The IACSP’s Counter-Terrorism Journal V24N1

Artificial Intelligence: A Taste Of Armageddon

Counter-Terrorism 2018: Where We Stand Analytically

Deception Technology To Combat Cyber-Attackers

Crimes Which Support

Islamist Terrorism In The United States

Counter-Insurgency Training And The Three Block Policemen

IACSP’s Homeland Security Bookshelf

Spring Issue Vol. 24 No. 1 2018 Printed in the U.S.A. IACSP.COM

Homeland Security graduate programs—100% online Anthony Flammia Graduate, Penn State Class of 2013 Homeland Security

Choose your degree from one of the nation’s most highly respected, comprehensive homeland security portfolios. With courses, options, and graduate certificates covering a broad spectrum of homeland and civil security specialties, you can feel confident in the quality and relevance of your education.

The Homeland Security base program offers options in: • Agricultural Biosecurity and Food Defense

• Public Health Preparedness

• Counterterrorism

• Geospatial Intelligence

• Cyber Threat Analytics and Prevention

• Information Security and Forensics

Complete a certificate or graduate degree—completely online!

worldcampus.psu.edu/iacsp U.Ed.OUT 18-WC-0559/gam/smb Journal

of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

Join the ranks of security and public safety professionals worldwide that have achieved the Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential as recognition of their unique expertise in the field of managing terrorism-related risk.

The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer (cATO™) credential is the global benchmark for recognizing career achievement and knowledge in the protection of facilities, organizations, and the public against acts of terrorism. The Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer designation is awarded to a candidate who has met eligibility requirements and passed the cATO™ Certification Examination in accordance with the standards set forth by the Certifying Board of The International Association for Counterterrorism and Security Professionals (IACSP).

Becoming board certified as a Certified Anti-Terrorism Officer distinguishes you in the security and public safety profession by demonstrating your expertise in the specialized field of managing terrorism-related risk and commitment to the safety and welfare of your community.

Learn more and apply online:

www.catocertification.org

Vol. 24, No. 1 Spring 2018 Publisher Steven J. Fustero

Page 8

Senior Editor Joan Perry

Artificial Intelligence: A Taste Of Armageddon,

Contributing Writers Jim Weiss Mickey Davis Paul Davis Thomas B. Hunter Joshua Sinai

by David Gewirtz

Book Review Editor Jack Plaxe Research Director Gerry Keenan Conference Director John Dew

Page 22

Communications Director Craig O. Thompson

Counter-Insurgency Training And The Three Block Policemen,

Art Director Scott Dube, MAD4ART International Psychological CT Advisors Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Counterintelligence Advisor Stanley I. White

by Dominic J. Traina, III

South America Advisor Edward J. Maggio Homeland Security Advisor Col. David Gavigan Personal Security Advisor Thomas J. Patire

Page 6

SITREP, Terrorism Trends & Forecasts

Page 8

Artificial Intelligence: A Taste Of Armageddon, by David Gewirtz

Page 10 Deception Technology: An Interview With Eric Schlesinger, Of Polaris Alpha Page 16 Assessing Precursor Crimes To Support Islamist Terrorism In The U.S.,

by Dr. Joshua Sinai

Page 22 Counter-Insurgency Training And The Three Block Policemen,

by Dominic J. Traina, III

Page 26 Counter-Terrorism 2018: Where We Stand Analytically,

by Dr. Thomas A. Marks

Hazmat Advisor Bob Jaffin Security Driver Advisor Anthony Ricci, ADSI Cyberwarfare Advisor David Gewirtz Cell Phone Forensics Advisor Dr. Eamon P. Doherty IACSP Advisory Board John M. Peterson III John Dew Thomas Patire Cherie Castellano, MA, CSW, LPC Robert E. Thorn Southeast Asia Correspondent Dr. Thomas A. Marks

Page 38 Security Driver: Backing Up, by Anthony Ricci Page 40 An IACSP Q&A With James M. Hawes, Author Of “Cold War Navy

European Correspondent Elisabeth Peruci Middle East Correspondent Ali Koknar

Seal”, by Paul Davis Page 44 IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf, reviews by Dr. Joshua Sinai

THE JOURNAL OF COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L is published by SecureWorldnet, Ltd., PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (ISSN#1552-5155) in cooperation with the International Association for Counterterrorism & Security Professionals and Counterterrorism & Security Education and Research Foundation. Copyright © 2018. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. The opinions expressed herein are the responsibility of the authors and are not necessarily those of the editors or publisher.

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA, (571) 216-8205, FAX: (202) 315-3459 .

Membership $65/year, add $10 for overseas memberships. Postmaster: send address changes to: The Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International, PO Box 100688, Arlington, VA 22210, USA. Web site: www.iacsp.com

Director of Emergency Ops. Don L. Rondeau Tactical Advisor Robert Taubert

Page 14 IACSP Update On Carlos The Jackal, by Paul Davis

Emergency Management Advisor Clark L. Staten

PHOTO CREDITS: Reuters, Army.mil, Navy.mil, shutterstock.com and authors where applicable.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed

SITREP

TERRORISM TRENDS & FORECASTS Global Overview 2018 Last month saw Cameroon’s Anglophone conflict escalate and new clashes between Somaliland and Somalia’s Puntland over disputed territory – in both cases, fighting increased in June.

Intercommunal violence rose in the Central African Republic and on both sides of the Mali-Niger border. In Burundi, President Nkurunziza pushed through changes to the constitution, entrenching his increasingly authoritarian rule.

In Yemen, both sides intensified their campaigns and the Saudiled coalition’s offensive on Hodeida could mean more bloodshed in coming weeks. Israel killed over 60 Palestinian protesters in one day, and Israel-Iran tensions climbed in Syria. President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal could ramp up confrontation between the U.S. and Iran or their respective allies. Fighting intensified in Afghanistan, while Indonesia faced ISIS-linked terror attacks. In North East Asia, China and Japan established a crisis management

6

hotline, tensions flared over the Taiwan Strait, and the summit between Trump and Kim Jong-un in June brought the tension down a notch between the two nations.

election last month likewise represents a further step backward in a country that has experienced one of the most precipitous economic collapses in history.

Outlook

In other international news, a festering territorial dispute on the border between Somaliland and Puntland, a semi-autonomous region of Somalia, saw new fighting that left dozens dead and could worsen in June. Along the border between Mali and Niger, intercommunal attacks rose sharply pitting ethnic Dossaak and Tuareg against Fulani, the former taking part in counter-insurgency operations alongside French and national forces, the latter suspected of supporting jihadists.

The website and international resource, CrisisWatch has spotlighted two under-covered crises: Burundi and Venezuela. In Burundi, the approval of constitutional amendments in a controversial referendum last month not only could allow President Nkurunziza to prolong his stay in power potentially for another sixteen years, but also sets the stage for the dismantling of the carefully negotiated ethnic power balance between Hutus and Tutsis that helped end the country’s civil war. Major violence might not be on the immediate horizon, but its seeds have been planted, and the regime is playing with fire.

In Venezuela, President Maduro’s victory in another contentious

Yemen’s unrelenting war could be about to get much worse. The United Arab Emirates and their Yemeni allies launched an offensive to take Hodeida, the main port city in Huthi-controlled territory. Hodeida’s invasion could compound the already acute hu-

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

manitarian crisis and spark a wider conflict. To avert worse suffering, relevant actors should press Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to hold off, persuade the Huthis to stop missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, and support the new UN envoy to revive a political process that is more inclusive and realistic. With fighting season in full swing in Afghanistan, the Taliban intensified attacks on rural centers and provincial capitals. In Indonesia, three families coordinated deadly terror attacks, involving the use of children to deploy bombs, on three churches and the police in and around Surabaya city.

Deteriorating Situations • Burundi Cameroon Central African Republic Somalia Somaliland Mali Niger Taiwan Strait Afghanistan Indonesia Israel/Palestine Syria Iran Yemen Improving Situations • Japan, China, North Korea https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch

balloons that caused severe fires in Israeli communities on the Gaza border. Hamas escalated the violence by launching 45 mortar shells and rockets at Israel. Two days earlier, Hamas fired three rockets into Israel following Israeli strikes responding to Palestinian arson terrorism.

FBI Releases Study Of Pre-Attack Behaviors Of Active Shooters This report, covering active shooter incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, examines specific behaviors that may precede an attack and that might be useful in identifying, assessing, and managing those who may be on a pathway to violence.

To read the 30-page document, go to: www.fbi.gov

New Rules of Engagement: Hamas Provokes Israel with Incendiary Aerial Devices Hamas is attempting to create “new rules of engagement” in its war against Israel, as the terrorist organization recognizes that Israel’s military will likely avoid direct responses against terrorist cells launching incendiary kites

This Hamas-provoked tit-for-tat resembles similar sequences of events that took place two weeks ago in a violent escalation between the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Israel.

The vast majority of Palestinian fatalities during violent demonstrations on the Israel-Gaza border were members or affiliates of terrorist organizations – primarily Hamas.

To read the full Meir Amit report go to: https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/ uploads/2018/06/E_160_18.pdf

The following are things you can do to protect yourself, your family and your property from the effects of a biological threat: • Build an Emergency Supply Kit • Make a Family Emergency Plan • Check with your doctor to ensure all required or suggested immunizations are up to date for yourself, your children and elderly family members.

• Consider installing a High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter in your furnace return duct, which will filter out most biological agents that may enter your house https://www.ready.gov/Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism Preparation Biological agents are organisms or toxins that can kill or incapacitate people, livestock and crops. A biological attack is the deliberate release of germs or other biological substances that can make you sick.

There are three basic groups of biological agents that could likely be used as weapons: bacteria, viruses and toxins.

Biological agents can be dispersed by spraying them into the air, person-to-person contact, infecting animals that carry the disease to humans and by contaminating food and water.

Before a Biological Threat

and balloons into Israel territory.

This tactical and strategic shift is outlined in a new Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center report.Last month, Israel’s air force struck several Hamas’ military targets after terrorists deployed incendiary kites and

or some other signal used in your community, such as a telephone call or a home visit from an emergency response worker.

A biological attack may or may not be immediately obvious.

In most cases local health care workers will report a pattern of unusual illness or there will be a wave of sick people seeking emergency medical attention. The public would be alerted through an emergency radio or TV broadcast,

Israeli Security Services Turn To Data Mining To Anticipate “Unorganized Threats” Israel’s domestic intelligence agency chief Nadav Argaman recently released sobering figures on the scope of the ongoing terrorist threat facing Israelis.

The figures that make it clear that the relative quiet routine in Israeli cities is deceptive, and that this quiet rests completely on counter-terrorist efforts, which almost defy the imagination in their scope.

As a result, in addition to the 250 organized plots, an estimated 400 suspected unorganized lone attackers have been stopped this year. In 2017, Israel prevented 1,400 suspected lone wolf terrorists from acting. In 2016, the number of unorganized attacks that were prevented reached 2,200.

When it comes to organized terrorism, Hamas leads the way

in attempting to turn the West Bank into a base for attacks.

It uses its headquarters in the Gaza Strip and overseas to try to create and activate West Bank terrorist cells. Its goal is to strike Israeli targets in both Israel proper and in the West Bank.

Such efforts are joined by other organizations like Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

As part of its ongoing adapting to new threats, the Shin Bet has developed new cyber defense and offensive tools. These have led to quality intelligence, which in turn contributed to the prevention of major terrorist plots, and the saving of lives.

Investigative Project on Terrorism https://www.investigativeproject.org/

IACSP News Many of our members are not receiving our new monthly CTS Enews (electronic security report) because we either do not have your email address, or you are using a .gov or .mil email address for your membership record. If you would like to receive our CTS Enews, please send me an email with the email address you would like us to use. Also include your current address. Please send the information to my attention to my personal email address: iacsp1@aol.com Until next time, as always, be vigilant and safe.

Thank you.

Steven J. Fustero, Dir. Of Operations/IACSP

Artificial Intelligence:

A Taste Of Armageddon

By David Gewirtz

I

n the classic 1967 Star Trek episode called “A Taste of Armageddon,” two opposing computers fight out a simulated war. The plot twist is that even though the war itself is simulated, and so there are no munitions or bombs, the two computers determine the casualty count had the war taken place, and that many real citizens are executed.

As you might imagine, there were plot holes galore. Even so, the writers intended it to be an allegory for what a populace would endure if

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

We’ve talked long and hard in this column about the risk of cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare. We’ve talked about how damage to infrastructure is possible, how citizens can lose their life savings, and how even pinpoint attacks could be mounted silently from across the planet.

But we have not talked much about artificial intelligence, or AI. Although AI has been with us for many years, in the computer games we play and financial markets (when you hear the term “programmed investing,” it often means a cognitive program is at work).

There are many aspects of AI, from voice recognition to speech synthesis,

they didn’t see the true nature of war.

8

Here in 2018, half a century after “A Taste of Armageddon” was broadcast, we’re experiencing something of a computer-simulated war ourselves. And it’s only going to get worse.

Vol. 24, No.1

Pair any of these attack methodologies with AI and you’re increasing the threat footprint by a vast amount. Instead of teams of hundreds of programmers, nation states could create thousands or millions of automated, intelligent agents, all working to carry out a nefarious agenda... to machine learning, to predictive behavior and sentiment analysis. All of these classes of software differ from traditional programming in that their actions are not governed directly by line-after-line of computer code, but by some combination of code and data that together form dynamically-evolving rules and guidelines. Essentially, the computer learns and then develops its own behavior.

If that doesn’t both excite you and terrify you, it should. On the side of benefiting mankind, we get GPS navigation smart enough to route us around traffic, self-driving cars, and tin cans called “Alexa,” capable of helping us turn on our lights without the unbearable labor of flipping a switch.

But then, there’s the other side. Google recently showcased its Duplex technology.

With Duplex, an AI can have a complex conversation over the phone with a person on the other end. What makes Duplex particularly disconcerting is how un-disconverting the conversation is. Duplex bypasses the uncanny valley, meaning its conversations sound completely human, including inflections and errors commonly made by casual speakers.

As demonstrated, Duplex was to be an assistant on your smartphone, a cloud-based aide for making restaurant and hair cutting appointments. But imagine if AI technology was paired with phone scamming, and a cor-

pus of psychological knowledge about how to scam people, and you’re seeing the ability to defraud people by phone, at epic scale.

As we look at the various facets of cyberwar, we note that there are phishing attacks (where fake messages are designed to get to specific individuals to provide network access), denial of service attacks (designed to break down systems through brute force), and advanced persistent threats (designed to live inside networks feeding information and taking command and control instruction).

Pair any of these attack methodologies with AI and you’re increasing the threat footprint by a vast amount. Instead of teams of hundreds of programmers, nation states could create thousands or millions of automated, intelligent agents, all working to carry out a nefarious agenda, all acting with intelligence, and learning with a dedication and single-mindedness that typical users and even trained operators could never keep up with.

Think about conventional warfare. First, there were simply bombs. Then the Norden bombsight changed everything, because bombardiers could actually aim at their targets and have a much better chance of a hit. Then we developed guided missiles and smart munitions, and suddenly, we could hit targets accurately from across the world.

