The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V25N1

What Does Facebook’s New Cryptocurrency Mean For Law Enforcement?

Legalizing Marijuana Won’t Smoke Out Narco-Traffickers Sniper And Active Shooter Ambushes: Washington D.C. And Dallas

The Case Against WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange

Red On Red:

The Security Situation In Nepal

IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf CELEBRATING

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Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 25, No.1

Join the ranks of security and public safety professionals worldwide that have achieved the Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential as recognition of their unique expertise in the field of managing terrorism-related risk.

The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential is the global benchmark for recognizing career achievement and knowledge in the protection of facilities, organizations, and the public against acts of terrorism. The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer designation is awarded to a candidate who has met eligibility requirements and passed the cATO™ Certification Examination in accordance with the standards set forth by the Certifying Board of The International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP).

Becoming board certified as a Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer distinguishes you in the security and public safety profession by demonstrating your expertise in the specialized field of managing terrorism-related risk and commitment to the safety and welfare of your community.

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Vol. 25, No. 1, 2019 Publisher Steven J. Fustero

Page 10

Senior Editor N. J. Florence

The Case Against WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange,

Contributing Writers Jim Weiss Mickey Davis Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai

by Paul Davis

Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

Page 42

Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

Part Three: Sniper And Active Shooter Ambushes in Washington, D.C. and Dallas

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White

by Jim Weiss, Bob O’Brien & Mickey Davis

South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

Page 6 SITREP, Terrorism Trends & Forecasts Page 8 What Does Facebook’s New Cryptocurrency Mean For Law Enforcement?, by David Gewirtz Page 10 The Case Against WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange, by Paul Davis Page 16 Legalizing Marijuana Won’t Smoke-Out Narco-Traffickers,

by Luke Bencie & Paige Morrison Page 20 Hizballah: A Terrorist Group Profile, by Dr. Joshua Sinai Page 28 Red On Red: The Security Situation In Nepal, by Dr. Thomas A. Marks Page 36 The 3-Zone Security Plan, by Stanley I. White, CPS, ATO, BDO Page 40 Let’s Be Blunt: Time For A New Critical Infrastructure Sector? by

Luke Bencie & Sami Araboglhli Page 42 Part Three: Sniper And Active Shooter Ambushes in Washington, D.C.

and Dallas, by Jim Weiss, Bob O’Brien & Mickey Davis Page 48 Security Driver: What Makes A Security Driver Different From A

Chauffeur Or Regular Limo Driver?, by Anthony Ricci Page 50 An IACSP Interview With Chief Inspector Daniel P. MacDonald,

by Paul Davis Page 54 IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf, reviews by Dr. Joshua Sinai

THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2019. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 .

Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, Army.mil, Navy.mil, shutterstock. com, Pixabay and other sources and authors where applicable.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 25, No.1

Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed Data Science Manager Robert Fustero

SITREP

TERRORISM TRENDS & FORECASTS Global Overview 2019 3rd Quarter Libya’s war spread beyond Tripoli, and Iran and the U.S. continued to teeter on the precipice of military confrontation. Nigeria’s woes deepened as Boko Haram stepped up attacks in the north east, tensions rose between herders and farmers, and the government cracked down on Shiite Muslim protesters in the capital Abuja. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab ramped up attacks in the capital Mogadishu and across the south, and thousands took to the streets in Malawi to protest President Mutharika’s re-election and alleged electoral fraud. In Europe, tensions rose between Kosovo and Serbia with a senior Serbian official claiming Kosovo had denied him entry.

The war in Libya expanded. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s military alliance pursued its campaign to take the capital Tripoli from forces nominally loyal to the UNbacked government based there.

For the first time since hostilities erupted in April, government forces struck outside the Tripoli

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area, deploying drones to destroy enemy assets in Jufra and Waddan in central Libya. Haftar’s forces retaliated by striking the air base in Misrata, some 200km east of Tripoli, from where the drones launched.

Tensions continued to run high between Iran and the U.S., keeping them on the brink of military confrontation. Once sparked, such a conflict could spread rapidly across regional flashpoints and engulf their respective allies. Maritime confrontations continued, especially in the Strait of Hormuz. In a new report, Averting the Middle East’s 1914 Moment, we warn that in the absence of direct talks between the two sides, a small incident could blow up into a regional conflict.

Nigeria faced greater insecurity on several fronts. Ten years after Boko Haram’s founding father, Muhammad Yusuf, was killed in police custody, the radical insurgent group seemed to be on the offensive, stepping up attacks

across Borno state and leaving scores dead, both civilians and security forces. In a recent report, we explain how one of its two factions, Islamic State in West Africa Province, is gaining influence by cultivating support among locals.

In Somalia, the Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab increased attacks on civilians as well as Somali and international forces, killing at least 109. In the capital Mogadishu, a female suicidebomber detonated her explosives in the mayor’s office, killing six people and injuring others including the mayor, who later also died. In Malawi, protests against President Mutharika’s 21 May re-election picked up steam, and in places opposition activists clashed with ruling party supporters. Opposition parties and civil society groups claim the election was rigged and demand the election commission chair resign.

In Europe, tensions rose between Kosovo and Serbia. A Kosovar

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foreign ministry advisor on 4 July announced a ban on Serbian officials entering Kosovo, which a government spokesperson denied the next day. Despite this, Serbia’s defense minister said he was prevented from entering the country on 10 July, calling Kosovo’s leaders “liars”.

Conflict Risk Alerts • Iran Resolution Opportunities • Afghanistan Deteriorated Situations • Somalia Malawi Nigeria Kosovo Libya Improved Situations • None

Nasrallah’s Latest Rocket Boast Underlines Threat to Israeli Cities and Sensitive Sites Hizballah chief Hassan Nasrallah recently issued a new threat to Israel’s cities and sensitive sites, boasting of his terror organization’s ability to hit

targets deep inside the country.

The threats came in a televised speech, serving as a reminder of the ambitious arms race that the Shi’ite terror army is engaged in, with the massive assistance of its state sponsor, Iran.

The Lebanese Hizballah is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor, and its surfaceto-surface firepower arsenal – estimated at around 150,000 projectiles – is larger than most state armies’.

Nasrallah also threatened to hit the IDF headquarters in the heart of Tel Aviv, as well as a series of air force bases.

The projectiles are manufactured by Iranian arms factories, as well as joint Iranian-Syrian weapons factories in Syria. The Iranian Quds Force is responsible for smuggling the weapons into Lebanon.

“For four years already, we have foiled Iranian attempts to build bases in Syria, and stopped them from building thousands of projectiles, [from bringing] jets, and the IRGC from bringing tanks [to Syria],” he said. “The Hizballah threat, and the direct Iranian threat remain intact. We are preparing for these day and night.”

Author: Yaakov Lappin is a military and strategic affairs correspondent. He also conducts research and analysis for defense think tanks, and is the Israel correspondent for IHS

Jane’s Defense Weekly. His book, The Virtual Caliphate, explores the online jihadist presence.

Personal Security: Do Yourself a Favor, Be Crime Smart.

Getting educated and taking a few basic steps may well keep you from becoming a victim of crime and fraud—and save you a great deal of time and trouble.

You can also help us protect your families and communities by reporting suspicious activities and helping find wanted fugitives and missing kids.

• Advance Fee Schemes: An advance fee scheme occurs when the victim pays money to someone in anticipation of receiving something of greater value—such as a loan, contract, investment, or gift—and then receives little or nothing in return.

• Business Fraud: Business fraud consists of activities undertaken by an individual or company in a dishonest or illegal manner designed to be advantageous to the perpetrating person or establishment.

• Counterfeit Prescription Drugs: Counterfeit prescription drugs are illegal, fake medicines that may be hazardous to your health.

• Credit Card Fraud: Credit card fraud is the unauthorized use of a credit or debit card, or card number, to fraudulently obtain money or property.

• Fraud Against Seniors: Senior citizens should be especially aware of fraud schemes targeting their lifestyle and savings and follow a series of tips to protect themselves and their family members from fraud.

• Telemarketing Fraud: When you send money to people you do not know personally or give personal or financial

information to unknown callers, you increase your chances of becoming a victim of telemarketing fraud.

Source: www.fbi.gov

Hurricane Seasonal Preparedness Digital Toolkit This digital toolkit contains social media posts and links to graphics/ videos hurricane preparedness and improve clear actionable information for individual and community preparedness.

What you should know about Hurricanes: • Know what to do before, during, and after a hurricane.

• Prepare before hurricane season starts. Pacific hurricane season starts May 15 and Atlantic hurricane season starts June 1.

• Create an emergency communication plan with your family before a hurricane.

• Have emergency supplies in place at home, at work, and in the car.

• Check your insurance coverage, damages caused by flooding are not covered under normal homeowner’s insurance policies.

• Know your local community’s evacuation plan and evacuation routes and how to receive alerts.

• Listen to local officials.

For the full digital kit, please visit: https://www.ready.gov/hurricane-toolkit

IACSP Reader’s Lounge Philip Mudd’s book is the first to seriously address the difficult decisions that confronted intelligence practitioners in the wake of 9/11. Mudd sheds new light on that enervating time, describing with verve and insight how the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center struggled with its new role as jailer and interrogator of terrorists.

The account he presents is that of an insider, yet he never flinches from telling the unvarnished truth about renditions, enhanced interrogations and other activities, the full import and lasting legacy of which likely will take decades to emerge. Like all good histories, parts of the book make for difficult, sobering reading. But Mudd’s narrative power propels the reader through, and it left me grateful to him for penning a volume certain to become a standard reference alongside the 9/11 Commission’s report. Available at Barnes & Noble and Amazon.com

IACSP News Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email address, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com Until next time, as always, be vigilant and safe.

Thank you.

Steven J. Fustero, Dir. of Operations / IACSP

What Does Facebook’s New Cryptocurrency Mean For Law Enforcement?

By David Gewirtz

I 8

n May, Facebook officially announced what the rumor mills had been buzzing about for months: its very own cryptocurrency. To find what all that means, and specifically what it means to law enforcement and counterterrorism operations, read on.

By now, you should have a pretty good basic understanding of cryptocurrency. If you don’t, I’ll point you to my article from a few issues back, “Cryptocurrencies: Follow-the-money just got a whole lot more difficult,” which will bring you fully up-to-date.

Facebook, sometime next year, intends to introduce Libra, a currency based on distributed blockchain technology.

Unlike many other cryptocurrencies, Facebook’s blockchain will have some centralized components. According to a white paper published by the company, this is because Facebook believes that

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

there will be so many transactions occurring that a fully-distributed solution will never keep up.

Libra is also not mineable, meaning that individuals and groups can’t create their own value merely by running some extreme compute power.

Vol. 25, No.1

You don’t mine Libra, you buy it.

Facebook has created two new legal entities that should be on your radar from now on: Calibra and the Libra Association.

Calibra is a subsidiary of Facebook that will manage the Libra wallets (where the value is stored digitally) as well as all the transaction technology. Calibra will run the tech behind Libra. The ability to transact Libra will be built into future versions of Facebook, WhatsApp, and Messenger.

The Libra Association, by contrast, will run the finance behind Libra. Consisting of about 20 founding members, including Visa, MasterCard, PayPal, eBay, Uber, Lyft, a bunch of venture capital firms, a bunch of blockchain startups, and a few non-profits, each member of the Libra Association buys its seat for a cool $10 million payment.

Facebook says the Libra Reserve in concert with the Libra Association will be able to do something other cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin haven’t been able to accomplish: create

This money, as well as all the money consumers pour in when buying Libra goes into something called the Libra Reserve. Because Facebook is so big and has so many users, the expectation is for the Libra Reserve to be a pot of gold with many zeros on the end.

This giant reserve of money will be invested and earn interest. It will also earn fees from every Libra transaction.

value stability.

Facebook says the Libra Reserve in concert with the Libra Association will be able to do something other cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin haven’t been able to accomplish: create value stability. Facebook says it’s going to peg the value of the Libra to a calculation based on the value of the dollar, yen, and euro. If this works, it will be a boon for buyers of the digital coin.

dollar, yen, and

The members of the Libra Association will be able to take profits from the Libra Reserve based on their membership share.

Multiple points of concern As you might imagine, this scheme could cause all sorts of ripples through the world’s financial systems. Libra is intentionally international, with a key goal to speed up and reduce the friction of international monetary transactions. If you think this has

Facebook says it’s going to peg the value of the Libra to a calculation based on the value of the euro. If this works, it will be a boon for buyers of the digital coin.

government regulatory bodies pretty freaked out, you would not be wrong.

From a law enforcement point of view, following the money might be much harder — or much easier. We don’t know yet. If Calibra can secure all transactions and can keep that information private, then it might be harder for law enforcement to track transitions.

On the other hand, Facebook has never been exactly chummy with the concept of privacy, so it’s possible that the company, or at least the Calibra subsidiary, may open back doors to various law enforcement entities across the world, presumably secured by at least a court order.

Facebook did say it’s publishing an API (an application programming interface) that will allow app makers to embed Libra transaction capability inside third-party applications. While many app vendors are legitimate creators of value, we have also seen a history of scams perpetrated via apps.

It’s relatively unlikely that Facebook will actively police users of the Libra API, so it’s possible that a considerable fraud vector might exist through the use of Libra in questionable apps.

Finally, there’s the Libra Reserve itself.

If, as Facebook expects, this does become a giant pile of money which the Libra Association can use as a generator of interest value, it will also become a ginormous target for hackers and rogue nations.

We’ll have to see how secure Facebook and Calibra are, as well as how secure each Libra Association member is, before we can assess whether the Libra Reserve is a nightmare heist waiting to happen.

Keep your eye out for this. Depending on the level of uptake by the consuming public, Libra might be the new money for millions of people.

Oh, joy.

About the Author CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed. is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension. http://www.zdnet.com/blog/diy-it/

Julian Assange

The Case Against

WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange

By Paul Davis

M

Private Bradley Manning U.S. Army

any journalists have decried the 18-count indictment against 47-year-old Julian P. Assange, claiming the WikiLeaks founder and operator is a journalist and therefore exempt from prosecution for publishing classified information provided to him from a government whistleblower.

Ben Wizner, the director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), stated that prosecuting Assange would be unprecedented and unconstitutional. He said the prosecution would open the door to criminal investigations of other news organizations.

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But not all journalists agree. Marc Thiessen, a conservative columnist for the Washington Post, states clearly that he believes that Assange is certainly not a journalist – he’s a spy.

“Some are concerned that the newest Assange indictment will help set a precedent to go after investigative journalist who publish classified information,” Thiessen wrote.

“But as I wrote in 2010, unlike reputable news organizations, Assange did not give the U.S. government an opportunity to review the classified information WikiLeaks was planning to release so they could raise national security objections. So responsible journalists have nothing to fear.”

“Regardless,” Thiessen writes, “ Assange is not a journalist. He is a spy. The fact that he gave stolen U.S. intelligence to al-Qaida, the Taliban, China, Iran and other adversaries via a website rather than dead-drops is irrelevant. He engaged in espionage against the United States. And he has no remorse for the harm he has caused. He once called the innocent people hurt by his disclosures “collateral damage” and admitted WikiLeaks might get “blood on our hands.”

Thiessen wrote in his column.

WikiLeaks, founded in 2006 by Assange, describes itself as a multi-national media organization and associated library.

WikiLeaks states on its’ website that they specialize in the analysis and publication of large datasets of censored or otherwise restricted official materials involving war, spying and corruption. WikiLeaks claims to

US Attorney G. Zachary Terwilliger

have published more than 10 million documents and associated analyses.

“Regardless,” Thiessen writes, “ Assange is not a journalist. He is a spy.

The fact that he gave stolen U.S. intelligence to al-Qaida, the Taliban, China, Iran and other adversaries via a website rather than dead-drops is irrelevant. He engaged in espionage against the United States. And he has no remorse for the harm he has caused.

He once called the innocent people hurt by his disclosures “collateral damage” and admitted WikiLeaks might get “blood on our hands.”

John Demers

“WikiLeaks is a giant library of the world’s most persecuted documents. We give asylum to these documents, we analyze them, we promote them, and we obtain more,” Julian Assange said in an interview with a German magazine.

WikiLeaks claims to have contractual relationships and secure communications paths to more than 100 major media organizations from around the world, which they say gives them sources, negotiating power, impact and technical protections that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to achieve. According to the WikiLeaks website, the organization is entirely funded by its publisher, its publication sales and the general public.

On April 11th, Assange was arrested in the United Kingdom in connection with a U.S. federal charge of conspiracy to commit computer intrusion for agreeing to break a password to a classified U.S. government computer.

Assange, an Australian citizen, was dragged forcefully by London’s Metropolitan police officers from the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. He entered the embassy in 2012 to avoid extradition to Sweden over sexual assault allegations, which he has denied.

Ecuador Foreign Minister Jose Valencia said Ecuador revoked his political asylum due to countless acts of interference in the internal politics of other countries,

FBI Assistant Director Counterintelligence John Brown

personal attacks on embassy personnel, visitors, and diplomatic officials from other countries, as well as making threats against the government of Ecuador.

Also, Ecuador was concerned about Assange’s deteriorating mental and physical health, his lack of personal hygiene, and his refusal to obey embassy rules.

Ecuador invited the police inside their embassy to remove Assange.

Afterwards, Assange was found guilty in a British court of failing to surrender to the court. He could spend 12 months in a British prison for the offense.

According to the U.S. Justice Department, the charge of conspiracy to commit computer intrusion relates to Assange’s alleged role in one of the largest compromises of classified information in the history of the United States.

The indictment alleges that in March of 2010, Assange engaged in a conspiracy with U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning, an intelligence analyst later known as Chelsea Manning. According to the indictment, Assange assisted Manning in cracking a password stored on U.S. Department of Defense computers connected to the Secret Internet Protocol Network (SIPRNet), a U.S. government network used for classified documents and communications.

“Manning had access to the computers in connection with the private’s duties as an intelligence analyst and was using the computers to download classified records to transmit to WikiLeaks. Cracking the password would have allowed Manning to log on to the computers under a username that did not belong to the private,” the indictment states. “During the conspiracy, Manning and Assange engaged in real-time discussions regarding Manning’s transmission of classified records to Assange. The discussions also reflect Assange actively encouraging Manning to provide more information. During an exchange, Manning told Assange that “after this upload, that’s all I really have got left.” To which Assange replied, “curious eyes never run dry in my experience.”

“During the conspiracy, Manning and Assange engaged in real-time discussions regarding Manning’s transmission of classified records to Assange. The discussions also reflect Assange actively encouraging Manning to provide more information.

During an exchange, Manning told Assange that “after this upload, that’s all I really have got left.” To which Assange replied, “curious eyes never run dry in my experience.”

On May 23rd, the U.S. Justice Department announced that a federal grand jury returned an 18-count superseding indictment charging Assange with offenses that relate to Assange’s alleged role in one of the largest compromises of classified information in the history of the United States.

According to the Justice Department, the superseding indictment alleges that Assange was complicit with Manning in unlawfully obtaining and disclosing classified documents related to the national defense. The indictment alleges that Assange aided and abetted the U.S. Army private in obtaining classified information that was to be used to injure the United States or to advantage a foreign nation.

“After agreeing to receive classified documents from Manning and aiding, abetting, and causing Manning to provide classified documents, Assange then published on WikiLeaks classified documents that contained the unredacted names of human sources who provided information to United States forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to U.S. State Department diplomats around the world,” the indictment states. “These human sources included local Afghans and Iraqis, journalists, religious leaders, human rights advocates,

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and political dissidents from repressive regimes. Assange’s actions risked serious harm to United States national security to the benefit of our adversaries and put the unredacted named human sources at a grave and imminent risk of serious physical harm and/ or arbitrary detention.”

According to the Justice Department, the superseding indictment alleges that beginning in late 2009, Assange and WikiLeaks actively solicited United States classified information, including by publishing a list of “Most Wanted Leaks” that sought, among other things, classified documents.

“Manning responded to Assange’s solicitations by using access granted to the private as an intelligence analyst to search for United States classified documents, and provided to Assange and WikiLeaks databases containing approximately 90,000 Afghanistan war-related significant activity reports, 400,000 Iraq warrelated significant activities reports, 800 Guantanamo Bay detainee assessment briefs, and 250,000 U.S. Department of State cables,” the superseding indictment states. “Many of these documents were classified at the Secret level, meaning that their unauthorized disclosure could cause serious damage to United States national security. Manning also provided rules of engagement files for the Iraq war, most of which were also classified at the Secret level and which delineated the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces would initiate or conduct combat engagement with other forces.”

Assange is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but if convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on each count except for conspiracy to commit computer intrusion, for which he faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison.

At the May 23rd announcement, Assistant Attorney General for National Security John C. Demers said he wanted to thank U.S. Attorney Zach Terwilliger as well as the FBI special agents and the prosecutors in the Eastern District of Virginia and the National Security Division who investigated this case over the years.

Demers went on to state that the alleged actions disclosed U.S. sensitive, classified information in a manner that made it available to every terrorist group, hostile foreign intelligence service and opposing military.

