging dangerously close to the aim expressed in Rome in 1957: “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. It seems that

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this aim has been blindly accepted by those populating the upper echelons of the Union, and generally resented by the populous as a whole. But most significantly, imposed upon them without consultation.

This is not altogether a surprise. From its conception the EU has lurched from one grand policy initiative to another, with scant regard for the opinions of the electorate in the nation states. After the failure of the original constitution, the EU sought to repackage the treaty in a more palatable way. This it is turns out was unnecessary, because the new constitution was pushed through without consultation with voters in any country (Ireland being the exception),

on the assumption that it would be rejected again. The EU is not a body concerned with the opinions of the people it governs.

Of course, the EU is less than transparent in its naming of the constitution; the official title is the rather catchy: “Treaty of Lisbon, amending the treaty on European Union and the treaty establishing the European Community”. But, selfevidently this is a constitution - it is a set of rules for the government of the EU, and importantly sets out the EU as a political and legal body. It gives effect to the EU as a body separate from the nation states, as well as guaranteeing human rights within the EU. Any law

book will tell you the same; a document which sets out how a government, administration and judiciary function and how this relates to its citizens is a constitution. What’s more, the EU is perfectly aware of this - this document is approximately, according to Sarkozy at least, 99% identical to the more honestly titled “EU Constitution”; the argument that this new document is anything less than a constitution is evidence of the tendency of the EU to attempt to pacify national electorates, or else purposely mislead them.

The extension of powers appears at first to be fairly limited - perhaps the most significant change is the creation of a legal personality for the EU for the world stage. But, on closer inspection, it is obvious that the EU has grander ideas. In creating a legal personality for itself the Union becomes a totally different body. It will be a body totally distinct from its component members, in the same way that the USA is a separate entity from Alabama and Wyoming and everything in between.

Further, there is a clause which allows for the EU to encroach on any national competencies, free from Parliament and the member states, to fulfil any objective set out in the constitution.

This sounds fairly harmless, but it is worth realising the precedent the Union has created for itself - it is pathologically unable to stop its advancement into national sovereignty, and there is no reason to suppose the flexibility clause in the constitution will do anything to hold this back. Rather, we shall see a further erosion of our democratically elected governments in favour of the gaping democratic deficit that is the European Union. Our national parliaments “shall contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union” and our collective identities the Brits, the French, the Austrians, all the nation states, will have a national

citizenship which is somehow equal to their citizenry in the EU, to quote from the constitution: “Citizenship of the Union shall be in addition to national citizenship.”

What had previously been termed to be a ‘complementary’ citizenship has been transformed into an equally important identity.

The affront to the individual extends beyond the constitution’s ratification and bizarre notions of citizenship. The constitution requires the appointment of a permanent President and a kind of European Foreign Affairs Minister.

These posts, it was suggested, were designed to give Europe a clearer leadership and a face on the world stage. Curious then, that the chosen appointees are virtual unknowns on the world stage - Herman van Rompuy, the new President, and Baroness Ashton, the new High Representative. In true EU tradition both posts were compromises which, despite the rhetoric of those involved, fully satisfied no one. This was a chance for the leaders of the nation states to give the EU a much needed sense of legitimacy, but the leaders who elected van Rompuy and Ashton chose not to. There is a creeping suspicion among commentators that the truth of the matter is that the leaders of the nation states do not particularly want a legitimate driving force leading the EU forward, they would rather have a ‘grey mouse’ renowned for his ability to oversee the compromises which continue to drag down the whole institution.

The issue of compromise is demonstrated by the appointment of Baroness Ashton; she is a woman who has steadily risen through the Labour ranks, but with next to no foreign policy experience. Why was she appointed? The answer is that Baroness

Ashton was not the first choice, but after Britain withdrew Tony Blair as a Presidential candidate, it was felt that the consolation prize should be given to them. This, teamed with the perceived need to have a ‘balanced’ team (centre right, centre left and, conveniently, a man and a woman) meant that Baroness Ashton was, on balance at least, the best candidate. Similarly, despite the far reaching nature of the constitution, the list of opt-out clauses for the individual states is enormous.

How can we simultaneously be striving for an ever-closer Union, if we are unable to unanimously decide on a bill which fundamentally changes the way the EU relates to each state? The nation states are not willing to let go of their national interests. It is this that truly cripples the EU: in a body that attempts to represent the needs of the individual states, continues to expand and simultaneously drive forward a notion of the ‘European’, and have a distinct face internationally will inevitably find, as the EU has, that it is not only impossible to please everyone, but displeasing just one member is enough to create months and even years of deadlock.

Barack Obama had previously suggested that he considered the expansion of Europe a good thing, and said he would place the EU at the ‘heart’ of his foreign policy. He had spoken of his hope that the EU united under the new constitution would usher in a “new era of international cooperation”. The notion that Obama felt the EU was a more significant body than the individual nation states was further enforced by the embarrassment suffered by Prime Minister Gordon Brown at the hands of the newly inaugurated President Obama during the G20 summit. The President had reportedly refused five requests for a bilateral meeting between the leaders of the ‘special relationship’,

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in favour of talks with a more ‘unified’ EU voice. The ratified constitution appears to have done little to provide that voice. The scheduled talks between the US and the EU have been cancelled post-constitution, on the basis that the White House was confused as to who they were supposed to be meeting with: Herman van Rompuy, José Manuel Barroso or Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Each man has some claim to attend the event, and the in-fighting is being conducted in public. The White House didn’t know which President it was supposed to be meeting, unsurprisingly, given that the Presidents didn’t either. So much for improving the role of the EU on the world stage, it is a testament to the problems that still hang over Europe - there is a lack of coherence and ultimately, of purpose.

We can be grateful for small mercies that the repackaged constitution and the nonentity appointments deliver. There is, for instance, no longer any mention of EU symbols in the constitution (they continue to exist, but it looks as though there is growing consensus that the people of Europe don’t necessarily need these forced

upon them like a particularly clumpy school uniform). Moreover, the new appointees have so far done exactly what has been expected of them - very little of note, but nothing embarrassing either. But what is evident following this chaos is that the EU needs to look hard at what it actually wants to achieve. It has done an impeccable job of ensuring one of its key principles the free movement of people (save for a stubborn Britain). America has made it clear that what it wants is a unified European partner, and we’re getting there. Equally the introduction of the Euro has done much good for the collective countries that braved the leap.

Yet the yawning democratic deficit and sprawling bureaucracy that characterises much of the EU’s administration look in no way to be receding. There is an absolute need for the EU to revaluate its aims. In the last issue, there was a call for a move towards a federal Europe. I call instead that the EU looks to find achievable aims - namely ensuring that the Eurozone continues to thrive and that it continues to be an advocate of human rights, especially for the people

in countries with a less than perfect record on this issue. Equally vital, however, is that the EU unlearns its bad habit of drafting grand treaties and then dragging them through ratification in attempts of drawing the union ever closer. The union is not perfect. The disregard it treats its people with is often shocking. It can never hope to recreate the Italian feat of ‘creating Italians’, no matter how pretty the flag is. Nor should it try to. If we cannot have an efficient union as it stands, then going further is only damaging. We have taken a good idea too far. It should go no further in eroding national sovereignty and identity because it cannot cope with the responsibility.

The logical conclusion of the constitution is a federal Europe, and from that we should expect a democratic body - with legislation coming directly from elected members.

The new constitution does nothing to rectify this situation, and more seems to entrench the messiness of the current arrangements. Europe need not get any closer.

Broken Britan: The Moral Malady

Putting Britain’s broken society in the spotlight: what can we learn from the politicians, the policies and our own perceptions of British morality?

by Tom Platt Ahead of the first Vatican visit to the UK in almost 30 years, Pope Benedict XVI has released a statement condemning what he considers to be the moral stagnation of British society. The Pontiff argues fundamental religious rights and moral values have been damaged by an increasing tide of secularism - focusing particularly on the support for euthanasia within UK society and the recent developments in

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the field of embryology. His statement was widely criticised by pro-choice and secularist groups, who plan to protest his arrival later in the year. But as the critique of modern society becomes increasingly commonplace in the UK - particularly by political parties as a means for winning votes - is the Great British moral fibre truly unraveling?

Britain’s ‘broken society’ has become the catchphrase for the

Cameron-era Conservative Party to denounce the failings of New Labour society. Cameron, who divulged his love for Guinness and darts in a recent interview, argues that family breakdown, crime and welfare dependency are severe problems in our communities. Broken Britain suffers greatly from a dependency on the state, a destruction of the nuclear family and a society turning to crime. The moral

outlook for the UK is decidedly bleak.

Yet Labour argues that whilst aspects of society may not function sufficiently, this does not reflect a ‘broken Britain’. Indeed, David Milliband suggests that to: “… say this is a broken society is to misunderstand the nature of the country we live in,” and that, “if you look at child benefit, if you look at levels of work, if you look at the provision on the estates of this country, there has been big change.” Milliband, quite the contrary to Cameron, argues that the welfare system is encouraging change and improving society. Perhaps things are not so bleak?

Understandably, there seems to be a lack of cohesion in Westminster towards the moral state of the UK. But what is noticeable is this trend of confusion seems to have spread elsewhere.

If we consider two truly controversial issues in modern society – the morality of abortion and voluntary euthanasia, the picture is far from clear.

The right to abortion in the UK was first granted in 1967. Today a woman is guaranteed the right to terminate a pregnancy for health reasons with the consent of two doctors before the 24-week period. Yet as a result of the 1961 Suicide Act, it is illegal to aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide of another, with maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment. Despite new guidelines to clarify rules on assisted suicide, family members will still be prosecuted.

These controversial issues on the right to determination of one’s own body are treated very differently under the law.

Undoubtedly, the case of euthanasia is mired in questions of legality and the two issues are not synonymous. But it remains that they are both progressive, moral issues that are treated in different ways and exemplifies the confusion of moral issues in UK society.

According to a recent poll commissioned by the Times, 70 per cent of respondents believe that Britain’s society is ‘broken’, and 82 per cent think that it is time for change. If a society exists only through the people that make it, this is surely damning and depressing news. For so great a number to feel downcast about the present and the future UK, surely the evidence must show that immorality is rife within the country?

Yet data in The Economist has shown that, despite the increase in Britons who believe the country has grown worse since New Labour took power, there has been a ‘steady, deep fall in crime’ - with vehicle theft and domestic burglary down as well as violent crime cases. In addition, teenage pregnancy has been slowly falling for the most part of the New Labour years, smoking is down and whilst British alcohol consumption has risen, it remains below other European neighbours such as France.

