The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V24N2

3D Printing: What Counterterrorism Professionals Need To Know

Assessing Trends

In The Terrorist Threats Against Jordan

Looking Back:

American Covert Regime Change Operations

Counter-Sniping Response

To The Terrifying Nature Of Sniper And Active Shooter Ambushes

Growing Problems:

How Security Threats Have Become The Dark Side Of The Cannabis Industry

Homeland Security Bookshelf

Vol. 24 No. 2 2018 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

the carver critical infrastructure protection conference BY security Management International, llc

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November 16, 2018

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Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.2

Join the ranks of security and public safety professionals worldwide that have achieved the Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential as recognition of their unique expertise in the field of managing terrorism-related risk.

The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential is the global benchmark for recognizing career achievement and knowledge in the protection of facilities, organizations, and the public against acts of terrorism. The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer designation is awarded to a candidate who has met eligibility requirements and passed the cATO™ Certification Examination in accordance with the standards set forth by the Certifying Board of The International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP).

Becoming board certified as a Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer distinguishes you in the security and public safety profession by demonstrating your expertise in the specialized field of managing terrorism-related risk and commitment to the safety and welfare of your community.

Learn more and apply online:

www.catocertification.org

Vol. 24, No. 2 Summer 2018 Publisher Steven J. Fustero

Page 16

Senior Editor N. J. Florence

Assessing Trends In The Terrorist Threats Against Jordan And Its Counterterrorism Countermeasures

Contributing Writers Jim Weiss Mickey Davis Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe

by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

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Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

3D Printing: What Counterterrorism Professionals Need To Know

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio

by David Gewirtz

Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan

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Page 10 Page 12

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SITREP, Terrorism Trends & Forecasts 3D Printing: What Counterterrorism Professionals Need To Know, by David Gewirtz IACSP Update: Drug Lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, by Paul Davis Growing Problems: How Security Threats Have Become The Dark Side Of The Cannabis Industry, by Luke Bencie Assessing Trends In The Terrorist Threats Against Jordan And Its Counterterrorism Countermeasures, by Dr. Joshua Sinai Looking Back: American Covert Regime Change Operations From The Cold War To The War On Terror, by Jason Jacooley Counter-Sniping Response To The Terrifying Nature Of Sniper And Active Shooter Ambushes, by Jim Weiss, Bob O’Brien, and Mickey Davis The CARVER Methodology Origins: The Best Defense Always Comes From A Good Defense, by Luke Bencie and Sam Araboghli Security Driver: Vision Part Two, by Anthony Ricci An IACSP Q&A With Luke Hunt, Australian Journalist And Author Of Punji Trap IACSP Homeland Security Conference Review IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf, reviews by Dr. Joshua Sinai

THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2018. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 .

Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, Army.mil, Navy.mil, shutterstock.com and authors where applicable.

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Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten Director of Emergency Ops. Don L. Rondeau Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed

SITREP

TERRORISM TRENDS & FORECASTS Global Overview 2018 Trending Third Quarter 2018 In August, the Syrian regime and its allies upped attacks in the north west, pointing to an imminent offensive on rebelheld Idlib province, home to nearly three million people.

Recently, though, Turkey and Russia have agreed to create a safe zone in the Idlib province which may prevent more violence in the short term. The UN’s consultations with Yemen’s belligerents in September could re-energize peace talks; but failure could trigger more violence. In DR Congo, the government’s determination to bar the main opposition contenders from December’s presidential poll could provoke more protests, while Zimbabwe’s elections left the country even more divided. Uganda’s detention of a popular challenger sparked protests, which the authorities put down with force. Mob violence rose in eastern Ethiopia, and Chad responded with force

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to a rebel attack. The exodus of Venezuelans to neighboring countries presented a growing regional threat, with the government’s new economic reform package making things worse. A forthcoming referendum in Macedonia could bring the country another step closer to resolution of its longstanding name dispute with Greece.

Saudi-led coalition intensified and coalition strikes killed more civilians, including at least 50 children.

Trends and Outlook

In sharp contrast to the recent positive stories coming out of Ethiopia – a drive toward more liberal domestic policies and more friendly regional relations – mob violence rose, especially in the eastern Somali region, where youth and the region’s police targeted ethnic minorities

Intense fighting erupted in Libya’s capital Tripoli between militias linked to the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), and the violence could escalate further in September. Clashes broke out late August between fighters of the Seventh Brigade, a militia formed by the GNA’s defense ministry in 2017, and a coalition of armed groups operating under the GNA’s interior ministry.

Meanwhile, infighting between Yemeni forces in the

Zimbabwe’s contested elections and the military’s crackdown on opposition supporters, killing six, have undermined the government’s legitimacy and deepened political divisions.

In the North Caucasus, Chechen authorities reported that the perpetrators of a series of attacks targeting police on 20 August ranged in age from eleven to sixteen. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attacks and released a video

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purportedly showing the young attackers pledging allegiance.

Conflict Risk Alerts • Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, Yemen, Libya Resolution Opportunities • Macedonia, Yemen Deteriorating Situations • Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Russia/North Caucasus, Venezuela, Syria, Libya Source: Crisisgroup.org

A Word About The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund As the nation marked the 17th anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the FBI has been helping to raise awareness about compensation available to law enforcement personnel and other first responders who have fallen ill as a result of their selfless acts in the days and weeks after the attacks.

in 2017, expecting a hero’s welcome. He was arrested, instead, charged with supporting the Jabhat al-Shamiya terrorist group, and sentenced to three years in Holland’s high-security prison exclusively for terrorists.

Speaking at the 9/11 Memorial & Museum in New York City last month, FBI Director Christopher Wray noted that in the past six months he has attended memorial services for three FBI special agents who died from illnesses related to their efforts in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

According to the World Trade Center Health Program there have been more than 7,500 cancer cases with more than 350 first responders having died from 9/11-related illnesses. The FBI has reported that 15 special agents have died from 9/11-related illnesses.

To date, according to the group’s website, nearly 21,000 individuals have become eligible for compensation, and more than 19,000 of them have been awarded funds. The total amount awarded exceeds $4.2 billion.

But there is no telling when a first responder might fall ill. Officials encourage law enforcement officers and emergency personnel who worked at 9/11 sites, and who may be at risk of illness, to register for possible compensation even if they are not ill now.

https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/ first-responders-and-the-911-victimcompensation-fund

Investigation Finds Dutch Program Aided Terror-Tied Groups When “Driss M” left his home in the Netherlands to join the fight in Syria, he was, he said later, heading there to fight against ISIS, not with them, alongside the Free Syrian Army. He returned

Now it seems the government that convicted him may be guilty of the same crimes.

Extensive investigative reporting by Dutch newspaper Trouw and news program Nieuwsuur revealed that the government had sent support to 22 armed groups in Syria – including Jabhat al-Shamiya – to the tune of €25 million (almost $30 million).

That fact points to an ongoing challenge for Western governments that have tried supporting anti-Assad forces. Like the Levant Front, many associate themselves both with terror groups and with non-terrorist rebel armies.

Knowing who stands in which camp has continued to confound throughout the Syrian war. Most recently, for instance, anti-Assad groups joined together to fight ISIS under the banner of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham; now, some fear that same organization will replace ISIS in a struggle to found an Islamic caliphate in the region.

Source: Abigail R. Esman and The Investigative Project on Terrorism, www. investigative project.org

Personal Security: Beware of Hurrican Relief Scams Be careful how you pay • If someone wants donations in cash, by gift card, or by wiring money, don’t do it.

That’s how scammers ask you to pay.

• To be safer, pay by credit card or check.

• It’s a good practice to keep a record of all donations.

And review your statements closely to make sure you’re only charged the amount you agreed to donate – and that you’re not signed up to make a recurring donation.

• Before clicking on a link to donate online, make sure you know who is receiving your donation. Read Donating Through an Online Giving Portal for more information.

Keep scammers’ tricks in mind • Don’t let anyone rush you into making a donation.

That’s something scammers do.

• Some scammers try to trick you into paying them by thanking you for a donation that you never made.

• Scammers can change caller ID to make a call look like it’s from a local area code.

• Some scammers use names that sound a lot like the names of real charities. This is one reason it pays to do some research before giving.

• Scammers make lots of vague and sentimental claims but give no specifics about how your donation will be used.

• Bogus organizations may claim that your donation is tax-deductible when it is not.

• Guaranteeing sweepstakes winnings in exchange for a donation is not only a scam, it’s illegal.

Report scams to FTC.gov/complaint. Find your state charity regulator at nasconet.org and report to them, too. Share any information you have – like the name of the organization or fundraiser, phone number, and what the fundraiser said.

Terrorism Attacks Decline Globally for Third Straight Year, Database Shows Number of fatal victims fell by half from 2014 to 2017. The University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database has just produced updated data showing terror attacks peaked in 2014 with about 17,000 events, then declined to about 11,000 in 2017.

Fatalities from the attacks fell by about half during the same time.

A large part of the decrease can be attributed to the continuing loss of power for ISIS, although the group still remained the most active overall according to an analysis of the data by Quartz.

The number of attacks ISIS was responsible for in 2017 fell by about 10 percent, yet at the same time the number of fatalities that group was responsible for fell more sharply by 40 percent.

Despite the decreases, the totals would still need to be halved in order to return to levels last seen in 2010 and 2011.

This entry was posted in National Security and tagged Terrorism. Bookmark the permalink.

IACSP News Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email address, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com Until next time, as always, be vigilant and safe.

Thank you. Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Operations/IACSP

What Counterterrorism Professionals Need to Know About 3D Printing and Desktop Fabrication

O

By David Gewirtz

Photo Credit: Seized plastic handguns which were created using 3D printing technology are displayed at Kanagawa police station in Yokohama, south of Tokyo, in this photo taken by Kyodo May 8, 2014. Yoshimoto Imura became the first man to be arrested in Japan for illegal possession of two guns he created himself using 3D printing technology, Japanese media said on Thursday. Japanese media said. Mandatory credit REUTERS/Kyodo

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ver the past few months, there’s been a lot of discussion about 3D printed guns. In most cases, the hype is overblown. But for counterterrorism professionals, 3D printed guns (and other fabricated weapons) may well be a real threat.

To understand this situation, it’s first important to understand what it is about 3D printed guns that may be a threat for counterterrorism professionals.

Most of the breathless news reports make it seem like 3D printers are something like Star Trek replicators. They imply that all you have to do is push a button and a fully-constructed, deadly weapon will blink into near instant existence.

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With today’s 3D printing technology, that couldn’t be farther from the truth.

Let’s first clarify what the press is implying when they’re talking about 3D printing. They are talking about the ability to download a file (like a PDF, but for 3D printing) that can be used to print an object on a consumer-grade 3D printer (which cost from about $200-4,000).

This furor revolves around the idea that anyone (regardless of technical or mechanical skill) can produce a weapon with this new class of printer.

There is risk to this technology. But there is risk to almost every technology we’ve looked at.

Technology that helps mankind can

To explore what this really means from a counterterrorism perspective, we need to distinguish between home or consumer devices and industrial factories. A wellfunded terrorist organization can purchase the industrial equipment and stock a facility with trained machinists. But that’s not what the fuss is about.

also be corrupted

The fuss is about the idea that factory/industrial level production facilities can now be replicated in a home garage for roughly the cost of a month’s rent. This category of computer-aided fabrication machinery does exist.

networking. And so it

The key contrast between desktop fabrication gear you might find in a garage and the industrial fabrication gear is profound.

It’s like the difference between a child’s bicycle and an 18-wheeler. Both will move you down the street, but their capabilities are vastly divergent.

Industrial 3D printing can produce weapons parts. But so can industrial computer-aided cutting machines and other factory tools.

While there is certainly a concern about terrorist organizations using factory-like techniques to produce weapons, that’s not what the 3D printing discussion is really about.

The 3D printing discussion is about using fused deposition modeling (FDM) machines to print out plastic objects. These machines do this by extruding layers of plastic one on top of the other, until a certain depth is built up.

When it comes to strength, FDM tends to break down on the layer lines. In other words, it can crack. Work has been done on the part of filament vendors (the folks making the material that 3D printers print)

by mankind. So it is with the atom. So it is with computers.

So it is with social is with 3D printing and desktop fabrication. to make stronger materials, ranging from metal infused to carbon-fiber infused plastics, and even nylon (which is both strong and somewhat flexible).

3D printing also is notoriously unreliable.

There are a lot of variables in terms of the temperature the plastic is extruded, how well the object sticks to the printing bed as it cools, and how the layers adhere to each other. Large prints can take days and are often prone to failure.

If a print does succeed, it’s rarely finished.

It usually needs considerable sanding and other post-processing to clean it up to make it presentable or usable. Consumer 3D printing is definitely a neat technology, but it’s also a bit of a pain to use.

So where does this leave the terrorist threat?

Well, let’s be clear. With today’s consumer 3D printers printing plastic objects, no one is going to make a gun that can shoot multiple bullets with any level of reliability. It’s just as likely that the gun will splinter apart in the shooter’s hand than that a projectile will exit on a defined flight path.

It is possible to 3D print single-shot plastic weapons that may survive one or two uses.

That does present risk, because it is therefore possible for a plastic gun to make it past a metal detector or other metal-sensing security check. It also might be possible to hide a plastic gun in other plastic objects.

That said, there still needs to be a firing pin and ammunition, and that’s not going to be made of plastic. It’s just that the scanning footprint for a few small metal pieces is considerably smaller than the scanning footprint for a large, metal weapon.

Beyond that, the key take-away message is that computer-aided desktop manufacturing is getting better and better. Whether it’s something that’s additive (like layers of plastic being applied on top of each other) or something that’s subtractive (like a CNC milling away chunks of metal from a slab), this type of production is getting both cheaper and better.

That means that it may be possible, someday, for designers and engineers working for terrorist organizations in far-away countries to create the designs outside our borders, and merely email the production specs to small garage fabrication facilities inside our borders.

There is risk to this technology. But there is risk to almost every technology we’ve looked at. Technology that helps mankind can also be corrupted by mankind. So it is with the atom. So it is with computers. So it is with social networking. And so it is with 3D printing and desktop fabrication.

Your job is to stay alert and be aware of these technologies and how they’re evolving. That said, don’t let the hyperbolic ranting of the press freak you out. There is some truth in those overblown reports, but, at least for now, they are overblown. The replicators of Star Trek are still quite some distance in our future.

About the Author CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed. is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension. http://www.zdnet.com/ blog/diy-it/

Drug Lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman:

Once the Most Wanted Man in the World

By Paul Davis

J

FBI William F Sweeny

oaquin Guzman Loera, 59, a drug lord who was once listed by Forbes as one of the richest and most powerful businessmen in the world, now sits in a 20-by-12-foot cell in a special high-security area of the Metropolitan Correctional Center, the highest security prison in New York City.

Known as the MCC, the prison once held Gambino Cosa Nostra crime boss John Gotti, as well as several high-ranking al Qaeda terrorists.

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Guzman, known as “El Chapo,” or Shorty, due to his 5’6 height, famously escaped from Mexican prisons – twice - so extra security measures at the MCC are being taken to ensure that Guzman remains incarcerated as he waits to go to federal trial on charges that he was operating a continuing criminal enterprise and other drug-related crimes through his leadership of the Mexican organized crime syndicate the Sinaloa Cartel this coming April.

He has pled not guilty.

Guzman was extradited from Mexico on January 19, 2017 and the following day then-Acting Attorney General Sally Q. Yates announced that Guzman was arraigned on a 17-count superseding indictment in federal court in Brooklyn. Guzman will be prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices in Brooklyn and Miami.

The U.S. Justice Department indictment alleges that between January 1989 and December 2014, Guzman was responsible for heading up a drug cartel that imported and distributed massive amounts of illegal narcotics into the United States. The indictment also alleges that Guzman conspired to murder people who posed a threat to the criminal enterprise.