He also noted that documents relating to these disclosures were even found in the Usama bin Laden compound.

This release, Demers said, made our adversaries stronger and more knowledgeable and the United States less secure.

“One of the Department of Justice’s top priorities is to prosecute, and therefore deter, unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

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In the past two years, we have brought four cases involving the leaks of such information.

This is the fifth,” Demers said. “In 2013, Chelsea Manning was convicted by court martial for offenses that involved violations of her military oath to protect and defend the United States.

As you know, she provided Julian Assange and WikiLeaks with hundreds of thousands of pages of national defense information.

The indictment today charges Julian Assange for his alleged complicity in Manning’s actions, including his explicit solicitation of classified information and his encouraging her to remove classified information from U.S. systems and send it to him. The indictment also charges Assange for his posting of a narrow subset of classified documents on WikiLeaks that allegedly identified the names of human sources—including local Afghans and Iraqis who were assisting U.S. forces in theater, and those of journalists, religious leaders, human rights advocates, and political dissidents living in repressive regimes. Assange thereby is alleged to have created grave and imminent risk to their lives and liberty.”

Demers went on to state that the alleged actions disclosed U.S. sensitive, classified information in a manner that made it available to every terrorist group, hostile foreign intelligence service and opposing military. He also noted that documents relating to these disclosures were even found in the Usama bin Laden compound.

This release, Demers said, made our adversaries stronger and more knowledgeable and the United States less secure.

“Some say that Assange is a journalist and that he should be immune from prosecution for these actions. The Department takes seriously the role of journalists in our democracy and we thank you for it. It is not and has never been the Department’s policy to target them for their reporting,” Demers said. “Julian Assange is no journalist. This made plain by the totality of his conduct as alleged in the indictment—i.e., his conspiring with and assisting a security clearance holder to acquire classified information, and his publishing the names of human sources.”

“Indeed, no responsible actor—journalist or otherwise—would purposely publish the names of individuals he or she knew to be confidential human sources in war zones, exposing them to the gravest of dangers. And this is just what the superseding indictment charges Julian Assange with doing. The new charges seek to

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hold him responsible in light of the full breadth of his illegal conduct.”

U.S. Attorney G. Zachary Terwilliger, for the Eastern District of Virginia, told reporters that he wanted to be clear about what Assange was charged with, and what he was not charged with.

“Assange was charged for his alleged complicity in illegal acts to obtain or receive voluminous databases of classified information and for agreeing and attempting to obtain classified information through computer hacking. But he has not been charged for passively obtaining or receiving classified information. The indictment alleges that Assange published in bulk hundreds of thousands of these stolen classified documents, but he has not been charged for that,” Terwilliger said. “Instead, the U.S. has only charged Assange for publishing a narrow set of classified documents in which Assange also allegedly published the un-redacted names of innocent people who risked their safety and freedom to provide information to the United States and its allies.”

“The superseding charges unsealed today are the result of nearly a decade of investigative work by FBI counterintelligence agents,” said FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence John Brown.

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Terwilliger said the sources included local Afghans and Iraqis, journalists, religious leaders, human rights advocates, and political dissidents from repressive regimes. The indictment alleges that Assange knew that his publication of these sources endangered them.

“The superseding charges unsealed today are the result of nearly a decade of investigative work by FBI counterintelligence agents,” said FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence John Brown. “Today’s charges illustrate the priority the FBI places on enforcing the laws that protect our nation’s security and vital intelligence sources. The FBI is committed to investigating this type of alleged criminal activity no matter how long a case may take.”

An extradition hearing for Assange will be held on February 25, 2020.

About the Author

Paul Davis is a regular contributor to the Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security Int’l.

Legalizing Marijuana

Won’t Smoke Out Narco-Traffickers

By Luke Bencie and Paige Morrison

D

The U.S. Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter BERTHOLF lived up to its mission of keeping our homeland and maritime borders safe. Returning to port this week, the crew offloaded more than 25 tons of cocaine worth more than $765 million seized in the Eastern Pacific Ocean drug transit zone off the coast of Central and South America. Official photo by U.S. Coast Guard photo/Petty Officer 1st Class Rob Simpson

rug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are capitalizing on new marijuana legalization laws. Federal legalization is within sight, and citizens and politicians alike have advocated for the change with one of their hopes being that criminal organizations such as Mexican DTOs are crippled. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Mexican DTOs bring in the most marijuana out of any other foreign DTO. Interestingly enough, recent figures show a trend in marijuana being smuggled into the U.S. that correlates with legalization.

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Seizures of marijuana have been steadily decreasing since 2014, when marijuana was fully legalized in both Colorado and Washington. Figures have gone from ~1.9 million pounds in 2014 to 461,030 in 2018. Since this trend isn’t consistent with other drugs, it could mean that legalization has impacted the amount of marijuana smuggled across the border. In fact, other drugs are on the rise - seizures of methamphetamine alone have more than tripled since 2014.(1) Perhaps this is one of the ways that narco-traffickers are adjusting to the changing drug market - by increasing their sales of harder drugs.

These numbers referencing marijuana seizures don’t necessarily mean that Mexican DTOs are abandoning the drug altogether.

In fact, DTOs are still a large part of the black market. Instead of smuggling marijuana across the Mexican border, some are growing it in states where marijuana is legalized in order to transport to states where it is not legal.

The 2018 DEA’s National Drug Threat Assessment report describes how marijuana legalization has led to an increase in home-grows intended for an individual use - which criminal organizations are taking advantage of. (2) The laws of how to get a permit and maximum plants allowed in home grows varies by state and is not always clear. Capitalizing on the ambiguity of laws, Mexican and Asian criminal organizations (primarily Chinese) sell product to nearby states where marijuana is not legalized.

With new laws, many grow operations are hardly discreet as they operate under the appearance of personal grows or supplying local dispensaries. They may set up shop in numerous residential houses as well as in warehouses. Another reason why home grows become attractive is that selling across state lines is less dangerous and difficult than having to transport the drug from Mexico and smuggling across the border.

Legalization of marijuana has certainly brought in the cash. While legalized states seem to be enjoying increased tax revenues, it may not be an accurate depiction of the whole situation. In reality, for every dollar that comes from tax revenue, Coloradoans have spent nearly $4.50 in efforts to diminish some effects of marijuana legalization,

The 2018 DEA’s National Drug Threat Assessment report describes how marijuana legalization has led to an increase in homegrows intended for an individual use - which

The San Diego Tunnel Task Force arrested six individuals and seized more than 32 tons of marijuana after discovering one of the most sophisticated smuggling tunnels along the U.S.-Mexico border in recent years. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Photo

criminal organizations are taking advantage of. The laws of how to get a permit and maximum plants allowed in home grows varies by state and is not always clear. Capitalizing on the ambiguity of laws, Mexican and Asian criminal organizations (primarily Chinese) sell product to nearby states where marijuana is not legalized.

such as public health and safety.(3) Legal operations across many legalized states are dealing with lower prices due to oversupply; DTOs and other illegal grows won’t suffer as much, as they do not have to pay taxes or go through regulations. While the states must deal with cleaning up negative effects of legalization, it seems that DTOs are just reaping benefits.

Speaking on a recent takedown of a marijuana trafficking ring, Colorado Attorney General Cynthia Coffman stated: “This case is a prime example that the black market for marijuana has not gone away since recreational marijuana was legalized in our state, and in fact continues to flourish.” (4) The bust resulted in 74 individuals being charged in connection to the trafficking ring, which stretched from Colorado to Texas over a period of four years. Parts of the organization operated under the guise of supplying medical distributors. Several were involved with money laundering. It is reported that the group produced nearly 100 pounds of marijuana a month, which likely meant more than $600,000 in quarterly profits.

The surprising numbers only detail a small portion of the marijuana black market.

The Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas Cartel, Gulf Cartel, CJNG, Beltran-Leyva Organization, and Juarez Cartel are labeled by the

U.S. Department of Justice as the top Mexican cartels that are most active in the United States. As such, it is unlikely that there is single cartel with majority black market control of marijuana. However, some police in legalized states confirm that there are undoubtedly representatives of Sinaloa Cartel and Beltran-Leyva actively growing and distributing cannabis.

Determining how much Mexican DTOs make from marijuana exports could show how much legalization might impact the organizations.

Due to very nature of the market, it is extremely difficult to get a completely accurate number. A common estimate is that DTOs earn $20 billion per year from elicit marijuana sales (which comprise 60% of overall drug sales).

However, a study by RAND International Programs and Drug Policy Research Center has refuted this claim, suggesting that the amount of marijuana sold is not equal to the amount of product consumed in the United States. RAND instead proposed that only roughly 15-26% of a cartel’s drug product is marijuana, resulting in a profit of around $1.5 billion.(5) The White House agrees. Dr. Keith Humphreys, who is a former Senior Policy Advisor at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy believes that marijuana is only a small part of drug traffickers’ profits. He places non-drug activity for being up to half of a cartel’s revenue, which places marijuana’s revenues at around 10-20% of an organization’s overall revenue.(6) This can give an estimation of how much DTOs would suffer from losing hold on a major product.

Thanks to legalization of medical and recreational marijuana in many states, U.S. grown cannabis is in high demand. U.S. cannabis has higher THC levels (the psychoactive component to marijuana) than that of Mexican marijuana. Similarly, due to required state testing/regulations, U.S. cannabis is deemed safer and more pure than black market brands.

Thus, Mexican marijuana is losing its value.

The DEA report also notes that while Mexican grown cannabis is still circulating, it is on the decline. DTOs must have other options when one of their big cash cows is being threatened.

Drug trafficking is where Mexican cartels make most of their money, and they can’t rely on home grows to make up all the difference from being the primary source of marijuana.

By turning to other drugs, DTOs will face less competition. For example, they are able to make methamphetamine at a low cost but still retain a high purity and potency levels.

Mexican cartels are resorting to harder drugs such as heroin, which is in higher demand alongside the U.S. opioid epidemic. This is also supported by DEA reports of higher seizure rates of both methamphetamine and fentanyl; the latter which rates have exploded in the last five years.(7,8) With legalization, its often speculated that crime will decrease. Some early studies have shown a decrease in crime, including violent crime, particularly in counties closest to the Mexican border. (9) DTOs are known to engage in violent crime to resolve disputes between rivals, especially near the border. DTOs will engage in crime if the benefit is equal to the value of the product. Meaning, when the revenue increases, the incentive for violence increases as well. With lowering revenue of Mexican marijuana, there is less violent crime in counties near the border, which have been traditionally controlled by Mexican DTOs. However, this fails to take into account data from recreational states as the data is from 2012, as well as DTOs heavy involvement with home grows. More recent data has shown that there is an increase in violent crimes in states where marijuana laws are passed. For instance, Colorado’s Uniform Crime Reports shows an increase in violent crime each year since legalization. Similarly, after the commercialization of marijuana in Washington State, assaults and homicides increased more than 20%, and human trafficking offenses skyrocketed from 2013-2016. Again, Oregon UCR shows that from 2014 to 2016, assaults

Customs and Border Protection officers assigned to the Tucson Field Office seized more than 1,800 pounds of marijuana. The marijuana, hidden in a shipment of cucumbers, was worth more than $900,000.

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and homicides dramatically increased (Oregon legalized “recreational” marijuana in 2015).

We have not seen the full implications of this new legislation that is still developing. It is evident that research in this area is lacking, as there are differing numbers regarding how much of DTO’s product is marijuana, and there have not been enough in-depth reports on crime in relation to recreational legalization. However, it is clear to see that Drug Trafficking Organizations are affected by marijuana legalization laws.

Whether they are switching from marijuana to harder drugs or adapting by doing home grow operations, DTOs are changing their business.

Legalization is not a cure-all that will stamp out DTOs. Just like any good business does, they are adjusting with the change of the industry, and are still thriving.

About the Authors Luke Bencie is the Managing Director of Security Management International. He has performed security consulting for dozens of cannabis cultivation facilities and dispensaries in the U.S. and abroad.

He can be reached at lbencie@smiconsultancy.com Paige Morrison is a Junior Associate at Security Management International.

References 1 CBP Enforcement Statistics FY 2019. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from https://www. cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics 2 2018 National Drug Threat Assessment (2018).

U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration. (1-151). DEA-DCT-DIR-032-18 https:// www.hsdl.org/?view&did=818528 3 Stamm, J. B., & HIDTA, M. (2019). Marijuana Legalization in the Midwest: The Potential Impact.

4 Skinner, A. (2017). AG Coffman Announces Indictment of Alleged Massive Illegal Marijuana Trafficking Conspiracy. Retrieved from https://coag.gov/ press-room/press-releases/06-28-17 5 Kilmer, Beau, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Brittany M. Bond, and Peter H. Reuter, Reducing Drug Trafficking Revenues and Violence in Mexico: Would Legalizing Marijuana in California Help?. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010. https://www.rand. org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP325.html 6 Humphreys, K. Mapping the Revenue of Mexico’s Organized Crime Organizations. Retrieved from http://www.samefacts.com/2011/10/drug-policy/ mapping-the-revenue-of-mexicos-organized-crimeorganizations/ 7 CBP Enforcement Statistics FY 2019. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from https://www. cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics 8 Gavrilova, E., Kamada, T., & Zoutman, F. (2017).

Is legal pot crippling Mexican drug trafficking organizations? The effect of medical marijuana laws on US crime. The Economic Journal, 129(617), 375407.

9 Stamm, J. B., & HIDTA, M. (2019). Marijuana Legalization in the Midwest: The Potential Impact

Vol. 25, No.1

Hizballah: A Terrorist Group Profile

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By Dr. Joshua Sinai

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Lebanon’s Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah speaks in the Beirut suburbs during a memorial marking the assassination of two of its former leaders, Sayyed Abbas al-Musawi and Sheikh Ragheb Harb, February 16, 2007. Both were killed by Israeli ambushes during its occupation of south Lebanon in the 80s and 90s. REUTERS/ Jamal Saidi (LEBANON)

izballah (“Party of God”) was established in 1982 as a result of a coalescence by pro-Iranian Lebanese Shi’a Muslim clerics and militia leaders following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June of that year. More broadly, it resulted from the political awakening by Lebanon’s disenfranchised Shi’a community, which had been brewing for many years, in a country in which they had formed one of the largest communities (according to the CIA’s 2017 demographic data, Shiites constituted an estimated 27 percent of Lebanon’s approximately 6.2 million population), but in which the Maronite Christians and the Sunni Muslims held political power.

As a Lebanese-based militant Shi’a organization, Hizballah is also an ideological outgrowth of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the radical preaching of the late Ayatollah Khomeini.

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Hizballah traces its origins to several small Shi’a organizations in Lebanon, particularly the Islamic Amal militia, which was established by Hussein Musawi, an influential cleric. In 1982, Musawi and some 500 members of the Islamic Amal militia joined forces with other Lebanese Shi’a groups at the instigation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, whose units had deployed to Lebanon in 1982, to establish Hizballah as a new umbrella Shi’a militia. Over the years, Hizballah evolved from a sectarian Shi’a militia into a full-fledged and powerful political, military and socio-economic organization, with branches overseas where Diaspora Shi’a communities lived.

In the 1980s, Musawi served as Hizballah’s leader, becoming secretary general in May 1991. With Hizballah involved, under Iranian direction, in attacks against Israeli and Western targets, including kidnapping Westerners in Lebanon, Musawi was assassinated in February 1992 when Israeli helicopter gunships attacked his convoy in South Lebanon. It was then that Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah became the organization’s secretary-general – a position he has continued to hold as its preeminent leader.

Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, one of the organization’s founders and its long-time spiritual leader, died in July 2010. Since then, Nasrallah has become the Lebanese Shi’a community’s spiritual leader, as well.

As evidenced by its origins, Hizballah follows the religious guidance of Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. As Iran’s proxy, Hizballah serves as its agent in Lebanon, as well as in Syria. In the recent period, this was the case when Hizballah’s military forces joined their Iranian counterparts in Syria to defend the Assad regime against its primarily Sunni Muslim insurgents (who also included al Qaida-affiliated and Islamic State fighters) following the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. Syrian territory has long been used to transship military supplies from Iran to Hizballah, especially rockets, which is one of the reasons for the numerous Israeli airstrikes against such storage facilities in Syria.

Hizballah’s objectives call for establishing a Shi’a theocracy in Lebanon, promoting greater Iranian leadership in the region (including in Shi’a majority Iraq), destroying Israel as a Zionist entity, supporting rejectionist Palestinian factions that oppose the Palestinian Authority’s peace negotiations with the Jewish state, and eliminating Western influence in the Middle East.

Hizballah gained international notoriety on October 23, 1983 when its suicide operatives carried out two simultaneous truck bomb attacks, with the first against the U.S. Marine Barracks compound in Beirut, killing 241 military personnel, and the second against a nine-story building

Over the years, Hizballah has been transformed from its origins as a sectarian militia into a sophisticated and complex organization that simultaneously engages in political and military activities in Lebanon, as well as providing extensive socioeconomic and educational services to the country’s Shi’a community.

Operating freely in the Lebanese “weak state,” Hizballah has succeeded in exerting virtually unchallenged

housing a French military contingent a few miles away, killing 58 paratroopers, and wounding 15 others. Other well-known attacks include the March 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires (allegedly in retaliation for the assassination of Musawi), killing 29 people and wounding 242 others, and the July 1994 car bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people and wounding several hundred others. It is alleged that Hizballah’s Saudi Arabia wing carried out the truck bomb attack on the Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996, which killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel and a local Saudi national.

Over the years, Hizballah has been transformed from its origins as a sectarian militia into a sophisticated and complex organization that simultaneously engages in political and military activities in Lebanon, as well as providing extensive socioeconomic and educational services to the country’s Shi’a community. Operating freely in the Lebanese “weak state,” Hizballah has succeeded in exerting virtually unchallenged control over most regions in the country, and, especially in most parts of Beirut and all of southern Lebanon, where it has established a “state within a state.”

The full extent of Hizballah’s “state-within-astate” apparatus was revealed during the 34-day July-August 2006 war with Israel, when Hizballah’s well-trained guerrilla fighters fired an estimated 4,000 rockets into Israel’s northern region without interference by the weak Lebanese army.

Although since the 2006 war a United Nationsled peacekeeping force has been deployed in southern Lebanon to prevent a renewed conflagration, Hizballah has used this period to vastly upgrade its military arsenal along the border with Israel, including enhancing its military infrastructure through upgraded rockets (its rocket force was estimated in late 2019 at 130,000 rounds), fortified underground bunkers, and numerous underground tunnel to enable its forces to cross in Israel as part of a future offensive campaign.

control over most

Political Component

regions in the country,

Hizballah is led by Secretary-General Nassralah.

Under him is a seven-member Majlis al-Shura (Shura Council), the highest governing body.

The Shura Council oversees regional and functional committees, such as ideology, policy, military, judiciary, finance, social affairs, education, and legal affairs.

and, especially in most parts of Beirut and all of southern Lebanon, where it has established a “state within a state.”

Since the early 1990s when Hizballah began contesting elections to Lebanon’s parliament, it has become increasingly integrated into the country’s government. In the May 6, 2018 parliamentary elections, Hizballah’s candidates won 12 seats, with the Shi’a groups and individuals aligned with it winning some 70 of the 128

seats in the National Assembly.

In the newly-installed Cabinet in early 2019, Hizballah’s allies controlled 18 out of the cabinet’s 30 ministries, with a Hizballah representative holding the key and patronage-rich Ministry of Health.

Hizballah was also involved in the country’s banking and financial sectors.

Political Leaders Hizballah’s leader, Sheikh Nasrallah, age 59, began his career as a military commander, but adding to his “gravitas” were his religious credentials, having studied in the centers of Shi’a theology in Iran and Iraq. He succeeded Musawi as Hizballah secretary general in 1992.

A charismatic leader, Nasrallah reportedly lives and works in a secured underground bunker in an undisclosed location, and rarely speaks in public, preferring to broadcast his speeches on an outdoor giant screen, while delivering them from his hiding place.

Naim Qassem, age 65-66, is Hizballah’s Deputy Secretary General. He was one of the organization’s original founders and often appears as Hizballah’s spokesman.

Hashem Safi al-Din, age 55, is Chairman of the Shura Council. A maternal cousin of Nasrallah, he is considered Hizballah’s second most important official.

Mohammed Raad, age 64, is head of Hizballah’s Parliamentary Caucus. He is one of the organization’s founders and an important political leader.

He heads the group’s Political Council and is the leader of Hizballah’s contingent in Parliament (having first been elected in 1992). He also sometimes acts as a spokesman for Hizballah.

Media Apparatus

As a political organization, Hizballah make extensive use of print, radio, television and Internet media. It publishes its own newspaper, al-Intiqad, operates its own radio station, al-Nour, and the television station, al-Manar, and various Internet sites. The group’s Internet forums and chat rooms are highly interactive, with Hizballah officials exchanging information with participants. The audience for these media outlets ranges from the local Lebanese population (both Shi’a and nonShi’a), the broader Middle East and, in the case of al-Manar and the Internet, a global audience.