These trends just don’t seem to match polling responses. Despite less crime, less teenage pregnancy and a reduction in some anti-social habits like smoking, Britons still feel downcast about the state of society. Where is the correlation between the levels of crime, immoral behaviour, and our perceptions of it?

All of these factors seem to lead to one conclusion: confusion.

We cannot deduce the morality of the issues at hand, our parties cannot agree on the moral state of the country and the electorate cannot decide whether we should despair or not.

But this is effectively the crux of the problem with any attempt to analyse morality and the broken society in the 21st century. In reality, many moral issues are simply too subjective.

Whilst the Vatican condemns aspects of modern British society, advocates of gay-rights, pro-choice and secularist groups are more than likely to argue the

opposite. Whilst political parties may attempt to garner votes by condemning moral degradation, rates of crime and teenage pregnancy seem to be falling.

Whilst the right to termination of pregnancy has been available for over thirty years, the right to choose when to die remains elusive: for better, or for worse.

Individuals, parties and groups will always attempt to capitalise on the perceived failings or successes of society and magnify them to create a climate best suited to their interests. As the polls and the policies show, modern society is consistently conflicting and confused. The morality of issues is often so difficult to ascertain and to please everyone with, that it is rare for contentious issues to be fully reconciled, and there will never be a consensus that issues like these are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.

But this is not a reason to be dejected.

Rather we should revel in the plurality of views in modern society and that there is no longer one linear thought process. Is Britain’s society definitively broken? No, instead it is the richness of modern British and European society that you are unlikely to find a definitive answer to, and more that one man’s hell is another’s Eutopia.

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Am I European?

A comment on European Identity

By Daniela Bädje In retrospect it strikes me as pretty ironic that I had to move to a country full of euroscepticism to find out what being European actually means.

Before I had the crazy idea of studying in London I decided that I definitely wasn’t German. Well, my passport may say something different but to be honest, that was only a tiny problem for me. You see, I have always found that Germany is not the perfect and ideal place for a person to grow up.

Is Germany a free country? Check.

Good social system? Check. Great cars?

Obviously.

But the thing is, we are not a proud country. Apart from the fact that it goes without saying that our past keeps us from being proud of what we are, and that most of our politicians leave a lot to be desired, I always thought it was silly to be proud of a mere coincidence. Yes, I was born in that country, but for all I know I could have been born in Timbuctoo. So

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should I be proud of something I cannot not help? No, probably not.

Being proud of my state is more or less impossible too. All you can find there are old coal-mines, lots of unemployment and a government that is about to ruin the educational system.

And my hometown? We have a football club that you can compare to Northend Thistle on the Isle of Arran (never heard of them? No wonder, they haven’t won a match for 18 years), we are all over the news because the city is so broke that they are closing down the only theatre we have, and the only thing we are famous for is the suspension railway because a baby elephant jumped out of it 50 years ago. To put it in a nutshell, every German person I have met in London has laughed when I have told them where I come from.

This probably sounds bitter and sad.

Don’t get me wrong; I have never been ashamed to say that I am from Germany

(if you look at my state and city this was the best option I had), but I never wanted it to define me.

This is how I decided that I was definitely European. I liked the idea that it was European values and morals that shaped me, and for what it’s worth, it also sounded very cosmopolitan and sophisticated. Besides, it would help me to keep the homesickness away, wouldn’t it? Because Europe is Europe...

How wrong I was. When I finally came to London I found out that I am living in a world full of stereotypes. I missed German punctuality and discovered that I despised British bureaucracy as much as I did German. I started to love my Spanish friends’ happy-go-lucky attitude and came to the conclusion that yes, French food is so much better than English pie (no offence). In the end it was the German mentality I missed, and it was my friends from all over Europe that kept me together by showing me their culture.

I might not be proud of my country, but it is part of my identity. Its values, morals and history shaped me and was one of the factors that made me the person I am now, and the same goes for my friends. Being European was suddenly put in the background.

We might be part of Europe but we do not share a common culture. We do not speak the same language, have the same values or the same rights. Really, look at the Eurovision Song Contest and you will realise that we do not even remotely like the same music.

For me, being European is not a question about identity anymore. It is being in love with the idea that we can work together peacefully and that someday, maybe, we will be able to find some common cultural ground. It sounds pathetic, but to find it we must know what we are, what is important to us, and then discover what the rest of Europe thinks. In the end it is not about giving up what you are - it’s about learning about your identity and accepting that your European neighbours have their own. For me, this is Europe.

Split Identities

Is it really necessary to rigidly define a common European identity?

by Omar El-Nahry What does it mean to be European? This question has been frequently discussed in the last few years, academically as well as polemically. There is no doubt that the question is becoming all the more important with the enlargement of the European Union. Every new membership heightens the importance of the question: “What is it that binds us together?”.

Despite the ongoing discussion, no one has been able to come up with a valid definition of what it means to be European as of yet – it seems to be a Herculean task to come up with one identity that can satisfy over 500 million citizens from 27 different countries.

There is one aspect to this debate however that has been frequently omitted: is it really necessary to have a clearly defined European identity?

To make the matter less confusing, it may be helpful to look at the perceived antagonist, or what some would call obstacle, of the emergence of a common identity – the national identity every citizen of the European Union holds.

Most people still feel largely attached to the country in which they were born.

They define themselves through their affiliation to the national community, especially in encountering people from other countries, when national identity is used to draw a distinction between ‘me’ and ‘them’. Hearing a German person introduce himself as ‘European’ to a Frenchman would surely raise a few eyebrows.

Important as it might be, is this national identity rigidly defined? Is it really completely clear to everyone what it means to be ‘German’, ‘British’, ‘Czech’ or ‘Greek’? In my opinion, it is not.

National identities are often only used when a separation and distinction is needed, football matches being only one very simple example. Surely people who are brought up in a country will share a number of common, basic identity traits, like language, food and certain cultural customs. Nevertheless, being German might mean something entirely different to me than to somebody who politely could be called a ‘nationalist’.

Furthermore, any given identity, whether

national or European, will always only be a part of a bundle of identities. Modern theories about human identity suggest that every human being can hold, and in fact always holds, several layers of identity, starting at a communal and subnational level and – possibly – ending with a feeling of identification with the European Community. The hierarchy of these layers logically depends on several external factors like social circumstances and upbringing. A person brought up in a very traditional Catalan family might first of all feel Catalan, and secondly Spanish, as opposed to somebody who has been brought up in Madrid, where the national, Spanish identity easily subsumes his or her regional identity.

This already complex structure can be further divided if somebody living in the Community holds an additional non-European identity in culture or religion. The interplay of these different strata will shape each and every one them in a certain way, making an absolute definition of ‘Spanish’ utterly impossible.

Is this structure an obstacle to the formation of a common European identity that embraces all people in Europe? By no means. Humans have always held more than one identity, even long before the nation state emerged.

They were members of a family, of a tribe and maybe of a larger community without having to sacrifice any of these identities.

It is obvious that a shared common identity in Europe must and cannot be a massive, monolithic structure that simply superimposes itself over all the other levels of identity. Adopting a European identity does not mean sacrificing the national or regional layer. It merely means re-evaluating one’s awareness of its importance, giving it a higher position in one’s internal hierarchy, making it more present and visible. Therefore, it is not a problem if the common identity remains somewhat diffused or undefined - allowing it to flow around and between all the other layers of identity. A certain permeability is not only desirable, but a necessary precondition for a European identity to function. The feeling of ‘being European’ is influenced by the adherence

to certain values and a common heritage that is not clearly definable with regard to territory and, to some extent, culture and religion. Surely, Christianity, the Enlightenment and other ‘classic’ European developments are a major influence on that identity. Nevertheless, Europe has never been a secluded entity, especially with respect to its Eastern neighbours. It is important to keep that in mind, even if it makes a clear definition of the ‘end of Europe’ even more difficult.

Therefore, European identity cannot work like a national identity, being a tool of narrow exclusion and tight boundary-drawing. On the contrary, a European identity needs to be flexible and embracing in order to embark all the different, valuable sub-identities that currently exist on EU-territory. It is indisputable that the definition of a ‘European identity’ would mean a certain measure of exclusion yet again, that is against all the other cultures that are defined as non-European. The major difference and innovation would be the fact that it would transcend the barriers of for example language, ethnicity and territory, at least within the borders of the Community. This will be one of the major tasks of European politics in the new decade: to find and stress the common values and to enhance crossborder solidarity and the feeling of being a member of the European community in every individual without suppressing other identities. Furthermore, the development of this shared framework will need to take into account the mistakes its predecessors, the national identities, made. The clash of national identities has been a contributing factor to the great catastrophes of the last century, namely the First and the Second World War. Therefore, a common identity should ideally be exclusive without being aggressive towards differing value systems. It might seem like an impossible task, but it is of crucial importance for the future development of a functioning European Union.

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POLITiCs

The New Green Deal / Emily Katzenstein / Vive La LibertĂŠ / Louise Dewast / Extremism: At Home and Abroad / Joshua Davison

Frau Europa

The 2009 Forbes list of the world’s most powerful people ranks Chancellor Angela Merkel at place 15 and having only to stand down to Silvio Berlusconi amongst European leaders.

But how strong is Merkel and her government really? A depressing perspective.

by Quirin Maderspacher ‘Frau Europa’ titled the Times Magazine Edition this winter. Merkel was interviewed and the American magazine drew a benign picture of the leader who managed to be the first female and the first Eastern German Chancellor in the Middle European country. Her seemingly infinite self-control, quiet and thoughtful style and commitment to the battle against climate change impressed the foreign observers.

However, there seems to be a noticeable discrepancy between Merkel’s image abroad and the public interpretation of her in Germany. Admittedly, Merkel is frequently voted top in the most popular politicians list, although surveys also show that an increasing percentage of German citizens are not convinced about her leadership skills; she is conceived as a tranquil person who prefers solving problems through backdoor politics rather than through open debate. Maybe she is introducing a degree of professionalism to politics which some of us are longing for. It might also just be her lack of eloquence.

