Nongqai Vol 15 No 3C - Flechas

FOREWORD: FLECHAS

Col Eugene de Kock

It is a great honour a privilege to write this introduction to the Flecha-series. One of my choice counter-insurgency forces.

I served in Rhodesia from December 1968, and afterwards I have performed counterinsurgency duties for many years on the borders from the rank of a Constable to a Senior Officer. During this time the Flechas came to my attention when I was doing research into counter-insurgency activities in Angola and Mozambique.

Various Portuguese officers and I met, and we held discussions regarding the military prowess of the Flechas. It amazed me that these little men from the Stone Age effectively took part in a modern war. They were very capable operators and were trained and handled by the Secret Police in Mozambique and Angola

I have great admiration for troops like the RAR and the Flechas because they fought as a closeknit unit and race is never an issue – they will blindly follow any good white officer who cares for them, especially because there is mutual trust and respect. I can state as a fact that such units become a closeknit, effective, para-military, or pure military unit.

As a former commander of racially mixed para-military operators, I have found that the most important factor is the acceptance of the officer as leader, by the men on the ground. This a personal matter – respect and loyalty must be earned before any field operations should be undertaken. You as commander, must be viewed and accepted as the leader by the men on the ground. You must lead from the front – you must eat the same food, you must sleep with them, endure the same hardship and privations. The commander must remember that he stands alone with, say 59 black men on extended patrols. Without their trust and loyalty such missions are impossible. They must trust you and know you will not waste their lives or that you are serving to receive kudus or some form of self-glorification.

I really admired these little brave men and even today have high regard and compassion for them. And now even after the war I think of them often and wonder how they are doing.

Finally, I want to thank the authors of this series, for their research into the past of our national security history. Lest we forget!

Taken for the future book Mozambique the South African Eastern border war by Paul J. Els. Authorized to be used by Paul J. Els for Nongqai.

THE FLECHAS: ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

1967 - 1974

"Work hard in silence and let success make the noise.”

By Stephen Dunkley

There has over the years been confusion regards the origin of the FLECHA's and their use in Mozambique, hopefully this chapter will help shed some light on those misconceptions. The wars in Africa between 1960 to 1989 have seen the creation of many irregular or specialized units, with the wars the Portuguese fought in Africa being no exception. The Portuguese were particularly adept at adapting their mind-set to include local inhabitants to assist them in combating external/internal aggressors’. Units such as The Commando’s, Black Dragoons, GE’s, GEP’s as well as the FLECHAs were to lead the way in fighting terrorist organizations determined on wresting away power in Angola, Guinea - Bissau and Mozambique.

The FLECHAS were a Paramilitary unit under the auspices of PIDE/DGS, (PIDE was renamed DGS in 1969). It's generally believed that the unit was started with eight Bushmen in 1967 by Oscar Cardoso when he was an inspector with PIDE/DGS, what is not well known is that in 1965 Inspector Fragaso Allas who was based in Luso, Angola had in fact started the "FLECHA concept" by using local Bushmen as a small militia.

It was not until 1967 that the term FLECHA was used when Oscar Cardoso (PIDE/DGS inspector) who together with Manuel Pontes (Local administrator of Cuando Cubango Province) started the FLECHAS's with a handful of Bushmen in 1967. This initial group were tasked to guard prisoners, be translators and act as guides for the army, Oscar initially made use of eight Bushmen for tracking, especially in the game reserves, as well as areas that were close to the Bushmen’s natural habitat.

After a short period, he started to use the men to go out and gather information, the Bushmen where able to remain in the bush for extended periods of time without support or the need for resupply as they had a uncanny ability to forage for food and to find water, attributes that were seen as very useful by Oscar and PIDE.

The first intake of locally recruited Bushmen, slight in physique where not suited to the use of modern weapons so they used traditional weapons such as bow and arrows, spears and blowpipes, the blowpipes were feared by their enemies due to the dart being dipped in poison and being able to travel nearly twice the speed of arrows. They were not issued with G3’s nor did they use captured Ak47’s. The men also wore no uniforms. This was a good physiological ploy by the DGS to let the terrorists wonder which of the Bushmen that they would encounter were in fact members of the FLECHA’s, giving the unit an almost supernatural like aura. Up until the unit was taken over by Alves Cardoso this small PIDE/DGS unit specialised in tracking and reconnaissance to gather information to be used by the Portuguese Secret Police.

It was Alves Cardoso (Career soldier) that transformed them into a “Commando Brigade” and used the term FLECHA to cover the fact that a new Angolan Army was being formed especially one that was going to be run along Commando lines with black officers (much like the Commando Companies in Guinea – Bissau that Alves had formed). There was a plan to form a new Angolan Army with the FLECHA’s forming the core of this new structure and the reason I believe that Alves joined DGS and decided to get involved. While the initial FLECHA concept had been reasonably effective in gathering intelligence and occasionally the killing of a terrorist it was only a Para-military unit attached to the PIDE/DGS that had no “real teeth”, it was felt that they could be used more effectively and should be used to support other military units in large scale operations as well as their traditional hunt and destroy missions, It was also decided that a man with extensive combat experience and a understanding for unconventional war should take over the unit, skills that Oscar Cardoso did not possess :... Enter Major Alves Cardoso.

Perhaps it’s pertinent at this stage to give you a glimpse at the impressive CV of Major Alves Cardoso prior to him being appointed as an Inspector of the DGS in 1971.

• Born 1934 in Huambo in the central highlands of Angola.

• Aged 17 attended law school in Lisbon.

• Aged 22 abandoned his studies to join the military.

• After basic training requested to attend the cavalry school.

• Completed armoured vehicle instructors’ course,

• Posted to Military police and saw service on Azores Island.

• After tour of duty in Azores, posted to Cavalry Battalion in Santarem as a 2nd Lieutenant.

• 1962 his company was posted to Angola and Alves started small group Commando style raids against insurgent's that would become the forerunners of the Portuguese Commando's.

• 1963 he was awarded Medalha Prata de Valor Militar.

• Alves requested by Colonel Bethencourt Rodriques (Chief of staff of the Portuguese forces in Angola) to conduct Commando style training as he had done with his company in Northern Angola.

• Transferred to Lamego Portugal to set up Commando training school in Portugal.

• Alves's next assignment was in Guinea Bissau to conduct the final practical training of 3 Commando Company.

• Returned to Lisbon and took up the position as one of General Camara Pina's ADC's. This posting allowed Alves to complete his law degree.

• Alves would be requested to present Commando courses for "Friends of Portugal”.