Hussein Naboulsi (age unknown), Hizballah’s information and media officer, is considered to be the organization’s “Webmaster”.

Military Component

Hizballah’s military strength is considered comparable to a mid-sized army. As a hybrid

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As a political organization, Hizballah make extensive use of print, radio, television and Internet media.

It publishes its own newspaper, al-Intiqad, operates its own radio station, al-Nour, and the television station, al-Manar, and various Internet sites. The group’s Internet forums and chat rooms are highly interactive, with Hizballah officials exchanging information with participants. The audience for these media outlets ranges from the local Lebanese population (both Shi’a and non-Shi’a), the broader Middle East and, in the case of alManar and the Internet, a global audience.

Hussein Naboulsi (age unknown), Hizballah’s information and media officer, is considered to be the organization’s “Webmaster”.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

military force, it has conventional and ‘irregular’ forces. In 2017, Jane’s estimated that Hizballah had more than 25,000 full-time fighters and 20,000 to 30,000 reservists, as well as several hundred terrorist operatives. With Hizballah’s military budget estimated at one billion dollars per year, it is reportedly financed in part by Iran. Its military forces are reportedly trained by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Hizballah maintains security and military departments, which are run by the Shura Council’s Jihad and Executive councils.

The ‘Engagement and Coordination Unit’ functions as its domestic policing apparatus, while a ‘preventive security apparatus’, provides security protection for Hizballah politicians. Hizballah’s military wing is known as the Islamic Resistance Units, and was run by Imad Mughniyeh. Also called the ‘special operations unit’, Mughniyeh’s military wing operated regionally and internationally. It was a “special research apparatus – Unit 910”, which is the code name for the organization’s elite covert force, consisting of an estimated 200 to 400 fighters, with most trained in Iran by the Revolutionary Guard’s Al-Quds Brigades. It also ran a division called “Unit 1800,” which coordinated Hizballah’s assistance to Palestinian rejectionist groups, such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, in the West Bank and Gaza.

Until his assassination in a Damascus suburb on February 12, 2008, 46-year old Imad Fayez Mughniyeh (also known as Hajj Radwan) was considered the head of Hizballah’s military wing. Mughniyeh was believed to be behind a series of attacks against American and Israeli forces in Lebanon, including the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut and the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847. In March 1984, Mughniyeh was reported to have kidnapped and killed William Buckley, the head of the CIA’s station in Beirut. Other operations included the March 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the July 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center. Mughniyeh was also reported to have managed Hizballah’s war in Israel in summer 2006.

In his later years, Mughniyeh shuttled between Beirut, Iran and Syria, where he was provided safe haven in Damascus. It is reported that Israeli agents had detonated the bomb which killed Mughniyeh and his bodyguard in car blast outside Damascus in February 2008

Recruitment into Hizballah’s security and military apparatus is primarily derived from the country’s Shi’a community, especially clans associated with Hizballah, but in a recent development, the group’s websites have radicalized additional recruits from outside the Shi’a community.

Vol. 25, No.1

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Military Leaders Sheikh Nassrallah had served as Hizballah’s military chief until January 2008 when Sheikh Naim Qassem, the organization’s deputy secretary-general, reportedly assumed command. Jawad Nasrallah, the son of Sheikh Nasrallah, is reported to be one of the leaders of the organization’s terrorist apparatus.

His brother, Muhammad Hadi, was killed by Israeli forces in a battle in Lebanon in 1997. Other military leaders included Khalil Yusif Mahmoud Harb and Haytham Ali Tabataba’i.

Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mughassil is reputed to be Hizballah’s current Military Commander. Born in Saudi Arabia, Al-Mughassil was the alleged head of the military wing of the Saudi Hizballah and has been indicted by the U.S. Government for the June 5, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers U.S. military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Ali Atwa (a.k.a. Ammar Mansour Bouslim, Hassan Rostom Salim) is alleged to be a senior member of Hizballah’s military arm.

Hassan Izz al-Din is allegedly a senior member of Hizballah’s terrorist arm. He is also believed to be a member of Hizballah’s Political Council and plays a role in the organization’s media operations.

Location/Area of Operation Hizballah’s forces primarily operate in Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Bekka Valley, and southern Lebanon, as well as in Syria. It also has support cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. Reportedly, Iran and its proxy Hizballah are active in Venezuela, where Hizballah operatives are alleged to engage in narco-trafficking, money laundering, and in actively supporting the besieged Nicolas Maduro regime.

Hizballah’s Involvement in the Syrian Civil War

ployed along the Lebanese-Syrian border (where there are Shi’a communities and shrines), near Hizballah’s stronghold in southern Lebanon, as well as around the cities of Damascus and Homs.

As the Assad regime gained the upper hand against its multi-faceted insurgents, fighting alongside Syrian, Iranian and Russian forces provided Hizballah’s fighters valuable battlefield experience,

Some Hizballah units are also reportedly deployed along the Syrian border with Israel on the Golan Heights. In what is termed the “Golan Project,” following the re-conquest of the Syrian Golan by regime troops, Hizballah operatives are using their observation posts along the border to collect intelligence on Israeli military activities in the area.

Terrorist Activities

including in

Over the years, Hizballah has been extensively involved in conducting terrorist activities in the region and worldwide. These include the following:

operating tanks provided by Syria

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and coordinating with Russian air power, as well as growing closer to its Iranian benefactor, which also improved

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the organization’s armory.

Hizballah has been extensively involved as Iran’s proxy in the Syrian Civil War on behalf of the beleaguered Assad regime since 2012. Hizballah intervened in Syria as a matter of survival, with the Assad regime a crucial strategic ally, Syria is an important strategic ally and additional area of operations for Iran, a patron of both Hizballah and the Assad regime, and to curtail the spread of Sunni Salafi-jihadist groups as part of its defense of the region’s Shi’a communities.

According to various reports, Hizballah had deployed between 7,000 and 10,000 troops in Syria, and had suffered about 1,675 casualties in combat. Most of Hizballah’s forces were de-

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As the Assad regime gained the upper hand against its multi-faceted insurgents, fighting alongside Syrian, Iranian and Russian forces provided Hizballah’s fighters valuable battlefield experience, including in operating tanks provided by Syria and coordinating with Russian air power, as well as growing closer to its Iranian benefactor, which also improved the organization’s armory. On a related front, Hizballah has also been active in preventing Sunni Muslim rebel penetration from Syria to Lebanon, where there are several hundred thousand Sunni refugees.

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October 23, 1983: Hizballah suicide operatives carried out two simultaneous truck bomb attacks, with the first against the U.S. Marine Barracks compound in Beirut, killing 241 military personnel, and the second against a nine-story building housing a French military contingent a few miles away, killing 58 paratroopers, and wounding 15 others.

1984: Hizballah operatives bombed the United States Embassy Annex in Beirut, killing 24 persons.

June 14, 1985: Hizballah operatives, armed with grenades and a 9-mm. pistol, hijacked TWA Flight 847 on its way from Athens to Rome. After forcing the aircraft to land in Beirut, reportedly in retaliation for a failed negotiation, they killed Robert Stethem, a U.S. Navy diver, and threw his body out of the plane. Hezbollah had demanded the release of more than 700 of their prisoners held in Israel, Cyprus, and Kuwait in exchange for the remaining 39 hostages. Most of the hostages were released, with five kept on board until their negotiated release on June 30.

March 17, 1992: A Hizballah operative driving a van carrying 220 pounds of explosives drove onto the sidewalk outside the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires (allegedly in retaliation for the assassination of Musawi), killing 29 people and wounding 242 others.

July 18, 1994: A Hizballah suicide bomber

Hizballah members carry the coffin of top Hizballah commander Mustafa Badreddine, who was killed in an attack in Syria, during his funeral in Beirut’s southern suburbs, Lebanon, May 13, 2016. REUTERS/Aziz Taher

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detonated his explosive-laden car at the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) community center in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people and wounding an estimated 300 others.

June 25, 1996: Operatives belonging to Hizballah’s Saudi Arabia wing reportedly carried out the truck bomb attack on the Khobar Towers on June 25, 1996, which killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel and a local Saudi national.

October 7, 2000: Three Israeli soldiers – Adi Avitan, Staff Sgt. Benyamin Avraham, and Staff Sgt. Omar Sawaidwere – were abducted

by Hizballah while they were patrolling the Israeli side of the Israeli-Lebanese border. The soldiers were killed either during the attack or in its immediate aftermath. Their bodies were exchanged for Hizballah prisoners in 2004.

2002: Singapore accused Hizballah of recruiting Singaporean Muslims in a failed plot to attack U.S. and Israeli ships in the Singapore Straits.

February 14, 2005: Hizballah reportedly assassinated former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, along with 21 others, when his motorcade was struck by a roadside bomb in Beirut, Lebanon. In 2009, the United Nations special tribunal investigating Hariri’s murder, reportedly found evidence linking Hizballah to the assassination. On June 30, 2011, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon issued arrest warrants against four senior Hizballah leaders, including Mustafa Badr Al Din. January 15, 2008: Hizballah operative bombed a U.S. Embassy vehicle in Beirut.

2009: Egyptian authorities arrested 49 men, allegedly tied to Hizballah, for planning attacks against Israeli and Egyptian targets in the Sinai Peninsula.

January 12, 2012: The Thai police arrested

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•

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Hussein Atris, a Lebanese who had acquired Swedish citizenship, for allegedly serving as a Hizballah agent scoping targets in Bangkok.

He was charged with illegal possession of explosive materials.

July 19, 2012: A suicide bomber detonated his suicide belt aboard a tourist bus in Burgas, Bulgaria, killing five Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian bus driver, and wounding 35 other Israelis. Two Hizballah operatives were accused by Bulgarian authorities of providing logistical support for the bombing.

2013: A Cypriot court sentenced LebaneseSwedish national Hossam Taleb Yaccoub to three years in prison for planning attacks on Israeli tourist targets in Cyprus. It was reported that Hizballah had paid Yaccoub to collect information on Israeli tourists, including Israeli flights arriving in Cyprus and registration plates of buses carrying Israeli tourists. Yaccoub admitted to collecting the information but denied any plans for an attack.

March 2014: Hizballah claimed responsibility for a roadside bomb attack on an Israeli patrol that wounded three soldiers.

April 13, 2014: Two Lebanese men were arrested as they arrived at the Bangkok airport for allegedly plotting to target Israeli tourist targets in Bangkok Khao San Road, a popular destination for tourists. It was reported that the suspects had agreed to provide information on “bomb-making equipment” in the province of Rayong, southeast of Bangkok.

In addition to these terrorist activities and plots, numerous other Hizballah plots around the world have been thwarted in countries such as Azerbaijan, India, and Nigeria, with their convicted operatives imprisoned in those countries. In one of the latest

incidents, in early June 2019 it was reported that in 2015, following a tip from Israeli intelligence, British security forces uncovered several Hizballah weapons caches holding thousands of explosives in northwest London.

Relations with Palestinian Groups Hizballah, while also operating as an Iranian proxy, provides military assistance to several Palestinian terrorist organizations, particularly Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), in the form of weapons, explosives, rockets and missiles, training, funding, and guidance, as well as overt political support.

The primary Palestinian terrorist organization, Hamas, also receives support from Iran/Hizballah, although this assistance has been supplemented by financial assistance from other countries, such as Qatar and Turkey.

Intelligence Services Hizballah operates an extensive intelligence and counter-intelligence apparatus. The intelligence component includes al-Amn al-Khariji (“External Security Organization, or Unit 910) that operates covertly outside Lebanon. Its counter-intelligence apparatus is composed of two branches: the Amn al-Muddad (“encounter security”), which is responsible for external security, and Amn al-Hizb (“party security”), which is tasked with protecting Hizballah’s leaders.

Notable Hizballah counter-intelligence operations include the following: •

1994: Hizballah thwarted the the attempted kidnapping of Hassan Ezzeddine, the organization’s foreign operations chief.

• •

•

•

•

•

• Late 2000: Hizballah kidnapped Elhanan Tannenbaum, a retired Israeli colonel, who had worked as an Israeli businessman in Europe. It is alleged he had established a business arrangement with Qais Obeid, a Palestinian criminal, and, reportedly, a former Israeli informant who had secretly defected to Hizballah’s Unit 1800. It is reported that Obeid had succeeded in luring Tannenbaum to Dubai, where he was drugged by Hizballah operatives and smuggled through a diplomatic “box” from the Iranian embassy in Dubai to Beirut, Lebanon.

July 12, 2006: Hizballah operatives abducted two Israeli soldiers patrolling Israel’s northern border. This led to the Second Lebanon War. February 2009: Hizballah arrested Marwan Faqih, of Nabatiya, a car garage owner who was one of Hizballah’s main suppliers of vehicles. He was accused of installing on behalf of Israeli intelligence GPS tracking devices in Hizballah-owned vehicles being serviced at his garage. In July 2009, Faqih was sentenced by death in a court proceeding.

April 2009: An alleged Israeli espionage ring, involving a retired senior officer in the Lebanese defense apparatus, was arrested in Lebanon. Reportedly, it had infiltrated Hizballah’s ranks.

2011: Mohammad Slim (known as Abu Abed), one of the original members of Hizballah, defected to Israel when Israeli operatives lifted him over the border fence with construction equipment.

2014: Mohammad Shawraba, from the southern Lebanon town of Nabatiya, reportedly a high-ranking Hizballah official, was arrested for allegedly serving as an Israeli informant.

He reportedly served as the head of Hizballah’s external-operations arm as well as the head of security for Nasrallah. Reportedly, he provided Israel with information that led to foiling several revenge plots in retaliation for the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh.

March 2019: A Canadian citizen, identified by the initials F.G., was arrested in Lebanon, and charged with spying for Israel against Hizballah. He was alleged to have operated under the direction of Unit 504, an intelligence division of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

Reportedly, he was recruited by Israel in 2013 to recruit informants to provide information about the whereabouts of the 1986 capture and suspected killing of Israeli airman, Ron Arad.

Significant Israeli Counterterrorist Operations Against Hizballah In the “cat-and-mouse” intelligence game between Israel and Hizballah, it has also suffered significant defeats by Israel. These include the following: •

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February 16, 1992: Abbas Musawi, Hizballah’s Secretary-General, was assassinated

•

•

• • •

•

•

by Israeli Apache helicopters who fired missiles at his motorcade in southern Lebanon.

December 6, 2002: Israeli agents reportedly killed Ramzi Nahara by means of a large explosive device camouflaged as a rock that blew up as his car passed by.

One of his nephews, also in the car, was killed as well. Nahara, reportedly a drug dealer and Israeli informant, had changed his allegiance and worked with Hizballah, including working with Obeid in the abduction of Tannenbaum.

July 12, 2004: Israeli agents killed Ghaleb Awali, who had replaced Salah in Unit 1800, by detonating an explosive device they had placed in his car in Beirut.

February 12, 2008: Mughniyeh 2013: Hassan al-Laqees, a senior Hizballah commander was assassinated in Beirut.

January 18, 2015: Israeli fighter aircraft targeted a convoy of Hizballah vehicles, killing several senior operatives, including Jihad Mughniyeh, the son of Imad Mughniyeh, the former Hizballah leader.

December 19, 2015: Samir Kuntar, a Druze member of the Palestine Liberation Front and Hizballah, who was involved in killing Israelis (for which he was imprisoned in Israel and returned to Lebanon as part of a prisoner exchange deal) was killed by Israeli fighter aircraft that launched missiles that destroyed his residential building in the outskirts of Damascus.

December 2018 to mid-2019: Israel publicly revealed the existence of a network of underground tunnels that Hizballah had constructed across the border with Israel.

State Sponsorship As discussed earlier, Iran is Hizballah’s primary state sponsor. This sponsorship takes the form of funding, weapons and explosives, rockets and missiles, weaponized and surveillance drones, training, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid. Iran’s embassy in Beirut maintains close contact with Hizballah’s leadership. Units of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’ ‘Quds Brigades’ (Jerusalem Brigades) who are deployed in Lebanon, provide training and other forms of support, including military materiel, to Hizballah. Hizballah operatives also train at Iranian military installations.

Funding Hizballah’s funding is multi-faceted. Overall, the organization’s annual budget is estimated at one billion dollars (although this figure is an approximation since its budget is not publicly known).

On the state level, it receives financial assistance (as well as weapons and training) from Iran, its state sponsor, which is estimated at $700 million annually. Iran’s current weak economy, due to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions, is reported to reduce the overall level of Tehran’s funding

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of Hizballah. This has reportedly led the organization to substantially reduce its expenditures, including implementing significant cutbacks in salaries to its officials and fighters.

As an organization that also engages in criminal enterprises, Hizballah also generates income from its operatives and supporters overseas who engage in illicit activities, such as narcotics, counterfeiting, stolen goods, smuggling and fraud.

Domestically, Hizballah also obtains funding through donations from its Shi’a constituencies and worldwide Islamic charities. Finally, it obtains funding from the Lebanese government, as part of the funding for projects for its domestic Shi’a constituency.

Future Trends Future trends in Hizballah’s warfare can be captured in three alternative scenarios. In a best case scenario, with Hizballah’s extensive organizational apparatus increasingly integrated into Lebanese politics, economy, and society, it will be reluctant to engage in offensive warfare against adversaries such as Israel, because it would have so much to lose, even if Iran, its state sponsor, was embroiled in an armed conflict with the United States and Israel.

In a worst case scenario, however, in an outbreak of warfare between Iran and the U.S. and Israel, Hizballah would be unconstrained by any limitations. It would mount a surprise attack from Lebanon into Israel that would quickly escalate into a full-fledged war. Such an attack could begin with the entrance into Israel by Hizballah fighters via some of the cross-border underground tunnels that have not yet been uncovered, accompanied by the launching of a massive aerial bombardment by its estimated 100,000 to 150,000 rockets and missiles, which are hidden in the South Lebanon hills, including the launching of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that potentially could be fitted with unconventional warheads. It is reported that Israeli defense planners are concerned that the country’s Iron Dome missile defense system would be unable to stop many of Hizballah’s rockets and missiles, which would target Israel’s population centers in the north, including its critical infrastructure, such as the vital Haifa port.

In what could be considered a realistic scenario, the current low-intensity military stand-off between Israel and Hizballah is likely to continue, with relatively minor conflagrations erupting along the border, but with no major military conflagration or terrorist operation imminent, at least in the near-term.

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is a Washington, DCbased consultant on counterterrorism issues. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@ comcast.net.

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9/30/15 4:21 PM

Red on Red:

Security Situation in Nepal

Classic IED

Thomas A. Marks, Ph.D.

R

ecent political violence in Nepal (see Figure 1) by the radical Chand aka Biplav faction should not have come as a surprise. Behind the national self-congratulation at ending the insurgency in November 2006 through negotiation, all Maoist factions continued to use terrorism to ensure the outcome of polls and to dominate local areas, thus to recruit and amass the funds needed for political action. In fact, turning a blind-eye to such violence has been a hallmark of the post-conflict order. Now, events have progressed to the point that this is no longer possible, as radical Maoist insurgent actions against a communist government – that includes the mainstream Maoists – have forced a reaction.

The result is a fraught Red on Red confrontation that places individual security further at risk.

The government, all political parties, and Nepali society itself are profoundly divided as to how to proceed. That the populace is not interested in a renewal of conflict is clear enough, even as thousands have continued to fall victim of Maoist coercion and violence.

The ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP),

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which most recently has found itself explaining why it had been maneuvered by its Maoist faction into backing the loathsome Maduro dictatorship in Venezuela, has moved from lackadaisical ignorance concerning the security situation to embarrassing bravado. Prime Minister KP

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Sharma Oli most recently is quoted as boasting, “The government will control the criminal and destructive activities [of the Chand outfit] within 15 days. … We will make them join the political mainstream by April 13. The group will be brought to mainstream politics, if possible politically, if not by even putting ‘the pseudo comrades’ behind bars.”(1) Foolish on its merits, the passage does not explain the government’s previous express orders to the security forces to ignore what it claimed were “political acts” by the Chand aka Biplav group. Now, with a 12 March 2019 “banning” of the estranged comrades, the NCP finds itself divided from within and at odds with both the law – the legal framework to support its orders is lacking – and the very party that led the previous conflict against the Maoists, Nepali Congress (NC).

Astonishingly, it has been security figures who have correctly emphasized the political essence of a challenge the government has suddenly decided to label criminal.

Beyond all else, there is the hollow ring of the label “pseudo comrades” adopted by the NCP. For it has not escaped notice in Nepal and elsewhere that the Chand aka Biplav faction is doing nothing more than carrying Maoist rhetoric and strategy to

Dahal aka Prachanda

preceded it for the previous two decades save the mainstream Maoist claim “now everything is different.” True to a point, this assessment is normally followed with another NCP claim, that Chand aka Biplav should follow the mainstream example and embrace “nonviolence.” The claim that violence has been renounced, though, is inaccurate, and it is to that point that this assessment will speak.

