HELP 2023-24 Level 3 and 4 Projects

STAFF INDUCTION HANDBOOK

2023-2024

2023-2024

FOREWORD

The Hampton Extended Learning Programme (or HELP for short) is a programme of extended learning open to pupils in the Second Year and above.

Now in its fourteenth year, HELP provides an opportunity for Hamptonians to extend their learning in an academic area of their choice.

There are four levels of HELP:

• Level 1 – Second Year

• Level 2 – Third Year

• Level 3 – Fourth/Fifth Year

• Level 4 – Sixth Form

Hamptonians have an exceptionally wide range of interests, and HELP aims to foster a love of learning for learning’s sake, where pupils can pursue these passions free of curriculum and examination constraints. A pupil completing a HELP project pairs with a teacher supervisor who guides them through the process, providing useful mentoring throughout the research and project-writing phases. This gives Hamptonians an invaluable opportunity to develop research, communication, and organisational skills. The only pre-requisite for completing a HELP project is that the topic must be genuinely outside the curriculum.

I thank Mark Cobb, the School’s Reprographics Technician, for designing and compiling this collection of prize-winning Level 3 and 4 projects from the academic year 2023-24. They represent just a small fraction of the scores of projects Hamptonians submit each year. I also thank the dozens of teachers who, each year, devote their time in supervising their HELP mentees. My final thanks go to all the pupils who see a HELP project through from start to finish; they never cease to amaze their teachers with the level of detail and passion that shines through in their projects. I hope that you enjoy reading these highly impressive pieces of work.

Dr J Flanagan Assistant Head and HELP Coordinator

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS AUSTRIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 19TH CENTURY A SUCCESS?

BY PIERS MARCHANT

(Upper Sixth, HELP Level 4, Supervisor: Mr O Roberts)

To what extent was Austrian foreign policy in the 19th century a success?

By Piers Marchant

The Congress of Vienna, watercolour etching by August Friedrich Andreas Campe

“It’s obvious that one day it will all collapse. It can’t last forever. Try to pump glory into a pig and it will burst in the end.”

Jaroslav Hašek, The Good Soldier Švejk

“The age doesn’t want us any more! This age wants to establish autonomous nation states! People have stopped believing in God. Nationalism is the new religion.”

Joseph Roth, The Radetzky March

Introduction

Over the course of 99 years, from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the beginning of the First World War, the European continent experienced a period of peace previously unknown in its history. International relations entered a new era in which pragmatism, rationalism and material superiority began to trump the antiquated notions of prestige, precedence, and absolutism. The Habsburg Monarchy was situated in the centre of Europe and in the centre of the diplomatic scene. The lands owned by this dynasty had evolved from a collection of distant duchies and kingdoms combined through the familial ties of their rulers in the Middle Ages, into a vast contiguous empire spanning most of central Europe, second in size only to Russia by the end of the Napoleonic wars.

Despite its embarrassment by Napoleon, Austria came out of the wars in a stronger position than before. Indeed, it could be argued that Austria occupied a stronger position than it had occupied for centuries. This is thanks to the successes of the Congress of Vienna, which kept Austria out of any major conflict for 99 years and established an

This 1910 ethnic map shows the many different nationalities scattered across the empire, all of whom were wishing for selfdetermination by 1914.

early system of collective security through Metternich’s balance-of-power vision of Europe. Austria emerged as the dominant power in Central Europe, Italy and Germany, and through a complicated network of alliances managed to keep the Russians submissive, which is by no means an easy feat. Even during its most difficult test in the revolutions of 1848, the Austrian Empire emerged from the crisis remarkably stable and continued its position of dominance in European affairs.

However, this diverse, multicultural empire would quickly be confronted by the forces of the 19th century which came to threaten its very existence. Liberalism, the revolutionary movement and, above all, nationalism rose in popularity throughout the century and challenged the principles underpinning the age-old monarchy. Across the empire, from Lviv to Trieste, national minorities began calling for self-determination and independence. While Germany and Russia had embraced nationalism, Britain liberalism, and France both nationalism and liberalism, Austria was left as the odd-oneout in the great power system that it had helped create. Indeed, after the 1850s Austrian diplomacy, still based on antiquated Metternichian notions, began to look more and more out of date and led to far fewer successes than it once had.

It is important to note that the Habsburg Empire lay at an interstitial point in European geography – that is, it was located between other large power centres. This meant that more than any other power, it was likely to be challenged by a war on two fronts, a strategic challenge which very few countries have historically been able to handle. A country like France, whose “hexagone” was protected on three sides by open water and on another two by mountains, was only required to commit extensive defence to a relatively small area, making it difficult to invade. The Habsburg Monarchy had no such luck, relying solely on the Carpathian Mountains for natural protection against an eastern invader, and with practically no natural defences against an attack from north or south. And while the Carpathians are by no means a small barrier, they do not pose quite the same difficulties as the Alps or the Pyrenees, thus further compounding the problems facing the empire

So overall, can the foreign policy of the Austrian Empire in the 19th century be called a success? To answer this, we must establish what is meant by the term ‘success’. Throughout the century, success for Austria meant the maintenance of Austria’s position as a great power in Europe as a whole, meaning that revolutionary, liberal and nationalist forces would have to be subdued. Success also meant that other great powers e.g., Russia, France, Prussia, did not eclipse Austria in its position at the centre of European affairs.

The story of this empire is therefore one of managed decline and mixed results. We cannot dismiss just how successful Habsburg policy between 1815 and 1853 was, with the effects of the Congress of Vienna not only shaping Austria’s role in the 19th century, but also changing the role of diplomacy in international relations in a revolutionary manner. In addition, a combination of defensive grand strategy and a generally creative foreign policy meant that Habsburg diplomats could maintain Austria’s status as a great power However, as the century wore on, in every diplomatic engagement involving Austria, it began to slip from its ivory tower, and increasingly found itself making

concessions to surrounding powers. Overall, Austrian foreign policy therefore gives us a mixed legacy, a combination of successes and failures.

The Congress of Vienna

From Napoleon’s first surrender at the end of May 1814 to his exile to St Helena after the Battle of Waterloo in July 1815, delegations from all the great powers of Europe (and many minor ones too) met in Vienna to create a new continental system based on the establishment of a balance of power between the various nations intending to avoid war at all costs and uphold the status quo. The congress was chaired by Klemens von Metternich, the Habsburg foreign minister, who would go on to be one of the most consequential men of the 19th century, not just for Austria but for Europe as a whole. Metternich was not Austrian by birth but rather a member of a cosmopolitan Rhenish diplomatic family. Having served in a variety of ambassadorial roles during the Napoleonic Wars, he emerged as the Habsburg foreign minister in 1809. Metternich’s style was reminiscent of the sober rationalism of the enlightenment; he avoided entertaining abstract theories or overtly dogmatic solutions to problems he faced, instead advocating for pragmatic solutions which would ensure stability for all parties involved. Hence, the balance of power system.

At the onset of the congress, it was not certain as to whether such a wide-ranging meeting could achieve its goals, but Metternich succeeded with consummate diplomatic skill in bringing together all the apparently conflicting interests of the victorious powers Metternich’s principles with which he guided the conference were “legitimacy, restoration of the pre-revolutionary status quo, adequate compensation if necessary, and balance of power between the great European states as imperative.” 1

The concept of legitimacy acted primarily as insurance against the potential success of any revolution that may arise in the future and was particularly beneficial to the Austrians. A regime such as the French First Republic was to the other great powers inherently illegitimate, as it had come to power by overthrowing the long-established Capetian monarchy, and did not claim any divine right, operating under revolutionary principles which were anathema to the ruling powers. The Habsburgs, on the other hand, could be considered the great power with the highest legitimacy. They had been emperors of the Holy Roman Empire almost uninterrupted since 1452, and one of only two states with an imperial title, the other being Russia. By asking the delegates at Vienna to uphold legitimate rulers, Metternich was essentially asking for stability, both internal and external, to be the prerequisite for the new European constitution. Europe, ravaged by two decades of war, could hardly refuse.

The most physical manifestation of the legitimacy doctrine came in the form of the Holy Alliance between Austria, Prussia and Russia. A key theme of Austrian diplomacy in this period is the creation of common European causes to distract from Austrian internal or military weakness. Prussia and Russia posed the two biggest threats to Austria, with Prussia having a history of rivalry, particularly under King Frederick the Great, and with the interests of Russia and Austria increasingly clashing over spheres of influence in the 1

Balkans. Metternich’s diplomatic skill allowed him to convince these two powerhouses that the spectre of revolution posed too great of a threat for them to be divided The Holy Alliance was therefore committed to intervention should a European country fall to revolution, “but it also obliged them to act only in concert, in effect giving Austria a theoretical veto over the adventures of its smothering Russian ally” 2 This is the first instance of the creation of a complicated series of alliances that would work in Austria’s favour in the 100 years that followed.

“Restoring the pre-revolutionary status quo” simply meant undoing the damage that the French Republic and later Napoleon had done to Europe. The Ancien Régime was restored in France, with its borders cut down to the size at which they exist today. Napoleonic client kings in the Netherlands, Italy and Spain were deposed and the independence of Switzerland was restored. In this way a conservative, reactionary order was established over Europe, intending to cause further strain on the revolutionary movement to the point of such a rebellion being considered impossible.

The principle of compensation was spearheaded by Metternich to be the primary way to resolve disputes between nations in the new European order, and he demonstrated this with many territorial changes imposed on Austria itself. Austria gave up the territories they had held in the low countries, first inherited from the Burgundian Succession in 1482, as well as a variety of exclaves known as Further Austria (largely just a collection of towns in and around what is now southern Germany). Not only were these territories difficult to manage, being separate from the metropole, but they were also prone to rebellion. By giving them up, the Habsburgs could free themselves from lands that were more trouble than they were worth, and also begin to foster improved relations with the southern German states, perhaps establishing a leadership role with which they could rival Prussia. 3 It also helped further remove the possibility arising of a direct conflict between Austria and France, particularly in the French-speaking Walloon parts of the Austrian Netherlands.

Nonetheless, in the spirit of the conference Austria demanded compensation to maintain the balance of power. This came in the form of northern Italy as Austria took control of Lombardy and Venetia. This would turn out to be one of the most controversial and fateful decisions of the Congress. The Austrian encroachment into Italy coincided with the rise of nationalism in the area. The Kingdom of Sardinia would embrace this ideology (which we will expand upon later) and by the 1850s would pose a serious threat to the Austrian presence in the region, eventually conquering the two provinces. Austrian foreign policy was realigned to centre on the Italian question for more than 40 years after the Congress of Vienna; even in 1866, it was the Italian entry into the war that can be blamed for Austria’s loss to Prussia “The Italian ‘mission’ was to be Austria’s justification in the eyes of Europe 4” While the intrusion of the Habsburgs into Italian affairs certainly gave them more influence, it ultimately proved to be more trouble than it was worth and was perhaps Metternich’s largest blunder at the Congress. He considered

2 “Diplomacy” Henry Kissinger p. 83

3 Kann p. 230

4 “The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918” A.J.P. Taylor p. 40

Italy simply to be a geographic concept and was blind to the forces of nationalism that would come to envelop the region.

Another aim in the acquisition of Lombardy and Venetia was to serve as a buffer zone to protect Austria against threats from the West, namely France. The quest to secure these buffer zones was one of the most vital aims for Metternich, due to Austria’s inherent geopolitical weaknesses in its location in Europe, and its military inferiority compared to the disciplined Prussians and the innumerable Russians. He knew that direct contact with other great powers was more likely to lead to war, as it had done most notably in the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763). Actions such as the establishment of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (to remove itself from France and create a buffer between France and Prussia) therefore make a lot of sense both for the maintenance of Austrian sovereignty and by extension a European balance of power. Other examples include the maintenance of Saxon sovereignty to preserve the buffer between Austria and Prussia, the creation of the autonomous Congress Poland to act as a buffer between all three Eastern powers, and the growing independence of Wallachia and Moldavia, to dissuade Russia from growing its influence in the Balkans. So, while Austrian encroachment into Italy and Germany did bring its fair share of problems, on the other hand, it also kept the challenges to Austrian power on the periphery of the empire, thus keeping the main body more secure for a longer time. 5

The most intricate display of the fashioning of the balance of power was the establishment of the German Confederation. The German question was long-established in European discourse, emerging during the proto-nationalistic Reformation, and this perennial problem arose again in Vienna.

German weakness was in many ways responsible for the success of Napoleon’s conquests. The almost non-existent Holy Roman Empire provided no resistance to the French and Napoleon quickly overran the hundreds of margraviates, principalities and archbishoprics in western and central Germany. A divided Germany tempted its neighbours into expansionism, making it impossible to maintain a balance of power. On the other hand, the prospect of a united Germany terrified all other European states, as they could not imagine being able to stand up against the united resources of a German nation. In the words of Kissinger, “historically, Germany has been either too weak or too strong for the peace of Europe.” 6

Recognizing this, the plenipotentiaries at Vienna crafted the German Confederation. In many ways a more centralised (although still disparate) version of the Holy Roman Empire, the Confederation was composed of only 39 members as opposed to the several hundred of the Holy Roman Empire Led by Austria and Prussia, the main purpose of the Confederation was to serve as a mutual defence bloc to defend Germany from French aggression. By balancing Prussia’s military strength and tradition with Austria’s legitimacy and prestige, it was remarkably successful in achieving this aim. The Confederation also served as a “legitimist” preservation of the rights of its ancestral princes and as a stopgap to further ambitions of German unification; while it lasted it

5

achieved both of these aims too. By forestalling German centralisation, Metternich secured a relatively peaceful Europe, standing for unity rather than union and preventing the premature rise of Prussian hegemony, thereby extending the relevance of the Habsburgs further into the 19th century. 7

Despite their collaboration during the Napoleonic wars and in the Holy Alliance, the beginning of the Austro-Prussian rivalry can be seen in the German Confederation. The Confederation had significant influence over its smaller member states, as it had the right to intervene in domestic crises, and it was a fixed bloc from which secession was ruled illegal Middle Germany essentially became a stomping ground for Austria and Prussia to exert their influence, initiating a German “great game.” Austria was also given the politically meaningless but nonetheless prestigious title of “permanent president” of the Confederation, which further increased the rivalry as Prussia did not want to be seen as secondary. This burgeoning rivalry would increase over the course of the century before coming to a head in 1866.

The German Confederation served as an unusual combination of pragmatism, reactionism and yet also progressivism, rejecting the orthodox nuances of the Holy Roman Empire in favour of a simpler system that ultimately became a conduit of Austrian power 8

The Congress of Vienna marks a stark turning point in the history of diplomacy, as the leaders of Europe “softened the brutal reliance on power by seeking to moderate international conduct by legal and moral bounds.” 9 Metternich designed an early system of collective security (which just so happened to particularly favour Austria.) This served as the genesis for the rules-based system we know today.

Regarding the Congress’ aims, it was largely successful in its overall goal in making a peaceful Europe. Between 1815 and 1914 there were only four short wars between major powers whereas between 1700 and 1790 there had been sixteen 10, a testament to the stability that a balance of power system can bring. The Congress of Vienna gave European statesmen the opportunity to choose peace, should peace be their aim While the Congress system began to break down by the 1850s and 60s, its overall influence on both 19th century politics and on diplomatic theory as a whole is vast.

Metternich fashioned his aims throughout the Congress as Europe-wide aims, but in reality, he was acting on behalf of the Austrians, with stability, legitimism and the status quo which would favour the Habsburgs more than anyone else With the many challenges that the Habsburgs would face in 1848, 1853, 1859, 1866 and beyond, it was Metternich’s skill in fashioning a system favourable to the Habsburgs that kept their empire alive.

7 Kann p. 232

8 Ibid p. 234

9 Kissinger p. 22

10 “The Habsburgs: The Rise and Fall of a World Power” Martyn Rady p. 241

A note on nationalism

The spread of nationalism took hold in the early 19th century as the idea of a unified culture of peoples tied to a state could begin to be spread through the expansion and centralisation of education as well as through the emergence of mass media. The phenomenon became particularly pronounced in divided polities, most notably Italy and Germany, as the peoples there, already considering themselves to be of the same “national culture”, could campaign for the establishment of nation states along the lines of France or Russia in which a predominant national group were in control of the state and the reins of power. In addition, the influence that Napoleon had left on these regions, both of which he had dominated for 15 years, left behind rationalist administrations and the proto-nationalist ideas of the French Revolution which would go on to animate the people into culturing a nationalist feeling 11 Nationalism would prove to be the greatest threat to Austria and would cause its destruction a century later. The Habsburg Empire could not inaccurately be called the “enemy of nations”, as Czech, Hungarian, Serbian, Romanian, Italian and many other nationalists among ethnic groups longed to establish independent nation states. Even the German nationalists despised the empire, believing the German speaking parts should be part of a unified Germany, not the custodian of an antiquated, multiethnic superstate. Other powers like Prussia and Russia had sizeable minority groups, but at least over half of the population spoke the tongue of the ruling class. In Austria, less than a quarter of the inhabitants spoke German as their main language in 1910. The rise of nationalism would be Austria’s perennial and greatest enemy up until the end, and it would mount its first significant challenge in the fateful year of 1848

1848: the brink of destruction

Metternich’s fashioning of a Europe averted to revolution manifested itself in the cultural and artistic movement of the Biedermeier period. The stability brought about by the Congress of Vienna led to economic growth and the expansion of the middle classes throughout Europe and therefore the creation of a socially conservative bourgeois culture focused on the idealisation of family life, the countryside and sensibility, with an overall sense of calm sweeping through the empire Indeed, there were no wars between great powers which could disturb this tranquillity and the congress system held firm, with subsequent congresses being held at Aix-la-Chappelle in 1818, Troppau in 1820, Laibach in 1821 and Verona in 1822. 12

However, beneath the surface, burgeoning political movements such as liberalism and nationalism grew in number, as did the urban working classes who were more desiring of social change than the conservative bourgeoisie. Liberalism in the Austrian Empire did not differ wildly from the mainstream seen in Britain and France – ideas such as freedom of speech and the press, political representation, and the rights of the citizen as an individual were universal – but the regime onto which it attempted to impose itself was

11 Mitchell p. 229

12 “Danubia” Simon Winder p. 319

markedly more authoritarian than its Western European counterparts. 13 Censorship was widespread in the empire, with overzealous bureaucrats prohibiting anything which could be considered even remotely seditious or uncouth, meaning liberal ideas could not spread as effectively, and the lack of elected government meant there would be no “revolution from above ”, as Metternich’s conservatism was unlikely to change. This left only one option for Austria’s liberals – a revolution from below.

It is important, however, not to overstate the ideological causes of the 1848 revolutions. Underwhelming harvests in the 1840s and the spread of the Industrial Revolution caused widespread economic and political unrest as quality of life for the rural peasants and urban working class began to dip, further contributing to the spectre of revolt. 14

For context, the tumultuous overthrowal of Louis Phillippe I in Paris spurred on revolutionary movements in the Habsburg Empire. In Vienna, Metternich, now unpopular both within court and in the overall empire, was forced to resign. Full executive power now lay with the monarch for the first time since Metternich’s rise. Unfortunately, that monarch was Ferdinand I, who, while amiable, suffered from severe epilepsy and a variety of mental conditions, perhaps the legacy of the infamous incestuousness of the earlier Habsburgs. Ferdinand was easily influenced and agreed to all proposals of the liberal coffeehouse masses and German nationalists, likely overwhelmed by the upheaval Metternich was thus succeeded by a series of five liberal noblemen in the space of eight months, demonstrating just how unstable the central government was at this time.

Although Vienna had been saved from a greater bloodshed, the rest of the empire had practically ceased to exist under the control of the Habsburgs. In this manner, the interactions between the rulers in Vienna and the revolting governments in Bohemia, Hungary and Italy can be seen as foreign policy and is therefore particularly relevant to the main question of this essay. It was through the admittedly brutal interventions of three generals that the empire regained its strength after 1848, coming from the brink of collapse to achieving the status of a great power once more.

The Bohemian revolt

In the aftermath of the Viennese revolution, the subnational entities within the empire almost immediately rose in revolt, inspired by the achievements of the nationalists in Vienna. Prague was, by most metrics, the second most important city in the empire, and the Bohemian crownlands had been under Habsburg control since the 16th century. Nonetheless, Czech national feeling, following a renaissance of national consciousness 15 , was at an all-time high in 1848, and nationalists were keen to follow the Hungarian example (which we will discuss later) and develop at the minimum, an autonomous liberal nation-state.

Bohemia was, much like the overall empire, ethnically divided. The Czech majority inhabited the interior of the region and began to exert more influence with the onset of Czech nationalism but was still largely controlled by the significant German minority

13 Rady p. 245

14 https://www.thecollector.com/revolutions-of-1848-anti-monarchism-europe/

15 Taylor p.66

living in the Sudetenland. While these tensions would come to a head most famously and disastrously in 1938, ninety years earlier an apprehensiveness was already brewing.

František Palacký is today remembered as the father of the Czech nation. He led the Czech national revival, and in 1848 he rejected the overtures from the revolutionary liberal German government in Frankfurt to incorporate Bohemia into a new German nation state, instead opening the first pan-Slavic congress on 2nd June in Prague.

Incorporating the Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats and Poles of the empire, the broad aim of the meeting was to rally for increased political autonomy and respect for the Slavic peoples within the Empire, a movement known as Austroslavism that would go on to form the basis of the federalist movement that would emerge at the beginning of the 20th century. However, it was plagued from the beginning by disagreement between the Slavic groups and was ultimately vague and unconvincing in its messaging, as delegates were divided on the extent of their loyalty towards the Habsburg emperor, and this congress ultimately failed to project any power beyond Prague’s walls. 16

However, within the city, the political excitement of the revolution spurred the young radicals to violence, culminating in the Whitsuntide riots of 12th June, pitting Slav against German within the city.

It is here that we must introduce another aspect of the Habsburg longevity: military tradition. While not necessarily renowned in Europe, often being overshadowed by countries like Prussia and France, the Habsburg army had nonetheless produced its fair share of large personalities who could command forces both on the battlefield, and within the tricky political manoeuvrings of the Hofburg 17. One such of these men was General Windischgrätz, the veteran military commander of Bohemia, a German Bohemian and an arch-conservative. During the congress, Windischgrätz had deployed his army close to Prague, ostensibly to keep order, although in reality provoking the nationalists into open revolt. Once the riots commenced, which resulted in the death of his wife, he began a bombardment of the city, with his troops battling their way through the old town until all opposition was crushed on 17th June. The general subsequently abolished all governmental framework in Bohemia, closed the congress and declared martial law, making the country his own personal fiefdom, albeit one that was fiercely loyal to Vienna. 18

This heavy-handed approach is representative of the Imperial army’s lack of aversion to violence and direct military action and would compensate for the impotence of the government in Vienna, even going as far as being responsible for the Empire’s continued existence after the revolution. While the influence of figures such as Windischgrätz came with drawbacks, such as the now permanent lack of desire for constitutional reform within the court, it is undeniable that without him and the other generals who dealt with Italy and Hungary, there would have likely not been an empire at all after 1848.

16 Taylor p.69

17 The Austrian court

18 Rady p. 247-248

The First Italian War of Independence

The second of the three generals responsible for reestablishing Austrian power in 1848 is perhaps the best known of any Austrian military figure – Joseph Radetzky. Of course, he is well known in popular culture not because of any particularly outstanding military victories but because of the celebratory Radetzky March, composed by Johann Strauss in celebration of the old general’s victory at the Battle of Custoza in July 1848, and now part of the established classical music canon.

Nonetheless, the general, born in 1766 and 81 years old by the time of the revolutions, was undoubtedly a shrewd commander and one of Austria’s greatest generals, singlehandedly maintaining a Habsburg presence in Italy.

Much like in Bohemia and Hungary, the Italian revolutionaries were heavily inspired by the success of the revolutionaries in France (although the first successful revolt had actually been in Sicily in January). Rebellions in Milan and Venice forced the Austrian commander in Italy, Radetzky, to retreat and the Italian kingdom of Sardinia declared war soon after, taking up the nationalist mantle.

The Austrian position was all but lost save for one timely aspect of Austrian grand strategy, reliance on fortifications.

The Austrian Empire was always defensively focused; it had acquired its vast array of lands almost exclusively by diplomacy and marriage rather than warfare and whenever it had to go to war it was rarely the aggressor, therefore its fortifications were particularly important. Aaron Wess Mitchell notes that “the fact that Austria faced foes on every side as well as potentially internally while possessing a relatively weak army gave forts greater utility than most states.” 19

Because of their importance in Austrian defence, Austrian military commanders wrote extensively about the use of forts in military strategy. Radetzky wrote that “the purpose of fortifications is to make a defence of the few against an attack by the many possible.” 20

The First Italian War of Independence would prove to be a textbook example of this maxim succeeding.

Perhaps the best illustration of the role forts played in this period in advancing Habsburg political and strategic goals can be seen in the famous quadrilateral fortresses of Italy.

The four fortress towns of Peschiera, Verona, Mantua and Legnano (“the quadrilateral”) had been the primary outlet of Austrian power in Italy since the 18th century and had even posed problems for Napoleon in 1796. These state-of-the-art forts were designed to “keep the French out and the nationalists down” and in 1848 they were hugely successful in the latter 21

It is worth remembering that the Italian nationalists were the only imperial minority completely set on secession from the empire. The independence of the Kingdom of Sardinia, which had embraced the nationalist cause, meant nationalists within the

19 Mitchell p. 241

20

21

Ibid p. 242

Ibid p. 246-247

empire could vocally call upon an outside power to liberate them, knowing that Sardinia would have no reservations.

With this in mind, it is clear the Italians posed a serious threat to both the general Habsburg position in Italy, and also the concern that if they succeeded, copycat revolutions might break out in the not-already-revolting parts of the empire. It was therefore vital that Austria maintained its position in Italy and put the nationalists down.

One of Austria’s general strategies in dealing with the 1848 insurgents was to separate the rebels and deal with the weakest first before moving onto the stronger foes. The stronger forces in Italy and Hungary would be preoccupied with sieging the strong internal fortresses, buying time for the army to deal with the Czechs and other more minor rebels before being freed up to combat the main threats. This strategy was by and large a success and was the main strategic reason Austria survived the revolutionary wave. 22 The success of this strategy can be clearly seen in Italy. After the revolts in Milan and Venice, Radetzky retreated to the safety of the quadrilateral, giving his army the chance to regroup and recover before counterattacking to take back control of Lombardy-Venetia. The Italian armies had no chance of taking control of all four forts, which were well equipped with up-to-date weaponry, as they were not backed by a foreign power such as France, although they did take control of Peschiera. Once Radetzky counterattacked at the Battle of Custoza on July 24th, he was able to defeat a numerically superior Italian army, showing the strength of the quadrilateral in maintaining Habsburg presence in Italy. Indeed, Austria would only be pushed back from Italy in 1866 due to diplomatic failure, not due to military defeat.

With the Italian forces crushed, Radetzky and Windischgrätz could turn East and South respectively to help deal with the largest threat of all, the Hungarians.

A Hungarian Rhapsody

As part of the widespread instability in the wake of the revolt in Vienna, Hungarian liberal and nationalist revolutionaries, who had conducted an uprising in Pest were granted a constitution by Ferdinand in April 1848. These “April laws” established a separate Hungarian government responsible for the entire administration of the Kingdom of Hungary including financial and foreign policy. Whilst the emperor and his advisors hopelessly insisted on an inseparable bond between Austria and Hungary, this existed in name only, and by April Hungary was de facto an independent nation, exercising its independence by refusing to assist Austria in pushing back the Italians. Half of the empire had disintegrated on the emperor’s pen stroke.

However, for the same reason that Hungary had risen up in the first place, nationalism was also an inherent weakness in the burgeoning state. In 1848, Hungary administered far more land than they do today, which meant significant Slovak, Serb, Romanian and German minorities came under the administration of the Hungarian nationalists. None of these ethnic groups preferred the openly nationalist Hungarian government to the blatantly multiethnic Austrian Empire, and many had nationalist movements of their own which then came into conflict with the irredentist Hungarians, thus weakening the 22 Mitchell

internal position of the revolutionaries from the offset with a second, racial war against the Serbs, Romanians etc. ensuing at the same time as the war to maintain their independence. 23 This nationalist infighting only served to strengthen the Habsburg army, in reality the only consistent governing force in this period. 24

Nonetheless, with the immediacy of the revolts in Bohemia and Italy, the Habsburg generals were resigned to relying on the fortresses in Hungary to buy time. To the credit of the fortification system this worked, with the fortress at Arad holding out for 270 days and the one in Timişoara for 59 days, furthering Habsburg strength. 25

It is here that we must introduce the third of the three generals mentioned earlier, that being Josip Jelačić As the Ban 26of Croatia he had witnessed an increasingly nationalist Hungarian administration begin to assert itself by enforcing the establishment of the Hungarian language as the official language of the kingdom and became increasingly devoted to Croat nationalism and the preservation of Croat culture. Despite this, he was a loyal Habsburg citizen, high up in the chain of command. This may seem unusual due to his nationalist leanings, but it is worth noting that he did not wish for autonomy from the entire Empire but merely autonomy from Hungary, content to be under the rule of the Habsburgs as an equal to the Hungarians. This type of nationalism was far more palatable to the Habsburg authorities, as it contributed to the image they were trying to build of the empire as a pan-European state, and they encouraged it through methods such as the promotion of Jelačić.

The first sign of conflict between the Habsburg army and the Hungarian state came in September of 1848 and it was over the issue of Croatia. The new Hungarian Diet 27 had abolished the region’s already marginal autonomy and subsumed it into the Hungarian lands while at the same time the administrators in Vienna and the Croatian Diet itself still believed in its existence. The restoration of Jelačić to his office on September 4 “was an open declaration of war with Hungary” 28, and he began his invasion a week later. It is here that the facets of Habsburg grand strategy: a strong military tradition, wellequipped fortifications, and a “divide-and-conquer” mindset, converge, resulting in the total destruction of the Hungarian revolutionaries. Windischgrätz and Radetzky met up with Jelačić’s army, which had been routed by the Hungarians, outside of Vienna. The imperial capital had been in a state of upheaval since Metternich’s overthrowal, and the student revolutionaries, sympathising with the Hungarians, began a full-scale uprising against the generals on 26 October, invading the war ministry and lynching the Minister for War, Count Latour. This provided the generals all the incentive they needed to regain control, with Windischgrätz subjecting the city to his tried and tested tactic of artillery barrage. By 30 October, all resistance had been crushed, and the generals were again in control of Vienna. It is here that Windischgrätz’s conservatism comes into play, as he abhorred Ferdinand’s liberal streak. The triumvirate agreed, with the cooperation

25

26

of the new minister-president Felix zu Schwarzenberg and Archduchess Sophie, to force Ferdinand to abdicate in favour of his 18-year-old nephew Franz Joseph. This momentous decision would decide the fate of the Habsburg empire, as Franz Joseph would go on to rule for nearly 68 years, a rule characterised by reactionism, resisting constitutionalism and much needed internal reforms to hold back the tide of nationalism. 29

The final blow to the Hungarian revolution was the sound of 200000 Russian troops marching across the border in early 1849. Franz Joseph had called upon the Holy Alliance and Tsar Nicholas, somewhat bizarrely unaffected by the revolutionary wave, answered, agreeing to help put down the revolution. 30

The Hungarian armies had their fair share of victories against the Habsburg army in late 1848 and early 1849, but none were decisive, and the Russian intervention meant that by August, the Hungarian army officially surrendered at the town of Világos (now Şiria), thus ending the revolutions of 1848.

Reflections on the brink of destruction

On the surface, the revolutions of 1848 look like a failure of the Metternich system. After all, one of the key aims of the Congress of Vienna was to fashion a system which would systematically put down any revolution and yet in 1848 the governments of France, Austria, Hungary, Denmark and several German and Italian states were rocked by the revolutionary waves and in some instances completely replaced. It could be argued that Metternich’s favouring of legitimacy and conservatism had completely fallen apart.

However, despite the tempestuousness and bloodshed of the years 1848-1849, were there any substantial liberal or nationalist gains? In the case of the Habsburg Empire, it is hard to argue that there were. The revolutionary governments in Vienna established between March and November had been unabashed failures, and the sympathetic Ferdinand had been replaced by the conservative Franz Joseph. By the middle of 1849, Austria projected the Metternichian ideals of legitimacy and the status quo more strongly than it had done since Ferdinand first took the throne in 1835.

And to what extent had the balance of power in Europe been disturbed? Despite the upheaval there were remarkably few border changes in 1848. France had undergone a significant revolution, but the foreign policy of the Second French Republic did not resemble the expansionist ideological fervour of the First Republic of the 1790s. The attempt to unify the German states had been thwarted largely because of infighting about what a German Empire would look like. Italy was still fractured as Sardinia’s bolt for national leadership had been defeated by Radetzky. Meanwhile Austria, despite being fractured and practically dissolved for a year and a half, had regained its rebelling territories and its previous position of power. It cannot be argued that the balance-ofpower system had fallen apart.

So, while 1848 was undoubtedly a challenge to the Metternich system it was not fatal to it. Indeed, the greatest measure of Metternich’s legacy can be seen in what did not

29 Rady p. 252-253

30 Mitchell p.253

happen during this period. None of Metternich’s fears (renewed conflict with France, the overrunning of Europe by revolutionary forces, the accession of Prussia to a predominant position in Germany) came to pass. The only fear that could be said to have been realised was the incursion of Russia into Austrian territory, but this was at the behest of the Austrian Emperor and under the Metternichian guise of the Holy Alliance. Russia could not claim a position of overwhelming superiority here as in the mind of Franz Joseph, Russia was simply doing Austria a service in the name of cooperation. 31

Austria would survive the next 70 years as a great power, with 1848 being its most frightening test up until 1914, but the second half of the century would nonetheless see Austria’s decline and eventual eclipse in the European arena

The perils of neutrality

The position of the Austrian Empire in the Crimean war remains one of the most interesting tales of neutrality from the 19th century. Torn between self-interest and loyalty, Vienna opted for an uncomfortable compromise that, whilst not totally inept, helped set the stage for the great disasters over the following decade.

The “Eastern Question” developed in European diplomatic discourse in the 19th century to deal with the status of the ailing Ottoman Empire, stagnant since the middle of the 18th century. “The sick man of Europe” could no longer effectively fight for itself and its fate was due to be decided by the surrogates of the great power system.

Russia was the great power who could potentially benefit most from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, as the Ottomans still had control of most of the Balkans, from Bosnia to Thrace. Russia had already gone to war with the Ottomans in 1828, ostensibly to support the Greeks in their war of independence, but in the process gaining control of the Danube delta and pushing the Turks out of the Sea of Azov, and the Caucasus. Now in 1853 Russian strategy hinged on total dominance of the Balkans, even the potential occupation of Istanbul, hoping to open up the strategic chokepoint of the Dardanelles so that Russia could finally have access to a warm water port with direct access to the main trade routes in the Mediterranean

It is already possible to see the significant problems Austria faced during this crisis. Had it been the 18th century, Russia would have likely invaded the Ottoman Empire under the justification of Raison d’État and no one would intervene (as no country would feasibly ally the Ottomans). However, under Metternich’s system (who was still alive at this point, having returned to Vienna in 1849), this justification would not suffice, as it would cause an untenable destabilisation of the balance-of-power, making Russia far too powerful for such a system. This was in the minds of Great Britain, France and Sardinia when they decided on intervention in the conflict. This was also on Austria’s mind, but it was a significantly harder situation to manage due to the Holy Alliance. When Russia helped Austria put down the Hungarians in 1849, the Habsburgs were considered in debt to the Romanovs and during the Crimean Crisis, Tsar Nicholas I expected unconditional Austrian support.

31 Ibid p. 255

Looking back at the Congress of Vienna and the buffer zones created to bolster the Austrian position in Europe, we can see these areas coming increasingly under threat as the 19th century wore on. Congress Poland, originally designed as a highly autonomous organ of the Russian Empire, had lost its autonomy after an uprising in 1830, and in 1853, in the lead-up to the Crimean war, Russia occupied the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which make up part of modern-day Romania. This created numerous problems for Austria. On the one hand it effectively doubled the already overstretched border zone between Austria and Russia, and it gave Russia control over the mouth of the Danube River, vital for Austrian trade and unity. In addition, by the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was effectively a buffer state for Austria too, as it stopped independent nationalist states such as Serbia or Bulgaria from being established which would inevitably be formed under the Russian pan-Slavic influence 32 The Austrian policy was therefore to avoid war and avoid siding with anyone at all costs. Fighting against the Russians would mean the main theatre of war would move to the Austrian province of Galicia, undoubtedly the worst-case scenario, but fighting alongside with the Russians would mean alienating the Western powers and fighting for Russian dominance in the Balkans. Peace was the only strategy that left Austria stable.

Despite Austrian attempts at mediation, relations quickly broke down and by October 1853 war had been declared. Austria continued to negotiate with the Russians, suggesting that a limited war with no change of territory would be sufficient for Austrian neutrality but Nicholas would not sacrifice his aims. Thus, the Austrians looked West, and diplomatically supported the French and British for the remainder of the war, in the meantime occupying the Danubian principalities once Russia withdrew in 1854. However, Austria’s prevarication and lack of commitment to a war which would almost certainly have bankrupted it meant that the West did not see Austria as anything more than an unreliable, oppressive and antiquated regime. Thus, the Austrians were friendless at the Congress of Paris in 1856, which concluded the war

The position of not taking a side thereby making everyone dislike you is a classic political blunder but in the case of Austria in the Crimean War it is even today difficult to decisively advocate for Austria having taken either side. A. J. P. Taylor saw alignment with the West as the only sensible option, since geopolitically speaking it would have neutered Russia’s advance into the Austrian sphere of influence in the Balkans and given Austria a stable foundation for a realignment with the Western powers, who were in the midst of the Industrial Revolution and an economic boom. While a war in Galicia was not in Austria’s best interests, if it was fought in 1853 it would have been in far more favourable circumstances than it was eventually fought in 1914. 33 However, such a course would invariably have resulted in a need for liberalisation in the Habsburg Empire, and the unwavering Western support for Italian unification would have meant Austria giving up Lombardy and Venetia, two of the Empire’s richest provinces. In addition, liberalisation was simply anathema to the young Franz Joseph, adamant on remaining as an autocrat.

32 Mitchell p.269

33 Taylor p. 91-92

On the other hand, the argument for alignment with Russia is even more preposterous Although Russia was prepared to divide the Balkans into direct Austrian and Russian spheres of influence, this would not have been particularly useful to Austria as with its already tenuous multi-ethnic nature, further expansion would hardly have helped. The status quo with the Ottoman buffer was a more stable situation. In addition, the gains Russia would have made would have meant Austria’s ultimate eclipse in the region and it is difficult to see an alliance between the two lasting more than a few years. While Austria and Russia could be friends everywhere else, in the East, they were enemies. In addition, Austria would have alienated itself from the other great powers even more than it did in its canonical course of action.

So, while Austria sat friendless at the Congress of Paris, there was nonetheless a silver lining for the Habsburgs. Firstly, the fact that the outcome of the war was being decided at a Vienna-esque conference is surely an indication of the lasting legacy of the Metternich system, as all the outstanding issues surrounding the conflict were resolved in a single congress and a single treaty. There would be no other war involving more than two great powers until 1914 However, as a whole, the experience of the Crimean War had fundamentally shifted European diplomacy for the first time since the Congress of Vienna, as the shared values created by Metternich in 1815 began to be replaced by the power politics that would culminate in the First World War.

This would prove to be catastrophic for Austria, who because of the Crimean War had to sacrifice the self-restraining Holy Alliance, liberating Russia and Prussia to pursue their own undiluted national interests. The principle of legitimacy, which had guided Europe for 40 years, was being challenged by upstart leaders like Napoleon III and Bismarck and the concept of the unity of conservative interests had thereby disintegrated. Henceforth diplomacy would rely more on naked power than on shared values. 34

But for now, Austria was stable and had not sacrificed its positions in Italy, Germany or the Balkans, nor had any of its buffer states been compromised. Perhaps that was enough.

The Second Italian War of Independence

Despite its castigation in 1848, Italian nationalist ambitions for unification were not hampered. 11 years later, the Kingdom of Sardinia would take its second shot against the Habsburg Empire, this time with far more success.

The Austrian position in Italy while intended as both compensation and a secure buffer zone for Austria at the Congress of Vienna, had actually placed the empire in the position of administering a security liability and source of conflict rather than “an intermediary body to act as a shock absorber in Great Power politics.” 35 While Lombardy and Venetia were undoubtedly some of the richest provinces of the empire, by the 1850s, Austria was collecting a quarter of the empire’s tax revenue from the Italian

34 Kissinger, p. 94

35 Mitchell, p. 262

lands alone 36 , they were consistently the most under-threat areas of the empire and the people there were completely resigned to refusing accommodation with Austria.

In addition, the aim of the territories to act as a buffer became less convincing as the century progressed, as it became clear that France would no longer pose a similar threat to during Napoleon’s rule. This meant that the Italian population, who had previously been more afraid of France due to centuries of French incursions, now became more wary of Austria, further adding to the issues in the region. 37

Thus the events in 1859 represented the first of the two-part Austrian defeat in Italy Diplomatically isolated, there was nothing to dissuade the French emperor Napoleon III, a virulent supporter of Italian unification since his youth, to urge the Sardinians into mobilisation. Austria actually initiated the war by sending an ultimatum (just as they would do with even more disastrous results 55 years later) demanding that Sardinia disengage, which was promptly ignored. Unfortunately for Austria, which economically lagged far behind the industrialising French, there was practically no hope for the Habsburg army aside from the prospect of a quick circuitous victory, much as Radetzky had achieved in similar circumstances in 1848. However, a quick look at military spending in this period shows the Austrian inferiority, as combined French-Italian spending was 2.5 times more than Austrian 38As a result, the war lasted only a little more than 2 months, with the only major battle being the Battle of Solferino In the Armistice of Villafranca Austria was forced to cede Lombardy, although they obstinately refused to hand it to Sardinia, instead ceding to France who subsequently handed it to the Italians two days later. Sardinia also gained control over the duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Modena which had previously been under Habsburg domination.