• in 1971 Alves was appointed by Dr Narcelo Caentano as the most senior DGS operational officer and became the overall commander of the FLECHA's in Angola

• Was fluent in Portuguese, Spanish German and French. Training of the FLECHA's was personally conducted by Alves who was in overall Command and ably assisted by 19 instructors all men who had either trained or served under him as Commando’s. It’s important to understand that apart from those that assisted in the training of this new unit there were no whites or Mulatto’s that went on operations with the FLECHA’s as Alves believed this would both distract and hinder the men in the field. FLECHA’s from an intelligence gathering to a full combat unit, he retained the name FLECHA but how it would operate in the future would be completely different to how it had operated and trained in the past. The mini operations that the Bushmen “Flechas” conducted under Oscar Cardoso in the south of Angola only would be replaced by Commando style operations against the enemy under the auspices of one of Portugal’s best soldiers and experts on irregular warfare. Alves also believed that it was virtually impossible for successful pseudo-operations to take place if you did not know the “lore” of the enemy you were

fighting. Alves was not just looking for men that he could “make” into good fighting men he was also looking for men that understood the mind-set of the terrorists he was fighting. By mid-1972 Alves could make available 2000 men in eastern Angola as well as numerous Bushmen trackers.

Just as there has been confusion regards which Cardoso did what with regards the FLECHA's there is also confusion as to the FLECHAS in Mozambique.

Alves Cardoso was recalled to Lisbon by Dr. Caentano (Portuguese Prime Minister) and was advised that he was to go to Mozambique and start the FLECHA's in Vila Perry, he was asked who he wanted to take with him to Mozambique, he said that he only wanted to take Commando personnel with him and no DGS men. Alves also left a few Commandos to carry on working with the Angolan FLECHA's and ensure the continuity of training between the older men and new recruits and to ensure that they still operated all over Angola in small groups or as support to army units to give them more power on operations.

The reason Dr Caentano asked Alves to start the FLECHA's in Mozambique was probably due to pressure from the Rhodesians and CIO chief Ken Flower for the Portuguese to set up Flecha type units on the Rhodesian border to stop incursions from Mozambique. It’s been rumoured that the DGS had “FLECHA” style units operating in Mozambique without official authorization from 1971 when the Rhodesians had first introduced the subject of the deteriorating situation on the Rhodesian/Mozambican border and suggested that Dr. Caentano use his influence in developing FLECHA's in Mozambique.

At the time this was misconstrued as being critical of General Arriaga and his handling of the security situation. Oscar Cardoso was transferred from Angola to Mozambique in 1971 with many assuming that he set up Flecha units in that country. This assumption is not correct as this extract from a letter received from Oscar Cardoso in 2007 will confirm, he writes “When I was in Mozambique in 1971, it was with the intention of organizing the FLECHA Corps but the people there were just not interested at the time. I then to keep myself busy, organized an intelligence network in Malawi to capture terrorists who planted land mines on the railway to Cabora Bassa and really achieved good success” (March 2007).

During the periods that Oscar Cardosa was “supposedly setting” up a FLECHA unit in Mozambique Alves Cardoso expanded the FLECHA's and their area of influence in Angola and with the assistance of Portuguese Commando’s as well as the South African Air Force helicopters conducted operations in and around Serpa Pinto in 1971/1972. It was with this support from South Africa that the South Africans also saw first-hand the abilities of Alves Cardoso and his FLECHA’s. This could have planted the seed for South Africa to use black soldiers in units like the legendary 32 Battalion and would be one of the reasons the South Africans assisting Alves in Mozambique in 1973. Rumour also has it that the DGS had been running a secret Pseudo unit from within Mozambique from 1971, long before the FLECHA’s set up in Vila Pery. This small team operated only outside the

borders on Mozambique in neighbouring African countries. Stories via the press as well as rumours via intelligence agencies suggested that the “FLECHA type” unit doing long range anti – guerrilla reconnaissance was being run by DGS. The unit was manned by a small number of handpicked black and white agents.

At the end of 1972 Ken Flower the head of the Rhodesian CIO managed to garner the support of General Hendrik van den Bergh the head of BOSS (South Africa’s Security Police) [regards setting up a FLECHA style unit in Mozambique and this is the second reason Alves Cardoso received a train load of supplies at Machapinda with everything he needed to set up the FLECHA’s in Vila Pery.

[The Bureau for State Security (BfSS) operated independently from the Police and Army and was an Intelligence Service – Editor HBH]

By 1973 time was running out for Portugal and Mozambique and it became even more pressing to co-ordinate all available intelligence between Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia and while discussions between the three had “agreed” in principle on a “Joint Defence of the Zambezi River line" in reality there was little chance of the theory becoming a reality. Meetings between DGS, BOSS and CIO saw the support from South Africa (particularly financial) regards formation of FLECHA type units (Pseudo - operators) if they be based along the Zambian Border, which for the Rhodesians defeated the object of the exercise as this would mean the re-introduction of conscripts or mercenaries in a conventional operation that had already been tried and had failed.

On arrival in Mozambique in April 1973 to become the Commandant of the Mozambican FLECHA's, Alves Cardoso paid a courtesy visit to General Arriaga (Commander in Chief of the armed forces, Mozambique) and met with Brigadier Remigio who was General Arriaga’s Chief of Staff. Brigadier Remigo had been a close friend of Alves in Angola, and he advised him that General Arriaga was not happy with the directive from Portugal that Flecha units had to be started in Mozambique as he was not a fan of irregular units.

General de Arriaga had asked for 10 000 troops to be released from Angola so he could defend the new front south of the Zambezi River against Frelimo incursions that had started as a trickle in 1969 but were happening more with increasing frequency and being launched from Zambia, these attacks were aimed at the Cahora Bassa dam. It was however decided that Flechas would be better suited as well as a more cost-effective option than sending an additional 10 000 troops to Mozambique.

Captain Alves Cardoso was therefore sent to Mozambique with a few Angolan FLECHA’s and instructions to recruit Mozambicans to fill the number it also needs to be mentioned that with his arrival in Mozambique Alves in fact had more power than General Arriaga due to his direct backing from President Caentano.

The relationship between the military leadership in Mozambique and Alves changed for the better on August 6, 1973 when General Basto Machado took over Command of the Mozambican armed forces. Machado knew Alves from Luso/Serpa Pinto.

On October 9, 1973, at the 10th defence meeting of the Mozambican State Government council the Commander in Chief (who) reported that the first group of FLECHA’s were in fact operational in the Niassa Province and that a second group had just completed basic training and after they had completed tactical training, they would be seconded to the DGS in Tete. He also told those at the meeting that a 3rd group of FLECHA’s would start their training at the beginning of November and after that they would be used in the Vila Perry and Beira theatres of operation.

I came across information but could not confirm its veracity that top secret FLECHA operation took place in Vila Perry area in January 1974, both the date of the operation as well as which group of FLECHA's were used I was unable to unearth. From the information I was able to glean from various sources as well as interviews with people who want to remain anonymous, I believe that these are the three most important dates regards the FLECHA’s in Mozambique.