(“Renowned,” though

Threat From the Extreme Left

Mainstream Maoist leader, Pushpa Kamal

“Fierce One” is most common in Western media) has claimed all along that the use of opportunistic, covert terrorism was producing results, while leaders of rival radical Maoist groups, especially Netra Bikram Chand aka Biplav (“Revolt” or “Rebel”), see an actual revolution nowhere in sight and thus favor systematic, overt terrorism such as marked the 2017 election cycle.

Figure 1: Current administrative structure. The model borrow from that of India to place states above the district level. Thus far, Provinces 4, 6, and 7 have names; respectively, Gandaki, Karnali, and Sudur Paschim.

a logical end. It is the government and the NCP, claim the Chandists, who are not “real communists,” hence revolt is the only option.

When considered within the closed loop of Marxist-Leninist logic, such a stance is not far off. In reality, there is little difference between what is unfolding and what

The period of extensive terrorism discussed in previous articles in Counterterrorism serves to highlight the intense debate that continues within the Maoists: how aggressively and in what form to use violence in the post-2006 (i.e., post-war) period.

Mainstream Maoist leader, Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda (“Renowned,” though “Fierce One” is most common in Western media) has claimed all along that the use of opportunistic, covert terrorism was producing results, while leaders of rival radical Maoist groups, especially Netra Bikram Chand aka Biplav (“Revolt” or “Rebel”), see an actual revolution nowhere in sight and thus favor systematic, overt terrorism such as marked the 2017 election cycle.

Ultimately, in the strategy advocated by the latter, terrorism would be accompanied by the use of urban mobilization and guerrilla warfare linked to action in the countryside along the lines pursued in 1996-2006.

From Dahal’s perspective, this Chand aka Biplav position not only is incorrect but misses the dramatic strategic shift that has occurred. The mainstream Maoists, he claims, have won – and won using terrorism not provocatively so as to provoke response but subtly in order to be effective.

A combination of violence and deft political action has resulted in communist rule and can maintain it. The Maoists hold key positions (e.g., the vice presidency) and ministries (notably the Home Ministry); they control the police, as well as elements of the intelligence apparatus; they also have complete control over two of the seven provinces (Provinces 6 and

7 in Figure 1), which include many of their legacy areas of domination occasioned by their wartime and post-war use of terrorism. Finally, in a formal undertaking, the UML faction (of the NCP) has agreed in three years’ time to move Dahal to the prime ministership for the final two years of the present government’s five-year term. For now, the two men engage in joint decisionmaking, with Oli heading the government and Dahal taking the lead in party matters.(2) Regardless of such outcome, the Chand aka Biplav group, has continued to attack symbolic targets for alleged crimes against the people and traditional rivals, such as Nepali Congress, while carefully avoiding actual injury to mainstream Maoists. This is particularly true in illicit fundraising, where all of the numerous and widespread acts of violent extortion have been directed at non-communists such as Nepali Congress.

In terms of targeting, the Chandists have stated that they will act as appropriate to deal with state repression. For nearly a year, for instance, entire districts have seen their elected officials, regardless of party, receive radical Maoist letters demanding that they resign or face attack. Carrying through with the threat would be the logical next step.

Regardless of such outcome, the Chand aka Biplav group, has continued to attack symbolic targets for alleged crimes against the people and traditional rivals, such as Nepali Congress, while carefully avoiding actual injury to mainstream Maoists.

In fact, there has long since been increased pressure placed upon families and acquaintances in efforts to locate previous Maoist targets who have fled. This pressure and action against located targets has invariably involved violence. Such activity has until last month (March 2019) been met with nearly complete government inaction.

Indeed, in the run-up to the current turn of events, the security situation was fraught, with only random efforts of professional security personnel occasionally interrupting local Maoist activity. A warrant for Chand aka Biplav’s arrest that was registered 28 February 2018 in the district court of Bhojpur district was struck down for lack of evidence, indicating the astonishingly indifferent manner in which security had been pursued.

At a massive Chand aka Biplav group rally held in central Kathmandu (the capital) on 24 November 2018 – at which police were present but inactive – the group’s leadership appeared openly, with Chand aka Biplav himself attending in disguise.

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Faced with such a situation, the government claimed at the time that it would provide security for the general public. Yet it had never done this, was incapable of doing so then, and is not able to do so now.

It has never possessed the capability for such action and frequently has also lacked the will, a not surprising reality given that the objects of such action would have to be their estranged but still close comrades. Ironically, it was in the unsettled atmosphere that followed the Kathmandu rally that the government announced in late December 2018 that a Home Ministry-appointed commission, charged with engaging in talks with estranged political forces, announced that “no more conflict exists in the country” – even while admitting it hadnot actually met with the major armed groups in the country, such as the Chand aka Biplav Maoists, only with less than two dozen minor groups. In such context, observed a Nepali security contact at the time, “The Biplav [Chand] faction has been able to spread fear among the masses.”

Government disingenuousness was thus on full display on 22 February 2019, when the Chand aka Biplav Maoists attacked cell phone towers nationwide in some fifteen simultaneous bombings, which included striking the cellular firm’s Lalitpur (Kathmandu) office, killing one and wounding several. It is this event which appears to have driven commentators to slip government-imposed shackles of silence.(3) A veritable explosion of frustrated public discussion followed. Nepali-language newspaper Nagarik, for example, editorialized, speaking directly to unstated realities, “Netra Bikram Chand was close to the current Home Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa who may still have a soft spot for him. It remains to be seen if the Home Ministry will prosecute this case strongly.

So far, the government seems to be hurt more by a few bitter words in social media than by such heinous acts.”(4) The barbed reference was to the communist government’s continued efforts to stifle critique of its poor performance and indifferent approach to security. As if on cue to put the lie to the government’s repeated claims that “nothing was happening,” February ended with the emergence of wartime weapons that had

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It was at this point that the government, on 12 March 2019, finally declared the Chand aka Biplav group to be proscribed. To what extent remains a mystery, as the bellicose verbiage of the NCP is matched by neither the laws available nor the deployment

Figure 2. Chand aka Biplav group agitprop being performed before forced audience in Doti district, 12 December 2018.

of forces necessary to provide popular security and to staunch radical publicity, recruiting, and fundraising. In many areas, Chand aka Biplav cadre, especially those engaged in political proselytizing and illicit fundraising continue to move and operate openly, interact with the police, and are not touched.

Figure 3. Chand combatant training camp captured 16 March 2019. The lines of Nepali text on the banner read: (top) Hail to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism; (curved at center) People’s Liberation Army, Nepal; (penultimate line) Basic Recruit Training Camp; (last line) No. 2 Company.

been cached – e.g., a light machinegun and an M16A2 seized from a Chand cadre in the east – followed by a renewed Chand aka Biplav group bombing campaign. The most significant action in the latter was again in the capital, an attack that upon the residence of the head of the Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies (NAFEA) in Kathmandu.

act with the police, and are not touched.(5) Actions such as using terrorism to ensure a monopoly of political organizing in local space – by the Chand group and others (e.g., ethnic separatists) – are not contested, as illustrated by Figure 2, which is a Chand aka Biplav agitprop session held 12 December 2018 in Doti district (see Figure 1, Province 7).(6)

It was at this point that the government, on 12 March 2019, finally declared the Chand aka Biplav group to be proscribed. To what extent remains a mystery, as the bellicose verbiage of the NCP is matched by neither the laws available nor the deployment of forces necessary to provide popular security and to staunch radical publicity, recruiting, and fundraising. In many areas, Chand aka Biplav cadre, especially those engaged in political proselytizing and illicit fundraising continue to move and operate openly, inter-

Such sessions are common, with songs and skits in local language and forced attendance of students and villagers. Those who attempt to challenge the coercion are met with violence.

There are no known instances of the police intervening in such sessions. As popular mobilization goes on, a slice of the recruits is trained, armed, and becomes the “muscle” which eliminates opposition to the Maoist political effort. Figure 3 illustrates this well, as it displays weapons and material captured by the

police in a Chand combatant camp on 16 March 2019.(7) That such preparations have reached the point illustrated highlights that hitherto the communist government has done little to deal with the threat. It has been oblivious to the needs of popular security even as its own paramilitary capability engages in actions not unlike those of breakaway radical Maoist groups.

Challenge of Providing Security The heart of the matter thus remains the inability of the state, often exacerbated by unwillingness, to provide security for its citizens. Leaving aside motivation, the lack of ability is a function of temporal and geospatial realities. Nepal has for much of its recent history been administered through governmental units based on traditional village areas, with 3,913 Village Development Committees (VDCs) grouped under 75 districts. The VDCs were further divided into Wards (approximately seven per VDC) as dictated by sub-village clusters of settlements (what in most of Asia would be termed hamlets). In this settlement distribution, geography played a premier role. The result is an astonishingly difficult environment within which to provide protection for individuals and organizations.

To secure such a dispersed population (now 28 million) in an area the size of Virginia (if the Himalayas are excluded), was beyond Nepal’s capability during the period of overt insurgency (1996-2006), when all forces were committed. It is beyond Nepal’s capability now. As an illustration, during the May and June 2017 local elections, when attacks on individuals and property were widespread and quite open, the authorities were tasked with guarding 6,642 polling centers nationally, in addition to normal security duties. Simply assigning 12-18 policemen to each center (a normal distribution) created manpower demands greater than the strength of the entire police force (67,416). Though available elements of the Nepal Army (NA, 95,000) and paramilitary Armed Police Force (APF, a constabulary directed to border security, approximately 40,000) were also deployed, the resulting distribution allowed no security for the general populace.

This is always the dilemma for the state, even where there is will.(8)

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Today, even if they are so inclined, the police can provide no security to citizens. The police were a primary target during the insurgency and have never fully recovered in terms of national presence.

Rolpa district, for instance, discussed in-depth in previous reporting, remains a Chand aka Biplav group clandestine stronghold (in addition to being completely dominated in its overt political structure by the mainstream Maoists and their paramilitary capability).

It has a population of approximately 221,000, yet just 600 policemen. This pattern is duplicated throughout the country.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Today, even if they are so inclined, the police can provide no security to citizens. The police were a primary target during the insurgency and have never fully recovered in terms of national presence. Rolpa district, for instance, discussed in-depth in previous reporting, remains a Chand aka Biplav group clandestine stronghold (in addition to being completely dominated in its overt political structure by the mainstream Maoists and their paramilitary capability). It has a population of approximately 221,000, yet just 600 policemen. This pattern is duplicated throughout the country. At present, the other armed government forces, NA and APF, play no significant role in internal security. The former is primarily devoted to United Nations peacekeeping, the latter primarily to border control.

Further, individual and situational cases aside, the performance protocol noted previously, whereby the police are directed not to become involved in “political matters,” is nearly universally interpreted by even the most professional officers to dictate non-intervention in any violent activity carried out by a political party or its organs, which in practice refers to the Maoists. This has not changed despite the “banning” of the Chand aka Biplav group.

The practical effect is that refusal of mediation or intervention is the norm in cases where personal security is requested, particularly by targeted individuals. Thus terrorism effectively has been relegated to a position as “background noise” and allowed to continue.

Such actions, with their fusion of terroristic verbal and physical acts, go on nationwide.

The government itself is part of the problem.

Left Alliance behavior in its year in office has supported concerns as to what communist domination would mean. In particular, there have been efforts to neutralize key civil society and external oversight mechanisms, to include the media. The highly regarded Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) annual democracy ratings, released January 2019, place Nepal at 5.18 (of 10) for 2018 and categorize it as a “hybrid regime,” occupying the third tier of four, between “flawed democracy” and “authoritarian” on the scale, 97th of 167 in the tables. This positions it between Uganda (5.20) and Kenya (5.11), neither at present lauded in terms of political freedom or public probity. Dahal and the mainstream Maoists openly support dictatorial states such as Venezuela, North Korea, and China and denounce American imperialism for “challenging democracy, sovereignty and peace.”(9)

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In fact, all sources, both public and private, appear aware of the extent to which the government itself remains divided as to its approach to security, with the mainstream Maoists as a whole opposed to moving against the Chand aka Biplav group (with whom they have maintained direct and indirect contact). It would appear that only the resurrection of an 8 February 2019 police “special bureau” report highlighting the extent to which the situation had deteriorated provoked action by key government figures to the exclusion of consultation with other factions within both the former UML and mainstream Maoist wings.

The report, in addition to highlighting the extent of weapons stockpiling and combatant training, extortion of funds nationwide (to include apparently seeking to buy arms externally; e.g., in India), and plans to attack isolated police posts in the classic arms-gathering tactic of any insurgency, also was said to have a targeting list that moved beyond the acceptable (to the communists) Nepali Congress victims to the communists themselves (to include mainstream Maoists). It was this final element which provoked the 12 March 2019 “banning,” though the analysis that read “hit list” into what was more likely a naming of those to be opposed emerged from a misreading Maoist terminology – supreme irony given that the key debate as to interpretation occurred within the mainstream Maoist faction of the communist government.

Not to be dissuaded, the Chand group responded with a nationwide armed strike that shut down many parts of the country.

birthday, 5 May 2018, by bringing Nepal to a standstill through an armed strike. Any who sought to resist were attacked). Yet the communist/Maoist government stood by and labelled the assault upon the populace as but “political action.”

The “banning” notwithstanding, Nepal has neither declared the present situation as one of emergency nor passed the necessary laws for dealing with terrorism. In the 12 March 2019 banning, the government moved against the Chand aka Biplav group by using the provisions appropriate to dealing with organized crime. The arrest, on 8 August 2018 in Kathmandu, for example, of Chand aka Biplav faction spokesperson, Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma aka Prakanda (“Profound,” as in intelligent), was on the grounds of extensive acts of party fund-raising by coercion not on charges related to subversion or terrorism. His arrest prompted both demonstrations from supporters and a legal challenge for alleged “fascist suppression.” Ultimately, Bishwakarma was freed due to lack of evidence (a telling indicator of government incapacity) and was the keynote speaker at the 24 November 2018 Chand aka group rally in Kathmandu discussed above (see Figure 4 ).(11)

The risk to targeted individuals posed by muddled government response and conflicted Maoist attitudes towards terrorism is obvious.

Yet nothing that has been discussed is new. For decades, even the most prominent individuals have not been safe. Those incidents that make the news are only the most prominent illustrations of terroristic acts that are routine.

The Problem With Ideological Posturing It is remarkable how similar such context is to that occurring globally, as described, for instance, in recent press dealing with the local level in eastern Germany, where neo-Nazi strength is pronounced, and in the United States itself, where similar degradation of the political process has become widespread. Analysis highlights a point well known when examining political violence: failure to intervene, either through law enforcement or the legal system, only causes extremism to grow.

Figure 4. Chand aka Biplav Maoists march through Kathmandu on 24 November 2018.

Not only does such assessment match the situation in Nepal, it is significant that a Maoist figure such as Dahal has consistently refused to condemn political violence – even when holding the highest positions. At an event in December 2016, bringing together communist parties in the country on the birthday of Stalin, the once-again prime minister was reported as opining that “the fundamentals of Marxism cannot be ignored including the armed conflict as a tool to capture the state power.”(10) Both Dahal and Home Minister Thapa have singled out “counter-revolution” and “reactionary forces” as the main threat to the country, whenever challenged concerning the ongoing slide into repression. The terms are Maoist labels for those who favor parliamentary democracy and the market.

Ironically, the same vocabulary and approach inspire the Chand aka Biplav group. The latter, for instance, honored Karl Marx’s

Struggle remains a police action, but army provides bomb squad support and takes casualties.

Despite breathless media coverage – derived, it should be noted, not from inside information but press conferences and releases – arrests of Chand aka Biplav group members have been relatively few, with but several figures of any organizational stature apprehended. Most of those initially detained have subsequently been released.

As confirmed as recently as 9 April 2019 by national police authorities, the overwhelming majority of the arrests that have made the daily headlines have resulted in quick releases with no charges or release on bail (due to the insignificance of the charges).

The total number of arrests for the past year was stated by the police as 579, of whom 135 were released after “simple interrogations,” while 338 were brought to court and a majority released on bail.(12)

Regardless of faction, the Maoists continue to target individuals whom they have identified as enemies and sources of support (especially, money).

Fleeing or moving

When charges are actually filed, it is for collateral actions. This is because, as the relevant 2016 annual State Department report correctly notes: “Nepal lacks a law specifically criminalizing terrorism or the provision of material support to terrorist networks. If an act of terrorism were to take place, Nepali courts would likely prosecute the perpetrators on the basis of laws pertaining to its constituent crimes, e.g. murder, arson, etc. Most Nepali officials view Nepal as at low-risk for an international terrorist incident. Accordingly, there is little impetus to introduce new laws.” (13)

elsewhere does

What this discussion does not make clear is that in their own treatments, such as that just cited, U.S. and Western sources in general speak only to international terrorism and do not include the domestic variety except as it impacts their citizens. This has caused the ongoing bombings in Nepal and attacks against Nepali individuals to remain largely unpublicized.

Maoist menace and

Meantime, the communist government has pardoned previously convicted Maoist figures, creating an atmosphere and reality of impunity. Only when actual murder is prominently committed (e.g., in Kathmandu) have the police gone through the motions of responding. It as in fact the terroristic actions in late February and early March 2019, discussed earlier, creating as they did casualties in the heart of Kathmandu, that forced the current move against the Chand aka Biplav group.

34

Yet the verbiage has not been matched by systematic response, and strategic planning remains crippled by the continued division among the players concerned as to how to proceed. More telling, of course, is the continued embrace of the Chand aka Biplav group by the Maoist mainstream.

not alter the Maoist efforts, with their attendant threats and actions.

Attempts to return to normal life are accompanied by attacks. Pursuit of targeted individuals has been a central feature of the operations of all Maoist factions and remains unchecked by government action.

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Continuing Threat to the Population Popular security thus remains a pressing concern. In many ways, the situation resembles that in Afghanistan, where two decades of claims of success against the Taliban have resulted not in victory and stability but a steadily declining state of personal security – headlines notwithstanding. Though a formal democracy, Afghanistan is ranked “authoritarian” (the lowest category) in the 2018 EIU Democracy Index (see Para 11, above, wherein Nepal was ranked slightly higher, as “hybrid”); and, like Nepal, it has a high level of corruption and inefficiency, in particular – as concerns this discussion – in the judiciary. Afghanistan’s much larger and capable security forces are no more capable of providing personal security than those of Nepal.

Regardless of faction, the Maoists continue to target individuals whom they have identified as enemies and sources of support (especially, money). Fleeing or moving elsewhere does not alter the Maoist efforts, with their attendant threats and actions. Attempts to return to normal life are accompanied by Maoist menace and attacks. Pursuit of targeted individuals has been a central feature of the operations of all Maoist factions and remains unchecked by government action.

It is especially dangerous now, because it occurs within the context of the intraMaoist conflict. That conflict, it was noted, concerns how aggressive and ruthless to be in the utilization of terrorism. The precise nature of Maoist terrorist acts hence continues to vary considerably, depending upon the faction and the specific campaign intent. This is especially true in dealing with past enemies, but kidnapping, torture (to include rape), and assault have been and remain common, as does the widespread use of bombs.

The Chand aka Biplav group presently dominates in the use of explosives, with

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– which remains the Maoist norm. In a sense, for the Maoists, this must be so, because neutralizing rival political opposition and tapping their resources remain imperative. In biting commentary, one of Nepal’s most prominent commentators, CK Lal, put the reality thus: “Comparable to the concept of a vegetarClassic IEDs (and local weapons) ian fox, a non-violent Maoist isn’t just an oxymoron but a ruse intended to fool its the mainstream Maoists preferring personal victim.

In its ideology, peace is possible assault utilizing traditional weapons such only by waging a ‘People’s War’. Thus as kukris (the traditional Nepalese blade a non-violent Maoist is at best a utopian, associated, in particular, with the Gurkhas) often a charlatan, and mostly a cunning and fighting sticks (lathis). Judging by excarnivore claiming to be a vegan.”

(14) planations of targeting protocol provided by senior figures in interviews, the group is oriented towards destruction for the About The Author: purpose of messaging, even as constant local violence, completely lacking in the Dr. Marks is a Distinguished Professor and MG Edglamor of sensational acts such as bomb- ward Lansdale Chair of Irregular Warfighting Stratings, are executed to establish local control, egy, College of International Security Affairs (CISA), National Defense University (NDU), Ft McNair, recruit, and raise funds through criminality. Washington, DC 20319.

Significantly, it is normally only the most prominent incidents of any sort that are Footnotes: publicized much less recorded.

This is the norm that challenges victims.

On the one hand, the communist government has been focused upon ideological positioning to an extent that has caused it to ignore terroristic violence by one of its key constituent elements, the mainstream Maoists. On the other hand, for the dozen years since the formal end of hostilities, it has been deemed by the same actors as more than acceptable that terrorism be used – by both splinters and the mainstream through its paramilitary capacity – to attack those determined to be enemies. Neither time nor space has altered the nationwide targeting

by Maoist local operatives, regardless of faction, of those they feel it necessary to remove from the political playing field and to generate the means for the revolution to continue (e.g., through extortion).