Imagine the depth of threat AI poses when the ability of the enemy is augmented by deep intelligence that not only can help at the launching end, but can exist out on the network, able to gather data and learn, unstoppable by traditional means.

Of course, we’re also developing AIs for cyberwarfare defense. I profiled some work IBM is doing in a series of webcasts for CBS Interactive.

IBM’s technology (and that of many of their competitors) also learns, and is able to separate identify true threats, reduce false positives, and help prevent incursions and attacks.

That all brings us back to A Taste of Armageddon. For we’re now truly at the point where intelligent agents are on both sides of the field of battle, each virtually attacking each other and defending against attacks, with an ever-increasing escalation in technology and ferocity.

Once again, I end with “oh, joy.”

About the Author CTSERF Research Professor David Gewirtz, M.Ed. is Director of the U.S. Strategic Perspective Institute, Distinguished Lecturer for CBS Interactive, Cyberwarfare Advisor for the International Association of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, IT Advisor to the Florida Public Health Association and an instructor at the UC Berkeley extension. http://www.zdnet.com/blog/diy-it/

That all brings us back to A Taste of Armageddon. For we’re now truly at the point where intelligent agents are on both sides of the field of battle, each virtually attacking each other and defending against attacks, with an ever-increasing escalation in technology and ferocity.

Deception Technology: An IACSP Q&A With Eric Schlesinger, The Chief Information Security Officer At Polaris Alpha

W

hat is deception technology?

Deception technology considers the human attacker’s point of view and methodology for exploiting and navigating networks to identify and exfiltrate data. The solution leverages the creation of traps and lures which are mixed among existing IT resources emulating and imitating desktops, databases, and other infrastructure devices while layering in bogus IT assets such as users and files that co-mingle with actual IT assets.

10

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

in-depth cyber technologies have struggled against the increasing wave of sophisticated and persistent human attackers.

Anyone, internal or external, that seeks to identify, ping, enter, view any trap or attempts to utilize a lure is immediately identified by this behavior.

How do deception technologies work?

Deception technology operates based on three simple principles: 1) Set the bait, 2) Spring the trap and 3) Stop the threat.

1. Set the Bait: This consists of deploying emulations that imitate desktops, databases and other infrastructure devices vulnerable to attack. Even bogus IT assets, such as users and files that co-mingle with actual IT assets, can be deployed as lures for internal or external attackers and automated malicious behavior such as viruses and malware.

2. Spring the Trap: Anyone, internal or external, who seeks to identify, ping, enter, view or utilize a lure is immediately identified by this behavior. Lures have built-in alerts that are produced as the end product of a binary process, giving an immediate advantage over heuristic approaches and the many thousands of extraneous alerts traditional techniques generate.

3. Stop the Threat: Once malicious activity is detected, security resources can determine how to deal with threats in the best way, such as blocking the threat and remediating damages, or even observing the threat behavior to collect data that support advanced cyber forensics.

Why is there a need for deception technologies?

The risk of sophisticated internal and external attacks has grown exponentially over the years. Today’s security technologies seek primarily to defend a perimeter, but both firewalls and end-point security cannot defend a perimeter with 100% certainty. Cyber-attackers can penetrate these networks and move unimpeded for months, stealing data and intellectual property.

Solutions that leverage heuristics may find an attacker within the network, but often generate so many alerts that critical issues are missed. Furthermore, existing defense-

Deception technology is put in place to lure attackers (just like a honeypot) but in turn to isolate and stop the threat to the infrastructure.

They are internal countermeasures allowing security professionals swamped with the velocity and ferocity of threat data to quickly zero in on cases of actual ongoing infiltration due to a trap or lure being accessed.

Intrusion activity monitoring is a complex task to achieve, especially if you do not want an attacker to be alerted about being monitored. A stealthy approach is needed, that does not alert the attacker about the presence of monitoring.

There is no silver bullet when it comes to defending against these types of attacks, just the ability to block as much as possible while detecting and containing what does get in. The faster the response is against something that slipped past layered defenses, the better chance there is to mitigate the risk to the enterprise.

How do deception technologies differ from traditional honeypots?

Deception technology is not a new concept as the theory of honeypots has been around since the late 90s. These early deception techniques were built to sit outside of traditional firewall protection to allow attackers to gain access to the exposed honeypot so researchers could better learn the tools, tactics, and motives of an attacker.

Deception technology is put in place to lure attackers (just like a honeypot) but in turn to isolate and stop the threat to the infrastructure. They are internal countermeasures allowing security professionals swamped with the velocity and ferocity of threat data to quickly zero in on cases of actual ongoing infiltration due to a trap or lure being accessed.

How do deception technologies compare to other countermeasures?

It is less about comparing deception technologies to other traditional countermeasures and it is more important to look at these tools to augment what may already be in place to thwart attacks and provide security professionals the ability to receive prompt alerting for items requiring immediate attention.

Layering in deception technologies with other countermeasures such as User Behavior Analysis, Machine Learning and Visual Intelligence only enhances the power of

these innovative tools.

How do deception technologies augment an existing security strategy?

Deception technology offers a viable solution that can help security teams regain the upper hand. Often strapped for staff and resources, security teams can employ deception to greatly expand their investigative and analytical capacity, prioritize incidents with greater accuracy and automate mitigation measures – thereby reducing the impact of the time attacks linger on a network and accelerating incident response with greater efficacy.

Armed with deception technology tools, security teams can detect movement inside their infrastructure by placing deception elements in the critical path. Remember, if an attacker is spending time in the trap or lure, he or she is not attacking production resources or accessing sensitive data.

While the deception is taking place, security professionals can get engaged and begin executing standard operating procedures based on the alert that is triggered: 1. Observe the Attack - While an attacker is in the trap or lure, security professionals can observe the attack and learn from the attacker’s methodologies. This activity can also help security professionals learn about zero-day exploits, or previously unknown attacks.

12

2. Stop the Attack – While the attacker is in the trap or lure, security professionals can take the appropriate action to thwart the attack and eliminate the risk. Protection techniques such as traditional blocks and blacklisting and reporting the activity to the appropriate authorities will be initiated.

With deception technology, the security team knows the minute an attacker engages a trap or lure early in an attack lifecycle.

This gives the security team the ability to be more proactive and options in regard to response choices with a clearer path for remediation.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Simply put, knowing when and where these attacks are coming from and where they are headed allows for timely response to their activity.

What are the main factors driving the decision to adopt deception technologies?

It is really a matter of choosing to be reactive or proactive when it comes to your operational security model. While threat hunting is a big buzzword today, it takes a significant investment in time and training to prepare security teams to try and take this proactive approach.

Unfortunately, this methodology still results in a delayed threat response as it still relies on someone finding that needle in a haystack.

Without deception technology tactics, security teams have to hope that the attacker interacts long enough to be detected by a scan or read in a log before any action is taken. This reactive nature is many times hampered by the sheer number of false positive alerts coming from multiple tools and multiple machines.

Furthermore, as the attacker is already deep inside the targeted network, the security teams

Vol. 24, No.1

tend to be extremely reactive once an attack is discovered which leads to confusing and often causing wrong decisions. This significantly delays an effective response.

With deception technology, the security team knows the minute an attacker engages a trap or lure early in an attack lifecycle. This gives the security team the ability to be more proactive and options in regard to response choices with a clearer path for remediation.

Additionally, since attackers are constantly modifying their methods to take advantage of different types of attacks, deception technology can be used as a tool to gather intelligence on potential attackers, discover new vulnerabilities before a patch is released or observe potential zero-day exploits.

Can you give an example of a deception technology approach that could combat a traditional security threat?

Deception technology can easily be used to combat ransomware. This risk is a

pervasive threat to organizations of all shapes and sizes. A company that falls victim to this malicious activity, can face significant mitigation and recovery costs across not only data and productivity loss, but fixes and possible regulatory penalties.

With that in mind, organizations can easily apply deception technologies to delay and detect a ransomware infection. The ability to create a ransomware defendable network that chokes and slows down a threat, allowing security teams to be alerted before the ransomware attacks production assets, is very feasible when approaching it with a deception technology mindset.

Instead of emulating an entire system, much like a traditional honeypot, it is possible to plant millions of fake files throughout a single file share on low powered, commodity hardware such as a Raspberry Pi. Any ransomware infection will attempt to change and encrypt those files first while triggering alerts based on known CPU, network, and disk thresholds.

YOU ARE DRIVEN TO

LEAD

WE ARE DRIVEN TO HELP YOU GET THERE. At American Military University, we understand where you’ve been, what you’ve done and what you’d like your team to achieve. Choose from more than 90 career-relevant online degrees — respected by the intelligence community — which can help your squad advance their careers while serving their country. Your team will join a network of professionals gaining relevant skills than can be put into practice the same day. Take the next step, and learn from the leader.

To learn more visit, www.PublicSafetyatAMU.com/IACSP

At a high level this is how this instantiation of deception technology could work • • •

•

•

The deception technology device sits in line with file servers on the enterprise network.

The device appears as a standard file server with CIFS storage in order to be presented to Microsoft desktops.

Via GPO or logon scripts, the storage is mounted as a drive letter that is higher in the alphabet (preferably the D or E Drive).

Ransomware will attack the device first, before moving onto other systems and file shares as it typically works alphabetically down the file shares.

As the attack is occurring, alerts are sent to the security team via standard monitoring and alerting tools, allowing the team to take appropriate action.

About the Reviewer Eric Schlesinger, chief information security officer of Polaris Alpha, has more than 20 years of experience in infrastructure, operations and security management.

IACSP Update: A Look Back At Carlos The Jackal: Once the World’s Most Wanted Man

I

By Paul Davis

Jackal

Iich Ramirez Sanchez, a/k/a Carlos the Jackal, once the world’s most wanted man, was recently back in the news.

This past March a French court denied his third and final appeal of the life sentence he received for a grenade attack on a Paris drugstore that killed two people and injured more than 30 in 1974.

The once-notorious international terrorist has been incarcerated in a French prison since 1994 after his capture by the French forces in the Sudan in 1994. .

“I am a professional revolutionary. Revolution is my job,” Ramirez declared in court. .

Ramirez, now 68, who claims to have killed more than 80 people, is also serving two other life sentences. He received a life sentence for the shooting and murder of two French police officers and a terrorist cohort-turned French informant in June of 1975. His other life sentence was received for his multiple attacks on French trains and streets in a wave of terrorist attacks that murdered 11 people and injured many others.

Ramirez was born on October 12, 1949 in Caracas, Venezuela. His father, Jose Altagracia Ramirez Navas, a wealthy lawyer and Marxist, named his son after Vladmir IIyich Lenin, the founder of the Soviet Union. Ramirez attended the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow from 1968 until 1970, when he was expelled for his undisciplined behavior. Ramirez flew to Beirut and became interested in the Palestinian cause and in the early 1970s he joined the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

To prove his worth to the Palestinian cause, he shot and wounded Joseph Sieff, the Jew-

14

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

ish president of the Marks & Spencer retail stores, in Sieff’’s London home in 1973.

He would have murdered Sieff had not his pistol jammed. In 1975 he unsuccessfully fired rocket-propelled grenades at Israeli airliners at Orly Airport in France - twice.

In June of 1975 he shot and killed two unarmed French police officers and a former colleague-turned-informant, and wounded a third police officer, when they came to his Paris apartment. He escaped despite an extensive manhunt.

When the British police raided an apartment where he had earlier stayed, they found a paperback copy of Frederick Forsyth classic thriller, “The Day of the Jackal.” The British press pounced on this item and then gave Ramirez the nickname “Carlos the Jackal.”

The world press soon followed suit. Ironically, the thriller belonged not to Ramirez, but to an Englishman who also lived in the apartment.

One former American intelligence officer scoffed at the idea that Ramirez was anything like Forsyth’s fictional cool, professional killer.

Ramirez broke on to the world stage in December of 1975 when he and a group of terrorists took more than 60 hostages at an OPEC meeting in Vienna, Austria on orders from the Palestinians. During the standoff with police, Ramirez, wearing a beret like his idol, Che Guevara, released most of the hostages, but held on to eleven of them. He negotiated to have a plane take him and the hostages to North Africa. Although the plan was to murder the Iranian and Saudi Arabian ministers, Ramirez received a $50 million ransom to release them alive.

On April 22, 1982 Ramirez was back in the news after he organized a plan to set off a car bombing that killed one person and injured more than 60. He committed other terrorist acts after that and was credited with many others that he had nothing to do with. He was tried in France in absentia in 1992 and convicted of the murder of two police officers and a police informant and sentenced to life imprisonment.

On August 14, 1994 Ramirez was captured by French forces in Khartoum, Sudan. Although French agents captured the notorious terrorist, the U.S. was involved behind the scenes.

According to Billy Waugh, the legendary Special Forces sergeant and CIA operator, his location was discovered by Waugh and other CIA operatives.

Waugh’s boss was Cofer Black, whom Waugh described in his book, “Hunting the Jackal: A Special Forces and CIA Soldier’s Fifty Years on the Frontlines of the War Against Terrorism,” as a hulking no-nonsense type who had been in the Directorate of Operations (DO) for more than twenty years.

Waugh said Black was a stand-up guy and one of the best at running an overseas station.

In his book, Waugh describes a meeting between Black, Waugh and others. “After the formalities and introductions were completed, the boss informed our IC group of our mission: In this city of one million souls, we would be responsible for finding and fixing none other than Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, the man known far and wide as Carlos the Jackal, the world’s most famous terrorist.”

“My work photographing and watching bin Laden was fascinating, but its importance would only be made apparent to me as time went Billy Waugh on,” Waugh continued. “UBL wasn’t much of a big fish at the time, but this was different. This hunt could make a career,

On August 14, 1994 Ramirez was captured

by French forces in Khartoum, Sudan.

Although French agents captured the notorious terrorist, the U.S. was involved behind the scenes.

and the stakes meant it had to be conducted with the utmost stealth. This was Carlos.

This was the biggest fish. We were about to chase a legend.”

Waugh went on to explain that Ramirez’s womanizing and drunkenness had caused him to fall out of favor with many Arab nations. “His actions caused them, rightly, to question his professed belief in Islam and devotion to the Palestinian cause,” Waugh wrote. “I was convinced his growing lack of discipline would cause him to make a misstep that would allow us to nab him, once and for all.”

Waugh said that during the final days of 1993 and the early days of 1994 he searched Khartoum as secretly as possible. He noted that the CIA did not have a photo of Ramirez that was less than ten years old. Then Ramirez was arrested for waving a gun at a shopkeeper. In jail, Ramirez placed an overseas call to a bodyguard for high-level Palestinian terrorist leaders. The CIA intercepted the call and heard Ramirez tell the bodyguard that he was being released from jail.

The CIA heard the man was being asked

by Ramirez to come to Khartoum to be his bodyguard. The man agreed.

The CIA had a photo of the bodyguard and Waugh and another operator located the bodyguard in a hotel lobby. The bodyguard soon led them to Ramirez.

“The hunt for the Jackal was over,” Waugh wrote. “The takedown was about to begin.”