Merkel has been Germany’s Chancellor for five years now. But never before have there been as many problems as at the beginning of 2010. For the first four years, Merkel had to share power with the Social Democrats who were voted out of office after eleven years last autumn. The FDP, the German liberal party, is now the CDU/CSU’s partner in the coalition with its chairman

Guido Westerwelle, who is also ViceChancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs (the CSU is the Bavarian version of the CDU; although separate parties, they have since the founding of the Federal Republic fought together. The CDU does not stand for elections in Bavaria; neither does the CSU outside Bavaria).

And this coalition of three parties, although long desired by all of them, is far from unanimous. The most debated topic at present is probably social policy. Germany’s system of social security has long been in need of reform and was redesigned under Chancellor Schröder and his Agenda 2010. Guido Westerwelle, recently portrayed as Berlin’s ‘Hulk’ by the magazine Der Spiegel, started the debate in February by stating he would feel some “lateRoman decadence” in Germany.

He was alluding to the seemingly paradoxical fact that an unemployed person could ‘earn’ as much as a working person, occasionally even more. A particular focus of the debate is the Hartz IV concept, a heritage of Schröder’s reforms in the early 2000’s.

A commission of economic specialists chaired by Peter Hartz had at the time developed a plan to reform the employment market in Germany which was then made law between 2002 and 2005. Behind all these discussions around how high unemployment benefits in Germany should be, the comments and subsequent discussions

have kicked off a debate on the entire social security system. The finding of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Germany’s constitutional court, declaring the calculation method for Hartz IV unconstitutional, helped fire up the debate. Westerwelle demands a restart and wants to reform the welfare state altogether. The FDP’s new general secretary Christian Lindner has in a philosophical attempt recently outlined his new liberalism as a response to, what he called, the new technocratic statism.

Here, we are encountering one of the deepest and longest debates concerning the welfare state. We are confronted with two opposing views: on the one hand, there is the image of the lazy unemployed person living off other people’s well earned money.

The main issue identified here is the danger of a lack of motivation amongst the people: “Arbeit muss sich wieder lohnen” (“Work must pay”) is an often repeated phrase of FDP politicians.

And thus the path to resolution is either a cut in social benefits or a rise of wages.

The increasing equality between the lowest possible income and the highest possible state-provided benefits is thus deeply concerning.

On the other hand, we are presented with images of families hardly able to afford their children’s school trip.

A well-known Berlin senator, who we dedicated an article to in our last issue, became famous for assessing the exact price of breakfast, lunch

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and dinner and considering them as basis for social benefits calculations.

The hereby portrayed jobseeker needs to think twice about spending a cent.

Possible solutions are therefore raising social benefits or the introduction of minimum wages across the country which Germany has avoided for decades, thereby creating Europe’s biggest low wage sector.

How are we to combine these images?

Is there a ‘right’ one? I would like to argue that the FDP and many others are overlooking the ‘intrinsic value of work’. Work is fulfilling; work provides prospects for the future and it is satisfying. People want to work.

The TV-watching, beer-drinking and unemployed citizen is a myth or at best an irrelevant reality.

However, that is not all: Westerwelle wants a “geistig-politische Wende” (that is, a U-turn in political spirit). No other politician is as present in domestic politics as Westerwelle at the moment; surprising for a Minister of Foreign Affairs. Another liberal minister, Philipp Rösler, the first minister with an immigrant background, and now responsible for health, has also been a centre of debate. As youngest member of the government, Rösler advocates a complete reform of the health system.

At the reform’s core lies the introduction of a flat-rate health tax for all employed people which is supposed to replace the income-orientated tax system in place at present. The Minister estimates the cost of this reform to be about 10 billion euros.

The Bavarian CSU estimates the cost to be around 21 billion euros. In a recent interview, the CSU’s chairman, Horst Seehofer, told the German public that it was impossible to introduce a flat-rate tax in the next years, since there are no funds to finance it. This is especially so after the economic

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crisis and the commitment, which is now constitutionally prescribed, of the federal government to not take up more than 8 billion euros of debt per year from 2020 onwards, and of the Länder governments not to take up any more debt at all. The CSU even threatened the federal government to veto any attempt to introduce the tax.

Seehofer and Westerwelle have since the coalition took office in autumn been arguing about almost every possible topic. Be it the tax reform or family politics, the CSU and the FDP seem to have become political antagonists.

Recenlty, Seehofer stated the following in a beer tent during carnival, proving a good sense of humour: “Keine Angst, das ist kein Tsunami, sondern nur eine Westerwelle”.

Merkel’s CDU is somehow trying to mediate between the two. But it also joins in in the big quarrel. The Minister of Environment, Norbert Röttgen, CDU, is thinking about shutting down nuclear power stations till 2020, an objective which had been made law by the Social Democrats and the Green Party under Schröder, but which has been abandoned after the new coalition took power. The FDP is a proponent of nuclear power and also Merkel is convinced that it should serve as a ‘bridge technology’. In addition, Merkel’s CDU is suffering from internal disunity. The Prime Ministers of the numerous CDU-ruled Länder have announced resistance against the federal government’s plans to certain tax projects.

The national German government is paralysed. The three parties of the coalition spend more time arguing than governing the country. Apart from tax reductions a couple of months ago, no big projects have been envisaged.

Deadlock rules Germany.

The reason for this deadlock has been presented: the disunity of the ruling

coalition. But how did this come about?

And is it not normal that coalitions should debate and argue publicly, to a certain extent at least?

Whilst the continuous attacks from Bavaria and a certain degree of debate amongst the ruling parties are nothing unusual, I would like to argue that the situation of this coalition indeed shows a major turning-point and a structural change in the German political landscape. And Merkel as Chancellor finds herself at the centre of this change.

The German party system is changing substantially. Traditionally, the Federal Republic has been ruled by two parties.

Either the CDU/CSU or the SPD went into coalition with the FDP. Two great coalitions (CDU/CSU and SPD) also emerged. But we have gone from a three party parliament, to a five or six party parliament now. The Green Party emerged in the early 1990s as a parliamentary force and die Linke, the Socialists, have recently seen polls rising. But also the great union of CDU and CSU is falling apart. Whereas Merkel has modernised the CDU, the CSU has remained a conservative, but also a populist, stronghold. The CDU has moved left and has pushed the SPD off its social democratic throne. The FDP has remained relatively consistent and presents itself at the forefront of liberalism. Attempts to get rid of the rich people’s party image were unsuccessful as recent debates about Westerwelle’s dubious interlinks over private and state’s interests show. The SPD has lost much of its popular support and suffered a historic defeat last autumn with 23 per cent of the votes. The CSU is fighting a desperate battle for its superior position in Bavaria, where it has been ruling almost uninterruptedly since World War II. Although it seems as if though this government consists of a traditional

coalition, Merkel is actually the first German Chancellor to rule a three-party government. Almost all parties have shifted their profile. The terms ‘social democratic’, ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’ etc. are not confined to one party anymore.

Instead of ideological labels, coloured labels are now used in public debate: Merkel’s government is ‘schwarz-gelb’ (black-yellow), black for the CDU/ CSU, yellow for the FDP. In addition, the time of great ‘people’s parties’, big political parties which accommodate for most of the population, such as the CDU/CSU and the SPD used to be, is over. Both parties will in the future need more than one partner party to

govern the country with. The German public has long debated this issue and has mentioned the danger of increased fractioning within the political landscape. It seems strange that now that it has happened, no one seems to take notice of it.

The German government is everything but strong at the moment. Major debates are publicly fought, but the Chancellor remains silent. It’s all quiet on the Kanzleramt front. Merkel, who completely lacks the conservative Biedermeier aura, continues to be the cold moderniser of her conservative party. But she risks losing her

conservative image altogether.

It thus seems ironic that Times Magazine portrayed Merkel as a strong and benign leader, managing Europe’s affairs, when it is clear that there is a country to be repaired at home. Hostile voices within her party are becoming louder and she might be at risk of following the destiny of her predecessor Kohl who became victim of a coup in that late 1990’s. The coup’s initiator at the time: none other than Angela Merkel.

Three things to do in Europe according to Rough Guides 1) Go wolf and bear tracking in the Carpathians. Romania has the largest wolf and brown bear populations in Europe, so why not track them? www.transylvanianwolf. ro is an organisation offering guided walks through the Piatra Craiului National Park.

2) Sleep in a cave. The shoestring hostel in Göreme, Turkey, is an ancient volcanic rock house which now has ensuite rooms and a pool.

3) If you’ve ever harboured the secret desire to throw tomatoes at people then here’s your chance to live the dream, at La Tomatina, Buñol’s hour long street battle. The last Wednesday in August sees the Spanish town packed with revellers with the sole intention of hurling some of the 130,000 kilos of the over-ripe fruit at each other.

Tips taken from The Rough Guide to Europe on a Budget second edition (February 2010) For more information on travel, and competitions, visit www.roughguides.com

cc Sir James

The Green New Deal

An Interview with Reinhard Bütikofer, MEP (European Greens)

By Emily Katzenstein Mr. Bütikofer, one hears the phrase Green New Deal more and more often nowadays. Could you explain the core elements of the Green New Deal?

The term ‘Green New Deal’ is a modernday variation of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ that was launched in the 1930s and entailed Keynesian stimulus programmes and government intervention designed to jolt the US economy out of the Great Depression.

The New Deal included government initiatives to re-regulate the financial market, to create employment through public investment and to combat poverty and social insecurity.

Today, we are finding ourselves in a similar situation as we are facing an economic, environmental and social crisis. The Green New Deal is an integrated response to this triple crisis and therefore has as core elements sustainability, economic revitalisation

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and social progress. It is designed to put forth new innovative thinking and ambitious government action that breaks with today’s outdated policies and stimulates the economy and creates jobs by putting our society on a more environmentally-friendly footing.

Is there a consensus on these core elements, or are there different conceptions of what a Green New Deal should consist of?

Not every proponent of a Green New Deal is singing from exactly the same song book. One most commonly shared core element is, however, an eco-innovative industrial policy focusing on a revolution in energy and resource efficiencies.

What is more, most participants to the discussion agree that a Green New Deal in its very nature implies the core elements of environmental, social, and economic modernisation. However, different people attach different levels of

importance to these core elements. Some tend to focus more on the social aspects while others stress the environmental or economic dimension.

Ban Ki Moon has called for a Green New Deal; Achim Steiner of the UNEP; Klaus Töpfer (CDU) - has the Green New Deal become a political consensus?

The Green New Deal has support that cuts across the political spectrum; it is not a concept that is ‘owned’ by a particular political camp, party or movement, but it is by no means universally accepted.