Director General of DGS Angola - Dr Anibal Sao Jose Lopes from August 1972 was also in control of the DGS in Mozambique with Inspector Pereira de Castro who was based in LM as his deputy in Mozambique.

General Kaulza de Arriaga on the 8 and 9 May 1973 at the 5th meeting that year of the Defence council of Mozambique said that he did not want to see FLECHA’s being used in Mozambique as attack forces like in Angola. He believed that the DGS was an intelligence gathering agency and not a fighting force. General Machado however who took over from General de Arriaga was in favour of using FLECHA’s in Mozambican theatres of operation.

In June 1973 the Governor of Vila Perry told my informed source that the DGS had started to bring in a few FLECHA’s from Angola to start the Mozambican FLECHA’s. It was only on July 9, 1973, that the Government in Mozambique made it known that FLECHA’s were training in Mozambique. The camp that Alves set up a few kilometres outside of Vila Pery was not your typical military camp. To the casual eye it would have seemed like an average farm there was no heavily fortified positions or an entrance that indicated you were entering a military camp. You could drive in and arrive at the first set of houses and think that the place was abandoned, this was not the case because as if they had appeared out of nowhere heavily armed men would surround the vehicle, “you could get in, but you would never get out”. Alves adapted the farm to his needs as he had done to his camps in Guinea - Bissau and he also believed in the adage “you have to think 24 hours a day like an Insurgent”.

Initially the weapons and equipment received by the FLECHA’s were provided by a Para unit in Beira, this was done covertly because the Portuguese army via requests from General de Arriaga and influenced by the MFA refused to supply the FLECHA's. In those days the Para’s were under the command of the Air Force. A short while later BOSS via requests from the Rhodesian CIO supplied Alves Cardoso and his men with everything, they would need to ensure they were totally independent from and not beholden to the Portuguese military in any way. The fact that BOSS sent

a train filled with weaponry as well as vehicles to Machipanda was not surprising considering that South Africa had been assisting the Portuguese in both Angola and Mozambique for several years both financially and equipment wise.

All military equipment that had been supplied by the Para unit in Beira was returned under the cover of darkness so that the Portuguese army, including the then Commander in Chief General de Arriaga had no knowledge of the Para’s and of its Officer Commanding involvement of initially setting up the FLECHA’s with supplies they needed to allow them to start training. Alves met with representatives from Boss (sic) at the Polana Hotel in LM a couple of weeks after the delivery of the supplies to personally thank them for their assistance. It was most likely at this meeting that arrangements were made with Alves to allow a representative of BOSS to visit Alves in Vila Pery, the person that was sent was a senior BOSS representative based in Lourenco Marques at the time.

Prior to Major Ron Reid-Daly retiring from the Rhodesian army after 20 years’ service he was summoned to Army Headquarters in Salisbury and asked by the Commander of the Rhodesian Army, General Walls to consider setting up a Special unit that would fight the terrorist incursions from Mozambique and Zambia by setting up Pseudo terrorist groups that would take on ZIPRA and ZANLA on their own terms. General Walls asked Ron-Reid Daly to pay Alves Cardoso a visit in Vila Pery and look at how the FLECHA’s operated and how their training could assist in setting up the envisaged new unit (Selous Scouts), that would become legendary in the close-knit world of the Special Forces. Reid-Daly was accompanied by Jack Berry from CIO who had visited the camp on several occasions prior to Ron–Reid’s visit.

It has been also suggested, even written that Daniel Roxo and his men were then absorbed into the FLECHA’s under the direct command of Alves and that Daniel, and his men were tasked with operations in the North of Niassa. This information is not correct. General Machado when he took over as Commander in Chief asked Daniel to come to Nampula to discuss his future and the possibility of he and his militia transferring into the FLECHA’s, Alves was not at this initial meeting. It’s possible that Daniel would have mulled this offer over but after Alves paid him a visit in Vila Cabral, he believed it would be foolish to integrate Daniel and his men into the FLECHA’s as he was very well established in Niassa they knew the area better than FRELIMO and they operated capably on their own.

The FLECHA’s would be used primarily around the Rhodesian border on pseudo - operations so that they could assist in limiting the ZANLA infiltration into Rhodesia as well as taking the fight to FLECHA who were also using ZANLA to infiltrate south of the Zambezi. This infiltration had started in 1972 as a slow but deliberate move on the power lines of Cahora Bassa it was this area that the FLECHA’s would concentrate their efforts.

Alves reported back to his superiors that “Daniel Roxo and his group would be out of place in Manica or any other place outside of the Niassa Province” this reasoning was also the understanding of

General Machado who believed having Daniel Roxo in Niassa was like having a fish in lake Niassa –“You can’t take it and put it in the Indian Ocean”. Alves was also a little concerned that Daniel’s men were very dependent on Daniel’s leadership as Alves did not send out white officers with his men as he believed that their focus would not be on the task at hand.

Alves did however ask Daniel to assist in assessing his men to see if they were ready for operations by shadowing them in the specific area they were to be tested. He also asked Daniel to use seven of his men to assist him with training of the new recruits at Vila Pery, Daniel agreed and seven ex -

FRELIMO insurgents (who had been trained in China) were seconded to him, they were to leave Mozambique in June 1974 with Alves and his men and then joined the Rhodesian armed forces. While a few instructors as well as core personnel came with Alves from Angola the bulk of the unit that started their training in Vila Pery were selected from local sources. This selection process took place in May and by September of 1973 the training had been completed and culminated in a training exercise to assess their readiness for active duty which started at the end of September with the men conducted small operations in Manica. The second group of recruits started training in January 1974 and comprised of a large number of ex-Frelimo’s who never finished their training and left Vila Pery after the Lisbon Coup on 25/4/1974, some of these men most likely joined the Rhodesian security forces at a later stage.

I came across an article printed in the Citizen on 26/4/1983 that deals with the mysterious death of Orlando Cristina. A sentence in the article caught my eye and it was this "At one stage Mr Cristina was asked to lead the dreaded FLECHA’s unit in Mozambique, which was greatly feared by FRELIMO." As far as I am aware this did not happen, but perhaps at some stage more evidence will come to light as to this statement.

It had been envisaged by Alves that the FLECHA’s would also be deployed at times via helicopter and to train his men in the art of embarking and disembarking from a helicopter he built a mock helicopter from wood on the farm so that his men could practice those procedures. The FLECHA’s when operational could do up to two – three operations per day as they had two helicopters based at the farm for a period of time. Small groups of five men would be tracking ZANLA terrorists in the mountains and would call for back up if they need it.