With the cooperation of the Sudanese government, the DST, and the French intelligence agency, they grabbed Ramirez and flew him to France where he was charged with crimes relating to his years of terrorism in France.

“Carlos is in the hands of French Justice to be tried for his crimes,” the then-French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua told the press some hour later.

About the Author

Paul Davis is a contributing editor to the Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security Int’l.

Assessing Precursor Crimes To Support Islamist Terrorism In The United States

I

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

16

n order to maintain themselves, terrorist groups engage in a spectrum of illegal activities due to their covert and illicit nature. They are criminal entities to begin with because terrorism involves pursuing extremist political objectives through the use of violence to target their adversaries, which violates their countries’ legal codes. Another type of crime they engage in is “hate crime” in which they demonize their adversaries by employing violence to target them, for which they can be charged and indicted. Since this type of criminal activity does not involve financial gain for the perpetrator, it is not covered in this analysis.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Also, a spectrum of ideologically diverse domestic terrorist groups and operatives engage in pre-incident financial-related crimes, whether far-right White Supremacists (such as Timothy McVeigh, the April 1999 the Oklahoma City bomber) or Islamist jihadists, but this article focuses solely on the Islamist operatives since they present a significant case study of terrorists who operate in the U.S. on behalf of their foreign Islamist groups, whether al Shabaab, al Qaida, the Islamic State, Hamas, or Hizballah, and, in most circumstances, are expected to “self-fund” their terrorist attacks or engage in document fraud to enter and stay in the country.

In another crime-related area that is not covered in this article, it does not focus on individuals who are arrested and incarcerated for criminal activity and then are radicalized into Islamist extremism while in prison and turn to terrorism following their release (although one case of such ex-prisoners is included in the cases listed below). The article, instead, focuses primarily on individuals without – or with only a

Vol. 24, No.1

minimal – criminal background that brings them into the attention of law enforcement authorities, who engage in various types of criminal activities during the pre-incident phases of their terrorist operations.

As mentioned previously, to sustain themselves, since terrorists, by necessity, operate covertly, they engage in a variety of secondary criminal activities, much like criminal organizations whose primary objective is to sustain themselves through various types of fraudulent and financial enrichment schemes. With the Internet’s cyberspace playing a significant role in a country’s economic infrastructure, terrorists’ illicit activities take place in physical space and cyberspace, within countries where they operate, and transnationally if they have overseas networks and adherents.

Attesting to the magnitude of the illicit financial gains garnered by Islamist terrorist operatives in the U.S., in his May 25, 2005 testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Matthew Levitt, a former Treasury Department official, cited “U.S. officials [who] believe ‘a substantial portion’ of the estimated millions of dollars raised by Middle Eastern terrorist groups comes from the $20 million to $30 million annually brought in by the illicit scam industry in America.”

This estimated figure is dated, so it would be important to ascertain whether today’s Islamist operatives in the U.S., in their various criminal-related enterprises (including as financiers), are generating a comparable or greater magnitude of revenues from their illicit criminal activities.

Major terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State (IS or ISIS), al Qaida, Hizballah, FARC, and others, engage in criminal activities in the countries where they primarily operate that are often enterprise wide. This includes, in the cases of FARC and Hizballah, running major narco-trafficking networks, or, in the case of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria at its height, due to its control of territory, appropriating local banks and oil fields.

In the case of Hizballah, in particular, its funds are also provided by Iran, its primary state sponsor, with their criminal enterprises providing additional revenue. The Palestinian Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, also receives funding from state sponsors, such as Iran, Qatar, and Turkey, although

Some of these operatives do not engage directly to attacks but are tasked with raising funds through criminal activities, such as money laundering, which they forward to their “parent” terrorist groups overseas.

In an example of such “non-combat” illicit activity, see the account of Talal Khalil Chahine, of Detroit, MI, discussed below, who had funneled laundered funds from his restaurant to Hizballah in Lebanon.

to a much lesser extent than a group such as Hizballah receives from its state sponsor. As a result, Hamas engages in criminal enterprises such as illegally funneling large amounts of financial aid from international networks away from their intended Gazan civilians and imposing an “import tax” on embargoed goods smuggled through the underground tunnels from Egypt into Gaza that are intended for local businesses. Interestingly, while such criminal enterprises are undertaken to fund the infrastructure of terrorist operations such as weapons acquisition, logistical arrangements, safe houses, and daily sustenance of a group’s operatives, for some terrorist groups, such as Hamas, they also provide a luxurious lifestyle for their top leaders.

While the illicit funding of terrorist groups still constitutes the major focus in counterterrorism, this article focuses on the financial crimes and other types of fraud by their agents and adherents in their Diaspora countries, in this case, the United States, where they operate either as small cells or as lone wolves, and where they have to “self-fund” their terrorist operations by engaging in minor criminal activities.

Some of these operatives do not engage directly to attacks but are tasked with raising funds through criminal activities, such as money laundering, which they forward to their “parent” terrorist groups overseas.

In an example of such “non-combat” illicit activity, see the account of Talal Khalil Chahine, of Detroit, MI, discussed below, who had funneled laundered funds from his restaurant to Hizballah in Lebanon.

In the case of terrorist lone wolves or those with a loose affiliation with foreign terrorist groups, their criminal activities generally consist of relatively “small scale” crimes such as coupon and credit card fraud schemes, immigration and driver’s license fraud, counterfeiting goods, money laundering, narcotics trafficking, illegal weapons procurement, and other offenses.

The individuals or networks that engage in such illicit activities are generally low level terrorist operatives who rely on such crimes to fund their attacks, or, others who have some nexus to terrorism, such as financiers who are sympathetic to their group’s cause. Since those designated as terrorist operatives range from a group’s leadership, operational planners, financial

and logistics providers, to the “combat team,” it is likely that only a small percentage of the individuals in an organized terrorist group that engage in such crimes are also involved in terrorism, so most of them will serve in ancillary and other supporting roles within a terrorist group’s overall organizational infrastructure.

This article will now present an account of the various criminal activities that Islamist terrorist groups’ agents and adherents engage in their U.S. Diaspora. Seven types of criminal activities are identified: (1) counterfeiting goods and cigarette smuggling; (2) robbery and theft, including shoplifting; (3) immigration and driver’s license fraud; (4) credit card fraud; (5) money laundering; (6) narcotics trafficking, and (7) using the Internet for illicit funding purposes.

Note that some of the incidents may include more than one type of criminal activity. The incidents are listed chronologically within each type of criminal activity type.

Counterfeiting Goods, Including Cigarette Smuggling One of the methods used by operatives linked to terrorism to generate funds for their organizations is the sale of counterfeit goods and cigarette smuggling.

July 2000: Federal authorities arrested 18 men in North Carolina for cigarette smuggling, for engaging in racketeering beginning around 1995. Their criminal activities included obtaining fraudulent driver’s licenses, filing fraudulent credit card applications, money laundering, crossstate cigarette smuggling, and immigration violations. The smuggling ring was led two brothers: Mohamad Hammoud, a Lebanese immigrant and Charlotte businessman, and his brother, Chawki Hammoud. The enterprise was reported to have earned an estimated $8 million, with some $100,000 sent to Hizballah in Lebanon. According to the indictment, members of the cell provided “currency, financial services, training, false documentation and identification, communications equipment, explosives, and other physical assets to Hizballah, in order to facilitate its violent attacks.” In a superseding indictment, filed in March 2001, four of the

18

cell members were charged with providing “material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” in violation of 18 U.S.C. No. 2339B.

July 2000: Federal authorities arrested 18 men in North Carolina for cigarette smuggling, for engaging in racketeering beginning around 1995. Their criminal activities included obtaining fraudulent driver’s licenses, filing fraudulent credit card applications, money laundering, crossstate cigarette smuggling, and immigration violations. The smuggling ring was led two brothers: Mohamad Hammoud, a Lebanese immigrant and Charlotte businessman, and his brother, Chawki Hammoud.

The enterprise was reported to have earned an estimated $8 million, with some $100,000 sent to Hizballah in Lebanon.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Also confirming the role of immigration fraud in facilitating such racketeering, the Hammoud brothers had each entered into sham marriages with American women to obtain green cards and the cover to operate their Charlotte, NC-based cell.

In June 2002, the Hammoud brothers were convicted by a federal jury in Charlotte, NC, of violating a ban on providing material support of groups designated as terrorist organizations by the United States, as well as cigarette smuggling, racketeering and money laundering. The Hizballah cell reportedly “responded directly to Sheikh Abbas Haraki, a senior Hizballah military commander in South Beirut.”

Robbery and Theft, Including Shoplifting Some terrorists generate revenue through robbery and theft.

December 14, 1999: Ahmed Ressam (known as the would-be millennium bomber) was arrested at Port Angeles, WA, while attempting to enter the U.S. from Canada with components used to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Known as the “would-be millennium bomber,” he had planned to bomb Los Angeles International Airport during the 2000 millennium celebration, but his plot was foiled upon his arrest.

Although al Montaz, an al Qaida training camp leader in Afghanistan, had provided Ressam some $12,000 to set up his cell in Montreal, Ressam and his Algerian compatriots engaged in petty crimes such as shoplifting, robbing tourists, picking pockets, credit card fraud, and stealing identity documents which were sent to his al Qaida contacts.

August 31, 2005: Kevin James and three ex-convicts, who called themselves Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), were arrested for plotting to bomb several military bases, synagogues, and an Israeli consulate in California. They were also indicted for attempting to fund their terrorist campaign by robbing gas stations in Southern California over the previous three months.

Vol. 24, No.1

Immigration and Driver’s License Fraud Terrorists engage in a variety of official documentation fraud schemes, such as immigration visa and driver’s license fraud.

December 14, 1999: Ahmed Ressam (discussed earlier), was considered an expert in producing fake passports. He had used a counterfeit French passport to enter Canada and apply for political asylum on February 20, 1994, using the fake name of Anjer Tahar Medjadi. On December 14, 1999, he used a fake Canadian passport under the alias of Benni Noris to enter the United States, but was apprehended by U.S. authorities.

September 11, 2001: The 19 members of the al Qaida terrorist cell that carried out the four 9/11 aircraft hijackings had arrived in the U.S., separately, beginning in January 2000. They were funded for their mission by al Qaida “Central” in Afghanistan, so they did not need to raise additional funding for their operation, but some of their operatives engaged in immigration and driver’s license fraud to obtain state identification cards and driver’s licenses. In one case, in November 2001,Victor M. Lopez-Flores had plead guilty to two offenses for helping Ahmed Alghamdi, one of the hijackers, on August 2, 2001 obtain a fake State of Virginia address and then falsely cosigning his DMV driver’s license form.

In another type of immigration document fraud, two of the cell’s hijackers entered the U.S. by acquiring a student visa, supposedly to take classes at a university or technical school, but never showed up for class. Three other cell members had entered the country on business or tourism visas and ended up overstaying their visas.

September 24, 2009: Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, aged 19, a citizen of Jordan, was arrested by the FBI for plotting to bomb Fountain Place, a building in Dallas, Texas. Smadi was in the U.S. illegally on a 2007 tourist visa, yet had succeeded in working at a gas station.

Credit Card Fraud The aim of engaging in credit card fraud is not only to acquire cash to fund terrorist operations, to meet the wider needs of sustenance, as well as to provide funds for one’s foreign terrorist organization.

September 11, 2001: The 19 members of the al Qaida terrorist cell that carried out the four 9/11 aircraft hijackings had arrived in the U.S., separately, beginning in January 2000...some of their operatives engaged in immigration and driver’s license fraud to obtain state identification cards and driver’s licenses.

In one case, in November 2001,Victor M. Lopez-Flores had plead guilty to two offenses for helping Ahmed Alghamdi, one of the hijackers, on August 2, 2001 obtain a fake State of Virginia address and then falsely cosigning his DMV driver’s license form.

September 19, 2009: Najibullah Zazi, aged 24, was arrested by FBI agents in Denver, Colorado, for leading a plot with two other operatives to bomb the New York subway system. As part of his indictment, he was accused of using stolen credit cards to purchase the bomb-making materials for his plot.

July 18, 2014: Ali Muhammad Brown, aged 29, was arrested for four terrorismrelated killings in Washington State. He had told investigators that the slayings were motivated by his Muslim faith and in revenge against the U.S. for its “evil acts” at home and military intervention in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Between 2002 and 2004 he had engaged in bank fraud, which prosecutors had charged was in support of the al-Shabaab Somalian terrorist group.

Money Laundering May 15, 2007: Elfat El Aouar, aged 40, of Plymouth, Michigan, a former Vice President of Finance for La Shish, Inc., a restaurant, and the spouse of La Shish’s owner, Talal Chahine, was sentenced in Ann Arbor federal court to 18 months’ imprisonment for tax evasion. As part of her guilty plea hearing on December 12, 2006, Elfat El Aouar admitted that from January 1, 2003 to April 15, 2004, she aided and abetted Talal Chahine in evading approximately $1.5 million dollars in federal income taxes, which authorities had charged were used to launder funds to persons in Lebanon with ties to Hizballah. Following the initial indictment of Chahine she fled the U.S. for Lebanon.

Narcotics Trafficking

Trafficking in narcotics has long been a profitable fundraising activity for terrorist groups in South America, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and elsewhere, including the U.S. January 2002: The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) charged that a methamphetamine operation in the U.S. was funneling its proceeds to Middle East terrorist groups, such as Hizballah. The smuggling reportedly went from Canada through Chicago and Detroit, and involved several individuals with ties to Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon and other Middle East countries.

Using the Internet for Illicit Funding Terrorists and their adherents use the Internet for illicit funding purposes.

June 11, 2015: Ali Shukri Amin, aged 17, pleaded guilty to charges of conspiring to provide material support and resources to the Islamic State (a designated foreign terrorist organization in Syria and Iraq). According to the Department of Justice news release, Amin admitted to using Twitter to provide advice and encouragement to IS and its supporters, including instruction on how to use Bitcoin, a virtual currency, to disguise the provision of funds to IS, as well as facilitation to IS supporters seeking to travel to Syria to fight with IS.

Conclusion Highlighting the nexus between Islamist terrorist operatives in the U.S. and their seven types of “precursor crimes” is intended to

20

In the case of individuals who engage in precursor crimes, when such crimes and the extremist ideologies that characterize their perpetrators are noticed by local law enforcement they require close coordination in sharing such information with intelligence agencies operating at state and federal levels domestically and internationally.

Being arrested for such precursor illicit activities thus presents an opportunity for early interdiction of potential terrorism.

When an overseas terrorist connection is identified, this will also contribute to overseas counterterrorism investigations against such foreign groups, as well.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

inform the law enforcement and counterterrorism communities about how such criminal activities, most of which, when viewed singly on their own may not necessarily indicate a link to terrorism, but that when such operatives are identified as motivated by an Islamist extremist ideology such a correlation will likely point to a nexus to a potential terrorist attack. It is at this point that these indicators represent the probable establishment of a seed-bed for a terrorist cell or lone wolf activity in that locality, thus warranting the activation of a counterterrorism target-zone investigation.