If the Green New Deal were a political consensus the billion-dollar taxpayer stimulus packages would have been spent in a better way. According to research from HSBC, the EU recovery plan, for example, only allocated 14 per cent of its funding into green measures. This falls below the 20 per cent advocated

by Nick Stern or the 1 per cent of GDP

target that was promoted by the UN. When push comes to shove a lot of politicians still don’t truly believe that investing in sustainable industries actually makes money and revitalises our economy. Instead, they join the Green New Deal rhetoric for political purposes while simultaneously throwing funds into outdated industrial processes with no strings attached rather than using that financial leverage in conjunction with smart regulations that can put those industries on a sustainable footing and thereby ensuring their longevity.

Who can provide leadership in this matter? Do you see the EU and the US taking on that leadership role?

They should be. Particularly the European Union as it has the technological expertise and know-how when it comes to green products and technologies. We are market leaders when it comes to the sale of industrial processes, wateruse efficiency technologies, electrical appliances, building technologies and we have clear targets when it comes to renewable energy and energy efficiency, not to mention one of the world’s first emissions trading systems. But this does not necessarily mean that the European Union is playing a leadership role. The economic crisis has definitely decreased ambitions and made the EU more wary of undertaking climate measures. Oldschool thinking returned giving support to unsustainable economic processes rather than continuing the momentum towards making these processes more sustainable.

The United States is in a similar dilemma where a political deadlock is impeding a leadership role in this field.

It is crucial that both the European Union and the United States seize that leadership role and engage in a healthy competition on who conquers the next industrial revolution first. This is also particularly important as we need to show the emerging countries, such as China and India, as well as the developing world, that there exists a different - a sustainable - model of development, and we need to ensure that we include them in this next industrial wave.

Ban Ki Moon has recently said that climate change should remain on the top of national agendas. However, he also stated that we are in need for a global New Green Deal. On which level can the Green New Deal best be implemented? What could be an appropriate political platform for discussing and implementing it?

The Green New Deal is a multi-faceted and broad concept that is relevant for every level of governance, be it local, regional, national or supranational. Some of its policies will be better implemented at the local level than at the supranational and vice-versa. This is particularly the case as not all policies are ‘one-sizefits-all’ in nature. We have to take into account the different local or national contexts and create policies accordingly.

As such, the supranational level would be best for agreeing on general political goals and co-ordinating the different national policies and exchanging best practice as well as experience in order to reach that common goal. As UNEP has argued for some time, a true Green New Deal has to pursue a global perspective.

Unfortunately, there is no single international institution well enough prepared to be a suitable platform for a Green New Deal drive. We have to develop the fitting governance structures as we go. The G20 should play an important role in that context.

We are constantly reminded that changes have to be implemented very quickly, if climate change is to be limited in the scope of its consequences. Do you believe that in the current political climate the political will for such changes can be mobilised in time?

We have taken some preliminary steps in the right direction but still have a lot of work lying ahead of us. In the current climate the outlook for more ambitious policies may be less than ideal but we, as Greens, are trying our best to push things forward. And, looking back just five years, we cannot but find that we’ve already come a long way. The topic is no longer a fringe issue, which it was considered to be for many years, but has moved to centre stage. What would be the alternative to continuing in our efforts?

What is the role of non-governmental organisations in bringing about a Green New Deal?

NGOs play a crucial role. Not only do they put pressure on governments to perform and put a Green New Deal into practice but they also disseminate important information with regards to a Green New Deal, can provide new ideas and innovative thinking and create cross-border alliances for the exchange of best-practice and policies. NGOs and civil society at large are a key component when it comes to a Green New Deal.

Where do you see the strongest obstacles to implementing the Green New Deal? How can they be overcome?

The principle obstacles are obsolete thinking plus established economic interests. People need to be convinced of the Green New Deal and come to realise that if we want to create a competitive and social Europe we need to invest in sustainability and our human capital.

We need to emphasise the drawbacks of continuing our outdated economic model, which will not only make us face rising unemployment and climate catastrophe but also leave us behind new competitive powerhouses such as China and India. China, for example, is strongly promoting green technologies such as wind and solar power. They know they missed the first and second industrial revolutions – they don’t intend to miss the third one. Thomas L. Friedman, a New York Times columnist, once wrote: ‘The major industrial country that gets the greenest the fastest with the smartest technologies - that’s the country that will lead the 21st century.’ Old economic interests, that are unwilling or unable to at least understand this perspective, will have to be pushed aside.

Reinhard Buetikofer became a member of the European Parliament in 2009. He was co-chairman of the German Greens from 2002 - 2008. Today, he is a member of the Committee for Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), deputy member of the Committee for Foreign Affairs (AFET), member of the sub-committee for Security and Defence (SEDE) and member of the USA delegation of the European Parliament.

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cc Rvin88

Benedict Blues

Why the current Pope is alienating Catholics, Jews and Anglicans alike

By Antoine de Saint-Phalle “I spoke to him as a brother whom I have pardoned and who has my complete trust.” These forgiving words were uttered by the late John Paul II after he visited Mehmet Ali Ağca, a Turkish gunman who had been hired to kill him, in prison in 1983.

The former Pope’s positions on contraception and homosexuality were upsetting to many, especially at a time when the breakout of AIDS led to the pauperization and marginalisation of millions of people. However, despite rejecting some of the views of his more liberal predecessors such as John XXIII, who advocated a greater tolerance of other moral viewpoints, it seems nonetheless that John Paul’s forgiving and charismatic persona will define his legacy at the head of the Catholic

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Church.

The same cannot be said for his German successor, Pope Benedict XVI. Even though he holds similar theological and moral positions and was a confidante of John Paul II when he was elected Pope by his peers in 2005, Benedict has been heavily criticised in his attempts to steer the church in a more conservative direction.

Hence, the German cardinal’s election should be a cause for concern for advocates of religious tolerance for four of the following reasons.

Firstly, Benedict’s rehabilitation of controversial church figures is widely perceived as an outreach to Catholic fundamentalists. In early 2009, the current pope lifted the

excommunication of four Holocaust denying bishops, including that placed on bishop Richard Williamson whose previous claim to fame (or infamy) was to have labelled Jews “Enemies of Christ”. Holocaust denial is illegal in several European countries, including France where it was outlawed by the Gayssot Act and Germany where it can result in up to 5 years of imprisonment.

Subsequently, this decision caused outrage among the Jewish community and moderate Catholics, and prompted Father Hans Kung, a theology professor at the University of Tübingen in Germany, to warn the public of possible extremist tendencies fuelled by the Catholic Church. In February of 2009, in an interview published by French newspaper Le Monde, Kung explained

that: “The Church risks becoming a sect. Many Catholics no longer expect anything from this pope. It’s very sad”.

The lifting of the excommunications of these bishops illustrated the Pontiff’s desire for a “smaller and purer church” according to Kung, as well as his inability to make necessary reforms.

Internal and external dissent were reinforced by the move made by the Vatican to beatify Pope Pius the XII, whose involvement during the Second World War has been criticised

by Holocaust survivors and historians for 50 years. Historians disagree on the extent of his involvement in the War, some saying that his failure to renounce Nazi ideology could have stifled the rise of Fascism, especially in the devout Catholic country of Italy, others claiming that he went out of his way to save Jews privately during the war but remained neutral and silent on a world stage. It is accepted that Pius’ ability to prevent any of these atrocities was slim and many of the documents that could contradict or corroborate different views are only open to select researchers as part of the Vatican’s archives. However, the fact remains that only a small minority of Popes have received beatification, which is the highest honour that can be bestowed upon a person of Catholic faith and is the final step in becoming a Saint. Therefore, it seems ill-advised to bestow such an honour upon a leader whose actions during the Holocaust were inconsistent at best. Granted, acknowledging past mistakes has not always been the Vatican’s forte. But the decision has fuelled distrust and placed more emphasis on Benedict’s own participation in the Hitler Youth movement, which has been well documented but that should not be blown out of proportion in this author’s view, seeing as this was a widespread phenomenon in Germany at the time and that the Pope has since renounced the movement.

Another reason for concern can be found in the Pope’s past writings. Before he became Pope, Cardinal Ratzinger was the primary impetus behind Dominus Iesus, a groundbreaking document released by the Vatican in 2000. The controversial nature of this document did not stem from its restatement of the universality of Catholic faith but from its strong criticism of religious pluralism. The document does not, for instance, recognise the ecclesial status of Anglicans and Protestants which it criticises very handily and describes as “defective” and “not proper churches”.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, responded to this statement by deploring that such a document “seems to question the considerable ecumenical gains we have made”. This is not a purely theological dilemma; as the reader is well aware, the conflict between Protestants and Roman Catholics in the British Isles serves as a stark reminder of the need for interfaith dialogue. Hence, whether you yourself are Christian or not does not mean you should dismiss these issues as being outside of your “spiritual jurisdiction”. Conversely, the influence that the Pope has on the 1.1 billion Catholics worldwide should not be underestimated. Even though he is widely perceived as a ceremonial figure in the West due at least in part to the dwindling number of Catholics in Europe, the Pope remains a very strong moral authority in the developing world. On the whole, the Dominus Iesus, even though it remains a theoretical document that has not been read by the overwhelming majority of Catholics, presented the narrow-minded world view of the man who was soon to become the most influential religious leader in the world.

The last controversial decision made by the Pope stands in contrast with the teachings of the Dominus Iesus. Whilst the Pope stressed in the aformentionned document that the Roman Catholic

faith and dogma are the only ways to reach salvation, in a recent apostolic constitution - which is the highest form of decree passed by the Vatican - the Pope has allowed Anglican clergy and worshippers to convert to Roman Catholicism. To do so the Vatican has made concessions, such as allowing married members of the Anglican clergy to join the ranks, breaking the age-old rule of celibacy for Roman Catholic priests.

While this may not seem like much at first glance, a further examination of the motivations behind this rapprochement tells a very different story. Aside from taking the whole Anglican community by surprise, as even the Archbishop was not aware of the Vatican’s plans until a few days before the announcement was made, and leading to what could prove to be a schism in the Anglican faith, this ‘expansionist’ decree reasserts Benedict’s will to attract hard-line conservatives to the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, one of the reasons why Anglican clergymen would be inclined to join the Roman Catholic ranks is the growing feeling among traditionalists that the Anglican Church has become too liberal, by allowing women and gay men to become bishops for instance. The idea of religious purity is not new and has been the grounds for the creation of some of the most important Roman Catholic movements in history, such as the Franciscan and Benedictine orders. However, the 20th century has shown that the rhetoric of purity coupled with staunch moral conservatism can bring about unspeakable atrocities. The Vatican should stop covering up past mistakes to appeal to its most conservative base and embrace interfaith dialogue in order to ease century old religious tensions. But perhaps we will have to wait for a new Pope to be proclaimed in order to reach this ideal.