Apart from the initial small operations in Manica they also conducted two operations in Niassa and made use on each occasion of two of Daniel's militia. After that they only operated south of the Zambezi River. Life in the bush was not easy for the men. North of Goromonzo the conscript Portuguese troops were not always aware that the FLECHA’s were operational in their area and north of Inhamitanga forest their presence in the area was reported by the local population who believed them to be Frelimo.

During their operational period in Mozambique they only did three joint operations with other Portuguese Security Forces the rest of the time they conducted pseudo-operations against both

Frelimo as well as ZANLA with the majority of the pseudo-operations being against ZANLA as already mentioned their main objective was to create havoc for Frelimo, scout the area, disrupt the movement of ZANLA terrorists into Rhodesia and capture prisoners to possibly be turned by DGS or CIO. Alves and his men operated extensively in the mountains very near to the new power lines from Cahora Bassa from November 1973 to April 1974 and the men did not have any difficulty in being a ZANLA terrorist one day and a few days later a Frelimo cadre. There was also a rumour that had not been confirmed that Chinese instructors were inside Mozambique with Frelimo and its probable that Alves and his men had been tasked in locating these men. This suspicion was only confirmed after April 25, 1974. An incident occurred on 14 January of 1974 that some say that was the catalyst for the Lisbon Coup a mere three months later. A farm was attacked at Fazenda Aguas Frescas in Manica and the wife of the owner murdered, FRELIMO were blamed for the attack and for her death but the Governor of Vila Pery Dr. Cunha e Sa in an official report stated that FRELIMO were never operational south of the Beira/Umtali line till after August 1974. It’s also interesting to note that FRELIMO never took credit for that attack, even after they took over the country. So, who committed this “terrorist attack” on the farmhouse and killed the lady and more importantly why? Theories range from it being the Rhodesians to the Pseudo FRELIMO units of the Portuguese DGS, I have my own theory, however at present and for the foreseeable future the real story regards this incident will remain a secret. While researching information for this book I came across an old, faded newspaper cutting that deals with this attack and the FLECHA’s dated 25/1/1974 with the headline “Arrows hunt terror gang”. Lourenco Marques –“The Portuguese are fighting terrorists with terrorists in Villa de Manica the rich farming area on the Rhodesian border. The FRELIMO gang that killed a farmer’s wife and blew up two trains is being chased by the crack FLECHA’s – “The Arrows” - who are “reformed terrorists”.

Farmers in the area say the FLECHA’s are the best anti-terrorist fighters and want more of them. They are trained in tracking and counter - insurgency tactics by the DGS, the Mozambique Security Police. Only former terrorists qualify for membership”.

This next piece of information by journalist Dennis Gordon also shows that the FLECHA's were operational in Mozambique.

"The all-black Arrows are now combing the hundreds of hectares of thick bush in the mountains. Several arrests have been made. Conventional army units and militia are guarding the tobacco farms and ranches. Farmers have been armed with automatic weapons but have not yet received 200 two–way radios promised by the government after the incursions last week. Women and children have been moved from most farms to Vila de Manica and Vila Pery, the district capital. But a prominent farmer told me yesterday there was no panic and nobody intended abandoning their land. There has been no trouble with farm workers. The railway link between Beira and Rhodesia

was back to normal yesterday." (By Dennis Gordon – “Mail” Africa Bureau). After this it became an “open secret” that ex-Frelimo’s were near Vila Pery.

While the FLECHA's based in Vila Pery may only have been operational from the end of September 1973 to May 1974 they did ensure that their area of responsibility was well protected. this fact well demonstrated by the following account.

“In April 1974 a mere 10 days prior to the April Coup in Lisbon that would change the history of Southern and perhaps Africa itself a sports competition for children from Mozambique and Rhodesia had been organized by the Sports Organization of Mozambique in Vila Pery. On 14 April the Governor of Manica was asked if the area was safe for the children. His reply that with Alves Cardoso and his FLECHA’s it would be impossible for any terrorists to be within 100kms of Vila Pery. Alves Cardoso had personally given his assurances that the 600 children arriving and who would compete in the games would be safe and the games would be a success”. It was.

Prior to the April coup in Lisbon, Alves and his men had access to helicopters but after they had to rely on their South African supplied trucks to transport men and this obviously made how they operated more difficult and not as easy to reach areas they wanted to blend in as Frelimo. The FLECHA’s last operation while based in Vila Pery took place at the end of May 1974.

For a month after the April 25 coup Alves and his men were left alone at the farm and to conduct operations as normal, however Brigadier Joao Fernando Ilharco the area commander of Manica called Alves to inform him that because he had only been a member of DGS for four years, he was eligible to re-join the Portuguese Army in Mozambique and then on to Lisbon. Alves asked the Brigadier about his men, and he was told that the Commandos could also re-join the army, but all the black FLECHA’s would have to be disarmed and then disbanded. Alves thanked the Brigadier for the information but was not going to tell the Brigadier this, but he would not allow his men to be disarmed and thrown to the wolves.

Alves Cardoso and his FLECHA's were seen to be members of the DGS and with the MFA wanting to disarm personnel to allow FRELIMO to gain a stronger foothold in the. The FLECHA's where obviously seen as a significant threat to that plan as well as the MFA’s ambitions for the future of Mozambique.

In the first week of June, two Companies of Commando’s and Para’s received instructions from Brigadier Ilharco via the MFA to disarm Alves and his men. Alves had envisaged this scenario and had put plans in place to protect the camp and his men. When the Commando’s and Paras's arrived at Alves's camp they saw a few armed men running in the bush near the road. Caldiera who had worked under Alves in Guinea Bissau told the Paratrooper Captain and MFA staff officer “These are Alves Cardoso’s people; I know that we are going to have one his receptions”. The Paratrooper officer replied, “let’s go back to base and get the armoured cars from the Cavalry”. Caldiera said “no

we must go there, Alves will not kill us, but we have to be ready to jump of the jeep in a moment should he decide to give us a show of force”.

When the two jeeps stopped at the farmhouse there was not a person to be seen but after a short while the officers in the jeeps had to run for cover as mortar shells exploded nearby. After the silence several AK47 toting men emerged from the bush and arrived with Alves Cardoso and two exCommando’s. Alves said, “you are all arrested don’t move or we will kill you all”.

Caldiera decided that discretion was the better part of valour and addressed Alves with the respect he deserved, this obviously worked as Alves said to Caldiera that he was very lucky he had not arrived with more men. Caldiera and the other men were advised to get back into the jeeps and go back to Brigadier Ilharco and tell him: “You and him are my guests for lunch at 1 pm today and that the other jeep will only be returned to Brigadier Ilharco, now off you go, all in one jeep”. The Brigadier did not accept the lunch offer!

