The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V22N4 by IACSP

Virtual Networking: A Way To Neutralize Hacker Breachers From The Inside Out

A Dedicated Emergency Response Team: Crowd, Riot, And Disaster Response Active Threats Against The Aviation Sector: Terrorism, Active Shooters, Workplace Violence, And ‘Insiders’ ‘Fat Leonard’ And The U.S. Navy Fraud Investigation An IACSP Q&A With Author Nelson DeMille Homeland Security Bookshelf

Winter Issue Vol. 22 No. 4 2017 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 22, No.4

Join the ranks of security and public safety professionals worldwide that have achieved the Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential as recognition of their unique expertise in the field of managing terrorism-related risk.

The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential is the global benchmark for recognizing career achievement and knowledge in the protection of facilities, organizations, and the public against acts of terrorism. The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer designation is awarded to a candidate who has met eligibility requirements and passed the cATO™ Certification Examination in accordance with the standards set forth by the Certifying Board of The International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP). Becoming board certified as a Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer distinguishes you in the security and public safety profession by demonstrating your expertise in the specialized field of managing terrorism-related risk and commitment to the safety and welfare of your community. Learn more and apply online:

www.catocertification.org

Vol. 22, No. 4 Winter 2017 IACSP Director of Operations Steven J. Fustero

Page 40

Associate Publisher Phil Friedman

A Dedicated Emergency Response Team (ERT): Crowd, Riot, And Disaster Response, by Jim Weiss, P.J. Ryan and Mickey Davis

Senior Editor Nancy Perry Contributing Editors Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

Page 18

Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

Active Threats Against The Aviation Sector: Terrorism, Active Shooters, Workplace Violence, And ‘Insiders’, by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

Page 6

SITREP, Terrorism Trends & Forecasts

Page 8

Virtual Networking: A Way To Neutralize Hacker Breaches From The

Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire

Inside Out, by David Gewirtz

Director of Emergency Ops. Don L. Rondeau

Page 12 Intelligent Software: An IACSP Q&A With Neil Fretwell Of ISS Global Page 16 Information Not Used Is Useless, by Patrick Dunleavy Page 18 Active Threats Against The Aviation Sector: Terrorism, Active Shooters, Workplace Violence, And ‘Insiders’, by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Page 28 The U.S. Navy’s ‘Fat Leonard’ International Fraud And Bribery Case, by

Paul Davis

Page 32 Judge Ideas On Their Merits, Not Their Pedigree, by John C. Simpson Page 38 Secure Driver: Automotive Technology: Line Of Sight, by Anthony Ricci Page 40 A Dedicated Emergency Response Team (ERT): Crowd, Riot, And Disaster Response, by Jim Weiss, P.J. Ryan and Mickey Davis

Page 44 An IACSP Q & A With Author Nelson DeMille, by Paul Davis Page 46

Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten

IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf, reviews by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed National Sales Representative Phil Friedman, Advertising Director Tel: 201-224-0588, Fax: 202-315-3459 iacsp@aol.com

THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2017. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher. Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 . Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, Army.mil, Navy.mil, shutterstock.com and authors where applicable.

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SITREP

TERRORISM TRENDS & FORECASTS Global Overview – First Quarter 2017

mid shifting global dynamics, the war in Yemen saw another serious escalation with the Saudi Arabia-led coalition launching a new campaign to regain territory, while fighting intensified in eastern Ukraine at the end of the month. The U.S. and China exchanged harsh rhetoric over the South China Sea, and the new

U.S. administration’s decision to build a wall on its border with Mexico sparked tensions with its southern neighbor. Domestically Mexico also saw a swell of popular anger triggered by fuel price increases. In the Balkans, political tensions spiked in Bosnia and between Kosovo and Serbia. Meanwhile in Africa, soldiers mutinied repeatedly across Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon’s government hardened its repression of protests in the country’s Anglophone regions. On a positive note, West Africa’s regional bloc ECOWAS successfully pushed for a peaceful handover of power in Gambia. In Yemen, with the peace process at near standstill, the Saudi-led coalition and aligned Yemeni troops launched a new military push against Huthi rebels and forces supporting former President Saleh. On 7 January, they began an offensive to retake an area in the south west bordering the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a strategic sea

passage running between Yemen and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, and a stretch of Red Sea coastline. They simultaneously increased military pressure in the north including in Saada, Hajjah, Jawf and Marib governorates. Coalition-aligned forces claimed to have retaken Dhubab district on the Red Sea and on 23 January Mokha city further north, but at the end of the month fighting continued. The UN now puts the number of civilians killed since the conflict began in March 2015 at 10,000. In Ukraine, clashes between the military and separatists along the front line in the east intensified in late January, with some twenty people killed including civilians in fighting near Donetsk. The UN Security Council voiced its concern over the deteriorating security situation and the impact on civilians cut off from water, electricity and heating. As well as pushing the Kyiv government to root out corruption, the U.S. and EU

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must maintain sanctions on Russia until it withdraws completely from eastern Ukraine. Elsewhere in the region, political tensions rose in Bosnia following the celebration by the Republika Srpska (RS) of RS Day on 9 January, in defiance of a state Constitutional Court ruling that it is discriminatory and unconstitutional. Kosovo was planning to attack it, while Kosovo President Thaci said Belgrade was plotting to annex northern Kosovo. Tensions rose between China and the U.S. over the South China Sea amid shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities under President Trump. As new U.S. administration officials signaled a tougher approach to China’s presence in the area, Beijing reiterated China’s “indisputable sovereignty” over parts of the South China Sea and urged the U.S. to “speak and act cautiously to avoid harming the peace and stability” of the region. Tensions also rose between Mexico and the U.S. after President Trump signed an executive order to build a wall along the countries’ shared border. The month saw widespread social unrest within Mexico over increased petrol prices, expressing public discontent at corruption in the political establishment, a lack of economic prospects and violent crime. In Africa, thousands of soldiers mutinied across Côte d’Ivoire to demand better conditions and bonuses. The mutineers, most rebels in the country’s civil war (2002-2007), took control of Bouaké city in the centre and temporarily took hostage the minister of defense. The government managed to resolve the crisis by capitulating to all demands, paying up and reshuffling the military leadership, but discontent in the military remains a major threat to the country’s stability. In Cameroon, the government hardened its repression

of a protest movement in the English-speaking Southwest and Northwest regions Deteriorating Situations • Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, South China Sea, Bosnia And Herzegovina, Kosovo, Ukraine, Mexico, Yemen Improving Situations • Gambia

https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch

FBI Bureau Launches FBI Wanted Mobile App

Play or the Apple App Store.

For downloads and additional information, go to: https://www.fbi.gov/ news/stories/new-fbi-wanted-app

Counterterrorism Guide for Public Safety Personnel (Web Version) Public safety personnel are often positioned to identify suspicious activity potentially related to terrorism, and in some cases, first responders who have reported this information have helped to disrupt terrorist plans or attacks in the US.

The new FBI Wanted mobile application provides the public with quick and easy access to profiles, photographs, and more about FBI wanted fugitives. Fugitives are in hiding. But now, they’re in the palm of your hand. Information is also available about kidnapped and missing persons, including children. The app is free and is compatible with Apple and Android devices such as smartphones and iPads. Chris Allen is the chief of the Investigative Publicity and Public Affairs Unit. Chris Allen: The goal is to put the Wanted poster in front of as many people as you can. So that used to be putting a Wanted poster in a post office, because that’s where people were. And now, we’re going where the people are—and that’s mobile applications. FBI Needs Your Help: The FBI relies heavily on public reporting. This application is a great tool—it provides them a very easy way to get a hold of us, whether they want to type in a tip or call us. Tips: Tips can be anonymous. Download the app using Google

JCAT’S COUNTERTERRORISM GUIDE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL is designed to assist first responders in: • RECOGNIZING and REPORTING suspicious activity that may be linked to terrorism, consistent with the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative; • SPOTTING indicators of mobilization to violence; • RESPONDING and MITIGATING terrorist attacks.

For a free copy, go to: https://www.nctc. gov/jcat/index.html

Who Is Tareck El Aissami? And Why Should We Keep An Eye On Him? U.S. intelligence has long considered Tareck El Aissami as a key figure in the global narcotics trade with ties to Iran. He oversaw massive shipments of drugs from Venezuela to other countries,

including the United States, and issued identification documents to Hizballah operatives. But El Aissami isn’t an affiliate of Hizballah or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). El Aissami is the vice president of Venezuela. U.S. officials previously have criticized Venezuela’s failure to cooperate on global counterterrorism issues. Yet these latest allegations – surrounding the upper echelons of Venezuela’s government – suggest that the South American country has devolved into a full-blown state sponsor of terrorism. Source: The Investigative Project On Terrorism http://www.investigativeproject.org/5796/venezuela-state-sponsorof-terrorism#

IACSP News Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email address, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com Until next time, as always, be vigilant and safe. Thank you. Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Operations/IACSP

Virtual Networking:

A Way To Neutralize Hacker Breaches From The Inside Out By David Gewirtz

o we really have to recount the litany of data breaches anymore? By now, we’re almost inured to the nearly daily announcement that another company or another agency has been hacked to within an inch of ludicrosity.

So let’s not. Instead, let’s just stipulate that we understand the phenomenon. Hackers somehow gain access to a private network, unleash some malware, set up a commandand-control port, and set up residence inside the victim network. It happens so often and so easily, it’s as if nobody’s paying any attention to security at all. 8

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Perhaps it’s time to start paying attention. I’ve talked before about the really simple ways individuals and organizations can reduce their target profile. For example, you should know by now that updating your systems so you’re not vulnerable to older, but still very much active threats, is a very viable strategy. You know to be careful what links you click on, what sites you visit, and you probably remember you’re not supposed to open random email attachments. You know this. But if there’s even one other person inside your network who’s willing to play fast and loose with the picture grandma sent, or the Twitter short-link that goes to an unknown destination, your network is at risk. If you allow laptops to walk in through the front door and connect into your network, you’re counting on every single employee and visitor to implement safe surfing hygiene at all times. As we all know, life isn’t that simple. Someone’s going to screw up. That, as surely as morning follows night, will lead to the bad guys having their way with another network. In this article, though, I’m going to tell you one way you can put a stop to this, or at least make the process of wandering around your networks far harder than it has been before. It’s time we won a round. To really understand what I’m going to tell you, you need to know how a firewall works. Almost all of us have one in our home. It’s the little box that connects the Internet to your home network and/

or provides you with your Wi-Fi connection. Everything on the Internet side of the box is outside your network. All the computers and devices you connect to the box inside your home can be said to be inside the perimeter. That’s a firewall. Most large organizations have them, too. They’re often much more expensive, can handle more traffic, and have a lot more features. Many of the newer ones can inspect packets as they travel by, even scanning encrypted packets to make sure the bad guys don’t send anything into a network through an encrypted link. For most organizations, the firewall is the main breach defense. It’s the city walls of the network. If you’re now picturing a giant horse rolling right through the gates of Troy, bypassing the city walls, you understand the weakness of a firewall. Once inside the city walls, Odysseus and his men are free to wreak havoc, and so are the hackers. No matter how good your firewall is, if something gets inside, you’re toast. And, as we’ve discussed before, stuff always gets inside. This is how long term breaches work. These are breaches where the perpetrator camps out in a hacked network for months (or even years). The answer is simple: firewalls aren’t enough. You may have heard of the term “virtual machine” or “virtual server.” This is where a full computer is simulated in software. Think of it as a holodeck for servers: everything inside is simulated, but to the programs running on the virtual machine, it seems like real hardware. Virtualizing servers has proven to be a huge boon to data center managers. Because it’s all software, they’re incredibly flexible. Modern hardware is virtualizationaware, so the software machines are as fast as the physical boxes.

For most organizations, the firewall is the main breach defense. It’s the city walls of the network. If you’re now picturing a giant horse rolling right through the gates of Troy, bypassing the city walls, you understand the weakness of a firewall. Once inside the city walls, Odysseus and his men are free to wreak havoc, and so are the hackers.

You can run more than one server on a physical box, allowing for consolidation, unrivaled flexibility, and easy failover (because the whole server is really just a file, not a rack full of wires and metal). IT folks have also virtualized storage, creating a similar benefit. Data is stored in huge pools, and it matters not at all to the software where the data lives in real life. Before I move on, the key concept is this: data center functionality can now be implemented as software without a performance hit. This means that the functions of a data center can be abstracted from the physical hardware, increasing flexibility and creating a layer of insulation between the applications and the physical hardware. All that brings us to the concept of a virtualized network. Networking hardware is notoriously painful to manage. First, there are all those wires. Then there’s the really challenging configuration settings needed on each of those thin little boxes. Adding and changing the structure of a network is painful, time-consuming, and often fraught with mistakes. If you’ve ever wondered why IT network pros seem cranky all the time, now you know. But, like virtualizing servers and storage, it’s possible to virtualize the network. This puts all of the network functions in software, running as a layer on top of the hardware. The connections are virtual and so are the firewalls.

anytime something changes on the network.

Stop and think about that for a minute. Firewalls in a virtual network are virtual. They’re simulated. IT managers can create a virtual firewall by merely clicking a menu item, rather than crawling on the floor, running wires, waiting for the hardware to arrive, practicing their profanity, and doing it all over again anytime something changes on the network.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Are you seeing where this is going? If you can add lots of segments (the IT folks call these “micro-segments”), if malware gets loose in one segment, it can’t get to any others. Each virtual firewall is like a water-tight door on a submarine, and serves a very similar purpose: preventing cross-compartment flooding. So now, let’s go back to one of those year-long breaches. Let’s say that Bob brings in a malware-infected laptop and plugs it into the network. The malware on that laptop can’t travel across the segments. Instead of digging into server after server, client after client, it’s locked to a much smaller area and can’t spread. The overall category for this technology is called Software-Defined Networking (or SDN), part of the Software-Defined Data Center (SDDC) movement. While there’s always a chance that vulnerabilities will be found in SDNs, they’re proving to be vastly more secure (if configured with security in mind) than purely physical networks. Boom! Bad guys neutralized. Finally, a win for the good guys!

What does this mean? It means that if you can virtualize firewalls and make them easy to deploy, you can use a whole lot more of them. Instead of just one firewall between your network and the rest of the world, you can have a whole bunch of firewalls inside your network, effectively segmenting parts of your network from other parts of your network.

About the Author CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed. is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension.

Vol. 22, No.4

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INTELLIGENT

SOFTWARE An IACSP Q&A With Neil Fretwell Of ISS Global

eil Fretwell is the Operations Director for Intelligent Software Solutions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a Polaris Alpha company

Prior to joining ISS Global in 2013, he served for 33 years as a Detective with the Metropolitan Police at New Scotland Yard in London. He was formerly a Post-Blast Forensic Examiner ending his career as the Lead Investigator within the UK Police National Bomb Data Centre. He was involved in many highprofile Terrorist investigations included the attacks in the US on 9/11 and in London on 7/7.

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Drag and drop linking

IACSP: “What are the origins

of the current software offerings available and in use in Law Enforcement Investigations today?”