While the examples cited in this article represent a small sample of these criminally-related activities with a nexus to terrorism, there surely are numerous other examples of these six types of illicit activities and, perhaps, others as well, that arouse law enforcement concern, indictment, and arrest not only for their criminal activity but a nexus to terrorism, as well.

Highlighting the nexus between such illicit activities and terrorism is not intended to suggest that all small cell or lone wolf Islamist terrorist operatives need to engage in these types of criminality to maintain themselves.

Most Islamist terrorist perpetrators, such as the mass murderers Major Nidal Hassan (Fort Hood, Texas), Omar Mateen (Orlando, Florida) and Syed Rizwan Tashfeen (who operated with his wife Malik Farook) (San Bernardino, California), were employed at the time of their attacks and had the resources to self-fund their attacks. They left other types of pre-incident early warning indicators that should have been picked up, such as their radicalization into violent extremism.

In the case of individuals who engage in pre-cursor crimes, when such crimes and the extremist ideologies that characterize their perpetrators are noticed by local law enforcement they require close coordination in sharing such information with intelligence agencies operating at state and federal levels domestically and internationally. Being arrested for such precursor illicit activities thus presents an opportunity for early interdiction of potential terrorism.

When an overseas terrorist connection is identified, this will also contribute to overseas counterterrorism investigations against such foreign groups, as well.

About the Author Dr. Joshua Sinai is a senior analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH) (www.kiernan.co), a homeland security/national security consulting and research firm in Alexandria, VA. He can be reached at joshua.sinai@kiernan.co.

Vol. 24, No.1

CounterInsurgency Training

Figure 1: Practicing COIN in Afghanistan

And The Three Block Policemen

I

By Dominic J. Traina, III

n July 2009 General Stanley McCrystal issued a tactical directive to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan noting, “Our strategic goal is to defeat the insurgency threatening the stability of Afghanistan.

Like any insurgency, there is a struggle for the support and will of the population.

Gaining and maintaining that support must be our overriding operational imperative - and the ultimate objective of every action we take.�

Note that this proclamation clearly states that one of the most essential elements to defeat an insurgency is to have the support of the population. The civil unrest that has taken place in some cities over the past several years may call for some critical thinking, reflection and revaluation as to how many of our nations over 900,000 law enforcement officers (LEO) are currently being trained. Although, many police academies parallel other academies there is no national standardized method of training for LEO’s. The disparity in training amongst the almost 18,000 different departments in the United States can vary greatly. Understanding counterinsurgency (COIN) training and incorporating that training into the guardian mindset of police training could assist in preparing law enforcement officers for the 21st century.

COIN Philosophy In conventional warfare, the killing of civilians falls into the rubric of collateral damage.... regrettable but unfortunately

22

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

unavoidable in populated areas. However, COIN is about protecting the population. The goal is to thwart the distrust and the alienation that the population may have towards the counterinsurgents or local law enforcement; and to ensure that the population does not ally with the insurgents. One of the basic principles of counterinsurgency is that an operation is counterproductive if it kills 5 insurgents or 5 members of the population through collateral damage and this leads to the recruitment of 50 more insurgents. 1 Military leaders are calling for a new approach to warfare. Conventional warfare or traditional warfare is the most unlikely type of war that United States will fight.

The overwhelming military superiority that the United States holds over its rivals is unprecedented in world history. Therefore, asymmetric struggles or non-conventional, low intensity, protracted conflicts are more likely to be the types of conflict US military forces will face well into the 21st century.

This calls for a new methods of training, some of which began with the development of U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual that was first published in 2006 when General David Petraeus took charge of the Iraq War in 2007 the war had been going sideways for several years. Following some major shake-ups within the Department of Defense, efforts were soon made to thwart the violence. General Petraeus and staff had created the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, which essentially became the blue print for counterinsurgency (COIN).

What is an insurgency? The U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, explains: “An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. . . . Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”2 COIN is often said to be 80% political and 20% military or as Mao’s Tse-tung, the founding father of the Peoples Republic of China, noted to his generals that insurgencies are 20% military action and 80% political.

COIN is used to counter the insurgency and it is a method of warfare that places

. . . Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politicomilitary struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”2 COIN is often said to be 80% political and 20% military or as Mao’s Tse-tung, the founding father of the Peoples Republic of China, noted to his generals

a greater emphasis on gathering intelligence, population control or securing the population, security and peacekeeping, and propaganda initiatives to gain the trust of the population. David Kilcullen, a renowned counterinsurgency analyst, thinks that “winning minds and hearts is not a matter of making local people like you” as some American authorities seem to believe.

Instead, it’s about getting local people to “accept that supporting your side is in their interest, which requires an element of coercion.”3 Note that the emphasis is placed upon human interaction and attempting to garner support from the population. If the population feels indignant towards government it is unlikely to side with the military or law enforcement and in some cases may sympathize with insurgent elements.

The COIN strategy offers the basic skills, which are fundamental to law enforcement, that include working closely with the community, having intelligence driven operations and conducting investigations. 4 By using intelligence to garner trust, COIN members can go after extremist and go after them relentlessly while reaching out to reconcilable elements. Mirroring LEO training with a COIN strategy could be the paradigm shift in law enforcement over the next several decades.

Principle of COIN Inspired Policing • Legitimacy is crucial to achieving our goals • You must understand the environment • Unity of effort is essential • Intelligence drives operations • Prepare for a long-term commitment • Local factors are primary • Security under the rule of law is essential • Gangs must be separated from their cause and support5

that insurgencies are

Three Block Policing

20% military action

In 1999, General Charles Krulak 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, predicted that 21st century warfare would be fought on urban terrain. He wrote a piece titled, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War” General Krulak argues Marines could be required to conduct full scale combat operations, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid within three contiguous city blocks. Furthermore, General Krulak notes, “In many cases, the

and 80% political.

individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well.

His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of the larger operation; and he will become, as the title of this article suggests -- the Strategic Corporal.”6 The message is that understanding strategy and teaching leadership must take place at very junior levels in the Marine Corps. Many members of the military and law enforcement are called to service and preparing for that career requires steadfast leadership that relies on carrying, believing and the trusting of others.

Leadership training at the lowest levels should be of a high priority…it needs to take place early in basic training programs and continue throughout a LEO’s career. As in the modern day military; law enforcement is a thinking person’s business. Decisions have to be made rapidly and spontaneously; often under evolving stressful situations. Therefore, LEO’s should be given the maximum amount of discretion so that they can be empowered to act. Long gone are the days when police should just focus on making arrest. LEO’s of the future can make arrest in one block, keep peace and security in the next, and do community policing on the third block. As new LEO’s attend training academies an emphasis on the three block policing could proclaim that officers could make arrest in one block, simply secure another block and provide assistance to the elderly or hand out school supplies in the next block. All of this could be done on any day throughout ones tour of duty.

the philosophy of COIN, which is to clear, hold, and build a community.

New School Training: Creating the Guardian Mindset

A new method of police training is taking place in the state of Washington. Sue Rahr, who was the Sherriff for King County and is currently the executive director of the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission, has created an academy that focuses on training “guardians” of the community going from what is considered a warrior culture to a guardian culture.

It is imperative for modern day police to understand and be a part of the community. The strategic policemen should most likely live amongst the population to build trust. This is the essence of protecting the population. This trust allows for officers to gather useful intelligence for future operations, which results in the targeting of the most notorious members of the community. All of this relates to

24

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

In many Law Enforcement (LE) training programs half of the training time relates to “Use of Force” usually instruction on arrest techniques, defensive tactics, Fourth Amendment, and other related topics such as weapons training and weapons retention that are all very relevant and incredibly important topics to master for Law Enforcement Officers in order to have a safe and successful career. A majority of the other half of training pertains to the study of law, report writing, computer skills and other administrative duties. Many programs are based off of military boot camp training programs implementing stress inoculation, along with a warrior mentality of an “us against them” mindset. This type of training starts on day one in most programs. It is noted that training new officers on community policing is less effective in stress based curriculums as the “stress training creates obstacles to the kind of police-citizen relationships necessary to operationalize community policing. 7 Course developers and instructors of law enforcement training programs should ask themselves are these programs spending enough time on human interaction skills and other types of training that relates to dealing with people. It is often noted that most important tool a LE officer has is his/ her “mouth.” The initial contact with members of the community will often set the tone.

A new method of police training is taking place in the state of Washington.

Sue Rahr, who was the Sherriff for King County and is currently the executive director of the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission, has created an academy that focuses on training “guardians” of the community going from what is considered a warrior culture to a guardian culture. Basic law enforcement training, such as handcuffing, writing reports, and handling weapons, are still essential elements in the training program and will always be critical for a safe and successful law enforcement career. However, this new

Vol. 24, No.1

Figure 2: U.S. Marine Corps Leadership in the Three-Block War

U.S. Marines huddle behind walls as they receive instructions about their next move after a M1A1 tank eliminates the Iraqi insurgents in a house the Marines were receiving fire from in Fallujah, Iraq, in support of Operation al Fajr (New Dawn) on Dec. 10, 2004. Operation al Fajr is an offensive operation to eradicate enemy forces within the city of Fallujah in support of continuing security and stabilization operations in the Al Anbar province of Iraq. The Marines are assigned to 3rd Platoon, I Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division.

training, in Washington, has an increased focus on community relations and empathy.8 Rahr, argues that despite three decades of falling crime rates mainly because of improved tactics and technology; public trust has eroded. 9 The instruction that is encouraged in the Washington state training program places a greater emphasis on treating citizens with respect and dignity. Modern day police training requires that the, “guardians” be better educated in order to do their job which is clearly noted in Plato’s, “The Republic,” and that it is for the guardians to protect the citizen’s, laws, and customs.

Additional training for basic LEO’s and advanced training for seasoned professionals could focus on incorporating more empathetic policing tactics such as; trying to avoid physical control and encouraging de-escalation, and serving as opposed to conquering.

Furthermore, Plato describes in “The Republic” that the guardians are to be gentle with citizens but fierce against enemies. This will never change, as bad actors will always exist. The Strategic Guardians, as with the Strategic Corporal, will play a greater role on the outcomes of future policing and military actions, and this can lead the way from a culture of warriors to a culture of guardians.

About the Author Dominic. J. Traina, III holds a MS in International Relations from Troy University in Troy, Alabama and a MA in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He is employed in the field of global maritime supply-chain security and is an adjunct faculty member in the Emergency and Security Studies program at Tulane University.

(Endnotes) The beam of a flashlight fastened to a rifle cuts through the dust in the air as U.S. Army soldiers clear a house in Al Fallujah, Iraq, during Operation al Fajr (New Dawn) on Nov. 13, 2004. Al Fajr is an offensive operation to eradicate enemy forces within the city of Fallujah in support of continuing security and stabilization operations in the Al Anbar province of Iraq. The soldiers are assigned to the 82nd Engineer Battalion.

Figure 3: Building upon a Guardian Mindset

1 Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, December 2006). P 1-20.

2 Field Manual (FM) 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, December 2006). P 1-1.

3 Packer, George. “Knowing the Enemy Can social scientist redefine the “war on terror”? The New Yorker, December 18, 2006.

4 Hiorns, Bruce. “Analysis of C3 Counterinsurgency Inspired Policing, and the Flip Side of the COIN.” Homeland Security Affairs, December 2014.

5 Massachusetts State Police C3 Policing Team, “C3 Vs Community Policing,” http://mspc3policing.com 6 Krulak, Charles. “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.” Marines Magazine January 1999. http://www.au.af.mil/au/ awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm 7 Karl Bickel, “Recruit Training: Are we preparing officers for a community oriented department?” Community Policing Dispatch, 6, issue 6 (2013) http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/06-2013/preparing_officers_for_a_community_oriented_department.asp.

8 Militich, Steve, “Police Academy 2.0: Less military training, more empathy.” The Seattle Times, July 14, 2013.

9 Rahr, Sue and Stephen K. Rice. “From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American Police Culture to Democratic Ideals”. New Perspectives in Policing Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2015. NCJ 248654.

COUNTERTERRORISM 2018:

WHERE WE STAND ANALYTICALLY Dr. Thomas A. Marks (1)

I 26

Leader of one of the Boko Haram group’s factions, Abubakar Shekau speaks in front of guards in an unknown location in Nigeria in this still image taken from an undated video obtained on January 15, 2018. Boko Haram Handout/Sahara Reporters via REUTERS

n the aftermath of 9-11, the U.S. raced to implement efforts and programs to deal with “terrorism.” It declared a “Global War on Terrorism,” which in turn became simultaneously other things: a “Long War” and “countering global insurgency,” finally “countering violent extremism.” Regardless, the challenge was no different conceptually than that faced by those of the past: how to respond to an armed nonstate challenge bent upon achieving political change through commission of violence directed, at its foundational level, against the innocent (persons and property protected by the laws of war).

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

This, of course, is the textbook definition of terrorism, yet immediately there surfaced in our efforts no degree of confusion as much that had once been called insurgency was reflagged as terrorism. As most groups we confronted were in fact insurgents, it was as if all of analytical history had suddenly vanished in our race to embrace hubris and strategic distortion.

Ultimately, most of academia, the various departments of the U.S. government, and both U.S. and international law ended up precisely where they had begun, with terrorism essentially defined as: violence by non-state actors directed against the innocent for political purposes. Such violence, of course, could be either method (used by insurgents) or logic (wherein the violence serves as an end unto itself, frequently having propagandistic value). Despite the by now hackneyed observation that there is no accepted definition of terrorism, in reality there was considerable agreement with the formulation just provided, particularly amongst the states of the United Nations. (2) The key challenge, then, was to identify who or what was “innocent.” For those serving a democracy, the answer was quite straightforward: persons or property protected by the laws of war. The democratic framework was essential, because absent legitimacy – which only stemmed from striving for a just order – the whole category of terrorism collapsed. This quickly became clear as the vocabulary and analytical approach were falsely appropriated by dictatorships with their murderous ways.

More to the point, alienation of significant slices of any polity that resulted in rebellion, whatever its precise form (with terrorism being one) demanded not merely condemnation but explanation, particularly if the marginalization was transnational (e.g., a segment of a religion, with Islam being of particular salience, but even, more recently, Buddhism).

Explanation, in turn, when carried out from a

Ultimately, most of academia, the various departments of the U.S. government, and both U.S. and international law ended up precisely where they had begun, with terrorism essentially defined as: violence by nonstate actors directed against the innocent for political purposes.

democratic perspective, demanded that attention turn to the failure, actual or perceived, of the political opportunity structure to be inclusive and responsive to the popular will of all.

The latter term was necessary to make clear that explanation did not necessarily mean justification, though even the deformities that were al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, when traced back far enough, invariably brought analysis face-to-face with socio-economicpolitical deformation, the imperfections and brutality of the Egyptian autocracy in the case of the former, the Iraqi dictatorship of Saddam Hussein for the latter.

Transferring Theory to Operational Reality All that has been discussed can be termed “the roots of conflict.” From the unfolding of the process discussed above emerges the threat group. This may seem complicated, but in reality, it is a process that all analysts of irregular challenge have used in some form or another for (literally) centuries, possibly even millennia – if we suppose that historical regimes going back to the birth of history, faced with rebellion, did not simply respond but at some point endeavored to assess why they had a revolt on their hands.