It is this refusal to move beyond a worldview that posits a constant struggle with enemies – even to let past victims go about their lives in the new era of “peace”

1. Reported in Anil Giri, “Ruling and Opposition Parties at Odds Over Handling the Chand Outfit,” The Kathmandu Post, 26 March 2019; available at: http:// kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2019-03-26/ruling-and-opposition-parties-at-odds-over-handling-ofthe-chand-outfit.html (accessed 26 March 2019).

2. Precise nature of the relationship at any point in time remains captive to the personalities involved. Excellent discussion may be found in P. Kharel, “Conflict Between Two Chiefs,” Republica, 2 October 2018; available at: https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/conflictbetween-two-chiefs/ (accessed 17 March 2019).

3. The government has been engaged in a systematic effort to regulate and thus silence hostile voices in the media.

4. “Stop the Extortion,” Nagarik, 26 February 2019, translated in Nepali Times, 1 March 2019; available at: https://www.nepalitimes.com/from-the-nepali-press/ stop-the-extortion/ (accessed 9 March 2019).

5. In addition to my own sources, Nepali language media, as recently as the last week of March 2019, has offered astonishing testimony to this reality, based on correspondents’ extensive visits to areas outside Kathmandu. No similar reporting has appeared in the English-language media.

6. Photo from Chand aka Biplav social media distribution, provided by Nepali source.

7. Photo from Nepali source.

8. The classic work that mathematically displays the conundrum faced by state forces is Chapter 33 of T.E.

Lawrence (“of Arabia”), Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (1926 edition), 188-196.

9. For democracy rating, see EIU, Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political Participation, Protest and Democracy (London: EIU, 2019); available at: http:// www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity =download&campaignid=Democracy2018 (accessed 17 March 2019). For Dahal denunciation of the United States, see his signed NCP Press Statement, 25 January 2019, English version (as released by NCP); available within Anil Giri, “Venezuela Quietly Lobbied Nepal’s Ruling Party to Release a Strong Statement Condemning the US and its Allies, Sources Say,” The Kathmandu Post, 27 January 2019, at: http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2019-01-27/venezuela-quietly-lobbied-the-ruling-party-to-release-a-strong-statementcondemning-the-us-and-its-allies-sources-say.html (accessed 17 March 2019).

10. Rather than a direct quote, the reporting used “has said.” There is little doubt, though, that the words were uttered. See “Fundamentals of Marxism Cannot be Ignored: Dahal,” The Kathmandu Post, 27 December 2016; available at: http://kathmandupost.ekantipur. com/news/2016-12-27/fundamentals-of-marxism-cannot-be-ignored-dahal.html (accessed 17 March 2019).

11. Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma as featured in “Biplav Maoist [sic] Shows its Strength in Kathmandu,” People’s Review, 25 November 2018; available at: http://peoplesreview.com.np/biplav-maoist-shows-itsstrength-in-kathmandu/ (accessed 17 March 2019).

12. See Biken K Dawadi, “Most Chand Outfit Leaders, Cadres out on Bail: Police,” Republica, 9 April 2019; available at: https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/ news/most-chand-outfit-leaders-cadres-out-on-bail-police/ (accessed 11 April 2019). This information aligns with my own sources, which have consistently stated that “most” of those arrested were being released.

13. “Nepal” in Country Reports on Terrorism 2016; available at: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/ crt/2016/272233.htm#NEPAL (accessed 17 March 2019).

14.CK Lal, “The Maoist Cul-de-sac,” Republica, 18 March 2019; available at: https:// myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/themaoist-cul-de-sac/?categoryId=blog (accessed 18 March 2019).

THE 3 ZONE SECURITY PLAN

By Stanley I. White, CPS, ATO, BDO

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ecurity is an imperfect art; even on the best day it cannot remove all aspects of danger or risk from an environment, especially during a crisis. This is mainly due to the fact that security plans, strategies and tactics are all generated by human beings and all humans are flawed. However, it is always better to have a plan and not need it than to need a plan and not have it. The world today is an extremely dangerous and unpredictable place even on a calm day.

The first step to developing an effective plan involves accepting the realization that threats, theft, assault, vandalism, terrorism, criminal activity are a reality that and can affect your life , activities and business dealings. This paper will introduce the reader to a very basic security principal comprised of various components that can be applied to a home, house of worship, corporate campus, school etc. The method is called the 3 Zone Security Plan (3 ZSP).

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What is 3 ZSP? The 3 Zone Security Plan or 3 ZSP is a principle that can implemented and modified to protect people, places and things.

This method of security is based on U.S. Department of Defense and Israeli security practices that have been simplified into a basic format which is flexible and allows the security planner to build upon based on their needs and resources. 3 ZSP takes a site/venue and divides it into 3 zones. These zones are denoted as the cold, warm and hot zone and can expand and contract based on the level of security readiness. These zones are summarized as follows:

Cold Zone: This is the outer most location

that encircles the warm zone and extends outward as far as the security elements can conduct surveillance. The main goal of the 3 ZSP is to keep the threat outside the cold zone and away from the asset(s) under protection. This makes the cold zone the first line of defense. This zone typically starts at the venue’s perimeter fence and entrance. Security starts in the cold zone and this is the location where security elements want to establish a secure baseline (a field knowledge of normal activities attributed to the area.

This protocol makes it easier to flag and investigate anomalies).

Generally speaking all human action whether it be terrorism, criminal activity, cheating, lying etc. require three components; these are: • Will to act • Means to act • Opportunity to Act 3 ZSP seeks to intercept the hostile entity in the cold zone through covert security monitoring thus protecting the asset encircled by the warm and hot zones. This methodology focuses on obstructing the attacker’s opportunity to act; this done by detecting the adversary’s hostile surveillance phase of their operation.

Warm Zone: This is the first interior

zone that begins immediately inside the perimeter fence and extends typically to exterior walls of the onsite building structures. The warm zone is the critical location where security elements patrol for anomalies that indicate security threats may have entered the site from the cold

zone. If there are signs that suspicious activity has occurred in this zone the level of awareness in all zones must be increased.

The 3 Zone Security Plan or 3 ZSP is a principle that can implemented and modified to protect people, places and things. This method of security is based on U.S. Department of Defense and Israeli security practices that have been simplified into a basic format which is flexible and allows the security planner to build upon based on their needs and resources.

Hot Zone: This is the most important zone due to the fact it is the last security layer that protects the subject asset(s). 3 ZSP establishes three zones of protection that an adversary must penetrate to engage the designated asset(s). Each zone has active security countermeasures engaged with the sole goal of asset(s) protection.

Security planners can also designate multiple hot zones encircled by the warm zone. Each of these hot zones is equipped with countermeasures to protect their subject asset(s).

Security Assessment and Plan A successful security plan always starts with the identification/confirmation of threats and hazards. The central purpose of 3 ZSP is to protect the designated onsite asset or assets from these issues. These assets can be broken into three groups of consideration; they are people (staff, guests, patrons etc.), places (the onsite building, outdoor venue, grounds, structures etc.) and things (intellectual properties, merchandise, critical infrastructure etc.). These are the main components that all security plans seek to protect. However, one major fact that all security planners (individuals who participate in the generation of the security plan) need to realize is they must prioritize which asset to devote the bulk of their resources. All three cannot be equally funded or secured. Once the prioritization of these three categories has taken place, a security assessment must be undertaken to identify the vulnerabilities at the subject site. Information from this assessment should be utilized to generate the subject plan. Items to be analyzed during this assessment phase should include but not be limited to the following: Review all existing security plans and protocols. This includes responses to theft, workplace violence, vandalism, onsite injury/medical emergencies, power outages, natural disasters, labor disputes, fire drills, bomb threats etc.

Review all onsite security/emergency incidents over the last 5-10 years at a minimum.

Review the current and past history of secu-

rity interactions with staff and guests (especially documented complaints against security personnel and disciplinary actions).

Review turnover rates for general staff and security personnel.

Conduct interviews with management and staff regarding the current and past safety/ security culture onsite.

Review and analyze the surrounding neighborhoods (residential, commercial, industrial etc.) adjacent to the subject site/venue as it relates to crime and criminal activity. Review local and regional crime statistics.

Analyze and document adjacent residential, county, and highways adjacent to the facility.

Observe and document pedestrian flow and vehicular traffic through the site at various times of the day.

Review existing and past relationships with local law enforcement and first responders. Document current response times of first responders to the site/venue.

Observe standard onsite operations and worker interactions during business hours and onsite activities after business hours.

Analyze onsite building security elements and protocols in the warm zones (reception areas, bag checks, CCTV, interior lighting, employee assess points, guest access points, restricted areas vs. public assess areas, etc.).

Analyze exterior security elements and protocols for the cold and warm zones of the site (security patrols, exterior lighting, landscaping and natural onsite barriers, perimeter fencing, CCTV cameras, guardhouse placement, etc.). The site should be inspected both at night and during the day.

Review best security management practices for the subject site/venue.

Two Types of Threats

It is strongly recommended that security planners employ armed security personnel (both uniformed and plain clothed).

If this is not possible, the security planners should at a minimum contract off-duty law enforcement to provide armed security during events where large numbers of visitors are onsite. The fact of matter is that the most effective counter measure to an armed attack is an armed response.

Insider Threat- this is a person or persons deemed as a security threat that have authorized access to the internal workings of an organization or agency. These individuals may consist of employees, contractors, board members, management personnel, patrons and others who have official access to the subject facility. They are able to launch their targeted assault from inside the subject site/venue through their exploited access. This paper will not deal with the insider threat vulnerability but rather the outsider threat.

Outsider Threat- this is a person or persons who are deemed security threats and who do not have authorized access to a site/venue. These parties

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can collect intelligence on the site/venue through convert surveillance from outside the subject location (i.e. hostile surveillance), social media, open source information collection and even through the recruitment/use of an employee (i.e. insider threat) working onsite. This information is then incorporated into the adversary’s operational plans against the site/venue.

Six Types of Security Elements Command Center- a secure room situated equipped to communicate with all security units, management and local first responders. This structure is also equipped with video monitors recording various sections of the site/venue. This location is usually manned by one or two security personnel and access is restricted to only select personnel.

Guardhouse- a structure(s) situated adjacent to all the ingress/egress points of the site equipped to communicate with all security units, management and local first responders. This structure is also equipped with video monitors recording various sections of a secured site/venue. This location is usually manned by one or two security personnel and access is restricted to only cleared personnel.

Uniformed Security Element (USE)- security personnel with distinct uniforms, identification and equipment authorized to enforce the onsite security plan. They should be trained in behavior detection techniques that will assist them in the flagging of suspicious actors and activities as well as first aid. The disadvantages to a uniformed security element is that they are highly visible (note: their level of personal protection firearm, Taser, baton, etc. is openly visible.) It is easy for an outsider or insider threat agent conducting surveillance of the facility to flag and monitor their patrol tactics.

However, their ability to project an organized security presence may deter an adversary from targeting a site/venue.

Uniformed Security Element Mobile (marked vehicle)- security vehicles with distinct identification and equipment used to patrol the grounds of the subject site/venue. These vehicles have disadvantages due to the fact that their movements can easily be tracked by outsider or insider threat agents conducting surveillance of the site. However, their ability to project an organized security presence may deter an adversary from targeting a site/venue.

Plain Clothed Security Element (PCSE)- security personnel who wear everyday attire that matches the dress of the onsite staff and management. They should be trained in behavior detection techniques that will assist them in the flagging of suspicious actors and activities as well as first aid.

All security identification and personal defensive equipment (firearms, handcuffs, tasers etc.) are to be neatly concealed from view. These elements are only authorized to enforce the onsite security

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plan during high threat situations. These situations would involve a situation where a USE or facility staff member is in physical danger. Their purpose is to remain undercover and monitor the various zones (cold, warm and hot zones) for anomalies, identify the suspicious actors and contact USE units to interview and investigate. PCSE units are to remain in the background monitoring and documenting onsite activities. The major disadvantage associated with a PCSE unit is that they can be confused with a hostile threat by local first responders during an emergency, especially if they have to draw their weapon. Their ability to produce visible identification during an emergency is crucial to their personal safety. However, their ability to remain undercover is a key element to countering the actions of an adversary attempting to penetrate the zones of the site/venue. This is one of the main reasons local law enforcement and first responder agencies should have the opportunity to meet with security staff, review and evaluate the site/venue’s current security plan.

Plain Clothed Security Element Mobile (unmarked vehicle)- vehicle used by the PCSE to monitor cold zone of the facility. This vehicle should be a non-descript vehicle, not a decommissioned law enforcement cruiser. It should not have any external detailing of a law enforcement or security vehicle. This means no dark tinted windows, driver side spotlight, black walled tires, push bumpers etc. The vehicle should be as low visibility as possible. (Note: It is recommended that the unmarked vehicle be black, tan, gray or brown. bright yellow or red colored vehicles should be avoided).

It is strongly recommended that security planners employ armed security personnel (both uniformed and plain clothed). If this is not possible, the security planners should at a minimum contract off-duty law enforcement to provide armed security during events where large numbers of visitors are onsite.

The fact of matter is that the most effective counter measure to an armed attack is an armed response.

This mindset is vastly different from the administration and faculty of Oakland University located in Rochester, Michigan who in 2018 distributed over 1000 hockey pucks to students to defend themselves against an active shooter on campus.

Armed security elements have historically proven to be an effective countermeasure for soft targets.

The jury remains out on the counter measure selection for Oakland University.

Four Categories of Countermeasure • Deterrence- consists of the tactics and equipment utilized to deter actors from attempting to penetrate the 3 zones. This results with the subject actors aborting an attack on the subject site/venue and choosing a softer target • Detection- consists of the tactics and equipment utilized to detect actors prior or during their attempted penetration of

the three zones • Delay- consists of the tactics and equipment utilized to slow efforts to penetrate the three zones and execute an attack on a designated asset. This delay allows security elements time to detect and thwart the subject attack • Denial - consists of the tactics and equipment utilized to neutralize the efforts of hostile actors attempting to attack the subject site/venue

(deter) • Cyber security network (detect, deter, deny) • Intruder Alarms and motion detectors (deter, detect) • Manned and unmanned Security Access Points (deter, deny, detect) • Digital Close Circuit Cameras (detect, deter) • Access control points, swipe cards (detect, deny, deter) • Utilization of aerial drone surveillance (detect) • Bag and Vehicle Checks (detect, deny) • Utilization of staff Photo ID Cards (deny, detect) • Screening equipment (detect) • Two- way radios (detect) • Window and door locks (deny) • Vaults, security containers (deny)

Required Types of Security Countermeasures The section of the appropriate countermeasures in the form of tactics and equipment to be utilized onsite is a critical part of the security plan.

This plan should be flexible and regularly evaluated so the most effective tactics and equipment can be deployed to secure the site/venue. The following tactical training and equipment (with associated categories) should include but not be limited to the following:

Recommended Tactical Training • All security elements trained in behavior detection methods, first aid, emergency response/site evacuation techniques • All security elements strongly recommended to be certified to carry firearms onsite (open and concealed carry). Elements should be trained in threat/ nonthreat and force on force firearm response.

All elements should qualify regularly at a certified range.

• An auxiliary security team composed of volunteer staff members should be assembled and trained to assist with onsite emergencies • Written security plan should be reviewed/ evaluated by local law enforcement and first responder agencies. Direct contact with key personnel in these agencies should be established and nurtured • Drills simulating an onsite emergency should conducted at least two times a year

Equipment and Associated Category • Fencing (deter, delay) • Guardhouse (detect, deter, deny) • Interior Command Center (detect, deter, deny) • Establishment of interior safe room(s) (delay, deny) • Establishment/Use of barriers- concrete jersey barriers, bollards, weighted planters, construction of natural barriers such as berms, plantings etc. (deter, delay) • Signage (deter) • Site Lighting, interior building lighting

Conclusion 3 ZSP provides security planners with a plan that can be employed at a corporate campus, hospital, educational facility, retail establishment etc. with a basic, flexible foundation that identifies and protects a singular or series of assets. Many security plans currently in use today view the security as a singular entity wrapped in a fence as opposed to dividing the site/venue into zones with flowing security elements patrolling each zone. This zone approach forces an adversary to have to defeat multiple layers of defense. A successful security plan starts with the identification/confirmation of threats and hazards. The next step assesses the subject site/venue in question for vulnerabilities, then takes the accumulated information and generates a written plan. This plan should be reviewed and evaluated by all cleared staff as well as local first responders. It is always hoped such a plan to guard against the threat of workplace violence, active shooter, improvised explosive attack etc. would not have to be put into operation. However, due to dangers of present-day society it is better to be prepared with a realistic and effective plan implemented by a well-trained staff and hope it never has to be put into use.

About the Author Stanley I. White is currently the Counterintelligence Advisor for the IACSP as well as a private sector Safety Officer. Mr. White has served as a Defensive Tactics Instructor at the Stamler Police Academy in Northern New Jersey for 16 years where he trained personnel from numerous local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. He also holds certifications as a Protection Specialist, Plainclothes Security Agent, Anti-Terrorism and Behavior Detection Officer. He is also an internationally published author on the topics of personal security, intelligence and counter terrorism. Mr. White is also the Private Officer International “2018 Distinguished Service Award” recipient and the American Security Today “2018 Astor Award recipient for Excellence in Homeland Security ”. He can be reached for comment at swhite@atix.riss.net.

Let’s be Blunt Time For A New Critical Infrastructure Sector?

By Luke Bencie and Sami Araboghli

T

he Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified 16 infrastructure sectors that are critical to the safety, security, and way of life of the United States. Varying from our financial systems and energy grid – to healthcare, transportation, and communication networks, any disruption to these systems would wreak havoc on the American way of life. Thankfully, DHS has crafted resiliency plans to counteract almost any “what-if” scenario that can happen, with the help of federal, state, and local authorities. However, there is one sector that is inevitably becoming a national commodity, something that federal security and financial regulations haven’t been able to accommodate yet. That sector is the multi-billion dollar medical and recreational cannabis industry.

Albeit controversial, sales of marijuana (and cannabis-related products) reached $9.2 billion in 2017. After years of being considered a drug with a high-potential for abuse and no accepted medical use, legalization has so far encompassed 33 states and the District of Columbia. The schedule I drug has become so popular with mainstream users, Forbes predicts that sales will reach $48 billion annually in less than a decade. Consider the following: If you spent $20.00 per second, every day for three

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years, it would add up roughly to the amount of cannabis sold in the State of California alone in 2018 – over $2.5 billion and mostly transacted in cash. With amounts like this in prospect, why wouldn’t people want to get in on the action?

Despite the glowing financial forecast, there remains a dark side to the cannabis industry. The

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not-so-dirty secret is the tremendous security threat posed to marijuana cultivation facilities, point-of-sale dispensaries and cannabis – and cash handling – transportation operations. Unlike other retail locations that sell, for example, expensive jewelry, antiques or fine art, most cannabis consumers prefer to use cash for their transactions (even though dealers verify their identities prior to purchase). Couple the influx of cash with the fact that most banks refuse to do business with the cannabis industry, and you end up with facilities sitting on excess stacks of paper currency. The situation creates all kinds of security issues not faced by other businesses.

Make no mistake, this is still the narcotics business… and narcotics draw criminal activity like a moth to a flame.

during World War II, CARVER was an offensive targeting tool used to determine where bomber pilots should most effectively drop their munitions on enemy targets.

Still, there’s no clear guideline for the assurance of safety and security for all who are involved in the medical or recreational cannabis industry, forcing companies to improvise, adapt, and overcome the barriers that are put in place. Its vexed legal status has sparked debate between federal and state authorities, resulting in a complex business structure. Since cannabis is still not legal federally, there are still many hurdles that the industry must jump over to prevent the Pandora’s box of security nightmares from ever opening.

•

With more than half of the states in the U.S. having already legalized marijuana for medical use (and a handful of those states legalizing recreational use as well), it’s not only inevitable but imperative that the federal government accept the reality of its growing importance and acceptance in society – and identifying the whole industry as a critical infrastructure sector. This is a necessary first step in protecting large-scale cultivation centers and distribution outlets. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should recognize – with proper input from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) – that federal security guidelines should be enacted to ensure that proper safety and protection for employees, customers, product and facilities.

Establishing a new critical infrastructure sector is easier said than done. Doing so would require much insight into its resiliency and response plans, as well as identifying and mitigating its encompassed risks. Interestingly enough, a methodology already exists for exactly that purpose – and its been the go-to threat and vulnerability assessment method for security professionals for decades – and its called CARVER. The CARVER Target Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment Methodology is a system that uses specific procedures, both qualitative and quantitative in nature, to interpret and determine the Probability of Attack from an adversary against critical assets and/or key resources. Originally developed by the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency,

The CARVER methodology is simple, yet able to extensively analyze most threats that exists.