The novel The Radetzky March, written in 1932 by the Jewish-Austrian author Joseph Roth, is an allegory for the decline and fall of the Austrian Empire, as it follows three generations of the Austrian bourgeoisie. It is telling that the novel begins in 1859 at the Battle of Solferino, indicating the belief that this was the beginning of Austria’s decisive and ultimate fall.

The Brothers War

Austria’s relations with Prussia in the 19th century arguably went through the largest variation of any of Austria’s foreign relations. Emerging from a particularly violent rivalry in the 18th century, the two states were forced into an uneasy alliance because of Napoleon’s threat. However, as we have seen, at the Congress of Vienna, Metternich sought to curb Prussia’s rise to the top. While Prussia did receive much of the economically bounteous Rhineland, this was separated from the main body of the state and the kingdom as a whole was confined within the German Confederation which was expressly designed to promote German unity (against foreign aggressors) but forestall German union. In these aims it was largely successful.

36

37 Mitchell, p. 263

38 Mitchell, p. 281

Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in 1866. p. 47

Prussia and Austria were also aligned under the auspices of the Holy Alliance, which among other things was designed to inhibit Prussia’s ambitions through the Austrian promotion of collective security. However, by the 1860s this alliance had broken down, and it is at this point that Otto von Bismarck enters the scene.

Bismarck first came to a national prominence as Minister President of Prussia in 1862, having spent the last 14 years as a conservative opponent to the German liberal strain that rose up in revolution in 1848. Despite his conservatism, he was a revolutionary on the diplomatic scene, being an avowed opponent of the Metternich system which he (rightly) interpreted as hindering Prussia from pursuing its national mission of unifying all Germans. Bismarck developed the theory of Realpolitik, essentially a return to the power politics of the 18th century relying solely on the consideration of national interest in international conduct. Since that point, international relations theory developed into two major schools of thought: the liberal school (somewhat ironically developed from Metternich’s system), and the realist school (developed from the theories of Raison d’État and subsequently Realpolitik 39

It is therefore easy to see how the Austro-Prussian rivalry developed over time. Bismarck is quoted as saying “Germany is too small for the two of us … Austria is the only state against which we can make a permanent gain” 40 (i.e. control of Germany as a whole.) Within five years of his appointment as minister-president, he severed Austria from its historical position in Germany, sending the empire to a second-rate position in Europe.

The Austro-Prussian war was undoubtedly the most tragic event of the 19th century for the Habsburg Empire and spelled its downfall as a nation. After just eight short weeks Prussia defeated the Austrian-led faction of the German Confederation, with the key moment being the Battle of Königgrätz in July 1866. In addition, Bismarck demonstrated his commitment to Realpolitik by allying with the Italians, who shared Prussia’s national interest in wanting to take something from Austria. At the Treaty of Vienna, the province of Venetia was ceded to Italy and Austria’s “Italian mission” was fundamentally destroyed.

Bismarck conceded a liberal peace to Austria, largely because he did not want to ensure permanent Austrian hostility and drive them to rapprochement with France or Russia. Nonetheless this included Austria’s total exclusion from German affairs and the dissolution of the German Confederation, which had always been a tool for Austrian power. Despite his leniency, Bismarck had destroyed Austria’s “German mission” too, leaving the empire in a state of stasis and decline.

In less than twenty years, Franz Joseph and his advisors had lost Lombardy, Venice and the German Confederation. The Austrian Empire had shrunk back into Central Europe and would largely stay there until its demise in 1918. The Metternich system had been replaced and by extension any conduit for Austrian power. 41

39 Kissinger p. 121-122

40 Ibid p. 133

41 Rady p.263

Conclusion

After its humiliation to Prussia in 1866, Austria would also have an internal Hungarian crisis to deal with a year later. Seizing upon a moment of Austrian weakness, Hungarian officials declared a tax strike and there were rumours of insurrection. The Habsburg rulers had no choice but to yield to a compromise. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 separated the Kingdom of Hungary from the Austrian Empire, with the only enforced cooperation between the two states being in the realms of diplomacy and defence. While the two halves were still considered “inseparable and indivisible”, in most respects they were independent of each other, including everything from separate coronations of the emperor to athletes at the Olympic Games competing separately. The simple majesty of the Austrian Empire was gone; it was now known as the awkwardly named Austro-Hungarian empire. 42 This entity would drudge on for another 51 years, most of them with Franz Joseph at the helm. While the empire would maintain a prominent role in European diplomacy, even gaining territory through the acquisition of Bosnia in 1878, it would never regain the dominant role it held in the first half of the century and would ultimately succumb to the brutality of nationalism and Realpolitik in the First World War.

How then can we assess the success of the foreign policy of the Austrian Empire in the 19th century? Let us start by looking favourably. The Congress of Vienna was an unbridled success for the Habsburg Empire and created the mechanisms which were to secure a primary position for Austria among the great powers of Europe in the 19th century. Metternich designed a system based on alliance networks, collective ideals and security all to Austria’s benefit. Not only did this system arguably make the 19th century the most peaceful century (at least for Europe) in recorded history, its influence on the practice of diplomacy can still be felt today, as collective security is today remarkably significant, with organisations like NATO purposefully dedicated to it. In addition, other Austrian practices such as its defensive policies, and their attempts to subjugate nationalists certainly allowed it to extend its lifespan into the 20th century.

However, the middle of the 19th century presented some undeniably catastrophic failures in Austrian diplomacy The most severe failure was its isolation among the great powers, largely created by the Crimean war. With the support of Russia or Prussia, the 1859 crisis could have looked very different, and the support of Russia, or even Great Britain (usually aloof from European affairs, but not resolutely against being involved) could have averted the disaster in 1866, resulting in the maintenance of Austria’s position in Europe. It is this inflexibility in diplomacy that can be blamed most for the loss of Austria’s primary position in Europe. In the end, it was forced out of Italy, lost its position in Germany to Prussia, and even had to concede internally to Hungarian pressure, making the Austro-Hungarian empire a shell of its former self. 43

The Austrian empire is so fascinating because of its ability to respond to its enemies despite all odds (we see this in 1848) and despite constantly seeming on the verge of collapse, to always pull through. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that the final end of

42 Rady p. 266

43 Mitchell p. 302-303

the Empire in 1918 was because of a long and managed decline rather than a swift overthrowal such as what could have occurred in 1848 or in 1866 had Bismarck wished for it. The Habsburg Empire was a bizarre aberration of a world power: a monarchy of a made-up Empire, a multicultural powerhouse whose strengths were also its greatest weaknesses, a state that lost war after war but somehow managed to resurface each time. Even its decline in the 1800s was postponed to the second half of the century. If we return to the concept of an interstitial power posited in the introduction, it is difficult to see in many cases how Habsburg conduct in the 19th century could have been improved. The Austrian dissolution seemed a foregone conclusion in 1812, 1848, 1859 and 1866, but it survived each of these crises until its final fall in 1918. Perhaps this is its greatest success.

(Final word count 9601 words)

Bibliography:

• Wess Mitchell, Aaron The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018

• Rady, Martyn. The Habsburgs: The Rise and Fall of a World Power. London: Penguin Random House, 2020

• Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994

• Winder, Simon. Danubia: A Personal History of Habsburg Europe. London: Picador, 2013

• Taylor, Alan John Percivale. The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948

• Kann, Robert Adolf. A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980

AN EXPLORATION INTO CONCEPTS

AND APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)

BY AVI BHATT

(Fifth Year, HELP Level 3, Supervisor: Mrs T Scorer)

An Explora�on into Concepts and Applica�ons of Ar�ficial Intelligence (AI)

By Avi Bhat

Level 3 HELP Project

Supervisor: Mrs. Scorer

1.1 Introduc�on

Ar�ficial Intelligence (AI) is a term for any computer system given human-like intelligence. It is currently shaping the future of computer science and almost every aspect of our lives, anywhere from in finance to engineering to health to crea�ve wri�ng.

This project aims to give the reader a comprehensive understanding of what will almost certainly play a significant role in their lives, regardless of who they are and whether they realise it or not.

Some vital AI terminology:

 Machine Learning (ML) – A subset of AI in which computers learn from experiences without explicit human instruc�on. This involves looking at data, recognising pa�erns, and applying pa�erns to predict new data.

 Deep Learning – A subset of ML where learning is completed by algorithms called neural networks, that mimic the human brain.

 Model – The algorithm that is responsible for how the computer learns. There are several different types of models, and they all have different applica�ons where they give different levels of success; they can be simple or complex.

1.2 Some Applica�ons of AI

All forms of AI can be split into three parts:

 Weak AI (aka Ar�ficial Narrow Intelligence) – Ar�ficial Intelligence that enables a computer to carry out a specific task. This accounts for all AI applica�ons that exist now, including but not limited to:

- Trend Forecas�ng, that can be used to predict anything from investment pa�erns to success of new medicine to future effects of climate change.

- Recommenda�on Algorithms that are used in almost every service-offering online pla�orm, including Google Search, YouTube, Amazon, Ne�lix, Instagram, Facebook, Spo�fy…the list goes on.

- Automa�ng Tasks e.g., recognising when sales for an online store are low, and then pu�ng appropriate items on sale

- Op�misa�on algorithms that look for the most efficient solu�ons to problems, such as the best business strategy or the best city design to reduce traffic.

- Genera�ve AI that can create mediums such as text (literature), images (artwork), and sound (music).

- Cybersecurity using AI to protect computers and users, to recognise characteris�cs of malware/ scam emails so following necessary ac�ons can occur.

- Informa�on Retrieval (IR) Systems that organise, store, retrieve and evaluate informa�on in a computer and require AI at each step – this includes search engines.

- Chatbots that allow users to navigate websites through standard English dialogue.

- Voice Assistants that are trained to carry out ac�ons verbally, such as Alexa, Siri, Bixby, Google Home, Cortana, etc…

- Game Development from crea�ng constantly different levels to making complex game bots that mimic a real human player.

- Image Recogni�on, used for conver�ng handwri�ng to computer text, and comple�ng facial recogni�on whilst accessing smartphones and laptops.

- Cruise Control and Autopilot features in several road vehicles.

- Natural Language Processing (NLP) – AI that involves computers interpre�ng human language, used in chatbots, voice assistants, translators, spellcheckers.

Above shows some men�oned AI uses, as follows (listed le� to right, top to bo�om): chatbots, chess bots, city planning, cybersecurity, Spo�fy, generated art, Amazon Alexa, Instagram

 Ar�ficial General Intelligence (AGI) – Ar�ficial Intelligence that results in computers having general human-like thinking, across any field. This has not been achieved yet, but two examples are not far off:

- IBM Watson is a ques�on answering computer system, that a�empts to answer ques�ons posed in English across any topic.

- ChatGPT is also a ques�on answering computer system, but can generate content and has generally greater understanding accuracy than IBM Watson.

 Ar�ficial Super Intelligence – AI that means computer systems/ machines have greater than human intelligence. This certainly does not exist yet, and has been idolised by science fic�on as a means for ‘the end of the human race’ through some unstoppable evil machine. Whilst mainly unreasonable, concerns are rooted in the vast future poten�al of AI.

1.3 The Simple Process

All Ar�ficial Intelligence applica�ons are slightly different, yet they require the same basic process as follows:

1. Training from the data. Models in AI learn by viewing ‘training’ data and recognising the paterns in it. The model remembers the paterns it has viewed.

2. Tes�ng the data. The model is then shown new pieces of unseen ‘tes�ng’ data, which are close matches to the training data By applying the paterns it previously analysed to the new data, it can make a predic�on for what to do with the new data.

3. Humans improving the model based on how accurate the model’s predic�ons were.

For example, a chatbot is being designed so that it can help visitors to a website’s homepage. The model that the chatbot uses must first be trained. Therefore, the model is shown examples of frequently asked ques�ons, and the correct response:

NB: This would be several entries long.

And a�er recognising the paterns in the training data it can then be tested to see if it learned the paterns correctly:

The model must use the paterns it learnt to predict what the outcomes of the tes�ng data are. It makes its predic�ons before the answers to the tes�ng data are revealed:

The accuracy of the model’s results can then be calculated, and the model improved to get beter results.

Addi�onal points:

• The original data is normally found as one part. It is then split into training and tes�ng data, where the model sees all the training data but only the tes�ng data inputs. Programmers control this split, normally le�ng 70% of the data go for training and 30% for tes�ng.

• Some�mes, the data can be split into three categories, with an extra valida�on data category. This is like tes�ng data, but the accuracy of the model is only noted by the computer, so it can ‘learn from its mistakes’. Valida�on data is not used to evaluate the model by humans; it is just another way of the model learning.

• Above, supervised training was carried out, where the model was shown some correct input and output data with assigned labels. Different models can be used for unsupervised training, where the model is not told about exis�ng data rela�onships.

Models are fundamental to AI and knowing when to use which one(s) is important.

Image source: htps://editor.analy�csvidhya.com/uploads/375512.jpg

2.1 Introduc�on

Linear regression is a ML model. It is widely used in explaining why things occurred, predic�ng future values, and deciding which future approaches are best for different situa�ons. Understanding it also reveals many fundamental concepts within more complex models. Before reading this, it is important to know how equa�ons of straight lines are represented (y=mx+c).

Linear regression operates using a line of best fit, that aligns to exis�ng data represented on a graph, before being used to predict unknown values. This approach is some�mes carried out manually in sciences (see below), but a computer has no error in best fi�ng a line to match data and can return predicted values faster.

Sec�on 2: Linear Regression

2.2 How to fit a line to data

Once the computer has received tes�ng data, it must find the line that best represents this data, in a decisive way (unlike the subjec�ve manual method). This is done using a cost func�on; the func�on returns the op�mum gradient and y-intercept for the best fit line. The ‘Mean Squared Error ’ (MSE) cost func�on is widely used for this:

• Errors (aka residuals) of data are the distances between points and their predicted values:

• The MSE func�on takes the error for a data point, squares it (to make sure there are no nega�ve errors), and repeats for all data points.

• It then divides this sum by the number of data points, leaving the average squared error for the data.

Mathema�cally, the MSE func�on can be shown as:

Error (actual – predicted)

Mean

Squared

Minimising this value will mean that on average, the squared error for each data point is smaller, and therefore the error produced by the en�re line is smaller. So, various posi�ons of the best fit line are tried, and the one that produces the smallest MSE is the true line of best fit:

2.3a Evalua�ng the model – RMSE and RSE

The simplest way of evalua�ng how well the model (complete with its true best fit line) would work is to find the square root of the MSE func�on for its line. Intui�vely, this is called the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE).

However, it has limita�ons because different datasets have different units:

Clearly, a normalised measurement is needed, that is consistent with mul�ple units. This is achieved by adap�ng RMSE slightly to accommodate degrees of freedom:

NB: Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) is the sum of squared errors.

2.3b Evalua�ng the model – R2

R2 is another normalised evalua�on metric. It is derived from R, a correla�on metric, where R=1 is the maximum posi�ve correla�on, R=-1 is the maximum nega�ve correla�on, and R=0 is no correla�on. However, R is not intui�ve:

For R:

For R2 however:

If R = 0.1 it is unclear that this is four �mes worse that R = 0.2

(This is because R = 0.1 has R2 = 0.01, and R = 0.2 has R2 = 0.04)

If R2 = 0.01, this is four �mes worse than R2 = 0.04 (More intui�ve)

So how is R2 calculated?

• Varia�on around the mean of a dataset is the largest possible varia�on. Varia�on around the line is hopefully much smaller:

• So, to find how well the line of best fit aligns to the data as a percentage, the following formula is used:

• By factorising out the var(mean), the formula can also be shown as follows:

NB: TSS means Total Sum of Squares, and is the sum of (actual - mean)2

2.4 What linear evalua�on metrics show

A high R2 value shows that data points and the line of best fit align very well, and that the linear rela�onship is very strong. When plo�ng how hours of sleep impacts height, for example, if R2 =1, hours of sleep impacts 100% of the data varia�on (i.e., it is the only factor determining height). The line of best fit goes through all the data points because no other factor apart from hours of sleep impacts height:

On the other hand, if values of R2 are low, it indicates that the independent variables do not accurately explain the dependent variable. Maybe there are other variables that determine height which were not included, or hours of sleep is irrelevant towards sleep.

Hence, a low R2 value indicates that the AI model will not work very well, because the training data does not contain proper variables that affect outcomes.

For example, �me spent watching paint dry and height have no correla�on. If I asked a computer to tell me a person’s height based on the �me they spent watching paint dry, it will perform poorly. Beter training data must be found with relevant variables affec�ng height.

More about evalua�on metrics

Other methods of assessing a model include t-tests, f-tests, p-values, chi squared tests, ANOVA, etc.

These work in different scenarios depending on e.g., which variables are categoric or con�nuous, and all convey some hypothesis (is the straight line significant, is data explained by the dependent variables, etc.)

2.5 When to use linear regression

As previously men�oned, different models are used in different scenarios. Linear regression should be used only if:

• There is a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variable(s) – which is determined using the evalua�on metrics previously discussed

• Errors (aka residuals) should be random and not have contain any paterns. If there is no rela�onship between errors this is called autocorrelation:

• There is a normal distribution of errors (there are not any anomalies):

Image source: htps://editor.analy�csvidhya.com/uploads/85436Screenshot_3.jpg

• Error terms have equal variance around the line of best fit (homoscedasticity not heteroscedas�city):

2.6a Using linear regression in Python – Basketball Players

The aim of this project is to give the reader a comprehensive overview of how to use AI for themselves. This is through choosing which model is appropriate and then implemen�ng it. I will atempt this first with predic�ng weight of basketball players based on their height.

Link to source code: htps://colab.research.google.com/drive/1DDRA2IH8XI9_huNCtHpFtzB-HZ2NbpCv?usp=sharing

Note: To view the code through the above link, uploading the data manually is required.

Navigate to the menu on the right and click the buton in red (see right).

Upload this data file: players_stats_by_se ason_full_details.csv

Impor�ng Data and Libraries, Cleaning the Data

Visualising the Data

The line has R2 = 0.668 which is quite poor (hovering over the graph in the editor tells me this):

This produces R2 = 0.659 which is even worse! There is also some heteroscedas�city in the data. Hence, using skills from before, I concluded that this was a poor dataset for using linear regression

2.6b

Using linear regression in Python – Test Scores

I made my own dataset in Excel, to predict test scores based on hours revised. This should hopefully be more suitable for linear regression.

Link to source code: htps://colab.research.google.com/drive/1tHTHXdGe7GlGELcIwTlfOmx0dG7eyXTR?usp=sharing

Data (can be uploaded like before):

Impor�ng and Visualising Data

(R2 = 0.924 and there is no heteroscedas�city, good enough for linear regression)

Spli�ng data into training and tes�ng sets, before training the model with training data:

Predic�ng Values with the Trained Model

Having seen that the computer performed well, I made the following user interac�on:

2.7a Considera�ons when using mul�ple variables (Mul�ple Linear Regression)

When using more and more dependent variables, some addi�onal factors must be considered before implemen�ng a linear model:

• Overfitting – adding too many variables means that the model memorises the exact training data too well and loses the ability to predict unknown situa�ons. This introduces high variance (discussed more later).

• Variables must be relevant – too many irrelevant variables can confuse the model.

• No multicollinearity – all variables should be for dis�nct quan��es. If too many correspond to the same thing, e.g., 5 are about height, the model again gets confused.

2.7b Mul�ple Linear Regression in Python – Life Expectancy

I now used mul�ple variables to predict the life expectancy of different countries

Link to source code: htps://colab.research.google.com/drive/19oy82sVq8M6jEuxkZs0Rx2ldGC9gZh4a?usp=sharing

Data:

Impor�ng and Cleaning Data

• The data is too large because each country has mul�ple years of data

• Also, some columns are not numerical, so cannot be used to train linear regression models

• I will filter extra rows/columns out

Implemen�ng Linear Regression

The model performs decently, and can now predict life expectancy of a country, given 5 variables

Sec�on 3: Bias and Variance

Images Source: htps://serokell.io/blog/bias-variance-tradeoff

3.1 Introduc�on

Bias and variance are considera�ons for any machine learning model. Bias is a systema�c error in the predic�ons of a model, whereas variance is the change in a model’s performance that varies when u�lising slightly different datasets.

Simplifying a model can lead to high bias, but complica�ng can lead to high variance. To illustrate this:

We can say that the complex model with high variance is overfit because it captures the rela�onship of training data too well (leaving poor tes�ng results).

Bias-Variance Trade-off atempts to find the op�mal balance between bias and variance, for the best model performance in many situa�ons. The two images on the page before illustrate this trade-off.

3.2 Regularisa�on – Ridge Regression

Lowering bias (ensuring the model is not underfit) comes from choosing the appropriate model for applica�ons. However, regularisa�on is a method to lower variance by increasing bias and has two types: ridge regression and lasso regression

Ridge regression

• Consider training data with just 2 points:

• For any graph, a flater line means less sensi�vity to the X value changing. For example, if the gradient is 1, the x value changing by 1 unit will cause the y value to change by 1 unit. But if the gradient is 1,000,000, the x value changing by 1 unit will cause the y value to change by a million.

• All regularisa�on does is add a penalty for a large gradient. So, fi�ng the line of best fit is not only dependent on reducing the sum of squared residuals around the line (see before), but also minimising the slope of a line.

• The cost func�on is therefore changed to the following:

Cost = RSS + λ * the slope2

(Where λ is the ridge regression penalty - any constant)

• So, the line of best fit will change, purposefully introducing bias but therefore reducing variance:

• Obviously, the value of the ridge regression penalty (λ) should be adjusted to ensure that it is lowering the variance of the model (and not just pointlessly adding bias).

Lasso regression is very similar to the above ridge regression formula…

3.3 Regularisa�on – Lasso Regression

Lasso regression also adds a penalty for a large slope, introducing bias in the model in favour of lowering variance, and betering overall model performance. The cost func�on is changed to:

Cost = RSS + λ * |the slope|

(Where λ is the lasso regression penalty - any constant)

With the absolute value of the slope being minimised (not the squared slope), the line of best fit can reach a gradient of zero (whereas the line for ridge regression cannot).

Therefore, lasso regression is preferable because it can shrink the coefficients of irrelevant variables in the line to zero:

Above, because colour was not relevant to predic�ng height, it could be removed en�rely from the equa�on for the model. This gives lower model bias (shrinking slope and slope 2 also lowered variance, as do all regularisa�on methods).

Bias, Variance, and Regularisa�on apply to several different models, where not all data is numerical and represented on a slope.

Sec�on 4: Classifica�on Models

4.1 Introduc�on

Classifica�on models are used when outcome is in categories. This could be to categorise a pa�ent into having/not having a medical condi�on, deciding whether a facial image is the correct image to unlock a phone, categorising content on YouTube with other similar content, the list con�nues.

There are many different classifica�on models in existence, notably:

• Logis�c Regression:

- Fits a line to data like linear regression, except the line is an S-shaped sigmoid func�on ranging from 0 to 1.

- Used to classify data into being true or false, especially for natural-language processing (NLP) applica�ons – e.g., classifying speech into topics, iden�fying toxic language…

• Decision Trees:

- Uses a tree-like structure to map out different true/false statements and their respec�ve outcomes. Data is predicted by running known informa�on about it through the tree, and returning the outcome landed on.

• Random Forests:

- Several decision trees used in parallel

- Generally, more flexible and accurate than decision trees but complex to implement

• Support Vector Machines (SVMs)

- Sorts labelled pieces of data into clearly defined categories

- Used for sor�ng certain astronomical data (e.g., defining which category a celes�al body lies in), sor�ng biological informa�on, etc.

• Naïve Bayes

- Uses the bayes theorem to find the probability of an event happening, given that other events happened. Used in weather, user behaviour, spam filtering

• K-Nearest Neighbours (KNN) Clustering

- Sorts unlabelled data into K number of categories (where K is any posi�ve integer).

- This is unsupervised learning

- Used when data of indefinite categories must be sorted, e.g., grouping similar content/users on a pla�orm.

In this project, logis�c regression, decision trees, and KNN clustering will be explored in detail.

4.2 Logis�c Regression – Introduc�on

Logis�c regression predicts probability of data being true or false (1 or 0 respec�vely). However, it is normally used for classifica�on (where a probability of >50% gives 1, <50% gives 0) Like linear regression, a line is fit to data, but the y-axis varies from 0 to 1 only. Hence, fi�ng a line to the data is different because residuals do not exist. Similarly, evalua�ng and op�mising the model takes different approaches.

• Above shows the sigmoid curve which logis�c regression is based on. For any value of x, the corresponding value of y on the curve gives a value between 0 and 1. If values are below 0.5, the outcome is rounded down to false, and vice versa applies rounding up to true.

4.3 Best fi�ng a line to logis�c regression

• Where p is the probability of something happening, the odds of p occurring are:

- So, if the probability of rain is 0.7, the odds of rain are 0.7 / (1-0.7) = 2.33

- If the probability of rain is 0.5, the odds of rain are 0.5/ (1-0.5) = 1

- And if the probability of rain is less that 0.5, odds will be between 0 and 1

• As illustrated above, odds against range from 0 to 1. However, odds for range from 1 to posi�ve infinity. To make the spread of probability consistent, the log() func�on can be used, where log(odds) ranges from nega�ve infinity to posi�ve infinity. This is called the logit func�on:

• By applying the logit func�on to the logis�c regression graph, where the y-axis previously contained probabili�es from 0 to 1, the following graph is obtained:

NB: the data is in pencil, machine learning points in blue, underlying maths in green

• The model algorithm fits any straight line to the new graph with log(odds) as y, as shown by the blue line above It then converts this back to the graph with probability as y, using the inverse of log(odds):

• So, the straight line and data points are put back on the original graph. The straight line becomes a sigmoid curve. Using the curve, the maximum likelihood is predicted for the data. This is the overall probability of the data given the line we have chosen, and it should ideally be as high as possible. To calculate maximum likelihood, we find the probability of observing each data point:

• And then mul�ply all the probabili�es. So above (whilst probabili�es for two points were found) we would have to find the probability of every point, and then mul�ply them to find an overall likelihood for data.

• Now, like linear regression, we try different posi�ons. The straight line on the log(odds) graph is rotated, and again projected as a curve to find a new maximum likelihood.

• The line of best fit is the line posi�on giving the greatest maximum likelihood:

4.4 Evalua�ng Logis�c Regression

There are many ways of finding a pseudo R2 value for logis�c regression (not truly R2 because only linear models have residuals). McFadden’s pseudo R2 is widely used:

Where LL(x) is the log likelihood of x.

• LL(LoBF) is already calculated when fi�ng the LoBF from before.

• Overall probability is the odds of data without considering the x axis, so like how var(mean) was the worst possible varia�on, LL(overall probability) is the worst possible data likelihood:

• Like before, R2 = 1 indicates the dependent variable impacts 100% of the results, and R2 = 0 shows the dependent variable is irrelevant (not sta�s�cally significant).

Other evalua�ng/op�mising methods

• With mul�ple dependent variables, the Wald test can remove irrelevant variables that have litle effect on results. This simplifies complex logis�c models.

• Confusion matrices, sensi�vity and specificity, ROC and AUC are all ways to compare models against each other e.g., it could say logis�c regression works beter than random forests in a scenario

4.5 Using Logis�c Regression

A project to use and visualise logis�c regression, for predic�ng the chance of rain based on temperature (with dummy data):

htps://colab.research.google.com/gist/AviBhat2008/90ddffe27126f566e375a82804111b25/logis�cregression-rain-classifier.ipynb

Data used:

rain_probability.csv

Commented Code Images

NB: Above, I converted log(odds) to probability, using the formula from before. Rearranging the original formula as follows (commented above for reference) gives the formula I eventually used:

Plo�ng the Data on a Graph:

Accuracy (varies from 0.57 to 1.0, because small data size):

User interac�on (predicts whether rain is true or false, based on temperature):

Visual Output of Logis�c Model:

4.6 Decision Trees

Decision trees are used for categorical and con�nuous independent variables, to usually predict some categorical ac�on. E.g., if the temperature is below 10°C, it is Sunday, and it rained yesterday, will I wear a coat today? Their applica�ons are broad, usually whenever categorical variables are needed, as regression cannot handle them. Several decision trees form a random forest (see above)

Once a tree is made, the computer runs down it systema�cally to return outcomes. But how are they made?

• It could result in this star�ng decision (by conven�on, le� means True and right is False):

• The first decision, i.e. ‘Is it a weekend’ is called the root node. To find the op�mum dependent variable to be the root node, a count is made at each result node (called leaves), storing outcomes. A weighted impurity is calculated, and the process repeats to find impuri�es for when different root nodes are used. The decision that results in smallest impurity is chosen as the root node.

• Many formulas are used to calculate different impuri�es. One such is Gini impurity. For an individual leaf:

So above, the impuri�es would be as follows:

• With overall impurity being carried out for different root nodes (‘Did it rain yesterday’ or ‘is temperature < x°C ’), the decision causing lowest impurity is the op�mum root node:

• No�ce that a yes or no ques�on about temperature would require some temperature threshold selected (i.e., a value of x, in ‘is temperature < x°C ’). For similar con�nuous variables, all possible temperatures would be tried and the one with lowest impurity is selected (much like determining the root node):

Branches refer to the many nodes between the root node and leaves. The op�mum branch decision is also the one causing lowest impurity. Using impuri�es, the root node and all branches are op�mally selected, and the decision tree is made.

4.7 Using Decision Trees

I used decision trees to predict the best drug for a pa�ent given medical informa�on about them, using learning data from Kaggle.

Link to source code:

htps://colab.research.google.com/gist/AviBhat2008/8c3ac492ba16e9792b2f9e9f0f2f2440/decision -trees-appropriate-drug-for-pa�ent.ipynb

Data:

drug200.csv

Impor�ng and Cleaning Data

Implemen�ng the Decision Tree

Example Output:

Visualising the Tree

Note the condi�on, impurity, and relevant data for each node

4.8 KNN Clustering

This is a new, unsupervised classifica�on model. Imagine being given several songs that need to be somehow grouped. Other classifica�on models would not work because the songs are not labelled with genre and the number of genres is unknown. How would this work?

KNN clustering can ‘cluster’ similar data (users/content/images) into K number of groups. Say that K is 3:

Steps

2. 3 random points are picked – the cluster centres

3. The cluster centres are re-evaluated as the mean of the cluster

1. Every point is allocated to their nearest cluster centre

4. Varia�on from the centre is calculated for points in each cluster

5. Different points are picked, and the process repeats a specified number of �mes – the centres giving least overall varia�on during this �me are deemed the cluster centres. Eventually this is found:

How to find K

• Increasing K will always give less total varia�on. For example, above, if we were spli�ng into 4 groups, having clustered correctly we could achieve the following:

• Plo�ng reduc�on in varia�on versus value of K gives this graph:

• Above, we pick K to be the point that causes the sharpest drop in varia�on. This is called the elbow method because we pick the ‘elbow’ of the graph to be K.

4.9 Using KNN Clustering

With the KMeans() func�on imported from the sklearn.cluster library, I grouped credit card users into similar groups from a Kaggle dataset. The graph plots their card balance vs purchases, and the clustering is according to these 2 variables (more variables being used could bring less dis�nct clusters and would hinder visualising through graphs).

Link to source code: htps://colab.research.google.com/drive/14IgisnWFxF0vPY732ppnWMdgOmHu4tAf?usp=sharing

Data used:

CC GENERAL.csv

Impor�ng and cleaning data

The graph outputed:

Deciding on the op�mum K value – note the elbow graph below which mirrors concepts above

Sor�ng data into 3 groups

Visualising the created clusters (and their centres)

Credit card users have hence been effec�vely categorised into 3 groups of similar users

Sec�on 5: NLP and The Future of AI

5.1 NLP and Cosine Similarity

The ability of a computer to interpret human language is called Natural Language Processing (NLP) and offers the future of interac�ons between people and technology. Hence, the power of compu�ng can be used for even more applica�ons: genera�ve AI, recommenda�on systems, chatbots (and ChatGPT) to name a few.

Cosine Similarity is a vital model for finding similari�es in language. Phrases could range between:

• Similarity = 1 (they are very similar)

• Similarity = 0 (phrases are unrelated)

• Similarity = -1 (phrases are very contradictory)

The similarity value is obtained using a formula best explained through simple examples first. Consider the phrases: “Morning!” and “Good morning!”

They could be represented as follows to find cosine similarity:

But normally, there are several factors in common being observed, so more dimensions would be needed on the above graph. Luckily, there is a formula to find the cosine similarity for given vectors:

The sum of all A*B values, for each descriptor

The sum of all values in the A row individually squared – then square rooted

The sum of all values in the B row individually squared – then square rooted

The formula looks complex ini�ally but can be understood through some examples (although knowing the formula is unnecessary for prac�cally u�lising the model):

There are methods of using cosine similarity in Python with model func�ons like before, however, their true poten�al lies as part of a neural network. Hence, being aware of cosine similarity is important, but specific examples with code are not wholly relevant.

5.2 Neural Networks

Ar�ficial Neural Networks are a collec�on of several models, structured in nodes of different depths, where the output a model returns can feed into the input of the next node Most industry-standard projects use neural networks for complex applica�ons instead of isolated models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs) containing many different models for NLP.

NB: Above each circle (node) would contain some model

The above structure in which models interact with each other can be complex, yet is important for understanding real applica�ons of AI technology.

5.3 The Future of AI (as I see it in 2023)

Working with computers increasingly now means dealing with AI. Advancements are so rapid that the above models, which may have seemed cu�ng-edge 5 years ago, have been updated so many �mes that on their own they are rarely used (rather many models sit together in a neural network).

Technology is everywhere, in every field, and AI is now everywhere which means covering everything is impossible. Examples above could have shown the same models in any scenario, provided the proper data; all producing valuable outcomes. The way I see it, is that AI is bridging the gap between compu�ng and crea�vity. When we previously thought of computers, they carried out instruc�ons already set out by a programmer, and this brought one wave of new products and companies to the world. Now, a new wave of products and companies is forming, where the func�on of the product is only possible because of AI advancements.

NLP is an extension of connec�ng compu�ng and crea�vity by introducing human language. The user is provided with a more accessible and powerful interface to connect with an app or website’s possibili�es because the language barrier is being removed between man and machine. Likewise, the computer beter comprehends data involving language. So, most future applica�ons of AI in crea�ng revolu�onary products will (possibly) be interface changes or computers beter understanding language AI search and strategy is an example of this, where the user asks queries regarding business growth and the computer gives advice. Really, this is a more powerful search engine, where the model can view a greater range of results regarding exis�ng business strategies and deliver a beter outcome to the customer.

Aside from providing several new technological opportuni�es, the role of AI in medicine could grow further to start finding the miraculous cures we hear are dearly needed for some diseases. It just requires beter data and the appropriate model to see that data. More generally, an increase in AI will mean more data is needed, and an emphasis will be placed on ge�ng clean, reliable data that complements models nicely. From an ethical standpoint, many have concerns over an unfair, discriminatory AI, when most �mes the judgement comes from unfair data being used to train the model.

This is only my perspec�ve, but either way, AI will con�nue to shape lives for a long �me.

Sec�on 6: Sources

Main websites:

htps://www.ibm.com/topics/ar�ficial-intelligence

htps://www.analy�csvidhya.com/blog/2021/10/everything-you-need-to-know-about-linearregression/

htps://www.analy�csvidhya.com/blog/2021/03/data-science-101-introduc�on-to-cost-func�on/

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eh4d6sabA0

htps://serokell.io/blog/bias-variance-tradeoff

htps://www.analy�csvidhya.com/blog/2017/06/a-comprehensive-guide-for-linear-ridge-and-lassoregression/

htps://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.linear_model.Logis�cRegression.html

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D4VlmL3G4_o&t=114s

htps://www.datacamp.com/tutorial/decision-tree-classifica�on-python

htps://www.datacamp.com/tutorial/k-means-clustering-python

htps://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.cluster.KMeans.html

htps://buil�n.com/machine-learning/cosine-similarity

htps://hbr.org/2022/04/the-power-of-natural-language-processing

htps://www.ibm.com/topics/neural-networks

htps://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesagencycouncil/2023/09/11/the-future-of-ar�ficial-intelligencepredic�ons-and-trends/?sh=20c587502393

Official Library Documenta�ons for Code: htps://pandas.pydata.org/docs/ htps://plotly.com/python/ htps://scikit-learn.org/stable/user_guide.html

htps://numpy.org/doc/stable/ htps://matplotlib.org/stable/users/index

StatQuest Videos (sta�s�cs and ML channel): htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ArmBVF2dCs (linear)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EuBBz3bI-aA (bias and variance)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q81RR3yKn30 (regularisa�on)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGf0voTMlcs&t=417s (regularisa�on pt2)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yIYKR4sgzI8&t=344s (logis�c)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vN5cNN2-HWE&t=761s (logis�c pt1)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BfKanl1aSG0&t=273s (pt2)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxFYro8QuXA&t=537s (pt3)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_L39rN6gz7Y (decision trees)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4b5d3muPQmA&t=353s (KNN clustering)

htps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e9U0QAFbfLI (cosine similarity)

Textbooks and YouTube to understand logarithms

Stack Overflow and Various Online Blogs for error fixing

My Parents for Knowledge of Industry Applica�ons

IS THE MEDICALISATION OF OCD, MDD AND GAD (AND THE USE OF DRUGS TO TREAT THEM) THE OPTIMUM METHOD OF TREATMENT?

BY ADAM JEFFREY

(Upper Sixth, HELP Level 4, Supervisor: Mr P Langton)

Is the Medicalisation of OCD, MDD and GAD (and the use of drugs to treat them) the optimum method of treatment?

By Adam Jeffrey

CONTENTS:

Page 80 – Introduction

Page 81 – Part 1: On the Status of Mental Disorder

Page 82 – Part 2: On the Philosophy of Mind

Page 83 -– Part 3: introduction On the Primary Discussion of The Efficacy of Medication upon Mental Disorder

Page 84 – Part 3a: On MDD

Page 89 – Part 3b: An investigation into GAD

Page 93 – Part 3c: Furthering the Study – OCD

Page 99 – Part 4: Final Evaluation and Conclusion

Page 100 – Part 5: Evaluation of Sources

Page 101 – References

Introduction:

In the UK, 10.4% of adults are receiving medication for mental health related problems1 , with this figure being even higher in the US (16.5% of adults are on prescription medication for mental health2). There is, primarily, a duet of avenues for comment with such statistics. Are mental health disorders becoming more prevalent in society with more people requiring medical intervention? Finally, is such medical intervention even necessary and/or beneficial for treatment? With regards to the first postulation, for an answer to be achieved, the question would require its own project, within the confines of which it can be dealt with the upmost meticulousness and inspection. For this project, we need only focus on the second question i.e. the treatment of these occurrences of mental health disorder/instability. The second question, just from a public inspection, can be said to have a certain stigma regarding it. It may be ascertained that many, who are on such medications (or considering their use), may feel wholly uncomfortable by even stating that the efficacy of such treatment is questionable and that it may be better to pursue other avenues for treatment. As shall be the primary focus for this project, I intend to delve into both the case for and against the use of medications to treat mental health disorders, with my conclusion having its basis on both scientific theory as well as philosophical underpinnings of treating with medication [for science is in itself a philosophy (as shall be explored in mere side notes)]. In order to refine the subject of this enquiry (for to do otherwise would be attempting to resolve disputes in the whole of the psychiatric field itselfan impossible pursuit!), the focus of the project shall be on Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. I have chosen these for

1 People seeking help for diagnosed mental health problems: Statistics (no date) Mental Health Foundation. Available at: https://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/explore-mental-health/statistics/people-seeking-help-diagnosed-mental-health-problemsstatistics#:~:text=Mental%20health%20statistics,People%20seeking%20help%20for%20diagnosed%20mental%20health%20problems%3A%20statistics,and%203%25%20receiving%20ps ychological%20therapy.

2 Products - data briefs - number 419 - october 2021 (2021) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db419.htm

Figure I

study due to their lifetime prevalence in the population being some of the highest of all the mental disorders that could be studied (see figure I3). On the NHS, SSRIs (used in treatment for all three of the mental disorders) are one of the most prescribed medications4. It seems that, by choosing these mental disorders for investigation, the controversy, with regards to their treatment, the extrapolated effects of finding a significant efficacy (whether hypothetical and statistical) are great. Before delving into the first section, it seems necessary to mention that the term disorder has been thrown around loosely within this introduction, yet it shall take focus in the next section, for we ought to know what state is the treatment aimed at.

Part 1: On the Status of Mental Health Disorder

The World Health Organisation defines Mental Health Disorder as “a clinically significant disturbance in an individual's cognition, emotional regulation, or behaviour”5. They also go on to develop that this is associated with distress or impairment in essential areas of function. Well, I can separate this concept into three main prongs:

i) Deviation from one’s own norm with regards to behaviour

ii) Distress

iii) Impairment

The latter is most likely the only empirically verifiable claim, for, verily, ii and i both have their rooting in 1st person subjective experience. It is important to recognise the impact of culture in the triaging of mental health disorder, for, certainly, norms change among different cultures. Many looking from one culture to another can assign different mental disorders to such a different culture just because it deviates from their own norm. Therefore, while WHO’s definition can be useful in providing a framework for disorder, it is merely a definition of the world ‘disorder’ in itself, in combination with ‘mental’. What is required, before any argument with the regards to the efficacy of treatments of these disorder, there is a necessity for a criteria allowing for individuals to be categorised as a target population for treatment.