According to the Justice Department, Guzman’s drug trafficking from Mexico into the U.S. netted more than $14 billion dollars in cash.

“Guzman Loera is the alleged leader of a multi-billion-dollar, multi-national criminal enterprise that funneled drugs onto our streets and violence and misery into our communities”, Yates said at the announcement of the indictment last year. “We are deeply grateful to the Government of Mexico for their assistance in securing Guzman Loera’s extradition.

The Mexican people have suffered greatly at the hands of Guzman Loera and the Sinaloa Cartel. Mexican law enforcement officials have died in pursuit of him. We will honor their sacrifice.”

Yates was joined at the announcement of the indictment by a number of law enforcement officials, including the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Robert L. Capers.

“Guzman Loera is accused of using violence, including torture and murder, to maintain an iron-fisted grip on the drug trade across the U.S./Mexico border that invaded our community and others across the country,” Capers said. “As a result, Guzman Loera made billions of illicit dollars. This prosecution demonstrates that we will apply all available resources to dismantle the leadership of dangerous drug cartels, wherever they operate, and will not rest until we have done so.”

“This extradition is a tremendous victory for the citizens of Mexico and of the United States,” added DEA Acting Administrator Chuck Rosenberg.

“Two principles stand out: No one is above the law and we do not quit in the pursuit of justice.”

Guzman, the Justice Department maintains, oversaw the smuggling of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine and marijuana to wholesale distributors in Atlanta, Chicago, Miami,

The case against Guzman and the Sinaloa Cartel was investigated by the DEA, ICE, FBI and other law enforcement agencies, who worked with Mexican and Colombian law enforcement officials.

Guzman was born in the poor Mexican mountain village of La Tuna in 1957. He began his criminal career when he was 15 in 1972, working in the poppy and marijuana fields. Working his way up the ladder of the drug trade, Guzman founded the Sinaloa in 1989. Through bold, innovative and violent action, Guzman became as feared and as large a drug lord as Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar.

In 2016 the Chicago Crime Commission declared Guzman Public Enemy Number One, a dubious distinction once held by gangster Al Capone.

“This extradition is a tremendous victory for the citizens of Mexico and of the United States,” added DEA Acting Administrator Chuck Rosenberg. “Two principles stand out: No one is above the law and we do not quit in the pursuit of justice.”

According to the indictment, Guzman and Ismael Zambada Garcia, the leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel, conspired to import more than 200 metric tons of cocaine into the U.S. The cartel obtained drugs from Colombian drug trafficking organizations, such as the Colombian Norte del Valle Cartel, the Don Lucho Organization, and the Cifuentes Villa Organization. The drugs were transported from Colombia in planes, boats and even submarines into ports the Sinaloa Cartel controlled in Southern Mexico and other spots in Central America. The drugs were then shipped to distribution hubs in the United States.

The Justice Department also maintains that Guzman and the Sinaloa Cartel used “Sicarios,” hit men, who carried out hundreds of acts of violence in Mexico, including murder, to protect the drug trafficking operations. During the Sinaloa Cartel’s internecine war with the Juarez Cartel from 2007 to 2011, Guzman ordered his Sicarios to kill thousands of drug trafficking competitors. Many of the victims were beheaded and murdered in other gruesome manners.

“What Al Capone was to beer and whiskey during Prohibition, Guzman is to narcotics,” said Al Bilek, the executive vice president of the Chicago Crime Commission.

“Of the two, Guzman is by far the greater threat. He has more power and financial capability than Capone ever dreamed of.”

But now that once powerful drug lord languishes in a New York prison cell.

New York, Los Angeles, Arizona and other locations. The billons of dollars generated from the sale of the narcotics was then secretly sent back to Mexico.

“One of the most dangerous and feared drug kingpins will now be held accountable for his alleged crimes in the United States after decades of eluding law enforcement,” said William F. Sweeny, the FBI Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s New York field office. “After years of gathering evidence in multiple investigations, the FBI and our law enforcement partners will do everything we can to bring El Chapo to justice.”

About the Author Paul Davis is a contributing editor to the Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security Int’l.

Growing Problems:

DEA.GOV

How Security Threats Have Become the Dark Side of the Cannabis Industry

W

By Luke Bencie

ithout question, the cannabis industry is the next “big thing” in American business. Albeit controversial, sales of marijuana reached $9.2 billion in 2017 and are expected to reach $47.3 billion within another decade, according to Forbes. This rapidly-expanding market, of both medical and recreational users, is considered by industry insiders as showing parallels to the “dot com boom” of the late 90’s. Just as the boom went bust for the emergence of Internet

startups, so too could the cannabis industry hit its own brick wall in the coming years (via unfavorable government regulations or - worse - a “race-to-the-bottom” in pricing). However, for most investors, the cannabis industry is still viewed as a license to print money, at least for the foreseeable future.

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Despite the glowing financial forecast, there does remain a dark side to the cannabis industry. The not-so-dirty secret is the tremendous security threat posed to marijuana grow-house facilities, point-ofsale dispensaries, and cannabis - and cash handling - transportation operations. Unlike other retail locations that may sell expensive jewelry, antiques, or fine art, most cannabis consumers prefer to use cash for their transactions (even though their identities are verified prior to purchase). Couple the influx of cash with the fact that most banks still refuse to do business with the cannabis industry and you end up with facilities sitting on excess stacks of paper currency. This invites all kinds of security issues not faced by other businesses.

Make no mistake, this is still the narcotics business… and narcotics equates to criminal activity.

The first step in an achieving an effective cannabis security program is understanding the threats involved, which includes advisory capabilities (aka “know thy enemy”). A good security posture is directly related to understanding those threats and knowing your physical, operational and response capabilities/ vulnerabilities. Risk management is paramount.

MJ Security Group, one of the largest security consulting providers in the cannabis industry, incorporates a comprehensive approach to security. Their philosophy is first to conduct a threat analysis followed by a vulnerability assessment of the assets to be protected. According to one of MJ’s consultants (who chose to remain anonymous due to the sensitivities/stigma associated with the cannabis community), “Once a thorough assessment has been completed, and the material risks and threats have been identified, we then determine the best approach to eliminating, thwarting or offsetting the vulnerabilities, and recommend appropriate security systems, protocols and countermeasures to be implemented, to include the budgetary implications involved.”

In the cannabis industry, there have been no shortage of aggressive adversaries looking to capitalize on the potential access to cash and/or product. Since marijuana became legal in the United States, the number of attacks against facilities, customers, and drivers, has increased each year.

Consider the following statistics from 2017: • • • •

70% of theft comes from insiders, often colluding with customers 30% of theft comes from robberies and armed robberies $1 million worth of marijuana was stolen at one dispensary last year in less than 15 minutes Over 1,000 marijuana dispensaries and cultivation facilities were victims of cyber attacks in the past 12 months

Security obviously plays a tremendous role in the cannabis industry. Regulations for CCTV camera coverage, employee/customer access control policies, and marijuana handling procedures are just a few of the many security regulations which are heavily enforced by the states. It is imperative that organizations understand the rules and regulations to stay compliant.

Investing in a security company with knowledge of these requirements can save you hundreds of thousands of dollars, as well as

Despite the glowing financial forecast, there does remain a dark side to the cannabis industry. The not-so-dirty secret is the tremendous security threat posed to marijuana growhouse facilities, point-of-sale dispensaries, and cannabis - and cash handling - transportation operations. Unlike other retail locations that may sell expensive jewelry, antiques, or fine art, most cannabis consumers prefer to use cash for their transactions (even though their identities are verified prior to purchase).

alleviate potential headaches.

Never hire a security provider based on lowest price. In the marijuana security business, you will get what you pay for!

When selecting a security provider, you should expect them to perform key activities, which include, but are certainly not limited to: •

• •

• • • • • • •

•

• • • • • •

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Ensuring that any security enhancements comply with the state health department or other oversite organization Performing a threat assessment of the security threats facing the organization Conducting a target analysis and vulnerability assessment of critical infrastructure and key resources, to prioritize assets and determine budgets for security enhancements Establishing Design Basis Threats (DBTs) for the potential hazards facing the facility Creating risk assessment models that establish “probability of attack” Making observations and recommendations for mitigating security threats Designing a comprehensive security plan for perimeter, external, and internal facility operations Vetting security vendors and evaluating products and pricing Organizing with local emergency response planning committees and other key stakeholders Helping create and staff a project management office to provide leadership over the security force: identify internal candidates to staff the office, both for the project manager role and supervisory leadership Conducting interagency liaison meetings that focus on timely, informed decision-making and resolution of jurisdictional issues Helping the general contractor and/or owners track major interdependencies and minimize key risks Implementing a guard force communications policy and other SOPs Training security guards on tactics, techniques and procedures Training drivers on tactics, techniques and procedures Establishing a crisis communications plan should an incident lead to unwanted media exposure Designing a crowd management work plan to determine any potential

•

For any cannabis organization to have an effective security

•

strategy, it must

•

adhere to a policy of deter, detect,

•

delay, respond,

•

and mitigate

•

potential threats.

The ability to bring

•

these principles

•

together is vital,

•

particularly when utilizing a “light touch,” low-visibility strategy. Without interoperability between them, the system is vulnerable.

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gaps, and to identify mitigation steps for implementation (i.e. scanners vs. hand-wands vs. physical search vs. questioning suspicious individuals) Identifying single points of failure in team structure, reviewing customer ingress/egress routes, studying crowd flow, determining crisis management contingencies, vetting vendors and staff (insider threats) Implementing a strong cyber and SCADA IT security program Evaluating secure communications, utilizing the PACE (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) Planning Method Reviewing and revising existing emergency response plans Creating and facilitating crisis response tabletop exercises Conducting penetration tests (PENTESTs) to ensure security processes are effective Performing on-going security audits of grow houses and dispensaries Providing 24/7 on-call response services Additional consulting and intelligence advisory services, as needed

For any cannabis organization to have an effective security strategy, it must adhere to a policy of deter, detect, delay, respond, and mitigate potential threats. The ability to bring these principles together is vital, particularly when utilizing a “light touch,” low-visibility strategy. Without interoperability between them, the system is vulnerable.

The future of federal legality of the cannabis industry is still uncertain. What is not uncertain is that crimes associated with the marijuana business will only continue to grow (no pun intended). For those operating in this multibillion dollar space, it is imperative that they take the necessary security measures to protect their interests.

About the Author Luke Bencie is the Managing Director of Security Management International. He has traveled to over 130 countries on behalf of the US Government on matters of national security and intelligence. He is the author of the books Among Enemies: Counter-Espionage for the Business Traveler, Global Security Consulting: How to Build a Thriving International Practice, and The Clandestine Consultant” Kings, Sheiks, Warlords, and Dictators. He can be reached at lbencie@ smiconsultancy.com

Vol. 24, No.2

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Assessing Trends in the Terrorist Threats Against Jordan and Its Counterterrorism Measures

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

Jordanian special forces participate in an anti-terrorism drill during the opening of the Special Operation Forces Exhibition (SOFEX) at King Abdullah II Airbase in Amman, Jordan, May 10, 2016. REUTERS/Muhammad Hamed

A

s of late 2018, Jordan faced significant terrorist threats, primarily from Islamic State-linked militants, whether domestic- or foreign-based, who regarded the moderate and pro-Western Hashemite Kingdom as illegitimate.

This threat was exacerbated by the spillover from the protracted civil war in Syria, whose massive internal population displacement led to an influx of estimated 1.4 million Sunni Syrian refugees into Jordan, which has an estimated population of 9.9 million. Many of the Syrian refugees were housed in the temporary Zaatari camp, with others scattered around the country, with little prospect for their future, and with a minority of them jihadi militants who were exploiting their safe haven to prepare for future terrorist activities in the country.

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Additional sources of terrorist militancy sprung from the country’s estimated 2.2 million Palestinians (with an estimated 370,000 living in 10 refugee camps), with a minority adherents of Salafi Jihadism or the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB), which was also affiliated with the Palestinian Hamas. This Jordanian branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also represented a significant anti-regime movement. Both the Salafi Jihadists and the JMB regarded the Hashemite monarchy, which had led the country since independence in May 1946, as politically and religiously illegitimate. As an example of Palestinian opposition to the Hashemite Kingdom, the country’s first ruler, King Abdullah, was assassination by a Palestinian militant in East Jerusalem on July 20, 1951. In a more recent example of extremist anti-Hashemite sentiments, the Salafist-Jihadists joined the JMB-led anti-government demonstrations in March 2012, where they called for the imposition of Shari’a law upon Jordanian society.

Against this background, this article discusses the terrorist threats against Jordan since 2000, focusing primarily on the current period, and the effectiveness of the government’s counterterrorism program’s response measures, which are supported by its close cooperation with neighboring countries such as Israel, as well as the United States. The conclusion will assess future trends in the terrorist threats facing the country.

facing Jordan was

were Jordanian Salafists, so their attempt to return to Jordan following their expected defeat in Syria was likely to turn them against the Hashemite regime. Finally, Palestinian terrorist groups were active in Jordan in the 1970s and 1980s, but their attacks against the Hashemite monarchy ceased following the Palestinian Authority’s signing of the Oslo Accords with Israel in the mid-1990s.

Salafi Jihadism, which

Salafist Jihadists

was previously linked

The primary threat facing Jordan was Salafi Jihadism, which was previously linked to al Qaida Central and then became part of the Syrian/Iraqi-based Islamic State (IS). The threat was both group-oriented and lone wolf, especially with the IS losing much of the territory it had previously controlled in Iraq and Syria and its terrorist operations becoming more decentralized. Jordan’s Salafist Jihadists viewed themselves as the successors of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-Palestinianborn leader of al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), who was killed by American forces in Iraq on June 7, 2006. Interestingly, because this group of Salafi Jihadists, estimated to number 6,000 to 7,000 in 2018, were largely suppressed by Jordan’s counterterrorism services, much of the operations by their Jordanian operatives took place in Iraq and Syria where an estimated (and unconfirmed) 2,500 Jordanians constituted some of the forces fighting with the al Qaida-linked terrorist groups in Syria, such as Jabhat al-Nusra Front, as well as the IS forces in those countries. Moreover, several Jordanians had become leaders of these groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra, which was rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in 2016.

It was reported that a majority of Jordanians had since then switched their support to the Islamic State (IS).

The primary threat

to al Qaida Central and then became part of the Syrian/ Iraqi-based Islamic State (IS). The threat was both grouporiented and lone wolf, especially with the IS losing much of the territory it had previously controlled

Terrorism Threats

in Iraq and Syria and

The primary terrorist threats against Jordan consisted of Salafist Jihadists in the form of al Qaida, and its affiliate, al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), which had split from al Qaida Central under its previous leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and eventually became the Islamic State (IS) in June 2014. Other militant opposition groups included the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB). It should be noted that Jabhat al-Nusra, al Qaida’s affiliate in Syria, constituted a potential terrorist threat to Jordan, because many of its operatives and leaders

its terrorist operations becoming more decentralized.

Al Qaida Starting in the early 2000s, al Qaida via al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), its affiliate at the time, had also focused their terrorist operations against the Jordanian monarchy, which they

Jordanian special forces participate in an anti-terrorism drill during the opening of the Special Operation Forces Exhibition (SOFEX) at King Abdullah II Airbase in Amman, Jordan, May 8, 2018. REUTERS/Muhammad Hamed

viewed as part of their “near enemy.” This changed in June 2014 when AQI transformed itself into the Islamic State (IS).

Terrorist Incidents • January 1, 2000: A series of terrorist attacks linked to al Qaida were foiled against four tourist sites in Jordan within the context of the millennium celebrations.

• April 26, 2004: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi planned a spectacular “suicide chemical attack” by explosive-laden trucks and cars against the U.S. Embassy, the Jordanian prime minister’s office and the headquarters of the Mukhabarat (Jordanian intelligence) headquarters in Amman.