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cc Kian Elyassi Bakhtiari

Vive La Liberté!

France contemplates the burka in public spaces

By Louise Dewast There has been yet another row over France’s recent vantage on religious symbols in the public sphere. Despite the ban of veils in schools and work places in 2004, the government has decided to take another step towards secularism.

On June 17th 2009, 57 members of parliament filed a bill to ban the burka in ‘public spaces’, i.e. in authorities and on public transport.

The President himself, Nicolas Sarkozy, clearly stated his opinion on the issue, declaring that the burka was “not welcome on French soil”, and claimed France would not abandon women ‘condemned’ to wear such a veil. On January 24th 28

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2010, a cross-party parliamentary committee led by the communist Guerin submitted a report arguing for a legislation on the ban of the burka.

Why ban the burka?

Firstly, the burka is said to entail the submission of women to men, and to reinforce gender inequalities.

In line with France’s commitment to ‘laïcité’, President Nicolas Sarkozy emphasised this point by claiming that such a ban would have nothing to do with religion, but with women’s rights and liberty.

In this sense, women who cover their entire body become a symbol of subordination. It is thus argued

that the ban would have liberating prospects for women.

The strength of this argument seems questionable at best. The oppression of women, of wives as well as daughters, as experienced in some fundamentalist Islamic countries does not necessarily take place in France. It is not unusual that educated, young women choose to wear the veil as expression of their personal faith. Dressing is a cultural expression and we should not force anyone to dress in certain way.

Moreover, it is every persons right to dress as they choose. Individual liberty is sacred on the condition that it does not harm or hinder the

liberty of others. The burka may be unsettling or even provocative to some but it does not impede on others’ lives and liberty. Moreover, only 20 per cent of French people actually mix with women in burkas (according to GN Research). Is the homeland of freedom and liberty not so tolerant after all?

It should also be kept in mind that the burka only concerns about two thousand women in France. If the government really wanted to address problems of women’s rights, e.g. gender inequality, issues such as rape, prostitution, violence and exclusion deserve much more attention than they are currently paid.

Many people, as mentioned above, would agree that it is unsettling to talk to someone whose face is covered. However, in addition to this unease, there seems to be a growing mistrust and scepticism in France towards Islam. Although there are no religiously based French statistics, GN research has gathered that 56 per cent of French people are ‘revolted’ when they see such women, and 65 per cent seem favourable to a ban on the burka in all public spaces, including the streets. This attitude can perhaps be explained by the fact that France has the largest Muslim population in Europe, up to 3.7 million, making integration into French society a considerable and difficult process.

But, as the supporters of the law brought forward, the issue is not one of Islam, but one of women.

The second argument is that wearing the burka is a threat to public security, as in the case of women whose faces cannot be identified when they go into a bank or pick

up their children at school. But are these women really a security problem? It seems as if the burka is often too quickly connected with fundamentalist Islam. The image of moderate Muslims is often rejected by the public and does not receive just treatment. Extremism indeed should be rejected, but how can we be sure of the tie between the burka and fundamentalist Islam?

It seems much more reasonable that the wish to ban the burka arises mostly from a fear of the unknown: people reject what they find alien or do not understand and therefore fear. This is one way in which the negative attitude of the public to the burka can be explained.

The third argument stems from France’s strong republican ideology and founding principle of secularity, which argues that religion should be discreet and private. The UMP and Nicolas Sarkozy argue that people living on French territory, including immigrants, should comply with the principles of ‘La République’ and respect all its laws.

Last year a Moroccan woman was refused French naturalization on the grounds that she wore a burka.

Historically, it has been forbidden for the state to intervene in religious affairs. After the many and bloody wars of religion that have taken place throughout France’s history, it is generally accepted that the state should not intervene with matters of religion in any way, leaving it to the private sphere. Would it thus be up to the Muslim community to limit such practices, if it believes it to be rightful in order to prevent extremism?

Drawing from this strict secularity, integration models in France go hand in hand with acculturation, which has always been praised for successfully encouraging immigrants to adopt the host country’s life style and ‘soul’. France’s integration model is very different from the one chosen by for example the United Kingdom, which refuses to interfere in the process of acculturation and even encourages people to develop their own cultural heritage, all the while embracing the benefits of a being UK citizen. It is of course legitimate of France to want to control this acculturation process by ‘helping’ immigrants to become French citizens. However, many French Muslims feel threatened by this approach. To ban the burka is a risky project in that it might start off a vicious circle of racism, distrust, violence and sectarianism.

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Who Are You?

Having finally ratified the Lisbon Treaty, European governments have chosen Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton to represent the EU on the world stage. But are they the right candidates for the job?

by Elena Georgantzis “WHO ARE YOU? I’d never heard of you. No one in Europe had ever heard of you!” This was the warm, welcoming message received by Herman van Rompuy during his maiden visit to the European Parliament last month, courtesy of UKIP MEP Nick Farage. Unleashing a torrent of offence, the outspoken MEP simply voiced what I suspect many people in the EU have been saying behind closed doors, ever since the man resembling “a low grade bank clerk” (in Mr Farage’s words) took on the post of President of the European Council last November.

The appointment of a President had been a long-awaited move. The result of the finally ratified Lisbon Treaty, itself the successor of the ill-fated European Constitution, Europe has been anticipating this appointment since 2004, when the Constitution was signed, but not ratified, by all member states of the EU. It is worth remembering that back then the European Constitution, as its grandiose name suggested, was intended to be the next great step forward for Europe. It was intended to be a single treaty replacing all existing ones; giving the EU a legal personality and thus the ability to enter into international agreements. Similarly, it was intended to move EU integration forward into unchartered territory and allow Europe to loom large on the world stage: a role perhaps befitting for the largest common market, exporter, investor and aid donor in the world.

But that has all been forgotten in the wake of the disaster that followed.

Rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the European Constitution was hastily re-packaged into an unintelligible series of amendments to previous EU treaties. Another rejection, following a referendum in Ireland in 2008, led to the Irish being called upon to vote yet again last year in an attempt to get the ‘right answer’ out of them.

And so, after this exhaustive and quite humiliating journey, the fact that the EU finally has chosen a pair of unknowns to represent it on the world stage is perhaps not so surprising. The fate of

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the Constitution clearly showed that the EU and its citizens were not ready for deeper integration, at least not in quite such an obvious manner. The result is that member states’ governments are now trying to stop the EU from resembling a federal entity rhetorically, through calling Catherine Ashton by the catchy title of “High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”, rather than a ‘foreign minister’.

This appears to be a bitter ending to what started out as such a promising endeavour. Shortly after the appointments were made, Chris Patten, a member of the House of Lords and EU commissioner for external relations from 2000-2004, said that by his second term, Barack Obama would simply send vicepresident Biden to European summits, instead of taking the time to turn up himself. His words were borne out much sooner than that. Just last month, the White House announced that the President would not be attending an EU-US summit taking place in Spain in May. US officials said that Obama had travelled to the EU very often during his first year, and that he would be doing so again for a NATO summit in November.

This, however, did nothing to drown out the voices suggesting that, after his experience at an informal EU summit last April which produced few substantial results, the president decided he had more pressing business to attend to.

It appears that Europe refuses to wake up to the fact that its clout could be considerably increased if it spoke with one voice. One of the main aims of the Lisbon Treaty was to provide an answer to Henry Kissinger’s infamous question: “Who should I call when I want to talk to Europe?”. Alas, this problem has still not been resolved. There are now at least four positions of ‘power’ within the EU structure: the President of the European Council (the body consisting of EU leaders, which directs policy), the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, the Head of the European Commission and the leader of the government in the country which holds the six month

rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers. This institutional maze of official posts does nothing to help EU relations with the rest of the world. This was comically illustrated recently, when the Mongolian President got confused whilst trying to list the people he had met with during a visit to Brussels.

Will the two appointments of Lady Ashton and Mr van Rompuy therefore end up damaging the EU, as opposed to helping it increase its global status?

In my opinion, whilst the two figures may be suited to the compromisebuilding which the EU requires to function on an everyday basis (after all, Mr van Rompuy is known - if only in Belgium - for helping to forge consensus between the Dutch and French speaking communities as Prime Minister), their appointment frankly symbolises the fact that European leaders are unwilling to create a truly common European foreign policy. This may be perfectly understandable, as no leader can be expected to enthusiastically support being pushed out of the limelight, but it reflects the fact that Europe has perhaps not grasped the global shift towards a G2 world dominated by the US and China, or perhaps by the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China). If the recent financial crisis has taught us anything about world politics, it is that the G7 can now only do so much, and that developing countries will be the powerhouses of the future. The EU has brought Europe so far: from being a continent mired in world wars and divisions, to being a model for democracy and economic integration for the world. It proved that apparent enemies can be reconciled around common goals and common prosperity. However, if it refuses to look to the future; if it fails to keep expanding in order to take in new members which can provide it with new workers and new market; and if it believes that it can be best represented on the world stage by two unknown technocrats committed to ‘quiet diplomacy’, then it risks relegating itself to irrelevance.

Extremism: At Home and Away

Its significance in Europe’s identity and for UCL’s reputation

By Joshua Davison It is evident that extremism of all kinds has been on the rise in recent years in Europe. In late October last year, BNP leader Nick Griffin appeared on BBC’s Question Time; Marine Le Pen, daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen and vicepresident of his Front National party in France, was on the 14th of January of this year given airtime on the current affairs show A Vous de Juger; in Bavaria, the debate over the legality of NeoNazi marches, in which police have previously been deployed in protection of the marchers, goes on.

Closer to home, the questioning continues over UCL’s reasons for not reporting Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to any higher authority after he invited extremist speakers such as Abu Usamah, who amongst other things is notorious for being a violent homophobe. In that particular case the invitation to speak was withdrawn shortly before the event, but Mr Abdulmutallab was known to have been in contact with him all the

same.

All of this raises an interesting question about our identity, European or university – what do we value more: freedom of speech, or a coherent, secure society? There recently appears to have been, in many cases, a swing away from unrestricted free expression. Concerning the issue of the neo-Nazi marches in Bavaria the German Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has recently ruled that such marches contravene anti-sedition laws and could be considered an incitement to riot.