It seems apparent that one of the greatest issues with defining mental disorder is to have a definition that persists, irrespective of individual circumstances and cultural norms. One of the most prominent models is Boorse’s (applying to that both of physical and mental types). According to this model, a disease corresponds to a dysfunction. A Dysfunction would be ascertained as an "alteration of natural functions resulting in reduced life expectancy and/or reproductive expectations”6 It is important to recognise Boorse’s pre-existent belief that the expectation to reproduce is independent of cultural norms and values that one may possess. Later in this discourse, Wakefield primarily agrees with the need for Dysfunction ad a criteria for disorder, yet, also, it seems necessary that harm also be present i.e. the individual ought to suffer (as a result of this dysfunction) to clarify as mental disorder. Both models agree that a dysfunction must be present for mental disorder to be the case. I, personally, shall take the a view throughout this essay, which resembles that proposed by Wakefield. I would take such a preference as , without the criteria of harm, an individual has not deviated from their ‘state of peace’ (which I can only define as being their state of being, which they wish to return to having experienced mental distress, irrespective of ever having experienced this state – yet, still, the criteria has grey areas) and thus, it is not a disorder, but rather still an order, for themselves. Nevertheless, Boorse brings to light the valuable premise that dysfunction is independent of values and essential in this definition.

It seems important to emphasise that mental distress ought to be primary to the suffering rather than secondary to it. To clarify, an individual may feel immense sadness (even to an extent that it embodies symptoms of MDD) or great stress and worrying (even to an extent that it embodies symptoms of GAD), yet these would be insufficient criteria for the diagnosis of mental disorder. For, verily, there are normal reasons for mental distress, which may

3 Prevalence by mental and substance use disorder (2019) Our World in Data. Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/prevalenceby-mental-and-substance-use-disorder

4 Prescribed medicines review: Summary (2020) GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prescribedmedicines-review-report/prescribed-medicines-review-summary

5 Mental disorders (no date) World Health Organization. Available at: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/mental-disorders

6 Varga, S. (2011a) ‘Defining mental disorder. exploring the “natural function” approach’, Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine , 6(1), p. 1. doi:10.1186/1747-5341-6-1.

occur in destabilising periods of an individual’s life. For example, Bereavement is in itself something that can cause harm (through sadness and altered mental rationality), yet there may be no psychobiological dysfunction at play, making it an insufficient candidate for mental disorder. In stark juxtaposition, auditory hallucinations are an example where there is clear psychobiological dysfunction but no clear harm, making it, once again, an insufficient candidate for mental disorder. For both examples, it seems necessary that there must be other considerations taken into account. With regards to the latter, medical professionals should consider the extent of distress and impairment indicative of harm before making a diagnosis. This highlights the nuances of mental disorder and the great difficulty in defining it, yet, being but a preliminary to the main topic at hand, we ought to have a definition, with which to work. Mental Disorder, building on WHO’s definition may be defined as the following:

A clinically significant disturbance as a result of a form of psychobiological dysfunction, resulting in a harm (primarily brought about by the dysfunction) and with both criteria requiring satisfaction However, the clinician, in his busy job, having to follow guidelines both to protect his conscience and his registry with the GMC, has to follow definitions set up by his “betters” (many of which lack the patient contact that the clinician himself experiences). These definitions of mental disorder help the clinician triage patients that come into his clinic and, while their validity in defining mental disorder may not necessarily be superior to the highly subjective and nuanced definition, it seems necessary to mention the two main systems of classification used, as this influences the classification of the dimension of mental disorder when efficacies are assessed in clinical trials as well as showing the group of patients that the treatment is aimed at. The two systems are ICD (International Classification of Diseases), which is used by WHO and the NHS, and DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual), which is used in the US and some select other countries. The main distinction is that ICD classification does not use clear diagnostic criteria unless they are independently validated (taking its liking more to dimensions), and allows the clinician to make judgements in the classification of disorder. In contrast DSM uses more categorical classification based on operational criteria, which, while it does not increase validity of triaging, would increase agreement upon clinicians. A problem with the classification of mental disorder is an absence of a zone of rarity (which is the interval between the feature of biological disorder and those without a diagnosis), which suggests classifications are wholly arbitrary and that a dimensional system (like with ICD) is more suitable, despite increasing the complexity of diagnosis. With regards to the biological basis of mental disorder, this result suggests that mental disorder can be seen as an extension of normal biological responses, which shall be observed as I evaluate the causes of mental disorder. However, in order to be clear of bias in the following sections, I shall explain the mental disorders to be evaluated with both classifications.

Part 2: On the Philosophy of Mind

Within this brief section, I shall not make an attempt to argue for different theories with regards to the nature of the mind and self, but rather I seek only to provide a framework, within which inspection of my subject matter will become more focused and refined; I need only begin with a rejection of hard Cartesian Dualism. Descartes’ philosophy of mind can simply be summarised as the following: the mind (or soul) is an independent substance, which binds with the body in an interaction currently unknown to us and (the main source of weakness) that thought occurs independent of the a physiological basis. Mental disorders are dysfunctions (as established) and these manifest themselves in feelings and thought patterns. The existence of a soul or a non-physical essence of the self can be left at peace, for its relevance does not concern the matter at hand. However, the latter idea of bodyindependent thought must and can be refuted, in order for mental disorder to be as a result of any physiological dysfunction. For, if thought is independent of mind, any harm of mental disorder cannot be treated with any medication, taking this investigation to an abrupt end. However, while I am not proposing (nor do I personally advocate for) a hard reductive materialism or functionalism, I can object to the concept of body-independent thought on the following grounds.

1. The evidence that physical impairment intervenes with mental function is irrefutable. For example, athletes who compete in striking-based martial arts often end up as sufferers of CTE (chronic traumatic encephalopathy), also known as boxer’s dementia due to repetitive strikes and head trauma, and thus experience symptoms of dementia.

2. The Brain’s structure in itself, shows the anatomical basis of different feelings and psychological functions, with its constituent parts governing intelligence, creativity, emotion, memory etc. i.e. our whole conscious experience

3. Similar to the example of physical impairment, one’s thought and experience of reality can (and is) altered by chemical substances and their biochemical impacts on the brain

4. Following on from the association of brain structure with mental function, thoughts and feelings that occur are simultaneously expressed in electrical signals in the corresponding parts of the brain

All such points indicate that thought (with regards to its capacity and nature) has a rooting in physiological framework. It seems not necessary, and perhaps even beneficial, to resort fully to a reductive materialism or identity theory (stating that thought and experience are the detected electrical signals), which would suggest a bottom-up explanation for thought (which removes any personal choice i.e. free will), and this will be further developed in a discussion of super-emergence and the top-bottom hypothesis.

Thus, it may be ascertained that there is still a grounding for chemical substances inducing effects on conscious experience, and, therefore, there can be promise for the efficacy of medication upon medical disorder i.e. the enquiry has not become to an abrupt and sudden end.

In addition, upon beginning my research, it is clear that there are two (or even multiplicities) of avenues that mental disorder can be explained, which have their roots in philosophy of mind. I will refer to these as ‘levels of explanation’. The advocators of psychotherapy as the primary treatment methods take on theories of mental disorder of the cognitive theorists or psychoanalysts, which are what I shall call ‘higher’ levels of explanation in that they are not independent to the biological phenomena of mental disorder. In contrast those that advocate for highly medicalised method of treatment take an empirical materialist view of the matter, with mind being the same as (identity theory) or derived from brain activity. I propose that such models, and all those between, are interplays of these levels of explanation. One level may be more simplified but be easier in explaining a certain aspect of disease, yet may break down when describing other aspects. The ‘base’ level of explanation is that from which the others emerge and, while it may seem to some as self-evident that these higher levels of explanation result from the lower and base levels, it seems possible (in a more instinctual way rather than a deductively ascertained way) that higher levels may result in alterations to lower and base levels (The Super Emergence Hypothesis). In this way, a case of psychotherapy, which does not disallow the use of medication in companion can be made. The complexity and nuance of the matter will become clear in the following sections as, for the sake of simplicity (despite being through complex material observation), many of the causes described will be biological in nature, yet I shall shift to a higher level of explanation to describe the impact of psychotherapy on the emergent properties of mind.

Before leaving the philosophical nature of the matter (even though the natural sciences are in themselves a philosophical school, albeit a tremendously large one) I ought to outline that this matter is beyond complex, and a whole series of volumes may be dedicated to investigating causation alone, or even its existence (even if a probabilistic relationship). Despite this, as a result of this essay situating within the domain of the natural sciences, I shall investigate the matter primarily as such (not necessarily via a reductive empiricism, but assuming the existence of causal connections).

Part 3: On the Primary Discussion of The Efficacy of Medication upon Mental Disorder

The following sections shall make up the large majority of the discussion within this essay. The first section outlines the mental disorders to be investigated and this is followed by the mechanism of medical treatments and then finally with an evaluation on their use.

In order to proceed with assessing medical efficacy on the treatment of mental disorder, it first seems necessary that, as in the same manner that we outlined the term of mental disorder, I ought to briefly explain the hypotheses that surround the mental disorders to be studied. For, verily, psychological dysfunction is wholly adverse in finding causes as it rests on both philosophical and empirical findings and premises, as I have demonstrated in the previous sections. It is important to recognise that the subjectivity of conscious experience makes the classification of mental disorder somewhat problematic, for continuously, mental disorders become repeatedly re-classified into sub-types and classes, labelling by both groups of symptoms and like causes (or the biochemical phenomena which accompany the ascertained symptoms), from which proposed mechanisms of disease arise. The biochemical phenomena is the aetiology of the disease i.e. the causation mechanism and the accompanying symptoms (as a result of this biochemical action) are the phenomenology of the disease. Diseases share a common aetiology while

it is in there phenomenology where differences (and a lenient approach to these differences during classification) occur. The prioritisation of aetiology over phenomenology with regards to classification is almost undisputed, for, verily medicine, being an empirical field, prioritises the objective over the subjective; despite this, with regards to treatment, across medical fields, it may sometimes be the case that phenomenology is given priority over aetiology e.g. in the instance of palliative care. It may thus be ascertained at a further length that the classification of mental disorder becomes even more artificial (if to be taken as an objective division based on aetiology), for aetiology of many mental disorders are wholly proposed as mechanisms of disease and it is in the phenomenology (which manifests itself in a patient’s presenting complaint) where classification begins.

Part 3a: On Depression (focusing on MDD)

1) Classification of Depression

One of the most common mental disorders, depression can be referred to as a heterogenous condition in that the various manifestations of disease have a common phenomenology across patients yet a variety of different aetiologies. This brings up the question of whether classification of mental disorder is so heavily subject to rapid change as a result of this reversed approach? (Yet, such a question would be wholly off topic with regards to this

essay.) Despite considerable work on the aetiology of depression including neurobiological, genetic and psychological studies, no reliable classificatory system has emerged that links either to the underlying aetiology or has proven strongly predictive of response to treatment (which makes the medicalisation of treatment of mental disorder so problematic). Depression, as with any other mental disorder, can be categorised either based on dimension (i.e. the severity of the disease) or category (i.e 1. whether this is a case of depression and 2. how the depression has manifested). Depression or a depressive disorder can also be classified as major or minor. The methods that this is done is by either ICD-10 or DSM-IV In order to diagnose a major depressive episode, the diagnostic systems require symptoms to have been present for at least two weeks to make a diagnosis. In both ICD–10 and DSM–IV the symptoms must result in impairment of functioning that increases with the episode severity7 From ascertaining depression, the dimension (severity) is then categorised by the abundance of symptoms as summarised in Figure II and III 8 .

7 Tolentino, J.C. and Schmidt, S.L. (2018a) ‘DSM-5 criteria and depression severity: Implications for clinical practice’, Frontiers in Psychiatry, 9. doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2018.00450.

8 Park, S.-C. (2020) DSM -5 criteria for major depressive disorder vs ICD-10 - researchgate, ResearchGate. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/DSM-5-criteria-for-major-depressive-disorder-vs-ICD-10_tbl1_339223401

Figure II

Figure III

Minor Depressive Disorders are slightly more problematic to diagnose by requiring a lower bound to differentiate case from non-case, which is difficult due to the absence of a zone rarity. The simplest method for this is at least 2 criteria being met for DSM-IV and at least 4 criteria being met for ICD-10 (and as a result, within this system, minor depressive disorder overlaps with mild major depressive disorder9

The various methods of classification and how they classify can be summarised below:

i. Categories [by accompanying symptoms / mental states / linked life events (which tend to emerge as subgroups when strong correlations are seen across demographics ] – e.g. psychotic, post-partum, catatonic (which results in abnormality and restriction of physical movement), seasonal pattern etc.

ii. Dimensions – mild, moderate or severe

iii. Duration – chronic (meeting the criteria for depression classification for more than two years) or acute (meeting the criteria for more than two weeks but less than two years)

iv. Major or Minor Depressive Disorders

The next aspect to consider is the (proposed) mechanism of depression. For the sake of simplicity (or something as close to it as possible), I shall consider research done on Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) in particular in explaining the aetiology of depression. However, as explained previously, MDD can be further classified into categories, as a result of different presentations of disease and therefore a single biological mechanism. Furthermore, in finding a physiological cause for depression, one ought to also take into account that MDD not only causes great mental anguish but also intrudes upon fundamental biological processes that regulate inflammation, coagulation, metabolism, autonomic function, neuroendocrine regulation, sleep, and appetite, which results in multiple co-morbidities and decreased life expectancy that statistically accompany individuals that suffer from chronic MDD.

2) On the causes of MDD

Firstly, one ought to consider the conventional explanations of MDD, with the monoamine hypothesis having been most prominent in attention and forming the basis of many medications used to treat MDD e.g. MAOIs, SSRIs, SNRIs etc. It is important to mention that such explanations have been considered in the past few decades to pose certain limitations, despite the success of the medications that have developed from them; it may even be argued that the theories themselves arose from the antidepressant effects observed in the medication use. The Monoamine hypothesis suggests that the physiological basis of depression is a deficiency in monoamines i.e. neurotransmitters such as dopamine, serotonin, norepinephrine etc. Thus, via pre-assumed knowledge of neurotransmitter action, a deficiency in these monoamines would result in the symptoms of depression described above due to reduced activation of parts of the brain responsible for certain types of positive emotional response. While the monoamine hypothesis may be evidenced by the action of antidepressant medications which target these monoamines e.g. SSRIs (which inhibit the uptake of serotonin from the synaptic cleft and thus maintain its duration, increasing receptor stimulation), the response from such medications is delayed, with the effect of inhibition of reuptake of monoamines e.g. serotonin being within a few hours, yet the response, with regards to recovery and remission of an episode of MDD, begins days or (mostly) weeks after administration, heavily suggesting that there must be something downstream to increase the synaptic availability of monoamines to result in depressive symptoms10 The monoamine theory explains this delayed efficacy of treatment as the time required for the 5-HT1A serotonin autoreceptor to sensitise and normalise serotonergic tone at the synapse but disrupting portions of the serotonergic system fails to induce a depressive phenotype10 ,thus suggesting that monoamine dysregulation does not fully explain depression. This would suggest that the use of medication e.g. SSRIs is with the result of inducing a state which relieves symptoms in any way a psychoactive drug would (as will be covered later).

Even accepting these limitations, it is, however apparent that melancholic depression (characterised by pathological hyperarousal and anxiety pervading one’s life), in contrast to atypical depression (having the characteristics of reactive mood increased appetite, hypersomnia, and interpersonal rejection sensitivity), has been evidenced to have

9 Tolentino, J.C. and Schmidt, S.L. (2018a) ‘DSM-5 criteria and depression severity: Implications for clinical practice’, Frontiers in Psychiatry, doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2018.00450.

10 Liu, B. et al. (2017) “From Serotonin to Neuroplasticity: Evolvement of Theories for Major Depressive Disorder,” Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience, 11. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3389/fncel.2017.00305.

increased noradrenergic function in the CNS11 The primary theory that has resulted is a hyperactivity of the stress response during one’s life, and eventually in continuation The prime movers of the stress response are the CRH (Corticotropin releasing hormone) and Locus Coeruleus-Norepinephrine (LC-NE) systems. The CRH system is divided into amygdala and hypothalamic systems; the amygdala system controls anxiety and fear related behaviours as well as activation of its hypothalamic counterpart as well as the LC-NE system, while the hypothalamic system regulates the HPA (hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis) and similarly activates the LC-NE system. The Amygdala system’s first pathway is humeral, where CRH is released into the hypophyseal portal system (a system of capillaries linking the anterior pituitary to the hypothalamus) to activate pituitary release of ACTH (which results in cortisol production), while the second descends to the brainstem to the LC-NE system. The locus coeruleus regulates noradrenaline release into the forefront of the brain and modulates ‘primordial unconscious functions’. The LC-NE system’s noradrenaline acts as a hormone in this case rather than a neurotransmitter and inhibits pre-frontal cortex functions which would reduce likelihood of survival during a fight-or-flight response, as well as acting as positive feedback system by activating the CRH system. It has been evidenced that hypercortisolism is an essential component in the aetiology of (specifically melancholic) MDD, which is produced in response to ACTH and CRH activity. The ascertained symptoms of decreased flexibility of mood and cognition, hyperarousal, increased anxiety, decreased feeding, and insomnia could all be driven by norepinephrine excess, while the atypical juxtaposition can all be explained by a hypoactivity of these systems. An extension of this view of stress as the driver of this causal cascade includes the effects of stress upon neurogenesis and neuroplasticity. With regards to the former, the Neurogenic Hypothesis of depression proposes that MDD’s symptoms are as a result of reduced adult hippocampal neurogenesis, resulting in the phenomenology of depression (melancholic depression specifically) and that the evidenced effect of antidepressants is due to an upregulation of hippocampal neurogenesis. This can be supported by the fact that there is an inhibition of neuroplasticity and neurogenesis that is reversed effectively by antidepressant treatment in MDD cases 12 Similarly, stress has been seen to affect neuroplasticity by reducing expression of proteins associated with neuroplasticity e.g. PSANCAM (the polysialylated form of the neural cell adhesion molecule), which is expressed at cell surfaces and associated with synaptic function and plasticity. These observations can be paired with the result that studies of hippocampal tissue collected from depressed patients post mortum have shown alterations in grey matter density, reductions in neuropil (areas of low density of cell bodies, having unmyelinated neurons and glia) and decreased hippocampal volume and neurogenesis 13, which are all simultaneously associated (and empirically observed) in patients under chronic stress Chronic Stress has also been seen to reduce dendrite length and complexity, as well as spine density, while animal models, such as in rats, further evidence the decreased NCAM expression and neurogenesis during chronic stress 14 It can thus be suggested that there is a link between chronic stress and MDD. However, a comment should be made on how there is an assumption that the fact that antidepressants result in reversal of these causes of stress suggests that the phenomena ought to of been a cause, yet,

11 Lee, H. and Kim, Y.J. (2015) “Different Mechanisms Between Melancholic and Atypical Depression,” in InTech eBooks. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5772/59959.

12 Gold, P.W., Machado-Vieira, R. and Pavlatou, M.G. (2015) “Clinical and Biochemical Manifestations of Depression: Relation to the Neurobiology of Stress,” Neural Plasticity, 2015, pp. 1–11. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1155/2015/581976.

13 Sartorius, A., Karl, S. and Zilles, D. (2022) “Hippocampal neuroplasticity, major depression and, not to forget: ECT,” Molecular Psychiatry [Preprint]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41380-022-01746-w.

14 Wainwright, S.P. and Galea, L.A.M. (2013) “The Neural Plasticity Theory of Depression: Assessing the Roles of Adult Neurogenesis and PSA-NCAM within the Hippocampus,” Neural Plasticity, 2013, pp. 1–14. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/805497.

Figure IV

personally such reasons seems wholly circular and we ought not assume that antidepressants treat depression without knowing the true cause of the disease (as the drugs could act like psychoactive substances rather than treating, as discussed before). Nevertheless, the reversal of these phenomena e.g. impacts upon hippocampal neurogenesis suggest medications may work hypothetically but mechanism remains unknown and this raises questions of whether we should use medications if mechanism is unknown even though their efficacy may be seen statistically? To summarise for the sake of evaluating medication usage, stress results in neural adaptation in the limbic structures that regulate feedback inhibition of HPA axis such as the hippocampus. These changes are summarised in Figure IV 15

3) Medications used for MDD

Before the assessment of the hypothetical and statistical efficacy of medication usage in the treatment of MDD, I shall outline the various medications used in their treatment. It is important to note that the mechanism of the medications is wholly catecholamine/monoamine specific, focusing on inhibiting monoamine reuptake. When it comes to the effect of these medications, their hypothetical efficacy (i.e. the effect they would have in theory) can be reduced to what they target, while, when this seems contradictory any positive statistical differences, it is important to resort to the previously mentioned effect of medications in acting as changing one’s mental state to relieve symptoms rather than treating.

I: SSRIs and SNRIs

Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, as mentioned, are one of the most prescribed 16 and ‘reliable’ (I use the word loosely to ensure I am as unbiased as possible) medications used in treatment of mental health disorder, nay – out of all medications! Their mechanism is that they inhibit the reuptake of serotonin by inhibiting SERT (Serotonin transporter) at the presynaptic axon terminal, thus increasing their duration in synaptic cleft and resulting in more post-synaptic activation, as shown in Figure V17. There reliability and high prescription rate owes itself to having fewer side effects than TCAs and MAOIs (due to lower intervention on other neurotransmitters), yet its use is often seen to have a lower statistical efficacy. SNRIs alternatively are used in patients with resistance to SSRIs in treatment; in general, their mechanism is like that with SSRIs via the monoamine hypothesis of action, yet acting also on norepinephrine (as a neurotransmitter in this, rather than a hormone) so thus inhibits the NET transport protein as well.

II: TCAs

Tricyclic Antidepressants also inhibit the reuptake of serotonin and norepinephrine in presynaptic terminals, which leads to increased concentrations of these neurotransmitters in the synaptic cleft. However, in comparison to SNRIs they also act as competitive antagonists on post-synaptic alpha cholinergic (for the acetylcholine neurotransmitter) , muscarinic, and histaminergic receptors (H1). Due to the blocking of cholinergic receptors, TCAs can also lead to blurred vision, constipation, xerostomia, confusion, urinary retention, and tachycardia, which can result in the reputation of multiplicities of side effects

III: Other Honourable Mentions

It seems almost arbitrary to mention other classes of medication used, for the use of SSRIs is so widely accepted it could make the subject of its own enquiry, yet it is important to recognise that, for treatment resistant depression and cases of depression in the past, other routes of medicalisation have

15 Gold, P.W. (2021) “Endocrine Factors in Key Structural and Intracellular Changes in Depression,” Trends in Endocrinology and Metabolism, 32(4), pp. 212–223. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tem.2021.01.003.

16 Prescribed medicines review: Summary (2020) GOV.UK. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prescribedmedicines-review-report/prescribed-medicines-review-summary

17 Figure 1: Schematic diagram showing mechanism of action of SSRIs. These... (no date). Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Schematic-diagram-showing-mechanism-of-action-of-SSRIs-These-agents-block-thereuptake_fig1_7730046.

Figure V

been used. NaSSAs (Noradrenergic and specific serotonergic antidepressants) for example have a dual mechanism of action, which increases both the concentration of serotonin and noradrenaline in the synaptic cleft to within the normal range. NaSSAs bind to and inhibit both noradrenaline a2autoreceptors and noradrenaline a2-heteroeceptors and it is this action that prevents the negative feedback effect of synaptic noradrenaline on serotonin and noradrenaline neurotransmission, sustaining neurotransmission, just in the same way as SSRIs. I shall also note the recent interesting research of the action of psilocybin (a component of ‘magic mushrooms’) upon treatment resistant depression. The efficacy of this shall be discussed in a later section but the mechanism of its antidepressant effect is uncertain and it becomes particularly important on the deciding whether, assuming medication has a significant effect, the effect is due to acting upon the cause of the disease or just creating a drug-altered state and relieving symptoms, for, if a psychoactive drug produces similar antidepressant effects, the medications may operate in the same way to achieve their antidepressant effects.

4) Statistical and Hypothetical Efficacies of Medication usage

To begin, a meta-analysis of both nonindustry and FDA depression data from trials (as indicated in figure VI) 18 found Combination Therapy to have the most statistical efficacy. There was also significant differences between placebo and psychotherapy/antidepressant on nonindustry data with error bars representing 95% confidence intervals. Another metaanalysis 19 found that all effect sizes (Standardised Mean Difference) achieved by pharmacotherapy in comparison to placebo were below 0.50, ranging from 0.19 to 0.41. The mean response rate for selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs, which form a core part in the evaluation of the current consensus in the psychiatric community for treatment of mental disorder) was 51% vs. 39% for placebo, corresponding to a small effect size, yet an effect size nonetheless. It is important to note however that one ought to consider the broad nature classification of mental disorder that was discussed in the previous sections immediately strikes the eye has problematic, in that it would thus suggest that some participants in clinical trials may not in fact be classified (with use of a more ‘strict’ classification system) as a patient with MDD. This, as mentioned, results from the absence of a zone of rarity and makes a lack of clarity between case and non-case. For example, there is an unclear boundary between Minor Major Depressive Disorder and Minor Depressive disorder, which suggests to oneself that effect sizes may be diluted due to alternative causes of the presenting phenomenology of the case. Furthermore, with regards to the peculiar upcoming research on psilocybin, in a relatively recent trial psilocybin use showed an absolute decrease in symptom severity compared to placebo compared to baseline and were significantly larger than those in the placebo condition 20 In another trial achieving similar results mean scores on the QIDS-SR-16 (Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology-SelfReport) at baseline were 14.5 in the psilocybin group and 16.4 in the escitalopram group (a commonly used SSRI). The mean (±SE) changes in the scores from baseline to week 6 were -8.0±1.0 points in the psilocybin group and -6.0±1.0 in the escitalopram group, for a between-group difference of 2.0

18 Khan, A.O. and Brown, W.A. (2015) “Antidepressants versus placebo in major depression: an overview,” World Psychiatry, 14(3), pp. 294–300. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20241.

19 Leichsenring, F. et al. (2022) “The efficacy of psychotherapies and pharmacotherapies for mental disorders in adults: an umbrella review and meta‐analytic evaluation of recent meta‐analyses,” World Psychiatry, 21(1), pp. 133–145. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20941.

20 Von Rotz, R. et al. (2023) “Single-dose psilocybin-assisted therapy in major depressive disorder: a placebo-controlled, double-blind, randomised clinical trial,” EClinicalMedicine, 56, p. 101809. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eclinm.2022.101809.

Figure VI

points (95% confidence interval [CI], -5.0 to 0.9) (P = 0.17) 21 Such statistical results are intensely intriguing for this investigation for, as mentioned, if antidepressant effects matching those of currently using antidepressants are achieved by infamously psychoactive substances, it becomes apparent that the affects of such antidepressants may be similar in their workings and thus, as a result, the effects are very general in their nature rather than specifically acting on diseases. This drug-centred rather than disease centred approach for drug use for treatment brings up an alternative conclusion possible. Even if medication does not treat mental disorder, such as in this case of MDD treatment, does that mean its use ought to be discredited? Nay, for statistically as showed, there are significant effects achieved in comparison to placebo, especially when coupled with psychotherapy and thus it raises the possible intermediate conclusion that such medical treatments provide a way of ‘coping’ with the disorder, which may allow one to seek the treatment in the less medicalised formats e.g. psychotherapy). If antidepressant effects can be justified, even if direct treatment becomes unclear, I would still propose their use in treatment of MDD.

With regards to hypothetical efficacies of use, while the efficacy of antidepressants is known indubitably to have some level of statistical significance the continuously changing theories of medication mechanism on depression makes hypothetical efficacy different for different models of depression (efficacy would be very high assuming a monoamine hypothesis but such limitations to the wholly simplistic hypothesis have been explained). Nevertheless, even without directly treating depression, it is clear that inhibition of reuptake of neurotransmitters (which features in the main medication type e.g. SSRIs, MAOIs) would provide some alleviation of depressive symptoms or provide a state to act upon MDD (in reference to the drug-centred models of treatment mentioned). Therefore, from the investigation into depression in context of the whole essay, it seems necessary to note the strength of i) the statistical efficacy of antidepressant medications ii) their similarity to the effects of psychoactive substances and thus the proposal of a drug-centred model of treatment in combination with psychotherapy (which does not negate the use of medication in treatment).

Part 3b: An Investigation into Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD)

1) Classification of GAD

Anxiety Disorders are typically differentiated into three subgroups: fear, anxiety and ‘other’. The distinction between fear and anxiety can be heavily detailed and would be beyond the scope of conciseness, yet the presence of the distinction is noteworthy. While the fear category contains conditions such as phobias and social anxieties, ‘other’ is where the realm of OCD resides, which shall be its own focus later in the essay. The anxiety component includes those such as GAD, which will be the primary focus of this section. There is a high comorbidity been anxiety and other psychiatric disorders which has resulted in an increase in number of subcategories of and thus in a significant increase in diagnostic subtypes between DSM III, DSM IV and DSM V22 For the sake of diagnosis, symptoms for GAD including: excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive expectation), occurring more days than not for at least 6 months, about a number of events or activities (such as work or school performance); the person finds it difficult to control the worry; and the anxiety and worry are associated with three or more of the following additional symptoms (restlessness or feeling on edge ,being easily fatigued, difficulty concentrating or mind going blank, muscle tension or sleep disturbance) 23 With regards to ICD-10, classification is similar to that of DSM V, yet including the need for the distress to manifest itself in autonomic symptoms e.g. palpitations, sweating etc.

2) On the Causes of GAD

As with MDD, this section shall primarily be concerned with the biological manifestations of the disease. I ought to mention that the causal relationship between biological manifestation and

21 Carhart-Harris, R. et al. (2021) ‘Trial of psilocybin versus escitalopram for depression’, New England Journal of Medicine, 384(15), pp. 1402–1411. doi:10.1056/nejmoa2032994.

22 Moreland-Capuia, A. et al. (2023) “Fear-related anxiety disorders and posttraumatic stress disorder,” in Elsevier eBooks, pp. 811–824. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-323-85654-6.00005-8.

23 Barton, S. (2014) Diagnostic criteria for anxiety disorders set out in DSM -IV and ICD-10 classification systems. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK262332/.

phenomenology of disease is up for discussion. The largest factor to consider would be models of ‘free will’, or whatever ‘free will’ truly means (for, who can define choice; choice is something felt instinctively but to define it would be to imagine otherwise, which goes beyond the limits of human capacity and experience). If there is a ‘free will’ (as I shall assume when discussing mental disorder in terms of ‘higher level’ explanations and treatment e.g. psychotherapy), ‘choice’ can have an impact on said biological manifestations of diseases, and hence not be a cause but rather an effect. Even causation itself is up for speculation! For what does it truly mean for one event to directly lead to another; David Hume argues this in his Enquiry 24, with all such causal relationships being but constant/customary conjunctions in our empirical outlook. Nevertheless, as I shall proceed, while humbly recognising the complexity of the issue, as if both higher explanations (that of the impact of ‘mind’) and lower explanations (that of biological causes) are contributing factors for, verily, reforming the scientific framework and current models of the nature of reality is beyond the scope of a project concerned with the point of view of the scientific.

To begin with, as with MDD, GAD has been associated with neurotransmitter dysregulation 25 , which, as mentioned before, is personally wholly reductive due to the aforementioned limitations. For example, neurotransmitters of particular concern include norepinephrine, serotonin, dopamine, and gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA). GABA is a new neurotransmitter in this essay, and it is involved in the inhibition of nerve transmission, thus resulting in decreased neuron excitability and resulting in a calming effect on the brain; it is thus ascertained, through a seemingly simple (yet, possibly reductive) logical framework, that GABA deficiency results in the ‘excited’ state symptomatic of GAD. However, a possibly more nuanced theory is that of the impact of chronic stress on the structure of the brain. This parallels to the explanation of the melancholic strand of MDD, with CRH and ACTH system dysregulation and a dysregulated HPA axis , yet GAD also being accompanied also with a dysregulation of cingulate activity26 Also, worry is evidenced to not suppress subsequent negative emotionality or physiological activation (which contrasts to the GAD patient’s belief with regards to ‘why they worry’, as shall be discussed later regarding cognitive theories of GAD) In fact, worry prolongs negative emotionality and physiological activation - worry in the evening predicted next-morning cortisol secretion independently of mood, anxiety, sleep, and stressors, and thus suggest contribution of worry to extended HPA axis activation26 This idea of chronic stress is even more relevant with GAD, with the disorder being framed as an extension of the response to sustained threat reduced resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex (PFC) in both adults and adolescents with GAD25 The PFC is involved in the inhibition of amygdala output and thus decreased RSFC would result in increased negatively valenced affective reactions. Thus GAD has been associated with the effect of hyperresponsivity of the amygdala Simultaneously, however, there are possible genetic factors which may have an impact upon viewing GAD as an expressed phenotype. For example, GAD patients significantly correlated with the expression of the DNA methyltransferases DNMT1/3A, such that greater anxiety severity was associated with more DNA expression27. In further inspection, GAD has been seen as correlating with trait negative affectivity (neuroticism), which is a heritable characteristic and thus accounting for the large genetic components of GAD25 With findings such as these, it furthers the complexity of the matter, suggesting the interweaving of multiple factors which result in an individual having GAD. This may also suggest, with regards to the medicalisation of the disorder (for, verily that is the purpose of this essay), that, being genetic, use of medication may be in order, for, speaking theoretically, GAD phenomenology can be intervened with by reducing gene expression, yet such a statement is independent of the possibility of that medication

24 Hume, D. (1748) “An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding,” in Oxford University Press eBooks, pp. 134– 198. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oseo/instance.00032980.

25 Newman, M.G. et al. (2013) “Worry and Generalized Anxiety Disorder: A Review and Theoretical Synthesis of Evidence on Nature, Etiology, Mechanisms, and Treatment,” Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 9(1), pp. 275–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-050212-185544.

26 Patriquin, M.A. and Mathew, S.J. (2017) “The Neurobiological Mechanisms of Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Chronic Stress,” Chronic Stress, 1, p. 247054701770399. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/2470547017703993.

In stark juxtaposition, there are also ‘higher levels of explanation’; not higher in a superiority sense, but in that they theorise around concepts which (at least to an extent, depending on how reductively materialist your point of view is), have roots in neurobiological structure of the brain. For example the Cognitive Theorist Borkovec proposed the Cognitive Avoidance theory of worry in GAD, in that worry functions as a cognitive avoidance response to perceived internal and external threats and may reduce some aspects of emotional reactivity to otherwise unavoidable negative events i.e worry either helps people to avoid (or suppress) negative emotionality or is an unsuccessful attempt to do so Despite this, evidence suggesting worry sustains emotional anguish and negativity resulted in the model developing into the Contrast Avoidance Model, which, nevertheless took into account evidence that those with GAD perceived less emotional discomfort when in contact with a negative stimulus when worrying beforehand (which was opposite for those without GAD, who a preferred relaxation state before contact with the negative stimulus)27 The theory ascertains that the individuals with GAD engage in chronic worry because they prefer to experience a sustained state of distress as a way to be emotionally prepared for the worst possible outcome to various events. This took parts of Affective Contrast theory from cognitive psychology, which took the presupposition that unpleasant states are less unpleasant if also preceded by an unpleasant state (especially when the preceding state is voluntary).

It is, furthermore, important to recognise the importance of worry in GAD, with worry as the propagator of GAD (being viewed as the lesser of two evils by patients of GAD). Worry is associated with increased sympathetic nervous system activity (fight or flight / stress response) and decreased parasympathetic activity (for rest/ relaxation states); in daily life, GAD patients exhibit higher sympathetic nervous activity in comparison to controls 28 . With regards to aetiology, evidence suggest that GAD patients listening to personally relevant worry statements induced activation of the prefrontal and thalamostriatal brain regions associated with response to threat, and citalopram (a common SSRI) usage resulted in decreased symptoms and decreased activation of these regions29 . However, one would need to accept citalopram efficacy upon GAD phenomenology to view the latter finding as significant. Despite this, with regards to the impact of citalopram upon states of worry, there is a suggestion that patients can experience a reduced worry state. This would provide increased evidence on its efficacy, yet, once again, without being sure on neurobiological causes of the diseases, its effect as disease-centred or drug-centred is unclear. Nevertheless, its use would, personally, be justified either way in relieving symptoms of the disorder. To further this investigation into the union of worry and neurobiological causes, GAD patients demonstrated increased BSNT (bed nucleus of the stria terminalis – associated with longer term sustained vigilance and anxiety) activation relative to controls in a task that suggesting losing money 30 ,which suggests the involvement of hyperactivation of the BSNT in this concept of sustained threat, which propagates GAD.

It can therefore be ascertained that there is a complex weaving of neurobiological, genetic and (as a result of the impact of sustained threat) social factors which come to play in formation of the GAD subtype in the clinical setting. It thus becomes apparent, that the forms of medicalising treatment are highly varied, depending on the various regions of the brain being targeted; as a result, making a conclusion upon such a matter is of high difficulty. Nevertheless, it makes the case that, due to the explanation of worry as propagating GAD, being both neurobiologically and cognitively evident, there is evidence in both higher and lower planes of explanation that symptoms of GAD can be reduced (albeit, treatment is a different matter of investigation) by the targeting of such systems through medical intervention.

27 Newman, M.G. and Llera, S.J. (2011) “A novel theory of experiential avoidance in generalized anxiety disorder: A review and synthesis of research supporting a contrast avoidance model of worry,” Clinical Psychology Review, 31(3), pp. 371–382. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2011.01.008.

28 Sharma, R.P. et al. (2011) “Clinical and autonomic functions: a study of childhood anxiety disorders,” Annals of Saudi Medicine, 31(3), pp. 250–257. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4103/0256-4947.81533.

29 Hoehn-Saric, R., Schlund, M.W. and Wong, S.H.Y. (2004) “Effects of citalopram on worry and brain activation in patients with generalized anxiety disorder,” Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 131(1), pp. 11–21. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pscychresns.2004.02.003.

30 Yassa, M.A. et al. (2012) “Functional MRI of the amygdala and bed nucleus of the stria terminalis during conditions of uncertainty in generalized anxiety disorder,” Journal of Psychiatric Research, 46(8), pp. 1045–1052. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2012.04.013.

3) Medications used for GAD

The medications for GAD, in terms of clinical usage, do not deviate greatly from those used for MDD i.e. SSRIs and SNRIs. As a result, the mechanism shall not be repeated again. It ought to be noted well that, such a finding further suggests the grounds for a drug-centred model for how these medications work, by the inducing of psychoactive states rather than distinct therapeutic effects.

I: SSRIs and SNRIs

As mentioned previously, their high clinical prescription rate (as cited in prior sections) and, being as a result of, their statistical efficacy (evaluated later) further suggests a significance in their usage (and advocates for it heavily) Despite this such efficacy deviates greatly depending on which ones are used and once again, like with MDD, are based on a monoamine hypothesis of disease (wholly reductive as it is), yet reduction of symptoms is still seen in individuals under these medications. This would, as a result suggest their aid in treatment of GAD, even if their effect is not directly therapeutic. For example, they may be accompanied by psychotherapy as acting upon the cognitive aspects of disease.

II: Benzodiazepines

This class of medications act as positive allosteric modulators (regulates activity of the receptor through binding and thus changing the receptor’s response to stimuli) on the GABA-A receptor (Figure VII) 31 . This results in a calming effect on the brain by resulting in decreased neuron excitability. Binding of Benzodiazepines induces a conformational change in the GABA-A receptor, allowing GABA to bind.

This further induces a conformational change in the GABA-A receptor's chloride channel hyperpolarizes the cell and accounts for GABA's inhibitory effect throughout the central nervous system. Clearly, hypothetical efficacy of such a medication would be high in reducing worry and the increased sympathetic nervous system activity during day-to-day life. Does this treat GAD? But, what does it mean to truly treat? To do so would need to have clear-cut definitions of GAD aetiology (and this applies for most mental disorder) and thus be able to recognise its subsiding to the ‘normal’ neurobiological make-up. Therefore, in terms of such medications operating in theory, they can be wholly helpful in reverting an individual’s symptoms to that of a calmer individual.

III: Barbiturates

This class of medications have a similar mechanism to Benzodiazepines in that they decrease ‘excitability’ of neurons by interacting the GABA-A receptor. This conformational change would increase chloride ion flux, resulting in postsynaptic hyperpolarization and CNS depression They are, like benzodiazepines, more in use for patients with panic attacks, as, in this case, an anti-anxiety is in order in comparison to the more commonly prescribed antidepressant (which are used more due to less side effects that they induce 32).

4) Statistical and Hypothetical Efficacies of Medication usage

Before coming to conclusions about the use of one medication over another, some statistical results must be achieved, for, verily, theoretical speculation does not provide sufficient evidence that a medication works, for the brain is a complex organ and a state so complex as GAD cannot be reduced to individual ion channels, as with barbiturate and benzodiazepine action. To begin with, Metaanalysis data shows that psychotherapies achieved SMDs for target symptoms between 0.28 and 0.44

31 Griffin, C.E. (2013) Benzodiazepine Pharmacology and Central Nervous System–Mediated Effects. Available at: https://www.ochsnerjournal.org/content/13/2/214.