Fretwell: The UK Bomb Data Centre at New Scotland Yard in London had collated historical data about terrorist Groups, methodology and componentry for many years. This was born out of a necessity to assist in investigations concerning Irish Terrorism. Information was held in hard paper copy in large storage rooms and was indexed and searchable via a card index system which had become antiquated. The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms in the U.S. was having similar issues. Both Units got together and commissioned the initial Dfuze Intelligence Management System in the late 1990’s.

The initial offering was ground breaking in its day in that, although each unit held its own data in its own database, it allowed for the easy exchange of encrypted data between units. Other units around the world saw the benefits in the exchange and today the software is deployed in over 40 countries. One of the most popular offerings at that time was a Report Desk. This was, and still is, a real-time configurable open source intelligence database that is fully web-based, device agnostic and accessible from anywhere in the world. It incorporates a “News Ticker” which keeps countries up-todate with incidents happening around the world in near real time. This open-source database currently holds details of in excess of 60,000 worldwide terrorist incidents

Fretwell: Since the type of terrorist attacks changed over the years, the software had to evolve, and new offerings developed, to meet the ever changing threat. As a direct result of the attacks of the 7th July 2005 on the London transportation system, the need was identified to create the means to be able to see the fast-time dissemination of information from the scene back to Command Control but equally importantly, from scene to scene. Mobile offerings were developed together with the ability to achieve what was required. The resulting software platform changed the name of the game, giving counterterrorism experts’ access to immediate information to help them “connect the dots.”

The database in London includes information on virtually every terrorist attack over the last half century, including hundreds of thousands, if not millions of photos ranging from the historical Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombings from the 1970s

onwards, the September 11, 2001 and the Boston Marathon explosions and the horrific suicide attacks taking place currently across Europe and worldwide. Moreover, with the mobile software, users can take photos on a mobile device and instantly upload to the

facial recog

IACSP: How has the software changed to meet modern day challenges? quick search

global network. Those photos immediately become part of the searchable database. When I was at Scotland Yard, I couldn’t share information with the office next door, but I could share it with America, or Australia, or Singapore because they had compatible systems. One of ISS Global’s products was first successfully used during the 2008 attacks in Mumbai. The UKPNBDC had forward deployed officers to India at the invitation of the authorities. They sent imagery back from a number of scenes on the ground to London where immediate identifications were made indicating that a Pakistan terrorist group were involved. The software can also assist investigators quickly search for data that could indicate a specific bomb maker’s “signature.” Their signature can be worked out by examining either one component or a series of components that a bomb-maker includes in every explosive device created. For instance, the bomb-maker might do something like always using a green, black and red wire, simply because they tried it once and it worked. Bomb-makers do not like change. If they make a bomb and it works, they tend to make it the same way every time. Bomb-makers tend to be creatures of habit. The IRA for instance, used a particular type of timing device called a memo park timer. These small clockwork devices were originally intended as a reminder as to when your allotted parking time was nearing expiration, and would buzz to remind you to return to your vehicle and put more money in the meter. The IRA adapted these for use in their devices. So you knew if a bomb went off, and you recovered part of a memo park timer from the scene, that it more than likely was an IRA device. The software products available today have been developed with direct input from the end-user, and continue to do so through an annual meeting which brings together our users worldwide.

When you tend to a bomb scene on the ground, it’s very difficult to get an overall picture. What you really need is an overview as to how big the actual bomb scene is to allow for the most efficient allocation of resources. The software which allows live video streaming helps in assessing the risk and any safety aspects that may be hidden, that you cannot see from ground level but can see from that elevated view.

IACSP: What other advances have been made as technology has evolved?

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Fretwell: Law enforcement and military assets are increasingly moving towards utilizing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) for many purposes allowing for more rapid planning by scene commanders and examiners. They are utilized for aerial photography and identifying hard to reach areas where vital evidence may have fallen. During recent years a new generation of UAV’s have hit the marketplace making them affordable to a much wider audience. These UAV’s are now being used in the areas of Search and Rescue, Crime Scene Investigation and Disaster Recovery Relief to name but a few. A new innovation recently developed allows for live streaming of video footage and images from UAV’s. Imagine having an eye in the sky at any scene at any time, being able to monitor events on your tablet, mobile or computer wherever you are. This is the reality that is now being offered in an affordable package. When you tend to a bomb scene on the ground, it’s very difficult to get an overall picture. What you really need is an overview as to how big the actual bomb scene is to allow for the most efficient allocation of resources. The software which allows live video streaming helps in assessing the risk and any safety aspects that may be hidden, that you cannot see from ground level but can see from that elevated view.

IACSP: What advances have been made in the field of “Predictive Policing”?

Fretwell: Predictive policing tries to utilize the power of big current data, information, geospatial technologies, social media and historical information to improve public safety and reduce crime through better tasking. The main idea is to move law enforcement from a mindset where they are purely reacting to crimes into the realm of predicting what and where something is going to happen and deploying resources accordingly. The Dfuze system can help identify where a terrorist attack may occur within a given area. This includes pointing out locations that are vulnerable, enabling warnings to be issued to security person-

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nel. Currently we cannot predict where or when a bomb is going to go off, but we can narrow the options by utilizing historical data, and help provide a “best guess” as to when and where an attack may take place. The software was used at the London 2012 Olympics ¬ where UK police forces increased the security presence at areas that were indicated could be at risk of attack. It worked by analyzing past attacks to give an idea of where attack hotspots might be in the future, as well as the types of explosive devices that might be used and how. Historically a lot of this work was undertaken by a team of analysts in an office wading through reams and reams of data, initially on paper but then on computer systems. If you add in a computer algorithm that can actually analyze that data for you, based on a number of parameters that you give it, it will break it down into the percentages and likelihood of something happening in a certain place at a certain time. It’s all about pulling

together big data and lots of different data sources to give you the best chance of getting your best guess of where something is going to happen and when. There is one note of caution though. These technologies have to be used alongside an experienced, analytical and investigative brain -- somebody who’s been in that environment and can recognize the tell-tale signs. Predictive capabilities get more sophisticated by the day and eventually there may be a reduction in reliance on experience going forward, but we are not there yet. IACSP: Can “Social Media” be utilized to assist in ongoing investigations? Fretwell: In the aftermath of terrorist incidents, for example the 2013 Boston Bombings, appeals were made by Law Enforcement agencies to individuals who may have been taking photographs, at what are normally very public events. This, coupled with the collection of Close Circuit Television (CCTV) footage from the immediate area and beyond,

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proves invaluable in the early stages of an investigation. Other forms of social media are slightly more problematic. An interconnected community sharing information and pictures in real time can cover a lot more ground than a lone individual, but it has to be controlled. The release of information and calls for assistance to user groups of likeminded self-interest individuals can prove to be of assistance, but an appeal being re-tweeted thousands of times can prove a real drain on resources when well-meaning individuals start to reply. Some investigations have been slow to get off the ground as they have been handcuffed by the mass of information they have received which has to be sorted and classified. Appeals need to be very narrow and specific. The authorities always have to be mindful also about what information is released, always with a mind not to prejudice any future prosecution. IACSP: Thank you for speaking with us.

IACSP Perspective

Information Not Used Is Useless By Patrick Dunleavy

A general view shows the site where a truck ploughed through a crowd at a Christmas market on Breitscheidplatz square near the fashionable Kurfuerstendamm avenue in the west of Berlin, Germany, December 19, 2016 REUTERS/Pawel Kopczynski

ecemberâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (2016) terrorist attack in Berlin by radical Islamist Anis Amri is flooding media outlets with continued questions about what authorities knew and when they knew it.

Amri was on German security radar, and his asylum claim was rejected over concerns he was radicalized, but somehow he managed to stay free and make a video pledging allegiance to ISIS before he crashed a truck into a Berlin Christmas market, killing at least 12 and injuring many more. 16

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When he was released from prison, Italian authorities tried to send Amri back to Tunisia and failed. He was then allowed to migrate to Germany because of its lenient immigration policies. German officials tried to deport him but again were thwarted by the Tunisian government’s refusal to accept him. The search for answers to prevent it from happening again requires solid data from reliable sources. We are consumed with obtaining the facts. As the layers of this case are peeled back and the process of drilling down on the facts of Amri’s life occurs, we find more and more of what was already known, and we ask, did authorities miss something? Anis Amri was an illegal immigrant from Italy, originally from Tunisia. He was disenfranchised and isolated from his family. He had a prior propensity to violent behavior, with prior arrests for assault. He had a history of petty criminal behavior and spent time in prison. He was radicalized while incarcerated. He was previously known to Counter Terrorism authorities and was on a watch list. His method of attack has been sanctioned and encouraged by ISIS. We’ve heard these descriptions before. The Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack, the Paris/Brussels attacks, the Toulouse shootings in France, the Orlando nightclub attack, the Chelsea bombing, unfortunately the list goes on. The vast majority of the most recent vicious attacks carried out in the name of Islam against society share some of the same indicators. If the information was there, then what went wrong? We live in a time that has been dubbed the information age, where enormous amounts of data flow freely over the internet and other media outlets. And yet I’m reminded of a line from a 1965 Rolling Stones’ song: “And the man comes on the radio He’s tellin’ me more and more About some useless information” What exactly is useless information? We get up in the morning and listen to the traffic report so we know the best way to

travel to work and how to avoid traffic jams. We listen to the weather report to determine how to dress appropriately for conditions like rain or snow. If we listen to those reports and then don’t apply the information, we put ourselves in an uncomfortable situation with predictable consequences. In the arena of counter terrorism, however, that neglect can be deadly.

Information that is obtained and not used (in a timely fashion) is useless. We learned this lesson the hard way after Sept. 11. The 9/11 Commission described incidents of “missed opportunities” and detailed one of the reasons being the failure to share information between agencies. Another was the inability to collect and analyze data (information). New intelligence gathering systems necessary to fight terrorism were designed and put in place. Still radical Islamists are able to carry out isolated incidents of terror. Why? The information was there prior to the Berlin incident. It was shared. And yet the attack still occurred. What was lacking was resolve. Amri should have been deported immediately after his first arrest in Italy for two separate incidents of arson. He was sentenced to prison for four years. While in the Palermo prison in 2014 he had a fight with his cellmate,who was a Christian, and attempted to cut his head off. When he was released from prison, Italian authorities tried to send Amri back to Tunisia and failed. He was then allowed to

migrate to Germany because of its lenient immigration policies. German officials tried to deport him but again were thwarted by the Tunisian government’s refusal to accept him. Following that, he was again released from jail and allowed to move about the country. Surveillance was suspended and Amri carried out the attack. Law enforcement officials tell us they lack the resources to track every terror suspect every hour of every day. The European Union’s dilemma since the migration of millions from war-torn areas of the Middle East pits compassionate open borders versus national security. The United States is looking at a similar situation. Two critical components must be in place before we open our doors. The entry vetting process must be exhaustive, and the deportation process must have a backbone fortified with the resolve to send back illegal aliens who are arrested for crimes committed while here. There must also be a deep resolve to take the battle to radical Islamic groups like ISIS and al-Qaida. Absent those requirements, all the information in the world will not prevent another Islamist terrorist attack from happening here or in Europe.

About the Author IPT Senior Fellow Patrick Dunleavy is the former Deputy Inspector General for New York State Department of Corrections and author of The Fertile Soil of Jihad. He currently teaches a class on terrorism for the United States Military Special Operations School.

Active Threats Against The Aviation Sector: Terrorism, Active Shooters, Workplace Violence, And ‘Insiders’ By Dr. Joshua Sinai

Emergency service workers are seen next to the wreckage of Pan Am flight 103, in a farmer’s field east of Lockerbie, Scotland in this December 23, 1988 file photograph. The twentieth anniversary of the bombing of the jumbo jet flight from London to New York was marked on December 21, 2008. REUTERS/Greg Bos/Files (BRITAIN)

ince the advent of modern terrorism, the aviation sector has been one of the most frequently targeted by Active Threat attacks. Active Threat is a new category of converging threats that is being advanced in homeland security to encompass the distinct threats of terrorism, active shooters, workplace violence, and

‘insiders’ which characterize numerous attacks in which the perpetrators tactics utilize several of these types of threats. Thus, in the aviation sector, for example, the shooting rampage on January 6, 2017 by Esteban Santiago-Ruiz at Fort Lauderdale Airport was both active shooter (he allegedly suffered from psychological disorders) and terrorism (it is reported that he was influenced by ISIS). 18

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By expanding the aperture to recognize such attacks as combining several threat types (e.g., active shooter and terrorism, or workplace violence, active shooter, and ‘insider’), it will also serve to upgrade the capability to counter them with appropriate multidisciplinary response measures. To understand the magnitude of the types of Active Threats facing the aviation sector – which in this article is defined as consisting of airports and airplanes – this article’s chronological listing of attacks that have targeted this sector breaks them down into these distinct types of threats and vulnerabilities. For those determined to kill indiscriminately and to inflict mass casualties, economic disruption, world headlines, and psychological anxiety and fear among wider publics, aviation transportation in the form of commercial airports and airplanes are ideal targets. Also making this sector vulnerable for Active Threat targeting is that they cannot easily be protected in a comprehensive way without interrupting the large flow of passengers and goods that rely on them for their transportation needs. On a tactical level, they are especially vulnerable because areas at airports such as passenger check-in departure areas and counters, and baggage claim and arrival areas are not as robustly protected as the more secure pre-board screening points with their explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment and random physical searches of passengers. Thus, attacking such vulnerable areas can also inflict high casualty rates until armed responding personnel arrive from the airports’ more secure areas. The aviation sector is especially vulnerable because large numbers of people pass through airports on a daily basis. During holiday seasons, in particular, the volume of passenger traffic increases exponentially, accompanied by especially heightened threat levels since terrorists attempt to exploit such special occasions to ruin their celebrations by inflicting mass casualties during such high volume passenger periods. On a positive note, once inside airports’ more secure areas, due to heightened security measures in inspecting passengers’ checkedin or carry-on baggage, it has become more difficult for terrorists to blow up aircraft in mid-air via their luggage compartments, which was not the case previously, such as on December 21, 1988 when a bomb placed in a baggage on board Pan Am Flight 103

For those determined to kill indiscriminately and to inflict mass casualties, economic disruption, world headlines, and psychological anxiety and fear among wider publics, aviation transportation in the form of commercial airports and airplanes are ideal targets. Also making this sector vulnerable for Active Threat targeting is that they cannot easily be protected in a comprehensive way without interrupting the large flow of passengers and goods that rely on them for their transportation needs.

exploded, destroying the aircraft and all 243 passengers and 16 crew on board, with the aircraft crashing into Lockerbie, Scotland. Similarly, with pilots cockpits’ doors locked and hardened during flight as a security measure introduced in the aftermath of 9/11, it is more difficult for terrorists to hijack an aircraft by overcoming its pilot crew, a tactic used by the 9/11 al Qaeda terrorists. Nevertheless, as discussed later, terrorists have continued to attempt to exploit new vulnerabilities in these areas, with several high profile attacks and bombings causing high levels of casualties and physical damage.