During the night the majority of the FLECHA’s left the camp and took up positions in the bush with Alves and his instructors making plans to move to Rhodesia the next day. The Flecha’s had been in Mozambique for a mere 11 months and only operational for a short period, during this period their behaviour was exemplary, and they managed to capture a large amount of weaponry.

According to information that I read in the book Pamwe Chete, Alves and his men after the collapse of the Portuguese government “Colonel Cardoso with some of his men forced their way across the Mozambican border at gunpoint and made their way into Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Army hoped that the remainder of his men would slip across the border as well and in this event, planned to form a company of FLECHA’s (sic)”. This after information from the “horse’s mouth” is not entirely correct as we shall see. Alves Cardoso was an astute man and had seen that the “writing was on the wall” and had via his CIO contact Jack Berry made arrangements to cross the border into Rhodesia when he felt the time was correct.

Alves and his men did not need anyone’s assistance to cross the border into Rhodesia from Mozambique as he knew the area well, he definitely did not need to "shoot his way" into Rhodesia especially since he had been “courted” by the Rhodesians who wanted a FLECHA style unit to operate from Rhodesia. In late June 1974 Alves with 154 men travelled to the official border post at Vila Pery and requested permission to cross into Rhodesia “Lock Stock and Barrel”. The customs official was caught unawares but after Alves had passed him a letter in a sealed envelope that contained a name and a telephone number it was not 20 minutes later that Alves was on Jeep with a Rhodesian Army Captain being followed by his men to be accommodated at a nearby military camp.

I believe the reason that Alves wanted to cross into Rhodesia officially and with all his weaponry and vehicles was to be able to return all the equipment to Boss (sic) that he had received 7 months earlier, also Alves would not have wanted to leave any South African or Rhodesian equipment

behind that could have been used by the MFA for propaganda purposes or used by Frelimo and their allies against the very countries it had originated from.

That same day Alves was transported to Salisbury for a meeting and two days after that he and his men received a visit from both army and CIO officials, not long after Alves and his men started to operate for the Rhodesians as an autonomous unit connected to Special Forces Command. He received Rhodesian communication equipment with his first mission being to control infiltration from the Manica province into Rhodesia. With the Portuguese security forces being moved back to and confined to various military bases it meant that the FLECHA's could operate without any restrictions inside Mozambique looking for ZANLA terrorists for the CIO to “turn” and use them against the very organization that had sent them.

The Mozambican FLECHA's went from conducting pseudo – operations inside Mozambique against ZANLA and Frelimo for the Portuguese to doing the same for the Rhodesia’s Special Branch –“The job was the same, just the paymaster was different”. Alves was made a full Rhodesian Major and was in total command of his men contrary to what I had initially read in Pamwe Chete. The arrival of Alves and his men would have alleviated the shortage of men that Special Branch and perhaps Ron Reid–Daly was looking for, after he had been instructed to double the size of the Scouts in May 1974. Reid-Daly had a problem with recruiting suitable men from the Rhodesian Security Services as the numbers of men to choose from were limited.

The period July 1974 – July 1975 would have been a very intensive period for both Alves and the men he commanded, and it was with the great help of Mr. Jack Berry of CIO who had been appointed as a liaison officer between Alves and the CIO on request of the Rhodesian Premier Mr. Ian Smith. Alves had two private face to face meetings with Mr. Ian Smith, one being at his farm “Gwenro” 225 kilometre south-west of Salisbury (now Harare). Alves admired Ian Smith very much who he believed to be a down to earth, brave and honest man, attributes that also describe Alves Cardoso very well indeed.

Jack Berry also facilitated meetings between Alves and Lt-Colonel Ron Reid-Daly during this period. Alves was also of the opinion that the CIO passed on numerous captured ZANLA terrorists from their operations inside Mozambique to the Selous Scouts. A few of Alve’s men did ask to be transferred to the CIO as well as other Rhodesian army branches on a full-time basis and this request was favourably considered by Alves. It’s also probable that Reid Daly would have had the pick of suitable ex DGS staff and not just FLECHA's to put through the Selous Scout selection phase. Alves was made a Major in the Rhodesian army and all of his men, white and black from Vila Pery came under his direct command.

There has been much speculation about what Alves and his men’s precise function was in the Rhodesian armed forces but with the major role players having either passed away or not speaking and with Alves himself not indicating what operational tasks they had been given specifics are

vague. I do know that the first Operation that Alves and his men undertook for the Rhodesians was at the end of September 1974. The operation took place in Mozambique in the Tete Province, close to Cahora Bassa, the Zambezi River near Zambia. I believe that the reason Alves and his men were used in an area they were not familiar with was a political move on the part of Ian Smith who was looking not to get involved with the transition of the Portuguese administration to a Frelimo one. Alves and his men were also asked by Ken Flower to be ready should they be needed to assist Rhodesia helping Mozambican citizens in the aftermath of the LM-coup [LM = Lourenco Marques] of September 7-10, they were not needed, nor were they needed in October after the “Commando” incident in downtown LM that sparked a wave of violence against white Mozambicans.

Alves and his men when on operations used SAS radios with Rhodesian frequencies; this was to cause consternation amongst the Rhodesians since all pseudo – operations conducted on behalf of the Rhodesians by Alves’s men (some ex-terrorists) were an all-black unit. This was a dilemma for the Rhodesians, they asked Alves “How can you trust these blacks to go with our radios into enemy territory, wont they give our frequencies to them if caught or they lose one”? His reply was that “Radios have frequencies if one is lost, we can change all the frequencies, but if I trust my life in these men’s hands, I also trust that the radios are safe with them.”

The above was not an easy concept for the Rhodesians to understand due to the fact they did not have that same trust in their own black soldiers until late in 1975. This was a mind-set that the Rhodesians had to change, they had to learn to trust their “Comrades in arms” no matter what colour they were after all they would fight and die next to each other. The CIO understood this way of thinking first with the Army taking a little longer to trust that a small, black only unit using army radios could be trusted and relied upon.

It’s been suggested that Alves and those that crossed into Rhodesia with him were the precursor of Renamo so de - facto the Rhodesians created RENAMO. RENAMO was not a Rhodesian creation, but it was supported by the Rhodesians and after 1980 by South Africa. RENAMO's founding member, André Matsangaíce, was a Frelimo dissident, not a former member of the FLECHA’s due to his public condemnation of FRELIMO policies Matsangaíce was sent to a re-education camp in the Gorongosa region of central Mozambique. In September 1976, Matsangaíce escaped from the camp and headed to Rhodesia from where the clandestine. Voice of Free Africa (Voz da África Livre) radio station had been broadcasting to Mozambique. In May 1977, the Voice of Free Africa announced that "members of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana had raided the Sacudzo reeducation camp" from where Matsangaíce had escaped the previous year "freeing its inmates" who became the core of Renamo guerrilla army.