32 Website, N. (no date) Overview - Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). Available at: https://www.nhs.uk/mental-health/talkingtherapies-medicine-treatments/medicines-and-psychiatry/ssriantidepressants/overview/#:~:text=SSRIs%20are%20usually%20the%20first,generalised%20anxiety%20disorder%20(GAD).

Figure VII

and these SMDs compared to treatment as usual or placebo between 0.01 and 0.72. In contrast, pharmacotherapies achieved SMDs in comparison to placebo between 0.33 and 0.45; most values were small, MAOIs medium and benzodiazepines large 33 This advocates for both medication and psychotherapy usage, due to SMDs being greater in comparison to treatment as usual or placebo, and thus (assuming an indifference to whether medication acts drug-centred or disease-centred), clinically, patients ought to be given a combination of both. With regards to the validity of such trials, unlike with depression, definition of anxiety is easier due to physical manifestation in the autonomic nervous system, thus trials (personally) are more accurate in their treatment of biochemically induced GAD, yet I ought to mention that this is from my observation of the classification of GAD in DSM and ICD, and, verily, the classification of mental disorder, as mentioned previously, is so complex and dependent on social norms (and the norm of the individual). With regards to Benzodiazepines (this new class of medications in this essay), 70% of patients will respond to adequate benzodiazepine treatment (up to 40 mg/day of diazepam or equivalent for at least 3-4 weeks), but less than two thirds will achieve remission of symptoms 34 . This is a high statistical significance and provides a strong case for benzodiazepine prescription for GAD, yet for co-depressive GAD (due to its co-morbidity with MDD, which is unsurprising to occur given similar neurobiological explanations with regards to chronic stress), they are unsuitable due to a notable depressive effect which would exacerbate symptoms 35 . SSRIs (specifically escitalopram) have been observed to be significantly superior to placebo in terms of improvement on the Hamilton Depression Scale anxiety sub-score 36 . SSRIs also, in general have less side effects, in contrast to benzodiazepines (which are associated with Respiratory depression, Respiratory arrest, drowsiness, Confusion, Headache, Nausea/vomiting)37 . Viewing the clinician’s logical preference to prescribe the medication with less side effects, given that both have anti-anxiety effects, it is understandable why SSRIs are prescribed more. As a result, as has aforementioned, it becomes clear that, if both drugs result in alleviation of symptoms, their mechanism is most likely not therapeutic but rather ‘numbing’, in similar action to painkiller. Furthermore, the SMDs achieved by psychotherapy, as shall be discussed in later sections that, for a disorder such as GAD where chronic stress and social factors have an impact, the use of psychotherapy alongside medication (albeit, with drug-centred intentions) is promising.

With regards to helping to conclude on the efficacy of the medications, hypothetically, barbiturates and benzodiazepines ought to be prescribed at higher rates than the antidepressant for GAD cases, as they directly act upon the ‘excited’ state of GAD aetiology. However, the opposite38 suggests that the general positively valenced states that are induced by both these medications (in cases that they have an impact), suggests that they all share in providing relief to GAD symptoms and that, after their statistical efficacies from trials, the clinician values the medications which result in decreased side effects, as logically follows from any sound mind. The case for the use of medications becomes increasingly clear, yet concern must be allocated for patient choice with regards to side effects as well as the requirement for the clinician to outline to the patient to co-treatment with alternative psychotherapy.

Part 3c: Furthering the Study – OCD (Obsessive Compulsive Disorder)

1) Classification of OCD

33 Leichsenring, F. et al. (2022) “The efficacy of psychotherapies and pharmacotherapies for mental disorders in adults: an umbrella review and meta‐analytic evaluation of recent meta‐analyses,” World Psychiatry, 21(1), pp. 133–145. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20941.

34 Cassano, G.B., Rossi, N.B. and Pini, S. (2002) “Psychopharmacology of anxiety disorders,” Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 4(3), pp. 271–285. Available at: https://doi.org/10.31887/dcns.2002.4.3/gcassano.

35 Leggett, A. et al. (2015) “The Association Between Benzodiazepine Use and Depression Outcomes in Older Veterans,” Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry and Neurology, 28(4), pp. 281–287. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0891988715598227.

36 Bose, A. et al. (2008) “Randomized placebo-controlled trial of escitalopram and venlafaxine XR in the treatment of generalized anxiety disorder,” Depression and Anxiety, 25(10), pp. 854–861. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/da.20355.

37 Bounds, C.G. (2023) Benzodiazepines. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK470159/.

38 Milani, S.A. et al. (2021) “Trends in the Use of Benzodiazepines, Z-Hypnotics, and Serotonergic Drugs Among US Women and Men Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” JAMA Network Open, 4(10), p. e2131012. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.31012.

As mentioned in the previous section, it is possible to classify OCD within the anxiety section, mainly due to the frequent co-morbidities and ‘fusing’ between the two conditions. Thus, DSM V moved OCD out from the anxiety section to its own Obsessive Compulsive and Related Disorders section. It is important when discussing OCD that there is a distinction that OCD does not need a physical manifestation in action (may be just the obsession rather than the compulsion). DSM V requires the occurrence of “Recurrent and persistent thoughts, urges or images that are experienced, at some time during the disturbance, as intrusive, unwanted, and that in most individuals cause marked anxiety or distress, The individual attempts to ignore or suppress such thoughts, urges, or images, or to neutralize them with some thought or action (i.e., by performing a compulsion), the person feels driven to perform in response to an obsession, or according to the rules that must be applied rigidly, The behaviours or mental acts are aimed at preventing or reducing distress or preventing some dreaded event or situation” 39 Such descriptions can be evidenced in historical texts, such as by John Moore (Bishop of Norwich 1691, England); individuals are obsessed by “naughty, and sometimes blasphemous thoughts that start in their minds, while they are exercised in the worship of God, despite all their endeavours to stifle and suppress them… the more they struggle with them, the more they increase” 40. One can infer from this a higher level description of OCD, as giving up most power to ones thoughts, elevated to the status of God (literally in this recording); this has resulted in ERP (Exposure and Response Prevention) psychotherapy, containing exercises, one of which requires the patient to enunciate their obsession until it becomes but a string of meaningless syllables (still words, nonetheless, but having lost psychological meaning). But, such an observation, as often made clear by OCD candidates, is highly relevant to the philosophical domain of this investigation, for, verily, what does it mean for a patient to “struggle” with a thought I mention this wholly briefly, for it is but a general problem, which becomes increasingly relevant with the OCD discussion, for the perceived ‘will’ of the patient affects their condition, and results in the ‘negative valence state’ and sustained obsession/compulsion.

It becomes apparent, as thus, that OCD, in comparison to MDD and GAD, is more explained cognitively and behaviourally (i.e. in the psychological domain), rather than biochemically (the neurological domain); the depths of these explanations shall be explained in the next section. However, personally, it does not make such explanations any less valid, for verily, in the clinical setting of healthcare (which is distinct, yet simultaneously intertwined with the academic domain) the healthcare professional deals with individuals, which is even more of a pressing matter in the psychiatric setting. Every individual is accompanied by their own story – a narrative. A patient’s reasoning may be explained fundamentally i.e. molecular biochemistry (even though this would involve complexity and a far-off explanation of the nature of mind and self-will), yet, through this story presented to the clinician, the medical professional can understand what it means for that patient to experience their condition, which, in the increasingly patient-centred approach to healthcare, the 1st person experience of the patient is central.

What is an obsession though? OCD sufferers often observe the experience of the ‘just right’ feeling. This can be defined as a type of sensory phenomena that precedes and thus triggers the repetitive behaviour. Whether this is a physical sensation, a sensation of energy release or simply an urge phenomena, it results in the carrying out of the obsession (and, in many cases, the following compulsion). This concept of energy release can be paralleled to the patients of Tourette’s Disorder.

With regards to such classification, ICD-10 classification is typically as follows (the dimensional rather than categorical nature of ICD can be clearly observed):

“a) they must be recognized as the individuals’ own thoughts or impulses;

b) there must be at least one thought or act that is still resisted unsuccessfully, even though others may be present which the sufferer no longer resists;

39 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (US) (no date) Table 3.13, DSM-IV to DSM-5 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Comparison - Impact of the DSM-IV to DSM-5 Changes on the National Survey on Drug Use and Health - NCBI Bookshelf. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK519704/table/ch3.t13/.

40 Simpson, H.B. and Reddy, Y.C.J. (2014) “Obsessive-compulsive disorder for ICD-11: proposed changes to the diagnostic guidelines and specifiers,” Revista Brasileira De Psiquiatria, 36(suppl 1), pp. 3–13. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1590/1516-4446-2013-1229.

c) the thought of carrying out the act must not in itself be pleasurable (simple relief of anxiety is not regarded as pleasure in this sense);

d) the thoughts, images, or impulses must be unpleasantly repetitive”40

The main distinction between ICD and DSM classifications is that ICD views obsessions and compulsions as having shared definition but DSM differentiates between them; DSM includes the nuance that a compulsion can still be mental, and still be differentiated from an obsession, which is notable, for, verily, a mental ritual is still a ritual nonetheless. Through this, DSM V suggests that there is often a functional relationship between obsessions and compulsions. Within the categorisation, obsessions are involuntary and result in unpleasantness in the individual (which recalls the condition for harm in Wakefield’s models of disorder). Compulsions are “repetitive behaviours…that the individual feels driven to perform in response to an obsession or according to rules….”40. The obsession, as such, triggers the compulsion. OCD like MDD is aetiologically heterogeneous, resulting in many comorbidities e.g. with MDD, GAD, Separation Anxiety disorder etc. This results in the increasing complexity in biochemical physiological mechanisms of disease, which, as shall be observed, makes ascertaining causes and thus treatment greatly difficult.

2) On the Causes of OCD

Before embarking on this investigation, it is important to recognise that there is an immense mixture of biological, genetic, psychological, behavioural-learned and cognitive explanative theories to explain OCD. The latter fall into the category of higher levels of explanation (possibly models of the biochemical on a different plane of reasoning), while the former two suggest the multi-factorial nature of developing mental disorder and, in this case OCD.

It has been theorised that there is a spectrum where the phenomenology of OCD presentations sit –Schizophrenia (a disorder beyond the scope of this already large project) is at the far extreme of the spectrum. This comparison (without me simply stating comparative statements) is illustrated in Figure VIII 41 However, while the neurotransmitter systems involved in both disorders are the same, the brain regions (and thus the affected functions) differ, resulting in differing aetiological and phenomenological presentations. Nevertheless, it is duly noted that these overlaps result in multiple co-morbidities, with OCD of a high incidence rate amongst schizophrenic patients 42

With regards to primary neurobiological models, OCD involves dysfunction in a neuronal loop running from the orbital frontal cortex (OFC) to the cingulate gyrus (which results in the ‘feeling of discomfort’ after mistakes until a mistake if fixed), the striatum (caudate nucleus and putamen, involved in decision making and reward), globus pallidus (controlling conscious and proprioceptive movement) and the thalamus (for information relating) and back to the OFC. The Basal Ganglia (caudate nucleus, putamen, and globus pallidus in the cerebrum, the substantia nigra in the midbrain, and the subthalamic nucleus) is particularly notable; the cortico-basal ganglia network activity is increased in OCD patients relative to controls and increases with OC symptoms, which suggests a

41 Poyurovsky, M. (2013) “Schizophrenia and OCD: comparative characteristics,” in Cambridge University Press eBooks, pp. 1 –21. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511686931.003.

42 Sharma, L. and Reddy, Y.C.J. (2019) “Obsessive–compulsive disorder comorbid with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder,” Indian Journal of Psychiatry, 61(7), p. 140. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4103/psychiatry.indianjpsychiatry_527_18.

Figure VIII

dysfunction of the basal ganglia and the whole cortico-basal ganglia network. This circuit is suggested to form a neural system critical for habit learning and for the routine performance of habits; this is evidenced through lesions in the OFC in humans resulting in deficits in behavioural planning and decision making 43. The involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (also apart the neuronal circuit) is also observed; restricted chemical lesions of the rostral cingulate motor area render monkeys incapable of selecting an action based on reward contingencies associated with it43, so would seem consistent that ACC and OFC may change the perceived value of stimuli. While this is a nonhuman study, the ACC and OFC are primordial structures, making their study and translational nature into humans relatively reliable.

The method that the Basal Ganglia (BG) is involved in OCD can be expressed in two hypotheses; I have avoided using bullet points so far but, for the sake of being succinct, they can be expressed as follows:

1) The BG influences both motor pattern generators in the brainstem and spinal cord and cognitive patterns in the cerebral cortex: the dysfunction of the cortico-BG group in OCD reflects both the compulsive (motor) and obsessive (cognitive)

2) The BG alters cortical and other inputs into a mode that allows actions to be released as behavioural sequences – the ‘what if?’ doubts notable to OCD are caused by a lack of loop closure in the neuronal circuit

Both hypotheses link to the typical OC symptoms and thus, through this dysfunction, it would become apparent, hypothetically, that medications would, undoubtedly, need to target the BG and its associated neuronal loop. The nuance between the hypotheses is, personally, irrelevant on a broader level and a reconciliation is possible between 1) and 2) but this is beyond the point; the important of the BG, however is essential.

With regards to the striatum (a component of the basal ganglia), studies have shown that lesions of the striatum can induce OC behaviour43, which lends the following question: do patients with phenomenological presentations of OCD have an aetiology having subtle lesions to the striatum? If this were true, severe cases of OCD would prompt surgical intervention, yet this is beyond the scope of this essay (for, verily, I am primarily concerned with medical interventions and the case for ‘softer’ i.e. psychological treatments). Nevertheless, it can further be reinforced that the BG, and specifically the striatum, ought to be a target for medical treatment; in contradiction, this is not the case in reality. To reinforce the importance of the corpus striatum, Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy suggests reduced N-acetylaspartate (used for enzymatic synthesis of neuropeptides) within the striatum of OCD patients 44, which would suggest reduced neuronal density and thus abnormal brain biochemistry, which would result in basal ganglia dysfunction, as suggested previously.

Biochemical explanations meet ‘higher’ level explanations in the Structured Event Complex (SEC) Model. This provides an approximate unity between the experienced ‘what if?’ (the doubt) and the corticobasal ganglia-thalamic-cortical loops (the most accepted neuroanatomic model is that there exists multiple of these loops). OCD patients often have a feeling to do an action, such as washing hands, which results in completion of the action and then feeling completion. However, OCD patients do not receive complete completion upon the SEC, but only partial completion. The Basal Ganglia sets the thresholds for SECs, thus excessive basal ganglia activity results in unclosed neuronal circuits and thus excessive SECs.

43 Huey, E.D. et al. (2008) “A Psychological and Neuroanatomical Model of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder,” Journal of Neuropsychiatry, 20(4), pp. 390–408. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.neuropsych.20.4.390.

44 Aoki, Y., Aoki, A. and Suwa, H. (2012) “Reduction of N-acetylaspartate in the medial prefrontal cortex correlated with symptom severity in obsessive-compulsive disorder: meta-analyses of 1H-MRS studies,” Translational Psychiatry, 2(8), p. e153. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/tp.2012.78.

Figure IX

The issue, however, is the complexity of brain structure and organisation, such that medicalising ‘thought patterns’ reliably and predictably is beyond the scope of current research. As a result, OCD, like other more complex conditions, like MDD and GAD, as previously discussed, has been reduced to the monoamine hypothesis, primarily on serotonin dysregulation; the main neurotransmitters in dysregulation suggested are serotonin, dopamine and glutamate (not necessarily all in deficit). Studies have shown increased glutamate levels in cerebrospinal fluid of OCD patients in comparison to healthy controls 45, which may suggest an aetiology of increased glutamate receptor hyperactivity and thus increased neuronal circuit activity (specifically the notable cortico-striatal-thalamo-cortical circuit – structure shown in figure IX46). Nevertheless, SSRIs (which only effect serotonin) does not involve glutamate during its action. Why then are SSRIs still prescribed? The literature for SSRI and TCA efficacy upon OCD is based on the reduction of symptoms experienced under the medication 47 , which is further reinforced by the withdrawal symptoms of ceasing SSRI use (suggesting a case for serotonin’s involvement in the biochemistry of OCD). Despite this, if medication (current methods at least) can still alleviate symptoms, it is not wholly irrational to permit medication use in the treatment strategy for OCD (and other discussed conditions for that matter). If this were an essay on the cause of mental disorder, it would be a different matter, yet, due to a primary concern with treatment, it is necessary to be open to both medication that ‘treats’ and ‘alleviates’ i.e. disease and drug-centred approaches.

Causes, however, even those distant from medical involvement are still relevant when considering treatment plans for the condition, and perhaps medications available after future technological advancements. For example, a recently researched cause of OCD are PANDAS (Paediatric Autoimmune Neuropsychiatric Disorders Associated with Streptococcal Infections). It is suggested that a strep infection (scarlet fever), primarily evidenced in children and in some adolescents48, can trigger OCD, as a result of an autoimmune response, due to antibodies against strep targeting selfcells. Such a find is particularly notable, for, verily, it suggests, perhaps, a permanent change in brain physiology and, through this alteration, patients experience OCD symptoms. Would non-medical treatment options be possible in such a case? Assuming a model of free will (as I have throughout the essay), is a patient’s choice, through engaging with psychotherapy, able to free them of the biochemical turmoil they are subject to, beyond their own self will? The subjection of the will to one’s own physiology can be observed through the genetic basis for OCD. Older studies of monozygotic wins show a 65% concordance for OCD (no control groups were included in this study though)41. More recently, another study found that the age-corrected morbid risk of broadly defined OCD was far greater in parents of OCD patients compared to those of controls (16% compared to 3%) 49. In 2001, a meta-analysis reported that a person with OCD is 4-times more likely to have another family member with OCD than a person who does not have the disorder 50. No consistent gene resulting in OCD expression has been found and the inheritance is most likely a complex polygenic one. Nevertheless, the findings suggests a subjection of the will to the biochemical make-up of the brain but, while some may suggest a lack of hope for non-medical treatment, it is personally far more convincing to argue that, purely by self-will, it is not possible to ‘cure’ oneself of the physiological ailment, yet, to relieve one’s symptoms is still possible. It can also be argued that such studies may not have taken into the account the similar cultural and social perceptions that family members may take to general order, cleanliness etc.

45 Marinova, Z., Chuang, D.-M. and Fineberg, N.A. (2017) “Glutamate-Modulating Drugs as a Potential Therapeutic Strategy in ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder,” Current Neuropharmacology, 15(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.2174/1570159x15666170320104237.

46 Figure 1: Cortico-baso-thalamo-cortical loops. The basal ganglia... (no date). Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Corticobaso-thalamo-cortical-loops-The-basal-ganglia-receive-inputs-from-the-whole_fig1_29648180.

47 Pittenger, C. and Bloch, M.H. (2014) “Pharmacological Treatment of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder,” Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 37(3), pp. 375–391. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psc.2014.05.006.

48 PANDAS Questions and Answers (no date). Available at: https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/pandas#:~:text=A%20child%20may%20be%20diagnosed,worse%20following%20a%20strep %20infection.

49 Nestadt, G., Grados, M.A. and Samuels, J. (2010) “Genetics of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder,” Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 33(1), pp. 141–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psc.2009.11.001.

50 What causes OCD | OCD-UK (no date). Available at: https://www.ocduk.org/ocd/what-causes-ocd/.

It seems useful to also mention some of the ‘higher’ level explanations, for these become particularly useful when discussing non-medical interventions, specifically psychotherapy. Cognitive Theorists suggest that everyone experiences the same thoughts as those with OCD, but some think that the thoughts bear an intrinsic significance, which causes them to develop into obsessions rather than subsiding; distress becomes mediated in a repeated negative-feedback loop, where belief in the significance of the thought, accompanied with the distress, results in viewing the thought as threatening. Similarly, Learned Avoidance Theory suggests that obsessional thoughts come through conditioning and become associated with an anxiety that has failed to extinguish. This has resulted in psychotherapies such as ERP (Exposure and Response Prevention), where patients are exposed to stimuli and then, by pure will, not follow through with the compulsion (whether this is mental or physical). This idea of pattern correction is seen as vital to the non-medical treatment of OCD. In stark contrast, the psychoanalysts, such as Jung and Freud, argued that there exists a neurosis (fragmentation) from dissociation within the conscious in modern man, becoming supra-rational. As a result ‘obsessions’ and ‘compulsions’ cannot simply be written off as the work of evil spirits or ghosts but persist and become over-exertions of rationality. While there is some merit to be said about the works of Jung and Freud, with regards to implications in a clinical setting, the use of Cognitive and Learned Avoidance Theories in psychotherapy are higher valuable and can help contribute to an alleviation of the patient’s symptoms, especially when combined with medical treatments via Combined Therapy (as was evidenced previously in context of MDD and GAD).

OCD is a complicated condition; its involvement of the ‘will’, greater than in GAD and MDD, makes treatment different for every case i.e. whether symptoms provide a small daily disturbance or complete existential paralysis. It is of vital importance to keep options for psychotherapy and medical treatment both open.

3) Medication used

for OCD

I: SSRIs and SNRIs in use

As with GAD and MDD, there use is not backed up by substantial evidence from first principle, despite alleviation of symptoms; the use is based on the ‘accident’ in seeing a reduction in OC symptoms, which, as has and will be discussed, further reinforces the concept of drug-centred models for medical treatment of mental disorder, rather than a disease-centred one, although this does not dismiss their use

II: Glutamate Modulating Drugs

As mentioned previously, Glutamate is the primary neurotransmitter in the cortico-striato-thalamic circuits and thus, by reducing glutamate levels, there is decreased neuron stimulation and, thus, a decreased stimulation of the whole neuron circuit. Thus, it follows, hypothetically that decreased basal ganglia activity (and thus the whole circuit), would reduce the excessive activity of the whole loop, and, as follows, its consequences of obsessiveness.

4) Evaluating the Statistical and Hypothetical Efficacy of Medication Usage in OCD

Mentioning of some studies seem in order to evaluate the use of medication. For pharmacotherapy, the largest meta-analysis reported a medium effect size (Standardised Mean Difference = 0.56)51 For psychotherapy, the largest meta-analysis reported a large effect size (SMD = 1.03)39. The impact of the will becomes clear here. Furthermore, more than 20 double-blind, placebo-controlled studies have established the efficacy of SSRI monotherapy in OCD39 ,even though the response to SSRIs has a relatively long delay (greater than for MDD). Meta-analyses of this class of trials, showed that SSRIs and clomipramine are effective in treating OCD with a mean difference in the Yale–Brown Obsessive Compulsive Severity Scale (YBOCS) scores ranging from 3.49 (1.81–5.12) to 4.72 (2.60–5.85), respectively, as compared to drug placebo 52. Despite this, it is widely accepted that 40–60% of patients do not show satisfactory response. With regards to Glutamate Modulating Drugs, a recent

51 Leichsenring, F. et al. (2022) “The efficacy of psychotherapies and pharmacotherapies for mental disorders in adults: an umbrella review and meta‐analytic evaluation of recent meta‐analyses,” World Psychiatry, 21(1), pp. 133–145. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20941.

52 Reddy, Y.C.J. and Arumugham, S.S. (2020) “Are current pharmacotherapeutic strategies effective in treating OCD?,” Expert Opinion on Pharmacotherapy, 21(8), pp. 853–856. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14656566.2020.1735355.

meta-analysis found memantine, topiramate, and lamotrigine to be significantly superior to placebo40, but the sample size was, personally too small to extrapolate to conclusions.

It seems possible, from this data, to suggest, as with MDD and GAD, the case for medication usage for OCD in the clinical setting is statistically favourable. The large effects of psychotherapy make it clear that (most likely due to the large involvement of the ‘will’), alongside medication (most likely SSRIs due to the outcomes of past studies), psychotherapy ought to be a vital component of the clinical approach to OCD. Hypothetically, the path for treatment is a grey area due to the presence of complex physiology and the multi-factorial nature of the condition. The impact of self-action and the prominence of SSRIs becomes wholly contradictory to the theories of OCD physiology discussed. Also, the heterogeneity of the condition may also result in different aetiologies of the disease. OCD is by far the most complex condition discussed, due to the immense contrast between clinical outcomes of different treatments and its physiological mechanism. Nevertheless, when statistical data is concerned, and a degree of argument is given to the unknown, there is a large case for medical treatment, especially in combination with the use of psychotherapy.

Part 4: Final Evaluation and Conclusion

Throughout this essay, I have opened the possibility for different approaches to medication use, which I have discussed and evaluated. They are as follows:

i. Medication ought to be used by directly treating a condition (disease-centred model)

ii. Medication ought to be used by alleviating symptoms and providing a mental state, through psychoactive properties, for treatment via psychotherapy

iii. Medication ought not to be used in the clinical setting for the treatment of mental disorder

The first conclusion can be viewed conditionally. For verily, perhaps at a future point, technology may advance in such a way to act on the more complex physiological processes that act on aetiology of the mental disorders discussed. This is beside the point, for, in reality, the current selection of medical treatments does not meet the criteria for acting upon the root physiological processes, with the majority of medication types (primarily SSRIs) being heavily rooted in the monoamine hypothesis for the all of MDD, OCD and GAD, which I have incessantly and unforgivably expressed as reductionist; for all three of the medical disorders (under the assumption of a reductive materialism) such findings on the dysregulation of neurotransmitters are most likely the result of upstream processes, whether unclosed neuronal circuits or decreased neurogenesis and the biochemical impacts of chronic stress. Such complication is further enhanced through the complexity of the will of the patient and the philosophical problem of the impact of the will upon the condition. Therefore, the effect of currently used medical treatments are not therapeutic. When considering, conclusion i) and iii), the differential factor is the statistical efficacy. To repeat trials would be trivial, but I have shown through this essay that, by various different measures of symptoms, the use of medication (even the theoretically reductionist SSRIs) have positive treatment effects, resulting in a decrease in negatively valenced states. The method that this works can be theorised as a drug centred model where concerns lie in the observation of psychoactive effects upon the patient rather than with therapeutic effects. It may be argued that the use of psychoactive substances upon patients is non-medical, for, verily, it goes beyond the domain of medicine (the treatment of disease), yet the clinical landscape has its concern for the individual i.e. the person, with all their experiences (positive and negative); this is observed through the use of palliative care in hospitals to aim at decreasing suffering to the greatest extent. Furthermore, it may be ascertained that the clinical efficacy in such a model is not restricted only to the direct outcomes of the medical intervention but also its translational effects into the engagement of patients with psychotherapy; combined therapy has been observed to have a larger effect size than either alone 53 . Also, another study showed that the SMD for psychotherapy compared

53 Leichsenring, F. et al. (2022) “The efficacy of psychotherapies and pharmacotherapies for mental disorders in adults: an umbrella review and meta‐analytic evaluation of recent meta‐analyses,” World Psychiatry, 21(1), pp. 133–145. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/wps.20941.

to waiting list controls was approximately 0.70 and was also more effective than care-as-usual (SMD of 0.31) and other control groups (0.4)54

Throughout this investigation, I have only mentioned psychotherapy and medication, or both, as treatment options. Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) – often used for treatment resistant depression - is a method that I have not given its due attention. My reasoning for this is simple; while there is some evidence that ECT is not inferior to and possibly has more preferable outcomes than antidepressants in some circumstances 55 ,the research behind the mechanism of ECT efficacy is uncertain and its treatment effect is volatile. Nevertheless, I think it beneficial for researchers to investigate its therapeutic properties.

The Medicalisation of Treatment for mental disorders is not a simple topic. The world of neurology and psychiatry is a vicious battleground, where multiple disciplines (psychology, medicine, philosophy etc.) fight for their case to be heard. In addition, observables and hypothetical theories often contradict, increasing the complexity of deciding on the use of medication for treatment. Nevertheless, throughout this essay, I have established my position in the favouring of statistical efficacies and it is clear that the effect size of medication use for all the conditions discussed is net positive and necessitating action in the clinical environment. Combined with psychotherapy, the benefits of medication become actualised and while, despite the mechanism of psychotherapy only possible to articulate through cognitive higher levels of explanation, there is once again, a statistically significant benefit (as cited previously) . With regards to direct treatment and producing therapeutic effects, I think that further research should be done in the targeting of the more complex physiological processes that underly the conditions so that, in future clinical practise, reversions of patient aetiology to a pre-condition state can be achieved. The nature of the subject is vast and I have only briefly touched upon so-called ‘soft’ disorders, which can be seen as intensely complex due to the impact of the will (such ‘hard’ disorders would include highly genetic, ‘involuntary’ conditions e.g. bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, mood disorders); the will is wholly powerful and to deal with the will is a violation of the objective lens of the empirical scientific method. For now, statistics and trials provide the basis for clinical action, but an individual is not a statistic, but a world-view, influenced and encompassed by their own emotions, experiences, desires and fears; they only wish to return to the state of pre-dysfunction. That is the aim of the physician!

Part 5: Evaluation of Sources

The majority of the sources that I found throughout the research, I used when forming the outline of the essay and the presentation. I mostly used journals (for trials, meta-analyses and literature on physiological processes etc.) e.g. the Lancet, New England Journal of Medicine; these are reliable as they are peer-reviewed and filtered before publication (misinformation is often retracted). For context, the websites I used are reliable sources e.g. Britannica and they provide scientific content to a sufficient academic level for the project. In contrast, I did not use sources which were aimed at the public e.g. mental health charities for scientific information as the information was often simplified for the public eye and lacking nuance and discussion. Despite this, I did use these charities to obtain statistics about incidence rates of mental disorders. I also obtained statistics from public institutions e.g. the NHS and the Office for National Statistics; these are reliable as they are publicly funded and thus in the best interest of the public healthcare system and for optimum treatment outcomes. I also had concerns about funding when it came to clinical trials; I did not use those conducted by larger pharmaceutical companies as a result of possible biases present, which may exaggerate effect sizes. I also did not use ‘health’ websites e.g. Healthline as these had a disposition to prevent information simply to the public eye. Furthermore, I was concerned about information from private healthcare providers e.g. Cleveland Clinic, as these may have financial motives and thus biases.

54 Munder, T. et al. (2018) “Is psychotherapy effective? A re-analysis of treatments for depression,” Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences, 28(03), pp. 268–274. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/s2045796018000355.

55 Trifu, S. et al. (2021) “Efficacy of electroconvulsive therapy as a potential first‑choice treatment in treatment‑resistant depression (Review),” Experimental and Therapeutic Medicine, 22(5). Available at: https://doi.org/10.3892/etm.2021.10716.

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e vs Pi

BY MATTHEW GREENE

(Fifth Year, HELP Level 3, Supervisor: Miss N Vasanthakumar)

e vs Pi

In this essay, I set out to study the mathema�cal constants e and pi through several areas, including their history, modern day uses and interes�ng proper�es, to determine which of the two numbers truly is the most important.

History

Pi:

The first known references to pi are from ancient Babylonian civilisa�on where an es�mated value of 3 was used to calculate the area and perimeter of circles in architecture. However, the Babylonians also had more accurate es�mates including one tablet, thought to be as old as 1900BC, implying that the value of pi is 3.125. The method used by the Babylonians to calculate pi is unknown, although it is likely that they used pieces of string to compare the lengths of the perimeter and diameter of circular objects. The Babylonians were not the only civilisa�on to reference pi though, with the Rhind Mathema�cal Papyrus from 1650BC Egypt using the value of 3.16 for pi to calculate the area of circles.

The next major discovery on pi came over a millennium later in 250BC when the famous Greek mathema�cian Archimedes found a method for calcula�ng the value of pi using inscribed and circumscribed polygons (see figure 1).

The method works by calcula�ng the perimeter of the inscribed (inside the circle) polygon, giving the lower bound for the possible values of the perimeter of the circle. The same can then be done for the circumscribed (outside the circle) polygon, giving the upper bound for the possible values of the perimeter. This works as the perimeter of the circle must be larger than the perimeter of the inscribed polygon but smaller than the perimeter of the circumscribed polygon. The upper and lower bounds can then be divided by the diameter of the circle to give a range for the possible values of pi. The greater the number of sides of the polygon used, the closer the range of possible values is to the true value of pi. An example of this is that when a hexagon (6-sided polygon) is used it can be shown that 3 < π < 3.464. The largest polygon that Archimedes used was a 96-sided polygon and from this

Figure 1

he determined that 3.141 < π < 3.143 This method can also be used with area as well as perimeter and it usually uses a circle with radius length 1 for ease of calcula�on.

A formula for calcula�ng the lower bound of pi:*

1

2 �������� × �

2 2 cos �360 �������� �

A formula for calcula�ng the upper bound of pi:*

tan �360

2�������� � × ��������

In both equa�ons n represents the number of sides of the polygon

For the next millennium, Archimedes’ polygon method remained the main way of calcula�ng pi, with many mathema�cians using polygons with more and more sides in order to calculate a more precise value. This reached a climax in 1630 when an Austrian mathema�cian and astronomer called Christoph Grienberger correctly calculated 38 digits of pi by using polygons with 1040 sides.

However, this record was soon to be broken with new developments in infinite series allowing pi to be calculated far more effec�vely and to more decimal places. An infinite series is the sum of all of the terms in an infinite sequence, in which the magnitude of the terms normally decreases as the sequence progresses, un�l they have very litle effect on the total sum of the sequence. There are many infinite series which can be used to calculate pi but perhaps one of the most famous ones is the Gregory-Leibniz series (also known as the Madhava series):

The Gregory-Leibniz series for pi is a special case of the arctan/inverse tan series (shown on the right), giving the value of π/4 when calculated with x = 1 as tan(π/4 radians) = 1. In 1699, English mathema�cian Abraham Sharp used an arctan series to find 71 digits of pi, bea�ng the previous record of 38 digits which was set using polygons. When using infinite series, a very important factor which determines how useful the sequence is at calcula�ng a precise value is its rate of convergence (how many terms the sequence takes to get close to the true value) This is as if a sequence has a slow rate of convergence, it will be too �me consuming to be used to find a precise value; whereas a sequence with a quick rate of convergence will be able to find a more precise value in far less �me.

The Gregory-Leibniz series (above) has a rela�vely slow rate of convergence when compared to other infinite series for pi, such as Machin’s series which John Machin himself used in 1706 to reach 100 digits of pi:

Note that all angles are in radians and not degrees

For the next 240 years, infinite series methods remained the most popular and effec�ve way of calcula�ng pi with many mathema�cians finding sequences with quicker rates of convergence and breaking the record for the number of digits discovered. This reached a peak in 1946 when Daniel Ferguson correctly reached 620 digits, which remains the record for the most digits of pi calculated without the use of an electronic calculator

The inven�on of the computer in the late 1940s drama�cally transformed the ability to calculate digits of pi, with the record for the number of digits being broken in regular succession as computers grew in power and ability. This record started at 1,120 digits in 1949 but grew exponen�ally to 1,000,000 digits by 1973, that an increase of 89,286%! Although computers were originally only being used to perform the same arctan infinite series methods that were once done by hand, they

also brought about a new method of calcula�ng pi in itera�ve algorithms. Itera�ve algorithms differ from infinite series as they use the output of the last term as an input for the next term, allowing them to calculate far more digits each �me. Despite this being the case, they are not always more efficient and can end up being more �me consuming due to the very large amounts of memory and processing power they require, leaving infinite series s�ll being the most popular method. Today 100 trillion digits of pi are known, a record set on 21st of March 2022 by Google. The calcula�on took over 157 days to complete and during its running 82,000 terabytes of data was read and writen!

Despite the long history of pi, the adop�on of its name and symbol (pi, π) are rela�vely recent, occurring in the 18th century. The symbol π was originally used in mathema�cs to represent the semiperimeter (half circumference) of a circle and the symbol δ (delta) was used to represent either the diameter or radius. This meant that the nota�on π/δ was used to show the ra�o of the semiperimeter to the radius (which is equivalent to the ra�o of the circumference to the diameter). In 1706, William Jones became the first to use the symbol π alone to represent the ra�o in a work of his, however the nota�on π/δ s�ll remained the main representa�on for the ra�o. It was the Swiss mathema�cian Leonhard Euler who popularised the use of the symbol π alone when he adopted it into his work in 1727; however it is important to note that Euler used the symbol π to represent both the numbers 3.14… and 6.28…(equivalent to modern day 2pi) in different works of his, eventually setling on the value by which we know pi today. The value of 2pi (6.28…) was later given its own symbol of τ (the Greek leter tau).

e:

When compared to that of pi, the history of e is very modern, with the first references being from 1618 in a book on logarithms by John Napier (although it is now believed to have been predominantly writen by William Oughtred) The number e, though, did not appear itself in the book with the only references being a table in the appendix showing the base e logarithms (natural logarithms) of some numbers.

The first actual men�on of the number e came 65 years later in 1683 when Jacob Bernoulli was inves�ga�ng compound interest. Bernoulli wanted to find out how much 1 Franc would be worth a�er a year if it had an interest rate of 100% per annum but the interest was compounded con�nuously. Below is a table detailing how much the 1 Franc would be worth depending on how many �mes it is compounded:

The general formula to calculate the value a�er the year is (1+1/n)n, where n is the number of �mes compounded. By studying this table, it becomes evident that the value a�er the year is approaching a certain number. This certain number is the number that would be obtained if the interest is

compounded con�nuously and in order to calculate this number, we must take the limit of (1+1/n)n as n approaches infinity:

Calcula�ng this gives us the value of 2.718281828… (or e); however, at the �me of finding, Jacob Bernoulli was unable to calculate the value more accurately than 2.5 < e < 3. Bernoulli was also unable to spot the connec�on between the number he had found and the one which William Oughtred had used as the base for some of his logarithms.

The next major development in the history of e came from the great Swiss mathema�cian Leonhard Euler Much like with pi, Euler is responsible for the adop�on of the symbol e to represent the constant, first using it in a 1731 leter to Prussian mathema�cian Chris�an Goldbach. Despite the common beliefs, Euler did not choose the leter e due to it being the first leter of his surname or of the word exponen�al, but rather because it was the next leter of the alphabet which was not already being used in mathema�cs. Many other leters have been used to represent the constant over the years, such as b, a and c by other mathema�cians such as Leibniz, although it is the symbol e which has now become universally adopted.

Euler is also responsible for finding the first and main infinite series for e:

This infinite series can be derived by performing binomial expansion on the formula for e from compound interest, as shown below:

Figure 2

In order to calculate the coefficients in our expansion we must use the formula:

In which n is the exponent and k is the term of the expansion.

Subs�tu�ng the term of the expansion in for k (n remains the same, as the exponent is n) gives us the following coefficients: (it is important to note that the first term is n = 0 not 1)

These coefficients can then be simplified to:

Now that the coefficients have been calculated we can do the full expansion:

As 1 to the power of anything is 1 this can be simplified to:

This can be further simplified by mul�plying every n with every 1/n:

As n is tending to infinity, any frac�on with n as the denominator must tend to 0:

This can then be simplified to give the infinite series:

This infinite series is far more useful than the original formula for e from compound interest as it has a high rate of convergence, allowing Euler to use it in order to calculate the value of e to 23 decimal places. Leonhard Euler was also the first to prove that e is irra�onal and used the constant in his famous “Euler’s Iden�ty” (I will explain both of these things in more detail later on in the essay). A�er Euler’s great contribu�ons to the development of e, it is no surprise that the constant is commonly referred to as Euler’s number.

Sadly for e, unlike pi, a race to calculate its digits never really took place, with only a handful of mathema�cians atemp�ng to do so over the years. One of these mathema�cians was William Shanks who in 1871 calculated e to 205 decimal places using Euler’s infinite series. Interes�ngly, Shanks also calculated pi to 707 decimal places, but made a mistake on the 528th digit, leading to that digit and all following ones being incorrect. Similarly to with pi, the inven�on of the computer transformed the ability to calculate e, with John von Neumann calcula�ng it to 2,010 digits in 1949 on the ENIAC, a major improvement on the previous record. Today, e is known to 31,415,926,535,897 decimal digits (this number looks familiar…), a record set by David Christle on the 5th of December 2020, taking over 96 days to complete.

Modern Day Uses

Pi:

The main modern-day use of pi is undoubtedly in architecture, where pi is frequently needed to calculate the surface areas, volumes and lengths of shapes being used in construc�on.

The explora�on of space would have also not been possible without pi as not only is it needed in the manufacturing of a spacecra� ’s parts, but it is also needed in the calcula�ons of a spacecra� ’s launch and re-entry angles. All satellites also con�nuously rely on pi in order to stay in orbit and communicate with Earth

Swinging objects, such as pendulums, also have a connec�on to pi because of their circular mo�on. The �me it takes a pendulum to complete one cycle can be found using the formula: �������� =2�������� × � �������� �������� , in which L is the length of the pendulum in metres, g is the rate of accelera�on due to gravity (this is approximately 9.8m/s2 on Earth) and t is the �me taken in seconds. By using this formula, we can find that in order to have one swing of the pendulum every second (one cycle every 2 seconds) the pendulum must be 0.994m long on Earth; although it would need to be 2.51m long on Jupiter!

e:

Similarly to with pi, e has many day to day uses, including being used when calcula�ng exponen�al growth or decay. The formula to calculate exponen�al growth is as follows:

In which A is the amount a�er the �me, A0 is the amount at the start, k is the rate of increase and t is the amount of �me. The formula for exponen�al decay is very similar, except k must be made nega�ve as it is a rate of decrease:

This equa�on is o�en used in carbon da�ng as it provides an accurate es�mate for the age of an artefact based on the amount of decay. It is important to note that these equa�ons involving e should be used when the growth or decay is con�nuous, for example in the mul�plica�on of bacteria or the decay of radioac�ve atoms, whereas different equa�ons (below) should be used if the growth or the decay only happens at the end of each �me period, for example annual interest.