Securing Cargo Aircraft In addition to securing passenger aircraft, also of concern is the security of aviation cargo. While a high percentage of air freight is carried in passenger planes, which are subject to inspection by x-ray, the rest is transported in cargo planes, with only a reported small amount of air cargo checked in the same strict way. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had attempted to exploit this security gap on October 29, 2010, when it shipped two packages, each containing a bomb consisting of 300 to 400 grams of plastic explosives and a detonating mechanism, on separate cargo planes bound from Yemen to the United States. Fortunately, the bombs were discovered and defused at en route stop-overs (one in East Midlands Airport in the United Kingdom and the other in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates). Finally, as discussed later in this article, it is possible that the bomb that exploded the Russian Metrojet Flight 9268 Airbus A321231 aircraft on October 31, 2015 as it was flying above the northern Sinai, may have been placed in its cargo compartment by an airport maintenance crew member.

Active Threat Incidents Against the Aviation Sector As mentioned earlier, the deadliest catastrophic attack against the aviation sector was al Qaeda’s coordinated and simultaneous hijacking of four airliners on September 11, 2001, intentionally crashing two of the planes into the World Trade Towers in New York City, with the third plane crashing into the Pentagon, in Arlington, VA. The fourth plane crashed into a field near Shanksville, PA, after passengers attempted to take control before it could reach the hijackers’

intended target, reportedly the U.S. Congress or the White House in Washington, D.C. Nearly 3,000 people died in those attacks, including the hijackers and passengers on board the planes. These coordinated attacks demonstrated glaring vulnerabilities in U.S. aviation security at the time, which the U.S. government and its allies around the world have since attempted to substantially upgrade.

Active Threat Incidents The aviation sector has long been targeted by the four types of Active Threat attacks, especially terrorism, although it also faces significant active shooter, workplace violence, and ‘insider’ threats, as well. With regard to terrorist groups, their tactics have evolved over the years from hijackings to bombings, as well as attacking airports and their nearby areas. In the 1970s and 1980s, hijacking was a pervasive terrorist tactic. This tactic was transformed in 9/11 when the terrorist goal evolved from the previous tactic of hijacking and then landing the aircraft (once their demands were met) to using the planes as suicide bombs to cause mass destruction as they crashed into their intended targets on the ground. In response, as security has been hardened at airport terminals and aircraft (especially by automatically locking cockpits), instead of hijacking planes (although several planes had been hijacked since then), terrorists have turned to other tactics such as bombing them by firing shoulder-launched Stinger missiles at flying aircraft. This was demonstrated by al Qaeda’s unsuccessful attempt to down the Israeli Arkia Boeing 757 aircraft, carrying 261 passengers that had just taken off from Mombasa’s airport in Kenya in late November 2002. Eight types of Active Threat attacks against the aviation sector are discussed in this section.

(1) Hijackings In the 1970s and 1980s hijacking airlines was a widespread terrorist tactic, with the hijackers using the airliners as a negotiating tactic, either to free prisoners, concede to political demands, or extort ransom payments. One of the first hijackings by a Middle Eastern terrorist group, which was also the first time an Israeli airliner was hijacked, occurred on July 22, 1968, when an El Al plane departing

In the 1970s and 1980s hijacking airlines was a widespread terrorist tactic, with the hijackers using the airliners as a negotiating tactic, either to free prisoners, concede to political demands, or extort ransom payments. One of the first hijackings by a Middle Eastern terrorist group, which was also the first time an Israeli airliner was hijacked, occurred on July 22, 1968, when an El Al plane departing from Rome and headed for Tel Aviv, Israel, was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and diverted to Algiers.

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from Rome and headed for Tel Aviv, Israel, was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and diverted to Algiers. Its crew and passengers were held hostage for five weeks and were released following 40 days of negotiations. Following the hijacking, El Al became extremely security-conscious and instituted the first baggage check program. This was followed on September 6, 1970 when PFLP operatives hijacked four airliners departing from European airports, diverting two to a disused airfield in the Jordanian desert, with a third airliner diverted to Beirut and then Cairo. Another hijacking attempt was thwarted by El Al security its flight from Amsterdam. On September 9, a PFLP sympathizer seized a BOAC flight in Bahrain and brought it to the same Jordanian airstrip as the first two. On May 30, 1972, after departing their aircraft, three members of the Japanese Red Army carried out an attack at Lod Airport (now known as Ben Gurion International Airport), in Tel Aviv, killing 24 people and injuring 78 others. On 27 June 1976, Air France Flight 139, originating in Tel Aviv, took off from Athens, Greece, heading for Paris, was hijacked by two operatives belonging to a PFLP offshoot, who were joined by two German terrorists. The airplane eventually arrived at Entebbe Airport in Uganda.

(2) Bombs on Board Aircraft Prior to 9/11, the deadliest terrorism-caused airline catastrophe occurred on June 22, 1985 when Air India Flight 182, operating on the Montréal–London–Delhi route, was downed by a bomb on board that had been placed by Sikh terrorists, killing its 329 crew and passengers. In an example of state-directed terrorism, in November 1987, two North Korean operatives planted a bomb on a Korean Airline Boeing 707 en route from Baghdad to Seoul, causing it to explode in midair over the Andaman Sea off the coast of Burma, killing its 20 crew members and 95 passengers aboard. In another major airline bombing, on December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103, a Boeing 747, en route from London Heathrow to New York’s JFK International Airport, was

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destroyed by a bomb on board as it was flying over Scotland, killing its 243 passengers and 16 crew members. The aircraft’s explosion also resulted in the deaths of 11 people in Lockerbie, in southern Scotland, as large sections of the plane fell, destroying several houses. The Libyan government was charged for the bombing. In examples of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and its affiliates continuously attempting to exploit gaps in aviation security they were largely thwarted in their attempts, despite the innovative tactics and weaponry used in each operation. The most notable forerunner of catastrophic airliner bombings was the December 11, 1994 bombing of Philippine Airlines Flight 434. Although the explosion was small, killing one person, with the plane making an emergency landing, it turned out to be a test run for a planned terrorist attack by Ramzi Yousef, called Operation Bojinka, to blow up 12 airliners and their approximately 4,000 passengers as they flew from Asia to the United States. Yousef’s uncle, Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, later used this blueprint of using multiple airliners in a single operation to plan 9/11, with the terrorists’ goal not merely to hijack aircraft but to use them as suicide bombs to cause mass destruction. The Bojinka plot was later duplicated by an al Qaeda conspiracy in August 2006, which was foiled by British authorities by arresting the operatives during the preincident phase, to bypass bomb detectors at airports by detonating liquid explosive bombs on board multiple airliners destined for Canada and the United States. The plot led to tighter restrictions on carrying liquids and gels in hand luggage in the European Union, Canada, and the United States. Another innovative al Qaeda operation was the attempt by Richard Reid, a British national, to detonate his special shoes packed with plastic explosives in their hollowed-out bottoms on board American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001. In a similarly innovative plot, on December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a radicalized Nigerian who had been studying in London, attempted to detonate plastic explosives hidden in his underwear while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253, en route from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan.

A member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police passes under wreckage of an Air India jet that was bombed over the Atlantic in 1985 as it sits in an undisclosed location in Vancouver, British Columbia, June 15, 2004. Media were allowed to view the remains of the flight that went down of the Irish coast after a bomb exploded in the forward cargo hold killing 329 people. Only five percent of wreckage has been recovered and reconstructed. Two men Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri are currently on trial in a Vancouver for the bombing of flight 182 and the murder of two bagage handlers in Tokyo’s Narita Airport in a second bombing. REUTERS/Andy Clark AC

In a different type of innovative tactic against the aviation sector, in late October 2010, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) placed several sophisticated parcel-bombs containing 300-400 grams of the explosive PETN on passenger and cargo planes. Although the bombs did not go off, they severely disrupted freight and parcel traffic in the region. In another new trend that was successfully executed, it is hypothesized that on October 31, 2015 operatives belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’s Sinai Branch exploited weak Egyptian security at the Sharm al-Sheikh airport’s tarmac to plant a bomb (possibly a soda can that had been converted into bomb) attached to the outside of the aircraft or inside its cargo cabin to explode Metrojet Flight 9268, an Airbus A321-231operated by Russian airline Kogalymavia (branded as Metrojet). It was speculated at the time that an ‘insider’, in the form of maintenance crew member, may have planted the bomb. All 217 passengers and seven crew members who were on board the aircraft were killed as it exploded above the northern Sinai following its departure from Sharm El Sheikh International Airport, Egypt, en route to Pulkovo Airport, Saint Petersburg, Russia .

(3) Firing Rockets at Aircraft

Further innovating their terrorist tactics against aviation, on November 28, 2002, shortly after Arkia Israel Airlines Flight 582, in a Boeing 757-300 aircraft, took off from Moi International Airport, in Mombassa, Kenya, al Qaeda operatives fired two SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, which narrowly missed the plane, which was en route to Israel, although they caused two trails behind the left wings, causing the aircraft to rock slightly.

In another new trend that was successfully executed, it is hypothesized that on October 31, 2015 operatives belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’s Sinai Branch exploited weak Egyptian security at the Sharm al-Sheikh airport’s tarmac to plant a bomb (possibly a soda can that had been converted into bomb) attached to the outside of the aircraft or inside its cargo cabin to explode Metrojet Flight 9268.

(4) Attacking Airport Check-In Areas

Finding it difficult to hijack aircraft due to intensified security measures, in December 1985, terrorists such as Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) operatives attacked the Israeli national El Al airline’s ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna airports, killing 20 people. A similar incident occurred on July 4, 2002, when Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, a 41-year-old Egyptian national who was granted asylum to live in the U.S.

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in 1992, used two Glock pistols to shoot at the passengers standing at the ticket counter of El Al, Israel’s national airline, at Los Angeles International Airport in Los Angeles, CA. Two people were killed and four others were injured before the gunman was fatally shot by a security guard (after also being wounded by him). On November 1, 2013, Paul Anthony Ciancia, aged 23, opened fire at around 9:20 a.m. in Terminal 3 of the Los Angeles International Airport, killing a U.S. government Transportation Security Administration officer and injuring several other people. On March 22, 2016, as part of a larger simultaneous attack that day in Brussels by local ISIS cells, three suicide bombers, carrying explosives in large suitcases, attacked a departure hall at Brussels Airport in Zaventem, killing 17 people (including the bombers) and wounding 81 others. The third suicide bomber (who was also among those killed), had failed to detonate his own bomb by the blast force of the other explosions. On June 28, 2016 three ISIS gunmen armed with automatic weapons and explosive belts staged a simultaneous attack at the international terminal of Terminal 2 at Atatürk Airport in Istanbul, Turkey. Forty-five people were killed, and more than 230 people were injured. The three attackers, who were reported to have come from Russia and Central Asia, were also killed.

(5) Attacking Baggage Claim and Arrival Areas

When faced with increased security, terrorists have found less secure areas to attack, such as the attack on January 24, 2011 by a North Caucasus Islamist suicide bomber in Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport’s international arrivals hall, whose explosion killed 35 and wounded 152. In an example of an attack that reportedly combined the elements of terrorism and active shooter, on January 6, 2017, at 12:55pm, Esteban Santiago-Ruiz, aged 26 years-old, opened fire with a Walther 9mm semiautomatic pistol in the baggage claim area of Terminal 2, at Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport, Florida. Five people were killed and six others were injured. In the ensuing panic, a further 30 to 40 people sustained injuries. The shooter was arrested

maintenance crew member may have planted the bomb on board the Metrojet Flight 9268 Airbus A321-231 aircraft that had exploded on October 31, 2015 as it was flying above the northern Sinai.

after surrendering to the responding police officers. Santiago-Ruiz was a resident of Alaska, and a military veteran, who had checked in his weapon in his luggage before retrieving it at the baggage claim Fort Lauderdale, which was loaded at an airport bathroom to prepare for the attack. As an active shooter, Santiago-Ruiz reportedly suffered from psychological problems, and, as a terrorist, he reportedly had become enamored with ISIS.

(8) Workplace Violence

In an example of workplace violence at an airport, on November 15, 2016, Dean Buie, aged 45, a disgruntled former employee of Southwest Airlines, shot and killed Michael Winchester, aged 52, an airline manager, outside the Will Rodgers World Airport in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Buie later committed suicide.

(6) Attacking Passengers Outside Terminals

Airports outside perimeters are also vulnerable to attack by terrorists. On March 2, 2011, Arid Uka, a lone wolf jihadi terrorist, shot at U.S. Airmen who were in the process of boarding their bus outside a Frankfurt Airport terminal in Germany to transport them to Ramstein Air Base. Two U.S. Airmen were killed and two others were seriously injured. On July 17, 2012 a suicide attacker bombed a bus with a group of newly arriving Israeli passengers on board, as it was still parked in the terminal of Sarafovo Airport, in Burgas, Bulgaria. Seven people were killed (including the attacker) with some 30 others injured.

(7) Attacks by ‘Insiders’ Airlines are also highly concerned that ‘insiders’, such as radicalized pilots, who might intentionally crash their aircraft in midflight. Although still under investigation, it might be possible (although unproven) that the crash in international waters of Malaysia Flight 370, which mysteriously disappeared on March 8, 2014 while flying from Kuala Lumpur International Airport near Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Beijing Capital International Airport in Beijing, China, might have been caused by one of the pilots, making this a possible ‘insider’ attack. In another example of an ‘insider’ attack, the deliberate crashing on March 24, 2015 of Germanwings Flight 4U525 by Andreas Lubitz, its co-pilot, in the French Alps while the aircraft was en route from Barcelona to Dusseldorf, demonstrates the potential for radicalized or psychologically suicidal ‘insiders’ to carry out such attacks. In a final example, it has been speculated, although still unproven, that an ‘insider’

Airports and Airlines Most Vulnerable Worldwide

In another example of an ‘insider’ attack, the deliberate crashing on March 24, 2015 of Germanwings Flight 4U525 by Andreas Lubitz, its co-pilot, in the French Alps while the aircraft was en route from Barcelona to Dusseldorf, demonstrates the potential for radicalized or psychologically suicidal ‘insiders’ to carry out such attacks.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the 19 hijackers succeeded in passing through two airports’ checkpoints at Logan and Dulles airports to board their respective aircraft with their box knives and without being placed on ‘No Fly’ lists, security at many airports worldwide has been substantially upgraded to lower the probability of comparable attacks occurring again. Certain airports around the world are still of concern because of lax security or being located in volatile regions plagued by widespread terrorism-related extremism. Under this categorization, airports of the first tier of concern would include those in countries considered as “state sponsors of terrorism,” such as Iran and North Korea. Second tier airports of concern are those in regions of weak or failed states and terrorist “hotspots,” such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Third tier airports of concern are located in countries undergoing turbulence, such as Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia, Turkey, and others, which might affect the degree of security at their airports that would prevent potential terrorists from boarding aircraft. All passengers flying, for example, to the United States from such countries, therefore, face heightened regular and random screening and being subjected to careful patting down and carry-on bags’ searching. In practice, this would mean for a traveler with a Yemeni passport or a passenger transiting through Yemen to be subjected to an extra body inspection or scan when transferring from a European airport to the U.S. In

practice, however, this has not always succeeded, as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who had spent several months in Yemen, despite being placed on a UK Home Office security watch list, was able on December 25, 2009 to board an aircraft in Ghana to Amsterdam, where he connected to Northwest Airlines Flight 253 to Detroit, Michigan to enable him to attempt his ultimately unsuccessful plot to detonate the aircraft. Based on terrorists’ targeting history, Israeli airliners would be considered their top targets, with U.S. airliners in second place. In a further breakdown of terrorists’ targeting, the downing of large aircraft would be favored over smaller planes.