• November 9, 2005: An al Qaida in Iraq team carried out a simultaneous suicide bombing at the lobbies of three Amman hotels (Grand Hyatt, Radisson SAS, and Days Inn), killing 60 people and wounding over 100, many of whom were part of a wedding party at the Radisson Hotel.

• December 30, 2009: Humam al-Balawi, a Jordanian jihadist turned on his Jordanian GID officer handler and detonated his suicide belt inside a CIA outpost at Camp Chapman near Khost, Afghanistan, killing several CIA officers. Prior to the attack, the Jordanian GID believed that Balawi was acting as a double agent against al Qaida, which provided him access to the CIA camp.

• October 21, 2012: The Jordanian security services foiled a plot by eleven members of an al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) group to carry out near-simultaneous attacks on multiple civilian and government targets in Amman, including the U.S. Embassy in the capital.

In response to these terrorist threats,

•

the Jordanian government had established a comprehensive counterterrorism (CT) program, which was led by King Abdullah II, the country’s ruler

18

•

(and a Major-General in the country’s armed forces).

•

Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) Although Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) had not engaged in terrorism, its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), opposed the government and boycotted the country’s parliamentary elections. As an example of its militancy, when al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006 the JMB declared him a shaheed (martyr), which greatly concerned the Jordanian authorities. During the current period, with Jordan allied with Egypt and Israel, the IAF had engaged in street demonstrations in support of its Egyptian counterpart, which was overthrown in early July 2013, declaring that “The fate of Egypt and all Arabs and Muslims will be determined in line with your action. Do not let the coupists, the Zionists and US administration win.”

Islamic State (IS) • October 2012: Eight jihadist terrorists engaged in clashes with Jordanian soldiers manning the border with Syria, killing a Jordanian soldier. Seven of the terrorists were arrested, with the eighth critically injured.

• January 3, 2015: The IS executed Moath al-Kasasbeh, a Jordanian pilot it had captured on December 24, 2014 when his F-16 aircraft crashed over Syria.

• Attack on Amman Police Training Center • November 9, 2015: Police Captain Anwar Abu Zaid, aged 28, who had become radicalized into jihadist extremism, killed two American security contractors,

•

a South African security contractor, and two Jordanians at the Jordan International Police Training Center near Amman. Four Jordanians, two Americans, and one Lebanese citizen were also wounded. Jordanian security forces shot and killed Zaid, who worked as a trainer at the center.

November 4, 2016: Corporal Marik alTuwayha, who was guarding the entrance to King Faisal Air Base, a Jordanian air force installation near Al-Jafr, carried out a shooting attack against U.S. Army Special Forces trainers stationed there, killing three of them. The Jordanian government indicted the guard with murder and sentenced him to life in prison with hard labor in July 2017.

December 18, 2016: Jordanian jihadists carried out a shooting attack at the Crusader-era al-Karak Castle, in southern Jordan, which is popular with foreign tourists. In the incident, a Canadian tourist and two Jordanians were killed, with 34 others wounded.

February 27, 2018: An IS terrorist cell was arrested for planning to attack Israeli businessmen, the U.S. embassy, and other Western and Jordanian targets in Amman August 2, 2018: The Jordanian Army killed several Islamic State group jihadists who tried to approach its northern border with Syria.

AMMAN, Jordan (May 8, 2017) A member of the Air Force Special Operation’s 23rd Special Tactics Squad and Italian Special Forces participate in small unit tactics at the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center in Amman, Jordan during Eager Lion 2017.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Christopher Lange/Released)

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

In February 2015 the government declared the JMB illegal and prosecuted and jailed one of its most important leaders, Zaki Bani Ersheid. This was followed in April 2016 by the government’s closure of the JMB’s headquarters in Amman, as well as its re-

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gional offices, and seized its financial assets.

It also prohibited links between the JMB and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’saffiliated Palestinian Hamas movement.

Counterterrorism Measures In response to these terrorist threats, the Jordanian government had established a comprehensive counterterrorism (CT) program, which was led by King Abdullah II, the country’s ruler (and a Major-General in the country’s armed forces). Jordan’s CT program was considered among the most effective in the Arab world, as demonstrated by its success in thwarting numerous plots (as listed earlier). Its effectiveness was also based on its close cooperation with regional and Western allies such as Israel and the United States, which provided it with extensive security assistance.

Jordan’s CT measures were based on several components: military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal/judicial, financial, and countering violent extremism. Jordan was also engaged with the international community in complying with various antiterrorism treaties and conventions.

Military The main roles of Jordan’s armed forces were border and internal security. The security missions included countering the threat from IS, especially the potential infiltration

by IS and other Salafist-Jihadist fighters into Jordan along the 230-mile border with Syria. To counter such infiltration, the military established the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP), consisting of a sophisticated infrastructure of a command and control center and watchtowers, which were supported by network of communications, sensors, and barriers, which cumulatively provided situational awareness to prevent such infiltration. Another component was the military’s 14,000-strong Joint Special Operations Command. When required, the Air Force carried out airstrikes against IS targets in Syria. Finally, the Air Force also assisted Saudi Arabia in its counterterrorism campaign against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Intelligence The Jordanian intelligence agency, known as the General Intelligence Directorate - GID, which was also a branch of the armed forces,

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was the lead agency in collecting intelligence about terrorist threats. It was reported to maintain close ties with Western intelligence services, which utilized its extensive expertise about Middle Eastern militant groups.

Police The Jordanian national police was subordinate to the Public Security Directorate (PSD) of the Ministry of Interior. The Special Police Force (SPF), which focused primarily on countering terrorism, was a separate law enforcement agency, known as “Daraq” (Gendarmerie).

Consisting of an estimated 15,000 personnel, it was responsible for security missions such as riot control, tactical missions, and protecting foreign diplomatic missions and their diplomats.

Legal/Judiciary The State Security Court (SSC) was Jordan’s primary judicial body for dealing with national security threats, such as terrorism. In 2006, Jordan passed its anti-terrorism law, which was amended in June 2014 to expand government authority to act against suspected terrorists by broadening the definition of ter-

rorism, to include associating with terrorist groups, and increasing legal penalties against them, including imposing the death penalty for terrorism.

Finance

Jordan was a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a regional organization to counter terror financing. The country’s Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism financing Unit (AMLU), a financial intelligence unit, was also a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, an informal network of international financial intelligence units that convened in Belgium.

Countering Violent Extremism Jordan’s countering violent extremism (CVE) campaign consisted of several components.

These included a religiously-based deradicalization program in Jordanian prisons, which attempted to engage extremist inmates by providing them literacy classes, employment counseling, and theological instruction in mainstream Islamic beliefs.

Regional and International Cooperation Jordan was one of the founding members of the multilateral Global Counterterrorism Forum (GTF), and submitted regular reports to the United Nations’ Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), in accordance with Resolution 1373.

Jordan/United States CT Cooperation The United States was one of Jordan’s primary counterterrorism allies. As an example, in 2015 U.S. funding for military and security assistance totaled $1 billion. In March 2018, Jordan and the U.S. inaugurated a CT training facility, south of Amman, to upgrade the Kingdom’s capacity in CT training, such as in crisis response, explosive incident countermeasures, post-blast investigations and tactical medicine. Jordan was a key member of the U.S.-led anti-IS coalition, and hosted several thousand U.S. military personnel, including providing bases for the coalition’s air campaign against the group.

Jordan/Israel CT Cooperation Jordan and Israel shared a several decadeslong history of cooperation in countering terrorism, a common threat that continuously challenged both countries. This cooperation took several forms, with much of their activities, for security reasons, unpublicized. In one form, Israel and Jordan maintained joint control over their common border, including border crossings. In other forms, in a sale that was approved by the United States, in July 2015 Israel sold Jordan a fleet of U.S. supplied Cobra combat helicopters to upgrade its security along the Syrian border, and pilots from the Royal Jordanian Air Force had participated in joint training with their Israeli Air Force counterparts. In another form of cooperation, Jordanian and Israeli emergency service personnel participated in joint disaster response drills (with Palestinian emergency

personnel, as well). This close cooperation took place despite occasional crises between the two countries, such as an incident on July 23, 2017, when Muhammad al-Juwaida, a 17-year old Palestinian laborer, stabbed an off-duty Israeli Embassy security guard. With the Palestinian attacker killed by the security guard (with the building’s owner also killed by stray gunfire), this led to a temporary closure of the Israeli Embassy in Amman, which reopened in mid-January 2018.

Conclusion The Jordanian counterterrorism program was considered effective at disrupting numerous terrorist attacks during their pre-incident phases (with the exact number of thwarted terrorist plots not publicly known), as well as managing the post-incident investigatory and arrest phases.

Nevertheless, the influx of the estimated 1.4 million Syrian refugees into Jordan – with an unknown number of them reportedly Islamist extremists – and with the Syrian civil war winding down as government forces, aided by Iran and Hizballah, regaining control over the country’s territory, the Salafist-Jihadists already in Jordan were likely to be spurred into greater operational activity against the moderate and pro-West Hashemite Kingdom, which they regarded as illegitimate. This was likely to place further pressures on Jordan’s King Abdullah II, one of the region’s most pro-Western Arab leaders, to solve the country’s multi-faceted domestic problems. These included obtaining additional humanitarian assistance from the international community to manage the care and rehabilitation of the country’s Syrian refugees, as well as other measures such as sufficiently liberalizing his kingdom politically by allowing for greater political participation by the country’s diverse communities, improving the economy, especially the rampant unemployment of its youth (and refugees). Such political and socio-economic reform measures were required to address the population’s needs, and when combined with effective countering violent extremism measures, they were required prevent the country from potential takeover by the Islamist extremists. Otherwise, these Islamist extremists were likely to increase their popular support among the country’s bulging youth, including the Palestinians, who were also being radicalized by their extremist counterparts in the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip.

About the Author Marines assigned to the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (26th MEU) scan the horizon while transiting the Bab al-Mandeb Strait aboard the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7). (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jon Sosner/Released)

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Dr. Joshua Sinai is a senior analyst in terrorism and counterterrorism studies at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH), in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at joshua. sinai@comcast.net.

Vol. 24, No.2

Looking Back: American Covert Regime Change Operations from the Cold War to the War on Terror

By Jason Jacooley

I

In his remarks President Bush said, “The Pentagon Memorial will stand as an everlasting tribute to 184 innocent souls who perished on these grounds. The benches here bear each of their names. And beneath each bench is a shimmering pool filled with the water of life -- a testament to those who were taken from us, and to their memories that will live on in our hearts.” White House photo by Eric Draper

ntroduction Over the course of his eight years in office, George W. Bush made several choices that history may show were harmful to the United States. Out of all of them, possibly the most damaging was the 2003 decision to invade Iraq. When this operation commenced, Bush asserted that it was a necessity since Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, was producing weapons of mass destruction. After inspectors failed to uncover any outlawed weapons inside this Middle Eastern nation, Bush was accused of presenting inaccurate information to the American public. While perusing the pages of Bush’s memoir, it becomes apparent that he continued to disseminate misleading content following his departure from the White House in January 2009.

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As the Forty-Third American President is discussing the campaign against Islamic extremists in his book, Decision Points, he informs the reader that he thought he was following in the footsteps of Harry Truman as this effort was getting under way during his first term. Towards the end of the 1940s, Truman introduced various measures that were intended to keep Soviet influence from spreading in the world. Once Truman left Washington, other presidents elected to depend on some of his measures as they dealt with the Cold War. At the beginning of the War on Terror, Bush recognized that it would not be possible for the United States to completely eliminate the Islamist threat by the time his presidency came to an end. Consequently, he worked to turn his “tools” for fighting extremist groups “into institutions and laws that would be available to” his “successors.”1 It cannot be denied that Bush created new initiatives for weakening Islamist entities between 2001 and 2009. What he fails to mention inside Decision Points, though, is the manner in which he and his successors also utilized some measures that were set forth during the Cold War in the effort against Islamic extremism, including covert regime change operations. Within the pages that follow, we will see how covert regime change operations were used during both the Cold War and War on Terror since a 1953 mission in Iran and a 2011 initiative in Libya will be closely examined. As these cases are being analyzed, it should become evident that the regimes which came to power during the Cold War and the War on Terror had different deficiencies. On the one hand, the regimes from the Cold War did not encourage democratic accountability. On the other, the governments from the War on Terror were unable to maintain order inside their borders.

Intervention in Iran during the Cold War The material from Decision Points that was alluded to in the preceding section is important for another reason. Besides establishing George W. Bush’s mindset at the beginning of the struggle against Islamist networks, it shows us the major way that a particular measure can end up being used by presidents for decades. If it is going to be possible for a measure to stand the test of time, a piece of legislation will need to be approved by the legislative and executive branches.2 We can notice the validity of this point by closely examining the act that has enabled numerous chief executives to conduct covert regime change operations during the Cold War and the War on Terror. When the Cold War commenced, many figures in Washington believed that the intelligence collection capabilities of the American government were poor. In order to eliminate this weakness, the Central Intelligence Agency was formed

The first American president to use the above clause in the National Security Act of 1947 to his advantage was Harry Truman. While he was in control of the executive branch, Truman had American covert operators execute several clandestine missions, including one in the Eastern European nation of Albania at the end of the 1940s.4 Although Truman exhibited an affinity for covert regime change operations, there were some missions that he appeared unwilling to authorize. with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Within this act, legislators set forth multiple duties that the employees of the new intelligence agency were expected to perform.

Among them was that Agency personnel should perform “such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.”3 This portion of the National Security Act of 1947 was widely interpreted as the sanctioning of covert operations that had the potential to overthrow unappealing regimes in other nations.

The first American president to use the above clause in the National Security Act of 1947 to

his advantage was Harry Truman. While he was in control of the executive branch, Truman had American covert operators execute several clandestine missions, including one in the Eastern European nation of Albania at the end of the 1940s.4 Although Truman exhibited an affinity for covert regime change operations, there were some missions that he appeared unwilling to authorize. The most important in relation to this discussion is the effort to topple the regime that was controlling Iran. At the beginning of the 1950s, various figures inside the CIA began to talk about bringing a new government to power in Tehran, but these individuals were reluctant to approach the White House about this matter because they believed there was “no chance to win approval from the outgoing administration of Truman and Acheson.”5 The preceding quote appeared in a book called CouterCoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran. Within this same publication, Kermit Roosevelt, a CIA operative in Iran, reveals there was a belief at the Agency that the incoming administration “might be quite different” when it came to the issue of taking action in Tehran.6 After the transfer of power on January 20, 1953, Dwight Eisenhower’s administration instructed the CIA to launch a clandestine initiative to remove the Iranian government from power.

Before this operation is examined, it would be useful to explain why Eisenhower was amenable to overthrowing the leader of Iran. At this point in time, a number of leaders in the developing world were not interested in being involved in the power struggle between the capitalist and communist blocs. Instead, they were more concerned about keeping outsiders from infringing upon the sovereignty of their respective states. It was widely believed that Mohammad Mossadegh was one of these nationalists, but Eisenhower was convinced that the Iranian Prime Minister was really a communist who intended to have his country become a part of the communist bloc. The remarks of an official from the British government can enable us to see just how concerned Eisenhower was about the situation in Tehran. During a meeting, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, informed Winston Churchill that Eisenhower “seemed to be obsessed by the fear of a communist Iran.”7 In addition to wanting to keep Iran from becoming a close ally of the Soviet Union, Eisenhower wanted to make it possible for American businesses to benefit from the oil production inside this Middle Eastern nation. Under previous leaders, Western companies had been able to profit from the production of Iranian oil. However, when Mossadegh came to power in 1951, he was determined to have the government assume control of the pumping, refining, and shipping of oil. During the spring of 1951, the Prime Minister presented a bill that called for the nationalization of the oil industry. Shortly after this piece of legislation was introduced, it was

approved and Western companies were no longer allowed to play a role in the production of oil.8 In order for an American covert regime change operation to be successfully executed abroad, it is imperative to have assets in a target nation. That is, there must be individuals in a country who are receptive to cooperating with clandestine operatives from the United States. The type of cooperation that takes place is determined by whether the assets are situated inside or outside the government which U.S. policymakers find unappealing. If the assets are not associated with the regime, CIA agents or operatives from another department in the U.S. government will help them conduct a paramilitary operation, an electoral interference campaign or a political action mission. The first involves personnel providing weapons and training to citizens who are interested in overthrowing political leaders with an armed struggle.9 The second entails operatives working with a challenger who is eager to defeat an incumbent in an upcoming election.