In the cases of Mr Griffin and Ms Le Pen there was public outrage including protests and, in the latter case, refusal by another guest to participate in the show. An event organised by Durham University intended to take place on the 12th of February that was supposed to feature two BNP members was recently ground to a halt by threats of mass protest from various student bodies.

At first sight, it appears UCL

has reacted similarly. The statement released by Malcolm Grant, Provost and President of UCL, (‘Freedom of thought is all we foment’, published in Times Higher Education on 31st December 2009) indicated that UCL would have intervened to stop Mr Usamah speaking had the event not already been cancelled, in accordance with the Code of Practice for freedom of speech on campus. This, however, is misleading. Essentially, if UCL claims it would have cancelled the event in question because it would have broken the Code of Practice, then why didn’t it have or raise suspicions about Mr Abdulmutallab for trying to organise it?

Moreover, the Centre for Social Cohesion, an independent think tank, points out that UCL’s Islamic Society had previously invited other known extremist speakers such as Abdul Raheem Green, an advocate of domestic violence, who were not prevented from speaking on campus.

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There are several potential explanations as to why UCL did not report Mr Abdulmutallab. Perhaps the mistake could have been, if not forgiven, then at least accepted, if it had been a tragic oversight, and the university had simply not been aware of what was going on.

Given the discredit that would have come with that, UCL instead chose to argue that it did not have any duty or obligation to report this known interaction between Mr Abdulmutallab and Mr Usamah, since the event and incitation of hatred didn’t actually take place on university grounds. Even if we for the moment were to ignore the other cases in which radicals were allowed to speak on campus, this defence is unsatisfactory; the issue was never one of whether or not the incident occurred, but of Mr Abdulmutallab’s attempt to organise it. In other words, UCL did not offer an adequate explanation for its mistake.

Moreover, this mistake was glossed over throughout by reference to the issue of free expression, as evidenced by the quotation from the statement deploring “any restrictions on freedom of speech within the law”.

To some extent, UCL’s actions (or lack thereof ) were correct in this aspect.

The restriction of free expression can constitute a violation of Article 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Moreover, given that there are 3.2 million CCTV cameras in England and that the march towards universal ID cards continues, it seems reasonable to suggest that at the UK government already intervenes too heavily in the private lives of its citizens and was rightly not invited to further do so.

It is curious though that UCL should involve the issue of free expression here, since Mr Grant already declared in the statement that he personally would have stopped any such expression by Mr Usamah at the university. Free speech must be protected when it is “within the law”, but this case would

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not have been, nor has it been suggested by any party that it would have been so.

It seemingly went from arguing against free speech (by saying it would cancel the event) to defending it.

Therefore, starting off a debate on free speech with reference to this case was dangerous, as it might confuse readers into believing that expression of radical, violent views ought to be condoned by the law. This is not the case. With any right comes responsibility, and it has been demonstrated time and time again that, as a whole, society is not responsible enough to filter information it is presented with and come to reasonable conclusions. We must not accept violent extremism as part of our identity, and it appears that the only way to eradicate it is to partly sacrifice our right to freedom of expression, in line with what has been demanded in the above examples involving the BNP, the FN and the Neo-Nazis.

Mr Abdulmutallab was not reported, and because of this he was able to attempt a terrorist act. UCL claims to have followed the Code of Practice for free expression on campus and to have defended free expression within the law. Yet given this fact, and all the other evidence presented, it can be concluded that either UCL in fact made a terrible but unintentional mistake, or its Code is wrong and we must sacrifice more free expression than our university believes. Given the political sensitivity of this case, we are unlikely ever to know which the real reason was.

Dalma Szentpetery Winner of the European Society ‘European London’ Photo Competition “The picture portrays my sister Alina visiting London for the first time. I live in New York and my sister lives in Romania, so London is essentially our middle ground. In February 2009 (through Facebook, nonetheless) I found out I had a sister for the first time in my life!

This photo documents the emotional and exhilarating weekend we had as we met for the first time in London – which just like for us is the meeting place for millions of people from around the world.”

aRTS Frisbee Session in Dormant New Forest / David Vajda /An Extract: The Diary of an Inconsistent Man / Matthew Bremner / Ohne Titel / Emily Katzenstein

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‘Frisbee session in dormant New Forest’ - Canon EOS 1000FN, 35mm-80mm, Kodak Professional BW 400 CN

Quality is Lost in Today‘s Digitalism An appeal for analogue photography

By David Vajda A simple click and the moment is immortalised. One click is enough to make art; then, click again and you have socially interacted with a person on the other side of the world. By simplifying - and radicalising - social interaction, the digital era has altered our priorities.

It is all about the moment and how soon it will arrive, at the cost of losing moments on the way. Acceleration of actions comes with a loss of quality and permanence. There are so called ‘Facebook friends’ with whom you share only the mutual pleasure of a voyeuristic flick through each other’s lives - or rather the lives you want others to think you have. A Facebook profile is an ideal; a contrived, Photoshopprocessed image of how people want

to be perceived. Here people become their own little showreels, with their own self-advertisement campaigns, which scream: “I am somebody different, somebody special”. In today’s digitalism, actions are being replaced with a mere semblance of reality. The irony of this homogenised pursuit of cyber perfection is the paradoxical question it precipitates: who is individual, when the very notion of individuality becomes generic?

Facebook reduces social interaction to typed, digitalised sentences and makes up for postponed meetings in real life with uploaded photos. Moreover, the number of ‘friends’ you interact with in this way increases daily. It is

not merely social interaction that is seemingly ephemeral in the digital era, but also education. Knowledge serves a momentary purpose; and that moment is the point at which you look it up on Wikipedia. The Internet, because of its immediacy, gradually replaces thoroughly researched and lasting knowledge, gained over time.

Nowadays, the most common way to solve a debate is to pull out an iPhone. But it is a lost cause to argue against these domains. According to our distorted priorities, functionality is preferred to quality; Facebook and Wikipedia are so convenient that in our digitally-drugged eyes their flaws are undoubtedly overlooked.

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Art and, in particular photography are subject to similar developments.

Everyone with a digital SLR camera and Photoshop is suddenly a photographer. What before required devotion and technical knowledge is nowadays largely automated. If you are not pleased with the first moment you capture, you simply take another shot.

Your 5GB memory capacity means that you can even chase that same moment from another angle. And even if none of the numerous pictures you take is satisfactory, Photoshop will do the rest.

Nevertheless, I do not want to take a wholly anti-digital stance regarding photography, which would be absurd.

Digital photography has enriched the discipline with amazing opportunities and new facets. German photographer Andreas Gursky, for example, frankly and deliberately uses digital photography and the manipulation it affords to create a new form of picture.

By editing and enhancing panoramic pictures of cold urban subjects, he creates an overpowering space larger than the object photographed. Indeed his masterpiece ‘Bahrain I’ - which depicts a chaotic racetrack in the desert, void of any discernible pattern - resembles an abstract painting. Gursky takes full advantage of the new possibilities that digital photography affords, in order to achieve an unseen and overwhelming mode of visualisation, rather than just for the sake of ease. Criticising Gursky for using digital techniques would be as absurd as denouncing James Cameron for using excessive special effects whilst making Avatar. Both of these artists are graduates of renowned institutions in their respective fields and have hence earned their mantle as masters.

Gursky studied photography in the 1980s, when the notion of a digital camera had not even been formed and Cameron’s first short movie in 1978 - a science fiction film called Xenogenesis - was a two-man, low budget project and the ten minutes of futuristic world

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they created were made almost entirely from cardboard. In other film genres, directors like Stanley Kubrick waited entire months for the right light to shoot a certain scene. It is this kind of long-term devotion that I miss in digital photography. I was particularly struck by this when I watched a young professional photographer two years ago, at a fashion shoot in Munich.

Whilst he told his models how to pose and which poses he liked, he kept his camera on a set mode - which took about five pictures per second - and moved it from angle to angle without even looking through the lens. If the images that were the outcome of this banal reliance on technique are regarded as art, then this is surely the beginning of its end. Art, including photography, should remain a skilled craft and is not to be lost to straightforward automatism.

If someone has a serious interest in photography, they should start with analogue photography in order to train their eye. The photographic process, starting with choosing the film and ending with holding the final result in your hands is a lengthy one, that is initially littered with failure. The wrong exposure time or backlighting darkening your shots are just two factors that can ruin their outcome. This learning process is suppressed by the instant visualisation of digital cameras, which allows you to correct mistakes at the time, but does not encourage you to permanently learn from and evolve with your mistakes. Additionally, pictures shot on film contain a certain warmth that digital pictures in their high and sterile accuracy can rarely achieve without Photoshop.

In my criticism of the digital era above, I explicitly targeted the moments that are lost by shortening the photographic journey. There are numerous moments that are forgone in the name of speed: the roaring sound of a new film being

wound up in the camera, a strong yet unconfirmed belief that the shot just taken is a good one and furthermore the excitement of awaiting the results.

Indeed, even the moment of opening a bag of freshly printed photographs and questioning the cause when you observe with surprise a particular picture’s tone, is lost. Similarly forsaken is the moment when, developing photographs in a dark room, the image magically and slowly appears on the paper lying in the chemicals. One of the greatest losses occasioned by the digitalisation of photography is the dark room. The dark room and all the mystery it beholds, is where the dénouement of photography takes place. Even in cinema, the dark room plays an arcane and obscure role.

In Antonioni’s 60’s masterpiece Blow Up, for example, Thomas, a professional photographer, accidentally photographs a murder. The dark room, as the place where he enlarges the images and makes the shocking discovery, is a crucial catalyst for the movie’s plot. Zooming into a picture on a computer - today’s hypothetical equivalent to this scene - would offer nowhere near the same impact as the gradual and more organic interpretation of Antonioni’s film.

In these fast-paced times, it is important to maintain a certain degree of nostalgia and even a reactionary stance, in order to make out where devotion and authenticity lie in today’s vast pool of data. Looking back to see how artists created masterpieces the hard way will hopefully help to uncover new and more rigorous approaches to art, amidst the omnipotent ease of the digital era.

Nowadays modern art is often only an unseen idea that has been realised and subsequently conveyed in a simple manner. Art is the act of creating and visualising a brilliant idea, in an equally brilliant way. Photography is and should be more than just a click.