Protective Response Measures

In response to the different types of tactics used by terrorists, a spectrum of security techniques and methods has been implemented to protect the aviation sector from future terrorist attacks. It is part of a sort of endless “cat and mouse” game being played by government agencies to continuously innovate technologies and methods to upgrade their aviation security while terrorist groups, such as al Qaida and its affiliates, seek to identify new vulnerability gaps to exploit as they have been doing since 9/11, and use new techniques to target this sector to inflict maximum casualties and physical, economic and psychological damages against their nation-state adversaries.

Measures to Secure Airlines and Airports Effective security is intended to make attacks more difficult for terrorists, increase their likelihood of being detected, minimize casualties and disruption, reduce resulting panic and anxiety, and reassure passengers that the aviation sector is safe and secure. It is also recognized, however, that no single defensive measure or technology is sufficient in being 100 percent effective in thwarting inventive and determined terrorist operatives. To be effective, a security regime must be multi-layered, employing measures and technologies to secure airports and aircraft at the operational and tactical levels.

At the operational level, since no security system can ever be 100 percent airtight, a widely accepted security notion is for airport security managers to implement risk management principles in the allocation of their defensive resources. These include watchlisting operation centers that maintain databases containing derogatory information about individuals that might have a nexus to terrorism to prevent them from boarding aircraft. With such ‘known’ terrorists not permitted to purchase tickets to board aircraft, this decreases the population size of potential terrorists who seek to exploit this sector for their attacks. It also means, nevertheless, that a continuous reassessment of the evolving terrorist threat and its local manifestations are required 24/7. At the tactical level, armed guards are deployed to maintain security at airport terminals. An important circle of security is done by screeners who manage body scanners and explosive trace detection systems to prevent potentially armed passengers from boarding aircraft. An additional tactical measure is the randomized security procedures used to keep potential terrorists off-guard, as well as profiling passenger behaviors to detect possible suspicious intent.

Watchlisting Databases

One of the most effective lines of defense in aviation security is the “No-Fly” list. Virtually all governments around the world maintain such databases with derogatory information about individuals deemed suspicious. As this system begins as soon as a passenger purchases an airline ticket, their airlines are required to submit lists of their passengers, including their names and dates of birth, to the their appropriate government transportation security administrations, which then compare the names to their own watchlist databases to determine their suitability to board an aircraft. In the U.S., the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains the database of individuals from around the world who are not permitted to board a commercial aircraft for travel in or out of the United States. As of 2013, the list contained about 47,000 names. Additional lists tag would-be passengers for extra inspection. These lists differ from the Terrorist Watch List, which is larger list

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of individuals suspected of some involvement with terrorism. As of June 2016, the Terrorist Watch List reportedly contained an estimated 1,877,133 names. To make it easier for frequent flyer passengers to by-pass the regular security lines, the TSA established the Precheck and Global Entry programs, for which they pay a charge to undergo a background check to qualify for faster entry to their departure gates. This system is not 100 percent foolproof, with several cases of terrorist operatives who were not placed on the ‘No Fly’ list when derogatory information about them was not effectively communicated or shared, or who managed to evade being placed on such watchlists. These include Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who was able to board a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, on December 25, 2009, despite being placed in a U.S. terrorism database the previous month after his father informed State Department officials in Lagos, Nigeria, that he was concerned about his son’s extremist beliefs and associations. He was not, however, placed on any watch list for flights into the United States, because at the time it was believed there was, according to a “Washington Post” report, “insufficient derogatory information available” to include him. Also managing to evade being placed on a ‘No Fly’ list was Tashfeen Malik, the Pakistani wife of Syed Farook, both of whom conducted the shooting rampage in San Bernardino, CA, who had passed the DHS counterterrorism vetting for her K-1 visa, despite her previous postings in extremist social media sites. Various means are available to individuals whose names might have been inadvertently added to such lists to enable them to appeal to be removed from them.

Airport Screening

In the first line of defense are airport security guards who patrol, observe, report on any suspicious activities they might encounter, or protect by deterring any violent activity on the premise they are working. Security guards might be armed or unarmed, requiring either a patrol or static position. In the second line of defense, screeners are deployed to check the millions of

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passengers who fly around the world daily. They are the human component of the technological system of metal detectors, X-ray machines, and explosive sniffers. At many airports, the screeners are complemented by contingents of armed guards who patrol the facilities. In the U.S. prior to 9/11 airport screening was provided by private security companies which were contracted with an airline or airport, but this changed in November 2001 with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deploying its own personnel to handle screening at all U.S. airports. In the tightened environment of checkpoint screening, those passengers who set off a walk-through metal detection alarm, even innocently, are then patted-down and thoroughly checked with a hand-held metal detector. Those detectors can scan and detect within seconds the spectrum of chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear and explosive materials. In response to the August 2006 London plot, new screening measures was instituted, such as forbidding passengers from carrying liquids, gels and aerosols in quantities greater than 3 ounces, with all permitted bottles placed in a clear plastic bag and sent through screening separately. Finally, all passengers are required show valid government-issued identification documents in order to fly. These are checked to ensure that they match the passenger’s information on the printed boarding pass.

Behavioral Profiling

Behavioral profiling is considered an effective component in aviation security, if done correctly, especially when it is not based on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds. The earlier and more precisely that a potential threat can be identified prior to a passenger with suspicious intent boarding an aircraft, the sooner that preemptive measures can be taken, beginning with secondary screening. Behavioral profiling not only checks for persons who might be behaving suspiciously, but those with an unusual travel patterns, such as travel to countries of concern.

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With terrorist groups continuously seeking to recruit new operatives who do not “fit” stereotypes associated with their membership, the use of behaviorally-based profiling can, therefore, be efficient and judicious. A best practice in behavioral profiling is the “Behavior Pattern Recognition” (BPR), a tool and training program developed by Rafi Ron, a former director of security at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport and a veteran aviation security expert. It provides airport security staff with the capability to recognize and assess passengers’ behaviors ranging from distress or confusion to potential criminal or terrorist intent that may not correspond with what could normally be expected in a particular environment. The BPR, which has been deployed at many airports around the world, was developed to provide security personnel a risk-based decision making process to meet the level of threat facing them, without engaging in religious discrimination or racial profiling.

Security on Aircraft

One of the first requirements of aviation security is installing bulletproof and locked and strengthened cockpit doors to protect the aircraft’s pilots from unauthorized access by a potential terrorist. In an additional measure, some aircraft are equipped with CCTV cameras to enable pilots to monitor potentially suspicious activities inside the cabin. Pilots are also given the option of carrying a gun, once they are trained to use it. Finally, federal air marshals are deployed in many flights to ensure an added layer of security. Wearing civilian clothes, they blend in with other passengers on board the aircraft, and are trained to employ investigative techniques, including terrorist behavior recognition, as well as aircraft specific firearms techniques and close-quarters self-defense measures.

Ramifications of Upgraded Aviation Security

While continuously improving aviation security, the vast upgrades in such antiterrorism methods and technologies have also incurred a spectrum of economic costs, whether direct in terms of increased costs for government, local authorities and Vol. 22, No.4

airlines to implement them or in increased inconveniences to passengers who have to arrive at airports several hours prior to their scheduled departures and wait on lengthy and time consuming security lines. The restrictions accompanying upgraded security have also led to debates over issues such as the need for tightened security versus civil liberties for passengers. Such debates over privacy violations are expected to grow, especially over the expansion of watch lists and as airport security increases the use of invasive whole body imaging (WBI) and biometric screening devices and behavioral recognition technologies to detect potential suspiciously hostile behavioral intent. To overcome such controversies, new screening technologies are continuously being developed, such as what is known as the millimeter wave scanner, a whole-body imaging device, which is used to detect potentially concealed weapons underneath an individual’s clothing. In addition to civil liberties issues over the use of detection technologies, other concerns are medically related, as such technologies might affect people with medical conditions, the elderly and pregnant women who might be negatively impacted by such radiation technologies.

New Trends

With the “cat-and-mouse” chasing games between government agencies and the Active Threat ‘actors’ continuing to escalate, certain potential new trends are discernible. First, aviation security practitioners now must be prepared to counter not only terrorists, but other Active Threat types such as active shooters, the four types of workplace violence (criminal, passenger on employee, worker-on-worker, and personal relationship), and ‘insiders.’ Second, with regard to terrorists, hardened security at airport terminals (although not necessarily at check-in counters and baggage claim and arrival areas) and aircraft, terrorists might resort to new warfare tactics such as bombing aircraft in mid-air by firing heat seeking shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, such as manpads. A third new trend might not involve attacking civilian aircraft, but using remotecontrolled drones packed with explosives

and guided by GPS to attack their intended targets. In an example of the latter tactic, in late September 2011, Rezwan Ferdaus, of Massachussetts, was arrested for plotting to use a remote-controlled F-86 Sabre in his plot to attack the U.S. Capitol and the Pentagon.

Finally, with the inside perimeters of airport facilities being increasingly hardened, terrorists are now targeting the newly arriving passengers as they board their buses outside the terminals, as demonstrated by the July 17, 2012 attack at Sarafovo Airport in Burgas, Bulgaria.

In a fourth possible new trend, just as the Iranians had succeeded in downing a flying U.S. “stealth’ drone over its territory in December 2011, it may be possible (although with great difficulty if they are properly encrypted) for terrorists to “hack” into an aircraft’s GPS system and “spoof” its GPS receiver with false navigational information. A fifth trend of concern to civilian aviation is the possibility of passengers who are infected with deadly biological diseases to become agents of global epidemics once they arrive at their various destinations. Finally, with the inside perimeters of airport facilities being increasingly hardened, terrorists are now targeting the newly arriving passengers as they board their buses outside the terminals, as demonstrated by the July 17, 2012 attack at Sarafovo Airport in Burgas, Bulgaria. In response to the multi-dimensional Active Threat-type attacks they now face, aviation security agencies are also coming up with a spectrum of new countermeasures. For example, to circumvent an aircraft’s engines from being attacked by a heat seeking surface-to-air missile, a decoy flare has been developed as a countermeasure. As proposed in a report by a homeland security association, another new countermeasure would involve the application of artificial intelligence ranging from deploying sophisticated imaging technologies using advanced algorithms at airports that make sensors and cameras ‘smart’, thereby enabling predictive analytical software to identify suspicious human behavioral patterns, including terrorists’ pre-incident ‘dry runs.’ In the future, the report adds, machine learning, computer vision and artificial intelligence could be combined in new ways to push out security checkpoints from the terminal to the street curb.

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is a Principal Analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (www.kiernan.co), a homeland security consulting firm that also specializes in Active Threat studies, in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

Fat Leonard Case Hongkong US Navy Photo

The U.S.Navy’s ‘Fat Leonard’

International Fraud And Bribery Case By Paul Davis

“T

he U.S. Navy’s “Fat Leonard” bribery and fraud scandal is a black eye that will take years to heal,” a long-serving and proud U.S. naval officer told a writer. “It sickens me to see how many naval officers, senior enlisted sailors and Navy civilian employees were so easily corrupted and bribed by a contractor. They traded U.S. Navy contracts, special considerations and classified information for money, food, cigars, booze and women.” 28

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The naval officer, who asked not to be named, went on to state that as he wished the U.S. Navy, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the other law enforcement agencies had stopped this criminal enterprise a good deal sooner. “This is a criminal case that has national security implications,” the officer added. While the massive investigation continues, the primary suspect, Leonard Glenn Francis, the owner and chief executive of Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA), pleaded guilty to bribery and fraud charges in federal court on January 15, 2015. According to the U.S. Justice Department, Francis admitted to presiding over a decadelong conspiracy that involving “scores” of U.S. Navy officials, tens of millions of dollars in fraud and millions of dollars in bribes and gifts. “Today’s guilty pleas of Leonard Francis, his company, and a senior Navy officer are vitally important steps in our active, ongoing investigation,” said Leslie R. Caldwell, the U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. “We will continue our efforts to root out those involved in this long-running corruption scheme, both inside and outside the Navy. The interests of justice and national security demand nothing less.” “It is astounding that Leonard Francis was able to purchase the integrity of Navy officials by offering them meaningless material possessions and the satisfaction of selfish indulgences,” added Laura A. Duffy, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California. “In sacrificing their honor, these officers helped Francis defraud their country out of tens of millions of dollars. Now they will be held to account.” Leonard Glenn Francis, nicknamed “Fat Leonard,” is a 350-pound Malaysian citizen and Singapore-based defense contractor. His company, GDMA, also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery and defraud the United States. As part of the plea agreements, Francis and GDMA agreed to forfeit $35 million and pay full restitution to the Navy. “The greed of all those involved in this massive fraud and bribery case has cost American taxpayers tens of millions of dollars,” said Andrew L. Traver, the Director of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. “NCIS and

“Today’s guilty pleas of Leonard Francis, his company, and a senior Navy officer are vitally important steps in our active, ongoing investigation,” said Leslie R. Caldwell, the U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. “We will continue our efforts to root out those involved in this longrunning corruption scheme, both inside and outside the Navy. The interests of justice and national security demand nothing less.”

our law enforcement partners have pored through mountains of documents and emails, discovering and documenting the crimes so that those who participated can be held accountable. Although today’s pleas are a significant milestone in the case, this investigation is far from over; there is much more work to be done.” As part of his guilty plea, Francis admitted to defrauding the Navy of tens of millions of dollars by routinely overbilling for various goods and services, including fuel, tugboat services and sewage disposal. “Francis admitted that he and GDMA gave Navy officials millions of dollars in gifts and expenses including over $500,000 in cash; hundreds of thousands of dollars in prostitution services; travel expenses, including first class airfare, luxurious hotel stays and spa treatments; lavish meals, including Kobe beef, Spanish suckling pigs, top-shelf alcohol and wine; and luxury gifts, including Cuban cigars, designer handbags, watches, fountain pens, designer furniture, electronics, ornamental swords and hand-made ship models,” the Justice Department stated in a press release. “In exchange, Francis solicited and received classified and confidential U.S. Navy information, including ship schedules. Francis also sought and received preferential treatment for GDMA in the contracting process. Francis further admitted that he bribed a federal criminal investigator in an attempt to learn more about the federal investigation of his company.” U.S. Navy Capt. Daniel Dusek also pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bribery on January 15, 2015. He was sentenced to 46 months in prison on March 26, 2016. Dusek was also ordered to pay a $70,000 fine and $30,000 in restitution to the Navy. According to the Justice Department, Dusek provided classified information to GDMA, a foreign defense contractor, in exchange for gifts. Dusek admitted that he used his influence as Deputy Director of Operations for the Seventh Fleet, headquartered in Yokosuka, Japan, and later as executive officer of the USS Essex and the commanding officer of the USS Bonhomme Richard, to benefit Francis and GDMA. Dusek also admitted to aiding GDMA in providing port services to U.S. Navy ships, and in return Francis gave Dusek meals, alcohol, entertainment, gifts, and dozens of nights and incidentals at luxury hotels and the services of prostitutes.