The third consists of agents allocating financial assistance to dissidents who would like to see government officials removed from power with protests, boycotts, or some other non-violent tactic.10 Should the assets be located inside the government, the only viable option that the clandestine operators have is to help their allies carry out a coup d’état.

When Eisenhower wanted to oust Mossadegh in the 1950s, there were not many individuals outside the Iranian government who were amenable to cooperating with operatives such as Kermit Roosevelt. Consequently, it was not possible for the thirty-forth American president to order the execution of a paramilitary operation, an electoral interference campaign or a political action initiative. While it was difficult to find assets outside the corridors of power in Tehran, Roosevelt and others were able to locate insiders who were willing to participate in a coup. Out of all of these assets, it is safe to say that the most important were figures in the Iranian military.

After all, history is filled with episodes that indicate a coup can only succeed with support from the armed forces. During 1999, Nawaz Sharif was forced to relinquish control of the Pakistani government after members of the military opted to back a coup. Approximately, three years later, some officials within the Venezuelan government tried to bring an end to the presidency of Hugo Chavez, but this plot ultimately failed because the socialist leader maintained the backing of important figures in the military.

If the assets are not associated with the regime, CIA agents or operatives from another department in the U.S. government will help them conduct a paramilitary operation, an electoral interference campaign or a political action mission. The first involves personnel providing weapons and training to citizens who are interested in overthrowing political leaders with an armed struggle.9 The second entails operatives working with a challenger who is eager to defeat an incumbent in an upcoming election.

Before the contribution of these military assets can be examined, we must discuss the role that the CIA’s main political asset played in the campaign against Mossadegh. For a period of time, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was quite influential within Iran. Once Mos-

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sadegh became prime minister, though, there was a noticeable decline in his power. Within a secret report, one department in the American government even acknowledged that the Shah was no longer capable “of independent action.”11 During the summer of 1953, CIA personnel arranged meetings with the Shah to see if he would be interested in participating in an initiative that could potentially lead to him regaining his power inside Iran. When Norman Schwarzkopf met with the Shah in July 1953, he tried to convince him to issue a firman or order calling for Mossadegh’s dismissal. After the meeting transpired, the requested order was never issued, so Kermit Roosevelt was asked by policymakers in Washington to speak to the Shah in early August.12 In hindsight, one can assert that Roosevelt was a far more persuasive figure than Schwarzkopf because the Shah went on to issue a firman in the immediate aftermath of the August meetings.

By the middle of August, the military assets began to partake in the CIA’s operation to overthrow Mossadegh. On August 15th, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri instructed soldiers to arrest some of Mossadegh’s supporters in the Iranian government. When General Taghi Riahi, Mossadegh’s Chief of Staff, learned of Nassiri’s actions, he took steps that prevented the plotters from accomplishing their objective, including having a contingent of soldiers surround the Prime Minister’s residence.13 Roosevelt and others were disappointed that Mossadegh was able to remain in office, but they continued to work behind the scenes to isolate the Prime Minister.

The developments on the 15th indicated that an inadequate number of troops had originally been recruited by the CIA. Consequently, operatives spent a lot of their time securing the support of additional soldiers from the Iranian military.

Once more troops exhibited a willingness to cooperate with the Agency, an attack was launched on the Prime Minister’s home. Although General Riahi led another effort to keep Mossadegh from being ousted, the Prime Minister still had to relinquish control of the government since the military units associated with the CIA took over Tehran and other key cities in the country.14 Now that the execution of the coup d’état in Iran has been addressed, we can begin to examine the successor regime that was led by the Shah.

Inside Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy, Francis Fukuyama asserts that a strong state and methods for promoting democratic accountability can help a country function more efficiently. By a strong state, he means “a central authority that can exercise a monopoly of legitimate force over its territory to keep the peace and enforce the law.”15 When he speaks of the latter, he is referring to opportunities that allow citizens to make sure those in power are responding to their preferences.16 Within the remaining paragraphs of this section, it will

Vol. 24, No.2

become evident that the Shah developed formidable institutions that possessed the capacity to preserve peace, but he did not provide Iranian citizens with chances to hold his government accountable.

During the twentieth century, Robert Dahl devoted a considerable amount of time to studying nations with political systems that were designed to hold government officials accountable. Within one of his books, he claims that this type of system cannot exist without public contestation and participation.17 If the former is going to be present, citizens must be allowed to form opposition parties and compete with the members of the ruling party to fill openings in the legislative and executive branches. In order for the latter to be prevalent, figures from the government need to permit free and fair elections to be held periodically. Under the Shah, opposition parties and legitimate elections were difficult to find in Iran. While 1960 was in progress, he allowed parliamentary elections to be held in July and August.18 However, this turn of events cannot be looked at as genuine public participation in Iran since there were numerous reports of the elections being rigged by individuals working on behalf of the Shah. Prior to the coup in 1953, multiple opposition parties were allowed to operate without government harassment. Following this development, though, the supporters of opposition parties started to be targeted by the security services, especially Tudeh. As early as November 1953, the military was taking steps to weaken this left-wing party inside Iran.19 Once an authoritarian regime limits the opportunities to impact the political process, citizens really have no alternative but to organize a major resistance campaign. While a campaign is in progress, it is common for instability to surface in areas with large populations. The amount of instability that emerges during a campaign is largely determined by the skill level of the figures inside the military, police forces, and other departments from the government’s security apparatus. If the majority of the individuals from the security services are incompetent, the amount of instability within the country will likely be high. On the other hand, if the security services are dominated by capable people, the amount of instability inside the nation will probably be low.

As one examines the resistance campaign that developed in Iran under the Shah, one becomes cognizant of the manner in which his security services were staffed with qualified figures. Out of all of the departments in the Iranian security apparatus, the ones, which the Shan relied upon the most, were the military and the National Information and Security Organization or SAVAK. When unrest surfaced in the streets of Tehran in June 1963, the Shah instructed the former to restore order. By the time order was restored in the Iranian capital, approximately 1,000 civil-

ians had been killed.20 Some of the opposition groups attempted to generate political change by performing terrorist attacks in different parts of Iran. Between 1970 and 1978, only thirtyfour attacks were executed by operatives from dissident groups.21 In order to understand why the number of attacks remained so low during this period, it is necessary to take the conduct of SAVAK into consideration. During the 1970s, this intelligence agency constructed a network of around three million informants, so it uncovered and disrupted planned attacks quite frequently.

Although the leaders of SAVAK did receive a lot of useful intelligence from these informants, it should be acknowledged that they also used unsavory tactics to collect pertinent information.

Within Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Fred Halliday alludes to how there were times when personnel from the intelligence service even tortured prisoners who were being held in Iranian prisons.22

American Intervention in Libya in 2011 At a White House ceremony in 1954, Eisenhower presented Kermit Roosevelt with the National Security Award since his conduct had helped keep American citizens safe.23 In the decades that followed, some of Eisenhower’s Cold War successors were not as eager to give personnel from the Agency this prestigious award. Instead, they were more interested in subjecting CIA employees to a considerable amount of criticism.

One went so far as to say that he would like to “splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the wind.”24 If an individual wants to understand why Eisenhower’s successors were so critical of the CIA, he or she has to look at the outcomes of America’s covert regime change operations. During the 1960s and 1970s, there were times when the CIA managed to topple unappealing regimes abroad. However, these successes did not attract much attention because the Agency was also involved in ignominious failures such as the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961.

In addition to producing many disparaging remarks about the CIA, these experiences led lawmakers in Washington to alter the way that American clandestine regime change operations were performed overseas. For many years, covert initiatives just commenced with presidents passing along orders to their subordinates at the CIA. Once the Hughes-Ryan Amendment was attached to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, though, initiating surreptitious missions became more complicated for U.S. presidents.

Besides instructing figures at the Agency to begin certain initiatives, presidents had to notify legislators about them by submitting “findings” to Congress.25 When the Cold War came to an end in 1991, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment was not repealed.

Consequently, the presidents who handled the

American campaign against Islamic extremist organizations also had to send findings to members of Congress. The most important in relation to this discussion is the one that Barack Obama submitted in 2011 as instability was increasing inside Libya. Within this document, Obama informed Senators and Representatives that he intended to have American operatives provide aid to rebels who were in the process of fighting a war against the government of Moammar Gadhafi.26 In other words, he told them that personnel from the United States would be carrying out a paramilitary operation in this North African nation.

Before the execution of this paramilitary operation is discussed, we need to identify what could be gained from the intervention in Libya.

Around the time reports began to circulate that CIA operatives were inside Libya, Obama claimed the he was “answering the calls of threatened people” and “acting in the interests of the United States and the world.”27 From these comments, it can be gathered that Obama was attempting to achieve two objectives while the Libyan campaign was in progress. One was to keep the Libyan people from being killed by the forces that were affiliated with the Gadhafi regime. The other was to advance interests that were deemed to be important by the U.S. and its allies. Because the president was so brief, one can only speculate about what interests could be advanced in 2011. It is safe to say that the initiative in Libya had the potential to bolster the pivotal campaign against Islamic extremist organizations. After Gadhafi came to power in 1969, he became known as a proponent of terrorism. When he was not inviting terrorist organizations to use Libyan territory to train operatives for attacks, he was instructing personnel from his government to perform operations in other nations.28 The Libyan regime’s most damaging attack came towards the end of the 1980s when a bomb killed 259 passengers on a Pan Am plane that was traveling from London to New York City.

During the early portion of the twenty-first century, Gadhafi worked assiduously to improve his image on the world stage. For years, many nations insisted that the Libyan government should give money to those who lost loved ones in the bombing of the Pan Am plane. In 2008, Gadhafi finally decided to allocate over 1.5 billion dollars to the families of the victims.29 Not only did Gadhafi provide compensation to people who had been impacted by his most damaging terrorist attack, he presented himself as a leader who was interested in assisting the U.S government in its struggle against Islamist entities. Following the 9/11 attacks, officials in Washington were determined to detain individuals who were either in the process of planning other attacks or knew about imminent attacks.

It was not possible to achieve this objective in a unilateral fashion, so American personnel had to

turn to figures from other governments for help. Personnel from the Libyan regime eventually participated in this effort by detaining terror suspects in Tripoli and other locations. Some suggested this cooperation between the American and Libyan governments was a sign that Gadhafi had turned over a new leaf, but it was inappropriate to arrive at such a conclusion because the Libyan dictator was simultaneously working with operatives from al Qaeda, the most formidable Islamist group in the world at the time.30 Since this partnership existed, it is clear an intervention in Libya could help bring a new government to power that would be a genuine supporter of the American campaign against Islamist groups.

With the potential benefits of intervening now identified, attention can be paid to the execution of the paramilitary operation. Inside Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett allude to how many researchers attempt to ascertain whether intervening factors are impacting the behavior of actors in the political realm.

According to these individuals, it is appropriate to make a case for influence if a change can be detected in a particular actor’s conduct once the intervening factor has been introduced.31 This turn of events has been known to take place when paramilitary operations are in progress. Towards the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union sent numerous soldiers into Afghanistan to keep a communist government from being toppled. Soon after this invasion transpired, Islamic extremists arrived in Afghanistan to participate in a resistance campaign that had been organized by indigenous elements. At first, the foreign and Afghan fighters did not encounter much success in their battles against Soviet military personnel. Once they received Stinger missiles from the CIA in the middle of the 1980s, though, they experienced many victories on the battlefield and Moscow elected to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, covert assistance improved the performance of a contingent of rebels, but one

26

must keep in mind that outside aid does not always generate the desired effect. During the 1950s, the leftleaning government of Indonesia had to contend with an insurgency led by anti-communist rebels. As the decade was coming to an end, officials in Washington instructed the CIA to allocate weapons and other supplies to the Indonesian rebels.32 Following the distribution of this clandestine assistance, the performance of the insurgents on the battlefield did not improve, so the members of the Indonesian government were able to remain in power.

While examining the Libyan case, one finds that it is akin to the Afghan one. In other words, there was a noticeable improvement in the performance of the rebels once they came into contact with clandestine assistance. During the early portion of 2011, insurgents worked diligently to take control of towns and cities throughout Libya. However, the majority of their offensives at this juncture were repelled by forces that were aligned with the Gadhafi government. When a substantial amount of machine guns, automatic rifles, and ammunition from the U.S. and its Arab allies arrived in the summer, the rebels were finally able to make some progress.33 At the beginning of August, the opposition pushed Gadhafi supporters out of Bar al-Ghanam. Emboldened by this triumph, they then moved to the outskirts of other key towns in the Western portion of the country, including Zawiya.

Although the seizing of land in western Libya was a step in the right direction, it cannot be labeled as the most important development following the introduction of weapons shipments. Within the highly acclaimed Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington asserts that there are two ways a revolutionary campaign can unfold inside a nation. When a “western” revolution is in progress, opponents of the status quo seize the capital city and gain control of towns in the countryside at a later date.34 During an “eastern” revolution, the resistance campaign commences with the taking of towns in the countryside and culminates with the seizure of the capital.35 It is appropriate to label the rebellion in Libya as an

“eastern” revolution. After all, as we have seen, the insurgents initially acquired territory outside the capital city. If we want to identify the culmination of this movement, we have to look closely at the end of August 2011. Towards the end of this month, rebel forces stormed into Tripoli with the intention of finding Moammar Gadhafi, but the dictator could not be located in the Libyan capital. It would be approximately two more months before Gadhafi was found in his hometown of Sirte.36 The rebels could have mollified the members of the international community by apprehending the deposed leader, but they chose to kill him in a gruesome fashion.

Before events in post-Gadhafi Libya are taken into consideration, we should devote some attention to another intervening factor that enabled the rebels to succeed. As military supplies were being allocated to fighters, the U.S. had operatives in secret locations flying drones over battlefields across Libya. When the drones were not taking reconnaissance photographs, they were firing missiles at the members of Gadhafi’s army so it would be easier for rebel advances to transpire. These drones fired some missiles, but other aircraft provided far more assistance to the rebels. Over a period of five months, North Atlantic Treaty Organization planes attacked Gadhafi’s forces 7500 times.37 American drones, on the other hand, only conducted strikes on 84 occasions.38 Within the preceding section, it was noted how public participation and contestation were not permitted in Iran following the coup d’état in 1953. While examining the political landscape in Libya after the downfall of Gadhafi, it becomes apparent that this problem was not prevalent.39 A good example of public participation can be found as one analyzes the parliamentary elections that were held in 2012.

When this event took place in the summer, the new government did not limit the amount of citizens who could cast their votes, so there were long lines at polling centers across the country. In the capital city, the lines actually began to form over an hour before the polling centers were scheduled to open.40 If the options that these voters had to choose from in the summer of 2012 are taken into

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consideration, it will be possible to notice how public contestation was present in Libya after the uprising.

Under Gadhafi, political parties were not given the opportunity to function inside Libya. However, once he was out of the picture, parties were finally permitted to operate freely. It can be said that the members of most of the parties took advantage of this opportunity because when citizens arrived at polling centers in 2012 they were able to choose from several options, including the National Forces Alliance, the Justice and Construction Party, the National Front Party, the Union for the Homeland, the Wadi Al-Hayah Party, and the National Centrist Party.