This can be made more visible by resorting to a display as at Figure 1 below, which presents a visual format using the present case of Boko Haram. (3)

Figure 1. Roots of Conflict as applied the case of Boko Haram (current)

In the upper left, societal context, which may be defined at any level – local, regional, national, international – impacts upon individuals (macro acting upon micro) through the salient factors of any world-historical moment. The result is either acceptance or dissatisfaction, with the latter at times, giving rise to substantial effort for change that goes beyond episodic protest; that is, to a social movement. This was the case in Nigeria’s northern, Muslim tier (especially the northeast) in the decades leading up to the turn of the century. To the various factors listed (upper left) could be added any number of others (e.g., urbanization), but the end result was a substantial social movement which embraced Islamization as its vehicle to a more acceptable world.

Within this larger movement, one of the most salient figures was Muhammad Yusaf (born 1970), assisted by Abubakar Shekau (born 1969), for whom substantial change, such as the implementation of sharia in the Islamic north, did not go far enough. Hence he formed his own Salafist movement (the ideological driver in the situation), which sought to exclude as forbidden (haram) foreign ways, especially education (boko). Despite its at times sharp elbows, it was essentially peaceful. In controversial circumstances, he and numerous members of his group, after launching a state-wide rebellion in Borno, were killed in state repression in July 2009. The result was Boko Haram under Shekau, a splinter from the original movement that thus sought through violence to set the world aright.

In this brief telling, leaders – in this case adherents to a form of political Islam – emerge as politicians in search of a constituency. Whether Yusaf would have continued on an essentially peaceful trajectory remains to be seen. The context which led to his rebellion is complex but does not support an assessment of premediated rebellion. State

28

repression achieved that. Left unexamined, of course, is the identity of the movement followers, both “before” and “after” the key trigger event of July 2009.

It is in examining this facet that the complexity of the factors (usefully abbreviated GHESP, or geographic, historical, economic, social, and political) in the upper left of the figure come into play.

Rarely, even where religion is concerned, are they attracted to clarion calls per se.

Rather, they seek because they yearn.

The political opportunity structure, for them, does not mediate their grievances.

Ideological formulation of solution – the process of framing and narrative – offers a way forward.

A frame provides the boundaries and content of the picture of reality it desires an audience to see. As a frame is dynamic, it is constantly being created and altered through the process of “framing.” The tools utilized are narratives, stories that provide the actual “pictures” that emerge within the frame. Such narratives necessarily can be explicit or implied in the messages they convey. Generally emerging from within unique cultural contexts, they are most powerful when they utilize idiom that speaks unconsciously to the target – such as, in this case, Nigerian Muslims. (4)

The alternative trajectories possible for such a splinter have already been noted.

Either terrorism as a logic, structurally divorced from the social base, or terrorism as a method, one tool in the arsenal of a mass mobilization movement, can eventuate. One hastens to note that structural estrangement from a potential social base, occasioned by entering a state of clandestinity – is not simply a matter of having or not having popular support. The latter waxes and wanes as per circumstances, but placing the group in a hermetically sealed position, if we may use that term, is something altogether different, Regardless, the threat will pursue a strategy, and state counter must interrogate and display the tangible and intangible aspects of the strategic unfolding. This can be done by using the widespread concept of lines of effort (LOE) and their constituent campaigns to map the threat actions that invariably occur (with absence as significant as presence), as displayed in Figure 2.

Of particular importance are the foundational conceptual campaigns that comprise the Political LOE of any group that seeks to construct a counter-state in opposition to the state: it builds (through mobilization of manpower and resources, both of which conceptually are subcampaigns) and it governs. Where a terrorist group is concerned, the discussion is essentially tactical and even the use of the conceptual terminology (lines of effort, campaigns), though still useful, becomes almost superfluous as opposed to simply discerning patterns and operational actions. It is the alternative world of an insurgency that necessarily must be mapped in all its complexity.

A poster advertising for the search of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau is pasted on a wall in Baga village on the outskirts of Maiduguri, in the north-eastern state of Borno, Nigeria May 13, 2013. REUTERS/Tim Cocks

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

Similarly, it is the Violence LOE that enables the construction and governance of the counter-state. It is, after all, at some point in time declared illegal

a conceptual category requires neutralization, then delve into the specifics and the seizing of the initiative.

Figure 2. Conceptual LOE with constituent campaigns.

and subject to state response. As displayed in Figure2, the violence involved must conceptually fall into one of four categories: terrorism, which has previously been defined; guerrilla warfare, small irregular unit action directed principally at targets of military utility (as opposed to the innocent as in the case of terrorism); mobile warfare (also termed maneuver or main force warfare), force-on-force military action; and war of position, military action which moves beyond force-on-force to the holding of terrain. These may be used simultaneously and in any combination.

Several points immediately surface. First, a number of the campaigns, as conceptual categories, demand further specificity. The terrorism campaign, for example, is displayed at Figure 3 using the logical target sets as the basis for sub-campaign delimitation. Any one of these sub-campaigns, in turn, may be further differentiated. What are termed “local players” (the local gentry in much of the academic literature), for instance, might be subdivided in any number of ways, such as livelihood or community.

Second, the conceptual display is necessarily duplicated in operational representation using maps and symbols. Schools, for example, are a key infrastructure target in the Thai Southern Border Provinces (SBP) conflict and thus are carried as such, with

attendant analysis used not simply to map the atrocity of attacks but to discern patterns and protective measures.

Third, within all conceptual categories, normal operational representation and plotting – the standard plotting of any police or military “ops-center” – goes on, since this is what unfolds on the ground.

The value of such conceptual display is to guide recognition of the operational art (the level of LOE and campaigns) that bundles tactics so as to comprise threat strategy.

Absent such recognition, correct response is impossible. Response must first discern that

Figure 3

An examination of the Terrorism sub-campaigns of Figure 3, for instance, makes clear that counter must determine how to utilize a combination of defensive and offensive measures, kinetic and nonkinetic, tangible and intangible, to safeguard the target sets.

Two categories alone, local players and infrastructure, create extraordinary demands for protection that can only be met through extraordinary mobilization of local security, normally popular self-defense forces (which, in turn, come in a bewildering variety of forms with numerous specific procedures to ensure discipline and command and control). (5) Such forces are normally of a basic level and far removed from the specialized units that one associates with VVIP or international actor protection.

Of a different nature are the armed forces themselves, a frequent terrorist target, for whom the procedural shifts embodied in force protection are normally sufficient, as opposed to the standing up of entirely new forces.

If this much is abundantly clear where armed action is the topic of analysis, the complexity of the matter muddies the picture considerably when examining the Political LOE and the required neutralization its campaigns. Arrest may be an immediate and necessary element of response, but it quickly runs into precisely the same challenge that makes local defense (or individuals and infrastructure, not to mention areas, which I have termed “local security”) so daunting. This is why counterinsur-

gency, in particular, but also counterterrorism is inherently political. Only rival political action in the form of cadre can address the political action of the threat LOE. For the security forces, even uncovering the clandestine apparatus of such threat can be hopelessly complex. The urge to cut through the Gordian Knott by use of torture has led to the any number of forces following down the path made infamous by the French in Algeria, as portrayed, it hardly needs adding, in The Battle of Algiers (Rizzoli, 1966) and, more recently, in a plethora of films dealing with American actions in the war on terrorism.

In the final analysis, response, absent a determination that “kill them all” is not acceptable, is only possible if grounded in legitimacy, however defined. It is not so much whether the challenge has it as the indispensable requirement that the state possess it in order to mobilize adequate response. Local defense, to cite but the most obvious illustration, is well-nigh impossible when the locals have nothing they are willing to defend – or simply see the other side as the lesser of two evils.

To complicate matters further, violence is conceptually accompanied by weaponized nonviolence (see relevant LOE in Figure 2).

The potential campaigns on any such LOE are myriad; those represented are evident in any detailed study of the past.

Most intriguing is the use of netwar as pioneered by the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico in their 1994 effort and beyond; that is, the mobilization of international and domestic networks of attachment and engagement (i.e., social networks) to bring pressure to bear asymmetrically upon the seemingly stronger adversary. The internet may be a virtual form; but communications are not the issue, rather linkages which allow the nonkinetic neutralization of, in particular, superior kinetic strength of the state. (6) As the Mexicans were to discover in the illustration at hand, neutralization of such a campaign was often beyond the state, at least in the near-term. Such may be said for the other campaigns displayed.

Most intriguing is the use of netwar as pioneered by the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico in their 1994 effort and beyond; that is, the mobilization of international and domestic networks of attachment and engagement (i.e., social networks) to bring pressure to bear asymmetrically upon the seemingly stronger adversary.

The internet may be a virtual form; but communications are not the issue, rather linkages which allow the nonkinetic neutralization of, in particular, superior kinetic strength of the state.

Finally, to the Nonviolence LOE must be added two more as further displayed at Fig-

30

ure 2, an Allies (Domestic) LOE and an International LOE. The constituent conceptual campaigns are again those that emerge from detailed study of the past and are delimited to the extent common sense would dictate.

All threat groups, for example, seek allies, but these invariably come in two basic forms, those that are controlled by the group under consideration (normally termed, fronts) and those simply influenced. Normal terminology is used, with the literature replete with alternative wording, such as “useful idiots” to describe those influenced individuals who engage in self-mystification in order to support organizations and their causes which are obviously odious to objective observers (one thinks of American and European supporters of the Khmer Rouge).

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

There is nothing mutually exclusive in these lines of effort. Neither can they be considered in isolation from the generating mechanisms discussed earlier. All exist conceptually only to give form to human action. It is the mobilization campaign of the Political LOE, for instance, that is comprised operationally of the actions of individuals to recruit manpower and obtain the wherewithall to wage violent politics.

Operational Reality to Strategic Planning What emerges, then, is a guide to interrogate any irregular strategic challenge by keying off the discussion to ask five questions: (1) what is the political project at hand? (2) Who are its domestic allies (outside the movement)? (3) How does it use violence? (4) How does it use nonviolence? And (5) What is it doing internationally? The answers will be the five lines of effort, with the details embraced by the relevant campaigns.

An example is dsplayed at Figure 4, drawn from the case of overt Nepali Maoist insurgency, 1996-2006, discussed previously in this journal. It illustrates the strategic clarity gained.

Though the Nepali Maoist insurgency did not use concepts and terminology advanced here, its thinking – derived from people’s war publications and cases – can be accurately represented as such. The relative sophistication of the insurgent strategy meant that all LOE were present with most of the campaigns discussed previously.

All evidence then and since points to the keen appreciation of the Maoist leader-

Vol. 24, No.1

ship for both the tangible and intangible dimensions of their struggle; that is, the use of kinetic action both to achieve facts-on-the-ground and to engage in information warfare.

Most particularly, they understood completely a point never grasped by the government: in irregular warfare, the fundamental relationships of combat are reversed. If in regular warfare, shaping, which is overwhelmingly nonviolent (e.g., information warfare itself), shapes the battle space for appplication of violence, irregular warfare sees violence itself as the dominant shaping mechanism, preparing the human battle space for application of poltiics. Even had the Maoists been a terrorist group devoid of a following, this would have been true, albeit tactically, with tactical instances of terror conducted for their messaging value. In this case, though, tactics assumed strategic salience, magntitude and direction, through their conceptual bundling into campaigns.

Evidence from Maoist leadership deliberations showed all kinetic actions considered within this framework, though communist idiom dominated. Campaigns, for instance, which have been variously labelled even in

Faced with such a strategic challenge, Kathmandu, had it conceptualized the matter correctly, would have deployed well conceived responses implemented by various resources drawn from its instruments of national power.

Western doctrine, are for communists but one level of “struggle,” a term which is especially useful when the object of analysis is non-military action. What results is not unlike a “normal” election effort but accompanied by the ability to violently attack human obstacles to electoral dominance.

Faced with such a strategic challenge, Kathmandu, had it conceptualized the matter correctly, would have deployed well conceived responses implemented by various resources drawn from its instruments of national power. Instead, it deployed only its security forces, led by the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). Despite its shortcomings and handicaps, not least astonishingly scarce resources and a complete absence of meaningful foundation for such a task, by 2005, the security forces had succeeded in stabilizing the situation. As shown on the figure, they had blocked the Maoist Violence LOE, which by that time had all four conceptual campaigns in play (with numerous constituent tactical efforts unfolding on the ground and in the arena of influence).

Yet as 2005 began, the political context afforded such opportunities that a debate ensued within Maoist leadership as to the viability of moving from essentially tactical support for violence to emphasis upon the four other LOEs. The decision to do so was made at a September 2005 meeting in Chunwang, Rukum. Frequently presented teleologically as a decision to participate in parliamentary politics, it was nothing of the kind.

The royal seizure of power (monarchical emergency rule is a useful interpretation) had alienated the legal political parties.

The resulting “seven party alliance” proved willing to enter into an arrangement with the Maoists (a union labelled SPAM by some) to overthrow the king. The Maoists seized the opportunity, though it was hotly contested by those leadership figures who felt violence was on the verge of delivering complete victory. In contrast, the main leadership saw that an inflexion point offered a chance for victory by altering emphasis.

The deicison was therefore made to use alliances, especially the united front campaign, in conjunction with political action in hitherto denied government-controlled areas – access to which was gained by of-

Figure 4

32

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

fering to negotiate for “peace” – to prepare the battle space for a seizure of power. An extensive lawfare campaign sought to enmesh RNA in a web of legal complications which would allow its effective dismantling (through leadership changes and wholesale integration of Maoist combatants). Violence was relegated to a supporting role and continued to be used extensively through the standing up of a paramilitary organization, the Young Communist League (YCL). Its weapon was terrorism, even as radical leadership figures were told that forces outside the YCL would prepare for urban combat to be launched when the moment was ripe.

In the event, circumstances – in particular the unwillingness of RNA to agree to its own demise – created a very different unfolding but one not altogether unfeavorable to the Maoists. So frustrated were radical figures at the long-game approach of the main leadership, with its emphasis upon opportunistic as opposed to systematic use of terrorism, that they split into increasingly more violent splinters, with the Chand aka Biplav faction being the present standbearer for immediate, wholesale (though not foolhardy) confrontation.

This, though, is to leap ahead. Neither such conclusion nor the operational art in play were appreciated by the national leadership in Kathmandu. The result, as illustrated in Figure 4, was that state response continued to focus upon the insurgent Violence LOE even as their other LOE achieved their operational objectives.

Not understood by the Maoists themselves, however, was the extent to which the essence of what has just been discussed was both grasped by key field grade officers and briefed in considerable detail to the higher command. RNA’s inability to influence the political nature of the struggle could not prevent the collapse of the oldorder, at least as concerned the monarchy, but did inform its response to the Maoist strategy following the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That the Maoists viewed the latter as a tactical step – as opposed to the strategic shift portrayed by the media and INGOs, along with a group of ill-informed European governments – was ultimately understood and could be acted upon with the shift to new RNA leadership to force the Maoists into still further strategic adaptation.