“Dusek is a golden asset to drive the big decks (aircraft carriers) into our fat revenue GDMA ports,” Francis wrote in email. “As a Navy officer, Captain Dusek took an oath to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States,” said Caldwell. “Instead, he chose self-interest, greed and prurience. And when he learned of the investigation, Captain Dusek deleted his email accounts in an attempt to shield his crimes from law enforcement.” Duffy noted that Dusek’s actions were the most distressing, as the Navy had placed trust, power and authority into his hands. She added that his sentence was fitting for man who was so valuable, his conspirators labeled him their “Golden Asset.” “This outcome again sends the message that corruption will be vigorously investigated and prosecuted,” said James B. Burch, the Deputy Inspector General for Investigation for the Defense Investigative Service (DCIS). “This is an unfortunate example of dishonorable naval officers who recklessly risked the safety of our troops by trading classified information for cash, extravagant gifts and prostitutes. Cases such as these are not motivated by need or other difficult personal circumstances; they are the product of simple greed. This investigation should serve as a warning that those who compromise the integrity of the United States will face their day of reckoning. DCIS and our law enforcement partners will pursue these crimes relentlessly.”

Shangri-La in Makati, Philippines, as well as providing him with the services of a prostitute.

Francis asked Dusek to exercise his influence on GDMA’s behalf by steering the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and its associated strike group to Port Klang, Malaysia (PKCC) – a port terminal owned by Francis. Dusek replied in a series of emails to GDMA in late August 2010 that he would make it happen.

According to Dusek’s plea agreement, he handdelivered Navy ship schedules to the GDMA office in Japan or emailed them directly to Francis or a GDMA employee on dozens of occasions, each time taking steps to avoid detection by law enforcement or U.S. Navy personnel. The Justice Department noted that Dusek was lavishly rewarded for his efforts to help GDMA. GDMA paid for a hotel for Dusek and his family at the Marriott Waikiki in Hawaii on July 19, 2010, and on Aug. 5, 2010, GDMA paid for a hotel room for Dusek at the

Leonard Glenn Francis Navy Ball 2007 US Navy Photo

Shortly thereafter Francis asked Dusek to exercise his influence on GDMA’s behalf by steering the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and its associated strike group to Port Klang, Malaysia (PKCC) – a port terminal owned by Francis. Dusek replied in a series of emails to GDMA in late August 2010 that he would make it happen. Dusek wrote that he had a good discussion with his admiral and convinced him that Port Klang was the better choice. He later wrote that the next Carrier Strike Group would in fact stop at Port Klang. That port visit cost the United States approximately $1.6 million. On June 9, 2016, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Robert Gilbeau pleaded guilty in federal court to charges that he lied to federal investigators to conceal his illicit years-long relationship with Leonard Glenn Francis and GDMA. According to the Justice Department Gilbeau pleaded guilty to one count of making a false statement. He is the highest-ranking U.S. Navy officer to be charged in the investigation thus far. In his plea agreement, Gilbeau admitted that he lied when he told agents from DCIS and NCIS that he had never received any gifts from Francis. Gilbeau also admitted that he lied when he told investigators that he “always paid for half of the dinner” when he and Francis met about three times a year. Gilbeau further admitted that when he became aware that Francis and others had been arrested in connection with the fraud and bribery offenses in September 2013, he destroyed documents and deleted computer files.

Rear Admiral Robert Gilbeau US Navy Photo

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Captain Daniel Dusek US Navy Photo

USS Stennis Singapore Harbor US Navy Photo

Gilbeau was the supply officer on the USS Nimitz and was responsible for procuring all goods and services necessary for operation of the ship. He later served as head of the Tsunami Relief Crisis Action Team in Singapore, heading the Navy’s logistics response to the Southeast Asia tsunami in December 2004, and in June 2005, Gilbeau was assigned to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations as the head of aviation material support, establishing policies and requirements for budgeting and acquisitions for the Navy’s air forces, according to the plea agreement. After his promotion to admiral in August 2010, Gilbeau assumed command of the Defense Contract Management Agency International and was responsible for the global administration of the Defense Department’s most critical contracts performed outside the United States. “As a flag level officer in the U.S. Navy, Admiral Gilbeau understood his duty to be honest with the federal agents investigating this sprawling bribery scheme,” said Caldwell. “By destroying documents and lying about the gifts that he received, Admiral Gilbeau broke the law and dishonored his uniform.” “Of those who wear our nation’s uniform in the service of our country, only a select few have been honored to hold the rank of Admiral – and not a single one is above the law,” added Duffy. “Admiral Gilbeau lied to federal agents investigating corruption and fraud, and then tried to cover up his deception by destroying documents and files. Whether the evidence leads us to a civilian, to an enlisted service member or to an admiral, as this investigation expands we will continue to hold responsible all those who lied or who corruptly betrayed their public duties for personal gain.” Gilbeau is awaiting sentencing. In addition to Gilbeau and Dusek, the others who have pleaded guilty in the “Fat Leonard” bribery and fraud case are U.S. Navy Captain (Select) Michael Misiewicz, Lieutenant Commander Todd Malaki, NCIS Special Agent John Beliveau, Commander Jose Luis Sanchez and U.S. Navy Petty Officer First Class Dan Layug. Former Defense Department Senior Executive Paul Simpkins is awaiting trial.

Belivea was sentenced to 12 years in prison and Petty Officer Dan Layug was sentenced to 27 months.

“As a flag level officer in the U.S. Navy, Admiral Gilbeau understood his duty to be honest with the federal agents investigating this sprawling bribery scheme,” said Caldwell. “By destroying documents and lying about the gifts that he received, Admiral Gilbeau broke the law and dishonored his uniform.”

The U.S. Navy announced on June 10, 2015 that Ray Mabus, the Secretary of the Navy at the time, issued Secretarial Letters of Censure to three senior officers following a review into their interactions with GDMA during 2006-2007. The senior officers were Rear Admiral Michael Miller, then-Commander, Carrier Strike Group 7 embarked on USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), Rear Admiral Terry Kraft, then-Commanding Officer, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), Rear Admiral. David Pimpo, then-supply officer of USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76). “Censure was both necessary and appropriate,” said Mabus. “I have now received the retirement requests of all three officers, and we will process them appropriately.” According to the U.S. Navy, the three admirals were found to have improperly accepted gifts from a prohibited source, two were found to have improperly endorsed a commercial business, and one engaged in solicitation of gifts and services from a prohibited source, when they were deployed to the Seventh Fleet area of responsibility during 2006-2007. The GDMA investigation continues by NCIS and DCIS. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California in San Diego and the Department of Justice Criminal Division in Washington, D.C. are leading the prosecution.

About the Author Paul Davis is a contributing editor to The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security Int’l.

Judge Ideas On Their Merits Not Their Pedigree By John C. Simpson

eality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away. Philip K. Dick in “How to Build a Universe That Doesn’t Fall Apart Two Days Later” (1978) Some time ago my good friend and IABTI member Captain Bob Lewis of the Collier County Sheriff’s Office forwarded an article on sniping in the September-October 2015 issue of Detonator magazine that he wanted me to review. Reading the piece, I saw him swinging back and forth between military and law enforcement sniping breathlessly sharing stories like Craig Harrison’s 2707 yard shots in Afghanistan and the berating the “gun culture” in America.

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After writing this, I of course submitted it to the magazine it appeared in so as to rebut the misinformation in the original article. Unfortunately, I never heard back from Detonator. So if a non IABTI member outsider may offer a response to the article by Professor Clive Williams let me begin by saying that this was one of the more poorly researched collections of nonsense about sniping that I’ve ever read. Now I was curious about the good Professor’s background to offer up the opinions

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on sniping that he did, so I investigated and found that he served with 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, from January 1965 to July 1966 in Vietnam. In 1998, he was awarded the Medal for Gallantry for an action with his platoon in November 1965. That said however, he authored a chapter in a 2002 book titled, The Australian Army And The Vietnam War 1962–1972. In this chapter entitled Doctrine, Training and Combat with 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1965–1966 he helpfully lists the organic weapons found in the platoon that he commanded: “The platoon’s weapons in Australia had been three GPMG M-60s, ten Owen SMGs, with the remaining weapons being 7.62 SLRs. In Vietnam, some of the riflemen converted their SLRs to automatic fire by inserting a matchstick in the firing mechanism. The Owens were replaced after a couple of months in Vietnam by American Armalite M-16s (except for the Platoon Commander’s), and we were issued with three M-79 grenade launchers and three disposable M-72 rocket launchers. I put my Owen (which was heavy and prone to rust) in an oil bath under my tent and replaced it with an M-16 from the brigade aid station.” So despite having service in Vietnam at platoon level on his resume the presence of any sniper rifles are conspicuous by their absence. “After leaving the Army in 1981, he pursued a civilian career in Defense Intelligence, working mainly on transnational issues. He was a Chevening scholar at the War Studies Department, King’s College, London, in 1987. He has worked and lectured internationally on terrorism-related issues since 1980, and started running terrorism courses at the ANU in 1996. He left Defense in 2002 to become a Visiting Fellow at the Strategica and Defense Studies Center of the ANU, and has since run Masters course electives on terrorism and counterterrorism at the ANU and at a number of Australian and overseas universities. These electives have been supplemented by another elective, “Security Management in Business and Government”, run with John McFarlane since 2003. He became an Adjunct Professor at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism (PICT) at Macquarie University in 2006.

He also became a Visiting Professor at the Department of Human and Social Sciences (HASS) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) in 2006” . Which is probably why when reading his article, I was reminded of one my favorite sayings, that “Non-snipers talking about sniping are like virgins talking about sex; they both do it with enthusiasm and ignorance.” To begin bringing some reality into this: 1. He says the definition of a sniper is simply someone who “shoots at other people from a place of concealment”. This of course ignores the fact that this is the goal of every infantryman since the invention of the rifled musket. 2. He says, “Military sniping has a long history, at least since the 1770s”. This is just bunk! Kind of hard to remain concealed in the age of black powder . Not to mention the whole muzzleloader thing. Even in the American Civil War the famous Berdan’s Sharpshooters were trained and employed as skirmishers. The Professor should remember that we had chaps wearing green uniforms, firing rifles from cover and concealment in Vietnam. They were called Infantry. 3. “Even when rudimentary and inaccurate, marksmen or sharpshooters were deployed in land battles to try and shoot enemy commanders.” Maybe, but one person usually held up as an example of a black powder sniper is Patrick Ferguson of the British Army who had invented a breech-loading rifle that was used in the American Revolutionary War. This is usually due to poor research because again, his men weren’t used as snipers but as maneuvering infantrymen. Besides, in a letter he wrote to a friend about an incident that happened in September 1777 at the Battle of Brandywine, “We had not lain long when a rebel officer, remarkable by a Hussar dress, passed towards our army, within a hundred yards of my right flank, not perceiving us. He was followed by another dressed in dark green, or blue, mounted on a bay horse, with a remarkably large cocked hat. I ordered three good shots to steal near to them, and fire at them; but the idea disgusted me. I recalled the order. The Hussar on returning made a circuit, but the other passed again within a hundred yards of us, upon which I advanced from

the wood towards him. On my calling, he stopped; but after looking at me proceeded. I again drew his attention, and made signs to him to stop, leveling my piece at him, but he slowly continued his way. As I was within the distance at which in the quickest firing I could have lodged half a dozen of balls in or about him before he was out of my reach, I had only to determine; but it was not pleasant to fire at the back of an unoffending individual, who was acquitting himself very coolly of his duty; so I let him alone. The day after, I had been telling this story to some wounded officers who lay in the same room with me, when one of our surgeons, who had been dressing the wounded rebel officers, came in and told us, that General Washington was all the morning with the light troops, and only attended by a French officer in a Hussar dress, he himself dressed and mounted in every point as above described. I am not sorry that I did not know at the time who it was” . A chance to shoot George Washington and you pass? Doesn’t sound anything like military sniping to me. 4. I did want to address at length two of the dumber things advocated in the article, the first being aiming for the medulla and shooting to wound someone. So the Professor writes, “Military snipers will normally aim for the chest, but a police sniper might try to disable rather than kill the target person” followed by “The only way of preventing any involuntary movement is a head shot targeting the medulla oblongata at the base of the skull…” In regards to the need to aim at the medulla or brainstem I’ve addressed this at length in my first book but I’ll provide an example of why this isn’t a good thing. The brainstem although taught as a one-inch circle by most uninformed sniper instructors is actually about ¾ of an inch at its widest part . Arguably the world’s foremost authority on wound ballistics, the late Dr. Martin Fackler had written: “The idea of having to hit the medulla or brain stem is a myth. The problem with this misconception is that the brain stem is a very small target –slightly less than one

inch in diameter. Under difficult conditions of distance and wind a sniper who thinks he must hit this tiny target might not shoot -- or go for the chest (a chest shot when a head shot was needed cost the life of a police officer in Alexandria, VA in 1989). To get the immediate cessation of action you need in a hostage situation, the aim point is … the center of a four to five-inch diameter target, which is the cranial vault (the skull with enclosed brain). All the nerve pathways to the arms and legs go through the brain stem and upper spinal cord, but any solid hit anywhere through the brain (4 to 5 inch target) with a potent rifle (such as the .308 you mentioned) automatically disrupts the brain stem -- you do not have to hit the brain stem. The bullet’s temporary cavity does it: a few milliseconds after the bullet’s passage the tissue surrounding the bullet path is flung radially outward. This causes a pressure increase inside the skull because there is no place for the tissue to go (the skull being hard and rigid). Just as in a hydraulic system, the pressure increase is distributed to all parts enclosed by the skull -- the only place the tissue can go is down the foramen magnum (the hole through which the spinal cord enters the brain). So the first thing that gets disrupted by this pressure is the brain stem -- it gets shoved down the foramen magnum -- cutting all nerve pathways that pass through it. As the pressure continues to increase it blows the cranial vault apart. I am unaware of any documented cases in which anyone got off a shot after being hit through the cranial vault by a .308 or similar rifle bullet.” So a ¾ inch target located somewhere under the brain or a four to five-inch diameter target. Considering that most police sniper targets in real life aren’t cooperating with your efforts to shoot them I’d go for the larger target myself and that’s what I and every other responsible sniper instructor teaches.

So a 3/4 inch target located somewhere under the brain or a four to five-inch diameter target. Considering that most police sniper targets in real life aren’t cooperating with your efforts to shoot them I’d go for the larger target myself and that’s what I and every other responsible sniper instructor teaches.