Euler’s number has also played a role recently in the COVID pandemic, being used by researchers in order to model the rate of spread of the virus and the changing number of cases.

Interes�ng Proper�es

One interes�ng property of both e and pi is how they appear side by side in S�rling’s approxima�on:

S�rling’s approxima�on is a formula which can be used to es�mate the factorial of a number to striking precision, especially when using large numbers. The table below shows the precision of S�rling’s approxima�on:

The main use of S�rling’s approxima�on is to calculate the factorials of very large numbers as it requires far less processing �me and power than the normal factorial func�on, whilst s�ll finding a value which is accurate enough to be usable. Another important use of S�rling’s approxima�on is that, unlike the normal factorial func�on, it can be used to find the factorials of non-integers as well as integers; however, the approxima�on does not work for the factorials of nega�ve numbers.

Another interes�ng property of e and pi is how both numbers are irra�onal and transcendental. Being irra�onal means that the number cannot be expressed as a single frac�on in which both the numerator and denominator are integers (whole numbers) It is impossible for all of the digits of an irra�onal number to ever be known due to the fact that they are both infinite and non-repea�ng There are many other examples of irra�onal numbers as well as e and pi, with more irra�onal

numbers actually exis�ng than ra�onal numbers, but some of the most famous examples are √2 and φ (the golden ra�o, approximately 1.618). However, unlike √2 and φ, e and pi belong to a further subset within the irra�onal numbers by being transcendental. A transcendental number is the opposite of an algebraic number as it is not the root of any polynomial of a finite length that has integer coefficients. This means that in order to reach a transcendental number, infinite length polynomials or special transcendental func�ons must be used Transcendental numbers can also be very hard to find and prove, an example of this being that it is known that at least one of π + e or π × e is transcendental, however it is unknown which one is transcendental and it could even be both!

The graph of y = ex , otherwise known as the exponen�al curve, also has some interes�ng proper�es. This is as the deriva�ve of ex is ex , making it the only func�on whose deriva�ve is itself. This means that for any point on the curve, the y coordinate of that point is equal to its gradient (see figure 3)

Another interes�ng feature of this curve and all other exponen�al curves is that they have an asymptote at y = 0 (the x axis) and so although they get infinitely close to the x axis, they never actually touch it.

Should We Even Be Using Pi?

Despite being one of the greatest ever mathema�cal constants, there is an ongoing debate about whether we should be using pi or if tau (equivalent to 2pi) would be easier, with many in favour of the later. The main advantage of using tau over pi comes when studying the number of radians in a circle. Similarly to degrees, radians are a measurement of the size of an angle, with one radian equalling roughly 57.3 ( 180 �������� ���������������� 360 �������� ) degrees. Radians are o�en thought of as a more natural unit than degrees and one radian is defined as the angle subtended at the centre of the circle by an arc which is the same length as the radius (see figure 4).

Figure 4

Figure 3

As the circumference of a circle = 2πr, this means that 2π (τ) radii can fit along the circumference and so there are 2π (τ) radians in 360o . Figure 5 below shows the number of radians for every quarter of a circle in terms of both pi and tau:

This diagram shows that pi only represents a semi-circle whereas tau represents the whole circle and when the frac�ons are in terms of tau, they are easier to understand and more intui�ve.

This argument is further backed up by the fact that pi already occurs in lots of formulae as 2pi and so the use of tau would simplify these formulae and make them easier to understand. If mathema�cians are in agreement that the radius is more important than the diameter, isn’t the ra�o of the circumference to the radius (tau) also more important than the ra�o of the circumference to the diameter (pi)?

Euler’s Iden�ty

Euler’s iden�ty is undoubtedly the most beau�ful and intriguing line of mathema�cs ever writen:

This is due to how simple the iden�ty is, whilst s�ll containing five of the most important constants:

e: the base of exponen�al growth and natural logarithms (approximately 2.71828)

i: the imaginary unit (√ 1)

pi: the ra�o of a circle’s circumference to its diameter (approximately 3.14159)

1: the mul�plica�ve iden�ty

0: the addi�ve iden�ty

Figure 5

The proof for Euler’s iden�ty once again comes back to infinite series, as is o�en the case for formulae involving e and pi. The infinite series for ex is very similar to the infinite series for e (shown earlier in the history of e):

This can then be modified for the infinite series of eix:

This can then be simplified as: i = i, i2 = -1, i3 = -i, i4 = 1, i5 = i…

We can then split this infinite series into terms not containing i and terms containing i and then factor out i:

These two separate infinite series may now look familiar as they are the infinite series for cosine and sine:

This means that:

We can then subs�tute the value of π in for x (it is important to note that for the cosine and sine func�ons the value of x in is radians and not degrees):

Incredible, simply incredible! It is also interes�ng to note the result if we use tau instead of pi:

Just as, if not more, impressive!

Conclusion

A�er having studied both the numbers pi and e, I believe that what makes them so interes�ng is how they appear in so many areas of mathema�cs, other than where they were first found and how they

appear in some areas to which they seem to have no rela�on at all. It is also amazing how these two numbers appear side by side in some of math’s most important and intriguing equa�ons, despite having been discovered over 3000 years apart!

However, I believe that overall e is more important than pi. This is as in a modern and constantly evolving world, rates have become very important, to which e is key, and, although e may not have as much history as pi, it will tell us more about history than pi ever will through its major role in carbonda�ng. As for whether tau should be used instead of pi, I believe that tau is more useful than pi, represen�ng the whole circle instead of a semi-circle, however as the conven�on of using pi has been around for such a long �me it is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

*How to derive the formulae for the lower and upper bounds of pi using Archimedes’ method:

Bibliography

What is Pi? | Pi Day

A Brief History of Pi (π) | Exploratorium

Pi - Wikipedia

100 Trillion Slices Of Pi: Google Smashes Record For Calcula�on (Again) | IFLScience

Pi - Numberphile - YouTube

htps://mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/HistTopics/e/ e (numberworld.org)

The History of e: Bernoulli and Compound Interest - YouTube

Figure 2: This work is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0

Gaoliang Bridge: This work is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0

The History of e: Binomial Theorem - YouTube

Pi | Defini�on, Symbol, Number, & Facts | Britannica

Exponen�al Growth and Decay | College Algebra (lumenlearning.com)

S�rling's approxima�on - Wikipedia

Deriva�ve of ��������ˣ (video) | Khan Academy

Tau replaces Pi - Numberphile - YouTube

What are Radians? | Radian (Unit of Plane Angle) | Infinity Learn - YouTube

Euler's formula & Euler's iden�ty (video) | Khan Academy

Why do Buses Come in Threes? – Rob Eastaway and Jeremy Wyndham

How Long is a Piece of String? – Rob Eastaway and Jeremy Wyndham

Writen by Mathew Greene 5H

CAN HUMANITY EVER DETERMINE

A UNIVERSALLY APPLICABLE CERTAINTY?

BY JAYDEN ONI

(Fifth Year, HELP Level 3, Supervisor: Mr B Clark)

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty?

– Jayden Oni 5E

Preface

Preface

The epistemological topic regarding the questioning of the validity of ‘human’ certainty has historically been one of the most thoroughly debated in the whole of philosophy. While ostensibly this question is very simple, it is in reality one of the most complex and significant questions to both ask, and answer, with it acting as a basis of the formation of many others For an example, it puts into question the usefulness of our knowledge: with the whole of human society being fundamentally built upon and reliant on the knowledge it possesses, if we cannot guarantee the reliability or accuracy of our knowledge then arguably our knowledge has no purpose. Additionally, the prospect of uncertainty is indeed naturally very troubling and unsettling as a human question, with this causing many well renown philosophers such as Descartes, Plato, and Aristotle to obsess over it and seek extensively for any sign of something (physical or metaphysical) that is necessarily certain to prove that humanity ‘can’ be certain, demonstrating the question’s philosophical importance. Yet despite this, the question is unfortunately very overlooked by the average non –philosopher, due to them viewing the question as basic and simplistic, often answering with a variation of ‘humans can be certain, as we have facts and science to prove it’, thereby failing to recognise that the answer is not as simple as this. This is why I believe the topic is of particular relevance in this project, as I aim to convert these forgivably short – sighted individuals into viewing this question in a broader perspective, by providing an accessible series of arguments, counter – arguments, and my position on the matter.

I will explore three main subjects in this project, commencing by clarifying, contextualising, and providing a background to the meaning of the specific question that I will answer (‘Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty’) by defining and comparing the types of certainty. Next, I will fully evaluate the argument of the empiricists (largely including Aristotle), before proceeding to do the same with the arguments from the rationalists (mainly Descartes and Plato). Any key terms in italics in my arguments will be defined in the Glossary at the end of this project.

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni Contents

Contents

Preface………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………123 Contents

Section

Section 2 – Empiricism: Can we determine certainty from observation?.........................127

Section 3 – Rationalism: Is true knowledge only obtainable from the mind?…………………131

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Section 1 – What is it certainty?

Section 1 – What is certainty?

Contrary to what the majority would believe, in Epistemology the term ‘certain’ is a very broad one, one that has many different implications in different scenarios. Therefore, in order to provide arguments surrounding it, it is crucial that I address and clarify not only the background of which ‘type’ of certainty I will be concerned with in this project and why, yet also the explanations of different types of certainty.

The main three types of ‘certainty’ are epistemic certainty, psychological certainty, and metaphysical (or objective) certainty. To commence, a metaphysical certainty, according to the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, is a proposition that is necessarily true, this is the type of ‘Universally applicable certainty’ (also stated in this project’s question I will be answering) that I will be focused on. It is a certainty that categorises anything that is, without any rational grounds for doubting, universally true These certainties ‘could’ be, as is suggested in the name, metaphysical (e.g., properties of beliefs) yet they could also be logical (based on reason) or physical (e.g., derived from observation). Moreover, metaphysical certainties are ones that, as Plato particularly believed, are simply not dependant on anything in the universe, and therefore they are immutable While these certainties may exist, it is the question of whether or not us humans, who can ‘supposedly’ only base knowledge off of observation or our imperfect cognitive capabilities, are capable of determining one, and if so, what is this metaphysical certainty. As additional context, to ‘determine’ a metaphysical certainty, is not humans just simply at random or fortune (without actually knowing if they are correct) discovering a metaphysical, logical, or physical aspect that is necessarily certain - this is rather known as accidental knowledge which will be alluded to in the following sections. It instead entails humans rightfully establishing a fundamental and universal certainty. In fact, human knowledge does, depending on how you define knowledge, have the possibility of being reflective of a metaphysical certainty, however the issue is if we can be absolutely sure, without any doubt, that a particular piece of knowledge is as such, as if we are not able to, then it cannot be rationally viewed as one. For instance, as also stated by the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the statement ‘It rains in Paris’ even if true, cannot be viewed as metaphysically certain, as there is a possibility that it does not rain in Paris. This is as human observations of it raining in Paris may be false, and additionally immediately once you make that statement,

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Section 1 – What is certainty?

it is possible that it never rains in Paris again rendering your statement incorrect. Another type of certainty is epistemic certainty, which according to the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, is a proposition that is certain relative to the epistemic position of a subject. In addition to its definition, it is crucial that, despite their relation, we distinguish epistemic certainties from psychological certainties, which are instead – again according to the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy – ‘attitudes’ adopted towards a certain issue. For an example, if a subject x states that ‘It is certain that y is not present in school, because he was registered as ill’, it is an epistemic certainty, as subject x is using how certain they are of the knowledge they have to make this statement. However, if subject x instead states that ‘It is certain for me that y is not present’, it rather reveals a psychological attitude of them towards the issue, made primarily in the absence of sources of knowledge – this is therefore a psychological certainty. The fundamental difference ought to be made between these two certainties and metaphysical certainty, is that while epistemic and psychological certainty both can exist in the absence of truth, metaphysical certainties are always true. While ostensibly from this, epistemic and psychological certainties would be unable to aid us in discovering a metaphysical certainty due to this vast difference, in reality all types of certainty are very interlinked, especially surrounding their connections to knowledge and belief. For an example, Descartes used the idea of epistemic certainty, with e.g. a belief and logical justification, as an aspect of his argument for the presence of a particular metaphysical certainty In addition, psychological certainties have a clear logical relation to belief (again, aspects of Descartes’ argument in particular) as explained by the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: ‘Whenever a subject is certain of p, they take p to be true which is characteristic of the attitude of a belief’. Therefore, while the focus on this project will be on metaphysical certainties, it is important to consider other certainties, and evaluate how effective they are in the ‘solving’ of this project’s question, as I will proceed to do in the next sections.

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Section 2 – Empiricism: Can we determine certainty from observation.

Section 2 – Empiricism: Can we determine certainty from observation?

Empiricism is defined as – again by the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy – the belief that all knowledge comes from empirical observation, with some knowledge being a reflection of our ideas received from experience. The key figure behind empiricism is undoubtedly Aristotle, who believed that true knowledge (i.e. metaphysical certainty) must be obtainable from physical things of which we can observe. This is as even if our senses may be faulty and unreliable, as rationalists like Plato and Descartes heavily argue, for physical things to exist they must eventually have, even if it takes an *infinite* regress of analysation and justification, a constant property. The reason as to why infinite has been put in asterisks here will be addressed further down in this section. Therefore, in the context of the question, it supports the fact that there is a possibility that humanity could determine a metaphysical certainty, as there are constant physical properties of which are therefore observable.

The fundamental reason that the opposing argument of rationalism (as will be explained in the following section) uses against empiricism is that physical things are constantly becoming, or in other words changing. They argued that for something physical to be constant, it would need for an example to have the shape, density, temperature, chemical formula (of atoms) to be constant at an infinitely precise degree (e.g. the temperature must be the same to an infinite number of decimal places), and that this was not possible. However, Aristotle dealt with this argument by accepting the fact that properties of physical things are always changing, yet for change to occur, something must be constant, otherwise you would essentially be changing nothing and therefore there is no change As the Philosophy 1 a guide through the subject book states, change can come in two forms, one being the inherent properties of a substance changing (alteration), and the other being new substances coming into existence (substantial generation) . For alteration, Aristotle’s above view on change can be, at least in theory, easily defended due to the fact that if change is only occurring to the properties of a certain substance, then even if all the properties are changing, it is still a metaphysical certainty that there is the presence of the atoms of that fixed substance, of which their properties are being subjected to change.

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Section 2 – Empiricism: Can we determine certainty from observation?

With alteration, change could be interpreted to only occur on properties, with it also requiring a substance that has these properties, and if you were to say that there is no constant in this type of change, you are essentially saying that no substance exists and just properties do. Yet if you are changing just properties without a substance, you are essentially changing emptiness which cannot occur as here there is no change. However, it is undoubtedly very difficult to argue that substances do not change when its (nominal) essence is constantly changing. In fact, as stated in the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, substances are generally defined as a composite of (physical) existence and essence, thereby directly indicating that an essence is what makes up a substance, and they cannot be separated as is done in this above interpretation of alteration. In my opinion, if you admit believing in alteration in this sense, you must also admit that you cannot define a substance by its essence (as otherwise you are not being logically consistent which is needed in the search for truth) yet is it even possible to define a substance not using this? You could argue that you instead define it by its atomic structure, yet a simple counter – argument to this would be that we can only define an atomic structure by the properties of the atoms involved (e.g. number of electron shells, shape size). Yet despite this, since new substances are not being formed (as this is not substantial generation), there must be some constant between the changed substance and the original substance Aristotle used logical means to argue for this, by claiming that changes to properties (the essence) of physical substances can only involve changes into actual opposites of the essences of the substance, of which can facilitate these changes. For an example, as the Philosophy 1 a guide through the subject book also states, a substance may have the essence of red or musical. If this is the case Aristotle would argue that red to not – red or musical to not – musical would be actual opposites and therefore only these actual changes could occur to those properties that make up the respective essences of the substances. Yet, while a change can occur from (red) to (musical and not – red), the musical aspect is simply accidental but the actual change that is occurring here is from red to not – red, the musical property is rather acquired from external sources as a new property and is crucially not newly generated (substantial generation). As a change from for an example red to musical is not possible, yet red to not –red is, there (according to Aristotle) must be a relation between the essence of red and not – red that allows for this, and as a substance is partially defined by its essence, there must also be a certain constant in this substance. Aristotle further defended this by stating that changes occur from a primary substance to a secondary substance, and from a secondary substance to a tertiary substance etc., with e.g. the secondary substances being a species/genus of the primary substance These changes can be related to the changes in the 7

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Section 2 – Empiricism: Can we determine certainty from observation?

forms of life from the kingdom (e.g. of animalia) to the species (e.g. of homo sapiens), yet even though these are changes, there are still many similarities between the broader category of all animals and the specific species of humans, with there appearing to be many constants between them.

Aristotle also used those above views to explain how it was less reasonable to believe that substantial generation can occur, yet rather only alteration does. However, if there is any possibility that substantial generation can occur in our world, then it renders all of his above arguments as inapplicable (we cannot be absolutely certain that certainties can be determined from physical substances), as now new substances could be formed, and a change could occur from red to musical, and we have definite reason to believe that there is a possibility. One crucial flaw (in my perspective) of Aristotle’s argument is that he fails to address the fact that our senses could be completely faulty into the true reality of things. He seems to rely on the fact that what we observe does not appear to be completely changing yet rather appears to simply be alteration, for an example a table does not appear to change into grass and back suddenly multiple times a second – bearing in mind that substantial generation requires a complete substance and property change essentially implying a complete change where the resulting ‘thing’ is entirely different. Yet, it is absolutely possible that our senses could be highly inaccurate and actually everything is in a constant state of substantial generation – while ostensibly this may seem like an arbitrary point to make, if we cannot be 100% certain of the accuracy of our senses as we are not, this is a possibility. Therefore, taking into account that a metaphysical certainty can only exist in the form of a 100% possibility, this argument suggests that humanity cannot claim that physical constants can exist in the form of a metaphysical certainty

Another key weakness of the general argument of Aristotle is when it comes to accidental true knowledge/certainty. Accidental knowledge is when, as referred to in the previous section, we discover a metaphysical certainty by means which in reality do not guarantee that what we have discovered is definitely certain. Particularly with physical things, to attempt to ‘determine’ a metaphysical certainty, you would need to be able to firstly observe it, secondly form a belief on it (that it has a certain constant property), before then having a justification for this belief, which ends up being true. This is not too dis – similar to epistemic certainty, whereby one uses the knowledge they have to deem a proposition as certain, with in this case the knowledge being partially from observation.

Section 2 – Empiricism: Can we determine certainty from observation?

However, the fundamental drawback of epistemic certainties, as previously discussed, is that they have the possibility of existing in the absence of truth, and therefore are not definite means by which to determine a metaphysical certainty. For an example in the context of observation, you could see a purple car pass your house and by ‘knowing’ that subject x has a purple car, and that they were meant to turn up to your house that day, you believe that they have arrived. It then turns out that subject x did arrive soon after, yet they were not travelling in that purple car. The issue here is that while you have made a belief and justification that has become true, this should not have been certain as your means for determining the nature of the proposition were false, and you have rather determined it accidentally This is a problem that evidently needs addressing in empiricism as otherwise how you would go about attempting to determine certainties, even if it does sometimes ‘work’, would not enable you to rightfully establish one without any possibility of being false. Yet with Aristotle and empiricism, the only method to absolutely ensure that accidental knowledge does not occur is by providing an infinite regress of justification from an infinite regress of observation, which simply is not possible for humanity, therefore meaning that we could not determine metaphysical certainties from physical properties.

These prominent issues with empiricism, particularly surrounding substantial generation and accidental knowledge are the primary reasons as to why in my opinion it is less reasonable to believe in this argument. It simply fails to acknowledge and consider how our senses could be completely faulty, and additionally how even though we could obtain knowledge accidentally by the means of this argument, if we are ultimately concerned about true knowledge which this project is, then it is, to a great extent, not useful in practice.

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Section 3 – Rationalism: Is true knowledge only obtainable from the mind?

Section 3 – Rationalism: Is true knowledge only obtainable from the mind?

Rationalism is the general belief that true knowledge (metaphysical certainties) can only be verified from ‘propositional’ logic/reason, metaphysical sources, and ultimately belief. Rationalists believe that any physical proposition (e.g., those in empiricism) can not only never be verified, yet can never be guaranteed to be constant, as instead substances are always becoming/changing, and are never fixed. It is an argument that is partially reliant on epistemic certainties/uncertainties, for an example take subject x to believe in proposition y because of reason z, while proposition y (if it is physical) cannot be verified from reason z, the existence of reason z within the intuit of subject x can possibly be verified. However, as stated by the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, the strength of the views on rationalism can vary from argument to argument, depending on their understanding of the warrant of the proposition. Some believe that the epistemic property of propositions/beliefs are beyond even the slightest of doubts, whilst others can be less absolute and instead say that they are simply beyond any reasonable doubt The distinction between these two is crucial, as for the latter, it accepts that ‘unreasonable’ doubt or doubt fundamentally of a lower possibility of being true does inhibit the rationalist argument, and therefore while the rationalist argument may be more reasonable to believe, it can never be a means of truly finding a proposition that is 100% certain

However, in the quest for true knowledge, someone who argued against this view is Descartes, who through his vigorous methods and principles of – as stated in the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy – considering any belief that falls prey to even the slightest of doubts as false, claimed to have determined a metaphysical certainty. For an example, he even went as far as considering how an evil demon could be deceiving him – even though he did not believe this, since he was searching for absolute certainty, he had to identify this as a doubt. This is a form of scepticism, whereby you keep doubting and doubting until there is no longer any reason to doubt. Scepticism is additionally a means of preventing accidental knowledge from occurring, and it is used in both empiricism as previously explained, and in rationalism, however yet again I believe there is a key distinction between scepticism in both of these arguments. In empiricism, it consists of doubting the reason you already have for the existence of something physical and therefore forming new reason (this leads to infinite regress), yet in Descartes’ interpretation of rationalism,

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Section 3 – Rationalism: Is true knowledge only obtainable from the mind?

it consists of doubting knowledge until a. Either all knowledge is doubted, or b. You reach a very basic form of knowledge that cannot be doubted. This crucially does not lead to an infinite regress since knowledge (certain or uncertain) is finite and easily categorised (bearing in mind here I am referring to human knowledge) which therefore in my opinion strengthens this argument. A logical counter – argument to my above view would be that knowledge (again certain or uncertain) is constantly expanding as us humans learn, and while this is true, as said above, it can be easily categorised and collectively dismissed (e.g. empiricism as a whole) and additionally human knowledge, even if it continues to expand, never will be infinite, the prospect of it being infinite would be the only thing that renders it impossible for humanity to determine a certainty through rationalism.

Using these methods, Descartes eventually determined the first certainty that he believed was indubitable, and that was, famously ‘I think, therefore I am’. His reasoning for this was that even though he had considered all beliefs based on senses as false, since he convinced himself that these beliefs were false, he must exist, since in that statement there is a ‘he’ that is being convinced. In my opinion, this is a strong argument, as without him existing in this case, there would be no convincing as nothing is doing the convincing and nothing is receiving the convincing, and additionally when we talk about convincing, we are referring to the convincing of a ‘mind’, not anything else. Ostensibly, this argument may seem to concur with the empiricist argument, as for him to exist, supposedly a physical substance must be present. However, Descartes perception of ‘existence’ was different to this, he instead believed that he was a ‘thinking thing’, and that the mind was what defined him, as unlike the physical aspects of him which are constantly becoming and are dependent on something, the mind is not dependant on anything, except existence. He then furthered this view by claiming that since e.g. intellect is solely part of the mind, yet e.g. sensation is not yet rather is dependent on the body, intellect too must exist, which includes logic, reasoning, and belief. In my opinion, this argument is also very strong, as even if e.g. logic, reason, or belief x works to justify physical proposition y, since x is not a conviction or verdict which would be unreasonable here (since the proposition is physical) and therefore doubtable, we can very reasonably say that x is true, as if we say it is false then we are essentially stating that the existence of x is doubtable, which is completely irrational for me due to the above arguments. A key counter – argument however that must be addressed with this view is that what if an ‘omnipotent’ devil did exist, and has all the capabilities of deception, including deceiving your thoughts – since this project is concerned with complete

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Section 3 – Rationalism: Is true knowledge only obtainable from the mind?

certainty, we must be able to dismiss this doubt in order to confirm the absolute status of this supposed certainty. My argument would be that since none of these certainties are convictions of physical reality yet are merely human conceptions (they are metaphysical), we can choose how to define them. For an example, if we go back to the notion of Descartes believing he was convinced, it does not matter whether or not this belief was true as ultimately the definition of ‘to be convinced’ is metaphysical and ambiguous, yet with his (or what he defines to be him) metaphysical definition of ‘convinced’, ‘mind’, and ‘existence’, he can be certain that he does exist

Plato is another philosopher who argued against the idea that knowledge can be obtained through observation, yet it goes without saying that his argument largely differs to that of Descartes. While still a rationalist view, he believed that only the ‘forms’ obtained by the senses are subject to change and are therefore unverifiable, however us humans can use reason to gain knowledge of unchanging forms. ‘Forms’ are what Plato believed to be the fundamental connections between things that exist, this is crucially different to the essence of these things, which are instead the properties a thing has For an example, as stated in Britannica, to say that ‘This is a triangle’ is a certain form that many, differently drawn, triangles would share, yet properties like size or angles would be part of the essence that differs between each, these are rather known as particulars. Plato believed that unlike particulars, unchanging forms do not exist/are not substances in space and time, and additionally do not change, they are eternal/immutable and just simply ‘are’ without variation or qualification and therefore only these are the ‘objects’ that you can apprehend when you obtain knowledge.

However, as indicated by the Philosophy 1 a guide through the subject book, there are many flaws with this argument, especially surrounding self – predication. Self – predication (of forms) is where a form is believed to be an instance of itself (e.g. the form of being beautiful is beautiful), yet if Plato did believe in this, we can argue that this belief is irrational, as e.g. the property of being beautiful is not necessarily beautiful itself, especially if it does not exist in space and time. Yet if Plato says that forms simply ‘are’ and never ‘are not’, does he not have to admit to believing in self – predication? Again, stated by the book, for some of his reasoning Plato appears to refer to forms as paradigms, or ‘supreme instances’ of a certain property (e.g. perfectly beautiful as a pose to beautiful) – yet this again is self –defeating in his argument. This is firstly, Plato has reason to use paradigms, as if forms were as such, the properties of existing things would have something to be judged relative to its absolute form, and therefore (as Plato intended with forms) there would be this

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Section 3 – Rationalism: Is true knowledge only obtainable from the mind?

connection between the substance and the form. This would not be the case if Plato assumed forms to be simply properties as then forms would be too specific and would not allow for the properties of substances to be judged relative to anything. However despite this, the belief in paradigms causes two main problems, firstly of how can forms be absolute (e.g. how can we have something that is truly beautiful, is this not subjective and additionally would lead to infinite regress as anything beautiful can be made more beautiful), and secondly some forms do not have gradations (e.g. something cannot be more or less triangular) and therefore would not be able to exist as a paradigm. In fact, with the belief of forms, Plato makes too many assumptions and not enough reasons, which weakens his argument. Therefore, while not completely irrational, Plato’s argument that absolute certainty is obtained from forms is less plausible given its abundance of fundamental flaws.

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Conclusion

Conclusion

Overall, while of course my arguments are merely summaries not reflecting the true vastness of all arguments on this topic, I believe that Descartes’ argument of only the mind and its thinkings being metaphysically certain is the strongest and the one I would argue for, as it was the one that was the most considerate of the smallest of doubts, and only argued for indubitable propositions. After all, my project is only concerned with absolute certainties, and while it may be for an example still reasonable to assume most of the things we see from observation to be true (empiricism), since it is not certain, we must dismiss it. However, science is a prominent example of increasingly justified propositions from observation, which – even though it is not certain – is still very useful and increasingly more reasonable to believe, and so it does beg the question of, what is the use or application of absolute certainties? This is a question that is yet to be as thoroughly answered as was the case with Descartes and certainty.

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Bibliography

Bibliography

Section 1

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Certainty- Certainty | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu)

Section 2

Philosophy 1, a guide through the subject edited by A.C. Grayling OXFORD - Aristotle pg. 399 – 436

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Epistemology - Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu)

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Aristotle - Aristotle | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu)

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rationalism vs Empiricism - Rationalism vs. Empiricism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Section 3

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rationalism vs Empiricism - Rationalism vs. Empiricism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rene Descartes - Descartes, Rene | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu)

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Epistemology - Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu)

Philosophy 1, a guide through the subject edited by A.C. Grayling OXFORD - The Pre –Socratics and Plato pg. 373 – 388

Britannica Encyclopedia, The history of Epistemology - Epistemology - History, Philosophy, Knowledge | Britannica 15

Can humanity ever determine a universally applicable certainty? – Jayden Oni

Glossary

Glossary

Accidental (change) – Change in which a substance acquires a new property which was not intended

Accidental knowledge – The obtaining of knowledge by means that does not guarantee that the knowledge we have obtained is necessarily true

Actual opposite – Logical opposites to a property within its essence (e.g. red to not – red, musical to not – musical

Alteration – A form of change in which the inherent properties of a substance change

Empirical – Something verifiable by observation and experience of/from physical things

Epistemic position – How certain someone is based on the knowledge they have (Nominal) Essence – The properties or basic qualities that make a substance what it is

Forms – Plato’s belief of the fundamental connections between things that exist, he believes that unchanging forms do not exist in space or time and just simply ‘are’

Immutable – Something that is unchanging over time

Intellect – Capacity of thought, some believe it to be identical to what animates the body (the mind)

Logical – A form of rational, well-reasoned justification, often involving making intuitive inferences.

Metaphysical – Abstract theory with no basis in reality

Metaphysical certainty – Propositions that are necessarily true

Paradigm – Supreme instances of a certain property

Particulars – Parts of an essence that differ between substances

Physical – Things that can be observed (e.g., geographical features of the Earth)

Proposition – Something in which we can attempt to determine whether or not it is true

Scepticism – A vigorous process of doubting knowledge and reason, in the search for absolute truth

Self – defeating – Where the truth of an argument/theory would imply its falsity

Self – predication – Where a form is believed to be an instance of itself

Substance – A composite of physical existence, and essence

Substantial generation – A form of change in which new substances come into existence

Warrant – How close a proposition is to truth

RISK – CONTROLLING THE

UNCONTROLLABLE

BY ROHAN CROWE

(Upper Sixth, HELP Level 4, Supervisor: Mr D Griller)

The Mathematics of Risk:

Its hard to find something more prevalent than risk. We are constantly evaluating it in our work, in our life decisions, it weighs on us when we are thinking and even when are not thinking. We gamble and dare our way through life - as much as we may not like to admit it, we are addicted to risk

Perhaps given its abstract definition, that being the potential for significant loss, it’s not surprising risk is so universal. Being such a universal force, the natural question that follows is; how can we understand risk, and moreover how can we respond to it?

To help understand something so abstract, it will help to outline two main problems that arise when understanding the unknown, and then investigate the mathematical tools that can be used to overcome these problems. One of the major problems with understanding chaotic processes is that we are profoundly pattern-based species and tend to see logic everywhere 1 . This means problems steeped in risk are often approached using logical, deterministic methods, however it is a case of the means not fitting the ends. The deterministic methods often solve these chaotic problems unsatisfactorily, so new, original ways of thinking about these problems are needed. Another problem is that the truly catastrophic often lies in the extremes. Because of little exposure to and general underestimation of extreme events, they can do real damage to whole societies – financial crises, tsunamis, pandemics, they hit us hard because we do not expect them coming. Thus some method of foresight is needed, some way to quantify what we should expect the future catastrophes to bring, some Extreme Value Theory.

Extreme value theory:

“In Cauda Venenum 2.”

For millennia humans have suffered at the feet of nature’s catastrophes; earthquakes, floods, droughts, tsunamis, meteors. Oftentimes, the things that are really devastating are to be found in the extremes: rare and forceful, they find us unprepared. To console our sense of helplessness at the face of chaos, our ancestors prayed to rain and sun gods, told stories of forewarning, and performed rituals. Ultimately though, our ancestors could not understand and therefore control this kind of risk.

In the early 1900s Leonard Tippett was working for the British Cotton Industry Research Association trying to make cotton fabrics stronger. Motivated by the discovery that the strength of cotton was determined by the strength of its weakest fibre, Tippett, along with polymath Ronald Fischer, pioneered the field of Extreme Value Theory by finding the distributions of the extremes of independent values. These distributions have found widespread usage, quantifying what to expect from the extreme and unexpected. This helps

1 Mattson MP. Superior pattern processing is the essence of the evolved human brain. Front Neurosci. 2014 Aug 22;8:265. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2014.00265. PMID: 25202234; PMCID: PMC4141622.

2 The poison is in the tail

engineers build earthquake resistant buildings, local authorities prepare against flood risks and financial institutions hedge against huge downsides in equities. As Tippett a 100 years before us, a concrete example will help demonstrate how Extreme Value Theory can be used to understand and thus prepare ourselves for the extremes.

Flood risk management:

“On the seventeenth day of the second month, when Noah was 600 years old, all the springs of the great deep burst open, the floodgates of the heavens were opened, 12 and it rained throughout the earth for 40 days and 40 nights.”

Flooding in the UK, despite being of significance (causing £1.4 billion in damages every year 3), is still of a relatively mild scale compared to the destruction flooding can bring in more extreme climates. For instance, recent floods in Pakistan affected at least 33 million people, and killed 1,700 4 Flooding destroys communities, infrastructure, and livelihoods, and thus it is very important to know how likely different levels of floods are so that new buildings and infrastructure can be built to appropriate safety standards. To guide data analysis and ultimately flood prevention, the process of flooding itself needs to be understood…

Simply put, flooding occurs when the height of a river rises to a height above its banks, the more extreme the height, the more extreme the flooding. The river Lune in Caton, Lancashire, often floods its banks and so will provide a large sample of floods to analyse. If flooding is to occur on any given day, then the peak height of the river for the day must be greater than the bank height (�������� ) - in Caton’s case 3.60m. There are two typical approaches used to extract relevant data for extreme value analysis, Annual Maximum series (AMAX) and Peaks over Threshold (POT). Annual maximum series takes the largest value from each year block (typically starting and ending around a significant annual meteorological event e.g. a monsoon), to use as a basis for analysis. The yearly separation of data ensures that all data is independent, so further filtering of data based on independence does not need to be undertook. An AMAX approach works well in extreme climates with clear yearly dry and wet spells, however for the UK climate, the weather throughout the year is more homogenous, so many flood events are distributed randomly throughout the year. This means that, because only one data point is taken per year, many flood events are missed out, which leads to an unnecessarily small sample of data. For instance, from 1979 to the present day, there were 271 days of flooding at Caton. Thus a POT approach is more applicable to this data set.

Downloading peak daily river height data (1979- 2023) from the UK Government Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 5 , the data is filtered as to only contain days where the peak height was over 3.60m, i.e. a flood occurred. However, floods often occur over multiple days, which would lead to multiple entries for the same flood. In other words, we are only interested in independent data events. To filter the data further, firstly, peak data from the same (water days do not necessarily follow the

3 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/300332/04-947flooding-summary.pdf

4 https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disasters/2022-pakistan-floods/).

5 https://environment.data.gov.uk/hydrology/station/9ad5d28c-7cfe-46db-b39d-58701689cd59

standard 0:00-23:59 day) or consecutive days are removed as these are certainly not independent floods. For these, the highest value is taken as this better indicates the full extent of the flooding - the extreme - which is what extreme value theory analysis is interested in. However, it is more difficult to determine whether floods more than a day apart are independent. For this an arbitrary threshold can be chosen that the river height must return to between floods, to count them as independent.

In this case, I chose that river height must return to below the mean – this seemed suitable looking at the time series graphs of the data.

River height time series

1979-10-11 1979-10-16 1979-10-20 1979-10-26 1979-10-31 1979-11-04 1979-11-09 1979-11-14 1979-11-19 1979-11-24 1979-11-29 1979-12-05 1979-12-10 1979-12-15 1979-12-19 1979-12-24 1979-12-29 1980-01-04 1980-01-08 1980-01-13 1980-01-18 1980-01-23 1980-01-29 1980-02-03 1980-02-08 1980-02-12 1980-02-18 1980-02-22 1980-02-27 1980-03-03 1980-03-08 1980-03-13 1980-03-18

Visibly, the independent flood events 1 and 2 are clearly independent and as we would want, the water level returns to below the mean river height between them.

Once the data was filtered, the Second Extreme Value Theorem (the Picklands-Balkema-de Haan theorem 6 – quite the mouthful) which really makes everything that follows possible, is leveraged. Fundamentally, it says, assuming independence of events, that as the number of samples in a Peaks over Threshold model approaches infinity, the distribution of the events approaches a Generalized Paredo Distribution (GPD). In practice, this means the GPD can be used as an effective model for POT data.

The general equation for a cumulative distribution (CPD) GPD is:

And the probability density function (PDF) is:

6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pickands–Balkema–De_Haan_theorem

In our case �������� =0, as the data is in the form of excesses which have minimum value of 0, therefore �������� =0. To work out the other parameters, the mean and variance of the data is calculated and then set equal to their respective derived expressions ( see derivation at the end).

This applies for ���������� 1 2 , else the variance is infinite

Then the equations are solved simultaneously for

And:

and �������� , which yields:

�������� =0.84924

�������� =0.08105

The CPD of the data is calculated by, for each data point, the proportion of data points that are less than the value of that data point. Then it is compared to the model for a visual check of the fit.

Then the data PDF is visually compared with the GPD PDF.

From the graphs, the model seems to fit the data very well, beginner’s luck perhaps, but to quantify the goodness of fit numerically, a Kolmogrov-Smirnov test is used.

The test calculates the deviation for each data point between the actual value and the predicted value from the model. It then outputs the greatest of these differences. The critical value for the test is given by 7:

For an �������� =0.01 (1% chance data didn’t come from the GPD distribution)

Where �������� : Number of data points in the sample

As the calculated value of ���������������� (0.0395) is less than the critical value ���������������� (0.1289), then we can assume with 99% confidence that the dataset and the GPD model are statistically related, i.e. the model assumed is a good fit.

Now that we have determined a suitable model, probabilities of how likely different river heights are, given there is a flood, and how likely damage to infrastructure is. This is invaluable information for prospective home-owners, farmers and companies planning industrial projects in the area. The UK Government’s Check for Flooding service 8 states that there is a risk of property flooding above 6.0m. Therefore the probability, given that there is a flood, of that flood posing risk to property is given by:

Where �������� is the river bank height (m)

This means local homeowner’s can expect a risk to their property 4.04% of the time that a flood warning is issued.

However, an even more useful standard is the 100 year flood, frequently used in engineering as a landmark of what structures should be able to withstand in an area with prevalent flooding. It is defined as the flood that has a 1/100 chance of being equalled or exceeded in a given year 9 . Since the Peaks over Threshold model is independent of time, a transformation

7 https://real-statistics.com/statistics-tables/kolmogorov-smirnov-table/

8 https://check-for-flooding.service.gov.uk/station/5029

9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100-year_flood

must be used to convert the POT model to an Annual Maximum Series model. Walter Langbein used the following transformation in his 1949 paper, “Annual floods and the partialduration flood series 10,” the transformation is given by:

Where �������� is the mean number of flood events in a year.

We are going to generalise the 100 year flood by finding the �������� year flood, which will enable us to later substitute in �������� = 100 and many other values of �������� to investigate how the maximum flood varies over different time periods.

Let ���������������������������������������� and ���������������������������������������� denote the PDF and CDF function respectively for the Annual Maximum Series.

Similarly, let �������������������������������� and �������������������������������� denote the PDF and CDF function respectively for the Peaks Over Threshold Series.

The probability of a flood being greater than or equal to some height, �������� ,

Therefore the probability of the annual maximum flood being greater than or equal to ��������

Since we want to calculate the n year flood, i.e.

= 1 �������� we can write:

Since we already have an expression for �������������������������������� (��������), that just being the Cumulative Distribution Function of the Peaks Over Threshold model previously calculated, it will be helpful to rearrange in terms of �������������������������������� (��������):

Substituting in our expression for �������������������������������� (

), we get:

10 https://luk.staff.ugm.ac.id/jurnal/freepdf/Langbein-1949-AnnualFloodsAndThePartialDurationFloodSeries.pdf

This is going to get very messy, so a bit of an intervention is needed. We let ���������� =1+

to clean the algebra up and to use a fun looking letter in the process.

We now have a fancy expression for the flood height, �������� , for the �������� year flood. Since the expression is in terms of parameters �������� , �������� and �������� which we have values for, and �������� which we are free to choose, the �������� year flood model is now effectively plug and play.

For different values of �������� , the �������� year flood is as follows:

This is extremely valuable data which would be used to advise all sorts of construction and industry projects on the required safety tolerances needed. From not knowing, unable to foresee the future, we now know what is coming and can thus prepare. In other words, we know the venom, and can prepare the antidote.

Monte Carlo:

“This blessed security I have found in all things, that they prefer to dance on the feet of chance.”

– Nietzsche ‘Also Sprach Zarathustra’

Monte Carlo simulations are methods of simulation characterised by their use of built-in risk and uncertainty to solve questions which involve uncertain future outcomes. Where more simplistic deterministic methods provide a single averaged outcome, Monte Carlo methods output a set of different possible outcomes, each with assigned probabilities. Essentially, they are a fight fire with fire tool for dealing with uncertainty.

The method was conceived by Stanislaw Uman, and then developed in conjunction with John Von Neumann for use on the Manhattan project. Specifically, it was used to simulate the nuclear chain reaction in the uranium core of an atomic bomb, using the recently innovated IBM punch-card computers. In the name of the secrecy that was so pervasive around the Manhattan project, the technique got the codename, ‘Monte Carlo,’ after the famous Monaco casino 11 .