Before the election in the summer of 2012, interim Prime Ministers had trouble maintaining order inside Libya. Following it, a lack of security continued to be a problem for Ali Zeidan, who was abducted by armed militants just months after becoming the first popularly elected Prime Minister of Libya. Zeidan’s successors did not have to deal with the trauma of being kidnapped, but they were forced to witness the further deterioration of order within their nation. This decline can be noticed if we rely upon the same standards that were utilized in the preceding section. While the security situation in Iran under the Shah was being taken into consideration, it was mentioned how personnel from the military were able to regain control of areas which had been seized by subversive elements. As one examines the situation in Libya following the ouster of Gadhafi, one does not come across many instances of security personnel pushing militant groups out of towns and cities. Instead, one consistently encounters episodes where the members of opposition networks managed to repel government offensives without much difficulty.

One location, which experienced a failed government assault, was Gadhafi’s hometown. In 2014, an affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria gained control of Sirte.

Two years later, fighters with ties to the government initiated a campaign to retake Sirte. However, by the end of this offensive, there were various parts of Sirte where members of the Islamic State’s Libyan branch were still active.41 Towards

the end of our discussion about the security conditions in Iran, attention was paid to the manner in which a notable increase in terrorist attacks could not be found in this Middle Eastern country during the 1970s. If some figures for Libya are taken into consideration, it will become apparent that this nation experienced an alarming rise in terrorist operations once Gadhafi was no longer in power. Between 1979 and 2008, there were a total of sixteen terrorist attacks inside Libya.42 In 2014, just three years after the downfall of Gadhafi, Libya experienced 707 attacks.43 In order to identify the reason why Libya became so unstable, it is necessary to examine the bureaucracy that prime ministers such as Zeidan had underneath them. When Gadhafi was in control of Libya, departments like the intelligence services were quite effective.44 However, while the revolution was in progress, these important institutions were weakened considerably by the defection of key personnel, a loss of weapons and ammunition, and so forth.45 If Libya’s security apparatus had been in better shape in the postGadhafi era, it is likely the prime ministers would have been able to establish the secure environment that the democratic government of Indonesia did in the early portion of the twenty-first century. Between 2006 and 2014, this Muslim nation just experienced five terrorist attacks since intelligence and law enforcement agencies were staffed with competent figures.46

Conclusion While the War on Terrorism has been in progress, American officials have been utilizing some of the same tools that were used during the Cold War. Within this article, attention was devoted to the American reliance on covert regime change operations. As the coup d’état in Iran was being taken into consideration in the second section, we had the opportunity to see the manner in which Washington’s Cold War operations usually resulted in the establishment of regimes that possessed a major strength and weakness. The strength of the successor regimes was that they exhibited the capac-

ity to maintain order inside their respective territories, while their shortcoming was the way that they did not allow citizens to hold them accountable. Inside the third section, the analysis of the paramilitary operation in Libya demonstrated that America’s clandestine initiatives during the War on Terror have tended to produce the opposite of their Cold War predecessors.

In other words, this examination showed that the missions from the campaign against Islamic extremist organizations have predominately led to the emergence of governments which encourage democratic accountability, but do not possess the ability to preserve order.

With ISIS and al Qaeda still carrying out deadly attacks across the world, it is quite clear that the end of the War on Terror is not imminent. As this conflict continues, American policymakers will probably choose to conduct other covert regime change operations.

When these missions are launched, it will be advantageous for officials to refrain from having them consist of the training and arming of rebels.

After all, Libya and the other paramilitary operations in Afghanistan and Syria did not turn out to be very successful. If paramilitary operations are eliminated from consideration, policymakers will be left with the three other kinds of covert regime change missions that were introduced earlier in this paper.

That is, they will be able to initiate political action missions, electoral interference campaigns, or coup d’états. It is unlikely political action operations will generate favorable outcomes because an earlier initiative inside Egypt produced a regime that was unwilling to cooperate with the United States in the struggle against Islamist networks. As for the second option, one cannot help but be enticed by it since recent electoral interference efforts have been beneficial for Moscow, but interfering in elections is not a viable option for American officials since the majority of the regimes that they would like to overthrow in the Muslim World do not allow citizens to vote periodically. Having read about the coup d’état in Iran, the reader is probably reluctant to endorse the idea of conducting coups during the War on Terror.

However, the result of another Cold

War era coup, which did not entail CIA involvement, may make him or her reconsider. Towards the end of the 1960s, the dictator Marcello Caetano took control of Portugal.

During the middle part of the 1970s, the Caetano regime was toppled by members of the Portuguese military. In the aftermath of this turn of events, a democratic government was established in Lisbon.47 Unlike the democratic government that came to power inside Libya in 2011, this regime went on to maintain stability within its borders.

About the Author Jason Jacooley holds a Master’s Degree in Political Science from the University of Connecticut. He teaches courses about American politics at the University of Hartford and Tunxis Community College in Farmington, Connecticut. His research interests include transnational revolutionary organizations, American foreign policy, and covert action.

References 1 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York, Crown Publishers, 2010), pp.174-175.

2 Ibid.

3 National Security Act, 1947.

4 John Prados, Safe for Democracy (New York, Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p.59.

5 Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup:The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979), p.107.

6 Ibid.

7 Anthony Eden, Comments Made in a Meeting with Winston Churchill, 1953.

8 Prados, p.99.

9 Gregory Treverton, Covert Action (New York, Basic Books, 1987), p.13.

10 Ibid.

11 U.S. State Department, Secret Report about the Political Situation in Iran, 1953.

12 Prados, p.104.

13 Ibid., p.105.

14 Ibid., p.106.

15 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2014), p.3.

16 Ibid., p.24.

17 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971), pp.13-14.

18 Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (New York, Penguin, 1979), p.27.

19 William Blum, Killing Hope (Monroe, Common Courage Press, 2004), p.72.

20 Halliday, p.76.

21 Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorist Incidents, Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iran from 1970 to 1978.

22 Halliday, p.84.

23 Prados, p.97.

24 John Kennedy, Comments about the CIA in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs Fiasco, 1961.

25 Treverton, pp.154-155.

26 The Telegraph, “Libya: Barack Obama Signed Order for CIA to Help Rebels,” March 30, 2011.

27 Barack Obama, Remarks about the American Intervention in Libya, 2011.

28 Yehudit Ronen, Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics (Boulder, Lynne Reiner, 2008), pp.32-34 29 Matthew Weaver, “Families of Lockerbie Bombing Victims Receive Compensation from Libya,” The Guardian, November 21, 2008.

30 Patrick Tyler, “Two Said to Tell of Libyan Plot Against Saudi,” The New York Times, June 10, 2004.

31 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Boston, The MIT Press, 2005), p.137.

32 Arthur Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1986), p.396.

33 James Risen, Mark Mazzetti, and Michael Schmidt, “U.S.-Approved Arms for Libyan Rebels Fell Into Jihadis’ Hands,” The New York Times, December 5, 2012.

34 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006), pp.266-268.

35 Ibid.

36 Damien McElroy, “Colonel Gadhafi Died after Being Stabbed with Bayonet,” The Telegraph, October 17, 2012.

37 Lolita Baldor and Slobodan Lekic, “Covert Teams from US, NATO Boost Rebel Forces,” Associated Press, August 22, 2011.

38 Ibid.

39 Dahl, pp.13-14.

40 Associated Press, “Libyans Vote in First Election Since Gaddafi’s Downfall,” The Guardian, July 7, 2012.

41 Samuel Osborne, “Libyan Suicide Attack: Dual Car Bombing Kills at least 10 in Former ISIS-Stronghold Sirte,” The Independent, August 18, 2016.

42 Global Terrorism Database, Amount of Terrorist Attacks in Libya between 1979 and 2008.

43 Ibid., Amount of Terrorist Attacks inside Libya in 2014.

44 Michael Morell, The Great War of Our Time (New York, Twelve, 2015), p.190.

45 Ibid., p.194.

46 Ibid., p.320.

47 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp.3-4.

Counter-Sniper Response to the Terrifying Nature of Sniper and Active Shooter Ambushes Report One

By Jim Weiss, Bob O’Brien, and Mickey Davis

S

Bundesgrenzschultz (BGS)’s GSG 9, the worldfamous counterterrorism German border police unit, in 1997.

niper ambush attacks are technically classified as active shooters/killers. However, while all sniper ambush attacks are active shooter incidents, not all active shooter attacks are sniperattack related.

Sniper ambushes by their very nature include the characteristics of superior tactical position, precision skill and weaponry, etc. They are terrifying because effective tactics can’t be location is known.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

In the eyes of police officers who were at these massive, long-lasting shootouts with the well-armed police opponents, articles, books, and news accounts often contain errors and misrepresentations.

We interviewed some of these officers to get an accurate account of the events.

Glenville Shootout and Riots, July 23-July 28, 1968 In 1968 the City of Cleveland and the Cleve-

land Police Department were undergoing hard times. Mayor Carl Stokes was the city’s political leader.

On July 23rd, two Cleveland police cars were set up outside of and in the vicinity of a black nationalist meeting house. Their orders were very specific as to where they could be and what they could to; that turned out to be a

employed until the shooter’s 28

This article will cover two of these incidents: the Glenville, Ohio, Shootout and Riots in 1968, and the Munich Massacre at the Summer Olympics in 1972. One involved domestic terrorism and the other international terrorism.

Vol. 24, No.2

death warrant for responding police officers.

It was a miracle that the officers within the two stakeout police cars weren’t killed as the two police cars were badly shot up.

Summer Olympics of 1972 (the Munich Massacre) and Black September Terrorists

Officially three police officers and one civilian helping the police were killed, and one police officer died a few years later of wounds received. A total of 12 to 15 people were wounded and three black militants were killed.

The Munich Massacre occurred during the Cold War period; the unification of West and East Germany had not yet taken place.

At the time, there weren’t any police ARVs (armored rescue vehicles) in the state and initially the police mainly were armed with their revolvers and shotguns. The police department also had a task force unit of uniformed police officers; this was later incorporated into a new tactical unit. This new tactical unit did have 3006 bolt-action, scoped rifles in the arms room.

The militants were heavily armed. Some police there believe that one or more automatic weapons were used. It is known the militants had military 30 caliber carbines, and it is suspected that they had other long guns, too. During the attack, they wore ammunition bandoleers.

During the shooting, residences were broken into, and at least one militant moved like a sniper from floor to floor and window to window. This was not a classic ambush or sniper attack; perhaps the militants would call this an armed uprising.

Mayor Stokes determined that the police were not trained or equipped to handle this, and he called for the Ohio National Guard, which responded.

During the shootout and subsequent rioting, the police used borrowed Brinks armored money escort trucks to remove the dead and wounded, and to patrol the area.

Later the police department received a custom-built ARV, the first and only police ARV in Ohio for some time.

The day after the initial shootout, white police officers and the National Guard were removed from the six-square-mile Glenville area and stationed at the perimeter; the Mayor believed

that black police officers and black politicians could best handle the situation.

Looting and arson took place in the rioting that followed. It was believed that the militants expected immediate battles in other cities such as Akron, Detroit, and Pittsburgh, and that weapons could have then been moved to them.

This Cleveland Memory Project photo is of borrowed Brinks Trucks. Co-writer, then Cleveland Police Officer Bob O’Brien, was assigned to one of the seven Brinks trucks placed into police service with the Cleveland Police Department during the first night of the Glenville rioting.

The following day he was assigned to an Ohio National Guard jeep.

During the shootout and subsequent rioting, the police used borrowed Brinks armored money escort trucks to remove the dead and wounded, and to patrol the area. Later the police department received a custom-built ARV, the first and only police ARV in Ohio for some time.

West Germany at the time was a federalistic government made up of 11 states (10 states plus West Berlin). Under the German Constitution (Basic Law) each federal state had the right to police itself, and the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) were forbidden to take direct action in matters such as those that took place in Munich. Also at that time, the city police of Munich were not incorporated into a Bavarian county police department; the security and policing of the Munich’s police was under the overall command coordination of Munich’s chief of police.

It wasn’t until after 1972 that all of Bavaria’s police became the Bayerische Landspolizei (Bavarian State Police). Munich’s chief of police could call upon the Bavarian state’s readiness (crowd and riot control) police, Bereitscha ftspolizei (Bepo), to assist and reinforce the city’s police. Also, under German law, one German federal state could call upon the police of another federal state and the German border guards (police with military-like combat status) (Bundesgrenzschultz) (BGS) for assistance.

Police from all over the state of Bavaria, as well as the national border police (BGS), were asked to help protect the Munich Olympics.

Also Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Ulrich Wegener, who was a member of the BGS border police, was there in the role of liaison officer to West Germany’s Interior Minister under West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.

Brandt was politically soft concerning the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and the Fatah (liberation of Palestine) to which the terrorist gang Black September was affiliated.

The Attack: With the help of several unsuspecting Olympic attendees, eight infiltrating Black September terrorists claiming to be Canadians climbed over the two-meter-tall chain link fence surrounding the Olympic Village. Their baggage contained AMK assault rifles, Tokarev pistols, and grenades. (Some sources refer to the terrorists’ assault rifles as being AK-47s; the AMK is a light version of the AK-47).

Now armed, they forced entrance to the ground floor apartments occupied by 11 Israeli

athletes, including coaches. Some Israelis resisted; two were killed, one wounded; mutilation of dead Israeli’s body followed.

Negotiations were held with the eight Black September kidnappers. The Munich’s Chief of Police Manfred Schreiber was acting as a primary negotiator, mediated.

However, early negations failed because the terrorists knew of police plans by watching television. This collapsed what is called “Operation Sunshine,” the police plan to storm the terrorist-occupied apartments.

Through later agreement, the terrorists--along with their nine bound hostages--were transported by bus to two waiting BGS border police Huey helicopters, crewed and piloted by BGS. (Bavaria’s police at the time only had small MBB 105 helicopters. These were too small to transport the terrorists and their captives, so BGS border police helicopters and BGS crews were used.)

The group was flown to a military airport, Furstenfeldbruck, about 25 kilometers away from the Olympic Village area. There the police had set a trap involving five Bavarian state readiness police (Bepo) snipers (at the time there was a small Bepo sniper team (PSK) as part of a Bepo readiness police company or Hunderschafts). These Bepo snipers were competition shooters, who, after having completed their basic police academy training, became members of Bepo special technical readiness police companies called Stabshunderschaften and worked with the Munich city police.

It was night and once at the airfield, things went south. The deal made was that once at this airport, the terrorists and their captives would board a Boeing 727 and be flown to a Muslim country in the Middle East. Police officers were disguised as Lufthansa personnel.

A couple of terrorists, when checking out the Boeing 727, realized it was a trap and warned the rest of

30

stated: “The snipers had different rifles; some had H&K G3 rifles, and other snipers had real sniper rifles with scopes.”

A different Bavarian police officer told us that at the airfield there were police officers with H&K G3 rifles and Austrian Steyr SSG 69 sniper rifles; these would have been Munich police officers.

DSR-1 precision bolt action rifle made for the German police snipers and counter-sniper sharpshooters is shown in use by a Bavarian police SEK commando in 2002. The Bavarian SEK officer is sighting in on a target in training. Well-trained German police snipers and SEK units were formed as a result of the Munich Massacre.

their group at the helicopters with the hostages.

The five police snipers did not have advanced sniper training, and their H&K G3 rifles—long guns not made to fill the role of sniper rifles--were not equipped with scopes or night vision said media sources; our source, who was there, said some police snipers did have scoped rifles. In addition, these police snipers could not communicate with each other.

They opened fire, as did other police and the terrorists. The two helicopter flight crews ran for cover. The terrorists shot out the runway lights plunging the area into darkness. The bound Israeli captives were unable to escape from the helicopters.

Heavy gunfire, including uncoordinated police sniper gunfire, reportedly lasted one and a half hours. Two of the eight terrorists positioned near a pilot were killed, and a wounded third terrorist would later die.

A platoon (zug) of young, rookie Bepo readiness police officers were stationed in the airport control tower and ordered to support the Bepo snipers. They were armed with P1 pistols being held in both hands. A City of Munich police sergeant (polizeiobermeister or

POM) Anton Fliegerbauer entered the control tower and was killed by incoming gunfire.