An Extract: The Diary of an Inconsistent Man

By Matthew Bremner A woman goes on as she must. Yet she goes on with no gaps; words merge into arbitrarily constructed continuums...I feel my back ache. My own problems rule, ruling as they must and they must.

And no wonder, slumped on a foam starved seat, sharp wooden edges from the anorexic furniture range at IKEA joust with my shoulder blades. In front, they carve creases in Steve’s shirt, gouge valleys into his flesh. Violence. I’m not sure I like Steve, Tanya is wearing a nice dress though. I notice the woman pause, check herself, re-compose and then confidently resume her most magnificent drawl. Outside I can see that the weather is trying to be bad. Oh where art thou Apollo?

I watch as people wriggle at two second intervals, like contagion, the “fidget” spreads from row to row the unconscious Mexican wave of the discomforted and bored. If nothing at all people-watching is a mindless

way to waste my time. Each time it gets back to Steve, 48 seconds have elapsed. In around 60-65 waves time I will be out from underneath the small crusted eyes of the women and from this to then. Now there are two positively uplifting words. Two words, two categorisations which reduce you - the doer, “the amateur live(r)” to an immovable, stagnant dollop of skin and cartilage, into two 3 cm words which encapsulate your entire existence. The actions of “this” and the actions that were: “then”. Quite fundamentally this is humanity’s greatest achievement, and one we have very charitably awarded to ourselves. The bloody woman keeps looking at me...All the strife, all the incessant worry, the happiness to be summarised by one simple journey; from the base of the letter t and ending most triumphantly at the foot of the letter n. How deplorable, that this is all we can muster for the some 5 million

years of our existence. Each morning your eyes open to see only “this”, to sit and remember the powerful nostalgia of “then”. It’s pathetic that I should even want to acknowledge this, but one must always wallow. Being sad is good for your happiness.

I chew aggressively on my sandwich; the kind of chew where you open your mouth just slightly, just enough to reveal the food inside. Where, the back section of the tongue fit neatly into the cavity of the upper mouth, letting out a thick damp clack as the lower jaw closes; the musicality of semi-processed food and yeasty trapped air. I like to piss people off. It seems absurd that you can actually annoy people whilst doing something completely rational. I need to eat and so do you. People are irrational, utterly absurd organisms who have major difficulties finding patience for the overzealous jaw. And how fun it is to irk them, challenge their

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precious sensibilities. Am I a prick? No I’m just irrational. Seeking out illogic in people, finding importance in the small details somewhat stretches the rigid notion of “this” and “then”- it requires more imagination. And so what if I’m a hypocrite, adopt one philosophy and you are blind to variety, adopt many and you appreciate all there is to offer.

After all you only ever become a “then”.

For example here, in this sparse, austere room, essentially void of any intrinsic personality, people litter the room with their contradictions. In front of me plastic bottles stand on desks, shamed by the natural orange juice inside of them, dirty tennis shoes rest dangerously close to newly polished brogues, there is even a boy wearing a fucking Hawaiian shirt with a pinstripe blazer. In one instant, in one room, there exists a micro representation of the dichotomies of a wonderful, yet onerous life.

Steve glugs his orange juice noisily. He is disgusting for it.

I am here, as I am everywhere. No I am not God, wouldn’t want to be, don’t have the right credential, didn’t study the right degree. But does it matter where I am if I ask the same questions perpetually. Stalling, frustrated and forever pontificating, stuck in between pretension and intellectualism, thriving in a self-obsessed purgatory. Row upon row of heads, they see what I am seeing; they hear what I am hearing.

The woman’s paralyzed upper lip, her limp, flabby arms and a twitchy left leg; this is our ocular commonality, our vision on the “big screen”. Yet how do they feel about her, indeed how do they feel about me, my faults. I can’t see me, they can. And right now I despise the woman’s appearance, wince at the sound of her rasping voice; I wish Diana would stop picking at that bloody spot.

Tomorrow I may like them, tomorrow I may be accommodating to Steve’s repulsive habits, but tomorrow I will always be stuck, asking the same

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questions and placing myself relative to them - the rest. Indeed my fluctuating mind skips from one assumption to the next, inconsistently controlling my perceptions of the people around me.

Mood dictates what you are allowed to see, an implicit but fixed barrier to your thoughts. There are some things which stay, but most leave. The selfishness and overbearing nature of the individual seeks to find a bit of themselves in everything. The fact that I like Tanya’s dress means that at this point I could bare her as a person. She conforms to an ephemeral ideal that I have instantaneously created and one that suits me in the present.

Rain. I wish it was a nicer day, I’d be much happier.

I have two friends here, they sit either side of me, and they, like the rest of the people here, are trapped in the notional situation I have created for them. Naturally they are oblivious, as I too am oblivious, to their own internal monologues; the impenetrably secret and pernicious nature of roving mind.

My version of what they are thinking, my own intuition presenting them with a narrative, a script with me at the centre of a cinematic-like experience.

The existence of tension between us in my head, but non-existent in theirs, and minds impose a state of oppression which exists only on my side. I am restricted by them not in reality but in my own alternate perception of “this”. Yet there is no fundamental hatred towards either of them, or in fact to anyone in this room, what my mind proposes is a scapegoat, a conduit through which I can justify my feelings.

To go beyond the inadequacies of words, but to go through the palpable and ostensible existence of human beings and what they are not expressing.

Take Ian; I hate the way he always brushes his hair to the side. With two fingers always and at consistent 30 second intervals. His legs crossed and then crossed again, he styles his hair in

the most immaculate of side partings, again and again. I hate his manner but admire his reliability. A nervous twitch, the elevation of his withered right hand, the deliberate and concentrated parting of his index and middle finger - sharp and scissor like - the firm grasp of his fringe and the final pull, sending his hair across a greasy forehead. These movements are real, the gouges on Steve’s shirt are real and the tight fit of Tanya’s dress is real. My embellished version of them is a fiction, and herein lies the true omnipotence of the story teller. He is the mind and he brings to life what he wishes, he is God, like I as I exist in my own mind - am God. Here I have the credentials, here I am interested. Ian is a real person, my hate of his habit exists only as potential, and it only breathes life when it is uttered into existence by my mouth. Sitting here gives me a right to adhere only to the imposed cultural freedoms and constraints; in my mind I define these.

I could tell Ian to stop being a fucking annoying twat, but I’m a coward so I can’t. Still, in my imagination I’m the bravest bastard around.

Three rows back I hear Suzanne...at least I think that is her name, her and that pustular pal of hers Katherine.

Behind me, harsh with their callous words and frenetic fidgets they bitch and connive; I can sense that the woman is getting annoyed. Everyone can hear their whispers, everyone now knows how unforgivably bad Fred was to Helena, and they now know that Helena slept with George, Fred’s best friend. Across from me Sam and Dave are writing notes to each other about their chances of success tonight with Monica - Harriet, Monica’s best friend, can see. This is where it hits me, and not just the rare and beautiful sound of another nosy gulp from Steve. This is where things balance out yet the jigsaw pieces still don’t fit. Things become skewed when words are spoken; they show us that things aren’t so great.

Each person here has the opportunity to tell a story and they are telling a story. They are given a context; they exist as a meaning which is part of someone else. Right now, as Harriet texts Monica about Sam and Dave’s grotty little schemes, she becomes part of a story, in which her part is given context by the reactions and subsequent behaviour of Dave, Sam and Monica.

Indeed, soon a message will appear on Monica phone, soon Monica will open that message and in that instant, she too becomes implicated in the events that follow. She is a constituent part of the story and as such has power over the other characters final judgements. Dave and Sam, writing the most chauvinistic things in the most effeminate way, are at this point still stolid to proceedings. However, soon each person, in this sordid little tale, will feel differently about each person’s involvement, will deviate from the truth so as to protect their own character - the art of storytelling is the act of self-preservation. Yet ironically it is always the amalgamation of thoughts, the words of that other people that

ultimately define each character and tell the story. The truth of the real person becomes impeded by the very thing that hopes to preserve it in the first place.

Yet in my head I am safe, a cerebral Fort Knox. I can imagine telling Ian right now that he is the most annoying little shit on the planet and he won’t do a thing. Katherine’s not going to cry, when I tell her that her face looks like a small mountain range and Steve, he won’t do anything if I say how much I hate him being fat. However, it is when we exist normally that we lose control, when we speak and cannot predict other people; this is the time we stand to lose ourselves. Amidst the banality, the dank brown corduroys and stiff collared shirts, people feel the need to take control and yet they fail to realise, power and reputation are facilitated by others. We wear castratingly tight jeans like Simon, kitsch African necklaces like the woman - who I’m starting to feel bad about ignoring – or even pink cornrows like Samantha. Each person here can control their physicality, but they can never control how they are perceived. One of the first things we do

in life is risk losing control of ourselves by trying to protect ourselves.

Six billion stories on this earth, each story consisting of smaller constituent stories all governed by an acquaintance or a fleeting encounter. There is no absolute ownership; throughout our lives a part of us is permanently on loan. We exchange personality for personality at fluctuating exchange rates - varying personal cost. Indeed our ability as a banker of these stories, as the true human capitalist determines our perceived success. Harriet’s skill as a “human being” will be measured by how she positions herself in today’s ensuing melodrama, whether through intrigue and diplomacy, she can maintain the value of her personality shares. And it is funny because very little of this matters, tomorrow things will be wonderful, Samantha may have green cornrows, and I may not have time to think of this because I will be listening, becoming part of someone else’s story. The beauty of it all is I haven’t done a thing; I’ve just told a story to myself, kept myself company for an hour or so and gone quietly from “this” to “then”.

des Westfensters an dem kleinen, roten Sekretär zu sehen meine; einen Bleistift in der Hand, die Stirn gerunzelt, die Augen klein hinter seinen dicken Brillengläsern. Verloren zwischen dem gestrengen Blick des Türken, der in Sepia an der Wand hängt, verloren zwischen all der Zeit, in der das Haus hier allein und vergessen gestanden hat, all den heißen Sommertagen, in denen nur die Eidechsen und Skorpione hier waren.