Figure 5

“Counterterrorism” Conclusion

The decision was therefore made to use alliances, especially the united front campaign, in conjunction with political action in hitherto denied governmentcontrolled areas – access to which was gained by offering to negotiate for “peace” – to prepare the battle space for a seizure of power.

What the Nepali state should have done seems self-evident. This was to assess the situation, examine the impact of present (likely unsuccessful) state response, form a concept of future response, implement.

Simple enough in theory, execution demands that this – which is but a simplification of all that has been discussed to this point – be conceptualized. To this end, see Figure 5, a template for analysis and response.

The structure of Figure 5 is certainly not set in stone, and it is displayed so as to facilitate assessment and response, with resourcing included to highlight the obvious: all ways undertaken to achieve ends must be operationlized through means.

Further, the “start,” in the box labelled “Problem,” emerges from the analysis done in the heart of the Estimate. That analysis involves everything already discussed, with the complexities of Figures 1 contained in the “Roots” box, those of Figure 3 (and, by implication, Figure 4) contained in the Strategy box. “Frame & Narrative” is self-explanatory in line with the earlier discussion.

The identification that consequently emerges for the “Problem” box necessarily drives assessment of “Present Response,” since almost invariably the state, when

examined at any point in time, is proceeding in ways inappropriate to the nature of the threat or simply ineffective even when appropriate. The recently reargued debate concerning U.S. (and NATO) strategy in Afghanistan well illustrates the point. Only then-sixteen years of futility could cause anyone to suggest, first, privatizing the war, second, considering seriously a plan for privatization that reduced suggestion for remediation to “kinetics on steroids,” in the private words of one critic.(7) Put another way, what state response must ask, and the privatization option just mentioned does not, is: (1) Who and what is the threat? (2) What has produced him? (aka “who are those guys?”); (3) What is their message? (aka what do they claim they are fighting for?); and (4) How do they intend to get to where they want to be? (aka what is their strategy and how are they implementing it?).

Response, then, as displayed in the lower half of Figure 5, speaks to the realities of the answers in such manner as to facilitate reincorporation into the polity. This is the approach of every significant actor who has entered the history books as a result of success in restoring normalcy in such manner as to not leave the battle space a howling wilderness.

Certainly even such a simple assertion can be controversial, given that many of those involved in reaction to revolt (by whatever name) are representatives of the established order and thus, it can be claimed, suffer from legitimacy shortfall. Nevertheless, in the modern era, the cases of “kill them all” are not advanced by anyone publicly as desirable. One thinks immediately of the Russians in Chechnya or the Chinese in first Tibet, now Xinjiang, though the latter may be considered as pioneering “smother them all” as opposed to the more brutal approach that has ended Tibet as it once was. Still, it is likely that those with the relevant linguistic skills can probably point to nationally produced assessments which laud the crimes of Moscow and Beijing. The Western colonial record in this regard is well known, but what is of greatest moment is the fierce debate,

34

Nevertheless, in the modern era, the cases of “kill them all” are not advanced by anyone publicly as desirable. One thinks immediately of the Russians in Chechnya or the Chinese in first Tibet, now Xinjiang, though the latter may be considered as pioneering “smother them all” as opposed to the more brutal approach that has ended Tibet as it once was. Still, it is likely that those with the relevant linguistic skills can probably point to nationally produced assessments which laud the crimes of Moscow and Beijing.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

which started even as expansion abroad commenced, as to what objectives should be and what methods were acceptable.

Other concerns displayed in the figure are self-evident, but it may be emphasized that the importance today of response to accord with rule of law is basic, though hardly of concern for the “kill them all” approach. For approaches grounded in embrace of citizen empowerment, legitimacy can only eventuate from response that adheres to due process. This should not be mistaken for pandering, a problem inherent to the very phrase “winning the hearts and minds,” which never meant quite what it has come to stand for: an agreeable form of social welfare action albeit facilitated by weapons. When first used by the American Patriots, the formulation, as advanced by John Adams, the text made the point much more clear: “But what do we mean by the American Revolution? Do we mean the American war? The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people, a change in their religious sentiments of their duties and obligations.”(8) This is the language of empowerment, not of services provision.

Regardless, controversy in execution of response is inevitable, all the more so when the threat group can be assessed as more terrorist than insurgent. Emerging from Figure 5, therefore, is the plain sense reality that the less analysis points to “Roots” and “Frame and Narrative” as factors, the more Response focuses upon the threat group itself; and more it is a primary group (e.g., the Japanese Red Army), the more this becomes a matter of tactics.

A gray area has plainly emerged when an insurgency, such as ISIS, in addition to practicing horrific terrorism as a method in its counter-state construction, simultaneously carries out raids internationally that ignore the laws of war, thus executing acts of terrorism. As this approach is shared by nearly all major violent radical Islamist groups, which overwhelmingly are insurgencies using terrorism as method (even al-Qaeda consistently has sought a territorial base, most recently in Yemen), response has increasingly gravitated to targeted killing executed by drones.

Vol. 24, No.1

Not surprisingly, this has become increasingly controversial, despite the reality that deep penetration patrols have for decades been instructed in (and executed) only two skills: observation of a target or its destruction, with the two frequently going hand-in-hand. The inappropriate use of the term “assassination” to describe targeted killing highlights the controversy evoked, with the issues not surprisingly making it to movie screens.

What is often less debated is the obvious tendency of the tactical actions to become ends unto themselves, not unlike the highly efficient “night raids” used by Western special operations forces in a variety of theaters but most notably Iraq and Afghanistan (where they continue).

Absent insertion into a strategic plan, they lose efficacy.

In fact, as globalization has resulted in unprecedented exposure of all elements of planning and execution, some have questioned whether it is even possible for democracies to engage in the roughand-tumble (aka “big boy rules”) that is inherent to countering violent politics.

As numerous cases illustrate, this is hardly the case, though the Western conflation of the term “counterinsurgency” with “expeditionary counteirnsurgency” serves to confuse what is endeavoring to engage in counterinsurgency in someone else’s country, with all the challenges attendant to what is a colonial project in everything but name. Minimally, a country engaged in such a project on home turf has priceless advantages in culture and language, though this is certainly not the case in numerous instances where separatism is either the issue or serves to feed larger issues. The noteworthy case of Sri Lanka serves to illustrate this well, where, from first to last, the predominantly Sinhalese forces were adrift linguistically in Tamil areas (though, ironically, less so culturally, both cultures having lived side-by-side for a considerable period of time, contending narratives notwithstanding).

To global challenges should be added the extraordinary possibilities for resource mobilization now available, with the premier illustration (at least until recently) being Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), which was

The inappropriate use of the term “assassination” to describe targeted killing highlights the controversy evoked, with the issues not surprisingly making it to movie screens.

What is often less debated is the obvious tendency of the tactical actions to become ends unto themselves, not unlike the highly efficient “night raids” used

by Western special operations forces in a variety of theaters but most notably Iraq and Afghanistan (where they continue).

Absent insertion into a strategic plan, they lose efficacy.

sustained by a profile of criminality dominated by involvement in the cocaine trade. This allowed a certain looseness in the implementation of its people’s war doctrine (of the Vietnamese variety transmitted primarily via the FMLN of El Salvador), in particular a focus upon armed action (particularly terrorism) at the expense of popular mobilization (which was all but still-born). As a consequence, when a reformed military in 1998-2006 led what ultimately proved a spectacularly successful regaining of the strategic initiative and subsequently the knocking of FARC to the canvas, initial assessment using the approach discussed herein revealed clearly that, unlike, say, the Nepali Maoists, the only the Violence LOE was robust, indeed, even functioning at the level of operational art in its implementation through terrorism, guerrilla war, and mobile war (with FARC having failed to make the leap to war of position). This allowed an initial 1998-2002 focus upon militarily reversing fortunes, which was followed by a more comprehensive Democratic Security Plan, 2002-2006.

It must be emphasized that the particular shape the Colombian response took derived from its careful and comprehensive construction of an Estimate that identified both the nature of the threat and the weak points in its ecology. Other countries have done the same, ranging from Iraq to Peru. The Iraq case is salient for the reasons well known: so rapid was the collapase of the state that the traditional devleopment of clandestine infrastructure proved wholly unnecessary, and the new counter-state, the so-called Caliphate, would immediately launch assaults upon other states, ranging from those in the region to those in Europe (or even the U.S. and elsewhere, if one credits self-radicalization). In victory, however, were the seeds of defeat. As happened in the case of LTTE, once it had effectively achieved its Eelam (Tamil homeland) by the turn of the century, statehood brought with it the requirement to wage war at the interstate level. This proved impossible once foreign powers came to Baghdad’s assistance, and Iraq itself engaged in considerable martial reform.

Iraq serves to illustrate a final point.

There is a mistaken tendency to con-

fuse both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency with politics per se. That is, it is held that a strategy of counter has failed – even if successful on the ground – if it somehow fails to address all the factors which gave rise to estrangement and violence in the first place. This is not at all what goes on.

Counter is a first-past-the-post matter of restoring conditions such that politics can again function normally. It may be forced to continue indefinitely, as in “the Reconstruction” era, 1865-77, that followed the American Civil War – or is occurring now in Sri Lanka; but that is a matter of policy not of something called counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. “Victory” sets the conditions for politics to address imperfect reality. To the extent politics fails, the teams return to the playing field.

This is not an effort to be Delphic only to highlight the obvious: like money, politics never sleeps. Warfighting – which we call counterterrorism or counterinsurgency – comes into play when the political process is unable to mediate grievances, hopes, and desires. No system is foolproof, but some are demonstrably worse at the business of addressing interest aggregation and articulation than others. Likewise, simply because grievance is expressed does not make it legitimate. There has been a growing tendency to claim that if violence appears, this alone is proof of a deficient polity. Such claim lacks merit.

About the Author Dr. Marks is a Distinguished Professor and MG Edward Lansdale Chair of Irregular Warfighting Strategy, College of International Security Affairs (CISA),

Likewise, simply because grievance is expressed does not make it legitimate. There has been a growing tendency to claim that if violence appears, this alone is proof of a deficient polity.

Such claim lacks merit.

All strategic assessment and response discussed above has proceeded from the standpoint of democratic governance.

The nature of any response to violent challenge can powerfully influence what follows. This is a matter of both sound planning and robust command and control in implementation. Once reintegration of the alienated is achieved, the new world created by the exigencies of war demands fresh approaches to governance such that popular incorporation and empowerment create a legitimate political opportunity structure. The very word legitimacy speaks to the metric: popular involvement and acceptance in a system that belongs to them.

This is the ultimate end-state we seek.

36

National Defense University (NDU), Ft McNair,

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Washington, DC 20319.

References 1. Distinguished Professor and MG Edward Lansdale Chair of Irregular Warfighting Strategy, College of International Security Affairs (CISA), National Defense University (NDU), Ft McNair, Washington, DC 20319.

2 For discussion see esp. Reuven Young, “Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation,” Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 29, no. 1 (1 December 2006), 23-84; available at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1054&context=iclr (accessed 9 May 2018).

3 For details, see Alexander Thurston, Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018).

4 For the original formulation of this concept see Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1974), as well as Charles Lemert and Ann Branaman, eds., The Goffman Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997).

5 For details in this periodical, see my “At the Frontlines of the GWOT: Colombia Success Builds Upon Local Foundation,” Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International 10, no. 2 (2004), 42-50.

6 For conceptual development, see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996); utilized further in David Ronfeldt, John Arquilla, Graham E. Fuller, and Melissa Fuller, The Zapatista Social Netwar in Chiapas (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998), with a condensed version available in Ronfeldt and Arquilla, “Emergence and Influence of the Zapatista Social Netwar,” Ch.6 in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 171-99. In this same work, bringing the circle round, Arquilla and Ronfeldt offer as Ch.1, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” 1-25.

7 For the presentation of the privatization option by its author, see Erik D. Prince, “The MacArthur Model for Afghanistan,” The Wall Street Journal, 31 May 2017, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-macarthur-model-for-afghanistan-1496269058; for the actual Power Point presentation, “An Exit Strategy for Afghanistan: A test Case for the Strategic Economy of Force” (undated), at https://mega.nz/#!k1AVX CKR!WXcK42Lq0L4HPU5VoeJFsBVfj3O 98QSDMA3PuuacNZU. 8 John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818.

Vol. 24, No.1

Protective Driving Executive Awareness Security Driver Bodyguard Seminar Protective Security Operations Threat Detection Nanny Driving & Security Awareness High Risk Driving Firearms Programs Corporate Fleet Driver Training Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) Training

ADSI is an internationally recognized advanced driving school, specializing in training Security Drivers, Executive Protection Teams and hosting many Corporate Fleet Safety Programs. We have the ability to design and implement courses for a wide audience, specializing in Corporate Security, Military and Law Enforcement training.

Advanced Driving & Security Inc.

5 Franklin Rd. Suite 5 East Greenwich, RI 02818 1-401-294-1600 Office Ext 2 Corporate/Private Security / LE / MIL Ext 3 High Performance 1-401-398-7932 Fax info@1adsi.com

www.1adsi.com

Security Driver: Backing Up

By Anthony Ricci

H 38

ow many of you are familiar with the famous stomach twisting back stretch trying to get your body around to get a better look through the rear window? I hate having to do that. I have to admit some days I don’t like to stretch that far either. You have to reach all the way up to the passenger seat head rest and actually twist your body backwards, all while pushing on the steering wheel, which by the way is supposed to be steering the car. Or better yet you could have gone to the wheel toss school where taking the wheel with your left hand and throwing it in the direction you want to go actually makes sense.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

That is a great way to get lost and not really know where straight is, not to mention lose control of your vehicle. No wonder there are so many accidents happening in reverse.

Truth is many accidents that happen in reverse are due to poor vision, bad coordination, excessive speed, lack of control, and jerky steering from having the wrong seat positioning or just plain laziness. Yes, cars and trucks are designed to go forward not backwards. This is not a bad thing; however untrained drivers and/or poor backing skills can make for a really expensive bad day.

Drivers need to understand the dynamics of moving in reverse as well as positioning themselves to better utilize the controls.

So I recommend a slightly different seating position.

I will be the first to admit this position is not the most comfortable; however it will increase your vision approximately another 45 degrees. You can actually see someone standing next to the driver’s side rear door.

In training classes we sometimes get complaints from students about stiff necks and backs during this drill. Truth is yeah the position sucks but it beats the alternative.

I’d rather suffer a temporary stiff neck or small discomfort to gain better vision and increased vehicle control. Once you get used to the new seating position the benefits of increased visibility and added control outweigh the negatives by far.