Young Bepo Polizeiwachtmeister (PW) (police officer) Charles N. was among the rookie Bepo readiness police. (PW Charles N. later retired as Erster Polizeihauptkommissar (EPHK) (police major). He stated an entire Bepo readiness police company was at the airfield in combat against the PLO Black September terrorists. His Bepo platoon was in the tower building. The other two Bepo platoons were engaged in combat outside the tower.

In the control tower, POM Fliegerhauer went down a few feet in front of PW Charles N. Also during this time he saw the Bepo readiness police snipers, and later noticed that the police armored rescue vehicles had finally arrived, although due to command and communication issues as well as traffic, the vehicles had been delayed and arrived late.

According to EPHK Charles N. as far as he knew the Bepo PSK snipers were on the roof of the terminal. One Bepo PSK sniper later told him that he, the sniper, had killed two, probably three of the terrorists. Another account indicated that there were Munich police officer snipers with H&K G3 rifles on the scene at the airfield tower. EPHK Charles N. further

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As he was leaving, one terrorist threw a hand grenade into the BGS helicopter, resulting in a gas tank explosion and a large fireball.

Four Israelis in that helicopter were killed. Another terrorist fired on the hostages in the second BGS helicopter, killing five of them.

Lessons Learned: A year before the Munich Massacre, there was a bank robbery in Munich in which hostages were taken. A Bepo readiness police officer shot one of the two robbers and in the incident one hostage was killed. This previous incident did not go down well and was deemed dangerous to the hostages; there were political, media, and an unsubstantiated legal action against a City of Munich prosecutor who had taken a leadership role and had ordered the police to attack the hostage takers.

At the time, Munich city police had just begun a SEK (SWAT) program that included snipers. This SEK training was not finished until after the Munch Massacre. Worldwide, the Munich Massacre proved to be a game-changer in strategy, tactics, techniques, etc., for both the police and terrorists sides. It had a tremendous impact on antiterrorism, including American law enforcement and SWAT. In reflecting upon the Munich Massacre, some people have referred to the Black September terrorists as being similar to fighters for a cause.

There were different levels of training on both sides--the police training versus training of the terrorists.

When comparing a police officer in Bavaria in 1972 to a PLO terrorist in weapon handling, tactics, and so forth, it was the terrorists who had a big advantage.

Young Bepo rookie police officers in the 1960s had training with FN G1 rifles (later replaced by the H&K G3 rifles) and H&K MP5 subguns, and only in basic training with MG 42 machine guns and mortars. The PLO terrorists, on the other hand, received training right up until their combat during the Munich Olympics in 1972. They were professionals at killing.

(Note: Some people called them “terrorists” and others called them fighters for being part of the PLO’s fight against the State of Israel, the Israeli occupying force from 1948.)

During the 1972 Munich standoff, the ranking police officer and various political leaders implored the terrorists to free the hostages. Because the hostages were Israeli, German officials were very sensitive due to past history. The prime minister of Israel would not yield to the terrorists’ demands.

At this time the Munich police did not have negotiators. In a hostage-taking situation, the police form of negotiation had been along the lines of a ranking officer telling the perpetrator: “You come out in 30 minutes, or we throw in the tear gas.”

In the aftermath of the Munich Massacre, SWAT (Spezialeinsatzkommandos, SEK) units with integrated snipers were formed in the various German federal states. Oberstlieutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Ulrich Wegener was instrumental in creating the BGS border police’s highly-regarded anti-terrorist unit, GSG-9.

American law enforcement adopted the negotiation concept, and improved its police security for the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. The U. S. Army also formed Delta Force, its first tellingly capable counterterrorism special operations fighting machine.

NYPD put together a negotiator program to deal with hostage

takers due to what happened in Munich as well as the Attica prison riot and the “Dog Day Afternoon” bank robbery. The initial NYPD hostage negotiating plan was to give detectives with psychological training the authority to negotiate, and SWAT had the job to contain perpetrators. NYPD’s hostage negotiators program was shared with other agencies, including the FBI. NYPD Detective Lieutenant Frank Bolz an acquaintance of Munich’s Chief of Police Manfred Schreiber was to become the first commanding officer of NYPD’s Hostage Rescue Team.

Bereitscha ftspolizei (Bepo) 1972 In 1972, the Bepo readiness police were made up of police cadets. These usually began their careers at ages 16 and 17, then went through two and one-half years of academy schooling while housed in barracks.

In regard to the lack of a fine police precision sniper rifle at Munich, Heckler & Koch (H&K) began to design a rifle based on the well-proven H&K G3 platform. The company’s end product was their H&K PSG1, considered to be one of the finest police semi-automatic, precision sniper/counter sniper rifles in the world, and has been used by such anti-terrorist units as GSG 9.

Both GSG 9 and the H&K PSG1 sniper rifle were the result of the Munich Massacre.

During academy training, the cadets formed

About the Authors

Special readiness police units or tactical

Lieut. Jim Weiss (Retired) is a former Army light infantryman, schooltrained Army combat engineer, a former school-trained (regular Army) Army military policeman, former State of Florida Investigator, and a retired police lieutenant from the Brook Park (OH) Police Department.

He has written and co-written hundreds of articles for law enforcement and safety forces magazines, most notably Law and Order. Tactical World, Knives Illustrated, Tactical Response, Police Fleet Manager, Florida Trooper, and Counter Terrorism.

companies were trained along with police

Mickey (Michele) Davis is an awardwinning, California-based writer and author. Her young adult novel, Evangeline Brown and the Cadillac Motel, won the Swiss Prix Chronos for the German translation. Mickey is the wife of a Vietnam War veteran officer and a senior volunteer with her local fire department.

of the police in Bavaria were trained with

Bob O’Brien (Retired) Cleveland, Ohio Police Department SWAT Sergeant.

CPD SWAT Unit co-founder.

Law enforcement consultant, instructor, writer. Vietnam War Army veteran.

Bepo readiness police training companies, which were part of larger units such as Bepo readiness police battalions, etc. Once finished with the basic academy studies and fully trained in police basics, they were assigned to more advanced forms of Bepo readiness police units for a few additional years, then proceeded to regular police assignments.

medics, signals, and engineers. They used police armored vehicles, their own vehicles, and specialized police vehicles. They also set up their own accommodations, tents, etc.

Since all Bavarian readiness police were trained with H&K G3 rifles, the vast majority the rifle. (H&K G3 was the same rifle used

by West Germany’s military). However, all members of the Bepo readiness police were armed with Walther P1 pistols (improved Walther P 38 pistols), which was different from the Munich police.

IACSP Spotlight

The CARVER Methodology Origins: The Best Defense Always Comes From A Good Offense

FBI.GOV

By Luke Bencie and Sami Araboghli

T 32

he old adage says that the best defense is a good offense. In the security industry, the methodology of choice for protecting critical infrastructure and key resources follows this same principle.

Originated out of a target analysis for effective attack employed by the U.S. Military and Intelligence communities, the CARVER method is recognized today by a wide range of industries as the gold standard in vulnerability and threat assessment.

Following the events on September 11, 2001, and as federal funds were released to assess vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure across the United States, a universal methodology had to be quickly adopted to fulfill the security requirements mandated

by Congress. The CARVER methodology was and continues to be that critical tool. Its applications are numerous, covering a wide spectrum of threats, from physical security and counterintelligence, to cyber and psychological attacks.

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Since its adoption, the key to the success of CARVER has been its ability to quantify and standardize risk based on a wide variety of threats in a broad range of scenarios.

This versatility rendered CARVER the methodology of choice for protecting critical infrastructure and key resources across different sectors:

More specifically, CARVE was an

CARVE – offensive target analysis

examination of

The CARVER methodology was developed in the mid 1970s to meet the emerging threat of global terrorism. It was born out of the earlier “CARVE” method, defined as an offensive methodology used to identify a target or asset that, if compromised, would meet a prescribed strategic or tactical objective. More specifically, CARVE was an examination of potential targets to determine its military/intelligence importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain the desired level of damage or casualties.

CARVE was the target analysis method of choice for CIA and the U.S. Military Special Operations from the 50s until the mid-70s, being a unique analytical tool that facilitated both a qualitative and a quantitative approach to target selection. The model used a value structure of 1-5 (or in some cases 1-10) to determine the relevance of a given target to a mission’s objective. The higher the number, the better that particular target met the objectives of the planners.

potential targets

CARVE contained the following elements: • Criticality: Single points of failure, choke points • Accessibility: Ease of access • Recuperability: Time needed to restore operations • Vulnerability: Level of exposure to attack based on adversary capability • Espy: Likelihood that the target will be recognized

Special Operations

While CARVE proved to be a highly effective offensive tool for decades, it fell short when employed to support asset protection against enemy attacks. As incidents of international terrorism emerged and increased in frequency, analysts began to find CARVE lacking as a vulnerability assessment tool. None of CARVE’s criteria quantified the goal of a terrorist attack – its effect: the impact, severity, and consequences it would inflict.

and a quantitative

CARVER and the Modern Era of Terrorism During the early to mid-1970s, interna-

to determine its military/intelligence importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain the desired level of damage or casualties. CARVE was the target analysis method of choice for CIA and the U.S. Military from the 50s until the mid-70s, being a unique analytical tool that facilitated both a qualitative approach to target selection.

Arlington. Va. (Sept. 12, 2001) -- Military service members render honors as fire and rescue workers unfurl a huge American flag over the side of the Pentagon during rescue and recovery efforts following the Sept 11 terrorist attack. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Michael W. Pendergrass. (RELEASED)

tional terrorism flourished, bringing to international headlines names like Carlos “the Jackal”, Red Army Faction, BaaderMeinhoff Gang, Japanese Red Army, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Many, if not all of them were intent on conducting terrorist operations against U.S. interests abroad. Businesses, embassies, airlines, and individuals were attacked using a variety of weapons and methods. An appropriate response to those emerging threats required an effective vulnerability assessment.

Terrorist attacks have some effect or consequence as a goal of their operation – the greater the effect or consequence, the more likely the action will be attractive to the terrorist or organization. Vulnerability assessments in their origins were primarily qualitative in nature and were based solely on the experience of the assessor. As a consequence, there was almost no way to measure the likelihood of an attack based on a target’s attractiveness to terrorists. What was needed was a nuanced and quantifiable approach to the vulnerability assessment process, one that could ensure that scarce resources could be applied where they would be more effective and cause greater impact.

To meet these needs, the CARVE target analysis methodology had to evolve to better address the security posture of potential terrorist targets.

CARVE lacked a way of quantifying the effect or consequences of a terrorist attack. Thus in 1976 CARVE evolved from an offensive methodology into CARVER, a defensive one, aimed at determining the likelihood of an adversary successfully exploiting a system or an asset’s vulnerabilities. This evolution required new criteria, in which the assessor could use a value scale to measure the probability of an attack by terrorists. By re-envisioning existing criteria and appending new ones, CARVE was transformed and modernized to support defensive assessment in the face of the evolving terrorism threat.

This restructuring originated the CARVER Threat and Vulnerability Assessment, which contains the following criteria: • Criticality: Single points of failure, degree of importance to the system.

• Accessibility: Ease of access (Security System Effectiveness) • Recoverability: The time and effort to recover system operations after an adverse event • Vulnerability: Level of exposure to attack based on adversary capability • Effect: Scope and magnitude of adverse consequences that would result from malicious actions • Recognizability: Ability of an adversary to recognize a target as a target • Since then, CARVER been used by the intelligence community, the military, and many other government and law-enforcement agencies to help protect our critical infrastructure as well as conduct target analysis against known and potential enemies. It is a time-tested vulnerability assessment methodology that balances efficiency with reliability.

CARVER Today Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, coordinated attacks have become commonplace while the “lone wolf” domestic terrorist threat has become one of the single biggest concerns to the FBI. Additionally, global terrorism turned into an unbounded reality, utilizing more aggressive, horrific, and deadly tactics. “Red team” exercises (mock attack simulations) performed by former Military

34

Thus in 1976 CARVE evolved from an offensive methodology into CARVER, a defensive one, aimed at determining the likelihood of an adversary successfully exploiting a system or an asset’s vulnerabilities. This evolution required new criteria, in which the assessor could use a value scale to measure the probability of an attack by terrorists.

By re-envisioning existing criteria and appending new ones, CARVE was transformed and modernized to support defensive assessment in the face of the evolving terrorism threat.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

and Intelligence personnel against critical infrastructure became commonplace. Water treatment plants, nuclear facilities, electrical distribution centers, transportation hubs, and communications stations, all recognize the need to be always prepared and to be proactive in the search for preventive measures. That is how CARVER, a tool previously only known to the Special Operations and Intelligence community, has become relevant to corporate security professionals, engineers, academics, and others.

The great advantage of the CARVER vulnerability assessment is that it brings offensive experience, previously employed to exploit vulnerabilities, as a tool to defend critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.

Therefore the CARVER Threat and Vulnerability Assessment is best applied with the collaboration of professionals with knowledge of offensive tactics – those who have encountered the threat up close and know how to best inflict the greatest effect on a given target – much like a terrorist would.

The success of a the CARVER method also lies in the right team of assessors, consisting not only of those with knowledge of the physical and operational systems of a given facility, but also the ones with the tactical and offensive experience.

Conclusion The early offensive CARVE method played a crucial role in developing what is known today as one of the most effective defense methodologies. With global terrorism growing as a threat to every community and industry, the CARVER threat and vulnerability methodology will continue to be vital in planning security posture and preventing tragedies. As it did in the past, the CARVER methodology will continue to evolve, and to play an essential role in the protection of our communities’ critical infrastructure and safety.

About the Authors Luke Bencie is the Managing Director of Security Management International. He has traveled to over 130 countries on behalf of the US Government on matters of national security and intelligence. He is the author of numerous books, including The CARVER Target Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment Methodology. He can be reached at lbencie@smiconsultancy.com Sami Araboghli is a Junior Associate at Security Management International. He is also a US Marine Corp Reservist. He can be reached at saraboghli@smiconsultancy.com

Vol. 24, No.2

Security Driver: Vision Part 2

By Anthony Ricci

I 36

n a former article, we spoke about visual acuity and peripheral vision and how essential they both are to spotting hazards well ahead or your driving path. However, there are many reasons why drivers may have hindered vision and longer response times to potential hazards. While some of these traits are medical and we cannot do anything but make adjustments, others are self-inflicted by drugs and alcohol or can be from vehicle and roadway design. It can also be just a better angle or a lapse in time that you can’t get back. Most drivers do not look at the road as a constant flow of movement. A constant time and distance math equation but simply a means of getting to their next destination. The other day while sitting at a light there was terrible sun glare.

I was waiting for the light to change, and the car behind me beeped their horn. Most would yell out the window in a rage; others would wave and thank the person behind them. I double checked the light then began to move forward, but I remember thinking about the time it took me to recognize the green light and the split second

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

delay which caused the person behind me to beep. The delay could not have been but 1 to 2 seconds. Think regarding how long each and every person takes to react to a particular situation. There are hundreds of reasons, however in this particular case this driver had a better angle than I did. He was quicker and perhaps due to a better line of

Vol. 24, No.2

sight didn’t have to be so cautious, or maybe it was just driver attitude. I’ll never know but it did get me thinking of the big difference in reaction time and why there are so many differing reaction abilities, responses, and alertness levels, it’s no wonder there aren’t more accidents.

Since driving is a game of mostly the eyes and mind lets talk about a couple of vision problems that most do not consider. First I had no clue that over half the people over the age of 40 are affected to some extent by Hyperopia or Far-sightedness.