Since its successful use in developing the first Nuclear bomb, Monte Carlo simulations have found wide-spread applications in; weather forecasting, computational physics, long-term investing (such as in pensions) etc … The simplicity yet profundity of the idea behind Monte Carlo, being that real world chaos is mirrored by randomness in the simulation, means that Monte Carlo is the main simulation of use when modelling many complicated and chaotic real-world phenomena.

Monte Carlo – S&P 500:

To investigate implementation of a Monte Carlo simulation, it will help to see how one might build a model from the ground up, in this case a weather forecast simulation. But first, a simple example in excel for forecasting the S&P 500 will demonstrate the theory behind a general simulation.

Firstly, we need to understand how the process we are modelling behaves in the real world. To that extent, some previous real world data is needed, here we have used the average monthly S&P 500 prices for the last 20 years. As the S&P is on average growing over time, the average value after 20 years of simulation will be very different to the current value. It is therefore easier to frame our model in terms of the month to month change in price as this necessarily will change less over time than the actual value. This calculation of rate of change of price over a month is actually a crude estimation of Delta:

∆ = ���������������� ����������������

Where ∆: Delta, �������� : price, �������� : time

Which is an important metric in financial modelling that is indicative of volatility.

11 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Carlo_method

Having produced the month to month changes in price, we can calculate various statistical properties of the data. The mean, or average growth, turns out to be 0.71% - if we were performing a deterministic method, we would just use this mean value every month to calculate the next value of the S&P 500. Of course, month to month, this value would be very wrong, as the S&P 500 moves stochastically (randomly) on the microscopic level, but over long enough time frames, provided the calculated mean is fairly accurate, this model would become more and more accurate. The standard deviation,

�������� =

(���������������� −��������)2 ��������

Where �������� : standard deviation, ��������: mean, �������� : Sample size

Is indicative of how much spread is in the data. It sums the square distance of each data point from the mean (this places greater emphasis on data points further away from the mean), and divides by the size of the data. It then square roots this value for rescaling so that the standard deviation is closer to the average distance between points and the mean. Each of the percentiles (��������%) indicate up to what value you would find ��������% of the data.

Now that we know how the process we are modelling works, we can choose a model for it. Because intuitively the S&P 500 will move above and below the mean with roughly equal likelihood, and considering the shape of the historical data, we can assume a normal distribution. There are various statistical methods to test whether a data set is normally distributed (e.g. Kolmogrov-Smirnov test and skew and kurtosis tests), but in the interest of variety (and simplicity), we will use a retrospective visual method and skew and kurtosis tests here, having already used a Kolmogrov-Smirnov test. One important assumption of normal distributions however, is that each data point is independent of each other. This means that the fact the S&P was up last month shouldn’t affect whether it is up this month. Intuitively, this seems like an unrealistic assumption, so, to test whether this significantly affects the model, we will assume a normal distribution for now, and then retrospectively check for independence.

Having assumed a normal distribution, we can use a inverse normal function in excel (=NORM.INV(probability (area), mean, standard deviation). The mean and standard deviation of the historical data are used here for the Monte Carlo, but for the probability parameter, a rand() function is used, which outputs a random number between 0 and 1. The area under a Normal distribution between a range of values represents the probability of a chosen value being within that range. The total area under the distribution is hence the area between negative and positive infinity, thus it is the probability of any value being chosen out of any value, therefore the total area is 1. When the inverse normal function outputs a random number between 0 and 1 it assigns this to the area between negative infinity and some unknown number, ‘�������� ’ Given that excel knows the mean (visually represented as the line of symmetry of the graph), the standard deviation of the graph (which determines how thick the graph is) and the area, it can calculate ‘�������� ’ This ‘�������� ’ is the output value of the S&P 500 from the Monte Carlo simulation. Because ‘�������� ’ was determined by a random area, it itself is random, however due to most of the area of the graph being around the mean, the output value of the S&P 500 is more likely to be around the mean than an extreme value, which is intuitive.

Running this simulation many times (in this case 1000), we can now forecast the S&P 500 into the future. Performing the same statistical calculations on the simulation data as were performed on the historical data, we can observe that the Monte Carlo simulation has very similar statistical properties, so in this way it replicates the historical data well.

To check the independence, more specifically whether a stock’s delta is significantly affected by its previous month’s delta, we can use the fact that the normal distribution of the Monte

Carlo has the same mean and standard deviation of the historical data, but assumes independence. Thus calculating the differences between each consecutive term and then taking the absolute value (which turns all negatives positive so the differences don’t cancel), we can create a graph of the probability of different month to month changes in delta occurring for both data groups. This difference between deltas is a crude estimation of a commonly used financial metric, gamma:

Γ = ��������∆ ����������������

Where Γ: Gamma, Δ: Delta, �������� : time

For larger data sets, an autocorrelation function can be used, which measures to what extent the current price is correlated with previous prices.

From the graphs, the range and thus the spread of consecutive differences for the historical data is actually greater than the Normally distributed Monte Carlo. This means the delta of the S&P 500 changes more month to month than would be predicted by a normal distribution

of the same mean and standard deviation. This means there is no positive correlation between different monthly deltas, and because the profiles of each of the graphs are similar, assuming independence is not an issue. However, whether the data actually fits a normal distribution in the first place may be an issue.

To check the fit of the normal distribution, probability density graphs are produced of both the historical data and the Monte Carlo:

Even from the rough visualisations of the data here; it is evident that while the historic data data has negative skew whereas the Monte Carlo has slight positive skew (although over more iterations this would approach 0 skew). This means the normal function used to model the S&P 500 historic data may be too simplistic and to improve the model, an element of skew could be used in our model. Furthermore, the Monte Carlo seems to have a lesser standard deviation (less spread) than the historic data, but this is more a result of the randomness of the simulation than any underlying fault in the model: indeed when we check the results, the standard deviation of the Monte Carlo is less (4.21%) than that of the historic data (4.25%).

To perform a more objective analysis of the fit to a normal of the Historic data, we can calculate skew (a vector quantity representing how far away a data set is from being symmetrical and in what direction) and kurtosis (a vector measure of how far away the tails of a data set are from what would be expected of a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation).

Skew is defined mathematically as:

����������3 =

∑ (���������������� −�������� �������� �������� )3

(�������� 1) ∗�������� 3

Where ����������3 : Skewness, �������� : Number of samples, �������� : Standard deviation, ���������������� : Each term in the data, �������� : Mean of the data.

Subtracting 1 from N may seem arbitrary and somewhat unnecessary, but it is used to reflect the uncertainty in the data as it is merely a sample (monthly price of the S&P 500) of the whole population (the price each day on the S&P 500). This -1 minimises the denominator, thus increasing the calculated value of skew. In this way, the subtracting 1 produces a worsecase skew value.

Calculating the skew of the data yields -0.61, which means, as we expected from the graphs, the data has moderate negative skew, but not significant which would be |����������3 | >212 . This means a normal distribution is a good approximation, but to improve the model, a skewnormal distribution would provide a better fit.

Calculating kurtosis we use the formula:

����������4 =

∑ (���������������� −�������� �������� �������� )4

(�������� 1) ∗�������� 4

Where ����������4 : Kurtosis, ��������: Number of samples, �������� : Standard deviation, ���������������� : Each term in the data, �������� : Mean of the data

Which yields 4.38, which is significant of moderate kurtosis, but not statistically significant, which would be ����������4 >713. Therefore a normal distribution is still a good approximation with regards to kurtosis.

Conclusion:

We have come a long way from our ancestor’s bewilderment in understanding and being able to mitigate against risk, however that is not to say our 21st century world is not filled with the uncertain and not sometimes subject to the catastrophic. Pandemics, financial crises, tsunamis are still afflictions of which we are alarmingly ill prepared for, and frankly we often don’t see coming. Development of the necessary risk models to improve our foresight of these disasters should be something at the top of society’s priority list. After all, only what we do not know can harm us, so by knowing more about what is coming will fundamentally keep our society’s safe from unnecessary suffering. It is evident that the mathematical tools covered, Monte Carlo simulations and statistical analysis are instrumental in preparing us for the future.

12 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3591587/

13 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3591587/

Mean:

Derivations for Mean and Variance of the Generalised Paredo Distribution:

THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS EFFECTS ON LEBANON AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

BY AARAN THAKORE

(Upper Sixth, HELP Level 4, Supervisor: Mr F Highton)

Written by Aaran Thakore

Contents

Introduc�on (page 160)

Syria (pages 160-174):

Background and History (pages 160-162):

- Post French Mandate

- 2011

- Country Profile – Syria

Causes of Conflict and Reasons for its Sustenance (pages 162-169):

- Resentment towards the Assad Regime

- The Poli�cisa�on of Religion

- Complexity of Figh�ng Fac�ons

- Interna�onal Involvement:

Geographical Loca�on

Geopoli�cs

Impact of Interna�onal Involvement

Impacts of Conflict on Syria (pages 169-174):

- Socio-Economic Trends:

Evalua�on

- Economic

- Social

- Poli�cal, Cultural and Environmental

- Mass displacement and Fatali�es of Syrian Civilians

Lebanon (pages 174-184):

Background and History (pages 174-176):

- Country Profile – Lebanon

- History

Effects of the French Mandate in Contemporary Lebanon (pages 176-178):

- Religion and Poli�cs

- The Longstanding Legacy of the French Mandate

- Neo-colonialism

Effects of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon (pages 178-184):

- Socio-Economic trends:

Evalua�on

- Economic

- Poli�cal: Hezbollah

- Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: Conflict and Discrimina�on

Lebanese Out-migra�on

Deporta�on

The Flip Side

Global (pages 185-194):

The Global Distribu�on of Displaced Syrians (pages 185-187):

- Evalua�on

Interna�onal Responses to Syrian Refugees (pages 187-190):

- EU - Gulf Na�ons

- Turkey

- UK

- USA

Impact on Interna�onal Events (pages 190-194):

- COVID-19

- Beirut Explosion – 2020

- Russian Invasion of Ukraine – 2022

- Turkey-Syria Earthquake – 2023

- Israel-Lebanon Conflict - 2023

Conclusion – (page 194)

Bibliography – (pages 195-205)

Introduc�on

In 2011, civil unrest broke out in the Syrian Arab Republic Thirteen years later, the conflict remains unresolved, and the Syrian refugee crisis now the largest displacement of people in the history of humankind. Prior to the country’s escala�on into armed warfare, the na�on was ruled by Bashar alAssad who assumed posi�on as president in 2000 despite being trained as an ophthalmologist. From his appointment as ruler, it is widely accepted that President Assad turned to oppressive regimes and dictator-like behaviour, his suppressive rule blamed for triggering the first protests against the authori�es in 2011 Although peaceful at the start, these protests soon became violent, exploited by extremist groups to spread their influence over an already fragile region.

The consequent civil unrest has resulted in unprecedented number of Syrians being displaced from their homes, both internally and interna�onally, and caused havoc on Syria’s economy and popula�on. However, the war ’s impacts have reached even further afield, past the country’s borders into the en�re Middle Eastern region. Thousands of Syrians now call countries such as Turkey, Iraq and Jordan home. For a na�on like Lebanon, with long term struggles caused by former French occupa�on, a country only just recovering from its own civil unrest, this has exacerbated economic, social, poli�cal, and environmental issues that were already exis�ng in a fragile state. The Syrian instability has also impacted the en�re globe, promp�ng responses including those from Europe and North America, in varying degrees of extremity regarding aid budgets and immigra�on policies. In our ever-globalised world, the Syrian conflict truly has become a global disaster, with its power being felt far beyond the republic’s territory.

Syria

Background and History

Post-French Mandate

Syria, like many of its neighbours, was a former mandate A mandate is in essence a colony, except for the fact that it had been legally authorised by the League of Na�ons which, despite this slight nuance, o�en atributed to all the same nega�ve implica�ons In the 1920s, France was given authority of Syria, which, alongside its occupa�on of Lebanon, resulted in the forma�on of the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. However, this was not the only country with interest in the region. This has meant that, thanks to the Bri�sh invasion of the region during the Second World War as part of a defensive measure against Germany (see Lebanon’s history page 18), Syria is a fairly new state.

With the last of French troops only leaving an independent Syria in 1946, its path since has been far from smooth. In 1967, Syria lost land to Israel, and, in 1970, came under the rule of the Assad family. From then, the government has priori�sed funding for military defence over investment into the general development of the country, turning Syria into more of a totalitarian state than a liberal democracy that had been hoped for. This is important to bear in mind when we think of the context of the Syrian civil war. Although it may be a longstanding aspect of Syrian history, the increasing frustra�on and anger of those oppressed both under French authority and the supposedindependent leaders has most certainly had its part to play in the events that unfolded in 2011.

These events have not only irreversibly altered the lives of millions of innocent civilians but have permanently changed the global percep�on of Syria and its path of growth in contemporary poli�cs

2011

2011 was the year that the Syrian conflict escalated Though protests occurred throughout these 12 months, each signalling a significant turning point for Syrians within the interna�onal community, a notable escala�on did occur in March. This month in par�cular saw an increase in frequency in acts of rebellion against Assad, leader of the socialist Ba’ath Party, and the regime he governed.

The cause of this change has been widely atributed to an event that took place in the SouthWestern city of Daraa earlier that month where 15 students, all under the age of 20 were arrested and subsequently tortured. The reason for this: graffi�. Writen on a school wall by Naief Abazid, then 14, was the Arabic equivalent of the words ‘It’s your turn doctor ’. The message, referring to Assad’s medical qualifica�ons and sugges�ng that his government would be the next to fall vic�m to the revolu�ons occurring through much of the Arab world at the �me, was seen to be direct atack to the president’s authority and swi�ly prompted the arrest of 15 teenage boys. The boys were then tortured and imprisoned for weeks, before being released, injured from the brutality they suffered.

These rebellious acts against the government in power were not uncommon in a region that was currently going through the Arab Spring. However, unlike the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen who responded to these protests by reconciling and giving up their posi�ons as head of state, Assad responded by �ghtening security and suppressing all those who dared to speak out. The regime in power showed litle remorse for what happened during the arrest of the 15 boys, with, as recounted in the book, ‘The Home That Was Our Country,’ the desperate parents even being told to ‘Forget your children. If you want children, make more children. If you don’t know how, bring us your women and we will make them for you’ (Alia Malek, 2017). Few words can be so apt in portraying the unwavering power the Syrian authori�es had over its ci�zens and the violent extremes it would go to abuse them.

Triggered by these seemingly unjust offences carried out under governmental watch, protests began to break out throughout the country which soon turned violent as extremists exploited the opportunity. These arrests were the acts that caused the Syrian people’s long suppressed frustra�on to finally topple over, leading to one of the grossest viola�ons of human rights in modern history, in a conflict where ‘Syrian security forces have killed hundreds of protesters and arbitrarily arrested thousands, subjecting many of them to brutal torture in detention’ (Human Rights Watch, June 2011).

Protests quickly spread from Daraa to other ci�es, including Damascus, the Syrian capital. They were at first peaceful, with unarmed civilians exercising their right to poli�cal expression. Yet the army con�nued by responding with violence, shoo�ng unarmed marching civilians and allegedly mass arres�ng innocent men and boys. This aggression was completely dispropor�onate to the supposed threat the protesters posed and was widely cri�cised as a viola�on of human rights and soon escalated when the military deployed tanks in Daraa, leading to what is now known as the Siege of Daraa. This siege occurred from the 25 th of April un�l the 5th of May, where the armed forces surrounded the city, cu�ng electricity and phone lines, blocking internet services, and minimising all movement in the area, including essen�al food and water supplies and the movement of humanitarian services (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

During the ten-day period, the number of fatali�es and arrests increased. Ac�vists found themselves amongst the targeted groups and were o�en subjected to torture and deten�ons on charges based on forced confessions. Throughout these early months, Assad made several speeches in which he defended the regime’s ac�ons, blaming unrest on ‘conspirators’ with an ‘Israeli agenda’ in a par�cular addressal on March 30th (Guardian, 2011). Though some concessions were made, including the president vowing to remove a law which gives authori�es the right to inves�gate and arrest Syrians in �mes of na�onal risk during a speech on April 16th (Britannica, 2011-), litle proof was given that ac�ons were being taken and officials con�nue to jus�fy their responses by labelling rebels as 'terrorists’.

Country Profile - Syria

- Popula�on: 23.44 million

- Size: 185,180 squared kilometres

- President: Bashal al-Assad

- Prime Minister: Hussein Arnous

- Bordering countries: Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon

- Official language: Arabic

- Length of navigable waterway (CIA World Factbook, 2021): 900 km

Demographic makeup (CIA World Factbook, 2016):

- Muslim - 87% (Shia (13%), Sunni (74%), Alawite (11%), other (2%))

- Chris�an - 10%

- Druze, jews and atheists – (3%)

Physical Geography:

- Separated by the Great Ri� Velley

- Syrian Desert in the South-Eastern region

- Western region of mountainous – An�-Lebanon mountains, Al-Ansariyyah Mountains

- Largest river: Euphrates

- Coastline Length: 110 miles

Causes of Conflict and Reasons for its Sustenance

Resentment towards the Assad Regime

Perhaps the most obvious cause of the conflict we are witnessing today is the long-suppressed resentment of the Assad regime by Syrian civilians Since the beginning of his presidency, life under Assad was tough. Unemployment was commonplace, with pre-war levels at 8.6%, and youth unemployment at a staggering 20.4% (Center for strategic and interna�onal Studies, 2021) Poverty thrived under Assad’s rule, with 11.4% of households considered extremely poor and 30% living beneath the upper poverty line, according to a study carried out by the Interna�onal Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth in 2019 As concluded in the report, despite fewer people overall living in poverty in 2009 in comparison to 2007, more people were classified as ‘extremely poor’, evidence for widening economic inequality. This is also shown as the wealth between rural and urban areas was increasing, which, coupled with recent droughts, climate change, poor environmental condi�ons, pollu�on, and bad weather, le� many in rural regions batling with litle money.

But this was not all. Assad led an increasingly authoritarian state whose secret police infiltrated within every aspect of Syrian life. As early as February 1982, Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s father and predecessor, ordered the Syrian army to supress a movement against the current government, ruthlessly murdering thousands of civilians in the process (BBC, 2019) This event, the 1982 Hama massacre, was just one of the many acts of oppression carried out by the Baathist government against innocent ci�zens In addi�on, it is worth no�ng that there was no foreseeable end to the Assad’s authoritarian control of Syria Democracy was non-existent and anyone who spoke against the government was simply goten rid of. To do this, seeing himself above the law, Assad would rou�nely, detain, torture and murder all his poli�cal opponents (History, 2018). It goes without saying that this oppression ins�lled fear within the Syrian demographic, a key to the success of all long-standing dictatorships. However, this fear, a blessing for autocra�c cons�tu�ons, will also be what caused its downfall. The governments’ innate corrup�on, its tyrannic totalitarian regime, so embedded into all aspects of Syria, only helped exacerbate the despera�on of the Syrian people and the sen�ment that the only way to topple a government so prone to violence is to use the one power that no violence will give them: the power of the people.

The Poli�cisa�on of Religion

Syria finds itself precariously posi�oned on a religious and ethnic crossroad. Situated in a region formerly under French occupa�on, many of the Middle Eastern borders we see today were first introduced by the French with litle regard to individual communi�es’ ethnic and religious affilia�ons. Therefore, though Islam is the dominant religion of most Middle Eastern countries, Syria, like others, is split into numerous groups depending on which branch of the Islamic faith they follow, with the two main branches being Sunni and Shia Muslims. Within Syria, most of the popula�on are Sunni Muslims, accoun�ng for around 65% of the popula�on in 2016, according to a CIA World Factbook (Cultural Atlas, 2016), much like the other Sunni-majority na�ons Qatar and Saudi Arabia. However, Assad, along with other top officials and military personnel, is an Alawite, an offshoot of Shia Islam This is due to the era of the French mandate in which many religious minori�es who tradi�onally found themselves at a disadvantage, outnumbered by the majority, used foreign occupa�on as an opportunity to infiltrate the high ranks by befriending the French and filling posi�ons they would have otherwise been barred from

Due to this, many Sunni Muslims now feel underrepresented and unaccounted for, with an increasingly powerful rhetoric of a small Shia minority ruling over a vastly Sunni majority. However, it would be inaccurate to cast the Syrian civil war as a religious conflict. Though there was and s�ll is lingering resentment between the different Islamic sects, this was merely capitalised to fulfil poli�cal incen�ves. This religious fragility was used to catapult the Syrian violence into full blown conflict. While protests may have originally been around all Syrians’ human rights, tapping into religious resentment meant both sides gained numerous supporters, and therefore fighters, willing to sacrifice themselves for what they believed to be a religious cause. Religion is nothing more than a powerful poli�cal tool. This religious mask used to promote poli�cal views is par�ally why the conflict has been so long standing, proof of the sen�ment that ‘religion is a mere instrument of state ambi�ons’ (Vox, 2016).

Complexity of Figh�ng Fac�ons

The Syrian conflict is undoubtedly complex. At first, it may have been easy to decipher the two batling sides: Assad supporters and Assad’s opposers. However, this simplicity was short lived, if it ever existed. As the violence and ensuing war developed numerous other groups joined the mass of

figh�ng fac�ons, each with slightly different aims and incen�ves, making this war the intricate merging point of forces we see today. This has helped prolong the war as each group is up against more than one opposi�on, and with more people involved, the greater length of �me it will take for resources to deplete

The Free Syrian Army was the original opposi�on to Assad’s government. As an armed group made up of Syrian civilians, as well as defectors from the Syrian military, the FSA very much considered itself the armed group of the Syrian opposi�on at the beginning of the war. However, its prevalence began to diminish by the middle of the decade as it struggled with a lack of funds, poor pay, bad condi�ons, waning interna�onal support and lack of coherent leadership as well as other logis�cal and opera�onal issues due to the growing presence of Islamist groups (Aljazeera, 2015). This meant that when the Syrian Na�onal Army (SNA) was formed in 2017, made up of and backed by the Turkish, it took over the FSA, with many the former FSA fighters moving to join this newer and stronger force (Rojava Informa�on Centre, 2022)

In addi�on, to the FSA/SNA, IS and Al-Qaeda, two extremist groups o�en incorrectly assumed to be the same due to the fact that the IS first originated as a local offshoot of Al-Qaeda going by the name AQI (Al-Qaeda in Iraq), are, in some form, also present in Syria. The IS, o�en called the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or its other official name prior to 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), took advantage of the Syrian instability to carry out its aim to create an Islamic caliphate in modern day Syria and Iraq. Unlike the IS, whose first recorded ac�vity dates to 1999 (Stanford, Center for Interna�onal Security and Coopera�on (CISAC) 2014), Al-Qaeda is an organisa�on rather than a state. Despite also following a twisted version of Sunni Islam, it aims to replace Middle Eastern governments with Islamic equivalents by targe�ng what it sees as its largest enemy: the United States (The Brookings Ins�tu�on, 2015)

This differing approach has also meant that these two groups have o�en found rivals in each other. Al-Qaeda officially entered Syria under its subgroup the Al-Nusra Front, or Front for the Conquest of Syria. However, in 2016 this Jabhat al-Nusra group officially changed its name to Jabhat Fatah alSham (Front of the Conquest of the Levant) and officially broke all �es with Al Qaeda, declaring itself an independent movement (Stanford, Center for Interna�onal Security and Coopera�on (CISAC) 2021). Therefore, although officially Al-Qaeda cannot be said to have a current presence in the Syrian conflict, their impact con�nues, and it would be accurate to say that many of its aims are being carried out by other groups s�ll figh�ng their batle. All extreme Islamic groups within Syria have merely monopolised Syria’s instability as an opportunity to project their own mandate on a country grappling with violence and fragility

Alongside these two groups, another major non-interna�onal armed group in Syria is the SDF (Syrian Democra�c Forces). This American-backed group is mainly made up of Kurdish mili�a and other minority groups in the North and East of Syria. Created in 2015 to support the US crackdown against IS, most of the SDG are part of the Kurdish People’s Protec�on Units (YPG). These units were themselves established in 2012 as the military component of the Syrian branch of the PKK or Kurdistan Workers’ Party known as the PYD (Kurdish Democra�c Union Party) Despite being responsible for security, there have been reports of corrup�on, arbitrary arrests, and indiscriminate civilian killings, as well as torture and unexplained disappearances carried out by the SDF/YPG (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2020).

The Kurds, a non-Arab group, are yet another force complica�ng the Syrian war. As vic�ms of regular discrimina�on under the Syrian government, their mission of an independent Kurdistan is opposed by Syria and Turkey as well as Syrian rebels. Both in spite and because of this, at the start of the civil unrest, the Kurds within Syria did not choose a side, but instead declared autonomy with the

crea�on of a state they called Rojava (Arab Center Washington DC, 2021) However, when the IS became involved in the conflict, this began to complicate things with the Kurds as they found themselves yet another enemy, and so began working with the US as American forces found them to be valuable allies whom they could rely on to help tackle the IS (Arab Center Washington DC, 2021) This started the SDF and US-Kurdish allegiances men�oned in the previous paragraph. However, this infuriated Turkey, as Erdogan viewed the PKK and therefore the YPG as a terrorist organisa�on.

When Trump was elected, due to his rela�onship with Erdogan, he withdrew his allegiance with the Syrian Kurds in 2018, resul�ng in Turkey and their Syrian allies to atack and invade the former Rojava region (officially declared the Autonomous Administra�on of North and East Syria (AANES) on July 16, 2018 (US Mission of the Syrian Democra�c Council)). This resulted in the deaths of Kurds and caused a mass displacement of over 100,000 to Iraq (DW, 2019). Though American opera�ons have at least in part been reinstated, Kurdish forces can no longer rely on a failproof American allegiance to sustain them, fuelling them to turn to Russia instead. However, Russia has used this albeit cau�ous friendship with the Kurds as a way to coerce Turkey into a more favourable posi�on in TurkishRussian rela�ons which is why Kurds con�nue to look at Russia with scep�cism (Arab Center Washington DC, 2021).

Biden’s inaugura�on as president, triggered hope that Trump’s damage may be undone, but despite showing promise, with Biden condemning Trump’s decision, labelling him and his ac�ons as ‘reckless and incompetent ’ during his presiden�al campaign (The Des Moines Register, 2020), their hopes did not come to frui�on. Eventually, Biden’s mistreatment of the situa�on was labelled as just ‘as great as Donald Trump’s (American Enterprise Ins�tute, 2022). This has all resulted in Syrian Kurds now looking for peace with their former rivals in the Syrian government (Al-Monitor, 2023). The Kurdish situa�on is evidence of how complicated the Syrian conflict is, with so many individual aims entwined within each other. The Kurds have only one desire and that is to achieve peace and some form of autonomy and independence. To succeed in this, they have formed alliances with whichever side they can benefit from, even if that means their support is o�en contradictory to former allegiances. This has added an addi�onal layer of intricacy to an already challenging situa�on.

The final internal group figh�ng within Syria to be looked at is the Syrian Hezbollah. As a branch of its Lebanese namesake, it is an ally of the Assad regime and has played a significant role in retaking rebel held areas. It has been a major reason as to why the Assad regime has managed to withstand opposi�on for so long. However, as it has a Lebanese counterpart, Hezbollah’s interven�on in Syria has not only had widespread consequences on the Syrian conflict but also the growing instability within Lebanon, which shall be examined later. All these groups create a fragile web of rela�ons and interac�ons, where one slight change has the poten�al to wreak catastrophic events, giving this conflict its characteris�c underlying complexity. This entanglement is what makes interna�onal interven�on so poten�ally beneficial if carried out correctly, but also so poten�ally potent if it is not.

Interna�onal Involvement

Though perhaps not a ‘cause’ of the Syrian war, interna�onal involvement has been integral for its longstanding survival. Regardless of how large a civil unrest may be, without an external supply of money, resources, fuel and weaponry, no conflict would be able to sustain itself for an extended period without naturally dying out. However, in the case of Syria, interna�onal funding and supplies has enabled all sides to con�nue their plight, and therefore it would be accurate to assume that at least par�al responsibility for the prolonged conflict lies on those outside the na�on’s borders. It is conflic�ng interna�onal responses that have helped to fuel the war, with each country having their own individualis�c incen�ve. Without the likes of Russia, Iran and the US, the lives of millions of

Syrians caught within their interna�onal crossfire would have been extremely different, for beter or for worse

Geographical Loca�on:

Syria’s loca�on in southwestern Asia, north of the Arabian Peninsula, is significant in interna�onal geopoli�cs. Not only did it formerly find itself as a key node within the historic Silk Road, with par�cular importance in ci�es such as Aleppo (UNESCO), Syria is in the Middle East, a region responsible for 32.8% of global oil produc�on in 2022, making it the largest producer of oil worldwide, ahead of North America by almost 6% (Sta�sta, 2022). This means that if the instability within the country was to spill out into neighbouring areas, the Syrian conflict could have the poten�al to wreak havoc far beyond its borders, disrup�ng global manufacturing industries and interna�onal economies. In addi�on, with its proximity to Africa, there is a danger of nega�ve implica�ons of the conflict, to seep into the neighbouring con�nent to disrupt a region already batling challenges with its own security and development (The Borgen Project, 2013). Finally, alongside Jordan, Syria makes up the Levan�ne crossroads, linking Europe with Western Asia, the Arabian Peninsula and Northern Africa. Having control of these areas would mean having control of goods, people, and trade between these three crucial con�nents (Clingendael Spectator, 2019).

The presence of oil and geographical posi�oning of Syria has resulted in varied responses worldwide to the violence, with some countries choosing to avoid forceful interven�on for fear it could escalate the situa�on and cause it to spread into a globally important region, with others seeing that same point as a reason to put all their resources into ending the conflict as quickly as possible

Geopoli�cs:

The Syrian war, though ‘civil’, is far from limited to Syrian borders. Due to geopoli�cs and the global consequences of poli�cising religion, other major regional powers as well as those further afield have invested money and resources into the various figh�ng fac�ons each for their own strategical reasons. As Tim Marshall, geographer and author writes in his book Prisoners of Geography, Iran, for example, a predominantly Shia na�on, backs Assad’s government. Other than simply being evidence of an innocent Iranian agenda to spread its religious beliefs, as Marshall writes, this is most likely Iran’s way to use religion to maintain influence within Syria, and thus ensuring a ‘land bridge’ is kept, linking Iran to the Mediterranean, in allegiance with Lebanon’s Shia Hezbollah mili�a. If this occurred, it would give Iran easy access for weapons trade and would enable it to increase the threat it poses to Israel and other regional Western allies. Having access to Mediterranean trade routes while maintaining influence over a valuable region would help Iran in its quest for interna�onal dominance, helping it become a force capable of challenging even the greatest global superpowers (Founda�on for Defense of Democracies, 2019).

Russia is another significant Assad’s supporter. As perhaps Russia’s closest Middle Eastern ally, keeping Assad in power would mean Russian interests are kept in mind in the process of policy making. This is of par�cular importance following a 2017 agreement to extend Russian presence on Tartus Naval Base, located on the Syrian Mediterranean coast, for 49 years (DW, 2017). Coupled with the Russian airbase located in Latakia, built in 2015, keeping Russian allies in top Syrian governmental posi�ons would safely secure Russia’s only access to the warm water of the

Mediterranean, which as we saw with Crimea in 2014, is crucial for a na�on whose marine trade is otherwise limited to a short window when its coastline remains ice-free. Due to this, despite Moscow repeatedly claiming to be solely targe�ng IS terrorists, there is notable evidence to suggest that Russian strikes have acted ruthlessly towards all rebel fac�ons against Assad’s regime, including those backed by the USA (Council on Foreign Rela�ons, 2023)

On the other hand, Sunni majority states, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have tradi�onally backed Syrian rebels to prevent Assad’s power from con�nuing. In conjunc�on with its allies, Saudi Arabia, has supported Syrian rebels, at least in part to weaken growing Iranian influence and reduce the risk Iran poses to their regional and interna�onal power. The sta�s�cs mirror this, showing that Saudi Arabia consistently has the largest military budget in the Middle East, which in 2022 accounted for $45,600 million. Despite having decreased by 10% from the previous year, this was s�ll over double the size of Israel’s, which came in second place, (Forecast Interna�onal, 2023). This is evidence of the Saudi’s commitment to defending its posi�on as a regional force, and also of its concern of the threat Iran, a na�on whose army size significantly dwarfs its own (Sta�sta, 2022), could pose to that. For these two countries, Syria is merely another outlet for their complex rivalry.

Another key support for the Syrian rebels also comes from the United States, in conjunc�on with Britain and France Despite the US mainly jus�fying its presence within Syria through its con�nued fight against ISIS and other extremist Islamic groups, it would not be unheard of to assume American forces may have other mo�ves to support the fall of Assad’s government. If Assad were to stay in power, and Iran consequently achieve access to the Mediterranean, not only would Iranian threat increase, something which is proving to be a growing concern for Washington, but Iran would also be able to escalate its rivalry with Israel, a key US ally. This would be disastrous for America as Israel has one of the world’s most powerful intelligence gathering agencies, Mossad, as well as deep military �es with its American counterparts. However, perhaps the most strategical reason for strong USIsraeli rela�ons, is the overwhelmingly strong support the American public has for Israel. This frequently overlooked factor has meant it is o�en in the interest of US poli�cians to put Israeli needs at the forefront of its campaign (Vox, 2014), something which could have played a part in Biden’s recent solidarity for Israel ‘having the right to defend itself’ by cu�ng off supplies to Gaza during its retalia�on against the Pales�nian people, following Hamas’ atrocious atacks in October 2023.

Turkey makes up another global player deeply entwined within the Syrian conflict. As an officially secular na�on with 90% of its ci�zens adhering to the Sunni branch of Islam, Turkey has been a key support for an�-Assad rebels from the start. Its forces have been a key help to many non-Kurdish rebel groups, including the former Free Syrian Army (FSA) – now mainly part of the Turkish backed SNA (Na�onal Syrian Army) Though it has assisted with US airstrikes against IS groups, Turkey’s main aim is to suppress all Kurdish rebel groups in Northern Syria, in order to prevent an independent Kurdistan movement, which, should it occur, would see the Turkish state not only loose territory but also 19% of its popula�on who are ethnic Kurds (World Factbook, 2022) This has been mirrored in President Erdogan’s controversial declara�on of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (or PKK) as a terrorist organisa�on. Perhaps counter-intui�vely this an�-Kurdistan rhetoric is mirrored by Assad which is perhaps why there was recent specula�on as to whether the two leaders would rekindle rela�ons over talks, even if this unlikely to occur given Turkey’s harsh condemna�on of the cruelty of the Assad regime. Regardless though, Turkey’s role in the Syrian conflict is far more complicated than simply another outlet of its con�nued fight against Kurds.

Despite helping America with opera�ons against IS, Turkey was, and possibly s�ll is, one of the main sanctuaries for terrorists, o�en used as a des�na�on for interna�onal jihadists to travel to in order to enter Syria. As portrayed evidently in Rania Abouzeid’s book ‘No Turning Back: Life, Loss and Hope in War�me Syria,’ the 566-mile Turkey-Syria border provides a crucial point of access to Syria for

terrorists. Even if official policies are against terrorist ac�vi�es, many Turkish officials, including those patrolling the border, are easily bribed to turn a blind eye to terrorists entering, hiding and leaving the country, as well as others simply choosing to look the other way. This has resulted in Turkey being accused of having an open border with Syria, at least at the start of the war, knowingly allowing the free travel of terrorists, with the country’s eastern regions being a common cross point for arms and weaponry Without a doubt, Turkey’s role in Syria, par�cularly when the war was s�ll in its early stages, was absolutely crucial, with the country being the most important foreign player in an increasingly interna�onal game.

Impact of Interna�onal Involvement:

It goes without saying that, if interna�onal involvement in Syria has been cri�cal for the con�nued violence, it has also had significant impacts on those civilians trapped within Syrian borders. For instance, if Turkey had a more strictly enforced border, the possibility for terrorists to exploit the Syrian instability for their own gain would have been greatly reduced. Many figh�ng fac�ons would not have been able to rely on any external supply of arms coming illegally through the border to sustain their plight. However, this is not to say that the interna�onal community is to blame and should therefore withdraw all support. Not least of all the morality of such a decision would be brought to ques�on since it would leave thousands of vulnerable Syrians abandoned at the mercy of their failing state. Therefore, there is a moral, if not legal, obliga�on to provide humanitarian or financial support to all those that need it and with this comes the risk that aid will end up inevitably being passed to the wrong side.

Though it would be impossible to accurately predict the consequences of a truly civil war, in which all interna�onal interven�on is banned, it would be safe to assume that such an implementa�on would have prevented the conflict from escala�ng to the scale it has. In addi�on, though it is worth no�ng that legal barriers will not always correspond to a complete halt in foreign involvement, as well as the fact that in an ever-globalised economy, all countries are deeply interconnected in a way that renders it impossible to truly disconnect one from the rest, fewer supplies flowing into Syria could have naturally tampered out the war as it ran out of fuel to sustain itself. Understandably, the implica�ons that would have had for Syrian civilians, let alone the number of fatali�es that could have been prevented, are not to be underes�mated.

However, not all countries involved within Syria have had the same impact. Though the conflict may have ended much earlier if all interna�onal involvement was limited, certain countries’ ac�ons have certainly had a more profound effect. While the ac�ons of Western countries such as the US and those in Europe have altogether been evaluated to have had rather insignificant implica�ons on Syria’s overall situa�on, other na�ons, such as Turkey, Iran, and despite being o�en overlooked, Russia, have le� a much more longstanding imprint. A Humans Right Watch report, issued in 2020, found that Russian forces, in coali�on with Syrian counterparts, were guilty of inten�onally targe�ng schools, homes and hospitals, acts that would classify as a war crime From 2019 alone, these forces were responsible for destroying, in whole or in part, over 50 medical facili�es (Human Rights Watch, 2020). These conclusions that found Russia guilty of interna�onal war crimes was mirrored by UN findings (CNBC, 2020).

However, perhaps even more shocking is the fact that the Syrian government, with Russian help, has been found to have used chemical weapons in rebel held regions, indiscriminately killing men, women, and children. One of the most well-known of these chemical atacks was the use of the nerve agent sarin in 2013 in the town of Ghouta, not far from the Syrian capital. As confirmed shortly a�er by a UN team, 1,400 people were killed due to sarin exposure. However, this was not the last atack of its kind. The use of toxic chlorine gas has been confirmed in atacks in both 2014 and 2015,

as well as sarin nerve agent being u�lised once again in an atack in 2017 (Arms Control Associa�on, 2021). This goes against the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibi�on of the Use of Asphyxia�ng, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which bans all use of chemical weapons in war (Organisa�on for the Prohibi�on of Chemical Weapons). This would easily criminalise both Syrian and Russian acts under interna�onal legisla�on.

Impacts of Conflict on Syria

Socio-Economic Trends

Popula�on (Worldometer)

Birth

– The World Bank)

Death Rate

1000 people – The World Bank)

Infant Mortality (deaths under 5 years old per 1000 live births)

2011

2016

2023 (unless specified otherwise)

22.73 million 18.96 million 23.44 million

World average - 20 19

4

World average – 19

20 (2021)

World average – 17 (2021)

World average - 8 7 World average - 8 5 (2021)

20.2 (UNICEF)

World average – 36 (The World Bank)

Literacy rate

Poverty

World average – 70.1

Over 90% es�mated (World Vision)

World average –84.32% (The World bank)

39.8 (UNICEF)

World average – 31 (The World Bank)

World average – 71.72

86.30% in 2015 (ycharts, 2015)

World average –85.56% in 2015 (The World bank)

World average – 9 (2021)

22.3 (2021 – UNICEF)

World average - 28 (2021) (The World Bank)

– women

World average – 73.16

86.41% (Countrymeters)

World average – 87% in 2020 (The World bank)

2009 – 24.8% live below na�onal poverty line (IPCIG, 2019)

2009 – 1.5% experiencing food poverty (IPCIG, 2019)

2010 – 28% live below na�onal poverty line (ESCWA)

2016 – 83.4% live below na�onal poverty line (ESCWA)

2022 – 90% live below na�onal poverty line (UNICEF) 2022 – 80% food insecure (UNICEF)

GDP $67.54 billion (The World Bank) $12.60 billion (The World Bank) $11.08 billion (The World Bank)

Average Income

$538.51 per month (CEIC Data)

$100.33 per month (CEIC Data)

$81.10 per month (CEIC Data) in 2020

Global GDP ranking 68 (Country Economy 127 (Country Economy) 150 (Country Economy)

Evalua�on:

The impacts of the war were most no�ceable from its beginning in 2011 to 2015, as Syrian economy, alongside various social factors, struggled to be maintained during the sudden outbreak of violence. This can be seen in the increase in death rates due to conflict causali�es and an increase in infant morality as the ongoing war plunged even more Syrians into poverty, with damaged infrastructure affec�ng healthcare and food insecurity. Together, these can be seen to have contributed to the sharp decrease of over 7 years in average life expectancy during that �me as reported by Country Economy. Furthermore, schools and other educa�onal services were affected causing in decline in the literacy rate while the conflict and instability increased unemployment levels, reducing average income. However, as the war has progressed from 2015-2023, certain impacts first experienced have decreased in severity. Infant mortality decreased notably and, though it remained higher than UNICEF’s figure for 2011 of 20.2 per 1000 live births, it fell below the 2021 world average of 28 (The World Bank, 2021). In addi�on, the popula�on has seemingly recovered, explainable by the slight increase in brith rates and dras�c decrease in death rates. However, as the ever-decreasing GDP and increasing poverty rates show this is unlikely to be due to a decrease in the intensity of the conflict but instead due to increased Syrian adap�vity and civilians becoming accustomed to the unstable situa�on. There is likely to be a considerable delay between these posi�ve changes in social factors such as death rates having an impact on the Syrian economy and its popula�on’s wealth.