Seat Position for backing: Take your left hand and put it at twelve o’clock on the steering wheel, swivel your hips around so your back is up against the driver’s door. This pivot starts at the hips not the shoulders. Your right foot still controls the gas and brake pedals so some of you will have to push off the dead pedal on the left floor board with your left foot, especially the vertically challenged individuals. Your right shoulder should be backed up against the door, wedged into the seat back. If you do not have the height to see over the head rest you may have to lean forward to look around it. Your right hand can either post against the passenger seat or my preference is to hold on to my own seat belt buckle which helps to give my upper body support. However, you should never put your right arm around the back of your own seat. Some drivers are tall enough to accomplish this and it may give some support but if an accident happens you risk

The faster the vehicle is going the less wheel turn needs to be input into the steering wheel. At slow speeds a driver may have to turn the wheel just a half turn where at speed a two inch rotation could upset the cars lateral motion quite quickly.

Since the vehicle can be upset so quickly in reverse it is very important to input smooth progressive steering movements and never jerk the wheel in either direction. Our eyes also control where our body goes and in this case where our hand turns the steering wheel. Since our eyes lead the vehicle we need to always look ahead of where we want the vehicle to go.

tearing your shoulder or worse. Due to the pivot or swivel in your hips you now can see much more of your rear window and some of the driver’s side rear window as well. From this point the rear window is now your new windshield and your left hand should stay glued to twelve o’clock on the wheel. If you have to make a full revolution with the steering wheel it is ok to palm the wheel but do not take your hand off the twelve o’clock position. Since once you re-straighten the wheel your hand will still be at twelve and you will know exactly when the vehicle is pointed straight again. Holding your hand position at the twelve o’clock position is very important because knowing when the car is straight is essential especially when backing for any length of time and/or at speed.

The faster the vehicle is going the less wheel turn needs to be input into the steering wheel. At slow speeds a driver may have to turn the wheel just a half turn where at speed a two inch rotation could upset the cars lateral motion quite quickly. Since the vehicle can be upset so quickly in reverse it is very important to input smooth progressive steering movements and never jerk the wheel in either direction. Our eyes also control where our body goes and in this case where our hand turns the steering wheel.

Since our eyes lead the vehicle we need to always look ahead of where we want the vehicle to go. Using mirrors restricts the driver’s visual control, as well as reduces the ability to direct the vehicle with total accuracy. There will always be a blind spot in your mirrors and it takes much too much time to switch between the right and left mirror. I only recommend using side mirrors in reverse for checking possible obstructions on the sides of the vehicle, or for quick measurement purposes. If you cannot see through the rear window in such vehicles as vans, and some police vehicles then you would be forced to use mirrors. However, you better be sure that no one is behind you before you start to move your vehicle. Although police vehicles will have more visual obstructions than an average car this seating position will still work in most patrol cars, trucks and SUVs. Hopefully with correct patrol vehicle set up you will have decent visibility to the rear and this position brings you good results.

About the Author Anthony Ricci is President of ADSI (http://www.1adsi.com)

An IACSP Q&A

With James M. Hawes,

Author of ‘Cold War Navy SEAL: My Story of Che Guevara, War in the Congo, and the Communist Threat to Africa’

J

ames M. Hawes was a U.S. Navy SEAL officer who was assigned to the Navy and CIA’s small boat operations into North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. He later served as a CIA operator in the Congo in 1965-1966.After several years working for the CIA, he attended Harvard and received his MBA in 1971. He settled in Asia and lived there for 34 years, pioneering a variety of business enterprises. He currently lives in San Antonio, Texas.

40

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

James M. Hawes is the author of “Cold War Navy SEAL: My Story of Che Guevara, War in the Congo, and the Communist Threat in Africa.” James Mr. Hawes was interviewed by Paul Davis, a contributing editor to the Journal.

IACSP: Why did you write the book?

Hawes: Several reasons, one being the contributions of the Cubans has never, ever, been recorded, acknowledged or honored.

And I wanted to do that. There are few of them left and I’m the last guy alive who can tell the story. And I’m the last guy who can record what the Cubans contributed. That was a big part of it. Number two, I wanted to thwart the revisionists historians who will try to choose to interpret a lot of these events out of context and in accordance with their prejudices. Now they’ll at least have to deal with a first-hand account.

IACSP: Why did you become a Navy SEAL? Hawes: It was a childhood dream. I loved

Vol. 24, No.1

the challenge. I liked being part of a small, well-trained group. I loved the physical and mental challenge. I didn’t see myself being happy doing anything else.

IACSP: In the beginning of your book you write about your Vietnam experiences as a SEAL. It was early days in the war. Can you tell us about your experiences there?

Hawes: It was very interesting. I was the first officer to go from SEAL Team Two on the East Coast to Vietnam. That was in April, 1964, not long after Defense Secretary McNamara made his visit and came back and assured us all that it will be all over by 1965.

In the course of that visit he had been in Da Nang and he observed what the CIA was doing with their Op Plan 34 Alpha, which was trying to collect intelligence and do harassment in North Vietnam. He certainly didn’t have any understanding of clandestine operations, but for whatever reason, he determined that this was a nice little operation that would be even better if it was a lot bigger. I was a part of the initial team of five people that integrated into Op Plan 34 Alpha in Da Nang in order to take it over on behalf of the Department of Defense. At the same time the entire Study and Observations Group was converted to the Department of Defense.

It became Military Assistance Command Vietnam Special Operations Group and we were Naval Advisers Detachment Da Nang.

That was fascinating to get into the ground floor of that and to work with a legendary CIA paramilitary officer named Tucker Gougelmann. Tucker kind of adopted me and became a mentor. At that time the agency was adapting Vietnamese junks for going north and also the first three swift boats in Vietnam were a part of that fleet and the navy didn’t really have any small boats in those

Ricardo

days. The strategy was for bigger vessels and there was no development for small vessels and the CIA identifies the swift as a good boat for that job, which it was. I took over the first three swifts. .

IACSP: Did the boats have American or South Vietnamese crews?

Hawes: They were Vietnamese crews and captained originally by Norwegians and then Taiwanese and then we took over.

China Beach, which later became the name of a TV program, was our private training area. Stretched out between Monkey and Marple Mountain is where we trained these commando teams for the operations in the north. I was the training officer and the assistant operations officer. It was an unusual job, as it was so secret, it went according to qualifications and not rank. It was interesting trying to figure out ways to do something meaningful in the north with basically meager resources in personnel. I’ll never forget the first time I went into the vault and started reading intelligence and I saw those two dredges at the entrances to Haiphong harbor and read that if those dredges went down, Haiphong would fill up in six weeks. It didn’t take a genius to understand the implications of that for supplies and so forth coming into Haiphong.

So I said let’s go get those dredges. I found out very quickly that we weren’t allowed to touch them.

IACSP: That’s no way to fight a war, in my view.

Hawes: Exactly. The navy not only didn’t have any small boats, we also didn’t have any operations manuals, nothing. So we sort of had to make all that up as we went along.

Jim Hawes

IACSP: What did your group achieve?

Hawes: Apparently we were able to tie up a lot North Vietnamese resources that otherwise would have been used in the south, so that was a good thing. And we were able to do some damage to some of their coastal radars, which presumably helped our pilots doing the bombing.

IACSP: I read in the book that your boats in the north were probably the reason that North Vietnamese gunboats came out and that turned into the incident that resulted in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the expansion of American involvement in the war.

Hawes: We were occasionally successful and I think that just before those events took place we had been successful at getting at some of the coastal radars and we went up and hit the islands in the pathway to Haiphong. That may have alarmed the North Vietnamese and angered them sufficiently so that some idiot officer thought those patrol boats could take on U.S. Navy destroyers.

IACSP: They learned the hard way that they couldn’t. So your Vietnam experience was overseeing small boats that were doing interdiction and harassment, which sort of led to your mission in the Congo, which you served as a CIA contractor. Can you tell us about that?

Hawes: Vietnam gave me small boat experience and training experience. In the Congo I had to train mercenary soldiers on how to be sailors.

IACSP: Can you talk about your mission in the Congo in 1965?

Jock Cassidy

Hawes: The Simba rebellion in the Congo was getting more brutal and the word was beginning to get out about the atrocities that were directed against the missionaries. No one was ever talking about the atrocities against the Congolese, because they were going on all the time. It got to the point where Western governments had to do something. The word got out that a particularly huge event was scheduled for Stanleyville against a bunch of missionaries and locals. The Belgians mounted a paratroop battalion and they were chauffeured in by the U.S. Air Force and they were dropped just in time to save a huge number of people. At the same time the CIA put in a column of Cubans led by a legendary CIA paramilitary officer named Rip Robertson. They went in on the ground and they saved a whole bunch of people. We just had the 50th Commemoration of that in 2014 in Miami.

IACSP: That’s interesting.

Hawes: The only people paying attention to it was the Miami Herald. The people who were saved as children flew from all of the world, from the Congo and elsewhere, flew to Miami to thank their rescuers. The little blonde, blue-eyed girl who appeared on the cover of Paris Match in 1964 was able to meet her rescuer, who she didn’t even know was a Cuban. This was totally ignored, which is why I wrote this book. Somebody has to say something about this.

IACSP: We are.

Hawes: So that event triggered what was called the 303 Committee in Washington, which was made up of George McBundy, Averell Harriman and other high-level national security people in Washington. One of the things they recognized was that supplies and weapons were coming across Lake Tanganyika from Tanzania and those had to be stopped. They needed what they called a “Pocket Coast Guard.” So that was my assignment. To go set up this navy on Lake Tanganyika, recruit and train the mercenaries, direct the operations and interdict the supply of weapons headed towards the rebels in the eastern part of the Congo.

IACSP: And you were a 26-year-old Navy SEAL Lieutenant JG at the time. Amazing. What was Che Guevara doing in the Congo at the time?

Hawes: Western intelligence agencies had no idea where Che was and they were concerned because they knew where ever he was would be a trouble spot. The anti-Castro Cubans came in as my training force, my training cadre, who trained the mercenaries. One night out on the

42

lake we’re monitoring radio traffic and one of the Cubans said he was hearing Cuban. A few days later we got the principal evidence that Castro’s Cubans and Che were there. That added a new level of intensity from the Congo all the way back to Washington. Che Guevara was there in all of his arrogance and ignorance. He thought he was going to somehow motivate the Simbas ideologically. He was just a vainglorious thug who was in love with the concept of revolution.

He was just a killer.

IACSP: Che Guevara was a total failure. He failed as a minister in Cuba. He failed in the Congo and he failed in Bolivia. I find it curious that so many people have this romantic notion of him. And he was a murderer many times over.

I read his Bolivian Diary, but I’ve not yet read his Congo Diary.

Hawes: His African diary validates everything I’ve said in my book.

IACSP: Were the Simbas communists or did Guevara hope to make them communists?

Hawes: That was the joke of it. He was in love with his own image and ideology and the Simbas were, are, and continue to be, only interested in rape, blunder and pillage. But the Soviet bloc was sending increasing numbers of Simbas to Eastern Europe for training and indoctrination. Maybe the indoctrination took with a few, but basically, their motivation was what it has always been; rape, blunder and pillage. As you read in his diary, Che’s Cubans finally said we’ll stay here with you, but we’re all going to die.

The Simbas just don’t care.

IACSP: His failure, would you agree, was largely attributed to your interdiction of his supplies and weapons?

Hawes: He says it in the diary. It became increasingly difficult for him to operate.

IACSP: So you ran his butt out of Africa?

Hawes: Yeah. We can say that.

IACSP: The mercenaries in your story are interesting. What was your impression of Colonel Mike Hoare?

Hawes: Hoare was an educated British officer during WWII. He was an accountant. He was tapped to go to Katanga and he became the head of the five Commando Mercenaries when they were established to combat the Simbas. The CIA chief of station called Hoare a “gentleman adventurer.” He was a rogue, but a loveable rogue, a terrific actor. That was an important

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

part of his role. He was a good soldier and he recognized good soldiering in others. Jock Cassidy and John Peters always said they were in charge of getting Hoare’s share of the loot so he could be the British gentleman above the fray.

He was resentful when I arrived, this kid that was going to take over this navy, but he found out he was not going to intimidate me or get in the way of the mission. We got along just fine.

IACSP: How about Jock Cassidy?

Hawes: He was an up from the streets kind of guy. He had been in the British forces. He was well-trained. He was angry and murderous.

As Hoare’s Sergeant Major, he trained all of the mercenaries. I got Cassidy on my team because he brought with him the files on all of the mercenaries. With his knowledge, we were able to recruit the best of the worst.

IACSP: So you had mercenaries and CubanAmericans under you and the two didn’t mix, right?

Hawes: Not at all. The Cubans were classy, proud, motivated people. They didn’t have anything to with them except on the boats.

IACSP: How did you interdict the supplies and weapons on the river?

Hawes: Lake Tanganyika was 450 miles long and 45 miles wide, making it the second largest body of fresh water in the world. In some places it was 7,000 feet deep. We had swifts, which gave us firepower and speed. All interdiction was done at night, so we couldn’t see anything, but we had radar. We had the equivalent of a Boston Whaler, which we armed with .30 caliber machine guns and shoulder-fired bazookas.

IACSP: Did you board or sink the boats?

Hawes: If they tried to get away, we sank them.

If they didn’t we would board them and tow them over to the mercenaries for interrogation.

IACSP: What do you think of today’s Navy SEALs in the war on terrorism?

Hawes: I think SEALs today are better than we were. They are better trained and equipped.

We were the bastards of the Navy. We were barely tolerated. Now everyone recognizes the contributions made by the SEALs. They are just sensational. But the whole special operations command is over-taxed, as they keep giving them more missions.

IACSP: Thank you for your service and thanks for talking to us.

Vol. 24, No.1

18105 IACSP Homeland Security Ad v1_Layout 1 12/10/13 9:28 AM Page 1

Online Undergraduate, Graduate & Certificate Studies in

Public Safety & Homeland Security Meeting the professional advancement needs of those committed to protecting the public.

Earn your career credentials without job interruption through Fairleigh Dickinson University’s respected online degree and certificate offerings. Established in 1942, FDU is New Jersey’s largest private university with 12,000 students worldwide.

Degree Offerings

• Master of Administrative Science • Master of Science in Homeland Security • Bachelor of Arts in Individualized Studies Certificate Studies Career-relevant programs are available at the graduate and undergraduate level in such areas as terrorism, forensics, global security, disaster and emergency management, transit safety, homeland security, and more. Credits earned can be applied toward the appropriate degree program.

• FDU is proud to participate in the Yellow Ribbon G.I. Education Advancement program enabling eligible veterans to attend FDU at no charge.

• FDU accepts Federal Tuition Assistance (FTA) for undergraduate and graduate courses (restrictions apply).

• No entrance exams required.

For More Information

Undergraduate Programs JoAnna Steiner 201-692-7357 online@fdu.edu

Graduate Programs Ronald E. Calissi 201-692-6522 calissi@fdu.edu

fdu.edu/mas

ALSO AVAILABLE: MASTER OF SPORTS ADMINISTRATION

IACSP Homeland Security Bookshelf

By Dr. Joshua Sinai

This column capsule reviews recent books on various aspects of homeland security, including military capability, and counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

IISS, The Military Balance: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics

T

(New York, NY: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 504 pages, $675.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-8574-3955-7.