CARVER assesses those threats based on six key factors: •

•

•

•

•

Criticality: Single points of failure, areas with great liability for successful operations (an example could be found in cannabis cultivation facilities, such as lighting, irrigation, and ventilation systems) Accessibility: Ease to which asset can be reached directly or indirectly by an adversary (how accessible could cannabis product and cash be to an adversary?)

Recoverability: Time and effort needed to successfully recuperate from an adversarial attack (how difficult would it be to recover from an attack, such as from theft or destruction?)

Vulnerability: Ability of adversary to damage, destroy, compromise, or exploit asset based on level of exposure (how easy would it be for an adversary to compromise our security measures already put in place?)

Effect: Scope and magnitude of adverse consequences that would result from malicious actions and responses to them (how much of an impact could an adversarial attack place upon the industry and society?)

Recognizability: Degree to which an asset can be recognized as a desirable element for attack (how easy would it be for an adversary to identify an organization’s assets as targets?)

Those factors are then used to analyze an asset on a variety of different scenarios, from its likelihood for attack, to level of impact, and thus visualizes anomalies that can be addressed swiftly.

An attractive feature of the CARVER system is that it is both an offensive and defensive tool – allowing it to be used to defend assets against potential attacks as well as identifying any possible vulnerabilities that may be present.

The distinct aspect that makes CARVER stand out from other threat and vulnerability assessment tools is its special ability to rank asset vulnerability using both qualitative and quantitative data. This is especially useful for an industry as critical as the medical marijuana industry, which employs hundreds of thousands of people, has millions of clients, and is expected to become a $30+ billion industry in less than three years.

Given such a large, and growing share in the economy, it is imperative that the federal government recognizes the importance of keeping this industry safe from an any adversarial threats by recognizing this as a new critical infrastructure sector. Just from a quick overview of the medi-

cal marijuana industry, CARVER will tell us that since much of the medical marijuana industry is cash-based, attacks on its financial sector would not only be very impactful but could also be more susceptible for attack than other parts of the industry. Also, CARVER can help us identify that the lucrative cannabis product itself is highly susceptible for theft – especially in and around states where its recreational use is not necessarily decriminalized yet.

Just as with any other major infrastructure sector, the medical marijuana industry has its fair share of adversaries that prey upon it for attack. Organized crime is the most likely adversarial force involved in targeting the medical marijuana industry, as many parts of the industry are held to be very lucrative for all types of organized crime organizations – from Mexican drug cartels upset with potential competition, to low-level street gangs looking to make a quick buck.

A major contribution to the significance of the criticality of the medical marijuana industry is its reliance on many of the other already identified critical infrastructure sectors. Such sectors include Food & Agriculture, Healthcare & Public Health, Financial Services, and Commercial Facilities sectors. The medical marijuana industry’s connection to these critical infrastructure sectors is only more valid reasoning for its recognition of its own special critical infrastructure sector.

A disruption to any of the current 16 critical infrastructure sectors as identified by the DHS could significantly disrupt society as we know it. Thankfully, the DHS has been proactive in not only identifying the risks that exist within our critical infrastructure sectors, but also response and resiliency plans just in case an attack was to take place. Now is the time for the federal government to recognize the elephant in the room. The medical and recreational cannabis industry is increasing in criticality to many parts of American society, and its national legalization is inevitable.

The federal government must proactively address this, by utilizing a system such as CARVER, in order to prevent any impeding attack that could disrupt society just as much as one upon any other critical infrastructure sector. Let’s be blunt - cannabis is leaning towards becoming a national security sector of its own.

About the Authors Luke Bencie is the Managing Director of Security Management International. He has provided security consulting to dozens of cannabis cultivation centers and dispensaries in the U.S. and abroad. He can be reached at lbencie@smiconsultancy.com Sami Araboghli is a Junior Associate at Security Management International.

Counter-Sniper Response To The Terrifying Nature Of

Sniper And Active Shooter Ambushes: Washington D. C. and Dallas (Part Three)

T

By Jim Weiss, Bob O’Brien and Mickey Davis

his report, the third in the series, will cover two additional sniper ambushes: The Washington, D.C.-area Beltway Sniper incidents in 2002, and the Dallas, Texas, ambush in 2016.

In brief, the Beltway Sniper Ambushes involved a 23-day series of attacks that terrorized the people of the Washington D.C. region in the fall of 2002. The two snipers, John Muhammad and Lee Malvo, launched their particular terror by killing random people who were going about their everyday activities. The twosome engaged in quasi-terrorism, mimicking real terrorists who create a climate of fear to bring about their agenda.

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Another serial type of killer was active shooter Micah Xavier Johnson in Dallas, an African-American who harbored a hatred of whites, and white police in particular.

During his murder and bloodshed spree of July 8, 2016, he killed five police officers, and wounded or injured nine other police officers as well as two civilians. Like the D. C. Beltway Snipers’ attacks, Johnson’s murder frenzy was well planned. They were all determined assailants who knew their stuff.

The Washington D. C. Beltway Snipers and the Dallas active shooter could be called quasi-terrorists: terrorists causing fear to meet their criminal ends. Such quasi-terrorist criminals could be a robber, rapist, an active shooter, a hostage taker, or someone who assaults another, acting alone or in a group. Terrorists can be homegrown militants or criminal or gangs, or they can have infiltrated the community with the intent to cause terror. These individuals are not ideological terrorist militants.

According to the FBI, the massive Beltway Sniper investigation into the attacks was led by the Montgomery County (Maryland) Police Department, headed

by Chief Charles Moose, with the FBI and many other law enforcement agencies

Sniper and active shooter topics and tactics are timeless, and just as deadly, dangerous, and challenging today as they were 50 years ago.

playing supporting

The D. C. Beltway Sniper Attacks and the Police Manhunt to Bring the Two Killers to Justice, 2002

the FBI’s assistance

John Allen Muhammad (41) and Lee Boyd Malvo (17) were the killers, but investigations didn’t come up with their names until close to the time of their capture.

Early on, it was determined that the sniper was using a high-powered rifle and killing at distances of 100 to 150 yards. Investigators would at first look at one person of interest and then move to other investigative considerations with no success.

The following is a list of the victims, dates, incidents, and locations, as well as details of the terror attributed to the appointed Chief of Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department, Charles A. Moose: October 2, windows shot out of a Michael’s arts and crafts store, no one hit; October 2, James D. Martin (55) killed in a Maryland grocery store parking lot ; October 3, James L. Buchanan (39) killed while cutting grass

roles. Chief Moose had specifically requested through a federal law on serial killings.

at a Maryland auto dealership; October 3, taxi cab driver Prem Kumar Walekar (54)(other legal sources list the victim’s name as Premkumar Walekar) killed at a Maryland gas station; October 3,Sarah Ramos (34) killed outside a Maryland post office; October 3. Lori Ann LewisRivera (25) killed while vacuuming her van at a Maryland gas station; October 3.

Pascal Charlot (72) killed while standing on a street just inside Washington, D.C., city limits; October 4, Caroline Seawell (43) wounded in a parking lot in Fredericksburg, Virginia; October 7. Iran Brown (13) wounded while being dropped off at his Bowie, Maryland, school; October 9, Dean Harold Meyers (53) killed at a gas station near Manassas, Virginia; October 11, Kenneth H. Bridges (53) wounded while pumping gas in Massaponax, Virginia near Fredericksburg; October 14, Linda Franklin (47) killed outside a Home Depot store in Falls Church, Virginia (she was one of the FBI’s own, an intelligence analyst); October 19, Jeffrey Hopper (37) wounded while leaving a Ponderosa Steakhouse with his wife in Ashland, Virginia; and October 22, Conrad Johnson (35) a bus driver is killed in his commuter bus in Montgomery County.

The killings ceased on the morning of October 24 with the arrests of Muhammad and Malvo, (There was an additional shooting attributed to Muhammad and Malvo: Montgomery County Department of Police report S02-231730 stated that on 9/14/02 Rupindek Singh Oberi was shot in his lower back in front of a beer and wine store, Silver Spring, Maryland).

According to the FBI, the massive Beltway Sniper investigation into the attacks was led by the Montgomery County (Maryland) Police Department, headed by Chief Charles Moose, with the FBI and many other law enforcement agencies playing supporting roles. Chief Moose had specifically requested the FBI’s assistance through a federal law on serial killings.

Details in the breaking the case were that on October 3rd, five persons were similarly murdered within miles of each other. The attacks were soon linked.

Within days, the FBI alone had some 400 agents around the country working the case. The FBI set up a toll-free num-

ber to collect tips from the public, with teams of new agents-in-training helping to work the hotline. Agency evidence experts were asked to digitally map many of the evolving crime scenes, and their behavioral analysts helped prepare a profile of the shooter for investigators. The FBI also set up a Joint Operations Center to help Montgomery County investigators run the case.

Ironically, the big break in the case came from the snipers themselves. On October 17th a caller claiming to be the sniper phoned to say, in a bit of an investigative tease, that he was responsible for the murder of two women (actually, only one was killed) a month earlier during the robbery of a liquor store in Montgomery, Alabama. That set in motion a chain of events that led to the capture of John Muhammad and Lee Malvo four days later, ending 23 days of random attacks in the Washington, D. C. area.

Here’s how the investigation played out:

The following morning their fingerprint database produced a match—a newsstand magazine dropped at the robbery scene bore the fingerprints of Lee Boyd Malvo from a previous arrest in Washington State.

They now had a suspect.

• Investigators soon learned that a crime in Montgomery, Alabama, similar to the one described in the call had indeed taken place—and that fingerprint and ballistic evidence were available from that case.

• An agent for the FBI’s office in Mobile, Alabama, gathered that evidence and quickly flew to Washington D.C., arriving Monday evening, October 21. While ATF handled the ballistic evidence, the FBI took the fingerprint evidence to their laboratory, at the time located at FBI headquarters.

• The following morning their fingerprint database produced a match—a newsstand magazine dropped at the robbery scene bore the fingerprints of Lee Boyd Malvo from a previous arrest in Washington State. They now had a suspect.

• The arrest record provided another important lead, mentioning a man named John Allen Muhammad. An FBI agent from Tacoma, Washington, recognized the name from a tip called into that office on the case. A second suspect had been identified.

• FBI work with ATF agents revealed that Muhammad had a Bushmaster

44

.223 rifle in his possession, a federal violation since he’d been served a restraining order to stay away from his ex-wife. That enabled charging Muhammad with federal weapons violations. And with Malvo clearly connected, the FBI and ATF jointly obtained a federal material witness warrant for him. The legal papers were now in hand.

• Meanwhile, on October 22, the FBI searched their criminal records database and found that Muhammad had registered a blue Chevrolet Caprice with the license plate NDA-21Z in New Jersey. That description was given to the news media and shared far and wide, leading to the arrest of the two snipers.

• At approximately 11:45 P.M. on October 23rd, their dark blue 1990 Chevrolet Caprice—bearing New Jersey license plate NDA-21Z—was spotted at a rest stop parking lot off I-70 in Maryland.

• On the morning of October 24, 2002, the FBI, with a team of Maryland State Police, Montgomery County SWAT officers, and agents from the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team arrested the sleeping John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd without a struggle.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

This ended the sniper attacks.

The FBI’s role in the case continued, with many additional hours spent gathering evidence and preparing for court—work that ultimately paid off in the convictions of both Malvo and Muhammad.

Evidence: What the FBI and other police forces found was shocking. The car had a hole cut in the trunk near the license plate so shots could be fired from within the vehicle. In effect, it was a rolling sniper’s nest.

In the car were the Bushmaster .223-caliber rifle used in each attack, a rifle’s scope for taking aim, and a tripod to steady the shots.

The car’s backseat had the sheet metal removed between the passenger compartment and the trunk, enabling the shooter to get into the trunk from inside the car.

On the car’s owner’s manual, the FBI Laboratory later detected written impressions Vol. 25, No.1

of one of the demand notes. Also found were a digital voice recorder used by both Malvo and Muhammad to make extortion demands, a laptop--stolen from one of the victims--containing maps of the shooting sites and getaway routes from some of the crime scenes, maps, walkie-talkies, and a number of other items.

Both Malvo and Muhammad were convicted at trial or pled guilty in multiple court cases in Maryland and Virginia. Both were sentenced to life without parole. Muhammad also received the death penalty in Virginia and was executed on November 10, 2009.

Dallas Texas, 2016 Ambush Killing of Police Officers Micah Johnson was a born-and-raised-inAmerica, self-styled terrorist, who used fear to accomplish his goal: the killing of white police officers and other white citizens. This was based on his hatred for whites, and in particular, white police officers.

Johnson killed five Dallas police officers, and wounded or injured an additional nine police officers and two civilians.

An African-American, he was a former Army Reservist. While serving in an engineer unit, he saw duty in Afghanistan.

Evidence indicates there were disciplinary matters during his active duty time and such issues eventually led to his discharge.

Johnson used a rifle, but he was not a classic sniper.

Rather, he was a gunman who used whatever tactics popped into his mind. Like Mark Essex, the earlier New Orleans police officer killer, they both used tactics they had studied, including, in Johnson’s case, what is described as an extensive personal journal of combat tactics.

On his Army uniform he wore an expert rifleman badge; however a reservist acquaintance of his noted that Johnson was weak in marksmanship skills. Regardless of his Army marksmanship record, he was deadly accurate in his Dallas ambush attacks.

Johnson used a rifle, but he was not a classic sniper. Rather, he was a gunman who used whatever tactics popped into his mind. Like Mark Essex, the earlier New Orleans police officer killer, they both used tactics they had studied, including, in Johnson’s case, what is described as an extensive personal journal of combat tactics.

Did Johnson have former affiliations with the New Black Panther Party? Yes, as well as interests in other black hate groups. He was angered by police shootings.

Was combat-zone, post-trauma stress indicated and not treated? Perhaps. He clearly had a deep-rooted hatred for police. The catalysts for his deadly Dallas Police attack were fatal police shootings in Louisiana and Minnesota.

Johnson kicked off his ambush attack during what has been referred to as a Black Lives Matter and/or a communityorganized Next Generation Action Network anti-police protest. Also present were about 30 counter-protestors dressed in camouflage, military-type fatigue cloth-

ing, some wearing ballistic vests and openly carrying rifles. Johnson, too, wore a ballistic vest and was armed with a Glock pistol and carrying a takeoff of the AK-74 rifle, a Soviet-era semi-automatic rifle, 5.45 mm.

News and other reports concerning Johnson and his ambush tend to be conflicting and confusing. There was a lot of chaos as gunfire echoed down the avenues in nighttime darkness when he initially fired at unsuspecting, white Dallas Police Department officers. The result was that Johnson killed three officers outright: Senior Corporal Lome Ahrens, Officer Michael Krol, and Officer Patrick Zamarippa.

Johnson then forced entry into Building B. Corporal Shaw followed Johnson’s blood trail, and, with another police officer, entered the building.

Not seeing Johnson, the two officers backed off.

Chief Brown said that the robot used was the Dallas Police Department Explosive Ordinance Unit’s Remotec Andros Mark V A-1. This remote-

The Main Street Shootings

controlled robot,

Johnson’s surprise attack happened in the Main Street area, not far from where President Jack Kennedy was assassinated in 1963. When the first officers were killed, other police officers took cover behind patrol cars and building pillars. They responded by returning fire and by tending to the wounded.

carrying a makeshift,

Reportedly, 11 officers fired toward where Johnson’s gunfire was coming from and advanced toward it, moving as if in Army training. These 11 heads-up Dallas officers were a credit to their department. They fought back and in doing so, lessened Johnson’s rampage so fewer were killed and more innocent people were able to get out of the way. Johnson reportedly was injured during this firefight.

Johnson continued to move. On Lamar Street, he engaged with and came up behind Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) Police Officer Brent Thompson, shooting him a number of times and killing him.

duct tape-secured C4 plastic explosive, went into the campus building from which where Johnson had been shooting.

The explosive was detonated. The robot‘s last camera image showed him lying on the floor.

This initial attack, referred to as the “Main Street Shootings,” was in the same location as the protest march.

As the deadly ambush/shootout raged downtown, Dallas Police (some with patrol rifles) along with SWAT, raced to assist their endangered fellow officers.

Police officers entered Building B and evacuated students and others. In doing so, they closed a police perimeter around Johnson, restricting his movement. Hundreds of shots were exchanged between Johnson and SWAT officers who were now in the area.

A stand-off took place--including two hours of failed negotiations. Chief David Brown okayed a decision to use a unique tactical plan: an aggressive undertaking by an explosive-armed police robot. He did not want to risk the lives of police officers and there weren’t other alternatives.

Chief Brown said that the robot used was the Dallas Police Department Explosive Ordinance Unit’s Remotec Andros Mark V A-1. Made

by Northrop Grumman Corporation, it was purchased in 2008 for about $151,000. This remote-controlled robot, carrying a makeshift, duct tape-secured C4 plastic explosive, went into the campus building from which where Johnson had been shooting. The explosive was detonated. The robot‘s last camera image showed him lying on the floor.

About the Authors Lieut. Jim Weiss (Retired) is a former Army light infantryman, school-trained Army combat engineer, a former school-trained (regular Army) Army military policeman, former State of Florida Investigator, and a retired police lieutenant from the Brook Park (OH) Police Department. He has written and co-written hundreds of articles for law enforcement and safety forces magazines, most notably Law and Order. Tactical World, Knives Illustrated, Tactical Response, Police Fleet Manager, Florida Trooper, and Counter Terrorism.

Wounded during the Main Street Shootings and after he had killed Officer Thompson, Johnson moved the fight to El Centro College, one of seven colleges that made up the Dallas County Community College District.

Mickey (Michele) Davis is an award-winning, California-based writer and author.

Her young adult novel, Evangeline Brown and the Cadillac Motel, won the Swiss Prix Chronos for the German translation. Mickey is the wife of a Vietnam War veteran officer and a senior volunteer with her local fire department.

While attempting to enter a campus building, he wounded two campus police officers who were inside near the doorway. Johnson attempted a forced entry, injuring Corporal Bryan Shaw, one of the officers.

Bob O’Brien is a (Retired) Cleveland, Ohio Police Department SWAT Sergeant, CPD SWAT Unit co-founde, and a. Law Enforcement consultant, instructor, writer, Vietnam War Army veteran.

El Centro College Shootings

46

Inside the building and now occupying the high ground, Johnson moved about, breaking out windows and shooting at police. Killed was Police Officer Michael Smith who stood near a 7-Eleven convenience store.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 25, No.1

Security Driver:

• What makes a Security Driver different from a Chauffeur or regular Limo Driver?

• What types of questions need to be addressed?

• Why consider someone with a security background for a driver position?

Y

• By Anthony Ricci

48

ou were contracted by a Miami-based client to provide protection for the principal and family while they stay in New York City for their business duration. Unbeknownst to you the client’s staff has hired an outside limousine service to provide all transportation. This normally could be a helpful gesture but, this time, due to business relations, the client hired a familiar firm that they have done business with on prior occasions. Not being able to select the transportation service creates a problem for the protection team since this transportation service is home based in Boston.

When you brief the drivers on the current situation and their responsibilities for the upcoming weeks that lie ahead, you quickly find out that they do not know the environment very well.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 25, No.1

You find out that they have very little security knowledge and worse they have never been exposed to a security detail of this magnitude. The two drivers usually provided basic airport runs for executives and worked many entertainment events for their companies’ clients. Although this detail is not really considered a high threat of danger and everything is expected to run smoothly; there is a slight chance of interaction with an aggressive group of demonstrators. This group does not share the same beliefs and views toward your client’s work. They have created very embarrassing situations in the past, however they are not expected to be violent to the point of causing physical harm. It is probable that it will only be a matter of time before their aggressiveness turns from just protesters pranks to seriously hurting someone, whether accidentally or intentionally. You certainly don’t want your client injured or embarrassed on your watch!

In your first briefing with the drivers you start to address basic route awareness issues starting with points along route that could be vulnerable to the element of surprise. You also address zones of predictability, which are places along your routes that your detail will be unable to avoid on a daily basis as well as important safe havens, locations where you would go to in the event of an emergency, such as police stations, airports, and hospitals. The drivers look at you with a blank stares as they are much more interested in finding out if a gratuity will be figured into their paycheck and if they get a lunch break every day. Anyone with some basic knowledge of executive protection can finish this story. These are basic ingredients for disaster. The drivers do not know the environment very well at all. This will cause problems with route selections in whether to bypass a problem or just to avoid traffic jams. Will the drivers know how to react and where to go if a major hospital and/or safe haven were needed? What alternate emergency routes to take without the detail leader’s assistance? You have done your job and investigated your team’s thoughts and subject knowledge, since there was no indication of an open-minded attitude, one that could accept the fact that they may be inconvenienced or have to make a sacrifice for the job and/ or the guy who ultimately signs their check (the principal). So should the Agent in Charge (AIC) or Detail Leader (DL) try to take on the job with the current drivers that they are faced with? This could blow up and that famously dreaded finger would point directly at you, the contact person for the protection team. You would hear how “You could not make it happen, we even got you professional drivers”. Starting a job without all the tools needed could prove to be disastrous unless the Agent in Charge (AIC) could renegotiate or discuss the possibilities for a new transportation team? If he/ she does make headway in selecting new drivers for the team what should he/she now consider?