Although a later autopsy revealed that the rifle round had destroyed his heart, Wise discharged his shotgun twice killing Corporal Charles Hill with a shot to the head and crippling Officer Andrew M. Chelchowski with a shot to his leg. Other officers then opened fire killing Wise. Dr. Fackler was brought in to analyze what happened and he determined that the sniper aimed at the hostage taker’s chest because he didn’t think he could hit the suspect’s medulla . This also counts against that shooting to wound nonsense because if you couldn’t disable someone by “wounding” his heart I don’t know what will. Anyway, if you aren’t legally, morally and ethically justified in applying deadly force to a suspect, then you have no business shooting at them in order to intentionally wound or disable them. Let me put it this way, if you’re justified using Deadly Force against someone and they survive more power to you. If, however, you are somehow justified in only wounding someone (huh?) and they die you’ve just made a lot of attorneys very, very happy. Despite what was seen demonstrated by Jack Lord on many seasons of the original Hawaii Five-O, there is no magic way to always wound someone and make them surrender. If you talk to a trauma surgeon they’ll tell you that a shot through the deltoid muscle not involving the shoulder joint is relatively

That Alexandria shooting that he referenced bears examination. On 22 March 1989 the Alexandria, Virginia PD was called to a hostage situation at Hopkins Court. A drug dealer by the name of Jamie Wise was trying to collect a drug debt and the situation had turned bad. Wise exited the house holding a sawed off shotgun to the hostage’s head. A SWAT sniper equipped with a scoped AR-15 shot Wise in the chest.

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easy to treat, but looking at this mug shot do you want to try and find the deltoid muscles on this worthy specimen? How about when he’s wearing a jacket? How about taking the shot when he’s walking at an angle to you? Or up some stairs? Remember, sniper targets aren’t necessarily cooperating with your efforts to shoot them. But if you’re aiming at the shoulder you’d better hope that you don’t sever the axillary artery Shoot them in the leg? Watch out for the femoral artery On November 26th, 2007 Washington Redskins safety Sean Taylor was shot in the leg by an intruder and had his femoral artery severed. Although airlifted to the hospital and undergoing 7 hours of surgery he died the next day . Again, a reasonable person would conclude that shooting someone with a rifle would kill them rather than “just wound them”. That’s why “dumb” isn’t too strong a word to describe his ideas that police snipers shoot to wound whenever possible. 5. The availability of sniper rifles in the United States? He writes, “Sniper rifles are hard to come by in Australia, but relatively easy to obtain in the U.S.” While reading his piece, I couldn’t help but notice a certain anti-American bias in the good Professor. Although everyone is entitled to their own opinion they aren’t entitled to their own facts. First of all, he doesn’t attempt to define what a sniper rifle is. Seeing as how sniping has been done over the decades

with M1 Garands, M1903A4 Springfields, Mosin-Nagants, Remington 700s, Winchester Model 70s and the like I take the view that the training and abilities of the person using it are way more important than the hardware. Put another way, my definition of a sniper rifle is a rifle being used by a sniper, remembering that a sniper isn’t someone who merely uses a sniper rifle. Second, he tries to imply that Americans are in peril of being “sniped” any second. I consulted the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports and found some interesting facts, such as over the five-year period of 2010 to 2014 you’re more likely to be killed by a hammer than a socalled “sniper rifle”. Keep in mind that these figures include ALL rifles and not just what might be argued to be a sniper rifle. 6. “Sniper rifles are hard to come by in Australia, but relatively easy to obtain in the U.S. That is why the US President never speaks from an open-air unprotected podium.”

At this point, all I can do is refer my faithful readers to this photo from the open-air 2013 inaugural ceremony of President Obama and simply say that the Professor is as correct as usual. And here it is from another viewpoint. See all that stuff in front of the President? That’s called open air.

Also, the Professor still hasn’t defined what these hard to obtain sniper rifles actually are. More on this later but I don’t think hunters in Australia are using slingshots. 7. He finished with “No doubt some people will have reservations about such an unusual line of work, but most Australians would find sniping enemy combatants or crazed criminals a lot more socially acceptable than shooting animals for pleasure.”

ment of problem animals such as foxes, rabbits and other feral species that cause social, economic and environmental problems.” And elsewhere on an Australian government website I read about how Australian hunters kill around a million kangaroos a year by rifle fire . I guess they’re just not allowed to enjoy it. Oh, and looking over the government literature showed that the Australian kangaroo hunters have a better grasp of wound ballistics than the learned Professor. These illustrations are from the Code of Practice for the Humane Shooting of Kangaroos: It seems that the hunters are aiming for the kangaroo’s cranial vault rather than any “medulla oblongata” nonsense.

I was pleased to see that the Australian Prime Minister is taking prudent safety precautions in his gun free paradise as well. In the March 25, 2015 Sydney Herald we can read an article entitled, “Prime Minister to be protected by $2m security upgrade ” that says, in part: “The Abbott government is pressing ahead with plans to fortify the ministerial wing of Federal Parliament that will see the Prime Minister’s office screened by a steel security fence and two bullet proof, concrete gatehouses.” “Police deployed outside Parliament are armed with “longrange weapons” and in recent weeks parliamentary staff have participated in “lock down” exercises focused on the threat that armed terrorists may gain access to the building.”

About that final crack about “hunting animals for pleasure”? This has absolutely nothing to do with sniping but is another example of an anti-American bias, in my opinion. I found some useful facts in a publication put out by the Sporting Shooters’ Association of Australia: “A CSIRO study into Australia’s recreational hunters indicates that the country’s estimated 200,000300,000 hunters contribute $1 billion per year to the economy” “While hunting may be a controversial media issue, in reality it should be seen as an activity similar to fishing where people go out into the natural environment and harvest the best in organic free-range food. Hunting is also part of the solution in the manage-

As much as I’d like to go on and address my problems with his grasp of military sniping in depth, I think I’ll end this here after pointing out that Craig Harrison’s rank was Corporal of Horse and NOT just a Corporal as the Prof writes. Hopefully I’ve proven that you need to be very careful whom you allow to hand out “facts” on the subject of sniping. So I’ll leave you with my favorite quote from American humorist Henry Wheeler Shaw (writing in 1874 as Josh Billings) when he said, “I honestly believe it is better to know nothing than to know what ain’t so.”

About the Author John C. Simpson has been a sniper instructor to both military and police for the past thirty years having served as an instructor at the US Army Special Operations Target Interdiction Course (SOTIC); as a Special Operations sniper; Chief Instructor at the 10th Special Forces Group Sniper Committee; an Adjunct Instructor for Police Sniping at both the Smith & Wesson and SIG Sauer Academies; and a Staff Instructor for Snipercraft and the Yanqui Training Group. He is the author of two books on sniping, Snipers Notebook published in 2010 and Snipercraft:

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Laying the Groundwork for Your Career as a Sniper published in 2013 by Paladin Press. In addition, he’s contributed chapters on Individual Movement and Ballistics to the Sniper Operations and Training manual published by the American Sniper Association. He’s been retired from the US Army since 1994. The opinions expressed in this article are the authors and are not intended to represent the views of any of the agencies or companies that he has associated with. Any discussions of wound ballistics are for information purposes only and are not intended to substitute for formal sniper training or agency policies. Sources Used: 1. The International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators https://www.iabti.org/ 2. Taken from his online profile accessed from The Internet Archive at https://web.archive.org/ web/20120229063513/http:// hass.unsw.adfa.edu.au/staff/ profiles/williams.html 3. As first pointed out by Major John Plaster, US Army(retired) in the May 2009 American Rifleman article, Riflemen of the Revolution, http://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/2009/5/9/ riflemen-of-the-revolution/ 4. From the August 1853 issue of The Gentleman’s Magazine published in London by John Bowyer Nichols and Sons 5. Snipers Notebook; 2010; http:// docslide.us/documents/flyerthe-snipers-notebook-v4.html 6. Gray’s Anatomy, 20th American edition; 1918 by Dr Henry Gray 7. Letter to me from Fackler dated 21 August 1992. 8. Conversation between Dr Fackler and myself. 9. Figure 523 from the 1918 Gray’s Anatomy 10. Figure 548 from the 1918 Gray’s Anatomy 11. Probe Begins in Taylor’s Death by Amy Shipley and Peter Whoriskey; published 28 November 2007; Washington Post 12. http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/ prime-minister-to-be-protected-by-2m-security-upgrade20150325-1m75q1.html 13. A Journalist’s Guide to Firearms and the Shooting Sports, 2016 edition; SSAA; www.ssaa.org.au 14. Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) http://www.csiro. au/ 15. https://www.environment.gov. au/biodiversity/wildlife-trade/ natives/wild-harvest 16. https://www.environment.gov. au/node/16657 17. In his Regiment there are no Sergeants so the rank equivalent is a Corporal of Horse. Attention to detail don’t you know (it’s a sniper thing).

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Automotive Technology Line of Sight By Anthony F. Ricci

ast issue, we spoke about the history of vehicle safety and made mention of self-driven cars. Although I do not think corporations are ready to put their most important asset behind the wheel of a self-driven car quite yet there are many technologies that are providing Security Drivers and even some Law Enforcement issued vehicles quite a bit of technology driven help. We mentioned many driver aides such as Smart headlights, Emergency Response Systems, Reverse Monitoring/Back up Assistance, Blind Spot Warnings, Lane Departure, Parking assist, Voice activated systems, Crash Mitigation, and Drowsy Driver Alerts. Letâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s spend some time first defining a couple of aides that increase our vision and line of sight in both the front and rear of the vehicle.

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Smart Headlight Systems What makes a headlight “Smart”? According to manufacturers they can perform several lifesaving tasks like spotting people and large animals on dark roads activating alert systems within the vehicle to warn the driver. Utilizing infrared cameras that sense the heat of an object would show on the heads up display in different colors which indicate the severity of the situation. These lights will also lead the vehicle through a turn pivoting before the car so the driver has a much better sight line through the turn. Believe it or not an article by Chris Perkins from Mashable.com claims this technology has been around and improving slowly ever since 1960. Headlights that moved with the front tires were put on the Citroen DS a French Car model in 1968. Think of smart headlights in terms of time and distance; if you could save a tenth of a second by seeing around that next curve just 9 feet further, you would give yourself another 9 feet and 60 MPH to react. If an animal or person were entering your path this may be the 9 feet you need to perform a corrective action and prevent an accident. Other manufacturers are developing this technology toward a design that could help learn the most popular routes you take in order to shine light in low light areas. Another technological addition to headlights is that of Automatic High Beams. This system enables the high beam if the sensor does not detect the light from an oncoming vehicle or the light from the rear of a vehicle. If the system is activated and there is no light detected around you, the high beams will automatically turn on to increase your visibility. When another vehicle is detected, it automatically turns off the high beams to prevent glare to the other traffic. With this added technology manufacturers are able to do testing that will allow for brighter and better lights because they will not blind oncoming traffic.

Reverse Monitoring Systems Reverse Monitoring Systems are sensors that will warn you when you back within a certain distance of an object. These sensors are reducing back up crashes and minor dents and collision damage

immensely. Back up cameras, usually part of the reverse monitoring systems, are getting better and better. Most have a huge line of sight starting with enough vertical vision straight down behind the rear bumper to see a coke can, and wide enough to the sides to see someone walking behind the car well before they are in your path. Sometimes the driver’s field of vision with these devices is up to 20

feet left and right of the car. They were introduced by manufacturers to reduce the about of child back-over’s in drive ways. Several instances had happened where a driver backed up without first checking behind their vehicle to realize too late that a small child had been playing at the rear of the car. Reverse cameras have come a long way. Several tips to remember is to first always keep your camera lens clean especially in a snow storm when cleaning your vehicle off or on a rainy day. Another tip is to take the time to learn your camera’s view

range. Have someone walk around the rear of your car and measure your sight range. This will give you a good indication and more confidence in trusting the capabilities of the camera. Also take notice when the reverse warning beep first goes off, get out and check the distance it displays. Then back up more and see if the view in the camera changes or the beep gets louder or faster. Again get out and see how much distance you have until impact, you may want to do this multiple times. This will assure you know exactly how much distance you have according the sound and sight picture. For Security purposes while sitting waiting for your CEO to arrive it is not a bad habit to use the camera to check your six to see if anyone is lurking behind your vehicle. If using aftermarket cameras there are ways to install switches to be able to see the camera with the flick of a switch rather than having to be in reverse gear. While our forward visibility is markedly increased from years past, old legislation prevents us from moving forward. In due time laws will be lifted that allow these improvements to shed light on the road ahead, adapting to situations and allowing drivers extra time to react. Reverse monitoring systems are standard in many models available for sale today, but ensuring that you measure the distance the camera shows will maintain your safety and the safety of those in your vehicle. Relying on technology is never good, but utilizing it for the benefits it offers and still maintaining your old-school driving skills is always ideal. As a Security Driver, the only one you want to rely on is you. For instance, the reverse camera may be an outstanding feature until it doesn’t work. Don’t become lazy. Always check before you back up. Old school reverse seating positions and reverse control should still be practiced in the case that you need them. How long will it be before your camera gets covered? Will you get out to check the camera or will you simply turn, look, and drive away keeping everyone in the car safe? Enjoy the technology don’t rely on it!

About the Author Anthony Ricci is President of ADSI (http://www.1adsi.com)

A Dedicated Emergency Response Team (ERT): Crowd, Riot, And Disaster Response By Jim Weiss, P. J. Ryan and Mickey Davis

learwater, Florida, Police Departmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Emergency Response Team (ERT) is a dedicated unit of situational-trained police officers. It can be activated during civil unrest for a show of force in an environment that, for the moment, is not under control. By its very presence, this show of force can be a psychological deterrent to a crowd before any weapons need to be used as well as a way to clear out demonstrators before a situation escalates.

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ERT is not SWAT. Rather, it is specially trained and equipped for crowd and riot control as well as manmade or natural disasters. This training also includes officer-down situations and area searches. Members of Clearwater PD’s ERT are volunteers. This means they have chosen to be on the team, and are not assigned at random, the normal practice in the creation of a LE agency’s Mobil Field Force. The advantages and need for having a dedicated ERT are numerous. First, the selected officers want to be there. In addition, the team utilizes less manpower within the department in the event of a riot, and can also be deployed for emergency responses to hurricanes, flooding, and search and rescue. It’s easier to train a certain number of dedicated individuals--almost one-on-one-- rather than a whole department. There can also be more training annually rather than just once a year as with a Mobile Field Force. Plus, dedicated ERT officers will retain the knowledge and skills used to perform a task easier. Riot Control Training as a Form of Martial Arts Martial Arts are defined as self-defense techniques utilizing physical skill and coordination. Mastering the handling of the riot shield for strikes, blocks, even jabs, is in and of itself a martial art. And just like any other martial art, for every move there is a counter move. ERT continually trains its members to counter a shield grab by protestors who try to take the shield from the top, bottom, or sides. They are also taught to isolate the threat and take down a hostile subject immediately in that situation. ERT officers are trained at minimum of 40 hours to understand this concept and how to use the shield in a given situation, before being issued one on the front line. In an officer down situation involving militant rioters, a rescue squad of at least five members is sent out in front of the ERT line to rescue the officer. Two shield operators in front provide cover for those behind them as they pass in front of the downed officer. One member picks up the officer by his legs while the other picks him up under his arms. An additional officer is at the rear of the stack providing cover. Finally, the entire team walks backward to the safety of the ERT line. ERT trains four times a year. This training consists of riot control, specialized Mobile Field Force line formations, shield tactics,

natural disaster training, and the use of heavy equipment such as chain saws, etc. Physical fitness is stressed through drills, and it’s up to the individual ERT officers to stay in shape.