Wikipedia defined Far-sightedness, also known as hyperopia, is a condition of the eye in which light is focused behind, instead of on, the retina.[2] This results in close objects appearing blurry, while far objects may appear normal.[2] As the condition worsens, objects at all distances may be blurry.[2] Other symptoms may include headaches and eye strain.[2] People may also experience accommodative dysfunction, binocular dysfunction, amblyopia, and strabismus.[3] Far-sighted drivers could navigate their vehicle perfectly during the day, but as dusk goes into the darkness, they begin to have vision problems and even start to see things in double. This is multiplied if the driver becomes fatigued. Based on the last articles math problem it becomes evident that wasted seconds and decreased visual acuity can result in slower reaction time and certainly get the occupants in this particular vehicle closer to a crash.

When we think of roadway navigation and the sign/light system we have colors and words that hold meaning and create action.

So what happens when the driver has color vision issues? In a driver system where red means stop this could be a huge problem.

Did you know more than 50 percent of men can’t see the red? Meanwhile, I just thought STOP stood for “Spin Tires On Pavement,” all this time and people couldn’t see the

Far-sighted drivers could navigate their vehicle perfectly during the day, but as dusk goes into the darkness, they begin to have vision problems and even start to see things in double. This is multiplied if the driver becomes fatigued. sign. Color impaired drivers require about twice as much time as an average driver with normal sight to act to traffic signals.

The photo above shows two different types of color blindness: normal on the far left, tritanopia in the middle (missing blue), and protanopia (missing red} on the far right.

If these drivers have this much uncertainty at stop lights, their decisions are delayed immensely, and they will start to use other visual clues to make intersection decisions which could cause more altered reactions.

One thing I struggle with more and more every year that goes by is a dark adaptation, eye stress, headaches, and trouble focusing at times when my eyes start to change to night vision. During the day our eyes use what is called cone vision (photopic vision) which gives you visual acuity to color objects and is essential for daylight, while nighttime rod vision (scotopic vision) is used. It may take 5 minutes or more when you walk into a dark room to start to see relatively well. We say our eyes are adjusting,

but our vision type is actually changing. During these times of vision change, many people experience headaches, eye soreness, and have more difficulty focusing. Performance behind the wheel can change dramatically with eye fatigue and vision change. This alone can alter a driver’s reaction time significantly.

The ability to regain focus after looking at oncoming headlights is another large reaction time killer and definitely reduces your visual acuity to any amount of detail. Most drivers have a hard enough time staying in their lane never mind doing it with reduced vision and eye pain. At night many drivers react much slower since their eyes are working at a reduced capability. Windshields that are pitted scratched, smoked stained or coated with a film (tobacco film and marijuana) as well as fog and rain make this situation extremely worse.

I mentioned these issues since most of us experience them and just accept them as a norm. I didn’t provide solutions because most of these are more medical. Some can be corrected with glasses/contacts, and other drivers can make things slightly better by cleaning their windows and reducing the intensity of the instrument cluster lights inside the compartment, but the real fix goes much deeper than the scope of this article. The driving system in the USA would have to change everything from eye testing to roadway design. I simply bring this to your attention as security drivers and law enforcement since it plays into why people do weird and uncalculated movements on the road. Instead of beeping and yelling, try to understand the other driver and be out of the way. Understand your scenario and have an open mind to the other driver’s inconsistencies. Meanwhile, take care of your eyes and get them checked regularly.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is President of ADSI (http:// www.1adsi.com)

An IACSP Q&A with Luke Hunt:

Australian Journalist and the Author of Punji Trap

L

Pham Xuan An On The Left

uke Hunt began his career in journalism in the mid-1980s after traveling through what was then some of the world’s trouble spots, including Northern Ireland and the south of Morocco. Initially, Hunt worked for Australian Associated Press and then Agence FrancePresse, where he served as bureau chief in Afghanistan and Cambodia. He was the first journalist to enter Baghdad with the US Marines in 2003. He also covered the war in the Middle East, Sri Lanka and Kashmir. While in Southeast Asia, he focused on conflicts and counter-terrorism issues.

(Editor’s Note: Luke Hunt is a veteran Australian journalist and the author of Punji Trap: Pham Xuan An: The Spy Who Didn’t Love Us, a book about the Vietnam War, espionage, propaganda and the Vietnamese spy Pham Xuan An.

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Vol. 24, No.2

His work has appeared in The Diplomat, The Economist, the Washington Times, Voice of America and the New York Times.

In addition Mr. Hunt serves as Opinion Editor for UCAN and he is a regular on radio in Australian and Hong Kong.

Luke Hunt was personally commended for his coverage of the Afghan civil war by the UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi and his work has been honored by the World Association of Newspapers and the Society of Publishers in Asia.

Luke Hunt was recently interviewed by Paul Davis, a contributing editor to the IACSP.)

IACSP: Why did you write a book about Vietnamese spy Pham Xuan An? Hunt: Like many of my vintage, I grew

up on the Vietnam War. We watched it on television, read about it the newspapers and a close friend of my family died when his helicopter was shot down by the Viet Cong. The interest was always there, and it was rekindled when I came across Pham Xuan An while studying journalism at Deakin University. I contacted his friends and wound up working with them. Then I met An in Vietnam in 1992, along with many other leading Communists like Gen. Tran Van Tra. That’s when I realized I had a book to write about An, and many more trips were to follow.

IACSP: In my view, An was a two-faced liar and fraud who spied for and supported a murderous, totalitarian Communist regime.

What do you think of Pham Xuan An?

Hunt: I grew up in Springvale, a working-

Currently I cover Southeast Asia from Phnom Penh, where journalists are doing it in a tough environment. It’s not Afghanistan of the late 1990s nor Iraq of a decade ago but it is getting harder with governments becoming more and more repressive.

Pham Xuan An

Hunt: On a personal level, he was a charm-

ing intellect of a misplaced faith. He really believed the Communists would deliver a better life fought under a nationalist cause. He got that wrong. On the professional level, he was an extremely good journalist who went to the dark side and never came back. He was a committed Communist and a brilliant propagandist for them. He tried to protect friends, but his work was responsible for many deaths, including innocent civilians, which happened while masquerading as a reporter, and he knew all of that by the time he started at Reuters in the early 1960s. From my perspective he was a charming liar, who meant well.

IACSP: Can you tell us about us your background and what you are currently doing?

Luke Hunt

class suburb of Melbourne. Good people with a strong work ethic, my mother in particular. She helped fund me through the university and I started out on Outback newspapers where local issues, like what crops to plant, were just as important as Donald Trump meeting Kim Jong-un. The university taught me a lot and I scored a job with Australian Associated Press and never looked back, well occasionally I might.

Currently I cover Southeast Asia from Phnom Penh, where journalists are doing it in a tough environment. It’s not Afghanistan of the late 1990s nor Iraq of a decade ago but it is getting harder with governments becoming more and more repressive.

IACSP: Would you tell us about the counterterrorism actions and other conflicts you are currently covering in Southeast Asia?

Hunt: In Southeast Asia over the last two decades it was mainly about Jemaah Islamiyha (JI), then their much nastier offshoot Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).

The world became full of experts on Islamic militancy after 9/11 but I had done a couple of years covering such issues out of Afghanistan before that, when I was the bureau chief for Agence France Presse (AFP) in the late 1990s and that gave me some unique insights, in particular the relationship between the Taliban, al-Qaeda and JI. That also helped following the Bali bombing in 2002, which was called in by Hambali from a mosque in Phnom Penh, where I was stationed at the time for AFP. Terrorism in Southeast Asia kept me busy and I did a lot of work in Iraq in 2003 with the invasion. In 2008 I went freelance and made counter terrorism a chief focus, particularly out of Borneo which was the safest place to operate given its strategic position, which was then known as (and I think still is) as T3 or the Terrorist Transit Triangle; of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.

The conflict in the southern Philippines, Islamic separatists in southern Thailand, and ethnic conflicts in Myanmar and Indonesia, and political upheaval in Cambodia have all given me a sore hand.

IACSP: Who and what are the terrorism, Luke Hunt

crime and other security threats today?

Hunt: The biggest issue con-

fronting much of the world, is Sinicization and the maritime dispute in the South China Sea, which is China’s Achilles Heel.

They want to be America; the problem is they’re not. Beijing can’t live with criticism and expects an entire planet to toe their political line. There is no concept of the separation of powers thus their executive, parliament, judiciary and press will always lack legitimacy. More importantly, their economy is in deep trouble – too much debt, too much printing money and it’s all spread way to thin across continents where the Communist party is buying influence.

It won’t last, and an increasingly hostile environment will probably follow and a major economic downturn.

IACSP: You’ve covered conflicts in North-

ern Ireland, the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan and other hot spots around the world.

Would you tell us about any harrowing, interesting and illuminating things you’ve encountered in your day?

Hunt: Witnessing a man strung up to a crucifix and driven around Kabul in the back of pick-up during a Taliban offensive, was memorable as was having to defend myself in a Sharia court after being charged by Talibs for espionage under pain of execution.

I was found not guilty. I actually got a fair hearing in a dangerous place and time by a people usually judged as anything but fair.

measures journalists, and many people helped, that and an absence of bad luck.

IACSP: Any lessons learned from your years as a journalist?

They want to be America; the problem is they’re not. Beijing can’t live with criticism and expects an entire planet to toe their political line. There is no concept of the separation of powers thus their executive, parliament, judiciary and press will always lack legitimacy.

More importantly, their economy is in deep trouble – too much debt, too much printing money and it’s all spread way to thin across continents where the Communist party is buying influence.

IACSP: Who were the most interesting killed in a double suicided blast in Kabul in people you’ve encountered. Why do they stand out?

Hunt: A lot of very ordinary people who go about trying to make life as normal as possible in conflict or times of trouble. Kids still go to school. People build houses, keep the electricity and water running and when things go bad, like a bombing, they are the first responders who pitch in and sort out the mess.

IACSP: What has been your high point and low point?

Hunt: The low point is when colleagues and friends become casualties. I keep a list of about 20. The latest was Shah Marai,

40

April. I gave him his first camera 20 years ago. He’d been a frontline photographer for two decades, five times longer than World War II. There are no high points in war, just moments of great relief and crossing the Diyala River into Baghdad was one of those moments.

IACSP: What was it like to be the first journalist to enter Baghdad with the U.S. Marines?

Hunt: My platoon, I was embedded, was elated, and so was I, just to get there. I was later told by Voice of America that I was the first to file, beat The AP by 10 minutes and that was pleasing from an overall work perspective. That’s one way the industry

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Hunt: PTSD: In the early days I used to

have nightmares after covering car accidents and domestic disputes. Once watched a man shoot his own head off after killing his wife and 18-month old baby. The sight of a baby being wheeled out on a full-size gurney under a starched white sheet has been etched in my brain for 30 years -- as much as the wounded tied to the bonnet of our ambulance as we drove through frontlines at Nasiriya during the worst of the fighting in the invasion of Iraq. We had run out of space and couldn’t just leave them there.

I hate it when people assume you’ve seen too much and argue that desensitizes you.

It’s actually the opposite. People I know with PTSD are overly sensitive. I had a touch of Survivors Syndrome but you learn with live it. I can’t watch rape scenes and violence in the movies or on TV, including documentaries -- particularly violence against women and children – it upsets me much more now than when I was young.

And I’m quite okay with that.

IACSP: Do you have any plans to write another book?

Hunt: There’s no shortage of ideas, stories and characters about life on the road across Asia. But writing a book takes up a lot of headspace and it’s about finding the time and place to pull it together. I hope it will happen.

IACSP: Anything you would to say to our

readers?

Hunt: Don’t believe the hype whether it’s from activists or politicians, the overwhelming majority of people are on your side. America gets a lot of bad press, not all of it justified. But America is big and broad and done more for the planet’s welfare than any other country since World War II. Headlines are about the absurdities we all have to deal with and not the reality on the ground. Reality matters.

IACSP: Thanks for speaking to us.

Vol. 24, No.2

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IACSP Homeland Security Conference Review Campus Safety Conference East July 18-20, 2018, Herndon, VA.

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

O

n July 18-20, 2018, Campus Safety Magazine (CS) held its’ 5th Annual Campus Safety Conference (CSC) - East at the Hyatt Regency Dulles in Herndon, VA. The conference covered campus safety topics, including an exhibition by leading security industry vendors. The magazine’s print edition is published eight times a year and is distributed free of charge to more than 18,000 campus safety and security professionals in the United States. It is also published online at CampusSafetyMagazine.com.

CS also publishes several e-newsletters that reach thousands of school, university and hospital security stakeholders every week.

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The conference/exhibition was held over three days, with the first day featuring two pre-conference workshops on handling protests and controversial speakers at university campuses and using scenarios to obtain buy-in by campus administrators for security and emergency preparedness programs. The second day’s presentations and workshops were thematically focused, accompanied by a security industry exhibition. For each time segment there were two to three sessions, with keynote addresses in the morning and evening. The panels were tremendously useful for security professionals in this field, as follows:

Dr. Frank Straub Director of Strategic Studies, Police Foundation, Washington, DC, Keynote: Lessons Learned From Averted Acts of School Violence.

The Police Foundation has created an “Averted School Violence” (ASV) database on averted and “completed” incidents of mass violence from 1999 to the current period to empirically examine these incidents against schools. The goal of the database is to generate findings on the pre-incident warning signs by such perpetrators and the factors involved in thwarting them, such as reporting their suspicious activities to appropriate authorities. The ASV website is located at https://www.asvnearmiss. org/. Dr. Straub also discussed the need to understand the consequences of the impact of security technology on emergency responses to different types of threats. For instance, lockdown equipment can protect against active shooters but not against the outbreak of a fire.

Police Department Buffalo State College Comprehensive Threat Assessment in a University Setting: A Case Study.

The presenters discussed the threat assessment process used by the police department at the State University of New York College at Buffalo to evaluate the risk of violence posed by a university student with psychological disorders who was judged to be a potential threat against university staff and students. What made this a best practice is that a continuously functioning intraprofessional collaboration was established involving a forensic psychiatric evaluation by several experts, including the FBI’s local

The Police Foundation has created an “Averted School Violence” (ASV) database on averted and “completed” incidents of mass violence from 1999 to the current period to empirically examine these incidents against schools. The goal of the database is to generate findings on the pre-incident warning signs by such perpetrators and the factors involved in thwarting them, such as reporting their suspicious activities to appropriate authorities.

representative and its Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) at Quantico, VA, as well as a criminal investigation, the suspect’s arrest, prosecution, incarceration, and post-release supervision, which remained ongoing.

Examples of the subject’s threatening writings and telephone conversations were presented, as well as the threat assessment methodology used by the FBI’s BAU.

Corina Bolger Global Sales Director, H&H Medical Corporation Active Shooter?

Learn How to Save a Life.

The presentation was a ‘hands-on’ practicum on the first aid devices, such as a tourniquet, that can be used immediately to stop and control life threatening bleeding by victims in the event of a shooting until emergency medical system (EMS) personnel arrive a few minutes later. Such immediate bleeding stoppage by applying pressure to a wound is crucial because, as the presenter pointed out, it can “change potential fatalities to surviving wounded.”

John Woodmansee, Security, Environmental, Health and Safety, Department of Education,

State of Connecticut Virtual All-Hazard School Vulnerability Assessment and Correction Actions The presentation provided practical steps to conduct an all-hazards security and vulnerability assessment of a typical K-12 school.

An all-hazard security plan consists of steps such as conducting a vulnerability assessment, developing an emergency response plan, implementing a security system, coordinating it with local agencies, and regularly exercising it. Of especial interest was the presenter’s visual tour of a school site to assess its security vulnerabilities in terms of effective signs to control public access, building and perimeter lighting, parking, fencing, bollards, access control, including the placement of windows to prevent easy access, and evacuation routes, including ensuring they are not locked in case of an emergency.

Lt. John Weinstein Lieutenant/Commander Strategic Planning, Northern Virginia Community College Police Department Active Shooter Response: How to Run, Hide and Fight.