What makes a Security Driver different from a Chauffeur or regular Limo Driver? What types of questions need to be addressed? Why consider someone with a security background for a driver?

You also address zones of predictability, which are places along your routes that your detail will be unable to avoid on a daily basis as well as important safe havens, locations where you would go to in the event of an emergency, such as police stations, airports, and hospitals.

The drivers look at you with a blank stares as they are much more interested in finding out if a gratuity will be figured into their paycheck and if they get a lunch break every day.

First of all, many decisions should be based around the risk level of the job and the degree of chance that the Principal and detail may come under the threat of violent attack or even embarrassment. This is the type of risk that puts the client in harms way and ultimately could be the end of your career as an Executive Protection Agent. If there is any degree of chance that an incident may happen to the Principal and family then the Detail Leader or Agent in Charge must decide to hire responsible, reliable, and properly trained Security Drivers for the job.

Whether the detail is a temporary assignment like the one described above or a permanent salary position such as providing protection for a corporation’s executive staff, transportation and professional drivers should be considered a major priority. First, in the event of an accident there could be terrible consequences for the principal and corporation.

Risk of injury, or worse fatality, vehicle damage and paying the price of injury/down time for both the driver and principal is a large consideration.

Using a trained driver will not negate all of your risks. However, it is definitely added insurance that a trained driver will have better skill and judgment level to avoid potential accidents/ambushes thus lowering injuries and damage rates. Basically, it is a big step in minimizing risk, which is all anyone can do. Risk will never go away but any AIC or Security Director can ultimately minimize potential risk. Outside the realm of an accident there is always a chance of attack on the target (principal). Chances are you probably will not know right away that your principal was selected as a target. For numerous reasons your principal could get targeted by any number of criminals. Kidnapping of principals is less common in the United States, however, it does happen. In many countries kidnapping for ransom or religious & political reasons is a growing and quite prosperous industry in itself. So what does this have to do with the driver? Let’s take a quick look back at the last forty years of vehicle attacks that happened in and along route. This is certainly not a complete list, just a snapshot from the Advanced Driving & Security Inc.’s database. Our database covers some of the major kidnappings and assassinations that took place through out the last forty years.

• 1971 Sir Geoffrey Jackson, Uruguay - simulated accident on motorcade – abduction • 1973 Carrero Blanco, Spain –motorcade explosive ambush – assassinated • 1977 Hanns-Martin Schleyer, West Germany – simulated accident on motorcade -abduction • 1978 Aldo Moro, Rome - simulated accident on motorcade --assassination after 55 days captive • 1979 General Alexander Haig, Belgium – motorcade explosive ambush – luckily escaped attack due to terrorist error • 1979 Ambassador Adolph Dubbs, Afghanistan – stopped car at staged search point – abducted and then assassinated • 1980 Ambassador John Dean, Beirut - Road side attack – Detail escaped by reacting quickly returning fire and driving to safe haven • 1980 Samoza, Ambushed and killed by terrorists using RPG’s • 1981 Fredrick Kroesen, West Germany - Road side attack – Assassination attempt failed due to partially armored car and no direct hit from terrorist weapons • 1981 President Ronald Reagan, Attacked and shot while walking to his car – luckily was not fatally wounded • 1982 Freddie Heineken, He was walking to his chauffer driven car when abducted by two masked gunmen

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• • • • •

•

• • • • •

•

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• 1982 Colonel Altika, Canada – Assassinated by a gunman while sitting in traffic • 1982 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ray, Paris –Attacked while walking to his vehicle – Shot and killed by a gunman carrying a small caliber pistol 1982 Orville Gundaz, Sommerville, Ma., - attacked en-route home from work as he approached a choke point – terrorist fired a 9 mm. handgun into the drivers window killing Gundaz 1983 Ken Bishop, Bogota – He was being driven to work – came under gun fire attack while in a zone of predictability 1983 Lieutenant Commander Albert SchaufelBerger, El Salvador - Attacked while waiting in vehicle – shot in the head by a 22 caliber revolver / left the window down in his armored vehicle 1983 Captain George Tsantes, Athens – Attacked and killed at traffic light - came under attack by two men on a scooter shooting a 45caliber pistol 1984 Master Sergeant James Judd, Athens – attempted assassination – same people as above and same technique 1986 Leamon Hunt, was assassinated at the entrance of his house – terrorists shot through a weak spot in the window of his armored car 1986 George Besse, Paris – walking from car to his front door – a young couple shot and killed him then escaped on motorbike 1986 Karl – Heinz Becurts – While en-route his vehicle was hit by a road side bomb 1986 Antonio da Empoli, Italy – Ambushed and shot in the leg and hand while getting out of his chauffeur driven vehicle to get a newspaper 1987 General Lico Girogieri – was being chauffeured home when attacked and killed by a motorcycle who came up along side Girogieri’s vehicle and fired into the back window 1988 John Butler, Bogota – Two car motorcade traveling from his work to his residence – hit with roadside bomb 1988 William Higgins, Lebanon – driving his car – was abducted and executed 1988 US Navy Captain William Nordeen , Athens - Road side bomb - assassinated 1989 US Army Col. James N. Rowe, Philippines – attacked en-route to his office - assassinated by two hooded gunmen with M16 rifles 1990 Alfred Herrhausen, Germany – explosive ambush – motorcade came under attack en-route as his motorcade passed through Spa Park in Bad Homburg 1991 Chefik Wazzan, Beirut, Lebanon – was en-route in and armored car when a road side bomb placed in a parked car exploded. He was injured but survived 1992 Sedney Reso, New Jersey, USA – was abducted and later died of injury – Attacked at the base of his drive way as he was getting out of the car to get the newspaper

• 2003 Zoran Djindjic – Belgrade – Shot by sniper as he exited his car and walked into government head quarters • 2003 Edward Lambert – Connecticut, USA – Kidnapped at gunpoint in a parking garage – released two days after attack • 2005 Rafik Hariri, Beirut, Lebanon – motorcade struck by a road side bomb demolishing target along with his motorcade, buildings, and over 11 people This list of past vehicle attacks further drive home the fact that one of the most common points of vulnerability is while the principal is en-route and passing through any transitions in and around the vehicle. The protective detail needs to make sure the principal or target is protected around the vehicle and en-route at all times. Many of these attack scenarios were not successful. Some principals escaped attack by either reacting quickly or having a professionally trained driver who reacted quickly.

Most of the untrained drivers froze and made a terrifying situation much worse.

Anyone in the protection business must be honest with themselves and always ask that very serious question: “how important is your principal and their families lives worth and since you may be with them how important is your own life worth?

Whether a high or low threat, we always need to minimize risk before it could become a potential life-threatening situation. However, the job of minimizing risks can become a very difficult task, since we do not live in a very proactive society and every decision revolves around budget and degree of pain the decision-maker happens to be in. Unfortunately at times, Detail Leaders and Security Directors have to become skillful sales people to sell the need of trained drivers to their principals. In many cases a trained Security Driver can even be used as a sizeable tax write-off. When protecting a principal en-route it is essential that we minimize risk and add a layer of insurance by providing trained drivers who have extensive knowledge and fill the criteria in the list below: • • • • • • • • • •

Accident avoidance and vehicle dynamics training with a good understanding of how time and distance works while in motion.

An excellent understanding of vehicles capabilities and safety features both active and passive.

An understanding of seatbelts / airbags / fuel cut off switches / tires / and armor.

Knowledge of security maneuvers Emergency or attack evacuation maneuvers.

Knowledge of how motorcades work.

Understanding proper vehicle positioning in the motorcade.

Understanding of how different vehicles present different problems in a motorcade, as well as regular driving scenarios.

Trained and certified in Automatic External Defibrillation (AED) and CPR as well as First Aid Understand the application and need for a

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

•

•

• • • • • • • • •

•

• • • • •

•

Route survey as well as how to conduct and brief them Drivers should be able to conduct their own route surveys and at minimum understand terms used by executive protection staff.

Many times the EP team conduct route assessments for the driver prior to hiring.

I strongly suggest if time allows that the driver always do his/her own route surveys. It is one thing to say you understand the path of travel and another to have driven the route several times before the threat becomes reality.

Understand the need for contingency plans and where to go if something happens.

Know how to use technology such as GPS and other basic communication devices.

Prepared to move at a moments notice Ensures safe and comfortable transportation Knows the vehicle extensively (could be a rental) Reacts to any threat and understands the importance of instructions from the Agent in Charge or Shift Leader Knows all primary and secondary routes and all react routes such as routes to hospitals and safe havens Has driven all the routes and is aware that landmarks look different depending on time of day and night Ensures that the vehicle is clean inside and out, checks the vehicle’s mechanical condition (ex. - oil, tires, power steering fluid, belts, radiator coolant levels, wipers, brakes, lights, flashers, headlights, horn and all emergency equipment – airbags fuel cut of switches, etc.)

Accounts for all emergency equipment and verifies it is functioning. Ensures all weapons are accounted for, loaded and in the proper carry position. Test all doors and automatic locks. Asks if unfamiliar with an item or it’s use.

Ensures vehicle log is present and filled out, notes any problems with vehicle or security issues.

Sets vehicle 30 minutes prior to scheduled departure and is ready to be in place when called.

Starts the engine 15 minutes prior to scheduled departure.

Knows the motorcade route (even if there is a lead vehicle) so that the motorcade may continue if the lead car is lost.

Understands there must be NO surprises.

The driver cannot react to danger if he or she does not know what is right and wrong, or not part of the norm.

Safeguard car keys. When the vehicle is not in use, it should be locked and it’s keys kept inside the command post. A spare set should be kept in the follow car, when en-route.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is the President of ADSI. (Website: (http://www.1adsi.com)

Vol. 25, No.1

Protective Driving Executive Awareness Security Driver Bodyguard Seminar Protective Security Operations Threat Detection Nanny Driving & Security Awareness High Risk Driving Firearms Programs Corporate Fleet Driver Training Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) Training

ADSI is an internationally recognized advanced driving school, specializing in training Security Drivers, Executive Protection Teams and hosting many Corporate Fleet Safety Programs. We have the ability to design and implement courses for a wide audience, specializing in Corporate Security, Military and Law Enforcement training.

Advanced Driving & Security Inc.

5 Franklin Rd. Suite 5 East Greenwich, RI 02818 1-401-294-1600 Office Ext 2 Corporate/Private Security / LE / MIL Ext 3 High Performance 1-401-398-7932 Fax info@1adsi.com

www.1adsi.com

An IACSP Q&A

with Chief Inspector Daniel P. MacDonald

C 50

hief Inspector Daniel MacDonald has served in the Philadelphia Police Department for more than 27 years.

He is currently the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau.

Previous posts include Chief of the Narcotics Bureau, Staff Inspector of the Standards and Accountability Division, and the Captain of the 9th, 12th, and 8th Police Districts.

He has received 2 Commendations for Bravery, 5 Commendatory Citations, 8 Commendations for Merit, as well as other citations, certificates and awards.

He was awarded a Bronze Star Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters), Combat Infantryman’s Badge, Combat Action Badge, Army Commendation Medal, and other medals.

He is also a Captain and military intelligence officer in the U.S. Army Reserves. He served multiple tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan.

He received a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations and Dispute Resolution AMU, Bachelor of Arts Degree in Management AMU, PERF, Senior Management

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 25, No.1

Institute for Police Class 71, FBI National Academy, Class 241, Northwestern University School of Police Staff and Command, Class 166, and Drug Unit Commanders Academy Drug Enforcement Agency.

He was interviewed by Paul Davis.

IACSP: Can you give us an overview of

the Philadelphia Police Department’s Intelligence Bureau and its mission.?

MacDonald: The primary mission of the Intelligence Bureau is to provide relevant, timely, accurate and predictive information and intelligence for the operational commanders of the police department so they can deploy their forces properly to provide public safety. In November-December of 2016, the police commissioner was soliciting ideas for improving functions of the police department. I’m a military intelligence officer in the U.S. Army Reserves as well, so previously, working with Inspector Walt Smith - who was then the commanding officer of the Delaware Valley Intelligence Center - we had agreed that the intelligence function of the police department was not as efficient or as effective as it could be. To increase the efficiency and effectiveness, we should create a bureau-level entity that consolidates all the intelligence functions within the police department under once chain of command--not necessarily under one roof, but at least under one chain of command. The police commissioner agreed, and he told me to develop a proposal for that, which I did with help from the people who are currently working in the various intelligence apparatuses in the police department, as well as the data statistics folks. I sat down and came up with a proposal and the police commissioner approved it in March of 2017, and we established the Intelligence Bureau and started operations.

IACSP: What are the components within the Intelligence Bureau?

MacDonald: The Intelligence Bureau is

currently composed of the Criminal Intelligence Unit, which is also housed here in this building. They are the collection side of the house. They are commanded by a captain and the unit’s police officers do human intelligence collections, covert/overt collections, briefings, and such standard fare on

We’ve allowed the fusion center to be a 24/7 operation by leveraging the Real Time Crime Center.

The Real Time Crime Center is the fusion center for Philadelphia and the DVIC is the fusion center for the five counties. Because there was so much overlap there, we provided additional training so they can function on top of each other, and that way we can provide 24/7 coverage, not just for Philadelphia area, but for the region with the fusion side of the house.

the collection side of the house. The next component that we have is the Analysis and Investigations Section. That’s composed of a couple different sections. The main section is the analytical section, which has both police officers and civilian analysts who do analysis of crime and all sorts of things to determine what is going on and why.

Separate from that, we have a Geographic Information System (GIS) section. They do all the mapping and computer programs for us. They are the technical folks. Then we have a Research Section, led by a civilian supervisor, a Ph.D., and they do a lot of our studies. They take us to the next level in the way we analyze and look at stuff.

Also, we have a HIDA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program) Watch Center here. Then we have the Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC). This operation has a couple of supervisors and numerous analysts, sworn and civilian, that perform the fusion center functions. They sit next to the Real Time Crime Center, which is the City of Philadelphia’s Watch Center.

IACSP: Is that the section that monitors all the cameras around the city?

MacDonald: Right. We’ve allowed the

fusion center to be a 24/7 operation by leveraging the Real Time Crime Center.

The Real Time Crime Center is the fusion center for Philadelphia and the DVIC is the fusion center for the five counties.

Because there was so much overlap there, we provided additional training so they can function on top of each other, and that way we can provide 24/7 coverage, not just for Philadelphia area, but for the region with the fusion side of the house. We expanded those capabilities. Last year, I developed the 2019 Crime Fighting Strategy for the City of Philadelphia. We developed it out of here using intelligence-led models called Pinpoint.

IACSP: Is that available to the public?

MacDonald: Yes. It is the Pinpoint Strategy, part of the city’s road map for violence reduction. We developed that here. We requested additional budgetary funding to roll it out. It is a two-part kind of thing; it is intelligence-led, using data and human intelligence to identify the worst of the worst people, places and things, and then a planning and execution model where we

develop plans to target those problems, whether they be people, physical aspects, or whatever the problem is.

Then we can fix them using not just police, but all the city agencies. In a way, that’s a unity of effort. Finally, we take all the actions that are planned and executed and measure the actual results and determine what works and what doesn’t work in a scientific fashion. We got funding for a new information management system that rolling out.

IACSP: Do you use intelligence in the way the CIA, DIA, and the other national security agencies do, such as a system to rate how reliable the information you gather is?

national security intelligence and police

MacDonald: Yes. I’ve been up and talk- intelligence?

ed to Deputy Commissioner John Miller.

IACSP: He’s an interesting guy. He in-

terviewed Osama bin Laden before 9/11 when he was a journalist.

MacDonald: I’ve talked to Thomas

Galati, he’s the chief of intelligence up there. I’ve looked at a lot of their stuff and we’ve worked with them quite often.

They have some really good stuff going on.

We’ve adopted some of their stuff. They send us information every day.

IACSP: Does your DVIC fusion center

have federal agency liaisons here?

MacDonald: Yes. Under the fusion MacDonald: Yes. We use a standard center umbrella, the FBI and DHS are reliability system. It follows the DHS and FBI format for reliability. All of our intelligence products and sources of information are given reliability grades.

We’ve migrated some of our focus away from the terrorism mission, not that we’ve stopped focusing on terrorism, but what is the biggest problem in Philadelphia?

What’s the biggest killer, what are the things that takes the most lives? Opioids last year took 1,200 people. Then there were a thousand shootings last year resulting in 351 homicides. They are as bad as terrorism.

IACSP: Terrorism doesn’t happen often,

thankfully, but when it does, it is often catastrophic.

MacDonald: Right. You need the infra-

structure and you need to keep your eye on that, but you also need to look at what is killing you every day. And to honest, there is very little terrorist activity that goes down without a criminal nexus.

here full time. The Coast Guard is in the building full time. The DEA is here. A lot of seats. The purpose of a fusion center is to share information. The Intelligence Bureau is bigger than the fusion center, but it is a fusion center on steroids when you make it a bureau, because they are collectors and holders of information that we may need for any number of reasons.

I’m hiring 15 to 20 civilian analysts next month. They will be forward deployed to the districts.

MacDonald: Yes. We are strictly intel;

we don’t run operations. We run intelligence. Counterterrorism has an operational component as well.

IACSP: Have you looked at the New York

City Police Department’s Intelligence Bureau? They’ve been highly praised.

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IACSP: Who are the truly bad guys in

Philadelphia? Who are the top threats that you are looking at every day?

MacDonald: Criminal threats. We have active investigations on a number of different groups, but I don’t want to get into the groups. There are 200 active and inactive gangs in Philadelphia. These are criminal organizations in the city, and they can be anywhere from 5 to 10 guys to 30 to 40 guys in gangs engaged in criminal enterprises.

IACSP: Would that include organized

crime?

MacDonald: Yes, we’re looking at

organized crime. The biggest threats to

IACSP: You’re putting them right in the life right now in my opinion would be district police stations?

MacDonald: They will be working for

the Intelligence Bureau, but they will be supporting the district captain. My goal is to put a civilian analyst working with a sworn partner in every district. Everybody needs intelligence.

IACSP: What will the analysts be doing at the districts?

IACSP: And the Philadelphia Police De- MacDonald: Their job is to gather inpartment has a Counterterrorism Bureau as well, right?

MacDonald: When you’re doing national security level intelligence, CIA, DIA, NSA, they are operating on Executive Order 12333 and not collecting on U.S. persons unless there is some significant stuff. We’re working with criminal predicates. We have to have reasonable suspicion or probable cause for the purpose of our collections. On the analyst side, there isn’t a difference. You’re using the same tried and true techniques.

formation. The idea is that they will have available in the field all of the information here. The methodology we use is to combine the data with the human intelligence and with street knowledge that doesn’t live in a database anywhere. About 80 per cent of what we do every day is not written down anywhere. The goal is to get as much out of their heads as possible.

the violent drug gangs that are selling fentanyl-laced products. The one aspect of it is that they are a drug gang and they are violent, and the second level is the fentanyl product. When you combine overdose deaths with homicides, the biggest threats in Philadelphia are the criminal narcotics gangs that sell fentanyl. There are plenty of other threats out there, but this is the immediate threat.

We still look at the other threats. We have a whole section that is dedicated to terrorism. When I was in Afghanistan, I was the chief intel advisor to the Afghan Border Police in the sector where I was working, and I found the lion’s share of the terrorist groups that were operating out there were first and foremost criminal organizations and terrorists second.

If you’re not looking at them from both ways, you’re missing something.

IACSP: Thank you for speaking to IACSP: What is the difference between us and thank you for your service.

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The American Terrorist:

Everything You Need to Know to be a Subject Matter Expert

R

Terry Oroszi and David Ellis, (Dayton, OH: Greylander Press, 2019) 238 pages, $24.95 [Paperback], 238 pages, ISBN: 978-0-9821-6832-5.

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ecent terrorist attacks in the United States against

Terrorism: General

IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

congregants at houses of worship, TV broadcast media and public figures highlight the continued severity of domestic terrorism.

Who are the domestic terrorists, what are their motivations, how do they become radicalized into violence, where do they live, who do they target and what can be done to mitigate their threat? These questions are answered by Terry Oroszi and David Ellis in their excellent book, “The

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

American Terrorist: Everything You Need To Know To Be A Subject Matter Expert.�

In it, the authors utilize their database of 519 Americans charged with acts related to terrorism from September 2001 to December 2018 to compile a general profile of the domestic terrorist.

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Both authors are professors at Wright-State University’s School of Medicine in Ohio, where, in addition to their teaching, they conduct research on terrorism using their medical specialization to empirically profile individuals who engage in terrorist-related activities.