Members of ERT do not need permission to shoot. However, they must be sure of what is behind the demonstrator. The same rules apply as to any other use of deadly force scenario-each shot must be accounted for. ERT members are trained to respond to commands in riot control tactical formations.

Equipment currently includes the standard ballistic-resistant duty vest, a ballisticresistant helmet, and special black BDU uniforms. On top of the ballistic vest ERT officers wear full riot gear equipment including gloves, and shoulder, elbow, and knee pads. Training in preparation for riot control includes Molotov cocktail drills, extensive shooting in line formations wearing ERT riot gear, and practicing techniques for reloading and clearing handgun malfunctions by tap-racking on the riot shields. Shooting-with-gas-mask drills take into account distortions caused by gas mask lenses and the plastic shield. Members of ERT do not need permission to shoot. However, they must be sure of what is behind the demonstrator. The same rules apply as to any other use of deadly force scenario--each shot must be accounted for. ERT members are trained to respond to commands in riot control tactical formations. The ERT partnerships with SWAT, sniper, tactical medics, K9, the bomb disposal unit, radio repair, computer mechanics, and support vehicles such as Armored Rescue Vehicles (ARVs) and tow trucks when in the field. Clearwater’s ERT History: Clearwater Police Department’s ERT history goes back to the racial violence that erupted in October 1996 in the nearby city of St. Petersburg, Florida. A white police officer shot and killed an African-American teenager during a traffic stop, turned felony warrant wants, turned felony stop. Because the riot grew and spread quickly, it was difficult to contain. And because nothing like that had ever happened in Pinellas County before, there was no adequate plan of action. This civil unrest prompted law enforcement agencies of Pinellas County to review what had happened and come up with solutions for the future. At this time the City of Clearwater began its unique Emergency Response Team program that continues today. Organization: Clearwater PD’s ERT is made up of two platoons: Alpha and Bravo. Each team has a team leader and an assistant team leader, a gas grenadier, a less lethal munitions operator, and 12 line officers. ERT utilizes a 40 mm standard pump action, less-lethal launcher.

The ERT commander gains information from the department’s Command Staff which includes the chief, major, and undercover police officers in the field ghosting the crowd or rioters. He relays the information directly to the Assistant Team Commander (ATC) who is with the ERT on the ground. The ATC then relays to the Team Leaders (TL) information such as to deploy gas and/ or less lethal, etc. The TL or ATL at the scene can make other less lethal use decisions as he sees fitting to evolving situations or as the environment dictates, such as less lethal munitions or changes in the line formations. Clearwater’s ERT does not employ helmet mics for communication. Although its officers are equipped with issued patrol radios, during a situation ERT will use a designated radio group for team members only. Communication on the line involves Team Leaders behind the line. Information is passed to the TL and he forwards it to line members directly using hands-on and verbal communication. The team employs the three-man cell principal. Every Team Leader is responsible for three line operators in front of him. This allows for faster communication to the team and less confusion for the line offers.

Clearwater’s ERT does not employ helmet mics for communication. Although its officers are equipped with issued patrol radios, during a situation ERT will use a designated radio group for team members only. Communication on the line involves Team Leaders behind the line. Information is passed to the TL and he forwards it to line members directly using handson and verbal communication.

Formations are at the discretion of the ATC based on the given situations and conditions at the time. These can vary from crowd density to active hostiles within the crowd, and environmental factors, such as alleyways, street corners, and weather.

Clearwater Police Department’s Emergency Response Team has been in the field under various circumstances, but for this article, our focus will be on its use during Hurricane Charlie and during the Republican National Convention (RNC) in Tampa in 2012. Hurricane Charlie – With four major hurricanes striking Florida within six weeks in August and September 2004, mutual aid efforts had to be swift and coordinated.

Clearwater PD’s K-9 Unit is very much part of the ERT. It is deployed at the end of the line formations to use if there is a potential threat by a rioter or looter to the immediate ERT line. Tactical medics are also part of the ERT. They are SWAT-trained members of the Clearwater Fire Department who have completed additional tactical medic courses. These medics are kept behind the line, but walk with the team to render immediate first aid and assist with an officer downed by injury or dehydration. They also give immediate aid to citizens injured during a riot-type situation. Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

ERT also has a special support entity called the ERT Housing Unit. It is a 40-foot, fifth wheel toy hauler. This travel trailer is part living quarters and part garage. It can sleep 12 ERT members, and comes complete with a full kitchen, bathroom including a shower, generator, spare fuel tank, 100-gallon fresh water tanks, and a 12x8 garage in the rear to haul quads, a side-by-side seating Kawasaki Mule™, or additional equipment. It is designed to deploy in natural disasters or large events so officers have a place to rest and sleep. The fully self-contained Housing Unit allows the team to respond to an area, set up, and have mobile housing in place without the need for a hotel. It also makes for quick mobilization to an area that needs ERT. ERT’s two Humvees are used to move team members from one point to another in a fast, accelerated manner. They can also be used to remove injured officers and citizens from the riot area. Since Clearwater has a large beach community and flooding problems, the Humvees were an excellent addition. They have already been employed to rescue citizens and motorists on the beach during storms and street flooding. The two vehicles were purchased from the federal government at $500 each. In the Field with ERT

When the Emergency Response Team is deployed to a riot situation, members are the boots on the ground dealing with the riot itself. SWAT snipers, working in conjunction, are utilized on the outskirts of the riot and/or rooftops with a bird’s eye view, looking for any potentially deadly threats to ERT members.

When deployed outside of the city, Clearwater’s ERT, with the assistance of other city departments, brings a fuel truck and a tow truck for disabled cruisers. Tampa Bomb Squad handles all possible bomb disposal situations. Clearwater PD also has an ARV as do other agencies in the county; there are stiff rules and regulations for their use.

Florida Emergency Operations Center sent the Clearwater ERT to Kissimmee, an area south of Orlando in the center of the state. ERT sent 12 members at time as well as tactical medics, the medic van, and the command bus. ERT’s duties and responsibilities included assisting Orlando P.D. with setting up a command post and sharing various resources with multiple agencies. Members also conducted patrols through hurricaneravaged neighborhoods looking for citizens and structural dangers, and assisted in the distribution of food and water to several thousand citizens. Vol. 22, No.4

ERT also had to solve several problems. 1. To deal with the heat, police officers were given IV’s by the tactical medics, which was better than any bottled water. ERT also set up a series of portable 10x10 shelters to provide additional rest areas for the officers. These were similar to first aid tents where officers from all the other agencies came for aid, snacks, rest, and IVs. These tents were in addition to the ERT Housing Unit. 2. After the first day in the disaster area, it became apparent the vehicles needed fuel; many of the gas stations were closed due to hurricane damage. A call was made to the city, and a large city fuel truck was deployed to the staging area along with a service mechanic to make minor repairs to ERT vehicles. Both remained with the team throughout the entire operation. 3. Aid poured in from everyone, so large ice, food, and water trucks had to be staged away from the public dispersing sites. Twenty-four hour security was also assigned to the staging area to prevent looting. Officers, mostly ERT members, used forklifts to unload the pallets of water and ice. A chain of officers was formed to stack the bottles of water and ice at the citizen dispensing area. 4. When ERT first arrived at the Osceola Mall, a line of cars stretched for miles trying to get into the parking lot so people could get water and ice for their families. It was chaos. After the first day, the ERT team--along with the Kissimmee Police Department--had several thousand traffic cones brought to the area. Late in the night when traffic was minimal, a flow plan was set up with a designated entrance and exit and two separate lines, each exiting the mall area in different locations to ease congestion. ERT also created large hand-written signs to direct people to the proper areas. Some officers walked the several-miles-long car lines handing out cold bottles of water to people waiting in them, while others drove golf carts, ATVs, and Mules up and down the line with coolers of cold water for officers to hand to those waiting in their vehicles. 5. Prior to the deployment, each ERT member was told to bring enough food and water to sustain them for at least two weeks. Many brought protein and granola bars, peanuts, cookies, jerky, etc. ERT stocked the Housing Unit fridge with eggs, bacon, chicken, etc. Between the ERT Housing Unit’s full kitchen and portable BBQ, Clearwater’s ERT officers ate several good meals. Many other agencies just brought officer and cruisers, and since

many of the restaurants were closed and stores had no power, getting a good meal for the first few days was hard for some.

Aid poured in from everyone, so large ice, food, and water trucks had to be staged away from the public dispersing sites. Twenty-four hour security was also assigned to the staging area to prevent looting. Officers, mostly ERT members, used forklifts to unload the pallets of water and ice. A chain of officers was formed to stack the bottles of water and ice at the citizen dispensing area.

Republican National Convention (RNC) Clearwater PD’s ERT was the only other training agency to assist Tampa PD and the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office in getting the Tampa Bay area ready for the RNC. They helped teach riot control shield, baton, and line formation tactics, as well as chemical munitions.. A Crowd Management Group (CMG) led by the Tampa Police Department and including ERT trainers Corporal Steven Squillante and Officer Rob Lazzaro, traveled throughout the state instructing those agencies not able to attend the Tampa area’s crowd control preparation. CMG trained these other officers over a nine-month period utilizing different riot scenarios, line formations, and arrest tactics. ERT officers were deployed for the week of the RNC, and many members stayed in local hotels or the ERT Housing Unit. The biggest lesson learned from the RNC was the need to quickly mobilize a large number of officers with the right skill sets. Housing was another issue. Had it not been for the Housing Unit, many ERT members would have had to travel to and from Tampa on a daily basis, with the chance of being caught in traffic jams due to the large volume of extra people coming into the city. Another lesson—for which they were well equipped--was proper and uniform training. Every agency has its own department policies and procedures. However during the RNC, the crowd management group trained every single officer (over 1900 officers) in how and what the rules of engagement would be, regardless of individual department policies, thus avoiding any confusion. Clearwater, Florida, Police Department’s dedicated Emergency Response Team is an example of law enforcement putting its best foot forward in tough situations. About the Authors Lt. Jim Weiss (Ret) is a former Army light infantryman, school-trained Army combat engineer and former State of Florida Investigator. Mickey Davis is an award-winning, California-based writer and author. P.J. Ryan is a retired law enforcement officer from the Southeast. During his career he was a state certified law enforcement firearms instructor and an agency armorer.

IACSP Q&A

With Author Nelson DeMille

N He was born in New York City on August 23, 1943 and then moved with his parents to Long Island. He spent three years at Hofstra University and then joined the U.S. Army where he attended Officer Candidate School and was commissioned a Lieutenant in the United States Army (1966-69). He saw action in Vietnam as an infantry platoon leader with the First Cavalry Division and was decorated with the Air Medal, Bronze Star, and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry. After his discharge, DeMille returned to Hofstra University where

elson DeMille is the author of fact-based international thrillers that deal with terrorism, espionage and crime, including “Cathedral,” The Lion’s Game,” The Panther” and “Radiant Angel.”

he received his bachelor’s degree in Political Science and History.

He was interviewed by Paul Davis, a contributing editor to the Journal.

He is a member of American Mensa, The Authors Guild, and is the past president of the Mystery Writers of America. He is also a member of International Thriller Writers and was chosen as ThrillerMaster of the Year 2015. He holds three honorary doctorates: Doctor of Humane Letters from Hofstra University, Doctor of Literature from Long Island University, and Doctor of Humane Letters from Dowling College. He has sold more than 50 million books worldwide

IACSP: Some of your novels,

like “The Lion’s Game” and “The Panther,” deal with international terrorism and your character John Corey went from being a New York cop to working on an anti-terrorism task force. What drew you towards counterterrorism as a subject for your novels?

DeMille: I was fascinated by the Cold War and I’ve written one major Cold War novel, “The Charm School.” Then the Cold

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War ended and I was looking for subjects to write about. I thought the war on terrorism would be a challenge and I looked at what was happening at the time. My character John Corey first appeared in “Plum Island.” He was a NYPD homicide detective, wounded in the line of duty, and retired on 90 percent disability, which meant that he couldn’t come back to the force. I’d never written a series before, and “Plum Island” was not meant to be a series. But everyone loved John Corey and they wanted me to bring him back.

IACSP: I like John Corey as well. He’s tough, cocky, irreverent and sarcastic. DeMille: He pays the rent. I have a friend, Kenny Hieb, and he was retired NYPD working for the Joint Terrorism Task Force and he was the one who said to me why don’t you make John a contract agent for the task force, which I did. But I renamed it the Anti-Terrorist Task Force. You get a lot more lee-way when you fictionalize an organization. You want to respect the men and women who work there and at the same time make it a bit more dramatic and take a little literary license. I kind of got into it. I was not as fascinated by the subject matter as I was the Cold War, but I think that’s a generational thing. I was brought up with the Cold War and it was second nature for me. I’ve read probably half the Cold War thrillers ever written and most of the nonfiction, but now I’ve immersed myself in the war on terrorism, which has a lot more nuances to it. It was a lot of hard work, I learned a lot, and I hope represented it accurately. IACSP: I believe you have. Beyond your friendship with Kenny Hieb, how extensive is your research?

DeMille: I use to do ride-alongs

with the NYPD. I have a lot of friends who are NYPD and Nassau County PD. I live in Nassau County on Long Island. The FBI has been forthcoming, but I get most of my info from retired FBI, because they tend to speak more freely. My research starts at the library and then I travel and I interview people.

guishing feature was that he was not politically correct. The rank and file cops related to him. I’m not sure if all of the brass did, but I’ve spoken to former NYPD commissioner Ray Kelly and I’ve had dinner with former NYPD commissioner William Bratton. They kind of enjoy the books.

IACSP: I thought you were a bit too

hard on CIA officers in “The Panther.” Have you thought of writing a book that features a CIA officer as the protagonist?

I love, to be similar to the military dark humor I recall from my Navy days, which I’m sure you, as a former

IACSP: I interviewed former CIA officer Gary Berntsen here a few years ago. He was involved in Operation Jawbreaker in Afghanistan just after 9/11. He’s an interesting guy, sort of a modern-day James Bond. I’d like to read a book of yours on the CIA. Is your character John Corey based on a real cop? And is Paul Brenner, your character in “The General’s Daughter” and “Up Country,” based on a real Army investigator? Are they in part autobiographical?

soldier, also see. Your books deal with dark matters, but there is a lot of humor in them. Why do you include so much humor?

DeMille: You can’t be unrelent-

ingly grim. Oliver Stone’s Vietnam film “Platoon” was accurate up to a point, but what he totally didn’t get or represent was the G.I. humor. We used to joke about death every day. You had to joke about it. I thought about that when I started writing some of my characters - they are going to be humorous. John Corey is that kind of character right from the get-go and so is Paul Brenner. I think the American public, which has a good sense of humor, responded to it very well and made the books best-sellers.

like your books?