Oscar Cardoso who you read about earlier in this chapter gave me this information in April 2007. "I had many contacts with the Rhodesians while in Angola where they used to visit me and stayed with us to see the way we dealt with the Flecha’s. I was asked to go to Rhodesia when released from

prison, on bail, in Lisbon by my good friend “- - - -“ who was a Rhodesian Diplomatic representative in Portugal. “ “was a member of Kenneth Flower’s CIO and I joined the same organization in Salisbury in 1976. I was posted in Odzi near Umtali disguised as a road department employee with some Frelimo refugees who became RENAMO. Our job was to do sabotage in Mozambique which we did successfully, like blowing up Chicamba dam etc etc”.

I believe that Alves and his men’s main role between September 1974 and June 1975 was to conduct pseudo-operations inside Mozambique for Special Branch with the main emphasis on gathering intelligence on the co-operation between Frelimo and ZANLA as well as ZANLA’s strengths and operational readiness. It’s also plausible that he was given a brief to identify any exmilitary in Mozambique that would be willing to take up arms against Frelimo.

While working for the Rhodesians Alves was approached by a former Angolan FLECHA and friend to recruit suitable men that would go to Zaire and train up FNLA recruits to become Commandos and use his expertise in leading those men against the MPLA in Luanda. The aim was to gain control of the capital before the date set for Angolan independence 25/11/1975. This move was planned in the USA by “Individuals” that wanted to assist Holden Roberto who also happened to be the brotherin-law of Mabuto Seso Seko. This arrangement was with the approval of the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith who had been fully informed of this initiative as well as the importance of Alves and his expertise in helping the FNLA take the fight to the MPLA.

Alves flew out of Rhodesia on 10 July 1975 was wounded during the advance on Luanda on 10 November 1975 and after receiving medical treatment in South Africa would leave the African continent for good on 26 February 1976 never to return.

SPECIAL REPORT: THE ANGOLAN FLECHAS: P.I.D.E.’S TROOPS

(1967 – 1974)

(P.I.D.E. OR D.G.S. – PORTUGUESE SECURITY POLICE)

Tony Fernandes

Who were the Flechas?

The Flechas, (or Arrows), were an armed organisation, employed by P.I.D.E. (Portuguese Security Police), which was established in 1967 and trained by Portuguese Commando instructors.

The Flechas were distinguished by a small number of other forces, created by the Portuguese Authorities, in the Three Theatres of War operations, who contributed to the ‘Africanisation’ of war; i.e. the Auxiliary Forces, such as, the G.E. (Special Groups), G.E.P. (Special Groups of Parachutists from Mozambique), Militias, T.E. Special Troops) Fiéis (or Faithfuls), Léais (or Loyals), Commandos, Fuzileiros (or Naval Marines), Native Hunters and even the Military Police. They were initially a private force of P.I.D.E.; and were characterised by having geographical restrictions, all pertaining to ethnic groups, of ‘Bosquimanes’ (or Bushmen), or Hottentots; a population who lived in the Kalahari Desert, on the border between Angola and South West Africa (Namibia), also known as, ‘Terras Do Fim Do Mundo’, (or ‘Lands of the End of the Earth’), in the Cuando Cubango Province of Angola.

The Origin of the Name, ‘Flechas’ (or Arrows)

As the ‘Bosquimanes’ (or Bushmen) were small and could not carry heavy weapons, they continued using their bows and arrows with poisoned tips. The insurgents became terrified by these weapons and the fear it caused, calling these men the ‘Flechas’ (or Arrows).

P.I.D.E.’s Mission and the Necessity for Flechas

During the Colonial War, P.I.D.E. (called D.G.S. after 1969), was responsible for the gathering of strategic information, investigation and clandestine actions against guerrilla movements, in support of the Portuguese Armed Forces and National Security.

The necessity to possess a Special Armed Force to assist and protect those agents in operations, was an official argument used by P.I.D.E. of Angola, to justify the creation of the Flechas, which was to save lives and use their specialist knowledge.

To create such a force, P.I.D.E. was inspired by models of, ‘Pseudo-Gangs’ operating in the Kenya (1960) war, and of ‘The Selous Scouts’ that the Rhodesians were organising, with only RhodesianForce Personnel.

The Flechas’ members were employed by P.I.D.E. agents, who needed very little training to operate. They operated in small groups, or in P.I.D.E. autonomous operations, utilising the same guerrilla methods.

The Bag of Payment

In the beginning of the Flechas ‘activities’ (operations), P.I.D.E., began to pay them with bags containing food and other goods which they could carry, but later this method was altered, and they were paid salaries. In this way, conventional weapons were also distributed, apart from bows and arrows. They were equipped with weapons that were used by the Portuguese Army, or ethnic groups, besides Bushmen and spread themselves all over the East of Angola, as well as to the North.

Pseudo Terrorists Operations and Joint Operations.

At first, P.I.D.E. used these skilled Bushmen as trackers, where they tirelessly tracked insurgents directly to their camps and arms caches. When Bushmen came into direct contact with insurgents, their bows and arrows were very effective, consequently making the insurgents fear the Bushmen. Some operations frequently carried out, were called, Pseudo Terrorists, in that the Flechas pretended, that they as enemy guerrillas, attacked target identified forces, such as the Portuguese; (i.e. targets in foreign territory, Religious Missions which assisted guerrillas, and bases of difficult approximation).

Later, the Portuguese Army developed great respect for these small groups of Bushmen, trained to be proud Flechas. After joint operations, particularly with the Portuguese Commandos, who first taught each other various (exchanged) survival skills, later complemented each other. Finally, these Flechas became in- dependent and completed all operations, exceptionally well, mainly on their own.

Initial Conflicts between P.I.D.E. and The Armed Forces

During the course of war, P.I.D.E. was progressively widening the type of employment of the Flechas who were, in the beginning, basically used as guides and P.I.D.E. agent gunmen, (who only carried pistols) and they were subsequently also used as assault troops during special operations. This widening field of action for the armed forces, was not peaceful, created tensions, and caused conflicts of competency between Military Commandos and P.I.D.E. agents. ‘Due to unit jealousy’ an employment policy between the armed forces and P.I.D.E. or S.O.P. (Standing Operational Procedures), according to Portuguese Military Reports, the Flechas were then simply called ‘D.G.S. Assistants’.

The Arrival of General Costa Gomes

Only after the arrival of General Costa Gomes in Angola, as Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola, improved these relations.

This, after a confrontation between the Flechas and a Company of Commandos. The Director of P.I.D.E., Saõ José Lopes, after sharing with the General, the opinion of priority to the, ‘Z.M.L.’ (or Eastern Military Zone), that General Almeida Viana, the predecessor of General Costa Gomes, did not consider defending, for not having seen existing, tangible signs of this worsening situation, in that zone.