The authors explain that domestic terrorists fall into three types: (1) Traditional cells of individuals belonging to some 29 domestic groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front, Antifa, Army of God, Aryan Nations, Phineas Priesthood and Sovereign Citizens Movement, with other cells acting on behalf of foreign groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS). (2) Self-starter cells that are loosely affiliated with terrorist groups. These usually consist of two or more actors, such as the group of six Muslim men who were arrested in May 2007 for plotting to attack the Army’s Fort Dix base in New Jersey, or the Tsarnaev brothers who carried out the April 2013 bombing of the Boston Marathon. And (3) Lone actors who operate on their own without other associates.

Examples include Omar Mateen, the mass shooter at the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida, in mid-June 2016.

Once identified, the next step is to profile terrorists’ characteristics. Here, the authors explain that “Terrorist profiling is the science of identifying qualities that predict the probability that an individual will become a terrorist.” Such “reproducible indicators,” they explain, “become a red flag” that “an individual may be susceptible to radicalization or may already be a terrorist.” What are the warning indicators? First, where reliable figures are available, the majority of U.S.

citizens charged with terrorism-related acts are male (90 percent), between the ages of 15 to 40 (80 percent), educated (61 percent), and have no girlfriend or wife (81 percent).

be our neighbor” by recognizing “the signs of someone vulnerable to recruitment into terrorism, perhaps we can also find an intervention that will prevent their radicalization.”

Although no reliable figures are available, the authors point to the academic literature’s findings that a majority of terrorists are likely raised without a father figure, and, most importantly, feel “displaced or alienated” resulting in their intense anger and sense of victimhood.

This leads such individuals who feel “isolated, displaced, alienated and lonely” to join terrorist organizations because they provide “comraderie and offer new purpose, new direction.”

Knowing where terrorists reside also aids in identifying potential targets since they tend to attack targets in their vicinity, such as military bases or government buildings.

An interesting finding is that among the Americans arrested for terrorism-related activities, lone actors are “over thirteen times more likely to have mental illness than terrorists sponsored by a larger organization” because such organizations prefer “the most capable people as members, and so anyone perceived as weak or unable to complete tasks are likely to be passed over for membership.”

In the intriguingly titled chapter “Is Your Neighbor a Terrorist?” the authors note that the 10 states with the most terrorists are led by New York (and New York City, in particular), followed by Virginia, California, Minnesota, Ohio, Florida, Texas, Michigan, Illinois and New Jersey.

This finding is important, the authors explain, because “Many imagine that terrorists are people we do not know from far-away places” so by being aware that “terrorists or people who are susceptible to becoming a terrorist might

Arresting a terrorist prior to an attack is difficult, but, the authors point out, the FBI’s investigatory measures are effective in preventing numerous plots. Once a tip is received about a suspect, the FBI will employ an undercover agent or informant to “befriend the person of interest,” which will be followed by “a sting” in which that person will be given the opportunity to follow through with what they think is “an act.”

This is not an entrapment, the authors explain, because these wannabe terrorists are being caught in the act. This measure is effective, with the FBI preventing “American terrorists from completing their goals in sixty-four percent of the cases.”

A final measure to prevent terrorism is to direct susceptible individuals toward a different, nonviolent route to achieve their goals.

“By altering their path, we can eliminate the very attributes which terrorist recruiters use to identify potential targets,” the authors write.

The book’s database-driven analysis makes “The American Terrorist” a valuable resource for identifying those drawn to domestic terrorism and how they can be defeated.

Guerrilla Warfare: Kings of Revolution

Peter Polack, (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2018), 160 pages, $12.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-6120-0675-8.

This is an important account of the approaches of leading practitioners of guerrilla warfare – a warfare tactic that has been employed throughout ancient and modern history. Following the author’s introductory overview and a chronology of guerrilla warfare from 1297 to 2016, it profiles guerrilla army leaders such as William Wallace (13th century Scotland), General George Washington, Simon Bolivar (Venezuela), Koos de la Rey (South Africa), King Abdulaziz Bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud (the founder of modern-day Saudi Arabia), Mao Zedong (China), General Vo Nguyen Giap (Vietnam), Manuel Marulanda (Colombia), Jonas Savimbi (Angola), and Velupillai Prabhakaran (the leader of the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers. These leadership profiles analyze their personal history, military tactics, and political strategy, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of their guerrilla tactics including the counterinsurgency strategies that were employed by their adversaries. Some of the findings include the importance of the tactic of exploiting the adversary military’s choke point, Sun Tzu’s recommendation to “avoid the strong and attack the weak,” and, for the large military to beware of hubris in confronting its supposedly weaker guerrilla force.

A Shadow of War: Archaeological Approaches to Uncovering the Darker Sides of Conflict From the 20th Century

Claudia Theune, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Sidestone Press, 2018), 208 pages, $24.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-9-0889-0454-7.

An interesting account of how to understand the nature of brutal conflict over the past 100 years through archaeological research and excavation of relics at the sites where such violence took place. The book’s chapters begin with an overview of the field of contemporary archaeology; sources and methodology used in the research; the sites and monuments of the wars and conflicts covered in the research, such as in the First World War, Nazi concentration camps, and the Cold War; the archaeology of civil disobedience; paying tribute to the dead; the world of small finds; a global perspective on the study’s findings, and the contribution of archaeology and commemoration. This approach reveals important details about daily life, such as the lives of people fighting in battlefields and trenches and survival conditions in internment camps. The Appendix includes a listing of memorials and museums utilized in the research.

Daesh: Islamic State’s Holy War

Anthony Tucker-Jones, (South Yorkshire, England, UK: Pen and Sword/Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishing, 2018), 128 pages, $22.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5267-2881-4.

The emergence in mid-2014 of the terrorist group Islamic State (IS), also known by its Arabic acronym Daesh, in Iraq and Syria, as the violently genocidal successor to what had been al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), established one of the greatest threats to global security today.

With the IS establishing a self-proclaimed “caliphate” in the territories it controlled in Iraq and Syria, which, fortunately, have since then been largely rolled back by the U.S.-led military coalition, the terror group has regenerated by continuing to operate through its franchises and cells in other vulnerable countries around the world, including in cyberspace, where its propaganda in extremist websites serves to radicalize and recruit additional members.

In the latest example of the Islamic State’s genocidal brutality, on Easter Sunday of this year, its local cell in Sri Lanka conducted a simultaneous series of suicide bombings at churches and luxury hotels in Sri Lanka, killing an estimated 258 people and wounding more than 500 others.

Anthony Tucker-Jones’ “Daesh: Islamic State’s Holy War” is an excellent and concise overview of its origins, multifaceted nature and terrorist activities. The author is well-informed on these issues given his background as a former British defense intelligence officer who has written more than 30 books on military subjects.

As Mr. Tucker-Jones explains, the IS was the successor to AQI under its former leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whose violent brutality became so notorious that it led Ayman al-Zarqawi, Usama bin Laden’s deputy at the time, so write him a letter in July 2005 cautioning him to ‘moderate’ his group’s attacks, especially against fellow Muslims. With al-Zarqawi killed by a U.S. aerial strike at his Iraqi hideout in early July 2006, he was eventually succeeded

by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (a nom de guerre) in May 2010, who proceeded to reconstitute the remnants of AQI and other jihadi forces into the newly formed IS in 2014.

The Islamic State’s destructiveness is manifold, as the author writes that with “torture, sexual abuse and non-judicial killings” part of its armory of terror, “it successfully undermined the fabric of society in every country it touched. Its public relations offensive, while barbaric and immoral with beheadings and burnings, was crude, it succeeded in creating fear and revulsion. As a terror organization it was at the height of its game.”

Most of the book’s chapters discuss the terrorist activities by IS’ cells and lone actor adherents, especially in Western Europe, the United States and Canada, and Australia. What makes such individuals join a terrorist group that propagates “anarchy and mayhem, like the

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bureaucracy of murder”? The author explains that leaked IS files provide an understanding of their recruitment methods, with many members having “criminal records and little detailed understanding of the Muslim faith.

Often it was simply a case of young people looking for direction. These rebels without a cause often make potential jihadists.”

The Church Security Handbook: A Practical, Biblical Guide for Protecting Your Congregation in Uncertain Times

A subject that is especially pertinent today is the author’s discussion of the measures required by governments to manage the threat posed by the radicalized extremists from the West who joined IS as “foreign fighters.”

To explain this phenomenon, he writes in the chapter “Holy War Tourists” that “War tourists have long been a feature of distant wars: those who go to fight are either seen as idealized freedom fighters or just plain mercenaries. Whatever the ideology that motivates them, for some there is also a perverse glamour to being in a war zone and being a fighter for a just cause. It is noticeable how foreign volunteers always adopt the fighting fashions of their hosts — often to comical if ultimately deadly affect.”

This concise guide provides authoritative and practical measures to protect houses of worship from violent assailants. Starting with proverbs’ 22:3’s admonition that “a prudent person foresees danger and takes precautions,” the author likens preparing for a violent assailant at a house of worship to the everyday precautions of wearing a seat belt or locking one’s house doors at night. Among the guide’s numerous insights is the author’s discussion of what he terms the “normalcy bias,” which can “lead to deadly consequences” because it is the default mode that “causes people to underestimate, minimize and rationalize a crisis. It’s part of a subconscious belief that, since something has never happened to us, it cannot happen and is not happening.” The guide then proceeds to discuss critical issues about security such as understanding the odds of an attack against one’s congregation; how to establish a security team without a “fortress mentality;” the issues involved in determining whether a security team needs to be armed or unarmed, considerations in how to select and train one’s security team, and using a layered security approach to deploy a security team, for instance, within an auditorium, in the lobby, and in the parking lot. This guide is highly recommended as an easy, inexpensive, and indispensable first step in preparing one’s congregation to establish a robust security program while maintaining an open, welcoming, and spiritual environment. The author, a former law enforcement officer with extensive SWAT experience, is president of Strategos International (www.strategosintl. com), of Grandview, MO, which is considered one of the nation’s leading trainers in emergency management, especially in protecting houses of worship.

What led to Islamic State’s decline and the loss of its territorial ‘caliphate’ in Syria and Iraq? The author explains that “conquering territory and running an effective administration” are “two entirely different things” and that it could no longer prop itself up once its revenues from its illicit activities, such as looting antiquities and oil, dried up, which were accompanied by its military defeats and the subsequent dispersals of its fighters and their families to other areas.

He cautions, however, that “its ideology of hatred” and capability to conduct terrorist attacks elsewhere remain intact because, as he concludes, “As far as Daesh is concerned, it is waging an ancient holy war that will never be extinguished.”

Such insights make this concise book a valuable resource for understanding the magnitude of the threat posed by the Islamic State and what must be done to defeat it.

Security for Holy Places: How to Do a Security Plan and Get Financial Help

Stephen D. Bryen, (Washington, DC: SDB Partners LLC, 2019) 207 pages, No Cost [PDF copy available at www.securityforholyplaces.org], ISBN: 9781-6460-6094-8.

Terrorism: Protecting Houses of Worship

Now that the IS has been largely defeated in Syria, many of these former “foreign fighters” and their wives and children seek to return to their home countries, thereby presenting dilemmas that need to be addressed.

The author’s recommendation is noteworthy, as he writes that a series of factors need to be considered: “While prosecution and prison may be the best course for some hardliners, for others who have simply been led astray or are simply idealized youths out to change the world, a better route might be reintegration with the support of social and mental health services.”

Vaughn Baker, (Grandview, MO: Strategos International, 2017), 60 pages, $9.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-9796-6177-5.

This is a comprehensive and authoritative security guide for houses of worship, including an innovative section on how to obtain financial assistance to establish a security program – a crucial component in enabling them to establish a robust security posture. The handbook consists of 10 chapters: (1) an overview of the threat posed by firearms, the role of gun laws, and the characteristics of active shooters; (2) an overview of the threats posed by bombs (including suicide bombers), and stabbings; (3) basic security concepts, including a critique of the response protocol of “Run, Hide, Fight”; (4) establishing perimeter security; (5) establishing interior security; (6) the challenge of protecting religious recreational camps; (7) the roles and benefits of security technologies, such as camera systems, gunshot detection, alert systems and alarms, and lighting and sirens; (8) decision-making considerations in hiring security guards, conducting physical vulnerability assessments, and assessing security technology requirements; (9) how to obtain financial assistance from various funding sources in establishing a security program in the United States, Canada, Britain, and Australia; (10) considerations in establishing security committees in houses of worship, including their authority

and responsibilities; and (11) conclusions. Among the author’s conclusions is the insight that “The most important element for successful deterrence is security visibility” because “unobtrusive guards and volunteers lose their deterrent value if they are unrecognizable” since this leaves “the congregation in doubt that they are protected.” Dr. Bryen is a leading expert in security strategy and technology. He has held senior positions in the Department of Defense, on Capitol Hill, as the President of a large multinational defense and technology company, and is currently a consultant to a multinational security company. He can be reached at: author@securityforholyplaces.org.

Vlakplaas: Apartheid Death Squads, 1979-1994 Terrorism: Africa

Robin Binckes, (South Yorkshire, England, UK: Pen & Sword Books/Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishing, 2018), 128 pages, $22.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5267-2921-7.

A detailed and interesting account of Vlakplaas (meaning ‘shalow farm’), the former covert military camp and counter-terrorism division of the South African Police, which was established in 1979 during the country’s Apartheid period. The author divides its operations into three phases. The first phase, from 1979 to 1989, focused on countering the African National Congress’s Umkhonto we Sizwe (or ‘MK’), the Pan Africanist Congress’s Azanian People’s Liberation Army (or APLA) and the South African Communist Party. The second phase focused on countering criminal elements, particularly in the crime-ridden downtown area of Johannesburg’s Hillbrow. In the final phase, the Vlakplaas, operating in what the author describes as the ‘Third Force,’ conducted operations that attempted to prevent the collapse of the Apartheid regime in the run-up to the first democratic elections in 1994. The Vlakplaas operated until 1994 when the apartheid regime was peacefully replaced by a new democratic political and social order. The book’s text is illustrated by numerous photographs.

Operations ‘Leopard’ and ‘Red Bean’ Kilwezi 1978: French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire

Daniel Kowalczuk, (Warwick, England, UK: Helion & Company Ltd., 2018), 80 pages, $29.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-9123-9059-5.

A lavishly photo-illustrated and detailed account of the history of the FNLC (Front for the National Liberation of the Congo: ex-Katanga Gendarmerie) in Angola and Zaire. Also discussed is the political situation under the Mobutu regime; FNLC’s guerrilla incursions across the Zaire border, which the author divides into the two phases of “Shaba Wars I and II”; and armed activities including hostage taking in the mining town of Kolwezi. Also discussed are the French Foreign Legion and Belgian Para Commando airborne operation and freeing of the hostages, which ultimately led to the defeat of the FNLC. In addition to the black-and-white and color photos, the book includes illustrations of the military equipment used in the operation, including fighter aircraft, and battlefield maps.

Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front: Blood Diamonds, Child Soldiers and Cannibalism, 1991-2002

Al J. Venter, (South Yorkshire, England, UK: Pen & Sword Books/Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishing, 2018), 128 pages, $22.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5267-2877-7.

This is an interesting and detailed account of Sierra Leone’s brutal eleven-year guerrilla war, which resulted in the death of more than 50,000 people, the majority civilians. The insurgency was started

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Terrorism: Central America Terrorism: Isreal

by the Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which was backed by Liberian dictator Charles Taylor and Libya’s Muammar Gadaffi, also included some 11,000 child soldiers. Also discussed is the role of foreign military assistance in the form of Executive Outcome, the private military force, the British military, and the intervention by the United Nations. The book’s text is illustrated by numerous photographs.

Nicaragua 1961-1990: Volume 1: The Downfall of the Somoza Dictatorship David Francois, (Warwick, England, UK: Helion & Company Ltd., 2018), 72 pages, $29.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-9116-2821-7.

A lavishly photo-illustrated and detailed chronological account of the Somoza military dictatorship in Nicaragua and its overthrow in 1979 by the Sandinista insurgents. Also discussed are details of the military and insurgent forces involved in the conflict, including their ideologies, organization, and equipment. In addition to the black-and-white and color photos, the book includes illustrations of the military forces and equipment used in the conflict, including fighter aircraft, armor, and battlefield maps.

Sha’I ben-Tekoa, Phantom Nation: Inventing the ‘Palestinians’ as the Obstacle to Peace [Two Volume Box Set] (New York, NY: Gefen Publishing House, 2018), 1380 pages, $70.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-9-6522-9925-3.

Utilizing primary sources and news reports, this is a comprehensive and authoritative account of the factual basis behind Palestinian nationalism from the 19th century until the current period and its opposition to the legitimacy of Israeli statehood. Following the author’s prologue, the two volumes’ chapters cover topics such as the ‘actual’ history of Palestine, Palestinian nationalism’s “deleting of Zionist history (1870-1939),” Palestinian participation in Nazi Germany’s Holocaust, the early period in Israeli independence (1949-1954), Algeria and the birth of Fatah (1954-1959), the Six-Day War and UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), the capture of the West Bank and beginnings of Palestinian terrorism after 1967, the origin and evolution of radical Islamist militancy among the Palestinians in the form of Hamas, the contentious Oslo Peace Accords and their consequences, the problematic nature of the Palestinian Authority, and Israeli responses to all of these developments. Although one may not necessarily agree with the author’s conclusion that “The idea of the ‘Palestinians’ has been a fabrication by the Arabs whose only books of enduring international fame are the Quran and A Thousand and One Nights…” (page 789), he is correct in his observation that “Peace will come when Islam undergoes its own version of a Protestant Reformation and/or produces an Islamic Nostra Aetate [doctrinal recognition of Judaism as a legitimate religion].” (page 794) This book is highly recommended as a valuable documentary resource, backed by the author’s well-written narrative, for understanding the contentious relations between the Palestinians and Israelis from the 19th century to the current period.

Israel for Perplexed Beginners: A Crash Course in Understanding Israelis Angelo Colorni, (New York, NY: Gefen Publishing House, 2018), 104 pages, $13.56 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-9-6522-9960-4.

Although this short and lively book is intended to serve as a guide for new immigrants and tourists to understand how to acclimate to the Israeli psyche and daily life, it is also useful in understanding how Israelis view serving in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and coping with the constant threat of terrorism. Especially notable is the author’s insight that “If you want peace, prepare for war,”

and that “The overall concept is that if you deal with a problem before it becomes a problem, you may have already gotten the solution under way, an ideology based on the stark reality that – unlike its enemies who are used to losing wars – Israel cannot afford to lose a single one.” (page 66).

Another insight is that “Israelis grow up internalizing the thought that there are people out there are mean harm to them, are determined to harm them, and spare no effort to harm them. Israelis are thus typically more circumspect and everywhere more aware of their surroundings than other nationals. And they go on with their lives.” (pages 42-43) Most of this book’s fascinating chapters discuss topics such as social interactions with Israelis, employment, housing, dress code, national symbols, the media, elections, cuisine, technological innovation, road signs, and navigating BenGurion International Airport.

Irgun: Revisionist Zionism, 1931-1948

Terrorism: South Asia

Gerry Van Tonder, (South Yorkshire, England, UK: Pen & Sword Books/Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishing, 2019), 128 pages, $22.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5267-2869-2.

This is an interesting and detailed account of the Irgun Tsvai Leumi (“National Military Organization,” known as the ‘Irgun’), the quasi-military organization of the pre-1948 Israeli State’s right-wing dissident political movement. Founded in 1931, the Irgun conducted terrorist-type operations against the British Mandate which administered Palestine from around 1921 to 1948. It also attacked the hostile and threatening Palestinian Arab forces. The Irgun’s most notable terrorist operation was the July 1946 bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which served as the hub of the British administration, which killed 91 British personnel and wounded 46 others. This account also discusses the capturing of Irgun operatives by the British forces. Interestingly, the Irgun’s size was less than 100 commanders and fighters and its role in bringing about Israeli statehood was superseded by the Hagana and Palmach, the primary para-military forces of the mainstream Zionist leadership in historical Palestine. The Irgun was dissolved several months following Israeli independence on May 14, 1948. The book’s text is illustrated by numerous photographs.

Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers: The Rare Victory of Sri Lanka’s Long War

Paul Moorcraft, (South Yorkshire, England, UK: Pen & Sword Books/Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishing, 2012), 208 pages, $34.95 [Hardcover], $24.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-7815-9304-2.

An informative and detailed account of how the Sri Lankan government’s forces succeeded in 2009 in defeating the Tamil Tiger insurgency after 26 years of civil war. The author’s account is based on extensive research in Sri Lanka, where he interviewed the country’s leading politicians (including the President and his brother, the Defence Permanent Secretary), senior generals, intelligence chiefs, civil servants, UN officials, foreign diplomats and NGOs. He also interviewed the surviving leader of the Tamil Tigers. Among the author’s findings is that the authorities were determined to stamp out Tamil Tiger resistance by utilizing brutal methods – which, in cases where they are challenged by a brutal insurgent group, may be necessary, although highly contentious.

The reviews of “The American Terrorist” and “Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers” originally appeared in “The Washington Times.” They are reprinted by permission.

About the Reviewer Dr. Joshua Sinai is a Washington, DC-based consultant in the field of counterterrorism and homeland security studies. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

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