Economic

The economic impacts of the war on the Syrian economy are arguably the easiest way to quan�fy the extent to which it has affected the country. A study carried out in 2021 revealed that 59% of Syrian GDP had been affected by the conflict, not only the highest percentage in the Middle East region, ranked the least peaceful globally, but in fact the greatest change in percentage from 2007 to 2019 of any country worldwide (Ins�tute for Economics and Peace, 2021). In addi�on, the report found that, at its peak in 2015, the total economic cost of violence measured at over $32 billion. For a country that was currently experiencing one of the greatest humanitarian crises in history, this fact would have only heightened exis�ng issues. This cost, atributed to one year, has contributed to an overwhelmingly large total economic impact of the violence. In 2022, the UN es�mated that the amount of infrastructure damaged by the conflict equated to around $117.7 billion or double Syria’s 2010 GDP (UNCTAD, 2022).

However, not only were Syria’s internal costs increasing, but the global revenue it receives through interna�onal exports and trade was also severely impacted. In 2018, export revenues were at $0.7 billion. Compared to the $8.7 billion they were eight years earlier in 2010, this accounted for a 92% reduc�on. This worsened the economic impact of the war on Syrian GDP, as Syria was gaining minimal income to offset its economic losses (Vision of humanity, 2019)

These impacts can be clearly represented by the fact that the Syrian pound depreciated by 90% from 2010-2018 and infla�on during the same period increased by 700% (ESCWA, University of St Andrews) In conjunc�on with the University of St Andrews, the UN issued a report in 2016 on its findings of the impact of the conflict on Syria’s economy. Within it, it es�mates that accumula�ve

loses from the start of the war to 2015 were a staggering $259.6 billion, with all economic ac�vity, from oil and food produc�on to the manufacturing of goods, suffering extreme loses, exacerbated by economic sanc�ons implemented by the interna�onal community. Despite aid, notably from Iran and the Russian Federa�on, providing some damage mi�ga�on, GDP consistently fell with loses highest in domes�c trade and governmental services. In terms of physical capital, the construc�on industry was the worst hit, followed by manufacturing (UN and University of St Andrews, 2016)

The only industries predicted to have benefited from the unrest are those in the informal and illegal sectors. With the informal sector already accoun�ng for 40% of Syria’s pre-war GDP, this is expected to have grown, however given its unregulated nature, it is hard to es�mate by how much. However, it is worth no�ng that therefore these industries are o�en unreliable, with an inconsistent source of income, poten�ally making many Syrians more vulnerable to poverty. Addi�onally, illegal ac�vi�es have undoubtedly increased. Though naturally difficult to monitor, the Islamic State reported that within the Deir-el Zor province, of which the majority is in their control, they achieved a revenue of $3.7 million due to confisca�ons in one month in 2015 alone. This has the poten�al to worsen the economic crash, as goods and money within the country are stolen and exploited by extremists rather than being given to civilians who are struggling to survive (UN and University of St Andrews, 2016)

However, Syria’s economy has not only been affected by internal ac�vity. Due to the fragile states of neighbouring Lebanon and Turkey’s economies, coupled with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and economic sanc�ons in place against the country, Syria is having to rely heavily on interna�onal aid and assistance to sustain itself. For example, due to its dependence on Iran for fuel, in governmentoccupied regions, Assad has increased fuel prices, causing exponen�al growth in the demand for public buses, while also leaving hospitals and schools batling with fuel shortages (Syria Jus�ce and Accountability Centre, 2023). This infla�on has resulted in growing prices for food and other basic ameni�es, pushing more of the Syrian popula�on into food insecurity, with the price of wheat in Deir el-Zor alone increasing by 978% from November 2014 to November 2015 (UN and University of St Andrews, 2016).

Social

Not only has increased prices and lack of employment meant more Syrians are reliant on aid from interna�onal non-governmental organisa�ons (NGOs), but the ongoing conflict has also resulted in severe impacts to both the country’s educa�on and healthcare systems. School atendance rates before the war were promising, yet a�er the conflict broke out, have since suffered tremendously, resul�ng in around 2 million school-age children not receiving any schooling by 2015, with an addi�onal half a million also at risk of dropping out (UN and University of St Andrews, 2016). The consequences of this are not to be underes�mated. While it will undoubtedly affect the future of the young Syrian genera�on, decreasing na�onwide literacy rates and Syrian’s ability to earn an income and provide for their family, it also dras�cally reduces the chances of Syria being able to recover quickly and effec�vely once the conflict dies out. Though understandably difficult, if educa�on provisions were maintained at pre-war levels, the possibility for innova�on to aid a speedy recovery for the country would have been greater, especially when there are a large skilled genera�on ready to fill the gaps le� by those who have passed. This would have meant that Syria would have had the poten�al and intellectual means to ini�ate a coherent, thorough, and effec�ve response, limi�ng any economic and social impacts dragging too far into the long-term.

On top of this, na�onal healthcare has also been heavily impacted by the conflict. As of 2010, there were 493 hospitals in the country. A�er five years of armed figh�ng, around half had been directly

impacted with as many as a third completely destroyed by 2015 (UN and University of St Andrews, 2016) Due to these hospitals o�en being logis�cally inaccessible or physically hard to reach, in conjunc�on with the already dwindling financial resources, repairing them is not an op�on. Those that were not directly impacted were s�ll struggling with lack of electricity, medicine, medical equipment, as well as increased demand. In addi�on, the comba�ng sides would o�en deliberately target medical professionals due to their importance in the conflict, which has meant that a dispropor�onate number of doctors and qualified medical staff have fled the country. The accumula�on of all these factors has meant that Syria’s healthcare has not been adequately prepared to deal with the large number of injuries and fatali�es caused by the armed combat.

Compounded by food insecurity, the destruc�on of water pipes and damage to sanita�on infrastructure, Syria’s death and infant mortality rates have also consequently increased, with life expectancy and physician to popula�on ra�os decreasing rapidly. Notably, this has helped cause a cholera outbreak in northern Syria in 2022 (MSF, 2022). These factors are worsened further by the lack of educa�on which means any shortages of staff are not being counteracted with a steady influx of newly trained professionals. Also, the decline of the average Syrian’s health hampers their ability to work and provide for their family while also meaning that, when the war ends, the Syrian popula�on will not be of a high health standard to ins�gate an effec�ve recovery.

Poli�cal, Cultural and Environmental

Though perhaps not the most obvious impacts of the Syrian civil war, there have been significant poli�cal, cultural, and environmental implica�ons caused by the conflict. Firstly, the war has increased geopoli�cal tensions between na�ons based on which side of the conflict they support, causing splits in geographical regions, o�en aggrava�ng pre-exis�ng strains on intergovernmental rela�ons. For example, it has heightened hos�lity between Iran and other gulf states, as well as causing fric�on within well-established trade blocs such as the EU (examined further in global responses). Addi�onally, most of the largest poli�cal impacts of the war have been felt far beyond Syria’s borders, with countries such as Lebanon, experiencing their brute force.

Compounded with these poli�cal effects of the war, the Syrian situa�on has also had severe cultural and environmental impacts. Though it can be considered a key cause of the conflict through the role it played in the hardship of Syrian’s daily lives, the environment has also been one of its greatest vic�ms. With oil spills and soil contamina�on, water pollu�on and lack of waste disposal leading to poor hygiene (not helping in a country with an already failing healthcare system which already had pre-exis�ng struggles with water scarcity), the extent to which the environment has been damaged is large. These poor environmental condi�ons can also contaminate food sources, with poor quality, polluted soil, producing insufficient yields to provide for an increasingly malnourished popula�on. Furthermore, the country has experienced severe forest fires and deforesta�on on a widespread scale. While trees are o�en cut down to be burnt for fuel when electricity is scarce, fruit trees are o�en collateral damage in the conflict, further jeopardizing Syrian’s ability to find food (Arab Reform Imita�ve, 2021) Moreover, unsustainable levels of logging will not only have grave long term affects, dras�cally decreasing soil quality and causing damage to an already fragile economy, but it has been linked to an increase in forest fires. In 2020, coastal forest fires killed and injured many, while also reportedly displacing up to 25,000 people, even if only temporarily. It also resulted in over 9,000 hectares of land, including land of agricultural use, being destroyed (Relief Web, 2020). This has all helped damage Syria’s olive oil produc�on, something that it was once a leading exporter in, decreasing Syria’s income through trade. Olive oil produc�on not only cons�tuted up to 3.5% of pre2011 Syrian GDP, but also provided income for almost 337,000 households in 2003 (Arab Reform Ini�a�ve, 2021). With deforesta�on, many Syrians are now faced with greater financial insecurity.

Overall, these environmental effects have the poten�al to have far reaching consequences. If damage to ecosystems and habitats, that millions of Syrians rely on, is irreparable, it could cause irreversible changes to Syria’s climate and greatly hinder, if not outright prevent, a full economic and social recovery from the conflict. Whether this is from con�nued degrada�on of the soil resul�ng in a longterm deple�on of yields, decreasing the Syria’s poten�al exports and its consequent trade revenues, or unsafe levels of water contamina�on and the misuse of already dwindling water supplies coupled with an increasing frequency of droughts experienced due to global clima�c changes, this would have devasta�ng implica�ons for the everyday lives of millions of Syrian civilians.

On top of this, before the war, Syria was a cultural hotspot. Situated on the historic Silk Road trade route, has meant that, despite not having served a trade purpose for several years, many Syrian ci�es are full of heritage-rich architecture and iconic monuments. The city of Aleppo is one such example. Listed as a UNESCO world heritage site, it has suffered extensive damage, with 60% of its old city severely damaged and 30% completely destroyed. This has meant the loss of countless landmarks, including damage to Aleppo’s famous Great Umayyad Mosque. The cultural loss of Syrian heritage caused by this cannot be overstated (UNESCO, 2017). The conflict has not only robbed Syrians of their jobs and homes but also the rich culture of their ancestors that they are so proud of Their homeland, their iden�ty, and their character have been taken in every sense. No recovery, however large, will ever bring that back. Syria’s charm and individuality will remain lost, the country shatered into yet another demolished war zone. Needless to say, this wasteful and arbitrary destruc�on of numerous ancient relics and culturally important artefacts will have long term implica�ons for Syria’s tourism industry, and all that rely on it.

Mass Displacement and Fatali�es of Syrian Civilians

Arguably the most disturbing impact of the Syrian war is the vast number of casual�es. Though it is prac�cally impossible to collect reliable data on the number of fatali�es caused by the war, recent UN es�mates suggest that around 84 Syrians lose their lives daily in direct consequence of the ongoing conflict. From its analysis, as of 2022, that equates to the lives of almost 307,000 innocent Syrian civilians, a staggering es�mate (OHCHR, 2023). However, according to Syrian Centre for Policy Research, as of 2016, the total number of fatali�es, including those that are an indirect cause of the conflict, was much higher at 470,00 which, with, the 1.9 million Syrians it es�mated to be injured, shows a shocking gap in numbers (Guardian, 2016). Though the reason for such a varied es�mate, par�cularly when considering they were six years apart, is probably explicable by what the respec�ve studies classified as a conflict caused fatality (ie whether they included indirect deaths), it does also show how difficult it is to accurately ascertain an accurate death toll during a conflict while also illustra�ng that even with moderate es�mates, the number of deaths is shockingly high, and the chance of it being even greater is not to be overlooked. These sta�s�cs clearly demonstrate how difficult life is in modern day Syria and how problema�c it can be to atain basic popula�on census informa�on in a country where stability is litle more than a distant memory. They clearly portray how deeply rooted the conflict is in all aspects of life, that it is safe to assume that nearly all deaths occurring in the country have in some way been a result of, or impacted by, the ongoing violence.

The Syrian crisis has also resulted in the largest displacement of people in the world. As of 2021, 6.6 million Syrians had fled the persecu�on and conflict, seeking safety and protec�on interna�onally as refugees. (Gil Loescher, 2021). A more recent 2023 UNHCR report paints an equally bleak image of those that have been displaced from their homes yet remain within Syrian borders. These IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) are o�en wrongly forgoten when we think of the mass displacement of people, yet the UN predicts that overall, since the conflict began over 14 million people have been

forced from their homes in Syria, with over 6.8 million people s�ll displaced internally today. The effects on these people, forced to migrate to unfamiliar places within Syria, are easily overlooked, yet can be just as profound as those that impact the Syrians who have fled interna�onally. Unlike their fellow ci�zens who may have a chance for a beter, safer life in another country, those internally displaced s�ll o�en struggle with poor living condi�ons and quality of life, which, in many cases is not much beter than what they experienced previously These factors have all helped result in around 70% of the Syrian popula�on needing humanitarian support, with nine out of ten living in poverty (UNHCR, 2023).

As for those who have sought asylum elsewhere, most have ended up in Syria’s neighbouring na�ons, with the UN predic�ng that Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt alone house around 5.5 million Syrian refugees between them. This sen�ment is mirrored in Gil Loescher’s ‘Refugees: A Very Short Introduc�on’, in which it is noted that nearby countries o�en have a dispropor�onate amount of the responsibility to respond to refugee crises, especially considering when many of them are faced with their own struggles themselves. This fact can o�en exacerbate issues, which will be further examined later. As Loescher rightly points out, 85% of all refugees globally were within developing or emerging na�ons at the end of 2019, with Turkey notably being the highest refugee hos�ng state both at the �me of the book’s publishment and now (UNHCR, 2023). In comparison more developed na�ons, with Germany as a possible excep�on, tend to accommodate a much smaller number of refugees, despite being in a beter financial posi�on to do so. Many Western na�ons’ media have twisted the truth regarding Syrian refugees, helping to play a part in a growing, yet no less shocking, an�-refugee rhetoric. This in turn has fuelled varying governmental approaches in response to the Syrian civil war, with many using distorted reali�es in their favour to rid themselves of all moral and legal obliga�on. These governmental responses, with large dispari�es between those of the West and those in the Middle East, along with analysis of the full global distribu�on of Syrian refugees will be inves�gated in the analysis of the global effects of the Syrian war.

Lebanon

Background and History

Country Profile - Lebanon

- Popula�on (Worldometer, 2023) : 5.3 million

- Total Area: 10,452 squared kilometres

- Capital: Beirut

- Bordering Na�ons: Syria, Israel

- Official Languages: Arabic

- Median Age (Worldometer, 2023): 28.8

- Prime Minister: Najib Mika� (from the Azm Movement party, currently serving his third term as of September 2021)

- President: Vacant as of 2022 (last serving president was Michel Aoun)

- Poli�cal Structure: Confessionalism (top posi�ons of authority propor�onately split between various religious groups so that no one group can have dominance over the country’s poli�cal stance)

Economic Ac�vi�es (as propor�on of total GNP) (The Embassy of Lebanon):

- Services and Banking (70%)

- Industry (20%)

- Agriculture (10%)

Religion (as percentage of popula�on who follow) (US Department of State, 2021 and 2022):

- Islam (64.9%) (Sunni – 32%, Shia – 31.3%, Alawites and Ismailis – 1.6%)

- Chris�anity (32%) (including Maronite Catholic (16.8%), Greek Orthodox (8%), Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Protestant)

- Druze (3.1%)

- Other (<1%)

In total, 18 religious sects are recognised in Lebanon, making the country ethnically and religiously diverse. The ra�o of Muslims:Chris�ans in parliament must be 1:1. Those belonging to the Druze faith have reserva�on over eight seats.

Physical Geography:

- Mountainous – Mount Lebanon/Lebanon Mountains, An� Lebanon Mountains (parallel to each other)

- Coastline length: 225 km

History

Before looking at Lebanon in the context of Syria, it is impera�ve to understand its history. Lebanon became part of the French Mandate of Syria a�er World War I. Though it was given the recogni�on of being called the ‘State of Greater Lebanon’ in 1920, it was in fact not un�l 1926, that the French officially separated Lebanon and Syria as two different en��es (despite both s�ll being under the rule of the Syrian French mandate). Therefore, the histories of these two countries are deeply entwined.

During World War II, Bri�sh forces entered Lebanon fearing that German military would gain control over the region, a move that could have been fatal to the Allied posi�on. In 1941, it was announced that Lebanon would be granted independence under the Free French government, however following the 1943 elec�ons, a new government was implemented and abolished the French mandate. This did not go down well with France, who proceeded to arrest the new government, before later releasing them on November 22nd, 1943, the day widely accepted as the day Lebanon started its journey to independence. A�er the end of the war, France withdrew from the country in 1946.

However, peace was short lived. In 1948, Lebanon joined the Arab-Israeli war and in 1975, its own civil war broke out. This Lebanese Civil War lasted un�l 1990 and caused the deaths of 150,000 and the maiming of a further 200,000. Importantly, in 1976, Syria intervened in the war to try and keep their allies, the Maronites, in power (BBC, 2019). In addi�on, twice during the civil war, Israel invaded Lebanon, and it was not un�l 2000 that Southern Lebanon was released from Israeli control a�er suffering numerous atacks from Lebanon’s Hezbollah. However, despite hopes, Israel’s lack of presence in the country did not hamper Hezbollah’s atacks and they con�nued to dispute over ownership of an area of land, called Shebaa Farms, which Israel saw as part of Syria, despite Syria agreeing that the land belonged to Lebanon.

In 2005, Rafik Hariri, former Lebanese Prime Minister, was assassinated by a bomb, which many blamed on Syria. This was not only due to heavy Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs but also due to Hariri opposing Syria’s ini�a�ve to change Lebanese law as to enable pro-Syrian Lahoud’s presiden�al term to be extended. This resulted in a spat of assassina�ons of prominent Lebanese

figures and resulted in the Cedar Revolu�on. The Cedar Revolu�on was made up of various demonstra�ve acts aimed at forcing all Syrian presence out of Lebanon. Syria eventually conceded and by April 2005, declared Lebanon free of all Syrian forces. Later that year Lebanon elected a new parliament which was evidently more an�-Syrian in its stance.

Violence on the Lebanese-Israeli border escalated once more in the summer of 2006 between Hezbollah and Israel. The war, which ended in August of that year, came at the price of 1,191 Lebanese and 44 Israeli lives. Hezbollah though, con�nued to remain a threat, with its militants, along with those from Amal, another Shia militant group, temporarily occupying western Beirut at a point in 2008, during the 6-month period that Lebanon’s government was failing, and the posi�on of president remain unoccupied. However, this was ended when on the 21st of May, a statement, signed by all major Lebanese par�es during nego�a�ons, elected Michel Suleiman as president. He was officially appointed just four days later.

Effects of the French Mandate in Contemporary Lebanon

The French Mandate, as with many colonies, has had a crucial influence on the Lebanon that exists today. This influence can in turn be seen to have had direct impacts on how Lebanon has coped with the Syrian conflict. Therefore, to understand why the Syrian instability has affected Lebanon in the way it has, it is impera�ve to look first at the core founda�ons that have made Lebanon the way it is, including the French occupa�on which had far reaching consequences in destabilising the country and hence exacerba�ng the effects of the Syrian civil war.

Religion and Poli�cs

As with a lot of interna�onal colonialists, France governed Syria and Lebanon according to its own interests, rather than those of the people. France wanted a na�on with Chris�ans as the majority, and so instead of crea�ng borders based on historic separa�on or geographical factors, they created a separate Lebanon from Syria for religious beliefs. This tac�c can be seen globally, from the separa�on of the Korean peninsula to the crea�on of Cameroon, interna�onal powers o�en arbitrarily drew lines through the land and called them borders, leaving groups separated and countries in turmoil. When France le� the region, they had separated Syria and Lebanon, yet had failed to establish a formal border. As shown in a 2022 research report carried out by the Interna�onal Ins�tute for Global Strategic Analysis, this has resulted in the extremely porous borders we see in the area today. In addi�on, this helped fuel the land disputes between Israel and Lebanon, par�cularly over the area of Shebaa farms. But perhaps the greatest impact of these weak borders was only realised much later in 2011 when terrorists and weapon smugglers could easily infiltrate them to move across the border, and Syrian refugees, in numbers unsustainably large for Lebanon to deal with, could enter Lebanese territory a�er fleeing the war.

The French were also the ones that installed Lebanon’s confessional poli�cal system. The rules were that “The President must always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the Assembly a Shia Muslim” (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 2008, as cited in IIGSA, 2022) Although created to try and unify Lebanon and create a strong Lebanese identity where all religious and ethnic groups could belong to and feel represented by it. It mainly resulted in Maronite Christian’s values being at the forefront of politics due to the fact they were ultimately the ones kept in power. This ‘neither Arab, nor Western’ Lebanese nationalism, implemented by French-controlled Lebanese news and education during occupation, caused resentment among the country’s Druze

and Muslim populations, and can be seen to have been a main force that caused the Lebanese civil war, which had longstanding negative implications on the Lebanon that we see today (Evan Ritli, 2011).

The Longstanding Legacy of the French Mandate and the Taif Agreement

These unsustainable poli�cal measures were never going to be able to remain successful throughout unpredictable demographic change. However, they were never really updated. Many believe that this harmful poli�cal legacy has been one of the greatest causes of the economic troubles facing the na�on today. To understand this, we must look at the Taif Agreement, established in 1989 to bring an end to the civil war in Lebanon. This agreement, though meant to gradually remove the problema�c religion-based system from Lebanese poli�cs, just reinstated the sectarianism. As shown by Joseph Bahout, wri�ng for the Carnegie Endowment for Interna�onal Peace in 2016, ‘poli�cal sectarianism was reaffirmed and even consolidated in the Taif Agreement.’ This was extremely problema�c.

Though it may have ended the war in the short run, it would cause ripples of instability to con�nue into Lebanon’s future. At its core, these religion-based parliamentary quotas do the opposite of what they aim to. Instead of reuni�ng the popula�on under a cohesive Lebanese iden�ty, it reinforces their separa�on, highligh�ng the fact that those from a various religious groups are in fact different. Counterintui�vely, it allows religious agenda to be at the centre of poli�cs. This Taif Agreement, notably meant to have been regulated by Syria, based on the original French instated system, is said to have ul�mately caused severe protests and economic upheaval Therefore, perhaps one of the most longstanding legacies of the French Mandate, is in fact Lebanon’s economic crisis (Foreign Policy, 2019).

In addi�on, the Mandate relied on limi�ng civilian’s poli�cal and cultural freedom, with France’s agenda portrayed in schools and by newspapers. They o�en used conflict, harsh punishments, and atrocious acts of violence to ins�l fear in their subjects, with French troops reportedly having grouped up men in random execu�ons in Syria (The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates, Michael Provence). Understandably, this can be seen to have had longstanding implica�ons in Lebanon’s path for peace, with France undeniably having its part to play in the issues that s�ll grip the country today.

Neo-colonialism

Lebanon has had a long and complicated history with France and other former colonialist powers. However, many predict that these once prominent rela�ons s�ll hold considerable power in contemporary geopoli�cs. Though it is inevitable for former �es to s�ll hold some relevance in na�ons today, France is being increasingly blamed for intervening in Lebanese affairs to reassert its influence in the region once more.

Although France has officially withdrawn from Lebanon, it is s�ll heavily involved in Lebanese finances. Given the current economic hardship, France has held various mee�ngs to try and tackle the corrup�on at the heart of the issue. To do this, it has given generous ‘aid’ to Lebanon to try and combat its high debts. However, these dona�ons have done the exact opposite, as they are in fact loans that increase Lebanese debt in the long run. This not only increases Lebanon’s reliance on interna�onal aid but also gives France leverage over Lebanese geopoli�cs (Middle East Eye, 2020) Addi�onally, it is noteworthy to men�on, that these corrupt individuals who have contributed to the failing of Lebanese government have o�en originally been instated or helped by France.

Perhaps the most evident example of this neo-colonialist a�tude though was France’s response to the Beirut explosion. Macron not only visited the country soon a�er the event, but also said words such as ‘France will never let Lebanon go’ in his speech (France 24, 2020), something many would say show a deep correla�on to colonialist a�tudes This will be explored further in the explora�on of the Syrian war on a global scale (see page 34)

Effects of the Syrian Civil War on Lebanon

Poverty 27.4% live below na�onal poverty line in 2011 (The World Bank)

GDP (The World Bank)

Migrant popula�on as percentage of total popula�on

Es�mated number of Syrians

billion

(Macrotrends)

Nominal (only 0.9 million Syrians lived abroad in 2010, with Lebanon not within the top 10 host countries (Middle East Ins�tute, 2020))

Lack of sufficient data

80% live in poverty

36% live in extreme poverty (European Commission, 2023)

billion $23.13 billion (2021)

(Macrotrends) Lack of sufficient data

1.2 million (accounted for around 20% of the popula�on at the �me) (Amnesty Interna�onal, 2015)

1.5 million (UNHCR, 2023)

Evalua�on:

The above table shows that the Syrian civil war not only had huge effects within Syria, but within neighbouring Lebanon as well A�er the start of the unrest, in 2015, the Lebanese popula�on spiked, partly due to the influx of Syrian refugees entering the country through the porous Syria-Lebanon border. In addi�on, the birth rate did not con�nue to follow its normal downward trajectory, but instead remained at 18 per 1000 people, the same rate as 2010. This again shows evidence that the conflict in Syria disrupted Lebanon’s progress of development through the demographic transi�on model (DTM). Death rates also doubled from 2015 to 2021, partly due to the poor living condi�ons that many Syrian refugees found themselves in, and the inability of the Lebanese government to cope with the increasing strains it was being placed under. These yet again are reflected in the increasing levels of poverty, compounded by the high levels of unemployment and the Lebanese economic crash, and plumme�ng levels of GDP that are in correla�on with the vastly increasing number of Syrians. However, one sta�s�c of par�cular interest that may seem counterintui�ve is the apparent drop in the number of refugees granted asylum from 2015 to 2022. This decrease, which equates to a drop of almost 15% can be par�ally explained by a rather recent change in Lebanese and Turkish a�tude towards Syrian asylum seekers that will be examined later on

Economic

Exports to Syria were a vital source of revenue for pre-2011 Lebanon. It is es�mated that, prior to the conflict, approximately $800 million of export goods were traded from Lebanon through the Nassib border crossing (Reuters, 2018). However, as expected, the war decreased Syrian demand for Lebanese services. This has led to a World Bank study finding that the average Lebanese exporter lost $90,000 in Syrian exports by only 2012 (The World Bank, 2015). This is of par�cular significance when trade exports account for over 26% of Lebanese GDP, as of 2021 (Trading Economics, 2023). This would have put added stress on an already failing economy.

Tourism was another of Lebanon’s industries that was impacted by the conflict, albeit mainly at the start. Though this has been heightened by Lebanon’s economic crash, which in itself is entwined deeply into the Syrian conflict, the ongoing Syrian war has meant that many interna�onal governments, including the UK’s, changed tourism policies, and advised against travel to certain areas within Lebanon. At the beginning of the war, this impacted tourist numbers significantly, with a decline of 0.8 million visitors from 2.2 million in 2010, to 1.4 million in 2012 (Faysal Itani, Rafik Harrari Centre for the Middle East, 2013), severely restric�ng the income obtained through the tourism sector. However, despite this, the tourism sector has recovered slightly, and is expected to generate $9 billion in revenues for the country in 2023 (The Na�onal News, 2023). In an economy where many other industries are failing, this can be seen as a huge success.

The economies of Syria and Lebanon are heavily linked and reliant on each other. Though Lebanon’s economy was already deteriora�ng prior to the breakout of violence in 2011, the Syrian conflict has inevitably increased these complica�ons. According to a 2013 study carried out by the Rafik Harrari Centre for the Middle East, for every 1% slowdown in Syria’s economy, there has been a respec�ve decline of 0.2% in its Lebanese counterpart. This is compounded by the fact that the Lebanese economy is par�cularly reliant on trade, tourism, and remitances, all of which are easily affected by regional poli�cs. But one of the greatest effects of the war on Lebanon is that which it has had on foreign investment. With Lebanese poli�cians split on their pro or an�-Syrian stances, poten�al investors have started losing faith that the Lebanese situa�on could improve, resul�ng in the dry-up of investment input From 2011 to 2012, for instance, direct foreign investment dropped by almost

70%, equa�ng to around $2.4 billion. Evidently, this would have devasta�ng effects on Lebanon’s chances of coping with the increasing regional instability (Faysal Itani, Rafik Harrari Centre for the Middle East, 2013).

For Lebanon’s fragile economy, the Syrian conflict is a huge threat This is in part poli�cal, par�cularly for Arab states which were infuriated by the Lebanese Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict.

All these factors resulted in the 2013 predic�on that a further 170,000 Lebanese ci�zens would fall into poverty by the end of 2014 because of the war (The World Bank, 2013). Though unclear whether this was met, increasing poverty rates have had a large role in Lebanon’s economic troubles, including its current economic crash, which many atribute to having started with the most profound effects in 2019.

Poli�cal

The conflict in neighbouring Syria has created a stark division within Lebanon’s poli�cal scene. As shown by a 2013 report, issued by the United States Ins�tute of Peace, these fractures were not only between different religious groups but also sub-groups within the same religious sect. For example, there has been some contrast in how different Sunni groups have responded to the Syrian war, with many o�en aligning with contradictory forces. This fragmenta�on has caused a lack of centralised and cohesive leadership which may lead to even greater poli�cal instability within the country and an increase in inter-sect conflict exacerba�ng exis�ng sectarian tensions (US Ins�tute of Peace, 2013).

Hezbollah:

Hezbollah is a militant and poli�cal party, backed by Iran. As a Shia mili�a group, recognised as a Foreign Terrorist Organisa�on (FTO) by the United States (CRS Reports, 2023), it has had an important role in Lebanese poli�cs. Therefore, though its hos�lity towards the US and Israel remains, the Syrian war has had las�ng impacts on the group.

As of 2016, at least 1,000 Hezbollah members had been killed due to the Syrian war (Brookings, 2016), which Dan Byman, a director in the Center for Middle East Policy, comments during a recent tes�mony, has been detrimental for the group. This is logical as the authority of Assad, an ally of Iran and Hezbollah, is now threatened. In addi�on, since the outbreak of civil violence and Hezbollah’s consequent siding with Assad, the public image of the group has suffered, with it suffering a decline in popularity (Byman, 2016). This shi� in the public’s percep�on of Hezbollah has been exacerbated by the fact that Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf na�ons, branded the group as a terrorist organisa�on in 2016 (Brookings, 2016). However, despite this, though it has had knockbacks, Hezbollah s�ll remains a threat to both Israel and America, as well as an increasingly fragile Lebanon (Byman, 2016).

Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon

Lebanon holds the largest popula�on of refugees in the world per capita, with around 1 in every 4 people having been refugees at its peak. However, exact figures are hard to come by and these es�ma�ons are likely to be on the conserva�ve side In 2013 the World Bank predicted that 37% of the Lebanese popula�on would be refugees by the end of 2014 (The World Bank, 2013)

To break the 1-in-4 down further, around 1 in 5 people within the country are Syrian refugees specifically (CARE Interna�onal, 2018). There are also notable popula�ons of Pales�nian and Iraqi

refugees as well as smaller groups from Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan. Though refugees from nonSyrian na�onali�es equate to approximately 12,300, compared to 1.5 million Syrians living within Lebanese borders (UNHCR, 2022), it is important to remember these ‘forgoten refugees’ have also found themselves indirectly affected by the Syrian war. Lebanon’s prominence as a refugee-hos�ng na�on is evidence of how far-reaching the consequences of the Syrian civil war are, as its impacts have not only affected regional popula�ons but also the global refugee crises both nearby and further afield.

Thanks to its porous Eastern borders and long-standing rela�ons with its much larger neighbour, Lebanon has found itself housing unsustainably large numbers of Syrian refugees, at a �me when it itself was weak. The Lebanese economy has never been the strongest, yet a sudden mass influx of vulnerable people in need of immediate humanitarian support has most definitely hampered any hopes of improvement. As of 2023, it is es�mated that 90% of all Syrian refugees in Lebanon are extremely poor (Human Rights Watch, 2023). In comparison with poverty figures of Syrians s�ll within their home country, these rates are the same, if not worse. The large number of refugees has put strain on public services, with housing, healthcare, and educa�on amongst those most affected.

The lack of adequate housing has meant many Syrians find shelter in spontaneous informal setlements, partly compounded by Lebanon’s refusal to create formal refugee camps due to supposed security concerns. This has helped contribute to the extremely poor levels of housing that many Syrians experience, with the UN Refugee Agency predic�ng 58% live in accommoda�on that is severely inadequate, due to it being substandard, overcrowded, or dangerous (UNHCR, 2023). Undoubtedly this has put a vulnerable popula�on in an even more precarious posi�on. The impacts of this include it now being harder for Syrians to receive aid, with only refugees registered with the UNHCR receiving insurance-covered healthcare, and even then, s�ll having to cover 25% of the cost (E-interna�onal Rela�ons, 2023).

In addi�on, this has been aggravated by the fact that public water services are at most only available three days a week, resul�ng in dangerously low levels of hygiene and sanita�on. According to a Journal of Global Health Reports’ 2023 research ar�cle, this has caused a number Syrians to contract Hepa��s B and C, with poten�ally lethal implica�ons. A cholera outbreak was also declared in Lebanon in October 2022 (Na�onal Library of Medicine, 2022). These are just two examples of Lebanon’s failing healthcare system, heavily impacted by the increased demand due to the number of Syrian refugees.

The educa�onal opportuni�es for Syrian children have also been greatly impacted. According to Save The Children, there are over 660,000 school-aged Syrians in Lebanon. It goes without saying that Lebanon’s weak schooling system was ill equipped to deal with a growth of well over half a million students prac�cally overnight. This has meant that schools are under immense strain, and free places in short supply. The UN es�mates that within Lebanon, 30% of all school-aged refugees have never atended school and that 37% of Syrians aged 15-24 are neither employed or receiving any kind of educa�on or training (UNHCR, 2022). This has the poten�al to affect not only the future of these refugees but also that of the Lebanese economy which relies on a skilled and educated workforce and its ability to compensate for the financial losses caused by the conflict.

Since 2011, unemployment in Lebanon has dras�cally increased from 6.8% in 2010 to 13% in 2020 (The World Bank). This has been caused by the Lebanese economic crisis, which Syrians find themselves as both a cause and vic�m of. As Syrian refugees are o�en willing to work for less, many employers have increasingly begun hiring Syrians over their Lebanese counterparts, increasing local unemployment levels. This has worsened the fragile economic situa�on of Lebanon, a na�on grappling with a 2012 public debt 1.34 �mes its GDP (The World Bank, 2023).

Conflict and Discrimina�on:

Many Lebanese ci�zens feel that their lives have been made harder by the presence of Syrian refugees. Due to increasing compe��on for public services, increasing poverty, their role in Lebanon’s economic hardship and, in par�cular, the preferen�al hiring of Syrian employees, locals have started to blame Syrian refugees for their current hardship Many feel they are suffering due to their government’s decision to help Syrians in need, resul�ng in a growing an�-Syrian rhetoric between Lebanese na�onals. This tension is growing, with the anger o�en presen�ng itself through explicit violence and discrimina�on.

In 2014, the Human Rights Watch issued a report sta�ng that in the two months of August and September, 11 violent atacks were carried out against Syrians (or indeed those that were deemed to be Syrian) by Lebanese civilians. These atacks included armed violence against unarmed vic�ms, with witnesses o�en repor�ng that security forces were complicit in them. In some cases, it reported that Lebanese officials were not taking adequate steps to prevent such discrimina�on, which was aimed at eradica�ng Syrians from specific areas. Atempts at implemen�ng curfews on Syrians within Lebanon have also been reported (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In total, at least 21 of Lebanon’s municipali�es have implemented limita�ons on Syrians that are discriminatory, including vast viola�ons of their right to free movement, o�en under the pretence of Covid-19 protec�ve measures, despite being implemented before the virus (Minority Rights Group, 2022).

Furthermore, Syrian women and children o�en find themselves vic�m to exploita�on, violence, and sexual abuse. Single girls are vulnerable to child marriage, and sexual harassment. Recent reports show that levels of child marriage have increased in Lebanon, and there has been an increase in forced pros�tu�on and ‘survival sexual acts’, used as a last resort by many Syrian women to sustain themselves in Lebanon, as a means to keep up with the rising costs atributed to Lebanon’s failing economy (BMC, 2020). This is evidence of Lebanon’s cons�tu�onal discrimina�on against Syrians, the lack of support given to refugees, so that they have no choice but to sell themselves for money, and the exploita�on of them for the personal gain of Lebanese perpetrators.

However, it is wrong to think that women and girls are the only vic�ms. According to a UNHCR study, sexual violence targeted at men and boys is also rife. With the subjects being Syrian refugees based in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, not only are rates of male child labour startling high, but the exploita�on of refugees by their employees is also commonplace. Many male refugees were vic�ms to human rights atroci�es. Reports of rape, sexual harassment and torture have also been given, with some men repor�ng that their employees refused to pay them unless they caried out acts of a sexual nature (UNHCR, 2017). These are just a few examples of how Syrians are disfavoured in Lebanese society, and how Lebanese officials fail to protect vulnerable Syrians under their care. This conflict between Lebanese and Syrian na�onals, a consequence of a growing tension between the two groups, both united and divided by their pain and struggles, is perhaps one of the saddest impacts of the Syrian war in Lebanon and those Syrians unfortunate enough to find themselves there.

Lebanese Out-migra�on

Lebanon is experiencing high levels of emigra�on. Due to the economic crash, many locals are facing tough living condi�ons and increasing poverty. This economic crisis is undoubtedly entwined with the ongoing Syrian war, and the effects of the mass setling of displaced Syrians within the country and therefore this migra�on has been impacted by the conflict. Further aggrava�ng the effects of an already failing educa�on system, Lebanon’s high levels of emigra�on, including highly skilled workers and other specialised professionals, has the poten�al to be detrimental for the na�on. A lack of

skilled workers will limit innova�on and advancements within Lebanon for the foreseeable future, while an overall smaller popula�on will limit the Lebanese workforce, making an economic recovery even more problema�c. This impact is not to be underes�mated, with the Lebanese ‘brain drain’ becoming an increasing concern for the country.

Deporta�on

Shown by the drop in the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon from 2015 to 2022, Syrian refugees are leaving Lebanon. However, this is not by choice but by an increasing number of deporta�ons carried out by the Lebanese authori�es. This is further proof of the growing an�-Syrian rhetoric within the Lebanese popula�on. While official sta�s�cs are difficult to find, a recent Human Rights Watch report stated that from April to July 2023, a staggering 1,800 Syrian refugees were deported back to Syria. When considering that many of these were single children, without parents or guardians, as well as Syrians who had already been granted refugee status, this is even more disturbing. The report went on to say that the Syrians were not given any opportunity to challenge their deporta�on and o�en their basic human rights were violated. In addi�on, the deportees were o�en subject to torture and abuse at the hand of Lebanese authori�es, in clear viola�on of the UN Conven�on Against Torture, 1984 (Human Rights Watch, 2023)

However, these deporta�ons were not due to a de-escala�on in the Syrian situa�on. The Syrian army and conflict were just as brutal as they had always been and many of the deportees were arbitrarily arrested, tortured, and abused upon their return to Syria. These abuses of basic rights could, and should, have been easily avoided had they remained on Lebanese soil. Though startling, these figures from 2023 are by no means an anomaly. Lebanon’s General Security reported that 6,345 Syrians were ‘returned’ to their country of origin between April 25th, 2019, and September 19th, 2021 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). This has undoubtedly been aided by the fact that legal residency rates within Syrian popula�ons were at an all �me low, with just 17% of refugees having legal residence in 2022, despite the majority having signed in by the UN (Relief Web, 2023). Notably, concerns around kidnapping were also at their peak.

These sta�s�cs are all further evidence of a changing governmental approach to Syrian refugees, as many Lebanese see them as part of the problem, not the solu�on. These deporta�ons, however, are in viola�on of the ‘1951 Conven�on Rela�ng to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol’ which asserts ‘that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom’ (UNHCR, 1951 and 1967). This shows that the acts of these na�ons are not just morally wrong but also go against their obliga�ons as stated under UN guidelines.

Lebanon though is not alone. Turkey has significantly ramped up its deporta�ons of Syrian refugees Jordan and Iraq have also con�nuously deported Syrian refugees back to Syria, and though these rates are perhaps not increasing, they are s�ll part of a disturbing trend. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the growth in the Middle Eastern an�-refugee sen�ment has been accompanied by a drama�c increase in the number of Syrian refugees being deported. Put simply, states are using Syrians as a scapegoat for their problems. It is easier to blame others for issues rather than tackling the problem. Through misinforma�on, at �mes encouraged by governments, refugees are becoming vic�ms to persecu�on in the places supposed to protect them Countless studies reflect the same disturbing truth. Beirut and Ankara, in conjunc�on with others, are priori�sing the restora�on of lucra�ve geopoli�cal rela�ons with Damascus and the oppressive Assad regime over the lives of thousands of innocent civilians (The Guardian, 2023). That is a truth that they simply cannot hide.

The Flip Side:

It goes without saying that, if many vulnerable people enter a country, o�en in need of healthcare and other basic services, there would be a financial cost for the na�on hos�ng them. However, that is not to say that refugees are an inevitable economic burden. If managed correctly and efficiently, displaced popula�ons have a plethora of skills that could be u�lised to benefit the state they find themselves in, easing pressure on a strained economy and limited workforce. In fact, refugees could increase the produc�vity of the country, fuelling economic ac�vity and boos�ng a country’s financial stability, even if this is not how governments choose to portray them.