The presentation provided law enforcement-based tactics for potential victims to employ the “Run, Hide, Fight” response protocol when confronted by an active shooter. Fighting the shooter is crucial, the speaker emphasized, because when the “run” and “hide” alternatives are unavailable, it is the only option that victims can

use to potentially save their lives. As part of this response, it is more difficult for a shooter to hit a moving target than a stationary one, so victims should always move around a room and attempt to continuously distract the shooter as much as possible, including throwing objects at him in order to “turn the hunter into the hunted.”

The “run” and “hide” response options were also discussed within the framework of the individual victim’s response capability, the nature of threat, and the immediate physical environment (e.g., whether a classroom, an office, a shopping mall, etc., and the physical objects that can be used to hide or use against the shooter).

Mitchell Zais U.S. Deputy Secretary of Education, Brigadier General, U.S. Army (ret.)

Keynote: The Federal Commission on School Safety The speaker discussed the role and activities of the Federal Commission on School Safety, which was established by President Donald J. Trump in March 2018. The Commission’s recommendations, he explained, will cover issues such as providing social and emotional support to affected victims, the components of effective school safety infrastructure, requirements for firearms purchases, and the impact of violent videogames and social media on students.

Sam Jingfors Vice President Safer Schools Together Digital Threat Assessment: How Publicly Available Social Media Can Be Utilized and Assessed to Ensure Safe Campuses

Dr. Peggy Mitchell Clarke and Mr. Todd Evans Trainers, SSI Guardian, Greenville, WI, Stop the Threat - Advanced Active Shooter Training for the 21st Century Safe School In this interactive active shooter prevention workshop, which focused on a school environment, the SSI trainers discussed the components involved in preparing to respond to potential active shooter attacks.

This begins, they explained, with an awareness of potential threat indicators, such as strong grievances, expressions of suicide, sudden withdrawal, severe mood swings, preoccupation with taking revenge, fixation on a specific target, and behaviors that indicate research, planning, and preparation for an attack. A second measure is the adoption of a survival mindset, since the potential victims are responsible for their safety during an incident’s first few minutes until the police responders arrive. Attaining such a mindset, the presenters explained, is made possible through the regular exercising of a response plan. This entails awareness of escape routes or places to hide, including, as they phrased it, “what is your last resort?” (i.e., fighting back). Also presented was a hypothetical scenario involving techniques to de-escalate a potentially violent confrontation, awareness of the special functional and access needs of individuals with disabilities, including limited English proficiency, and the shot-term and long-term psychological and emotional components of recovering from an incident.

The presentation focused on how students often leak their violent intentions to carry out an attack through their social media postings. Understanding where, how and when to locate this critical precursor threat information is possible by utilizing geolocational tools and techniques to regularly conduct online searchers. The types of concerning postings include online threats (whether anonymous or under their names), sexting and sextortion, swatting and doxing.

These threats are posted in social media sites such as Snapchat, which is highly popular with students and others.

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The conference’s other sessions focused on police response measures at the shooting at the North Park Elementary School in San Bernardino, CA; understanding the NFPA 3000: the new national standard for responding to active shooter events; and emergency alert communications systems.

Industry Exhibition The conference’s industry exhibition was highly informative in showcasing some of the latest development in security technologies for campuses in areas such as access control (BEST; Biometric Associates, LP; Boon Edam; Door Armor; DSX Access Systems, Inc.; Napco Security Group; Netronix Integration; Silvershield; and S2 Security); mass alert notifications and voice evacuation systems (Aiphone; Biamp Systems’ Vocia; Bold Technologies; CASE Emergency Systems; Door Armor; Edwards/United Technologies; Halo SOS; Hytera; Omnilert; Pinpoint; ReACT! By Pro Lite; Security Information Systems, Inc.; and Valcom); video surveillance equipment (Antaira Technologies; Avigilon, a Motorola Solutions company; Dahua Technology; FLIR Enterprise Security; Hikvision; OWL’s GroundAware® Surveillance Sensor Systems; Pivot3; Singlewire; Snap; and Vicon); lighting systems (CIMCON Lighting); networked command-andcontrol systems (Blackboard Transact™ Security Management; Diversified; Verkada; and Winsted Control Room Consoles); window protection (Eastman; Window Film Depot/3M ); stop-thebleed equipment (QuickClot); gunshotdetection technologies (Shotpoint); social media monitoring (Dataminr); and training solutions (Safe and Sound Schools; Safer Schools Together; Safe Colleges

by Vector Solutions; and SSI Guardian).

Two additional Campus Safety conferences with some of the same speakers and additional local ones were held in Irving, Texas, and Pasadena, California.

About the Reviewer Dr. Joshua Sinai is a senior analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH) (www.kiernan.co), in Alexandria, VA. The second edition of his “Active Shooter – A Handbook on Prevention,” was published by ASIS International in May 2016. He can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

Vol. 24, No.2

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IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

This column capsule reviews recent books on various aspects of homeland security, including military capability, and counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

What’s Your Plan? A Step-by-Step Guide to Keep Your Family Safe During Emergency Situations

T

James A. DeMeo, (Digi-Tall Media, February 2018), 94 pages, $ 20.00 [Paperback] ISBN: 978-0-9989-2863-0.

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his is an excellent and practical step-by-step guide to keep oneself and one’s family safe in a variety of settings during emergency situations such as an active shooter attack. A spectrum of settings is covered, such as sports and entertainment venues; malls and shopping centers; houses of worship; corporate workplaces; colleges and universities; festivals and amusement parks; movie theaters; and recreation and fitness centers.

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Vol. 24, No.2

For each of these settings, their respective chapters begin with a short overview, factors to consider when entering them (e.g., remembering where one’s car is parked, ensuring one’s smartphone is fully charged, and designating a pre-planned meeting spot for one’s family in case of an emergency); adopting a personal mindset of situational awareness (e.g., paying attention to persons why may be activing in a suspicious manner that might indicate potential attack threats that might arise, such as an active shooter incident, an IED explosion, or terrorism; and knowing how to contact local security personnel); and key points to facilitate survival (e.g., having a well-thought out pre-planned response measures such as awareness of exits; and knowledge of the “Run, Hide, Fight” protocol). Each chapter concludes with a valuable “Exercise Action List” of five assignments to reinforce the chapters’ recommendations, such as developing a checklist of emergency response measures. In the conclusion, the author makes the important point of emphasizing that the mindset of “bad things happen to other people, not me” needs to be replaced by “knowledge and education” of how to respond to potential emergencies, which this book’s “personal safety toolbox” provides. A short glossary defines significant terms such as confined space protection, risk management, and standard operating procedure.

The author is a retired law enforcement officer, and founder and head of his firm, Unified Sports and Entertainment Security Consulting, LLC (USESC), which is based in Raleigh, North Carolina.

Workplace Violence

Kim M. Kerr, (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2010), 344 pages, $65.06 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-1281-0198-8.

This is an excellent, comprehensive and detailed handbook on workplace violence prevention. In addition to the listed author, three other practitioner experts also contributed to the volume’s chapters.

The handbook’s 15 chapters cover the spectrum of topics related to workplace violence. It begins with an overview of the four types of workplace violence: criminal intent, customer/client, workeron-worker, and personal relationship. Other chapters discuss the impact of workplace violence on its victims, legal obligations by organizations to safeguard their employees from violence, the characteristics of a workplace culture that facilitates violence, the economic impact of workplace violence on organizations, early warning signs of possible workplace violence, proactively dealing with anger in a workplace, and responding to and recovering from incidents of workplace violence. The remaining chapters discuss the importance of employee background screening in detecting possible resort to violence, implementing policies and procedures to establish a workplace violence prevention and recovery, including training staff to understand how to respond to such attacks. The new and evolving threats (at least at the time of this volume’s publication) of violence at school campuses as well as cyber threats, such as cyber stalking employees, are also discussed. Since organizations and campuses experience active shooter attacks by external perpetrators (as well as by internal staff), a chapter discusses how to respond to such incidents. The Appendices consist of 12 templates of samples and checklists on emergency response procedures, recovery plans, workplace violence prevention policies, and policies on allowing weapons in a workplace.

Practical Airport Operations, Safety, and Emergency Management: Protocols for Today and the Future

Jeffrey C. Price and Jeffrey S. Forrest, (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2016), 630 pages, $69.97 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-1280-0515-6.

This is an authoritative, comprehensive and detailed handbook on the protocols and best practices for managing safety situations and emergency challenges that might arise at U.S. airport operations.

The book is divided into six sections. The first section covers chapters 1 to 3. It provides the context for the physical, regulatory, and political environments that airport operations personnel need to address, including ensuring that operations are in compliance with relevant laws and regulations. The second section, chapters 4 and 5, focus on Safety Management Systems (SMS) as an international safety standard that is being adopted by airports worldwide. This includes a implementing a system of safety oversight and measurement, safety audits, and promoting a culture of safety at airports.

The third section, chapters 6 to 9, focus on compliance by an airport’s operations with FAA’s Part 139 certification on commercial airfield safety. This includes implementing safety self-inspections, airport maintenance standards, and ensuring the safety of air traffic control and air operations. The fourth part, chapter 9, focuses on terminal and landside operations, such as ensuring the safety of

passenger terminals and airport roadway layouts. The fifth part, chapters 10 to 12, focus on planning for emergency management at airports for a spectrum of hazards, ranging from aircraft crashes to natural disasters. The last part, chapter 13, discusses future operational challenges to airport operations, such as the need to understand the impact of emergency incidents on responders and victims, threats to airports and aircraft posed by intruding unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the use of lasers around airports, and cyberattacks. The handbook is organized as a job-aid reference resource. Each chapter begins with an introduction, short sections, call-out boxes with vignettes, tables and figures, photos, a summary, and references. The authors, veteran practitioner experts in airport and aviation security, are professors at the Aviation and Aerospace Science Department at Metropolitan State University of Denver, in Denver, Colorado.

Practical Aviation Security: Predicting and Preventing Future Threats [Third Edition] Jeffrey C. Price and Jeffrey S. Forrest, (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2016), 598 pages, $99.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-1280-4293-9.

This is an authoritative, comprehensive, and detailed handbook on the aviation security system. It begins with an overview of the aviation industry in terms of aviation economics, airport security operations and the government regulatory agencies and industry organizations that set policies, procedures, and security standards; significant terrorist and criminal acts against the aviation sector; the role of government in aviation security, including gathering and disseminating intelligence information and intervening, when necessary; commercial aviation airport security’s role in managing access control and incident management; airport screening operations, including baggage screening and profiling passengers for suspicious indicators; issues in commercial aviation aircraft operator security, including airline employee safety and the role of law enforcement personnel such as Federal Air Marshals; securing air cargo; analyzing threats by adversaries such as terrorists, including new trends such as threats by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), MANPADS, the use of weapons of mass destruction against the sector, and the threat by new types of actors, such as “insiders”; and the role of security management systems in ensuring aviation safety and mitigating potential threats. The handbook is organized as a textbook as well as a job-aid reference resource. Each chapter begins with an objective paragraph, an introduction, short sections, call-out boxes with vignettes, tables and figures, photos, conclusions, and references. The authors, veteran practitioner experts in airport and aviation security, are professors at the Aviation and Aerospace Science Department at Metropolitan State University of Denver, in Denver, Colorado.

Workplace Security Essentials: A Guide for Helping Organizations Create Safe Work Environments Eric N. Smith, (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2014), 224 pages, $34.97 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-1241-6557-1.

This is a highly useful, practical and easy to follow step-by-step handbook for establishing a workplace security system for organizations and businesses of varying sizes. The handbook’s 14 chapters cover the spectrum of subjects in workplace security, beginning with the elements of security awareness, and then understanding the categories of threats facing an organization, such criminality or terrorism, and using probability analysis to generate a risk score. Other chapters discuss the requirement to conduct a risk assessment to understand the threats, vulnerabilities and consequences facing an organization; and developing a security system, ranging from deploying technological systems to manage access control or emergency alarms, to establishing procedures to conduct background checks, employee interviews, and training employees in security and awareness, including conducting emergency response drills and exercises. The remaining chapters cover criminal type threats facing businesses, such as burglary and shoplifting; and managing threats such as workplace violence by dangerous customers or disgruntled employees. The final chapter presents the business case for establishing a robust security system, as the author writes, “Integrating security into each of the different business units helps to make each more effective and more valuable to the company and better able to meet goals and strategic outcomes.” (p. 201). The author is a director of security for a large hospital system based in Colorado, following more than a decade in law enforcement.

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Your Most Powerful Weapon: How to Use Your Mind to Stay Safe

Steve Tarani, (Phoenix, AZ: Tarani, 2018), 202 pages, $18.95 [Paperback] ISBN: 978-1-5323-5456-4.

In today’s turbulent world, violent assailants can strike anywhere and anytime. How can one be proactive in defending and defeating such unpredictable threats? This handbook provides a useful framework for staying safe in such “new normal” environments. According to Tarani, a veteran protective services practitioner expert and trainer, with extensive U.S. government experience (including in the CIA), several response measures are required to increase the chances for one’s safety. One response, termed “mindset,” is to defeat the “normalcy bias” by understanding that a normal circumstance might suddenly turn abnormal (i.e., an attack by a violent assailant). A second response, termed “mental toughness,” is to understand that hard self-defense skills (e.g., use of firearm/ammunition/knife) can be complemented by using one’s soft skills, which are attained through awareness-based training.

Such response measures will upgrade a potential victim into becoming a “hard target” and enable him/her to “take control” of the situation. Other valuable situational awareness and proactive defense frameworks provided in the handbook include the author’s discussion of the OODA Loop (observe, orient, decide and act); the five steps of the attack cycle (look, choose, stalk, close in on the target, and attack) and how to defeat them through the proactive measures of avoidance, the active measures of mitigation, and the reactive measures of defense (e.g., the options of flight, fight, or freeze). A useful glossary of terms is also included.

From Kabul to Baghdad and Back

John R. Ballard, David W. Lamm, and John K. Wood, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 384 pages, $42.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-6125-1022-4.

This is an insightful and important assessment by top military academics of the key strategic decisions that shaped the course of the American campaigns, first, in Afghanistan and, later, in Iraq, and the impact of the parallel operational actions in Iraq that then affected the decade-long (at the time) campaign in Afghanistan. Following the introductory chapter’s historical perspective on past experiences of fighting two enemies at the same time by Nazi Germany, the British, and America, the book’s nine chapters discuss the role of the 9/11 attacks by al Qaida in the American decision to fight al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the decision to shift the American national focus to overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, re-focusing the Afghan campaign as a secondary theater of operations, General George Casey’s strategy of “buildup and transition to Iraqi forces,” the parallel campaigns in both countries, the 2007 Baghdad “Surge” strategy by General David Petraeus, the attempt to implement a similar surge strategy in Afghanistan, the pullout of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011and the attempt to formulate an exit strategy while achieving conflict termination in Afghanistan. In the concluding chapter, the authors assess the effectiveness of America’s fighting the two-war front in terms of the components of what they characterize as “the changing character of war”: fighting the Taliban and al Qaida as non-state actors; techniques in combat that blend conventional and irregular warfare; waging counterinsurgency with a nation such as Pakistan providing sanctuary to the Taliban and al Qaida, as well as the difficult relations between America and the Afghan host-nation; how to define operational success; and tactical innovations introduced by the American military in the operational environment. As to the challenges posed by simultaneously fighting two theater campaigns, the authors conclude that “the United States did a poor job of conducting two nearly simultaneous campaigns in two distant theaters of operation against the same major enemy.” (p. 299) They add that the desired outcomes should also “include the building of national capacities” and that the “odds of developing such successful conclusions rest mightily on the host-nation leaders they partner with and the willingness of any other nation to give sanctuary and succor to the insurgents. Conducting multiple military efforts is a challenge for only the most dire of strategic circumstances.” (p. 302) John Ballard is the dean of faculty at the National War College, and David Lamm is the deputy director and John Wood is an associate professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, in Washington, DC.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

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