jewish thought
Can Kosher Make Sense? Adin Even-Israel Stainsaltz
T
he distinction between the permitted animals and the forbidden animals raises a question that has occupied many commentators: What distinguishes the permitted animals from all the prohibited ones? Why is a hyrax worse than some other animal? What is wrong with camels and pigs? Why is sturgeon caviar worse than salmon roe caviar? This question is not a new one, and similar questions can be asked regarding many other Torah laws. On this subject, however, the question is glaringly conspicuous. One of the reasons for this is the prominence of these laws in our daily lives and in Jewish law. Ever since we were exiled from our land and thus unable to fulfill most of the Torah’s commandments, the dietary laws form a central part of Jewish life. Separating milk and meat, avoiding non-kosher foods, and using the appropriate silverware for each meal take up much of our time and attention. There have been various attempts to resolve this question. Some have claimed that eating non-kosher animals is physically harmful, and from time to time claims arise regarding the danger of eating pork. It is true that pigs’ meat is sometimes infected with worms, which can cause one who consumes the meat without sufficiently cooking it to contract a parasitic disease called trichinosis. But if that were the reason for the prohibition, instead of prohibiting pork the Torah could have given much better advice – that one must cook the meat thoroughly before eating it. Others have claimed that pigs are prohibited because they were used for idolatry, while still others have claimed the reverse, that pigs were not considered fit even for idolatry, so they are certainly unfit for our consumption as well. There have been similar attempts to explain tzaraat, the leprosy-like condition described in the Torah. Maimonides, for example, explained that tzaraat is a type of disease. Ultimately, however, even he reached the conclusion that the tzaraat described in the Torah cannot be identified with any of the diseases known to him. On the contrary, especially in light of the fact that it can appear on houses as well as on flesh, tzaraat more closely resembles a miracle than a disease. In
January 2022 / Shvat 5782
fact, Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi writes that only supremely exalted individuals can be stricken with tzaraat, for only a spiritually exceptional person is worthy of experiencing such a miracle on his flesh. The same is true regarding spiritual purity and impurity: no clear explanations exist. We do not know why hedgehogs, chameleons, lizards, and snails are impure, while frogs are pure. There seems to be no reason why a frog, which is pure whether alive or dead, should be considered more exalted than a weasel or a mouse. However, the Torah distinguished between them, and we have no logical explanation for it. Generally, attempting to justify mitzvot by portraying them as intended for physical or even spiritual benefit ultimately proves futile. This does not mean that such a justification is necessarily unfounded, nor does it mean that one should argue the reverse, namely, that pig meat is actually better than cow meat, only that G‑d, knowing how good it is, nevertheless prohibited it to us. What it
means is that this type of justification can never be the central consideration. It is better simply to rely on G‑d and not attempt to give explanations. In the Torah, the words pure and impure appear in two completely different senses: in the list of animals that may or may not be eaten, and in the list of creatures that impart impurity when they are dead. These two lists are juxtaposed, even though there is no practical connection between them. Clearly, the statement, “it is impure for you,” regarding the camel and the hyrax has no relation – neither conceptually nor legally – to the statement “it shall remain impure until evening; then it shall be pure” regarding the creeping things. The first statement denotes that the animal may not be eaten, while the second denotes that these creatures convey impurity. Animals that may not be eaten are not, as a result, impure. When they are alive, they certainly are not more liable to convey
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