The Flechas later however, won the complete admiration of General Costa Gomes

The East: The War that could Not Continue

What General Costa Gomes and Saõ José Lopes were in agreement with, was the wealth of the subsoil (for mining) of the East of Angola, which previously, General Almeida Viana, did not understand.

The mineral deposits and mining activities in Eastern Angola, made General Da Costa Gomes realise the economic importance of a war-free area, including the economic importance to Portugal.

The important large companies - Diamang, near Vila Henrique De Carvalho, in the North East, in Lunda Norte Province and the mining company of Cassinga in the South (which was served by the Moçamedes Railway Line, with a special second port to handle iron-ore exports) – and the pressure of South African neighbours at the border of South West Africa (Namibia), did not permit a war in the East of Angola.

P.I.D.E. and The Eastern and Southern Control Of The S.W.A. / Angola Border With ‘Trans-BorderTroops’

The border zones between Angola and South West Africa (Namibia), were areas of instability, for both Movements, as well as for the Authorities.

The importance of the East and the necessity of the non-existence of war in the East, or at least, the guarantee of the level of violence, which did not put at risk the great explorations, increased the responsibility of P.I.D.E., and the forces it controlled.

The Flechas were indeed, ‘Trans-Border-Troops’, fortified by ethnic elements, installed on both sides of the borders of, ‘The Berlin Conference’, (over a century-old agreement, between Portugal and Germany, when South West Africa was a German Colony), which could intervene with full knowledge of the territory and with impunity.

In the Lunda Norte Region, the ‘Fiéis’ (or ‘Faithfuls’) ‘Catangueses’, (from Catanga, a province of the Congo), was an auxiliary force in the Diamang area (near Vila Henrique De Cavalho) that could intervene in Shaba, previously Catanga. In the South, the Flechas were in conflict with both, the M.P.L.A. as well as S.W.A.P.O., which pleased the South Africans, along the border with Zambia, and with South West Africa (Namibia).

P.I.D.E. always had regular liaison and co-operation with the South African Security Police, and Rhodesian Security Police, in Mozambique.

P.I.D.E., even tried organising a group with Zambian dissidents, and gave them the name, ‘Léais’ (or ‘Loyals’), but their small force, (a company), did not permit the siege, that was a door of entry for ‘the Agostinho Neto route’; (route from Zambia to Luanda). It was also the only corridor between Diamang and the Benguela Railways, (from Lobito to Vila Teixeira De Sousa’, a border Town of the D.R.C.), where it tried to advance. From 1969, it was this corridor, on the Benguela Railway Line, where they were concentrated.

The Flechas who served with distinction and pride, were, without doubt, the most outstanding and most important Military Forces of Angola. They deserve a place in the Military History of Portugal.

The total force of the Flechas in 1974, in Angola, in the three Military Zones, (North - South - East), comprising of (42) forty-two groups, was 2156. Eighty-six (86%) percent of the Flechas Forces were found in the Eastern Military Zone (or Z.M.L)

1975: Angolan Flechas join the S.A.D.F.

From the 25th of April 1974 until 2nd November 1974, it was estimated that 25% (twenty-five per cent) of all Angolan Bushmen were executed by ‘Liberation Movements’ in Angola.

During August 1975, some plainclothed Angolan Flechas, who crossed the border into South West Africa, along with Portuguese refugees, including some Portuguese Commandos, joined the South African Defence Force (S.A.D.F.), and formed Combat Group Alpha, which in 1976 was renamed, 31 Battalion. In 1979, the name was again changed to 201 Battalion, after joining up with Bushmen from the Caprivi Strip, Ovamboland, in South West Africa.

Kind References and Acknowledgments

My sincere thanks to the following, for all their assistance in compiling this Special Report:

• Os Anos De Guerra Colonial. (The Colonial War Years) 1961-1975 (Book 2010 - Quidnovi) - by Aniceto Afonso - Carlos De Matos Gomes

• The Angolan Flechas: P.I.D.E.’s Troops - (Chapter) - (Translation from Portuguese to English by Tony Fernandes.

• The Flechas – Insurgent Hunting in Eastern Angola,1965-1974 (Book (2013) - by John P Cann. This excellent book also includes, not only great photos, but also specific operations / battles / successes / honours, etc.

• Sargento (Sergeant) ‘Tony Boné’ (Nom de Guerre) (Northern Angola) - for kindly examining this Report.

• Sargento (Sergeant) ‘Cariango’ (Nom de Guerre) (Northern Mozambique) – for kindly examining this Report.

FLECHAS

Wikipedia

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Flechas

The insignia of the Flechas.

Active 1967–1975

Country Portugal

Allegiance Portugal

Branch PIDE

Type Paramilitary

Part of PIDE/DGS

Garrison/HQ Lisbon

Engagements Portuguese Colonial War

Commanders

The Flechas (Portuguese for Arrows) were an elite paramilitary tactical unit of the Portuguese secret police (PIDE, latter renamed DGS) that operated in Angola and Mozambique during the Portuguese Colonial War. Unlike most of the other Portuguese special forces that were employed in the several theatres of operations of the conflict, the Flechas were not a de jure military unit but a PIDE/DGS (secret police) unit.

Flechas were organized as platoon-sized units consisting of local tribesmen and rebel defectors who specialised in black operation, clandestine operation, close-quarters combat, counterinsurgency, covert operation, desert warfare, direct action, irregular warfare, pseudooperations, jungle warfare, raiding and kidnapping high-value target, special operations, special reconnaissance, tracking, and urban warfare. They sometimes patrolled in captured uniforms and were rewarded with cash bounties for every guerrilla or guerrilla weapon they captured. Flechas had a reputation for atrocities, brutality, torture, and summary executions.[1][2]

History

Flechas units were created and employed in Angola, during the Portuguese Colonial War, under the command of the PIDE (renamed DGS in 1969). Despite being a paramilitary police force, they were thus a police unit, not being under military command as the remaining special force. Composed of locally recruited men, often former guerrilla fighters but mostly bushman Khoisan, the units specialised in reconnaissance, tracking, unconventional tactics, and pseudo-terrorist operations.[3]

The Flechas were created and organized by Sub-Inspector Oscar Cardoso, when he was the head of the PIDE branch at Serpa Pinto, Angola (present day Menongue). Initially, the unit was intended to support the activities of the branch, whose area of responsibility covered the remote eastern areas of Angola that the Portuguese called Terras do Fim do Mundo (Lands of the End of the World) and which corresponded to the Frente Leste theatre. In this theatre, they achieved a great success in the early 1970s, contributing for the virtual Portuguese victory in the campaign. The success of the initial Flechas unit created by Oscar Cardoso, made PIDE/DGS to expand the concept and to created new groups attached to other of its local branches.