Verloren zwischen den Herbstnächten, in denen ich, eingewickelt in zahlreiche Decken, auf dem gusseisernen Bett allerlei Geschichten freiließ, um die

Kälte zu vergessen. Allerlei Geschichten von Monstern, Bösewichten und Brüdern, von Steppenwölfen und Trümmerländern. Geschichten, die ich weiterspann, ihnen eigenes, neues Leben gab, ihnen Hüte aufsetzte und dunkle Blicke in die Augen zeichnete - solange bis sie anfingen auf eigenen Beinen durch das Zimmer zu stolzieren - solange, bis am Sekretär die Brüder Löwenherz saßen, bis sich 1000 Jahre Einsamkeit auf der Kommode breitmachten und Ronja Räubertochter neben mir auf dem Bett schnarchte.

Solange, bis Ideen und Gespenster,

Ohne Titel

By Emily Katzenstein Ich habe jeden Sommer hier verbracht und trotzdem habe ich das Gefühl, als wäre höchstens ein kleiner Hauch meiner Träume an diesen Wänden hängengeblieben, ein winzig kleiner Hauch, verloren zwischen all den Gerüchen, Geräuschen und Geschichten, die das Zimmer bevölkern. Verloren zwischen den glitzernden, raschelnden Kleidern meiner Urgroßmutter, zwischen den aufrechten, in Reih und Glied aufgereihten Gedanken meines Großvaters - den ich - bis heute, zehn Jahre nach seinem Tod, im Schatten

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Erinnerungen und Illusionen das Zimmer bevölkerten.

Sie alle schweben hier im Zimmer herum und ich kenne sie alle beim Namen außer den Türken, aber er heißt von jeher ‘der Türke’ und hat jeden anderen Namen sicher selbst schon vergessen.

Lotta und ihre Geschwister, Sibylle (die eigentlich Mutti heißt), Kater (der mein Großvater war und zudem ein kluger, humorvoller Mann), Fabian...

Ich kann dir genau sagen: Der Schatten dahinten, zwischen den Pfosten, das ist das Äffchen von Pippi (fast kann ich nicht glauben, dass es solange hier überwintert hat - es ist doch nun schon Jahrzehnte her, dass ich Pippi gelesen habe) und der Windhauch, der hier gerade den Lampenschirm so leicht bewegt hat, das ist Mutti, die herumstreicht, und alles mit ihren Spinnenfingern berührt (und ich schauere, denn sie ist mir unheimlich und ein bisschen zu schön) und da drüben, neben dem Schrank, wo das Sonnenlicht so schräg einfällt, da steht Till (der sich nicht weit von hier zu Tode gesoffen hat, was ausgesprochen schade ist, denn er war klug und charmant und großspurig) und neben der Kommode steht Erich Kästner als kleiner Junge und streitet sich mit Pünktchen (die er erfunden hat, aber nicht wirklich ausstehen mag), während Fabian ihm müde den Kopf auf die Schultern legt, wie um zu sagen: Aber das ist es doch nicht wert, nun hör schon auf, du alter Moralist. Und dann gibt es da noch Lasse und Bosse, einen alten Mann, der auf einem Grashalm kaut und aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach Anzio heißt, ein Gespenst namens Rosa und - sieh mal an! - auch Paula Trousseau hat sich eingefunden (dabei habe ich sie im Zug zwischen Paris und Mannheim gelesen - wie sie wohl hergefunden hat? - Vielleicht war es die Sehnsucht).

Und es sind noch viele andere da, aber manche von ihnen zeigen sich nur mittags um 12 und sind dann wieder spurlos verschwunden und andere

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sieht man nur, wenn das Abendlicht schräg auf das Bett fällt. Manche sind schüchtern, andere vorlaut und wieder andere habe ich in all dieser Zeit noch kein Wort sprechen hören. Manchmal wird es mir zu viel - all diese Stimmen und Gesichter, all diese Erinnerungen, diese fast vergessenen Träume, diese Fantasien - und dann mache ich das Westfenster auf und lasse den Wind herein, der sie alle davonweht, sie mitnimmt über die Hügel, nach Borgo, nach Ronta, nach Firenzoule und bis ganz hinauf in das kleine verlassene Haus am Hang. Der Wind weht sie alle hinaus, Fabian, Herrn Nilsson, Ronja, Mutti mit den Spinnenfingern, Till, meinen allerliebsten schwarzen Kater, ja der Wind zieht sogar an dem Kleid von Paula Trousseau. ...der Wind zieht und zerrt an ihnen, bis sie alle heraus sind aus diesem Zimmer. Nur die heißen Sommertage voller Einsamkeit, die bringt kein Sturm hinaus. Sie sind hineingeweißt in die Wände und liegen schwer und behäbig in den Mauern. Aber sie stören nicht, schlummern nur vor sich hin und geben eine wohltuende Wärme ab.

So habe ich für ein paar Stunden meine Ruhe. Ich kann in der Nase popeln, ohne dass Mutti mich ermahnt, und billige Romane lesen, ohne dass Kästner gleich eine missbilligende Augenbraue hochzieht. Ich kann endlich eine Zigarette am Fenster rauchen, ohne dass mein Großvater einen Asthmaanfall bekommt. Ich kann ein bisschen schlafen, ein bisschen träumen.

Aber sobald es Abend wird, kommen sie zurück. Manche schlüpfen zur Tür herein, andere bringt das Abendlicht durchs Fenster wieder nach Hause und wieder andere schweben wie die Geister, die sie sind, einfach durch die dickgeweißten Wänder meines Zimmers.

Und ich muss zugeben, dass sie mir Angst machen, gerade am Abend.

Manchmal denke ich daran, in eines der Südzimmer zu ziehen, in denen nichts

weiter lebt, als die Sonnenstrahlen frühmorgens und ein paar Skorpione unter dem Bett. In eines der Südzimmer in denen die Mittagssonne alle Gespenster vertreibt.

Und ich nehme mir fest vor, dass ich im nächsten Sommer... ...im nächsten Sommer schließe ich die schwere Tür zur Küche auf, stelle meine Sachen ab, gehe die Treppe hinauf, fast schon am Zimmer vorbei - aber dann sehe ich den roten Sekretär, den großen weißen Schrank und das gusseiserne Bett - kurz ich sehe das große karge Zimmer mit all seinen Gespenster und mich überkommt die seltsamste Sehnsucht. Ich gehe - alle Südzimmer der Welt vergessen - in mein Zimmer und lächle über Herrn Nilsson, der doch tatsächlich immer noch auf dem weißen Schrank herumturnt, und meint, ich sähe ihn nicht. Auf dem Hocker hinter dem Sekretär sitzt mein jüngeres Ich in einem langen, schwarzen T-Shirt, den Kopf auf die Schulter meines Großvaters gelegt, und nickt mir zu, als wolle es sagen: Da bist du ja auch wieder. Und auch Fabian lächelt und gibt Kästner einen kleinen Schubs, um ihn auf mich aufmerksam zu machen. Ich lächle zurück, und streiche Ronja über das verklettete Haar. Irgendwo lacht ein Mädchen sehr hell und ein wenig erschrocken. Es hat wohl begriffen, dass es in einem Raum voller Geister steht.

THINK YOUNG It all started back in 2005 and 2006, while working in Brussels for Jade, the second biggest student association in the world. It was easy to realise then that young people were not involved in the political process of building Europe.

The fourth pillar upon which we stand is the production of documentaries. Our first, about young Kosovarians, was recently shot in Kosovo, and we plan to do several more in the months to come.

Along with some friends, ThinkYoung.eu was opened as a blog, and we started conducting surveys on 5,000 young Europeans. This was in 2008. We received good feedback from the European institutions, and got invited to several conferences to speak about our activities. Last November we decided to take a big step, and opened an office in Brussels.

We are enthusiastic about future collaboration with EUREKA and think that we can serve as useful platforms for each other, particularly in terms of publishing the articles and research of young Europeans across the continent or conducting surveys on young Europeans.

Recently we got an agreement with the European Business Summit, the most important conference in Brussels. For their 2010 edition ThinkYoung will form a panel of 400 European Future Leaders, and will ask them what the future of Europe should look like. The results will be presented on June 30th in the presence of the Presidents of the European Commission, Parliament and Council and several CEOs from important global companies.

Today we are a team of six people (of which three are based in Brussels), and we focus on four things: surveys, publications, conferences and documentaries.

We conduct surveys on a database of 5,000 young Europeans.

Involving your local community as well in our surveying is possible.

In terms of publications, we are constantly on the lookout for young people’s essays about Europe to publish on our website.

As regards conferences, we work as knowledge partners for two conferences, a recent one in Brussels about Social Entrepreneurship involving 150 EU university students, and The Junior Enterprise World Conference in July in Milan, engaging 400 university students from all over the world.

Being a knowledge partner involves the organising of panel discussions and workshops.

Whether you are interested in publishing an essay on our website, an internship, a job, being part of the European Future Leaders, or making a project about young Europeans you may have, feel free and encouraged to get in touch with ThinkYoung!

I invite you to follow us both on our website, which is always ‘under construction’ as things change very quickly, www. thinkyoung.eu and on our Facebook page: www.facebook. com/thinkyoung.

Andrea Gerosa Chief Thinker ThinkYoung

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Daniela Bädje

Sarah Coughlan

Louise Dewast

Omar El-Nahry

Elena Georgantzis

Maria Holmblad

Quirin Maderspacher

Tom Platt

Antoine de Saint-Phalle

Ben Tufft

David Vajda

Marta Zieba

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15 Years eureka A message from the President, It has been almost 15 years now since the first edition of Eureka Magazine was published in October 1995. Back then it consisted of two black and white A4 pages and focused mainly on the analysis of European current affairs. One of the cover stories of the first issue was that Latvia sought accession to the European Union. “It is the latest in a string of applications from former Eastern Block nations”, pointed out the author of the article.

15 years on, Latvia and eleven other Central and Eastern European states have become members of the European Union, while Eureka transformed into one of the most popular publications across the UCL campus.

With over 40 pages of political analysis, opinion columns, creative writing, brilliant photographs and stunning graphic design, it is perhaps the most important achievement of the UCLU European Society.

I would like to thank everyone, who got involved in the development of the magazine over all those years, and helped to make our publication what it is today. Happy birthday Eureka – not just a year older, but a year better!

Michal Wojciech Zdzieborski President of the UCLU European Society

Eureka Magazine UCLU European Society The magazine is available online: http://eurosoc.co.uk/ Design & Photography / Konrad Laker Cover & Photography / Lucile Bornot Photography / Christine Seifert / Dawid Kotur / David Vajda Proof-Reading / Sarah Coughlan / Ben Tufft / Tom Platt Editors / Maria Holmblad / Quirin Maderspacher / Konrad Laker