44

he annual The Military Balance, which is published by the London-based The International Institute for Strategic Studies, is considered the most authoritative, comprehensive and detailed assessment of the military capabilities and defense economics of 171 countries. It is widely used as an unclassified reference resource by governments’ military and intelligence agencies, as well as academic institutions and public policy research institutes, around the world. The volume is divided into two parts. Part One, “Capabilities, Trends and Economics,� consists of 10 chapters. They cover general topics such as defense and military analysis, comparative defense statistics, and country comparisons and defense data.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

The volume’s primary section, consisting of 471 pages, provides data on the military capabilities in terms of orders of battle (units, formations, and equipment of a military force) and defense economics of the 171 covered countries, which are divided into the seven regions of North America, Europe, Russia and Eurasia, Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The volume’s second part, “References,” provides explanatory notes, definitions, and an index of countries and territories.

In a disappointment to this reviewer, unlike the volume’s previous editions, this one does not include any coverage of terrorist groups, such as al Qaida and the Islamic State, that threaten the global community. In one exception, in the entry on “Palestinian Territories” we are informed that Hamas’s Izzz al-Din-Qassam Brigades consists of 15,000 to 20,000 personnel. (p. 356) The entry on Lebanon, on the other hand, has no mention of Hizballah, with the Taliban also not listed in the entry on Afghanistan. Al Shabaab is not listed in the entry on Somalia (although it does list the militia-unit strengths of Somaliland and Puntland), with Boko Haram also not mentioned in the entry on Nigeria. The only exception is the entry on Syria, which provides the estimated sizes of the insurgent groups in what it terms the “Territory Where the Government Does Not Exercise Effective Control.” (pp. 364-365) With the volume’s entries focusing on the conventional military capabilities of its covered countries, of particular interest to the counterterrorism community is their detailing of their combating terrorism forces. Thus, for example, it details that the United States’ Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) consists of 63,150 active forces and 6,550 civilians (p. 57); France has 3 Special Forces groups (p. 106); Norway’s Army has 2 Special Forces groups and one Naval Special Forces group (p. 134); Sweden has one special operations group and one combat support group (p. 154); the United Kingdom has a large contingent of Royal Navy, Army and RAF Special Forces regiments and squadrons (p. 164); Russia has 554,000 Paramilitary forces, consisting of 40,000-50,000 Federal Guard Service’s forces, and 340,000 National Guard forces (p. 205); China’s paramilitary’s People’s Armed Police consists of 660,000 forces, with the Internal Security Forces consisting of 400,000 forces; India has 1,585,950 Paramilitary forces and 12,00 National Security Guards (p. 265); Israel has 3 Army Special Forces battalions and 1 Special Operations brigade, 300 Naval Commandos, and 8,000 Border Police forces (pp. 340- 342); and that Jordan has 14,000 forces in the Joint Special Operations Command and 15,000 in paramilitary forces such as the Gendarmerie (p. 344) .

Also valuable is the first chapter’s section on “Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and Defence.” It discusses how big-data analysis, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (IA) are providing, “In the military context, the opportunities for remote-sensing, situational awareness, battlefield-manoeuvre and other AI applications [that] seem promising. It remains unclear, however, whether these new technical capabilities will ultimately shift the balance in favour of offensive or defensive actions.” (p. 10) With cyber warfare becoming a crucial component in a country’s military capability, each entry includes a section on its capacity for cyber operations.

Homeland Security/Counterterrorism

Strategic Intelligence Management Babak Akhgar and Simeon Yates, (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2013), 340 pages, $79.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-1240-7191-9.

The contributors to this practitioner-useful edited volume examine the components involved in managing strategic intelligence, with strategic intelligence a crucial component in the formulation and application of a government’s overall national security. Strategic intelligence, as defined in the volume’s introductory overview, consists of six dimensions: assessment (an accurate picture of the situation in an area of responsibility), knowledge (focusing on relevant threats and risks), holistic (ensuring that intelligence covers the full range of internal and external risks and threats and is gathered from the full spectrum of relevant sources), goal driven (based on a collaborative approach), adaptive (sufficiently

flexible to respond to all new and emerging threats), and result oriented (ensuring that specific and measurable targets are set via a performance-driven approach). (page 6) The framework is applied to the volume’s four sections. The first section covers national security strategies and issues, such as responses to an interdependent world, the challenge posed by insider threats, 4th generation asymmetric warfare in the maritime domain, and port and border security, as the first and last line of national security. The second section examines the challenges in responding to various threats such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, the role of community-based policing in national security, the role of utilizing social media in crisis communication, and emerging technologies in expanding state surveillance capabilities. The third section examines the roles of information and knowledge technologies in national security in terms of user requirements and training needs, the nexus of crisis management and knowledge management, upgrading the actions of first responders in a crisis situation, exploiting intelligence for national security, and formulating new requirements for standardization for interagency information sharing. The final section, “Future Threats and Cyber Security,” discusses strategic responses in securing cyberspace, formulating a national cyber defense strategy, the use of cyber operations by terrorists and state actors, cyber security countermeasures in combating cyber terrorism, and developing a model to reduce and/or prevent victimization to cybercrime. These issues are summed up in the concluding chapter, which observes that “In essence, the strategic intelligence management vision for national security is released through connection between national security and national interest, dynamic collaboration among stakeholders, and proactive communication strategies and enabling technologies.” (page 272)

Risk Analysis and the Security Survey [Fourth Edition] James F. Broder and Eugene Tucker, editors, (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2012) 368 pages, $48.97 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-1238-2233-8.

This is a highly useful handbook on the components of risk analysis and the security survey in creating a risk management program. The handbook is divided into two parts. The first part, “The Treatment and Analysis of Risk,” defines and explains issues such as risk, risk analysis, risk assessment and risk exposure assessment; conducting threat and vulnerability assessment; measuring risk and the principles of probability; quantifying the prioritizing gloss potential; conducting a cost/risk analysis, the significance of the security survey and audit techniques; predicting the occurrence of internal and external crime; and the role of risk management in determining insurance requirements. The second part, “Emergency Management and Business Continuity Planning,” discusses the response components of a risk management program. This includes an overview of emergency management, including its mitigation and preparedness components; the components of response planning in terms of plans, teams, and procedures; conducting business impact analysis; planning for business continuity following a crisis event, including formulating a project management plan and documenting it; crisis management planning for threats such as kidnapping and extortion; monitoring and testing protective safeguards; employing in-house or outside security consultants, including writing, costing and evaluating security proposals and reports. The Appendices include security survey work sheets, a sample kidnap and ransom contingency plan template, and security system specifications, with the specifications for an integrated electronic security system provided as an example. The authors are veteran practitioner experts in formulating and managing risk management programs.

Homeland Security: The Essentials [Second Edition] Jane A. Bullock, George D. Haddow, and Damon P. Coppola, (Cambridge, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2018), 438 pages, $99.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-1280-4465-0.

This is a comprehensive and authoritative textbook on the discipline of homeland security in the United States. Its thirteen chapters cover homeland security-related topics such as its conceptual underpinning and how the Department of Homeland Security was established in the aftermath of 9/11; an overview of significant terrorist incidents affecting the United

46

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

Save on the latest books for Security Professionals from CRC Press SIGN UP for our emails to keep the offers coming!

CRC Press is a premier publisher of books on Counterterrorism and Security Management Visit www.crcpress.com to see our complete selection of titles and use promo code THS18 for a 20% discount www.crcpress.com

Sign up for our emails to get more special savings!

States; the spectrum of natural, technological, and man-made hazards challenging homeland security, such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, storm surges, tornadoes, wildfires, landslides, tsunamis, transportation accidents, infrastructure failures, nuclear accidents, chemical and biological agents, and terrorism; the bureaucratic organization of the Department of Homeland Security; homeland security’s intelligence and counterterrorism components; border security, immigration, and customs enforcement; transportation safety and security; cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection; the components of all-hazards emergency response and recovery; mitigation, prevention , and preparedness; the role of crisis communications in disaster response; the role of science and technology in homeland security, such as R&D efforts on preventing the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction; and the future of homeland security. In terms of future threats that challenge homeland security, the authors note that with the automation of the “Internet of things” becoming prevalent in all components of homeland security, “cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare, cyber crime, and other cyber threats” are the “most significant problem facing the nation at the moment.” (p. 394) Thus, with “All of our hardening of perimeters and physical security enhancements will do nothing to prevent deadly attacks if the ability to prevent unauthorized control of such systems and devices is not developed and enabled.” (p. 394) “It is incumbent upon the DHS leadership,” the authors conclude, “to ensure the issue remains elevated and that those in decision making positions are adequately informed in order to properly fund and authorize action.” (p. 394). As a textbook, each chapter consists of an introduction, coverage of the chapter’s topic, a conclusion, key terms, review questions, and references. The authors are partners of Bullock & Haddow LLC, an emergency response management firm in Reston, VA, with extensive collective experience in agencies such as FEMA.

Emergency Response to Domestic Terrorism: How Bureaucracies Reacted to the 995 Oklahoma City Bombing Alethia Cook, (New York, NY: Continuum, 2009), 136 pages, $23.36 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-8264-6265-7.

This is a conceptually innovative theoretically- and empirically-based detailed analysis of how the emergency response community responded to the Oklahoma City terrorist bombing on the morning of April 19, 1995. The author uses a disciplined and structured approach to provide insights into the key challenges faced by the responders, the impacts of bureaucratic structures, networks, and culture on their response activities, and the successful and unsuccessful aspects of the response effort. This framework is applied to the book’s six chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the issues and methods involved in bureaucratic response to disasters. The second chapter presents a summary of the events that unfolded in the first 12 hours after the bombing occurred on 9:02 am. The third chapter, “Emergency Response Challenges,” discusses the literature on emergency response and identifies the challenges that are present across different response events. The fourth chapter, “Response as a Street-Level Phenomenon,” examines the bureaucratic structures, networks, and culture discussed in the literature and how they impacted on the response activities in Oklahoma City. The fifth chapter, “Response Bureaucracies’ Tasks and Goals,” focuses on the emergency response plans that were in place at the time of the bombing incident and how they played out in the participants’ response. The concluding chapter, “Conclusions: Lessons Learned and Reinforced,” provides analysis, accompanied by tables, that provides quantified weights to the author’s findings, such as that “Tasks corresponded well or were somewhat related to expectations,” (p. 84) that many components of the preparation plans were implemented, or in some cases, such as in resource management, “Resources arrived – some requested, some not – in huge numbers and were poorly coordinated.” (p. 88) The author is Associate Professor, Department Chair and Director of Security Studies, at East Carolina University, in Greenville, NC.

Physical Security: 150 Things You Should Know [Second Edition] Lawrence J. Fennelly and Marianna A. Perry, ((Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2016), 204 pages, $55.97 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-1280-9487-7.

This handbook provides a comprehensive and detailed overview of technological systems and trends for managing the physical security requirements of buildings and campuses. The handbook is divided into five parts, with their chapters averaging a page or two in their coverage. The first

48

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

part, “Property Management,” consists of 70 chapters, covering topics such as the elements of physical security, site and target hardening, asset protection, the elements of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (COPTED), video surveillance, the security/protection officers’ checklist, and liability for inadequate security. The second part, “Assessing Risk and Vulnerabilities,” covers topics such as the four D’s of deter, detect, delay, and deny, qualitative and quantitative assessment methods, defense in-depth, designing a security plan, and active shooter/active assailant response. The third part, “Crime and Crime Prevention Techniques,” covers the crime prevention triangle (ability, desire, and opportunity), a checklist on anticipating crime, deterrents, and residential security. The fourth part, “Fire Protection, Emergency Management, and Safety,” covers checklists for fire prevention and suppression, best practices for emergency policies, planning, and training, and what managers need to know. The fifth part, “Emerging Trends,” discusses the impact of the Internet and social media in security, encryption, cyber threats, drones, target hardening, and proactivity (the anticipation of types of problems or incidents and planning to deal with them by implementing preventive countermeasures. The authors, who also relied on contributors for many of the items, are veteran security practitioners and compilers of numerous edited volumes on various aspects of security.

The Corporate Security Professional’s Handbook on Terrorism Edward Halibozek, Andy Jones, and Gerald L. Kovachich, (Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann/Elsevier, 2008), 288 pages, $46.16 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7506-8257-2.

This is a practitioner-oriented comprehensive and detailed handbook on the threat of global terrorism against corporations and its impact on their roles as executives and protectors of their corporate assets. The handbook’s 14 chapters are grouped into three sections. The first section, “The Global World of Terrorism,” provides an overview of terrorism, its perpetrators, and their motivations. The second section, “Establishing and Managing a Corporate Antiterrorism Program,” provides security professionals with the means to implement an antiterrorism security program. This includes determining corporate risks to terrorist attacks, physically securing corporate facilities, emergency planning and implementation, coordinating and planning with antiterrorism agencies, and methods for mitigating terrorist attacks. The final section, “The Future World,” discusses future trends in terrorist warfare and how security professionals can prepare to defend their corporations against such new threats. Written by veteran practitioner experts in corporate security, the volume is filled with numerous insights, such as their observation in the preface that there is an important difference in analyzing terrorism against corporations and their assets and terrorist attacks against government assets because government agencies lack the resources to protect all corporations from terrorism. It is for this reason that “It is up to the corporations themselves to harden themselves against terrorists – essentially, harden the corporate target.” (p. xi) Nevertheless, government agencies can provide threat-based intelligence information to corporations, so corporations and their government counterparts need to establish information-sharing mechanisms to enable corporations to anticipate such threats and harden their vulnerabilities accordingly. The handbook is organized like a textbook, with each chapter consisting of an introduction, a main body of text (with numerous headings), a summary, and references. Despite the handbook’s publication a decade ago, it is recommended as a valuable resource for corporate security professionals for its still relevant approach and methodology.

About the Reviewer Dr. Joshua Sinai is a Senior Analyst at Kiernan Group Holdings (KGH) (www.kiernan.co), a national security/homeland security consulting firm in Alexandria, VA. Dr. Sinai can be reached at: joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1

Advance Your Homeland Security Career

100% ONLINE 100% Online Degree HOMELAND SECURITY Fully accredited, nonprofit brick-and-mortar institution n Ranked by U.S. News among the best universities offering online degrees n

n

Rated by Military Times as one of the Top 5 schools for veterans in the nation

Go.EKU.edu/IACSP

I

859-622-7428

Now Enrolling

!

EKU-15140 HomelandSecuity_IACSP_fullpageAd.indd 1

9/30/15 4:21 PM

BUILD THE SKILLS YOU NEED TO BECOME AN INTELLIGENCE LEADER

AMU ALUM AND VETERAN LINWOOD HARRISON B.A. INTELLIGENCE STUDIES (2013)

At American Military University, we understand what a typical day in the intelligence community involves. The intelligence field is ever-evolving, and that’s why we offer more than 200 informed and career-relevant online degrees and certificates including Intelligence Studies and Intelligence Analysis.

Our degree and certificate programs are respected by the intelligence community and taught by experts – many of whom have real-world IC experience. Apply today and join a global network of like-minded peers and professionals all with one goal in mind: success. To learn more, visit www.PublicSafetyatAMU.com/IACSP Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 24, No.1