General Costa Gomes – Portuguese Commander-in-Chief in Angola – argued that African soldiers were cheaper, knew the terrain better, and were better able to create a relationship with the local populace, a tactic that predates the 'hearts and minds' strategy later used by United States forces in Vietnam at the time.

Flechas units were also created and operated in Mozambique at the very end stages of the conflict, following the dismissal of Kaúlza de Arriaga on the eve of the Portuguese coup in 1974. The units were to continue to cause problems for the FRELIMO even after independence and Portuguese withdrawal, when the country splintered into civil war [4]

The Flechas served as model for the latter created Rhodesian Selous Scouts and the South African Koevoet Organization

The Flechas were organized in combat groups (platoons) of about 30 men, although the formation was often loose. Each of these groups was dependent from a PIDE / DGS local branch, operating in its area of responsibility.

Uniforms and equipment

The Flechas received combat uniforms identical to those worn by the Portuguese Armed Forces, in the Portuguese vertical lizard pattern camouflage. With this uniform, they wore a beret with the same camouflage pattern. This nonstandard camouflage beret became their most distinctive uniform item. In parade, the Flechas also wore neck scarves and metal tabs in the left shoulder with the name of the unit. Allegedly, in some operations, they wore enemy uniforms in order not to be identified.

The Flechas were also mostly armed with the standard small arms in use by the Portuguese Military, including the Heckler & Koch G3 and FN FAL 7.62×51mm battle rifles. They also frequently used captured AK-47 rifles and they showed a special preference for the use of tribal traditional weapons, including spears and the bows and arrows which gave origin to the name of the unit.

After independence

In 1975 a group of ex-Flechas who had fled Mozambique after its Independence formed the insurgent group RENAMO[5] and subsequently fought in the Mozambique Civil War. Other Flechas were enlisted in the Rhodesian Army's Selous Scouts.[6]

Other special forces units

There were, in fact, a number of Portuguese special forces units that were unique to the Portuguese Colonial War:

• Special Groups (Grupos Especiais): units similar to the ones used in Angola.

• Paratrooper Special Groups (Grupos Especiais Pára-Quedistas): units of volunteer black soldiers that had paratrooper training.

• Combat Tracking Special Groups (Grupos Especiais de Pisteiros de Combate): special units trained in tracking. See also.

• Koevoet

• Selous Scouts

Footnotes

• ^ Margaret Hall; Tom Young (1997). Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. pp. 26– ISBN 978-1-85065-116-1. Retrieved 23 April 2019.

• ^ Michael Radu (29 September 2017). The New Insurgencies: Anti-communist Guerrillas in the Third World. Taylor & Francis. pp. 181– ISBN 978-1-351-47865-6. Retrieved 23 April 2019.

• ^ Roelof J. Kloppers : Border Crossings : Life in the Mozambique / South Africa Borderland since 1975. University of Pretoria. 2005. Online. Retrieved on 13 March 2007

• ^ Brig. Michael Calvert, Counter-Insurgency in Mozambique, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, no. 118, March 1973

• ^ Hall, Margaret (2011). "The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): a study in the destruction of an African country". Africa. 60 (1): 39–68. doi:10.2307/1160426. ISSN 0001-9720. JSTOR 1160426. S2CID 132946595.

• ^ Seegers (2018), Section: Independent Mozambique and the Role of the Armed Forces. Works cited.

• Seegers, Annette (2018) [1st pub. 1986]. "From Liberation to Modernization: Transforming Revolutionary Paramilitary Forces into Standing Professional Armies". In Bruce E. Arlinghaus; Pauline H. Baker (eds.). African Armies: Evolution And Capabilities. Abingdonon-Thames: Routledge. pp. 52–83. ISBN 978-0-367-02004-0 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flechas - accessed on 2nd of March 2024.

Brig HB Heymans (SAP – Afgetree)

As lessenaaroffisier te veiligheidshoofkantoor het ek die veiligheidspolisie, afdeling militêre inligting en die buro van staatsveiligheid (later nasionale intelligensie) se onderskeie inligtings- en veiligheidsoorsigte soos hulle verskyn en versprei is, met aandag gelees. Suider-Afrika was ‘n miernes van militêre bedrywighede. Dit was ook in die dae van die Koue-oorlog. Die stryd teen die Oos-Blok lande was ‘n werklikheid. Ons opponente is plaaslik en in die Oos-Blok lande opgelei en het teen ons magte in die veld geveg. Op ons manier het ons alle magte en kragte tot ons beskikking optimaal in die stryd aangewend. So bv is die San ook gemobiliseer om tot die stryd aan ons kant toe te tree In die militêre stryd het ons besonder goed gevaar, want dit was ‘n belangrike dimensie in die stryd ‘n Ander ewe belangrike deel van die stryd was seker die moeilikste en het op die politieke en staatkundige terrein gelê.

So deur die jare het ek kennis geneem van die Flechas en hul dapper optrede in die verskeie gevegsarenas (hoofsaaklik Angola en Mosambiek). Hulle telkaart het altyd goed gelyk! Dis waarom ek hulle suksesse met belangstelling gevolg het. Ook het ek PIDE (die Portugese veiligheidspolisie in Angola en Mosambiek) se bedrywighede ook met belangstelling dop gehou.

Vandag na baie water in die see geloop het, dink mens onwillekeurig terug aan die verlede. Hierdie was mense uit die steentydperk wat in ‘n simbiotiese verhouding met die natuur geleef het en hier kom ons Westerlinge en ons koloniseer onder meer Afrika. In Europa word die grense van Afrika se landkaart getrek – ons sny die stamgebiede byvoorbeeld in twee en oornag word mense Duitse-, Engelse-, Spaanse- en Portugese burgers, afhangende hoe die kaart lyk.

Ek dink soms aan die geweldige skade wat ons aan hierdie mense en hul kultuur berokken het deur hul byvoorbeeld bloot te stel aan Westerse maniere. Ons Westerse kultuur is vir hulle vreemd. Hulle ken nie begrippe soos moord, onwettig jag of diefstal nie. Wat is die uitwerking van trauma op hierdie mense? Watter invloed het trauma op die onderskeie stamme?

Mens wonder onwillekeurig hoe die mense na die oorlog weer aangepas het in hul natuurlike omgewing; of het hulle dorpenaars geword? Dit verg eintlik ’n studie op sy eie wat van hierdie mense geword het. Hoe is die Flechas en hul mense deur die nuwe heersers in die onderskeie lande aanvaar? Ons weet tans nie.

Ons van die veiligheidsmagte kan net hierdie oud-Flecha-vegters loof vir hulle dapperheid en krygslis. Ons hoop hulle oorleef op hul tradisionele manier en dat hulle hul simbiotiese verhouding in vrede met die natuur kan voort sit. Ons salueer hulle!