DeMille: I’ve never gotten any negative feedback from them. I get a lot of positive feedback from all over the country via my website. They may appreciate that I’m on their side.

DeMille: When I first created John Corey he was NYPD and his distin-

IACSP: I find cop humor, which

DeMille: I respect the CIA, especially what they do in Afghanistan it’s amazing. I’ve been thinking about writing a book about a CIA operative, a good guy. I wanted to do a modern James Bond. He was a cool character and he was the hero. I haven’t come up with the plot yet.

IACSP: Do the cops and the feds

IACSP: There are so many novels and TV and films that are anti-cop, anti-intel and anti-military, so yes, I believe the active duty and retired cops, federal agents and intelligence officers do appreciate books like yours. I certainly do.

NYPD and suburban country cops that I’ve known over the years. I have a lot of police friends. I find them amusing, funny, sarcastic and politically incorrect. They are great storytellers. It is a subculture and once you’re into it and understand it, you can create an amalgam of all of the cops. An everyman cop.

IACSP: What books and writers do DeMille: The Paul Brenner char-

acter maybe be a bit more autobiographical. I didn’t base it on anyone. I barely knew any CID people when I was in the Army. The John Corey character is based on a number of

you like?

DeMille: Joseph Wambaugh gave me a good insight into the police mentality. I thought of him many times when I created John Corey. I like Ian Fleming and

Graham Greene is a great writer. I tend to like British authors. With American writers, it would be Hemingway.

IACSP: Can you give us a brief overview of your life and career? DeMille: I went to Hofstra University, but I got bored after about three years and the Vietnam War was on, so on April 17, 1966 I joined the Army. I got out in April of 1969. It was a great three years. If I haven’t had that experience I know I wouldn’t be the same man I am now. I came back and finished college and was kind of bored with the idea of going to a regular work-a-day job. Once you’ve been a combat infantry officer, nothing is exciting anymore. I consider myself very lucky to have survived that year on frontline duty. That’s what drew me to writing, because writing is cathartic but it is also kind of living vicariously. Maybe that’s why I admire Hemingway. He wrote about things that he really did. I’ve tried to keep the adventure up by going back to Vietnam, Moscow, Belfast, and some weird places in the world. Last October I was in Cuba for two weeks. The book I’m writing now is set in Cuba. It has been an interesting life and I have no regrets. Glad I got into writing and I’ve been doing it for 40 years. IACSP: Having visited Cuba, what do you think of Guantanamo? Should terrorists captured on the battlefield be given military tribunals or should they be tried in civilian courts? DeMille: They should be tried by the military. It is either a war or it’s not a war. I think Congress should declare war on terrorism. A declaration of war. We have a war on drugs, wars on this and that, and these are not real wars. A war on terrorism should not be confused with the war on drugs, obesity or whatever. A declaration of war on terrorism would change the whole political and diplomatic picture on how this war is being fought. I’ll tell Donald Trump that when I see him. IACSP: Thank you for speaking to us.

IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf By Dr. Joshua Sinai

This column capsule reviews recent books on homeland security in the Active Threat areas of terrorism, active shooters, malicious insiders, and weapons of mass destruction. The reviews are arranged alphabetically, by authors’ last names.

Effective Physical Security [Fifth Edition] Lawrence J. Fennelly, editor, (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2017), 458 pages, $79.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-12-804462-9.

he contributors to this edited compendium comprehensively examine all aspects of physical security. Its 23 chapters cover topics such as the components of effective CPTED (a multi-disciplinary approach to preventing criminal behavior through environmental design); ensuring that security programs are compliant with industry and government standards, regulations and guidelines; conducting vulnerability assessments, including assessing required layers of protection; working with architects to design physical safety structures; the role of lighting electronics, including hardening glass and windows, and chain-link fences in upgrading physical security; how locks mitigate criminal entry; establishing internal and external intrusion detection systems to identify threats; the benefits of biometrics; the components of information technology (IT) systems in physical security, and the roles of security officers and equipment monitoring in providing additional layers of physical security. This reviewer wrote a chapter on “Access Control Systems and Identification Badges,” which discusses the components of access control systems and protocols and access badges for personnel. The volume’s editor is a prominent practitioner expert and writer on the role of physical security in crime and other types of violence prevention, based in South Yarmouth, MA.

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The Field of Fight:

How We Can Win the Global War Against Radical Islam and Its Allies

Michael T. Flynn and Michael Ledeen, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2016), 208 pages, $26.99 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-25010-622-3. With this book’s primary author, Lt. General, U.S. Army (Retired) Michael Flynn appointed by President Donald Trump as his National Security Adviser and head of the National Security Council, this is an important account of his approach to countering radical Islam, its primary organizations, the Islamic State and al Qaeda, and their affiliates and adherents worldwide, including in America. Although Michael Ledeen, the book’s co-author, is also listed in the title, as a veteran author and expert on this subject, his role was to amplify General Flynn’s thinking and approach to these issues, so General Flynn will be referred to as the primary author. As explained by the author, the book’s title and overall theme are derived from Homer’s Iliad, in which an epic battle is being fought “involving both men and gods.” (p. 3). As the author explains, “Our most fanatical contemporary enemies think they are in a similar battle with us. Most of them believe their cause is blessed and supported by the Almighty. We must prove them wrong.” (p. 3). This book, accordingly, was written to explain the full magnitude of the war being waged by the jihadists, which the Obama Administration “has forbidden us to describe our enemies properly and clearly: they are Radical Islamists.” (p. 3) The book’s second purpose was “To lay out a winning strategy,” (p. 3), which the author outlines as two-pronged: (1) organizing “all our national power, from military and economic to intelligence and tough-minded diplomacy,” and, (2) “They must be denied safe havens, and countries that shelter them have to be issued a brutal choice: either eliminate the Radical Islamists or you risk direct attack yourselves.” (p. 8). Applying his extensive experience in military intelligence, including as a former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the author concludes that a “winning strategy” consists of the following elements, which are to be fought in the physical and digital environments: “1. Properly assess your environment and clearly define your enemy; 2. Face reality – for politicians, this is never an easy thing to do; 3. Understand the social context and fabric of the operational environment; 4. Recognize who’s in charge of the enemy’s forces.” (p. 169). Such a “winning strategy,” according to the author, also involves the inclusion of America’s close military allies in the Middle East: Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.

Insider Threat:

Prevention, Detection, Mitigation, and Deterrence Michael G. Gelles, (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2016), 252 pages, $42.46 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0128024102.

This handbook is an authoritative and comprehensive examination of the insider threat. It is defined as “unauthorized dissemination of trade secrets, intellectual property (IP), or classified information” by individuals who have privileged access to such information due to their relationship with the affected organizations or companies as “insiders,” whether as employees, contractors, or vendors. To explain this threat and how to counter it, the book’s chapters cover topics such as threats posed by ‘insiders’ and third-party insiders (e.g. vendors), challenges in establishing an insider threat prevention program, using data analytics in risk management, establishing technical and physical controls over the use of an organization’s IT network, the crucial ingredient of getting employee engagement in mitigating the risk of an insider threat, monitoring and investing instances of insider threats, privacy considerations for insider threat mitigation programs, and future trends, including the changing definition of an ‘insider.’ The handbook is well organized, with numerous diagrams, tables, charts, and quadrants that illustrate the volume’s discussion. Also, many of the chapters begin with an “Introduction” and conclude with useful sections called “In Summary” and “Key Takeaways.” The Appendices include valuable templates and a section on “Frequently Asked Questions” for establishing an insider threat mitigation program in one’s organization. The author is a Managing Director at Deloitte Consulting, LLP, Federal practice, in Washington, DC. As a collective effort, the chapters were written by Dr. Gelles in collaboration with his Deloitte analysts who are listed under their respective chapters.

Biological Weapons:

Recognizing, Understanding, and Responding to the Threat

Kristy Young Johnson and Paul Matthew Nolan, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2016), 360 pages, $110.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-1188-3059-8. This authoritative and comprehensive textbook examines the magnitude of the threat presented by bioterrorism, the components of biological weapons, and effective response measures. The textbook begins with a valuable introductory overview, which discusses the nature of the threat, how biological weapons originated, why terrorists might employ bioweapons, and why it is important to study this topic, which the authors explain are “not limited to a battlefield; all civilians are potential targets.” (p. 3) The textbook is divided into four units: Unit I: Agents, Immunity, and Agencies (bacteria, toxins, and viruses; the human immune system, and defense agencies); Unit II: Bacteria (Anthrax, Plague, Tularemia, and Cholera); Unit III: Toxins (Ricin, Botulimum Toxin, and Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B); and Unit IV: Viruses (Ebola, Smallpox, Hantavirus, Viral Encephalitis, Nipah virus, Lassa Fever, and Marburg Virus). The final chapter discusses policies, procedures, and preventative measures against biological weapons. As a textbook, each chapter consists of a chapter summary, review questions, and valuable “reality checks,” which are intended to raise issues for classroom discussion. Each chapter also includes numerous tables and illustrations. The Appendices include answers to the chapters’ review questions and unit reviews, as well as excerpts from significant documents on biological weapons. This textbook is highly recommended for courses on weapons of mass destruction, as well as a stand-alone reference handbook. The authors are professors at The Citadel – The Military College of South Carolina.

School Shooters:

Understanding High School, College, and Adult Perpetrators Peter Langman, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 298 pages, $38.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-44223-356-0.

This is an excellent examination of 48 cases of school shooters in the U.S. and internationally (with several others referenced, as well) in order to explore their motives and other factors that drive them to carry out such murderous rampages. This collected information is applied to classify these individuals according to the author’s typology of psychopathic shooters, psychotic shooters, and traumatized shooters to explain the factors leading to their attacks and allow for comparisons with other shooters. The concluding chapter presents the author’s recommendation for preventing school shooters by identifying such at-risk individuals prior to their attacks. This can be achieved, the author writes, through the identification of potential attack-related behaviors, such as leakages by such individuals of information about their intended attacks, which need to be better understood by those in their immediate environments in order to report them to the appropriate authorities for early as possible preemption. The author, a psychologist in private practice in Allentown, PA, is a prominent expert on analyzing school shooters. His website, http://www.schoolshooters.info, includes a large collection of materials relating to school shooters.

Hearts of Darkness:

Why Kids Are Becoming Mass Murderers and How We Can Stop It

John Liebert and William J. Birnes, (New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, 2014), 288 pages, $24.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-62914-184-8. This is a highly interesting and well-informed examination by a leading psychiatrist (and his writer collaborator) of the epidemic of mass shootings in the United States, also known as “active shootings,” against the psychiatric background of the perpetrators. One of the book’s findings is that “we found many paths to understanding the nature of this epidemic and the spread of mental illness, the evolution of American society and how it is affecting our children, the influence of the media – particularly, violent video games – and the nature of suicidal mental illness itself. Suicidal mental illness deserves to be studies as a separate aspect of criminal justice and of both psychiatric medicine and clinical psychology.” (p. 2) To examine these issues, the book discusses the psychiatric, socio-psychological, and genetic backgrounds of violence and aggression which are applied to

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significant cases of mass shooters: Adam Lanza (Sandy Hook, CT), James Holmes (Aurora, CO), Jared Loughner (Tucson, AZ), Anders Brevik (Norway), Eddie Rough (the killer of former Navy Seal Christopher Kyle), and others. The authors find that “almost all suicidal mass murderers are mentally ill and that their illnesses were detected years before their crimes,” such as “usually schizophrenia,” with “the person feeling hopeless, in pain, and aggressive toward a world that seems neither to understand nor care.” (pages 153-155) Another finding is that many suicidal mass murderers “actually studied the crimes of other suicidal mass murderers…” (p. 154) The final chapter provides practical guidelines for identifying signs of potential violence, such as what to look for in an individual’s strange behavior, ideations of violence, manifestations of violent behavior, withdrawal from others, violent mood swings, and the importance of early intervention. This book is highly recommended for understanding the psychological and psychiatric characteristics of individuals who become mass shooters. The book’s primary author, John Liebert, MD, is a veteran psychiatric practitioner who lives in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Understanding Homeland Security Gus Martin, (Los Angeles, SAGE, 2017), 456 pages, $86.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-050634-613-7.

This is an updated and expanded second edition of the author’s comprehensive, authoritative, and well-organized textbook on the components of homeland security, with a particular focus on the establishment and missions of homeland security agencies in the United States. The textbook is divided into four thematic parts. Part I, “Foundations of Homeland Security,” defines homeland security, including its historical origins in the post9/11 era; how homeland security approaches all-hazards, ranging from terrorism to natural disasters; its legal foundation; the balancing of civil liberties and the requirement for security; and the agencies that carry out homeland security missions. Part II, “Threats and Vulnerabilities,” examines new trends in the terrorist threat facing a nation. Part III, “Preparedness, Response, Recovery,” discusses the components required to defend a nation’s critical infrastructure, respond to a terrorism incident, and recover from such incidents. Part IV, Homeland Security: An Evolving Concept,” analyzes near-future trends in the terrorist threats facing homeland security. As a textbook, each chapter begins with a series of learning objectives, several “chapter perspective” boxes that include discussion questions, tables and figures to further illustrate the accompanying text, photos, a chapter summary, key terms and concepts, recommended websites for additional resources, web exercises, and recommended readings. Also included are web-based student study guides and instructor guides. The author is Professor of Criminal Justice Administration at California State University, Dominguez Hills.

Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies

Gus Martin, [Fourth Edition] (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2017), 336 pages, $82.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-50633-097-6. This is an updated and expanded fourth edition of the author’s highly regarded textbook on terrorism and counterterrorism. The textbook is organized into three thematic parts, with each consisting of several chapters. Part I, “Understanding Terrorism,” discusses how to define terrorism, presents an historical perspective on ideological origins, analyzes the causes of terrorism, and examines the types of violence committed by terrorists and how these are covered by mass media. Part II, “Terrorist Environments,” covers topics such as state terrorism, the use of terrorism by insurgents, religiously extremist terrorism, transnational terrorist groups, and domestic terrorism in the United States. Part III, “The Terrorist Battleground,” examines the components of counterterrorism, the role of homeland security in protecting the United States, and future trends in terrorist warfare. As a textbook, each chapter begins with an introduction; side boxes that present various perspectives on the subjects covered, including questions for discussion; tables and figures to further illustrate the accompanying text, including incident chronologies; key terms and concepts, recommended readings, and additional Webbased resources for additional materials. For course instructors, the volume includes a website that provides resources to supplement the book’s materials, including PowerPoint lecture slides and discussion questions. The author is Professor of Criminal Justice Administration at California State University, Dominguez Hills. Several of this column’s reviews were previously published in this reviewer’s company’s newsletter “Active Threat Intelligence Digest,” and are reprinted by permission.

About The Reviewer Dr. Joshua Sinai is a Principal Analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH) (www.kiernan.co), a homeland security consulting firm in Alexandria, VA. Dr. Sinai can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

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