Recent reports show that the Syrian refugees have not come at an economic cost for Lebanon, but it is in fact the mismanagement of them that has. This is portrayed clearly through the housing issue, and the problems many Syrians face with lacking a legal residency. If these refugees were integrated into Lebanese society effec�vely, they could have brought unexpected benefits for an economy that was struggling. In fact, the World Bank has gone as far as to say that the Lebanese financial crisis is a ‘deliberate crisis’, with the New Humanitarian adding that it has been ‘born out of poli�cal mismanagement and corrup�on.’ This contradicts the message of the Lebanese government.

In 2022, The New Humanitarian issued a report sta�ng that, according to their extensive research, there has been no rela�onship between the number of refugees and the growth of the Lebanese economy (using key indicators such as imports, exports, par�cipa�on rates and unemployment).

Going further, it commented that a majority of Syrian refugees were setled in Lebanon’s poorest areas, a further indica�on of the mismanagement of the refugees by the Lebanese government. If the responsibility was spread out, and effec�ve measures implemented to protect and help refugees, there is no doubt that they could have saved the Lebanese economy.

Lebanon, however, should not carry all the blame. Western na�ons have employed the same tac�cs to rid themselves of the responsibility of catering for those displaced in the Syrian conflict (The New Humanitarian, 2022). Europe especially has taken to portraying refugees as a burden, rather than a group of poten�al, a type of invading army, one that should be stopped at all costs. If the interna�onal response to the war had been united in its aim for inclusive development, helping, and at the same �me benefi�ng from, the influx of refugees, the future of Syrians and those countries affected by the Syrian war would have looked far less bleak. Instead, though, the interna�onal community has taken to shunning refugees, blaming them for acts in which they are blameless, doing everything in their power, from outright blocking their entry to arbitrarily depor�ng them, to avoid having to put in the effort and management needed to cater for them, jeopardizing not only their own na�on’s future but the future of the millions of innocent civilians whose lives are at their disposal. This, if nothing else, is morally and inexplicably outrageous.

Global

The Global Distribution of Displaced Syrians

(Seman�c Scholar, 2017) (2015)

Evalua�on:

Most na�ons that have the highest number of Syrian refugees are, naturally, those nearby. This can be explained by the fact that it is both logis�cally and financially easier for refugees to travel to a neighbouring region rather than somewhere further. They are more likely going to be able to afford it, there will probably be less barriers (i.e., borders to cross), and the chances of them integra�ng quicker into the new region will be higher as there is a higher chance for neighbouring regions to have the same, or at least similar, culture, religion, language, and customs. Addi�onally, if you are suddenly forced out of your home, it is only natural to find refuge in the nearest place possible.

However, this has also coincidently meant that these countries have a dispropor�onate number of refugees. For example, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan house 3.5 million, 815,000 and 661,000 Syrian refugees respec�vely (Sta�sta, 2022), making them the three largest Syrian-refugee hos�ng na�ons. This has also meant that the countries housing the most refugees are also those that are either developing or emerging, which can further add complica�ons to their ability to cope and accommodate to these added popula�ons.

Perhaps the most shocking trend is that, despite Western media’s portrayal, most European countries (with Germany as the most evident excep�on), in fact house very few refugees. Though stories of hoards of refugees plaguing Europe are common in Western media, these are o�en the countries that are taking the least number of refugees in propor�on to the number that they are capable of. In fact, as of 2016, Sta�sta es�mated that Canada, Norway, Germany, Australia, and Finland were the only Western na�ons who were taking their ‘fair share’ of Syrian refugees, calculated according to the country’s economy. Countries such as Sweden and Austria were just falling short of their capabili�es, while the US, France, Switzerland, and Italy were just a few of the na�ons with extremely low numbers of Syrian refugees. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Japan, Russia and South Korea were ranked as some of the countries with the lowest numbers of Syrian refugees in

(Sta�sta, 2022)

rela�on to their economic size. These sta�s�cs, though they may have changed since the �me they were published, do bring to ques�on the truth behind the West’s approach to Syrian refugees, and as to whether they are truly stretching themselves to house those displaced by the conflict on the large scale they portray themselves as doing.

Interna�onal Responses to Syrian Refugees

The ongoing war has displaced millions of Syrian civilians, not only internally but also interna�onally. However, as shown above, the distribu�on of these refugees has been far from balanced. Though many interna�onal governments o�en portray themselves as accommoda�ng to large number of Syrians, the truth is o�en starkly different. Instead, these false governmental asserta�ons are o�en used to help rid officials of the moral responsibility of responding to the refugee crisis, which has led to a disturbing trend of an�-refugee policies being implemented worldwide. Even in na�ons like Turkey, that ini�ally accepted large numbers of refugees, due to their mismanagement, there were o�en nega�ve implica�ons for those countries, which were then wrongfully blamed on innocent Syrians as a scapegoat, which has had devasta�ng impacts on those civilians that rely on these states for their safety

EU

The EU is rather well-known for the large number of refugees it supposedly takes in. Though overall there is truth in this, the distribu�on of refugees within the EU is far from equal. While na�ons such as Germany and Sweden house large numbers of refugees, others have taken in very few. Prior to 2022, all Eastern European EU countries, had received refugees that equated to less than 0.04% of its popula�on. The only excep�on to this was Bulgaria. Despite this having now changed due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, before 2022, Poland, for example has only welcomed a group of refugees the size of 0.01% of its popula�on (Global Figures, 2023).

However, it is not alone. Portugal, a na�on in Western Europe has received refugees at only 0.61% of its popula�on, far from its capabili�es. A reason for this short falling is perhaps the Dublin Regula�on which states that migrants must seek asylum in the first European state they arrive in (Global Figures 2023), but then again this has not been adopted and, even with large propor�ons of refugees entering Europe through the southern states of Greece and Italy, many travel further to northern countries Therefore, in 2015, the EU demanded the regula�on was to be followed strictly, adding a temporary scheme that stated other EU countries were to receive a certain propor�on of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece for two years. However, some na�ons opposed this and refused to agree with the numbers conscripted to them. This ul�mately led to the failure of the scheme and no permanent plan being implemented a�er its expira�on in 2017 (Global figures, 2023).

Most of the migrants that arrive on European shores do so by sea from Turkey to Greece. From the Greek Islands, they are given permits to travel to the Greek mainland and the majority then con�nue to travel through the Balkans into mainland Europe. Though over one million Syrians have arrived in Europe seeking protec�on, they account for only 10% of the total number of Syrians that have fled. Addi�onally, over 55% of these asylum applica�ons were made in only two countries – Serbia and Germany. Though Germany suspended the Dublin Conven�on, it did not do so to prevent Syrians from entering Germany, but instead to allow more to do so. In 2015, it announced that all Syrians are welcome to claim asylum in Germany which par�ally explains the large number of Syrians residing there today.

However due to route complica�ons many s�ll ended up claiming asylum in nearby na�ons, such as Hungary, which ended up causing tensions within the EU, as these countries felt they were having to carry a dispropor�onate amount of the burden. This led to the crea�on of an increasingly secure Balkan route along with a deal with Turkish authori�es to slow the flow of migrants in exchange for over £2 billion and visas allowing Turkish ci�zens free travel in parts of Europe.

The Syrian crisis has exacerbated tensions between EU member states, as seen with Hungary and its neighbours, in par�cular Germany. In 2015, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban called the refugee crisis a ‘German Problem’ (Euronews, 2015), building a fence along the en�rety of its border with Serbia to stop the movement of migrants. As migrants then started to go through Croa�a instead, which led them back to Hungary, Hungarian forces proceeded to build a second fence on its Croa�an border. This approach could not have been in starker contrast to that of Germany, whose large number of Syrian refugees are now bringing invaluable economic benefits for what was once a deple�ng workforce (OCC, Observatory on Contemporary Crises, 2022). This is clear evidence of how refugees, when integrated into society effec�vely, can be much more of an asset than they are a cost.

Gulf Na�ons

The Gulf na�ons have o�en been forgoten when we consider low refugee-hos�ng na�ons. Countries such as Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, have some of the smallest numbers of refugees in the world. The reason for this is quite simple: these na�ons do not recognise refugees. Therefore, though they may have some Syrian ‘migrants’, they house no refugees.

Unlike their European counterparts, these countries are some of the few na�ons that did not sign the UN 1951 conven�on that established the refugee status. These countries have no legal obliga�on to take in refugees and legally, see no difference between migrants and what other countries would consider refugees (Le Journal Interna�onal,2016). Therefore, they do not except Syrians as refugees, but instead as part of their general migra�on framework. Jordan and Lebanon have also not signed the 1951 conven�on, but unlike the Gulf states, both have separate equivalent agreements with the UNHCR to protect refugees (Oxford Academic, 2016).

Syrians in these countries receive litle protec�on for healthcare and other services, and many, like the UAE, have groups of Syrians now stuck with lack of legal residency. Though this has not, in the case of the UAE, meant mass deporta�ons, it does mean that these na�ons have a rather relaxed approach to the Syrian crisis, with governments o�en not following through on promises, such as that of Reem Al Hashimy of the UAE, who said that the UAE would accept 15,000 ‘refugees’ over a period of five years (Oxford Academic, 2016). It can be said that though Gulf na�ons do have sizeable numbers of Syrians, they see them as economic migrants, and therefore aim to gain from them for their own personal benefit, which has le� reports of some refugees being treated poorly at the hands of these na�ons’ authori�es. Addi�onally, the Syrians they do host are not in numbers nearly large enough to what they are capable of.

Turkey

Turkey is the largest refugee hos�ng na�on in the world. Due to its key geographical posi�on, straddling the con�nents of Asia and Europe, it has been a key point of refuge for those fleeing the Syrian war. Once civil unrest broke out in 2011, Turkish authori�es adapted an open border policy, giving Syrians temporary protec�on, including access to services such as healthcare. Undoubtedly this has helped result in the large number of Syrians currently residing within Turkish territory.

However, any large number of foreign na�onals entering a country will have implica�ons, par�cularly if this migra�on is not effec�vely managed. This has resulted in consequences like those experienced in Lebanon, with a growing tension between Turkish and Syrian communi�es. There has been a growing an�-Syrian wave rippling through the country with large numbers of refugees being returned to Syria, o�en at the peril of their own safety. This, perhaps contradictory stance to that that was first adopted, will have irreversible effects for the Syrian refugees who now find themselves in an increasingly hos�le Turkey.

UK

Immigra�on could not be a more topical issue for the Bri�sh government. With constantly evolving plans to deal with what many poli�cians deem as ‘unsustainably large’ numbers of arriving foreign na�ons, the future of refugees in the UK is currently uncertain. However, contrary to what officials may like to believe, the Bri�sh government’s response to modern refugees has o�en been cri�cised for being slow and ineffec�ve.

As of 2022, only 0.54% of the Bri�sh popula�on were refugees, asylum seekers or stateless persons. In the context of the recent mass displacement of Ukrainians, that would equate to startlingly few Syrian na�onals. Despite the media’s portrayal of ‘hordes of migrants forcing their way into the UK’, recent sta�s�cs show that the number of asylum applica�ons has not surpassed its peak of 84,000 achieved in 2002. In fact, by 2010, it had reached an extreme low and by 2015 had only started to gradually increase (Refugee Ac�on, 2023). These sta�s�cs paint a vastly different image to that ins�lled by the Bri�sh government.

The number of refugees seeking safety in the Bri�sh Isles is not unsustainably large. As of 2021, only around 28,000 Syrians lived in the UK, a vast decline from 2019 (Sta�sta, 2021). It is the UK’s immigra�on policies that are ill-equipped to deal with humanitarian disasters like the Syrian war. The fact that 68% of asylum seekers must wait over 6 months for a verdict on their applica�on (Refugee Ac�on, 2023), aggravated by the fact that asylum seekers cannot claim benefits or work, has led to the vast backlog of refugees stuck in the UK immigra�on system. If the processing of asylum seekers was more efficient and effec�ve, the UK would benefit from the added workforce and skilled popula�on, able to u�lise their talents for economic growth. Refugees would be a benefit rather than a burden, especially in the context of an ageing Bri�sh popula�on.

The truth though is far from this. The number of those resetled by the government con�nues to decrease, with only 8.7% of asylum seekers coming through governmental resetlement schemes in 2022 (Refugee Ac�on, 2023). Though the UK’s Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resetlement scheme was inevitably beneficial for thousands of those fleeing persecu�on in Syria, there was concern that there could have been more done to help with housing and the learning of English, as well as concerns that delays between arrival in the UK and source of employment were too large (UNHCR, 2017). This, along with the fact that the scheme came to end in 2021, is yet more evidence of how the UK’s response could have been more effec�ve had it been stronger, larger, and more cohesive.

Despite these clear sta�s�cs, the UK is experiencing a growing an�-immigrant sen�ment. Though not necessarily targeted at Syrians, governmental policies, like the controversial Rwanda policy, will have nega�ve implica�ons for the thousands of Syrians that have, or hope to, reach Bri�sh borders. It will be yet another barrier blocking the UK from benefi�ng from a new and talented workforce, full of opportunity and growth.

USA

The reasons for the USA’s meagre numbers of Syrian refugees are mainly poli�cal. Even compared to its much smaller (in terms of popula�on) neighbour Canada, America’s acceptance of Syrian refugees has been minimal, which, for a highly developed country, famed for being an accep�ng place for migrants, is somewhat surprising. The American immigra�on system is ill-equipped to deal with humanitarian crises, which alongside the country’s precarious poli�cal situa�on, could explain this.

Under the Trump administra�on, the American quotas for refugees were at some of their lowest. These self-imposed limits prevented many Syrians from having access to the ‘American dream’. This harsh stance on both legal and illegal migrants is perhaps one of Trump’s most signature implementa�ons and has led many to accuse him of undoing years of hard work in establishing America as a safe place for refugees. Though Biden’s stance differs to Trump’s, this inconsistency and constant change in America’s approach to Syrian refugees has led to so few being setled in the US.

This has also been mirrored by an increasing an�-immigrant sen�ment within the country ’s popula�on, which is heightened by the USA’s historically low acceptance of Muslim refugees. In fiscal 2019, almost 80% of all refugees were Chris�an, equa�ng to almost 24,000. In comparison to the 4,900 Muslim refugees accepted, there is a stark difference (Pew Research Centre, 2019). This highlights America’s growing Islamophobia and the inaccurate percep�on of all Muslims being terrorists. Without a doubt, these restric�ons and public sen�ment have had nega�ve implica�ons for Syrians hoping to find a safer life in the United States

Impact of Interna�onal Events

The complexity of Syria’s situa�on is not to be undermined. In an ever-globalised world, every global phenomenon has effects that reach beyond just one country’s borders. As with other crises, the one in Syria has not been immune to external forces, but instead, the conflict we see today, is the product of various powers impac�ng together. Events, from the recent coronavirus pandemic to the Turkey-Syria earthquake earlier this year, will have impacts on the Syrian popula�on, humanitarian responses and the current war, as much as the other way around.

COVID-19

COVID-19 was, and to some extent s�ll is, an interna�onal disaster. Its impact on refugee popula�ons must not be overlooked. Due to restric�ons, the number of asylum seekers plummeted due to the virus, and the free movement of refugees was severely impacted (Migra�on Policy Ins�tute, 2022). Addi�onally, according to a report by the Na�onal Library of Medicine, the risk COVID-19 poses to refugee popula�ons is much greater. This is in part since so many lack decent healthcare and sanita�on facili�es that are crucial to prevent the spread of the virus.

Furthermore, the lives of many s�ll within Syria have been impacted by a decline in the amount of interna�onal aid because of a global shi� in efforts which resulted in governments focusing financial aid on their own popula�on’s protec�on against the virus. However perhaps the most prominent impact has been the economic effects of COVID-19. Syrians were much more likely to be made permanently redundant compared to locals in Lebanon, with as many as 60% of all Syrian refugees permanently laid off during the pandemic (Interna�onal Labour Organiza�on, 2020) According to a UNHCR report, COVID had dras�c effects on the daily survival of Syrian refugees, with increasing

numbers of them struggling to meet their basic needs, such as food, medica�on, and housing The preoccupa�on of global healthcare systems with the virus meant that there were less resources available to support the vulnerable Syrian popula�on.

Beirut Explosion – 2020

On the 4th of August 2020, a total of 2,750 tones of ammonium nitrate stored at the Port of Beirut exploded in the Lebanese capital. This resulted in the deaths of 218 people, many of whom were foreign na�onals with ci�zens of Germany, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Australia just a few of those included in the deceased. 7000 people were also le� wounded, over 300,000 people displaced, and 80,000 children rendered homeless. The list goes on. Numerous hospitals, schools and healthcare centres were affected (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The educa�on of thousands of children along with the country’s ability to cope with the intensity of the COVID-19 outbreak was greatly hampered with inevitable longstanding affects that will not disappear easily. Extensive material damage was es�mated to be around $3.8-4.6 billion (World Bank) Psychological damage was even higher

The shipment of ammonium nitrate was to travel to Mozambique but was stopped in 2013 where it was unloaded at the port due to technical issues. Due to its owners being unable to keep up with docking fees, they were forced to remain in the port. However, ammonium nitrate is a poten�ally explosive, and therefore dangerous, cargo, and should not have been allowed to have been stored in such a haphazard manner for so long (Arab Center Washington DC, 2022). It is widely accepted that the Lebanese government’s corrup�on and mismanagement, and Lebanese officials’ willingness to turn a blind eye on the viola�on of such standards is to blame for the explosion. This, by extent, has meant that the government’s careless failings have caused civilian deaths, including foreign na�onals.

This is not anything new. Lebanon’s government has had longstanding allega�ons of corrup�on, mismanagement, and unsafe prac�ces. However, this port explosion only exacerbated the issues already prevalent in the country. With unemployment, lack of housing and poverty already causing issues, this explosion only heightened its severity and dispropor�onately impacted Syrian refugees. Almost one quarter of all those killed were Syrian refugees and many more were affected in other ways, experiencing even less help from Lebanese authori�es. As a general response to the incident, the Lebanese state implemented a scheme for financial compensa�on for those affected. However, many disfavoured societal members like Syrians were excluded by the scheme. This meant that while locals had the chance to recover and rebuild their lives a�er the event, or at least atempt to as the financial compensa�on s�ll fell short to compensate fully for Lebanese losses, Syrian’s were forced into even greater turmoil (Middle East Ins�tute, 2021). Even with aid and resources sent by interna�onal governments and organisa�ons, relief efforts were confused, sporadic and poorly managed meaning that many of those truly in need did not receive aid (The New Humanitarian, 2020).

France was at the forefront of this interna�onal response However, this came with great controversy. Macron was the first foreign head of state to visit Lebanon a�er the explosion and pledged to donate aid that would go to the people, not corrupt officials, who they notably had a significant role in appoin�ng to power (France 24, 2020). This, although seemingly posi�ve, leaves many to wonder about France’s possible ulterior mo�ves. Lebanon is in a fragile and vulnerable posi�on. They desperately need and rely on this French input. This puts France in a posi�on of power and influence over the country, as Lebanon will therea�er be in its debt. These ac�ons have le� many to believe France’s over-enthusias�c stance in helping Lebanon, may be proof of its neo-

colonialist aims, as it tries to assert itself as a regional power once more. And, given the despera�on of the Lebanese popula�on, they have no op�on but to accept it

This was further enforced by Macron’s message of ‘France will never let Lebanon go,’ accompanied with, ‘The heart of the French people s�ll beats to the pulse of Beirut’ (Macron, 2020). These could merely be signs of innocent support, albeit expressed insensi�vely, but do also have startling connota�ons towards France’s growing control. The then French foreign minister also expressed his solidarity with Lebanese locals by sta�ng ‘Help us help you’ (Jean-Yves Le Drian, 2020). Irrespec�ve of the possibility that this message could be interpreted as condescending and patronising, this highlights Lebanese reliance on France. Addi�onally, to follow through with aid, Macron sent a list of changes and reforms, both poli�cal and financial, that would need to occur before. While some perceive them as France’s way of preven�ng Lebanon from rever�ng back to old ways, many fear that it gives France a chance to implement their own Lebanese agenda, aimed at personal gain. This is the view held by Ali Bakeer, analyst on Middle East and North African affairs, that France should focus on solving its own issues rather than looking at those elsewhere (Anadolu Agency, 2020).

Russian Invasion of Ukraine – 2022

The Russian invasion has caused a significant shi� in the poli�cal makeup of the Syrian war. Though Russia has never been the biggest player in the Syrian conflict, its increasing concentra�on on Ukraine has le� an empty void in the precarious balance in Syria’s poli�cs. This has allowed Iran to become a more prominent player in the war, with the Iranian government taking advantage of the Ukrainian situa�on to deepen its alliances with Moscow, by aiding it in its invasion through its supply of drones amongst other measures (Washington Post, 2022). This growing partnership of two major regional players will have the power to topple interna�onal geopoli�cal rela�ons and threaten American influence.

In addi�on, Russia has reportedly deployed Syrian fighters to help in the combat in Ukraine (Middle East Eye, 2022) Although the likelihood of these roles including those on the front line is low, it does highlight the huge influence Russia has globally and the connec�on between the Syrian situa�on and other global events. This is not all. Turkey has also been impacted posi�vely by the Russian invasion, strategically using its posi�on to exploit both sides of the conflict for its own benefit. Turkey has supplied Ukrainian defence with resources but has simultaneously been strengthening Russian �es by providing a safe place for Russian ci�zens (New York Times, 2022). Furthermore, is has used its own NATO membership as leverage over the NATO applica�ons of Sweden and Finland, which are both in Russian interests. This growing alliance has meant that Russia has conceded to Turkey playing a greater role in the Syrian conflict, notably increasing its aggressive stance against Syrian Kurds.

Ties between Israel and Russia have also been complicated due to the Ukrainian situa�on Despite adop�ng an official neutral stance, Israel is a key force in the Syrian conflict. However, its views on the Ukrainian invasion have caused upset within the Kremlin resul�ng in moun�ng tensions between the two na�ons. Therefore, the poten�al risk this poses to Syria, which caught in the middle of this disagreement, is increasing (War on the Rocks, 2023). But the impacts of the Ukrainian war are far from being limited to just a few regional players. Since the Russian invasion, interna�onal aten�on has been diverted from the ongoing Syrian conflict as efforts have been piled in to resolve the Ukrainian dilemma. This has le� a gap in Syria, which in turn has been filled by the likes of ISIS and Iran. Alongside the Russian invasion threatening already fragile food supplies, this could have poten�ally dras�c implica�ons for the Syrian popula�on who find themselves par�cularly vulnerable to the impacts of changing global geopoli�cs.

Turkey-Syria Earthquake – 2023

On 6th February 2023, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Southern-Central Turkey and Northern Syria. The earthquake, followed by another with a magnitude of 7.5 just nine hours later came at the cost of at least 56,000 lives This number is huge and, when the fact that many locals believe authori�es stopped official records early is taken into considera�on, the human toll of the earthquakes are dire. The reason for this high number is par�ally due to the Syrian popula�on being already vulnerable due to the war. Moreover, the death toll not only included Syrian and Turkish civilians but also aid workers opera�ng in the region.

As for economic cost, physical damage in Syria is es�mated at $3.7 billion and the direct impact of the earthquake in Turkey es�mated at $34.2 billion. This will have long standing implica�ons for the two na�ons that are already batling to sustain themselves in the turmoil of the Syrian conflict. The earthquake also pushed more Syrians into hunger, with dwindling food supplies impacted even more. As for Turkey, 20% of the country ’s food produc�on was affected which will make it even harder for the na�on to accommodate the Syrian refugees that rely on it. (Center for Disaster Philanthropy, 2023) In fact, of the 9.1 million people directly affected in Turkey by the earthquake, 1.7 million of them were Syrian refugees. With another 8.8 million Syrians living within the most affected regions in Syria, they truly have been the vic�ms of more than one devasta�ng crisis (UNHCR, 2023)

The earthquake targeted already vulnerable popula�ons, with the Syrian crisis exacerbated by the damage. Due to the conflict, it has been extremely problema�c for the necessary humanitarian support to reach those who need it most, especially in Syria (BBC, 2023) As rela�ons across the borders remain tense, thousands of Syrian civilians are being le� without the sufficient aid and resources, significantly limi�ng their ability to recover According to recent sta�s�cs, 86,000 people were newly displaced in North-western Syria due to the earthquakes. Considering Syria’s pre-exis�ng refugee crisis, this only worsened issues (Relief Web, 2023). For many Syrians, having endured 12 years of war and many more decades of instability, they simply cannot take anymore. The earthquake was simply the final straw.

According to the World Vision, one of the most severe impacts of the earthquake on Syrians were not economic, or poli�cal but in fact the psychological implica�ons of having to survive yet another disaster. As of 2021, 100% of all those under 18 in the Idlib region of Syria had symptoms aligning with post trauma�c stress disorder. In 2022, another study found that 66% of respondents were concerned that children were ‘very likely’ to follow through on suicidal thoughts (World Vision, 2023). These facts speak for themselves. Syrians, par�cularly children, are suffering increasingly from the psychological toll of having to cope with challenge a�er challenge. The Syrian mental health crisis is perhaps one of the most underreported crises in the modern era, with poten�ally disastrous implica�ons for those impacted. Syrians are close to breaking point.

Israel-Lebanon Conflict - 2023

This year has seen an escala�on in conflict between Israel and Lebanon. Rockets and shelling have recently occurred on the Israel-Lebanon border as pressure mounts between the two opposing powers, with Hezbollah leading Lebanon’s atack. The issues are once again focused on an area of disputed land between the two na�ons, home to residents that ally themselves to Syria (Reuters, 2023). In total there are 13 areas disputed, Shebaa Farms and Ghajar Farms amongst them.

The increasing tension has poten�al to impact both countries significantly, especially as Israeli power con�nues to dwindle. Israel has never been weaker, and though it may not want an escala�on to

result in combat (which is increasingly unlikely due to the recent Israeli concerns over Gaza), Hezbollah’s aggressive stance is of concern to the region’s stability. According to predic�ons, Hezbollah is prepared for war, with an ability to launch up to 4,000 missiles per day during the first stage of combat (Middle East Monitor, 2023). The current Israeli-Pales�nian conflict in Gaza only complicates this further. This conflict has the poten�al to put an increased strain on Lebanon’s fragile poli�cal and economic stability, further heightening the issues addressed earlier.

Conclusion

The Syrian conflict is complex. Its effects as intricate as its causes. We cannot shy away from the fact that interna�onal involvement has been responsible for its long-las�ng survival and therefore some of its global impacts. Though it is difficult to understand, the conflict has indisputably had a startling prevalence in the contemporary world of modern poli�cs and geopoli�cal rela�ons. From Ukraine to the USA, Germany to Greece, the impacts of the civil war and the thousands of consequently displaced Syrians are as far reaching as they are numerous. And unfortunately for all, there is no clear solu�on.

As the conflict shows few signs of easing, and the resilience of the Syrian popula�on begins to wear thin, interna�onal support cannot begin to wane. For decades, nearby regional countries have carried the brunt of the responsibility, o�en with nega�ve effects. Lebanon has never been more fragile and its mismanagement of over one million Syrian refugees is partly to blame. More governments interna�onally need to step up and, following the lead of Germany, increase the support they give to displaced Syrians, reducing the strain on the countries failing to do so already.

Lebanon, like much of the region s�ll struggles with asser�ng itself as a global power since the withdrawal of colonialist powers. Its history makes it even more fragile. The current instability is not a cause of the Syrian refugee crisis but has most certainly been exacerbated by it. Therefore, it is up to na�ons such as France and the UK, notably those who once occupied the territory, to take a more ac�ve approach in the resolu�on of peace in this corner of the Middle East. As more Syrians face starva�on, poverty, exploita�on and internal turmoil, the interna�onal community needs to step forward to protect those most vulnerable and do their part in response to this crisis. A�er all, stability will not only benefit Syria but all na�ons around the globe

We must turn away from the hatred growing within na�ons. Turn away from the an�-immigrant rhetoric that is having a startlingly large influence on global poli�cs, from Hungary to Turkey, the UK to Jordan. We must not exploit ethnic minori�es to divert responsibility for our own short fallings. Syrians are not to blame for the failure of interna�onal powers. If anything, they could be the source of opportunity and growth when integrated effec�vely into society. Blocking Syrians from moving, stopping them from seeking safety elsewhere when their lives are at stake, is not the way to end the crisis. Simply ignoring their existence, will not put an end to their hardship. Acceptance and integra�on are the only way to advance, not hatred and insular na�onalism.

The future of Syria is unknown. The fate of millions hangs precariously in the balance. However, one thing is for certain. If we do not all work together towards a cohesive strategy for peace and stability, the situa�on will only deteriorate. As shown by the recent earthquake, natural disasters are inevitable. But our responses are not. If we do nothing our complacency will cost the lives of thousands of innocent civilians. The human toll cannot be overstated. The Syrian war is civil by defini�on alone. It is up to the en�re interna�onal community to help resolve it. The future of Syria and the 24 million that s�ll call it home depend on it.

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REINTERPRETING AND PERFORMING

WAITING FOR GODOT

BY JAMES MELLOR

(Upper Sixth, HELP Level 4, Supervisor: Mrs A Jones)

Reinterpreting and Performing Waiting for Godot

James Mellor

For their HELP project, Drama pupils were tasked with reinterpreting and performing a play of their choice.

Below is the ‘creative log’ for this process, encompassing:

• How ideas were created/developed for meaning

• Conventions, forms and techniques

• Idea creation and definition

• Connections between theory and practice, application of research on text and practitioner

• Justification of decisions made during the creation process

Formulating

The surrealist play “Waiting for Godot” was first performed in Paris at the Théâtre de Babylone on the 5th of January, 1953, and later in London in 1955. It is a tragicomedy born of the “Theatre of the Absurd” movement. It was originally written by Samuel Beckett in French but was later translated by the author himself into English. The story focuses on just 2 main non-English characters (which is apparent due to their frequent jokes about the country, and as a result they are often portrayed as Irish in English productions) called Vladimir and Estragon, nicknamed “Didi and Gogo”. The fact that there were only 2 main characters was likely the main reason for our selection of the play for our reinterpretation task, as our group of 3 included one member doing sound design, leaving 2 actors. The play presents the conversations that the two have with each other, and a few passers-by, whilst awaiting the arrival of an unknown individual called “Godot”. Godot, however, never arrives, and they are left waiting, alone, with the only indication of the continuation of the outside world being an inconsistently aging tree, in what is portrayed to be a timeless, repetitive spiral.

It was written to explore ideas and themes to do with absurdity, nihilism, aimlessness, time, purpose, suffering and companionship. It is an attack on realist tradition, and dispenses conventional perceptions of plot, purpose and time within entertainment, placing a significant focus on the essential components of the human condition. It implements modernist (in the way that it defies classical standards) and surrealist (as it has no rules or logic) styles in order to challenge the regularity of the traditional productions of the time, utilising expressionism, theatricalism and absurdism in order to do so. Our extract is from the opening section of the performance, and depicts the beginning of the development characters' confusion, pursuit of purpose and descent into uncertainty, whilst also beginning to establish the central relationship between the characters.

The extract, and even the play as a whole, could be interpreted as a commentary upon the post World War 2 world at the time at which it was written, presented in an anti-realist format in order to escape from the restrictions of this time itself. There were attempted bans and censorship of its postmodernist features, further proving this interpretation. Vladimir arrives and meets Estragon, who, following a rough night in a ditch, is taking off his boot. They talk about their relationship and personal lives. The biblical story of the thieves acts as a metaphor, criticising the current standards of reliability, propaganda, and truth. This is likely inspired by the recent instances of people’s beliefs being influenced during the war, and is especially relevant following Nazi propaganda in France during the war. They cannot leave because Vladimir says they are waiting for Godot. They wonder if they are in the right place, or are there at the right time, presenting the uncertain flow of time and narrative. They sleep, talk about their dreams and dependency, argue, and make up, showing themes of companionship. This establishes the relationship of the characters, and their interchangeability (due to the repetition of certain lines) portraying lack of unity within time, and the repetitiveness of life. They suggest hanging themselves, a comment upon the meaninglessness of life, and the pointless death caused by the war. They continue to wait (themes of boredom, waiting, repetitiveness, nihilism). The short exchange to do with the carrot presents human reality and nature.

They discuss if they're tied to Godot, linking to the meaning of life. There is a random cry, portraying suffering and uncertainty. Their attempts to leave are repetitive. Godot could also be a liked to, or a metaphor for god, due to not only their similar names, but the concept of him having such a large impact on what the central characters believe, think and do without ever physically appearing. Hands and knees – religious figure. This could be an analogy for hoping for religion to bring meaning into your nihilist, repetitive life. Maybe it means there lack of evidence for existence of Godot/God? Or that many religious followers are constantly attempting to follow their beliefs, and how this gives them a purpose. It could be interpreted on a commentary on how religion acts as a way for humanity to find meaning and purpose when life seems meaningless.

These themes are in many ways linked to challenging, defy and contrast convention and tradition. As a result, our play aims to reflect and establish foundations for many of these themes, especially those such as time, companionship, nihilism, humanity, dependancy, reliability of events and suffering within a new, more extreme context, that is significantly and intrinsically linked to the original motivation for the play in order to explore the fundamental aspects of the themes discussed by this extract within Waiting for Godot.

Creation

We chose to inspire our original ideas for such a performance by considering the techniques utilised by the English film and stage director Declan Donnellan, due to his links to reinterpretation, translation and naturalism, which seemed to us to be the most effective style of creating a dramatic, and as a result well communicated, depiction of our themes. In 2004 he was named a Chevalier de l’Ordre des Arts et dès Lettres as a result of his extensive work in France, along with many honours in England. He also wrote books, including “The Actor and the Target” in 2001, which was originally in Russian and then later translated to English in 2002, and since has been translated into 15 languages including French. It would

also be difficult to implement techniques such as multi rolling, narration, placards and puppets with only 2 actors, and so a naturalistically driven practitioner seemed to be the best choice for us. These techniques could be effectively incorporated into our piece, which was beginning to form into a story of friendship and betrayal between two characters in a conflict, as a result of how our play was originally translated from French, and our intention to both reinterpret, and to use naturalistic acting to convey our central ideas of uncertainty, fear, purpose and finality.

Donnellan’s main theory is to do with the fact that actors should not look into themselves for solutions to do with acting, and instead to relate their acting to an outside target. He does not want actors to be thinking from their own point of view, as worrying about showing emotion can take you out of a naturalistic scene. We made sure as a result to develop our comprehension of the characters’ relationships to one another in not only “Waiting for Godot” but within our ideas for our own reinterpretation. We considered how our characters might view one another in order to improve how we would deliver our lines within the context of how the characters would view each other, and want to be seen. By keeping your attention outwards, we could more effectively fit into the scene with the other character. Donnellan believes that theatre “helps us to share our humanity and develop our empathy”, and that “Acting is a reflex, a mechanism for development and survival… it isn't ‘second nature’, it is ‘first nature’. By looking at such aspects of his work, we were inspired to reinterpret the original performance in a way that largely upheld the original style and messages, whilst also reimagining the format, setting, stakes, story and characters in a way that was powerfully linked to, yet not directly parallel to, that of the original and the techniques used by Declan Donnellan and other similar practitioners, such as Stanislavsky, whom Donnellan was heavy inspired by. This concluded in our creation of the primary ideas of setting the performance in a WW2 setting during the Nazi occupation of France, which would allow for naturalistic acting and translation, frequently explored by Donnellan, whilst also being a topic well linked to the themes and messages of the original performance. This allowed us to explore the messages and themes linked to the original performance through the techniques of the practitioner in our own format and setting.

Declan Donnellan is of the view that “theatre reveals what is eternal in the way our species is made”. Many people interpret his style as being a “realistic recognition of the commonalities and predictability of the human experience across time and space” as stated by ‘“Making things look disconcertingly different”: In conversation with D. Donnellan’, which goes on to discuss his reflection of the ideas that no human is perfect in his themes of unexplained violence and mental illness. “His fascination with people’s inherent capacity for violence” is extremely fitting for our ideas, whilst also aligning with central themes from the original performance of time and space. Our initial ideas for the story and characters were then formed from these foundations, and we eventually decided for the 2 characters to appear to be on the same side to both themselves and the audience. However, one character would discover that they are really enemies, and, in the final scene, this revelation would be revealed, and a sudden, shocking confrontation would take place between the two, during which both characters would die in order to further emphasise our themes of loss. According to Donnellan, “our shock that reality is other than expected is weirdly tenacious”.

Development

We wanted to convey a similar message and atmosphere to the original play, and so we decided to stage our performance as end on, as the author himself intended for the play to be performed in this way, stating that the play needs “a very closed box”. This is also the most naturalistic type of staging, and kept the audiences focus entirely on our portrayal of the characters. We hoped to keep our audience obviously aware of the fact that they were watching a portrayal of themes, and this staging was a good way of doing so.

However, as the aim of the play itself is largely open to personal interpretation, similarly so are the specifics of the deliberately vague set. Generally, a minimalistic, bleak atmosphere is conveyed, with often only a central tree and a mound, or stone, being used. We decided that we would also use a minimalistic stage. Our play was set entirely in and around a forest in the countryside, in which the characters are lost.

Their search for salvation and purpose within their bleak, lonely, timeless surroundings is made more poignant and apparent by a lack of specific information given by the set. By having only logs for the characters to sit on, with the possibility for the use of lighting and shadows in order to portray any further significant details about the setting, such as our use of a cutout to create the silhouette of a windmill, we left the performance space open and bleak, reflecting the intentions of the performance itself, and allowing us to convey the important relationship between the characters through the use of proxemics, distance and movement. The logs acted as a good centre point in order to focus the audience’s attention on important moments, and to provide an opportunity for less active, engaging scenes, allowing us to contrast the energy at different moments of the performance, emphasising certain points. It also allowed for easy scene changes. We wanted our structure to reflect the underlying themes of the performance, such as the loss of the morals that make us human, uncertainty, companionship, and betrayal in war.

We chose to use a simple progression of 4 main scenes, with the first being entirely sound and lighting based and contrasting peace and the chaos of war, in order to portray both the setting and the development of the relationship between the characters. By contrasting the hopeful growth of friendship in hard times displayed by the first 3 scenes with our ideas for a climactic betrayal in the fourth, we would emphasise our emerging messages of the lack of trust and the emergence of uncertainty in war, and how the values that make us human can

be abandoned in times of conflict and danger. Recently we have been focusing on developing our ideas for how the climactic betrayal will take place, by researching the conditions of the situation in France during WW2.

Having performed our first drafts of the performance, we gained feedback that we needed to make the context of the story, and the emotions felt by the characters due to their experiences, and their relationship, more apparent and obvious to the audience. We did this by adding in lines that explored the backgrounds and thoughts of the characters, such as when we showed their more personal lives with “Where were you from again”, and “I remember how it used to be”, deepening the audience’s connection to the characters, and so giving what happens to them far more depth, meaning and impact. This also allowed us to implement more of the original script within our performance.

Refining

We specifically decided to make one of the characters a French man collaborating with the Nazi rule in France at the time, whilst the other was also French, but fighting with the resistance against the Nazi regime. Whilst the collaborator seems at the surface level to be the more antagonistic of the two, especially due to our decision to make him the one to figure out that they are enemies, and the initial betrayer, both characters are morally uncertain Emotions, motives and thoughts are expressed during the climatic betrayal through the use of physical and vocal techniques, clearly communicating the messages of the performance through the demonstration of our characterisation.

Having completed our ideas for the story, and how, through this story, we would portray our messages to the audience via our use of dramatic techniques, we decided to focus on

refining the script. By now it had been decided that I would be playing the resistance soldier, and so I began to refine my ideas for the ways in which I would convey my characterisation through my vocal and physical skills. In the opening encounter between the characters, my character is physically exhausted, injured, and dehydrated, and is mentally unstable, paranoid, frightened, miserable and mournful, likely suffering from PTSD, anxiety and some degree of shell shock. This was all to convey to the audience how war and conflict can have horrible personal effects on all those involved, voluntarily or otherwise. In order to convey all of this, I was physically tense and firm, yet also subtly shaking, glancing around, twitching, slumping, breathing heavily, and talking in a raspier voice. On the line “Raise your hands”, I conveyed a façade of confidence by steadying my voice and strengthening my physical stance, in contrast to how I had been unsteadily ranting in confusion, moving erratically and speaking with a wavering voice around the line “How long have I been waking for”. I allowed my hand to slightly tremor, conveying how my character was trying to hide his humanity, depicting how many people lost their own identities through the trauma of WW2.

We also made sure to implement sound in order to set the atmosphere and convey suspense, fear and danger, whilst also contrasting the bleak viewpoint of war that we were focusing on portraying with underlying themes of friendship, nature and life through our script and sound effects. We gradually allowed the characters to seemingly grow more comfortable and trustful, by slowly shifting our focus towards their efforts to help each other. By then suddenly contrasting and destroying this evocation within the final scene, we quickly remind the audience of the wars constant presence, and how it effects the characters. This effectively achieves the performances aim of portraying how war destroys our idealistic views of friendship, humanity and hope.

I significantly contributed to much of the script writing and development (specifically focused on the opening and ending), scene structuring, story ideas and conception, and presented the idea for the setting of the story to be that of WW2 France in order to morally link our play to the original. By then using the naturalistic acting style and minimalistic set of Declan Donnellan, whilst also implementing his use of reinterpretation and translation, we were able to refine our plays style and presentation, contributing towards a successful, meaningful, and impactful reinterpretation of the original play.